Jocko Podcast - 233: Pressure-Test Yourself and Your Methods. Are you Moving In The Right Direction. The Boer War.
Episode Date: June 10, 20200:00:00 - Opening 0:00:47 - The Boer War. By Jay Stone and Erwin Schmidl 1:29:11 - Final thoughts and take-aways. 1:33:05 - How to stay on THE PATH. 1:53:10 - Closing Gratitude.Support this podcast ...at — https://redcircle.com/jocko-podcast/exclusive-content
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This is Jocko podcast number 233 with Echo Charles and me Jocko Willink.
Good evening, Echo.
Good evening.
So the last podcast, we were reviewing a book about the Boer Wars.
And we were going to pick up where we left off last time, which is what the British did with the lessons that they learned, the military reforms that they made, and how they made this transition and then where it ended up in.
Well, in World War I.
So the name of the book is the Boer War and Military Reforms by Jay Stone and Irwin Schmiddle.
And let's take it back to the book.
So picking up where we left off, this is when they start talking about the reforms that got made.
From the top down appointments were made in a casual, random manner that often
resulted in matching of poor and poor matching of personality skills or personal inclinations
to the demands of a particular post.
So the way that they were appointing officers was just kind of random.
And then the way they were matching up teams was also kind of random.
And then you take the wrong personalities and mix them together, you're not going to end up
with good leadership.
Continuing on.
If locating and assigning qualified officers to proper posts proved a problem, the same must be said of the selection of individual units and even private soldiers.
What unit cohesion had existed vanished quickly in South Africa.
Littleton's division for no apparent reason shrank in a few weeks from eight battalions to five and a half.
Regiments were broken up into smaller units, then reconstituted into mixed battalions.
This was done with a seeming disregard of structural and historic uniformity with adverse consequences on a spreeing.
decor in an army with strong wrench of mental ties.
So they take a bunch of teams.
They get to South Africa and they split them all up and mix them all up.
This is just a bad move.
I used to be, I used to feel like I was kind of cheating a little bit when it came to,
when task unit bruiser was going through our pre-deployment workup because I would, we would,
we would train, we'd split up and we'd mix up.
But when we had to do a training operation, we'd get in our units and we'd stick to them,
for the most part,
because it was just so much better.
Yeah.
So much better.
When you're working with people you worked with.
And they just threw that out the window here.
Yeah.
Wait, you said you felt like you're cheating?
Yeah, it felt like I was cheating.
Yeah.
Because it was so much more effective.
It was like an advantage.
It was just such an advantage.
And they'd try and give us multiple targets
where you could kind of convince yourself
that it would be a good idea to take these guys
and move them over to this platoon and take these,
and just no.
No.
We'll just stick with the platoon integrity.
And I'm not saying that you shouldn't do interoperability because you should.
And you should be able to mix people up.
But you should also have that kind of baseline.
And there's a reason.
They're like the regimental historical esprit of core.
That's real.
Continuing on, bureaucratically, the system was a nightmare.
As an official account of manpower was sometimes lost for months at a time.
The lack of coherence was not due to want of paper.
For if anything the pre-war structure was overly centralized in
1898 the Broderick committee on decentralization
Decentralization heard testimony from the general commander commanding at Aldershot that it took
12 signatures including two orders from London to return an unsatisfactory driver
So you got some micromanagement going on some centralized command that's never good
Fast forward a little bit staff work though
Thus fell on about 70 officers, some well-trained, but many useless, although pleasant aristocrats.
Buller later claimed that in Pretoria, I found Roberts sitting in one building with his Hindu staff,
Kitchener in another with his Egyptian staff, and Kelly Kenny in a third with an English staff,
all pulling against one another.
With so many centers of control functioning at once, it should come as no surprise that time and again
Key points would be left unguarded, isolated battalions unsupported, or critically needed guns unassigned.
The saving grace to an otherwise chaotic system was Roberts' phenomenal memory and attention to detail.
So you got these guys that have their own little silo set up.
You know, you got Kitchener that had worked in Egypt and worked with the Egyptians, and he brought them into South Africa.
And same thing with Roberts, with his Hindu staff.
They all had their own little cliques.
that's not going to work out good.
You're not working together.
Troops, and because of that, fast forward a little bit,
troops sometimes went hungry, cavalry sometimes lacked courses,
and hospital arrangements rarely proved adequate.
Kitchener's misunderstanding of staff principles was best demonstrated
where when he wrote about the battlefield imposing his will
rather than staying at his headquarters and manifesting it
through properly organized staff channels.
So again, that means he doesn't trust his people.
He's out there on the battlefield trying to tell people exactly what to do
and what kind of oversight are you giving when you're out there on the battlefield
bark in orders at people to tell them exactly what to do.
Not going to work out well.
Alan B. summed up the view of a commander of a subordinate column by noting one is always at
high pressure.
One is probably under the same general for about a month at a time.
When he has played about and knocked one's column to rags, he goes off.
That's what the subordinates were saying.
Oh, you're going to show up here for a month.
You're going to bark orders.
You're going to yell at us to do stuff.
And when we're all worn out, you're going to bail.
The drawbacks of Kitchener's system are obvious over centralization, isolation from the field.
And time lags.
After a year of frustration, Kitchener agreed to the appointment of Ian Hamilton as chief of staff.
This was an admission that given the greater size, complexity and distances of modern warfare, coupled with extreme dispersion of
forces that no individual could single-handedly run an entire war.
But that was a year deep.
This is something that worked.
That's something I see a lot is people that are, people that, they're too egotistical to say,
hey, you know what I need some help.
I need to hire number two.
That's all it is.
It's just ego kicking in.
They talk about running the railroad, because that was a big part and the British really
didn't have the capability.
They didn't have that in their in their in their capabilities of hey, we need to run this rail.
The British military needs to run a railroad and they didn't really have that capability.
I also circled one note in here about the fact that what Roberts ultimately did was resorted to having hostages,
civilians on the trains to try and keep them safe.
Interesting advancement here.
The soldiers benefited from the first individual field dressing kits and identified.
Identification cards this information proof so useful
That in 1906 dog tags were introduced so there's the introduction of dog tags in the world
I thought that was interesting they also founded the Royal Army Medical Corps
So they realized some of the things that they needed to do from a medical perspective another thing they say here
A major complaint of medical officers with the enormous amount of red tape
Surgeons spoke of an inability to operate because of long hours spent behind the desk
Check out this statistic
over the course of the war,
poor water and sanitation
were largely responsible
for an annual sickness rate
of 958 men
per thousand.
So almost every single person
you are going to get sick.
And they're not reporting like minor colts.
They're reporting,
hey, this guy was out of duty.
So that's why all the support people
out there that are listening to this,
all the military support people out there,
doesn't happen if you're not there.
Logistics wins wars.
You can't win a war if everyone's sick.
Fast forward a little bit.
In all the, in all areas the changes wrought by the Boer War were by no means limited to
higher organization nor to big ticket items such as larger guns, hospital ships or armored chains,
many seemingly minor changes occurred as well.
What stand out are the changes in the mundane items of soldierly life, such as uniforms
and personal equipment.
Perhaps the most obvious of these was the evolution toward uniformity of battle.
field attire among all types of troops. This led to the adoption of the India-inspired khaki-colored
drill field uniforms by all except the Highlanders. Economy and camouflage potential became the new
standard of production, yet it was only with the widespread use of smokeless powder that
these qualities could take precedence. Previously, rapid fire weaponry had been restricted by the
heavy smoke that would cover a battlefield. Under those circumstances, camouflage uniforms
seems superfluous and needlessly unattractive.
So this is where you start getting camouflage uniforms.
Because before there'd be so much smoke on the field
that it was just pointless to even have camouflage.
No one could see you anyways.
So you might as well look good if you're a Brit.
Pre-war dress standards in the British Army
had always emphasized excessive smartness
to the point of making it the most unserviceable
and unworkable in the world.
In the eyes of some contemporaries.
perhaps the most pernicious effect of smartness.
So they had these really nice looking uniforms, which were totally unfunctional.
However, there was a need to discipline men to take cover during pre-war training.
Having to pay for damaged uniforms, discouraged ready use of the ground.
So these guys would have these uniforms that were so nice that during training,
they wouldn't want to get on the ground.
Regarding the rest of the kit, wherever possible is lightened,
including the adoption of aluminum canteen first developed in Germany.
so they're making stuff.
This is why some of these things,
this is where you start getting the first modern war.
You know,
there's a couple of wars that you can talk about
that were the first modern war.
These are some of the things
that make you start saying,
hmm, this is,
these are legit movements forward toward modern war.
To outfit an entire army in the same manner
had advantages aside from ease of supply and economy.
Now this is,
this is,
I made a quick note here.
I always talk about decentralized, right?
Decentralized command.
Everything's got to be decentralized.
And it does.
That being said, some things should be centralized, and if they're not centralized, there's going to be problematic.
So, for instance, do we want everyone in our platoon of 40 guys?
Do we want everyone to have different weapons?
What do you think?
No.
No, we do not.
We want everyone to have the same weapon.
So where are we going to get that weapon from?
A centralized place.
So when we all have the same weapon,
we all have the same parts,
we all have the same ammunition,
that's what we want.
We don't want everyone carrying
their own different type of weapon.
Uniform, same thing.
We want everyone to look the same medical kit.
Where is that medical kit going to go on your gear?
You want it in the same spot.
So if you get shot, I can come over.
I know where your medical kit is.
So there's some things that absolutely have to be centralized.
So occasionally, like I'll be working with a company,
and there's someone that doesn't want to kind of, you know,
doesn't want to use whatever standard,
doesn't want to follow some procedure.
And I always have to bring this up, you know,
that there's some procedures absolutely have to be centralized.
When you're in the Battle of Ramadi,
you have near and far recognition signals.
You want everybody to know what those are, you know,
and we had everybody in Ramadi knew what the recognition signals.
was from a long ways away.
We all, everybody knew it.
Army, Marine Corps, everyone had the same thing.
Believe me, you want that centralized.
You don't want 12 seals going out on an operation
and they have a different recognition signal
than the Army guys.
So yes, there are times when things must be centralized.
Of course, fast forward a little bit.
The essential piece of equipment for all ranks
and virtually all services was now the rifle.
More potent powders and improved smaller caliber bullet design
made possible higher velocities
and more precise shooting
at ever-increasing ranges.
So this is, we're using the rifle.
That's what we're doing.
Both sides realized the potential of bicyclists
as the booers distributed a company
of cyclists among their generals
and the British cold cyclists
from various units had retrained
two full battalions
out there on their bikes
getting after it.
Imagine if they had modern mouth
mountain bikes and you know now they have the mountain bikes with the electrical with the electric boost have you seen those things
John Dudley the hunter archer
He uses one of those things to get out to different hunting locations
Why very it's quiet it's silent can take it anywhere it's light
It's viable. It's totally viable
communication was perhaps one of the most consistent problems encountered in a swift moving war
fought over tens of thousands of square miles of terrain for messages to Europe the
oceanic cables sufficed but within South Africa telegraph cables were often cut
thus signal flags were used but had limited ranges of eight kilometers and
transfer rates of eight words per minute much preferred was the heliograph
with a range of over 40 miles on clear terrain and a speed of 12 words per minute
heliographs had the advantage of being undetectable
if not indirect line of sight.
What's a heliograph you might wonder?
It's a mirror.
It's a mirror.
You're using a little mirror to reflect and send Morris code or whatever.
Huh, yeah.
40 miles.
You got to have some altitude to do that.
Yeah.
Because the horizon is 12 miles.
It's how big is that what?
Like this is.
I have no idea.
Four, three inches.
I think it's bigger.
It must have been some kind of machine with a little aimer on it.
Well, shoot, if you're talking four miles, that's like,
40 miles 40 miles oh yeah that's like huge then I don't know that's not the kind you're carrying in your pocket
Maybe not we'll have to go off to take a historical look at the heliographs of the past
40 miles 40 miles
It would have to be trash can size at least I think
Trash can lid could be
I don't know could be here look into that one
Can you imagine the number one form of communication that you have is using a mirror and reflecting it towards your buddy who's 40 miles away?
by the way this is what 100 and 100 years ago 110 years ago something like that and now we got an iPhone in our pocket we can talk to people in space
oh geez wartime experience clearly showed the need for better equipment for reconnaissance communication and ranging so there you go those are some of the reforms
now we dip into a little bit a little bit more tactical stuff during the
course of the Boer War every branch of the British Army experimented experienced change and nowhere
was this more evident than in tactics for the infantry the foremost consideration was the
enormous increase in firepower proper maneuvering and deployment which could lead to initial
superiority of position or psychological advantage became even more important as concentrated rapid fire
had become so devastating that once battle had been joined it was nearly impossible to rectify
any initial errors without suffering serious casualties battles were now resolved at an
uneven pace a few minutes at a tactical disadvantage could prove more decisive than hours of
marginal superiority what are we talking about there what we're talking about is all of a
sudden if you got the tactical advantage you were at a massive advantage not a little
one a massive one and you could get yourself to a position through five this speeds
surprise and violence of action you could get if you use speed surprise and violence
advantage and you got the advantage you were at a massive advantage a massive
advantage marksmanship was be could fast forward a little bit marksmanship was
becoming a matter of soldier selecting individual targets and ranges rather than
collective mass volley fire and this in turn necessitated a new type of training
for one as for as one Boer noted of 35 men whom we took prisoners after
they had fired up to at us up to 350 paces not not a single one had his site correct most of
them had kept their sites at 800 and 850 yards because no order to change had been given
that's centralized that centralized command you're at 350 yards can you imagine your
capturing so by the way just in case you don't know this when you have your site set for 850 yards
or 800 yards and you're shooting at someone that's 300 yards away,
you're not going to hit them.
That's not happening.
You're going to miss them.
So imagine you capture your opponent and they don't even have their sight set.
And you ask them, why not?
Well, we didn't get ordered to.
Crazy.
Keep your weapons doped in, is what I'm saying.
The British infantry drill of 1896 had placed too little emphasis on the firefight
and too much on depth of formations.
At Clemso, the Boers were outnumbered 4 to 1, yet less than a third of the British Army was involved in the attack.
The Boers understood modern small arms.
Captain Reikman and American Military Observer noted, I did not learn of any case when the Boers had determined to hold their ground that the frontal attack succeeded by its own power.
So what are we hearing right here?
We're kind of hearing a little bit of that flanking movement coming in to play big time.
Never heard of the frontal attack working.
Am I going to tell you the frontal attack never works?
I'm not going to tell you that.
I'm going to tell you, though, you best be leaning towards flanking maneuvers.
The futility of the old attacks and frontal assault was compounded by an infantry termed
by the times history as being in different shots, careless of cover,
slow to comprehend what was taking place, or to grasp the whereabouts of the enemy,
He always surprised her loss, helpless without their officer, in a word, well disciplined, but
ill-trained.
One might say untrained.
Think about those descriptions.
How would you like your military unit to be described as in different shots?
You can't hit anything.
Careless of cover.
You're not protecting yourself.
Slow to comprehend what was taking place needs no explanation.
Or to grasp the whereabouts of the enemy, you don't even know where the bad guys
are always surprised or lost.
That's a nightmare.
Helpless without their officer.
These are amongst the worst descriptions that you can give.
And then what's interesting says, in a word, well disciplined, and you know me, discipline's at the top of my list.
But if you're so well disciplined, but you can't think for yourself, you're worthless.
The provisional course of musketry for the year 1902 took the bold step of abolishing the
So now we're not going to get online anymore and shoot on command as well as encouraging fire from cover and the use of any kind of rest natural or artificial.
So now that's the first little step they're taking.
And I want you to pay attention to us a little bit.
1902.
So now they're starting to take the lessons from the Boer War and say, okay, guess what?
We need to learn how to fire from cover.
We need to start shooting individually.
And the reason I say pay attention to that date is that they're going to make changes.
and then they're going to regress back.
They're kind of going to go to what you know.
It's like, you know, when you get the,
you get the wrestler,
and he's going against a sick jiu-jitsu guy,
and you say, look, don't take this guy down.
You got better hands,
and then he gets caught with a little shot,
and what does he do?
Take down.
He goes right back to what he kind of knows.
That's a trap.
Yeah.
It's a trap.
Your habits are a trap.
continuing on the defense's increased power drastically reduced troop densities so how many people
do we have on the battlefield we're starting to spread out wellington had fought waterloo with
69,000 men on a two-mile frontage the boorers had held their front front with only 300 men to the
mile did you hear that 69,000 for two miles
and 300 men to a mile,
that's how much different it was.
That's how dispersed they got.
Continuing on a little bit,
larger, more dispersed battlefields
destroyed the ability of a single general
to command a battle
and even in the most broad of terms.
I'm going to say that again.
Larger, more dispersed battlefields
destroyed the ability of a single general
to command a battle
even in the most broad of turns.
So you got all these people.
They're spread out over three,
hundred miles how and you got to communicate with a freaking mirror right you're not
gonna so what you need to learn how to use decentralized command you need to learn
how to give commander's intent greater reliance had to be put on lower echelon
officers and NCOs frequently non-professional officers were expected to lead by
personal example in battle this disproportionate their disproportionate losses
testified to this role under South Africa's fluid battle conditions small unit
command became more critical and this is the same way the military is now you can't expect a
platoon commander that's out there in the battle of romadi he's out there he's not he's making decisions
he's making calls at least that's the way it should be does do does communication modern communication
start to allow for micromanaging to take place yes it absolutely does which one uh alpha two which
Are you moving? I want you to move 200 meters to the north take the two to 200 meters to north
Roger that you know that's what can happen nowadays. It's not good in
Self-protection and for the good of the army officers began to leave their
Comptraments behind and play a less conspicuous role in advance so now we're not wearing our you know our badges that say we're in charge
role models such as Buller who remained in the thick of the fighting at Kalenso until
wounded became a thing of the past senior officers now kept further to the rear and the tactical
role of junior officers was enhanced in the early months of the war the British were fortunate and that
their unique organizational pattern of eight small companies per battalion allowed them to have
sufficient complement of officers to weather the heavy early losses but yeah so now we're
moving more toward decentralized command interestingly it was the volunteers and militia so
the volunteers in militia if you remember these are like the reservists
people that were doing part-time,
they proved most adaptable to new forms of warfare,
probably because of their closer ties to the civilian mode of thinking.
They have open minds.
At the bottle of Dorn Kopp,
the city of London Imperial Volunteers advanced by rushes
and used covering fire while the gardens were still moving in forward
and relatively dressed lines.
Cover and move.
I love getting to the root of things.
Like that's that incredible you have these civilians that are reservists and they go hey guess what you shoot I'll move
They didn't been taught that they figured it out you shoot I'll move when I get in a good spot
I'll shoot you move ready go meanwhile the pros the Gordons were already all rise all forward march that's what they're doing
Yeah it's like their their treat their creativity was trained out of them or something they're
I always have to give that warning about discipline inside of a unit
Because if you have so much discipline inside of a unit people stop thinking
Yeah, and that's the last thing as a leader. That's the last thing you want. It's the last thing you want anywhere, right? You have a company
You don't want people to stop thinking about how to do things better
You have a jiu jitsu school. You want everyone just to learn the moves that you teach them and not think of anything? No
Creativity should be nurtured
Creativity should be watered
grown and and and and rewarded you know I keep thinking back to that what you just said about like they
didn't adjust their sights because they weren't ordered to so you ever watched coming to America
so yes so that in the beginning he was or Eddie Murphy Ersinio Hall yes sir so he was going to
get married what do you call it an arranged marriage marriage where the his wife is going to be
like the ultimate servant wife, right?
And essentially she was like those people not adjusting the sites because they
weren't ordered to because this lady was going to do everything, like everything that he
wanted, every single thing.
And she proved it or whatever, just real briefly.
It kind of went on notice this little part, but it made it kind of basically the same
point.
Dude, this movie had a lasting impact on your philosophies continue.
Bro, I'm telling you there's nuggets and Easter eggs in there, all in there.
So he was like, hey, so you're.
going to do everything. He was like, hey, let me talk to you for a minute, right in the middle
of the marriage ceremony. Let me talk to you for a minute in the back room, whatever. And he's like,
she's like, yeah, at your service, whatever. And he's like, hey, so I want to get to know you.
And she's like, yeah, I've just been raised to serve you. He's like, what kind of stuff you like?
She's like, dang. He's like, so anything I tell you to do, you'll do. She's like, yep.
It's like, anything I tell you what you'll do. She's like, yep, like happy too. So he's like,
hey, bark like a dog.
She starts barking like a dog.
She's like, hoot like orangutan or something like this.
She starts doing it.
He's like, hop on one leg.
She starts doing it all at once, right?
And he's like all confused.
His dad walks in.
He's like, oh, you guys are getting along, whatever.
And he's like, oh, please excuse us to the wife.
Meanwhile, she's still hopping on one lake.
And hooting like orangutangang, still.
Didn't get ordered to stop.
That's why.
He's like, hey, can you excuse us?
You'd think she'd be like, okay, thanks.
So walk out, she hops out.
doing the orangutan thing.
You see what I'm saying?
She didn't get ordered to stop.
Same thing.
Even though it'd be kind of common knowledge,
but she was trained her whole life to follow his orders.
See what I'm saying?
Same thing.
It's interesting that that scene from that movie from 1984 or 86
or whatever has just been floating around in your brain waiting to get grabbed on
to by the Boer Wars.
Bro, I'm telling you.
And the London Imperial volunteers.
Yes, same thing.
Well, and their creativity versus the Gordons who are just hopping on one leg and hooting like orangutans.
Or what happened?
Because they weren't ordered.
Yeah.
Well, the point there is these concepts are everywhere.
You got to watch out.
Yeah.
See what I'm with you.
Be careful.
Just like, was that Eddie Murphy's character or Arsenio Hall's character?
In that scene?
Yes.
Eddie Murphy.
Just like Eddie Murphy didn't want someone that.
Lacked creativity you as a leader do not want people that just are going to follow orders
Yeah, I know it's hard to understand that but it's true
Yeah, after watching that movie I understand it's more clear for sure
But that's well was part of the point though of the movie you're literally your your analogy is proved by all authorities
Yes sir. Yes sir continuing on
The agile infantry of 19 oh the average the agile the average the agile
Infantry Man of 1901 who ran and crawled across the battlefield relatively unencumbered by bulky
equipment and directed primarily by whistles was in marked contrast to the 1893 image of the professional
soldier which still pervaded many of the regulations.
So by 1901 they had advanced.
They were moving.
They were traveling lighter.
Advances were now made under the cover of rolling barrage.
And what is that?
That's when you're launching artillery of people.
So the enemy gets their head down and that's how you're going to move.
That's cover move.
First demonstrated at the Battle of Peters Hill.
Earlier methods that depended on accurate, low angle of fire of shrapnel and high explosives on enemy positions proved ineffective.
The avoidance of independent, affrontal attacks wherever possible, became matter of universal consensus as presented in infantry drill.
So they have by the end of the war realized frontal attacks, no good.
Psychological preparation for the bayonet assault went far beyond the military training
and was reflected in numerous contemporary accounts and drawings.
That such occurrences were rare was of little relevance.
Interestingly, the booers claimed contempt for cold steel,
as no position or piece of terrain seemed worth dying for.
Europeans used to fighting in far more restricted areas under strict discipline would on occasion stand and defend a position to the death.
So this is the weird thing that they kept, they kind of kept this idea behind the bayonets and the cold steel.
So there's an American journalist named Julian Ralph and he had this little quote.
We have learned that even British valor displayed by a number of men equal to,
the foe is of no conclusive value under the new condition and that if all modern armies could
entrench themselves and then and could then compel their enemies to meet them in frontal attack war
would be abandoned as soon as possible or sorry it would be abandoned as impossible what he's saying
there is if you could get your if you could get in an entrenched position and get your enemy to attack you
war would be abandoned because it would seem it's impossible you're not going to be able to take out these positions not against and and and and what's crazy this is what world war one is in trench positions attack it doesn't work it doesn't work doesn't work doesn't work and this guy this american journalist is saying this in in you know 1902 previously the british were hesitant to adopt field entrenchments despite numerous contempor
experiences to the contrary they feared that a defensive psychology bred by reliance on field
works and by field works they mean trenches and ditches and foxholes did not bould well for a
victorious army like that's a that's a negative attitude that's patent right we're not digging in
that means we're defending we're not defending we're going on offense bullers famous pre-war jack-in-the-box
memorandum at which i look for i couldn't find it is perhaps the most indicative of the english way of
War, battles he felt could not be won by officers or men who ducked in action.
Think about that.
That's when you're telling your MMA fighter, hey, bro, don't, you need to just go out there
and throw punches.
And if you get hit, that's part of it.
That's how you win because you're a man.
You don't need to, you don't need to move you.
Don't worry about head movement.
Pre-war Army regulations recognize two types of entrenchments, the half hour and the one-hour
type.
Both of which were earth embankments and the one hour, the one and a half feet high differing in width.
So the only, the most you're going to dig it is a half an hour.
You can't dig an effective foxhole in a half an hour.
It's not happening.
The British infantrymen did not even carry a shovel and was accustomed to regulations to native laborers or engineering building any necessary entrenchments.
The final proof of this change in doctrine was the issuance of shovel.
to two-thirds of the infantry and light picks to the remainder by 1903 so by 1903
They realized you know what we got to give two-thirds of these guys shoveling the other guys we got to pick axes
Entrenching tools
It is ironic how many of the wars lessons for infantry could have been learned during peacetime
Be they the value of well-constructed entrenchments or light in combat loads
The enhanced difficulty of reconnaissance or the new dangers of the fire zone the misplaced faith in the
firing line is self-sufficient protection at long ranges or the essential nature of the turning
movement in combination with all frontal attacks. If they would have trained, that's saying if
they would have been able to figure a lot of this stuff out. Now as they looked at this,
it's, there's a quote here, the bulk of the British officers preferred to believe that failure was
due to a lack of training and discipline. So we start to get back, we start to
head back in the wrong direction that's saying,
hey, look, if our guys would have been more disciplined,
then they could have done better.
We're not quite so 100% sure about that.
It's the idea of, you know, when a jih Tzu move isn't working,
like if I'm showing you a footlock and you're saying,
hey, the guy, you know, the guy's not tapping.
And I look at your footlock and I say,
do it harder.
That's my,
that's my recommendation.
Yeah.
Same deal.
It's not good.
Yeah.
Go harder
is not an effective
way of correcting something
that isn't working.
I run into this with businesses.
Business will show me their,
the strategy that they're using
their marketing plan,
their growth plan or whatever,
and it's not working.
And I say, well,
so what are you going to do now?
Well, we're going to do it.
We're going to put more money
into we're going to do it harder look sometimes do you need to overwhelming force sure but sometimes
you got to look at that and say wait we really haven't gotten to anywhere and now we're just going to
go harder pour more assets into this squeeze harder on the foot how hard should you have to
squeeze on the foot for it to work there's a different mistake that you're making let's figure out
what that is yes when is the time to go harder maybe when it's kind of working yeah that's
what are a why are you getting because if I'm if you're if you're putting a
a footlock on me and I'm not barely even reacting to it.
We're judging that as ineffective.
Yeah.
And you start to squeeze hard.
Maybe I,
maybe I feel it a little bit,
but I'm barely still not even reacting.
If you see me start to react.
Yeah.
What do you always say when you get a,
when you get some little moment of,
of beauty with me?
Mm-hmm.
You always go,
sense of urgency.
Sense of urgency.
So if you see a sense of urgency,
you know,
you think, oh, okay.
Maybe I could go a little bit harder to make that,
make something happen there.
Yeah,
then it does feel like it dep.
depends kind of on how hard you're going to begin with.
Because if you're maxing out and I sense a slight sense of urgency, I'm like, man,
if I go harder, that might not be, you know, might be diminishing returns on that one.
So it's like, man.
So, yes, contrast your output with your ROI and see if you should just go harder.
Because sometimes it's face it, Brad, just go harder and it'll work, you know.
Yeah.
Yeah.
Yeah, sometimes it does.
But there's probably a mistake that you're making, right?
Most jujitsu moves, you shouldn't have to, you shouldn't have to, you shouldn't get tired doing a jiu-jitsu submission.
Yeah.
Right?
Yeah.
I mean, occasionally, you like maybe some weird choke that your grip is getting tired.
Yeah.
Or even like in a competition where you're kind of like, maybe like you're focusing too hard on conservation or something like this.
And this guy's kind of picking up the pace on you and it's a competition.
So it's like, you know, a little different environment, you know, in a way.
And then, yeah, so maybe go a little bit harder.
Even then it's like, man, you could think your way through that, you know, unless you're admittedly, admittedly being lazy.
Then you go harder, at least a little bit.
When you're going to go harder, you have to make sure that the direction that you're going is going to be fruitful.
Yeah.
You ever, when you're training, like you get, like, let's say someone's on.
Sure.
You know who I do this to?
Kind of Greg Train.
Sure.
Dick,
he'll get a good,
he put a bow and arrow choke on me.
And I mean,
it was legit.
Like he,
and I had,
you know,
I had like a little bit of his ghee
and a little bit of my ghee.
Yeah.
And I just sat there.
And,
you know,
he went,
and we were probably doing like six minute rounds.
Yeah.
And he got it pretty quick.
You know,
he got it within,
Let's say probably within two or three minutes.
So he had three or four minutes of me.
Yeah.
And I just kind of had the, you know, bit down and kind of flex my neck.
And I'm holding his ghee and my ghee.
Yeah.
And I had pretty good grips on both.
You know what I mean?
Like, you know, you happen to get like the, you happen to get a good grip.
And Greg Train admittedly is smaller than me as well.
But he went hard.
for four minutes.
And let's face it, what is the drop dead time for a bow and arrow choke to work?
Like at what point do you say, hey, it's been 45 seconds.
And this guy did not tap.
And I put my knee in his back and I arched hard and I pulled hard and this guy didn't tap.
The rest of probably from 45 seconds on is a waste of energy.
Yeah, especially if you're pulling, if you're, if you're, if you're, if you're, if you're,
maxed out the strategy is to pull you know like that's it right there I mean that's not
counting like you know because you can make adjustments and it could take like a good three
minutes sometimes let me adjust here try okay that didn't work he had entered the submission
attempt yeah he was no longer setting up he had entered the submission this was to make me tap
yeah yeah and I just sat there and so anyways I can't remember if he held on until the
the round ended mm I don't think he didn't
I think, you know, with 30 seconds left, he let go and we, you know, but he was just done after that.
He was so gassed.
He was gassed like he just did a 20 minute METCON.
Check your ROI.
Whatever, man.
I can't help but kind of relate to him a little bit because you get into that position where the men, the submissions in on Jocko.
Shoot, you think I'm going to risk adjusting or abandoning you?
No, no, no, no, no.
I'm going for it straight up.
I'm belining for that submission.
You're just going to maintain.
Do or die.
But seriously, you get me in a bow and arrow choke and it's been 45 seconds.
Think about how long 45 seconds is.
That's a long time.
And it doesn't work.
You're going to keep pulling?
No.
No, not at all.
But I am saying that I can relate for sure with the attitude for sure.
Well, I wonder, did he see you?
Did he see that you had that grip?
Yeah.
Yeah, so a lot of times, yeah, after the 45 seconds, you're like,
bro, that grip is jamming me up.
So that's the issue.
The issue is in my choke.
It's that grip right there.
How good of a job did I do of giving him a false sense of hope?
Right?
Like, how much did I go?
Yeah, yeah, yeah.
How much did I, like give that to him where he's thinking it must be close and it's not close.
I know, that's, yeah.
That's such an interesting strategy.
I do that with Dean and Dean just like.
laughs. Dean knows that I'm lying.
Yeah, well, sometimes when you do it, it's like
you have a tone of condescending.
I do it to you. When I do it to you,
I absolutely will have a tone of condescending.
I'm just saying your move
is ineffective.
Yeah. It's like a
you know, and then you go.
Yeah, bro. That's my
torment for sure. Back to
the book. There was, this is
a fast forward, there was, however, one aspect
of British pacification policy
that did cast
lasting disgrace upon their methods, the concentration camps. The military gave three pretext for their
existence. First, they were meant to protect the isolated Boer families whose men had gone off to fight.
Second, they were meant to separate the commandos from the supplies and intelligence that their
families could provide. And third, it was claimed that the subsequent isolation would force the
burgers to surrender. 28,000 whites and 14,000 Africans died in these camps of various diseases. The
reasons for this disaster were many.
Again, modern war, this is our first real look at concentration camps.
And, you know, I don't know, I don't know what the intent is, and we'll have to study
more to find out the intent.
I could see both sides.
I could see the intent of being those things that they talk about, hey, we wanted to
protect them, we wanted to keep their supply lies separate.
Like I could see that as the intent.
I could also see the intent as we've been here for two and a half years and we're not winning and we're going to break their will to fight by by killing them by putting in these camps and making their lives miserable for their families.
That's a I mean, that's, I don't know what 27 movies you're about to bring up.
But you know, where the movie is like, hey, you know, the cops ready to, ready to, you know,
do something to the bad guy and then they pull pull up in the car and there's the
there's the cop's kid right like they they go to the family and that's what
breaks the guy that's what makes him have to comply so it seems like maybe and again I
don't have the research on this but I could see it being either way that the the
the the public facing hey we're just trying to protect them but behind the scenes
guess what we're gonna we're gonna take their families and see how much they want
to fight once we've got their families
And that is jacked up.
And they admitted that that's why they kind of broke.
It's one of the major reasons why they broke.
True lies.
True lies.
That's one of the movies where they do that.
Arnold.
But do they have Jamie Lee Curtis in the end?
Who do they do?
No, they took the daughter.
Oh.
Isn't it in one of the lethal weapon movies too?
Yep.
Yeah.
See, this is a common theme.
Bro, that's how.
Yeah, that's a good move.
Really?
When you think about it, it's a good move.
Yeah, it's effective
You get that's so that's what I'm saying
People go you know what this is a good move
We're gonna get their families and it's and and it's messed up
Even if their intent wasn't to let him die and starve and die of disease
Even if their intent was we just have your families
That's just jacked up in its own right
The leverage of that one
Male Boer prisoners of war generally fared better than their family since the army had at least some experience in this area
And was aiming at reconciliation
So you got soldiers that go into prisoner of war at least they understand how to soldier at least they understand how to
You know clean and and and and stay disease free whereas the families had no idea
By May 1902 after two and a half years of fighting the cost and morale physical and monetary terms had made itself felt on both sides the guerrilla war had inflicted more than twice the casualties of the conventional phase on both sides
Attrition became the critical factor, the deliberate destruction of 30,000 farms.
Hundreds of square miles of farmland, three, or sorry, 6.3 million sheep filled Britain with a sense of guilt.
The leader of the opposition was moved to question the supposed methods of barbarism in parliament.
Stripping the country had only hardened the booers' reserve. Concentration camps proved both expensive,
and debilitating on the British's will to win.
So, you know, this is sort of like a Vietnam situation
where the people back in America
are looking at what's going on in Vietnam
and seeing it as a nightmare.
And that's sort of what they're saying here
that the British are seeing what's happening
or hearing about what's happening
and they're starting to have a sense of guilt about it.
Not even the vast wealth of Britain
could sustain the seemingly endless struggle in South Africa
in the face of increasingly uneasy, domestic, and hostile international opinion.
So you also got the world looking at them going,
what are you guys doing down there?
You got the women and children dying in concentration camps?
We're not okay with that.
The cumulative effect of these various factors was to soften the terms,
ultimately offered to and accepted by the booers in May of 1902.
The reasons given for their surrender included the devastation of country,
fear of those in concentration camps,
an increasingly hostile native population, loss of property, and an inability to keep British prisoners.
From the British perspective, these were more psychological than military causes for victory.
As late as, so think about that.
And we've covered that multiple military strategy tax.
It's like you break the will of the people.
It's not a, hey, we beat you on the battlefield here, there, or wherever.
But when you break their will psychologically, that's how you're going to be.
you're going to win and that's exactly what happened here as late as December 25th
1901 the times of London still spoke of large areas of South Africa where columns of
less than 600 men could be overwhelmed over 21,000 boers now laid down their arms
to the British a force equal in numbers to that with which they started the war
of the 24,000 boers who died in the war only 4,000 could properly be judged as dying
in combat the remaining 20,000 consisted primarily of
women and children victims of the camps. The British lost 22,000 men, two-thirds of whom died from
disease. In the end, superior numbers of wealth and will to power had won out in conjunction
with a radically reformed approach to modern warfare. And yeah, again, this is a modern war where
you've got civilians dying. It's a freaking nightmare. And you also have the,
big imperial power with all the strength and all the might and all the people and all the supplies
you know kind of coming to a draw with a bunch of peasants with farmers with untrained
guerrillas you know like we're going to see well like we're going to see in vietnam like we're
going to see in afghanistan like we're going to see in iraq the last um section
really gets into how this how how those things that were learned are are put into play and they
talk about Roberts here and and what his emphasis was on administration and communication and
and they actually started bringing naval officers in to help because naval officers had a good
reputation for being you know good at communication good administration you know that the navy
the Navy is a very logistically heavy organization.
You've got ships at sea.
They have to be fueled.
You have sailors on board that need to be fed.
There's an administrative part of it that is incredibly challenging.
And you've got to do all this while you're on the ocean.
So they're good at that.
The Navy is very good at that.
Roberts also eliminated outdated exams and encouraged personal evaluation of senior officers in
for order to get people advanced so that was solid greater importance was placed on
field work during the increasing numbers of maneuvers held in the decade after
the war so after the war they're looking around going we better train we better fix
the way we're training and we better fix who we're putting into these good positions
these officer positions who we putting in there
It was claimed that of the 40,000 dead or wounded suffered by both sides in the war, only 50 were a result of the sword or the lance.
In the light of the Dickinson's committees finding that a more prominent position must be given to the training of cavalry soldier and the use of the fire weapon.
The carbine, despite its lighter weight, gave way to the longer-range Lee Enfield short rifle and the British thus became the only rifle-armed cavalry in Europe.
1914
The survival of the sword
As a secondary weapon
So they kept the
They kept the sword on hand
Listen to this
You know that term stick in the mud
Yeah
Like oh that guy's a stick in the mud
Doesn't want to change
No it doesn't want to change
Hey he's hey we're doing this new
We're gonna start working
You know go go plata
And like I like to stick with the old stuff
You know what I mean like stick in the mud
They don't want to change
Holy cow I thought that meant useless
Like this whole time
Oh, no.
Stick in the mud.
Yeah, stick in the mud.
It means you don't want to change.
The survival of the sword as a secondary weapon was a testament to its original pervasiveness
and the disinclination to waste all the material and training previously invested.
So they'll also have, what's that bias called, Mr. Bias?
Which one?
You invested a lot into, oh, what is it, the lost investment bias?
Oh, sunk cost fallacy.
So here we go.
They bought all these swords, and then they trained all these people in how to use the swords.
They're like, hey, we bought them.
We trained people.
We're going to stick with them.
It was claimed that the lance interfered with the very cavalry function, saved the charge for encumbered, dismounting, firing, and concealment.
Regarded as inferior to the sword in protracted melee and difficult to master when little time or money could be spared for a third weapon.
The lance was consigned to the dustbin of history.
Maintenance of the sword, on the other hand, rested upon tradition, its cheapness.
as compared to a pistol and the fact that it was always loaded.
Like I can, I can, I can put myself in the room to the military group that's sitting around talking of discussing,
should we get pistols or should we give swords?
And someone's, someone's in the back, you know, some old school guys in the back saying,
we're going to give these another gun, they already have a gun.
What happens if they run out of bullets?
You know, what happens if they need to take time to load that thing?
Your sword is always loaded.
You know, and it's, hey, well, you can't really.
argue with that and the old man in the back wins
and we keep making swords and keep training people in the swords
so I thought that that was interesting
I also have a section here saying in snow fog and
dusk or dawn the the they still thought that the sword could win
battles how big is that sword
I don't know probably just the normal length you'd think a sword to be
like you know three or four feet yeah I don't know seems big
I have a Navy sword.
Seems cumbersome.
It's ceremonial.
Yeah, you don't can carry it around, though, right?
I did not carry my sword into combat.
Yeah, that makes sense.
The return to more traditional cavalry tactics was fraught with difficulties.
Years of training led to broad fronted attacks to avoid concentric fire.
Concentric fire, meaning we're surrounding the area and we're starting to have blue-on-blue situations taking place.
By 1911, it was clear that the reactionaries had won.
the day in the matter of cavalry tactics other armies constricted conscript infantry it was
bleed could never stand to charge that's an arrogant statement hey look we will continue to do these
mounted charges because a bunch of conscripts draftees they're not going to withstand a charge
you can hear the british talking about no no one would be able to withstand one of our charges
a bunch of conscripts furthermore faith was placed in tactical
imponderables such as ammunition giving out or that some local condition would lead to
surprise or a major battlefield role despite evidence to the contrary provided by the
Boer War so they they would they would still talk I I've been in so many of these
conversations as things start to new tactics come out I've been in so many of
these conversations because I was in training for a long time I mean I was in
training as a as a young enlisted seal for I don't know a couple of years I was at
training cell at seal team one which was a good crew of guys master chief faculty was in
charge it was just legit but you know we had all these little discussions some new
tactic or whatever and then once a war started it was on because now we had to make sure
we figured out our tactics and make them right and there's always you know people with
differing opinions I'll tell you what I used to sit I probably pulled so much
leadership understanding from sitting in those meetings and not saying anything
just seeing two people dig in and getting a fight over should you do this or should
you do that I can that's why these as I hear these things being talked about I can
I can picture it you know I can picture someone saying there's no way no could
stand a charge from our cavalry unit it's possible to think because you do think
You know, you know what else this happens?
You ever, like, I'll, I've trained fighters.
And you think there's no way that this could ever happen.
Mm-hmm.
And sure enough, it happens.
Because it's a fight.
Yeah.
And anything can happen in a fight.
Yeah.
It's a way more wild.
The, you know how like when someone does like a self-defense demonstration?
Mm-hmm.
And it's like, sure.
Okay.
someone's holding your neck here, so you hit them to the rib cage,
and that'll bring their hands down here, right?
So, like, their whole instruction or demonstration kind of relies up on the enemy to react
or not withstand certain charges that you're throwing at them, you know?
And so, and then you compare it to, like, a real fight or whatever.
Like, every once in a while, yeah, like, you'll hit a guy in his liver and his hands will come
all the way, he'll recoil in this, like, way, whatever.
But, yeah, every once in a while, but probably hard.
ever really when you consider how many punches and kicks are thrown to the to the ribs you know totally
just like bro that's not going to happen and here's what's even worse than that when I say to you hey
you when you grab me by the neck and I punch you in the ribs your grip is going to get loose for a second
and then you say well it might not and I go okay hold my neck and then I just punch you in the ribs and you know
because we're not in a fight,
we're just kind of standing there
and I catch you off guard
and punch you in the ribs.
You know, I gave you a nice body shot.
Yeah, your hands get a little loose,
but you're not trying to kill me at that moment.
You're got,
you weren't even ready for it.
And so therefore I reinforce the idea.
It's like if in this situation,
I've said, okay, I'll tell you what, mate.
I'll tell you what.
Why don't you go down there and stand with your troops
and I'm just going to charge it to you
and see who can stand there.
It's like,
going to stand there.
Yeah.
I remember my wife's brother one time.
I don't know if he was just openly refuting the effectiveness of Jiu-Jitsu or what,
but he was like,
basically like I'd just do pressure points on you.
Oh, yeah,
I had that one too.
But not the kind of I'm going to hit you in a pressure point.
The kind of like, I'm going to put my finger on you.
Dimok.
Yeah, you know, all these things.
And then so you kind of think like first off like,
you kind of consider it for a second.
You know, like, man, what if he does really put the pressure point on me or whatever?
And I'm thinking, okay, all the times I've been training and competing or whatever.
Like, what if someone put a pressure point on me?
Like, during jujazz.
I don't think I would ever, I don't think you'd even feel it in a competition.
That's what I'm thinking, right?
I was like, even the most, I mean, really, what's a pressure point?
I'm behind your ear, you know, your jaw and like these other.
He did one like by my neck like in the center.
And I was like, hmm, interesting.
So I was like, okay.
and I realized like yeah
bro you won't feel pressure points when you're for real fighting
so I was like all right even when you're just training
like bray you're not going to feel that so I was like all right do it
and I just I was like okay like we're kind of fight just in my mind
I wasn't getting like fired up outwardly or nothing
and did it I was like oh pressure point and brad all you have to do is be like
okay this pressure point is dumb and then when he puts it on
you don't feel it but put it this way like if I'm just cruising next to you
or something, even like you, and I start like digging into the back of your ear, you're going to be like, oh, it's going to make you move.
Just because it's like, bro, your mind's not like on that thing right now.
I had a guy.
This was, this was, I might have been trained in jiu jitsu for like, maybe six months.
And I had a, you remember this term, traditional martial artist.
Yeah, T, man.
Oh, I forgot about the, oh, I forgot about the abbreviation.
So I had a traditional martial artist who has.
was talking me about, well, you know, I pressure point this and you know, this blah, blah, blah, blah.
And of course, bro, you think I'm fired up for jiu-jitsu now.
You shouldn't see how fired up I was for jiu-jitsu when I had been training for six months.
I mean, I was ready to rock and roll at any time.
And so this guy, he was a seal too.
And, you know, you know how he had like the whole thing going on, the whole kind of, you know,
mystical sort of vibe, you know, talking about how well.
And you know what I'm saying?
I have no mystical vibe whatsoever.
I'm like, let's fight.
Yeah, that doesn't.
Let's fight.
And we actually, in this particular situation, we were in, I had mats.
Because as soon as I started training, I got mats.
So I had mats three feet outside of my office in the day in where I was working at the time.
So, you know, he starts talking this.
I'm like, hey, let's fight.
Okay, so cool.
And I think I actually started in the bottom, on the bottom.
And he tried to pressure point my neck, you know, my neck.
And I armlocked the shit out of them.
You know, just, you know, he's in my guard.
He's giving me.
You can't give, you can't deliver anyone a more beautiful arm lock than holding your
arm's straight on their nose.
neck and trying to dig your thumb into their trachey or whatever, whatever the pressure point is.
Yeah.
And of course, I was like, whack.
You know, I made like a face like it, like I cared.
And then just slap the psycho arm lock on.
And, uh, yeah, that was my, the end of my belief in pressure points.
Yeah.
They would, you know, there'd always be guys that would have the, some of the, uh, prisoner handling
techniques would be, what they call it?
They called it pain compliance.
Oh, yeah.
Oh, you do this like under your nose,
above your lip and under your nose,
it's like, oh, you'll make people.
But man, if you're at all fired up to use your term,
you can just grit through that, you know?
And it's different because if you have,
because they used to use that.
If you want to choke someone,
you put your finger under the nose
and you can lift their chin.
Try that to somebody that's angry.
Yeah.
No, what you have to do is,
and what's lame is all you have to do
is actually just choke their face.
He just put a rear naked choke on their face.
And then it'll open up and you'll crush their jaw.
And it's all nasty and it hurts.
That's pain compliance.
Yeah.
And so,
yeah,
when you kind of think about it,
because like you're right,
like,
okay,
so doing that,
the nose thing,
like when you want to lift up their head.
Did you ever learn that?
Oh,
yeah,
I do that.
Did you learn that in jiu-jitsu?
Yeah.
And it does work in jiu-jitsu in training.
Yeah,
and it can work in competition too,
but you make a good point when you say,
try do it to someone who's mad.
Yeah.
Usually even in competition,
people aren't mad.
You know?
It's like, it's a sport.
Like, it even feels like a sport, especially the more you train.
Like, in the beginning, it kind of feels like a little fight because you're like, oh, whatever.
But in training, it'll work because you're not, no one's mad.
It's like, oh, that's more pain than this whole role has presented.
So, like, your head just kind of naturally does it.
But if you're mad or if you're ready for it, like, if someone's like, oh, I know this guy always does this and you don't let it affect you, it won't affect you.
Here's what's really jacked up.
it you know you and I both pretty much agree that it doesn't work if you're mad yeah and when it
happens to you you get madder so it works even less yeah yeah I can see that little little sequence
for sure moving forward volley fire was obsolete as a skirmishing infantry were now limited to using
it only as ranging techniques reconnaissance observation dispersion and above all marksmanship were now
stressed so this is still right after the war Roberts the ever proponent of marksmanship
eliminated the old bullseye and replaced it with modern smaller moving and
disappearing head and shoulder targets that appeared at unknown ranges and forced the men to
judge distance for themselves by 1907 the qualification involved 180 shots over half of which
were at range of between 300 and 600 yards so that's awesome
that's an incredible improvement to go from shooting bull's eyes and you know I always heard that
this came in America after World War I that that's when they started shooting so man-saped
silhouette targets and moving targets but here you go this is pre-World War I had the
British responded to increasing firepower by a recourse to harsher discipline and a ready
acceptance of higher losses as did some of their continental brethren they would no doubt
of evolved a different set of principles. So the British, instead of responding to increasing
firepower by harsher discipline, because, you know, what I could say as a leader is, hey, when
the machine gun shoots, we need to go. And when it doesn't work, we go harder. And it's still
not going to work. That's what some of the Continentals did. So as it was, they preferred to recast
their system into a more intelligent, less mechanical soldiery.
Following Roberts' dictates first proclaimed in November of 1900, the British solution
was a reasoned response to the realization in South Africa that officers could no longer be
heard and dared not be conspicuous.
This is just such an important aspect.
Every aspect of modern warfare emphasized the individual.
dispersion, which means spreading out.
Independent fire, which means selecting your own targets.
Use of cover, which is sacred.
Intermitt rushes, which means we're going to go whenever we feel like it's the right time to go,
not just when everyone tells us to go, not just when we're ordered to go.
And the sheer scale and intensity of the battle, the greater psychological isolation on the battlefield had to be overcome
so that the loss of five men and 25 advancing over 250 yards would hardly stop.
in advance while it was known that 50 out of 250 would so this is just this this whole little
paragraph is is so important to understand that the British had learned lessons and had
actually come up with an effective way of fighting in a modern way an indication of the
new British attitude was the substitution of infantry training for infantry
drill in the 1902 manual.
The combined training manual, which applied to all ranks, addressed this issue directly.
Success in war.
And here it is, success in war cannot be expected unless all ranks have been trained in peace
to use their wits.
We want people to think.
Generals and commanding officers are therefore not only to encourage their subordinates
in doing so by affording them constant.
opportunities of acting on their own responsibility, they will also check all practices.
So that means stop all practices which interfere with the free exercise of judgment and will
break down by every means in their power the paralyzing habit of an unreasoning and mechanical
adherence to the letter of orders and to routine when acting under service conditions.
And you believe that?
That's what we talk about all the time.
That's what we talk about at Aslam Front.
That's what decentralized command is.
Every leader is a thinking person.
We want everybody to lead.
That's what they're talking about.
We want to set a culture where we want you to think outside the box.
And we want to stop anything that prevents people from making decisions and showing initiative.
Captains, so that's a pretty low-ranking officer, were not only granted more independence,
but we're also forced to take a hand in the education of subalterns, a role traditionally managed by the colonel.
So now we're looking at our captains and saying, you better train these young lieutenants, get them up to speed.
With the anticipated isolation of the battlefield, and just to reemphasize what they mean by isolation of the battlefield, we're all spread out.
There's 300 people over, you know, a mile front.
We are not close to each other.
So you get psychological isolation.
How are you going to act when you're alone?
and you get the actual isolation of being separated from,
maybe from the other people that are with you,
maybe from your squad,
but definitely from the senior leadership.
With the anticipated isolation of the battlefield
and constantly intermingled lines,
it seemed a necessity to develop informed
and assured officers to prevent rearward drift.
Smaller British companies with 120 men
as compared to continental units twice their size
seemed especially well suited to increased individual training now,
They made the units a little bit smaller key elements of new training for infantrymen included practice at various
intervals and pacing accuracy of maintained direction use of cover and independent fire
familiarization with intermixed units and the development and acceptance of interchangeable command necessitated by casualties
sustained among leaders this is everything we used to run and trade at oh we're going to put all your
leaders down you're going to use cover you're going to use independent fire you're going to mix up your units
The post-war development's entire thrust was toward a simplification of techniques that would allow for mastery by the lowest ranking soldier, keeping things simple.
The Provisional Infantry Manual of 1902 went so far as to eliminate several traditional drill positions and all field bugle calls except the charge.
So they're getting rid of the reason you have a field bugle call is so that you can tell a match.
Mass of people to do everything at the same time and they're getting rid of all those to say hey
individual leader you know subordinate leaders out there make things happen the only one they
keep is the charge and why is that probably because
That British bravado and courage is still is still a real thing and because if you have one
emergency situation
You want to at least be able to say hey look we better freaking just charge hit the call
Physical and bayonet drills were brought down to the squad level and the company replaced the battalion as the training tactical unit since it was regarded as the largest force commandable by an individual under battle conditions.
So they used to try and direct 500 or 700 people by one man.
Now they're down to a company of 120.
The new manual stressed the many lessons of the war and was so recognized even at the time.
Noted, for example, the tasks allotted.
Infantry upon the occupation of a position the forward placement of skirmishers with an eye to maximizing firepower
Camouflage utilizations of rests determination of ranges and clearing of fire zones
So many tasks on so low a level necessitated a soldier who could think for himself all those things
We still do those things we get into a position we get into a perimeter
Machine gunners are checking out they're they're getting in position they're camouflaging themselves they're getting
covered position you got the the point man figuring out where the extract will be
everyone's doing this stuff decentralized so many tasks on so low a level that's what
we're talking about but the initiative the impetus impetus toward greater
initiative by all ranks in in the tactical sphere was one of relatively short
duration as military emphasis began to shift toward continental warfare so you
had all these great changes taking place.
The lessons learned from the Boer War.
And they started to get influenced by,
they started to get influenced by what the continental armies were doing,
the French, the Germans, the Russians,
which was the old school stuff.
The newer tactics were based on the belief
that success in war depends on morale,
depends more on morale than on physical.
physical qualities say same thing so they're saying look it doesn't matter it doesn't
matter these little running around and skirmish lines and all that and taking
cover that's not what's important what's important is the morale skill this is
what they thought skill this is a quote skill cannot compensate for want of
courage energy and determination boy is that a lie no one wants to hear this
that's a lie yeah you think your skill that's like the
guy right that rolls into the gym hey dude this you have a courageous guy rolling in off the
street you know he's courageous he's fired up so he has energy he's super determined I'll take
someone in here yeah cool roll with Jeffrey Glover over there yeah because guys will say that too
right like oh I don't I don't care how trained you are like I'm like ferocious oh yeah that used
to be I mean there was a there was definitely a time when that was a much more prominent
Thought right?
Well, if it really went down
Yeah.
Bro, I would just get nuts on you.
Yeah.
You know?
And you're just looking at them going.
I'll tell you what,
why don't you get nuts right now?
Well, and you know, when you really think about it, though, it's like, okay,
you can kind of understand why someone who doesn't know any better would think that.
Because remember back in the day when you're like a little kid and the guy can be bigger than you,
but in Hawaii, I mean, I'm sure they say they have an expression.
In Hawaii, they call it amping out.
So if you just amp out on a guy, you can take them for a couple of reasons.
One, you're just going.
Like you feel less pain and you're just going and whatever and you have all this crazy energy or whatever.
Well, you know what that is?
That's surprise violence of action.
Yes, that's another element.
Oh, yeah.
You're going to get nuts.
Yeah, get nuts.
Yeah.
You're going to amp out on a dude.
It's going to be surprise.
It's going to be violence of action.
You're going to get the upper, the tactical upper hand.
And now this dude's days and that's how you win.
That is a factual thing.
And you just go.
Yeah.
And you can even get cracked.
It's a factual thing with two untrained
people.
Exactly right.
I just realized,
hey,
I just said that's a factual thing
and it sounded like I was saying
that that would work.
It works if you're going against someone
that's equally as untrained as your dumb ass is.
Exactly right.
And that's the point.
So you get a guy off the street,
bro,
that's usually how they are.
They don't know.
They have no idea what,
like,
they think that if you get a choke on them,
that they did some sneak attack lucky thing or something.
Like,
that's what it feels.
They just don't know.
So, yeah,
make sense that they think that you know you can kind of understand that's where let's go again
comes from yeah a big time when someone's like oh i'll i'll take that jitzy stuff whatever you're
not going it's not going to work on me cool you choke them and then they get up and they go well
let's go again you're like cool let's go again yeah you know those those gracey inaction
videos remember those like that was how they and the guy was like they'd be like oh let's go
again i just need to just go harder really that's literally what they'd say
You know, it's like the same deal, the same deal, the same deal.
And after a while you're like, I can't, you know, can't do nothing.
You know why, though.
And I remembered, I remembered this too, where, you know, before you know,
jiu-jitsu and someone winds up in a good position, like, let's say you just get in a big
scramble in a real fight.
And you just wind up in this weird and they get you deep in some headlock or something
like that, right?
Because you were just scrambling and whatever, you wound up in a headlock.
A lot of times, jujitsu positions,
feel like randomly like landed on positions if you don't know Jiu Jitsu.
So someone has you like in the mount or on your back or whatever and you feel like real like kind of helpless.
You're like, oh, this seems like we just sort of landed here, you know?
So if I just go harder and maybe keep my eyes open a little bit better or whatever.
Oh yeah, yeah, yeah.
I see what you're saying.
So you're saying for the victim of Jiu Jitsu, that person doesn't understand that the position that you end up in is a position.
that you know and that you dictate deliberate yes very up and that it has an outcome oh yeah which is
known yes exactly right but yeah if you don't know jiu jitsu it feels like oh he we just sort of wound
up there because we don't have like jiu jih Tzu's like this map even know the map and i talk about
this like you know if we're talking to people who don't have training yet the map of jiu jitsu
side mount mount guard like half guard like all this stuff or whatever super clear when you know jit's
super clear you know exactly where you are at at pretty much every moment of a jiu jiu jr's
Jitsu situation winning or losing.
But if you don't know Jiu Jitsu, it all just seems like kind of like a whirlwind.
Like you ask somebody, oh, do you remember like if your leg was over his leg or under his leg?
They would have no idea what are you even talking about.
But if you're if you know Jiu Jitsu, you'd be like, no, I remember one leg was over, one leg was under.
It was total half guard situation.
Like I don't, there's a lot of things that I don't remember.
I do remember every single position for sure.
And you know what's cool when I would train young leaders and seal leaders and put them through
dynamic situations where they had to make calls and make decisions and this exact same thing.
You know, and I'd say, well, where were you getting shot at from? Was it from this building or this
building and they would have no idea? Or, you know, where did you place your machine gunners? They
would have no idea what happened. Or do you think you have all your people? And they would have
no idea. And then the better that they got, the more training we put them through, the more they
understood the positions, the more they would recollect what was happening, the more they could
see what was actually happening as it was happening.
And that's the way you need to train.
The more time you spend training for these pressure situations, the more you're going to see,
the better control you're going to have, the better mind control you're going to have.
Because that's a whole part of it.
You know, that's one of the best reasons for Jiu-Jitsu being so good for self-defense is you're
used to getting, you used to having somebody grab a hold of you and grind on your
freaking head and grab hold of you. That's why also you need to spend some time boxing
and doing Muay Thai. Because if you don't know what that little crack feels like and it happens
to you for the first time, you're going to, you're going to get, you're going to get beat down.
Yeah. Yeah, especially in the face. Oh, yeah. Get someone punch you in the nose or whatever. It's
like, it's like, it's not nothing.
Yeah.
So you jam me up for sure.
Yeah.
Gets to be careful.
Continuing on.
New criteria had to be drawn as to which qualities were desired in the infantry.
By 1906, Ian Hamilton, and you've got to read the book if you want to get all the background on Ian Hamilton,
Hamilton was unfavorably equating initiative and intelligence with smartness on the parade field.
as a cause of rapidity and cohesion of movement.
And so what he's saying is, hey, initiative and intelligence is kind of moving us away from
cohesion when we're on the drill field.
Another guy, Hague's belief that the war of masses necessitates mass tactics led to a tightening
up of British formations to mean a density of one man.
per yard in an advancing line by 1911 so we can see that this is a nightmare so this guy is saying
this guy haig is saying hey mass war of masses means mass tactics we need to function together and that
leads to if we're going to function together we better be close together to the tune of one man per yard
that's a nightmare this in turn was recognized as an overreaction to the south african extension since
It seemed far easier to concentrate men on the battlefield than to spread them out.
This is what we call modern day dispersion.
You've got to spread out.
And I wrote about in leadership strategy and tactics, there's all these different reasons
why you want to get close to someone else when they're shooting going on.
All kinds of reasons, subconscious reasons, actual tactical.
Like, I want to hear what you say.
I'm a little bit nervous.
I want to get close to you.
We stick together.
And all those things.
All of a sudden, you look around you and you got five, six, seven, eight guys.
right next to you and that's not good one grenade one machine gun fire can can take you all out
or at least several of you out and it's already hard to fight it but when you go into the battle
situation already tight grouped it's going to be it's going to not work out well the french
and then the british began to consider frontal attacks the most decisive of
all so you see where now this is again this is like 1911 they're starting to regress this
regressive theory was given official sanction in the 1912 FSR which field service
regulations and marked the greatest split with the Boer War experience whereas the
Boer War led primarily to a modern approach to warfare downgrading battlefield
cavalry and fostering initiative and firepower Manchuria proved
regressive. And so what Manchuria is the J, the Rousseau Japanese War, which was the another big war that took place and they were using the old school tactics. But they were also fighting old school against old school. And they were both playing by the rules. So if you and I decide to have a war of attrition, if you and I decide, hey, we're going to have a boxing match and the rules are we can only punch, then we stand there and punch each other and
the head and if you're bigger and stronger than me then you can win and if and so what
what and so then it looks like you're better than me right hey you're bigger and stronger
than me and you'll beat me and we bring on the next challenger and you're bigger and
stronger than him and you beat him and then we bring in a 300 pound guy and he's
bigger than you and he beats you how did he beat you he was bigger and stronger but he
used the same tactics but he was just bigger and stronger so what are we going to do we're
going to make our military our groups bigger and stronger
What happens when you go out and throw a punch and someone does a double leg take down put you on the ground gets side control gets mountain and chokes you
Don't matter how big that person is
Simplicity and elasticity of movement were among the prime lessons of South Africa
Formalism was on its way out but individual responsibility was still quite a way off
So this this part here runs through a little bit of timeline that we've been tripping through I've been kind of jumping around a little bit by
1904 both the scale and complete so they're going back to
1904 by 1904 both the scale and complexity of military exercises had increased for the first time the army and the Navy cooperated in trial invasion and
Reembarkation under fire the troops were now were by now scarcely visible so they were they were using camouflage they were hiding by virtue of improved technique and equipment no attack on entrenchments was considered successful at odds of less than six to one and there was no volley fire so that does 1904 by 1905
maneuver battalion and brigade training had become
considerably more decentralized,
increasing responsibility of lowering range.
So 2005, or sorry, 1905, we're still moving in the right direction.
1906 exercises featured controversies
over the effectiveness of machine guns.
So that was when we start.
This is like traditional martial arts.
And someone's saying, hey, man,
if you get punched in the face,
you'll give this reaction.
And someone's saying, well, with machine guns, you'll have this reaction.
People are saying, well, I don't know about that.
Right.
So now they're having a little debate about what's going to work and what's not going to work.
1907 experience was marked by complaints from the territorials that despite expectations of their ability to perform on a divisional level, they never trained as such.
So now we're starting to see that the training's fallen off maybe a little bit.
1908, the problem consisted of mobilization and concentration of an entire army of four divisions, attached cavalry, ancillary service.
is in a friendly area,
the roles of senior personnel,
large formations and logistics were coming to the force.
So now they're focused on the big movement,
the big logistics.
In deference to private property,
which is where they were running these big exercises,
tapes were laid down to demonstrate positions.
So they're just saying,
hey, this is our position,
lay down some tape here
because they didn't want to dig in
because it's private property.
Far more would have been achieved
with actual actual.
digging, but that had to await the acquisition of larger government-owned training areas.
1909, the maneuvers marked a contrast to those of 1904 to 1906, as the infantry was adopting
appreciably denser formations.
So they're going backwards.
Denser formation.
Less dispersion.
Greater commitment to reserves and more emphasis on the counterattack by 1910.
There could be little doubt that the British tactical practice.
practices had largely drifted from those evolved during the Boer War to those of the more
conservative French.
The memorandum on Army Training 1910 emphasized winning the preparatory action through strong
advanced guards to be followed by a commitment of a central reserve.
Central Reserve.
This is like, oh, the commander's in the back and he's going to commit the central
reserve under the direct control of the commander who was to apply.
them at the decisive point as part of a prepared plan.
You see where this is going?
We're doing cata.
We're doing cata.
This is what we're going to do.
This is the plan.
Once you hit here,
then you follow up of this.
It's all prepared.
Yeah,
and that's another thing.
It reminded me of like when I talk about that martial arts and demonstration.
When they demonstrate on an actual victim, right?
Where it's like,
you're going to hit them here in the ribs,
their hands or their hands and they buckle over,
you know,
then you implement.
you know, employ the knee, you know, here and whatever.
It's not only that they're predicting the other guy's movement,
it's they're predicting it.
And then their next move is dependent on that very prediction.
Yes.
So when it like doesn't happen in real life, it's like, man,
it'll jam me up big time.
Yes.
And this is actually the last section of this book.
We're going to read the last thing.
And this supports what you just said.
Concentrations were to be completed before and not during.
the battle, meaning we already know what we're going to do and we're not going to make adjustments,
which is the idea that you're talking about.
This idea that this is what we're going to do, this is the reaction we're going to have,
and the Mike Tyson statement of no plan survives the first punch in the face, the common
military, which is no plan survives the first enemy contact, that idea is thrown away.
And we've gotten to a point through doing these fake, you know, drills where you start believing your own ideas.
They don't work.
And this is why when we started using simunition and paintball in our seal training, we started changing the way we were doing business.
Because when we started that, it was like 1992, 1993.
And they used it a little bit in the 80s, but on a broad level to actually go to, you.
You know, to run drill after drill, iteration after iteration,
really didn't start until the 90s.
And then it really took hold after the war started.
Because then people are saying, wait a second.
This is more.
The drills that we did with paintball and with some munition,
when the war started, they were validated even more.
It wasn't the opposite.
You might think, well, you know, once the war started, the real bullets started flying, the, the things got more validated.
And what's horrible about reading this and seeing the regression is that we know where it leads.
We know that it leads to World War I.
We know that it leads to trenches.
We know that it leads to not maneuver warfare, but to attrition war.
We know that it leads to 10 million, 10 million military deaths and 7 million civilian deaths.
That's where all this goes because we didn't learn from history.
We let arrogance get in the way.
And you know, like I was saying with the two people deciding to fight, right?
The Russo, the Russo Japanese War, right?
If you and I both, let's say have conservative minds and we're kind of stuck in the past, we're both the stick in the mud, that's okay, right?
That's what we're going to do.
You and I are going to stand there.
We're going to go blow for blow.
We're going to box.
That's what we're going to do.
And that's what the Brits were kind of looking around the world saying, oh, you see, boxing does work.
Because look at how the Russians fared here and look at how the Japanese fared here.
We see that boxing does see what happened over there?
But it doesn't mean that grappling doesn't work.
It just means that you're not paying attention to it.
It means that they decided that they were going to box.
And if you decide you're going to box, guess what?
You're going to get punched in the head a lot.
And when you come against a force that's equal to yours,
it is going to be very, very hard to overcome them
without taking massive damage.
And that is World War.
one and we need to make sure that we don't let that happen test yourself evolve in every aspect
of your life test yourself evolve make sure that you are making progress make
sure that you are continuing to learn and continue to progress and not regress
at Echo Charles.
If we want to continue to learn,
if we want to progress
rather than regress,
what do you got for us?
Progress.
Always get better.
Always progress.
Try to.
Step forward,
not backward.
Stay in the game.
Get in the game, stay in the game.
Get in the game.
Stay in the game.
That's it.
Anyway, we do that by what?
Working out.
We're working out.
We're doing jiu-jits.
We are
eating healthy.
Guess what?
You know how people sometimes go, hey, you know, Echo Charles, what did you learn?
What have you learned from Jock over, you know, the past five years of doing the podcast?
Yeah, yeah.
You know, the first thing that I learned from you, what's that?
You want to know what it is?
You said, exercise is the singular thing that will impact the most aspects of your life.
and I never really thought of that before
maybe because I was too close to it
and exercise is just kind of
part of been part of my whole adult life
and much of my youth was like
focused around exercise
but when you said that and you laid out
hey it helps you here it helps you there
it helps you somewhere else
I recognized yes
this is a something I never really thought of
I never thought of the impact
because exercise was just part of my life
I never thought of the positive impact
that it had on my life
but when you pointed out that exercise
is the most universally complimentary thing that you can do for your life.
And look, there's people right now, oh, what kind of idiots?
You know, would you say, well, your meathead saying that, which we take as a compliment.
But a meathead saying that, right?
You think exercise is going to, you know what?
Exercise is going to.
It's going to.
So when you kind of go out, oh, you know, we want to work out.
Like, no, think about what, think about how that impacts every part of your life.
Get in the gym.
Start lifting.
Start training.
Start working out.
Run, swim.
Do calisthenics.
Get after it, man.
It's going to make your whole life better.
Yep.
It is.
That is true.
Little interlude.
Yeah.
No, it's, yeah, fully.
And, man, it's like, okay, so we're in quarantine, 2020.
right now.
So you can kind of fall into a thing.
I mean, if you're really in touch with like your feelings or whatever, like sometimes
you feel kind of stale like inside because you're not out.
You're not doing anything or and not only you're not out and do anything.
You're not out and do anything for kind of extended periods of time.
You know, some people straight up haven't left their house months.
Haven't left the house.
So that can like weigh on you, of course, psychologically.
But I think it's like physiologically too, like in your brain, like chemically.
it's got to have some kind of weird effect.
Definitely.
I think that's scientifically proven
that there's some kind of weird effect.
I think that's actually the literature that I read
said that there was some kind of weird effect.
Okay.
Obviously, I don't know the literature,
but I know the feeling.
So like the other day, right,
where I was like,
inside, you know, focusing, you know,
doing some stuff on my computer for a long time.
And I felt like off.
I didn't feel good.
And not to mention there's some negativity out there
in these streets right now.
So, man, I was feeling like off.
Like, man, I don't know, man.
Is this all worth it?
I don't know what I really meant by thinking that.
But it was those types of feelings, you know?
I was like, man, I'm going to go outside and my home gym is outside.
That's a little covering there.
It's cool.
It's nice.
But it's outside, nonetheless.
So I go outside and I feel like the sun.
And I'm like, okay, you know, it's cool.
Something.
It's the sun, but I'm still kind of feeling it.
Br, bro, I did my first two sets, which are warm-up sets, by the way.
And it was like my brain just like switched back on to like living mode like all man life is like here now here.
Here's the problem with that.
The problem with that is that a lot of people don't make the transition to the gym.
That's the hard.
Once they get there, they know they're going to feel better.
Oh, yeah.
And if they don't know they feel better, they should know that they're going to feel better.
But they don't.
Like you're at least have that thought in your mind.
You know you kind of know you kind of know subconscious.
Yeah, I feel I don't.
Would you say you felt you felt off?
Yeah.
You kind of know that to feel on, you got to go out there and just jack some steel.
Yeah.
It's true.
Right.
Well, okay.
So when you do lift weights and you have to lift weights a certain like intensity or whatever.
And it's pretty low, especially if you're used to lifting weights, it's pretty low intensity that you have to pass that threshold that it'll trigger a biological physiological
logical response that is positive.
Endorphins and there's other things.
But these are,
I always hear like when people,
the way some people,
you know, whatever,
not everybody,
but some people the way they use endorphins,
almost like it's like this just throwaway term like,
endorphins,
you just sort of feel better in this and like ambiguous sort of way.
But it's a real thing.
It's a real thing.
It's like makes you like,
like just like depression is a real thing.
Like the opposite of depression,
like that boost you get from working out,
literally a real thing oh yeah so yeah the critical and then consider that notion that
affects everything you do so if you if you're a stronger healthier and have a better attitude
I don't know one thing I mean maybe I could think of one but right now at top of my head I don't
know one thing that that won't improve like it's like tangibly measurably improve totally good to go
oh yeah so we want so we want so we
want to be working out we want to be working 100% which means we're going to need some fuel we will
need some for sure so we got to eat right but supplementation supplementation if you're into it
and here's the thing there's all kinds of supplementation here's in my opinion most important
type of supplementation currently for me and I do I am one of those people who like I would I do wish
I was on this train like a while ago before I ended up getting on it so this. This
This is the kind of fuel we like.
Jaco fuel.
Jock fuel, right?
Anyway, joint warfare for your joints.
Criol oil for your joints and antioxidants in their general health.
Life.
Life.
This is going to help you for sure.
Omega 3s all day.
Also, discipline and discipline go.
Kind of the same thing.
Yeah.
Yeah, we have some options there to kind of get you up on step, whether it's the powder,
discipline, go, jaco Palmer, ice teeth.
lemonade mix
every day
discipline going to can
you got that
we just came out with the D
yeah
vitamin D
oh yeah yeah
just came out with a D
I thought that's where you're going
you were talking about
sunshine well that's true
that's a that's a big
yeah
sometimes we have to kind of fake
that sunshine a little bit
get that vitamin D
but one of the reasons
I made the vitamin D is because
I did my blood
work
and the area I was
lacking the vitamin D so guess what I know I'm not the only person I'm living a healthy
lifestyle I'm I live in San Diego sunny San Diego I surf I'm outside I shoot my
bow outside I run outside yeah I'm in the sun and I still had so guess what I know
there's other people that need to get on the D yes the D train D train
get yourself some vitamin D that's good man but by the way um
One thing I know, you look at situations, they put you in a certain scenario, you want to take advantage of it.
How's the milk train recipes going in your house?
Because in my house, because both my daughters are home from college, they're on the milk.
Oh, dude, man.
Oh, yeah.
They're making all kinds of stuff with milk.
Yeah.
Raw milk that put it in the everything.
I never tried the raw milk yet.
Well, it doesn't taste like anything.
It's just gives you protein.
But you can put it in whatever you want.
It's like a cool little base.
Yeah.
Yeah.
Interesting.
Is that swinging with monk fruit or anything like this?
It's just plain.
It's plain.
But you can put it, you know, my middle daughter, she likes to make some smoothies with fruit.
You know, so put the blueberries.
Oat milk.
She's doing all kinds of radical things.
Oat milk.
Just different kind of milks and stuff.
And so she's on that raw milk train.
My son, on the other hand, he told me.
That the best flavor, which this was weird, is the darkness.
Yes, I understand.
That's what he's down with right now.
Yeah.
So he mixed one up this morning as I was on my way here, and I took a little hitter.
Of course, I don't know if it was like this.
What do you have?
You have your twin brother, Jade.
You got your little brother.
Mm-hmm.
Kinata.
And then you have your sister?
I have an older sister.
Okay.
Did you guys fight and, like, want to stab each other?
when it came to food at all?
No.
Okay, so that's what it was like in my family
when I was growing up.
And with my kids, absolutely.
Everyone is ultra like dog, wolf pack,
protective of their own food.
Gotcha.
So, you know, my son was mixed up the darkness.
He put it down on the counter
when he was gonna turn around and kind of put the stuff away.
And he saw that I was in the vicinity.
And he immediately turned back around and grabbed it,
got it to his own protective custody.
And I looked at it.
And I looked at him and said, give me some of that mulk.
And he, you know, he kind of, he recognized.
Dang, Debo style.
I had to debo his, his mulk.
But I just had a little hitter.
And I kind of went into an agreement.
Look, it's not my favorite.
But that's, it's good to go.
Yeah, the darkness.
Oh, yeah.
The darkness.
So, all right, anyways, get some mulks, some strawberry milk, some mint milk, some peanut butter.
Get some jocco white tea.
Get some, get some D3.
You can get it all at the vitamin shop.
or you can get it online at origin, main.com.
You can also get geese there.
Jiu Jitsu, let's face it,
Jiu Jitsu is coming back.
I think it's going to be like the economy.
It's going to come back even stronger.
Yes, very possible.
Actually, that seems to be the case even in theory.
Not to mention by practical practice,
but think about it.
Like, you know how like when you take some time off?
You want it.
When it's time to go back,
you're like, oh, man, I can't wait to get back.
Bro, they've been tricking us along for a long time,
you know, us wanting to get back and stuff.
So, yeah, it's going to be way more strong.
And that's not to mention the people who, hey, I'm going to start, I'm going to start,
Jiu-Sat.
I'm going to start J-Jitsu.
Oh, I was just going to start J-Jitsu.
Now they're really going to start.
Pent-up.
Pent-up demand.
So J-Jitsu is going to come back strong.
Keys, jeans, boots, T-shirts, whatever you need.
We're getting there.
Made in America, by the way.
No big deal, but every single thing I just said is 100% made in America.
There's nothing being imported.
There's no little parts.
They're not just flying in a bunch of parts from all over the world and sewing them together.
No, they're growing it and sewing it.
Growing it and sewing it.
It's true.
Origin main.com.
Go check it out.
And that does provide the support.
Yeah, big time.
Also, more support, more items for to represent and maintain yourself on the path.
You know, sometimes the way you say that, like in a lot of things that you say,
especially during this support section, you kind of wind it up and you kind of say it like
you're going to have a new approach.
Yeah.
But it's not.
But that's the gift that keeps on giving for sure.
First time every time, as we say in the industry.
Yeah.
So, you know, when you say there's clothes that you can represent and I'm thinking, what is he going to say?
It sounds like he's thinking he's making him.
moves get us try something new represent while on the path and I'm okay I guess we're
going with what you know all right so we're gonna go with you know away if you need to
represent while on the path yes sir oh wait how can you do should we not represent
while we're on the path should definitely represent well you can represent right that's what I
think too I don't know I might be alone yeah but I'm probably not alone you know I
because I see them I see the I see the people you know I see the people representing in
the wild that's what I see
Check.
Anyway, if you want to represent on the path, in the wild, in private, wherever you like, jocco store.com, that's where you can get your shirts, hats, hoodies, discipline equals freedom, good.
Take the high ground or the high ground will take you.
Ain't that the truth.
It's all there at jocco store.com.
Yeah, man, if you see something that you like, get something.
Some patches on there, too.
Women's stuff.
Women's stuff on there, too.
Get something for, you know, your lady.
personnel in whatever capacity.
Is that in like,
is that not good personnel?
Personnel, right?
Sure.
Mothers, wives,
girlfriends,
daughters, cousins that may be female.
Neighbors that might be female.
They can represent too.
Boom.
All day.
Anyway, yeah, jacquistore.com.
Also, you can subscribe to this podcast.
If you feel like it,
you can do that
wherever you listen to podcasts.
We also have some other podcasts.
We got the thread.
Why is it taking so long for me to figure out the new name for the thread?
The reason is because the thread, I like the name,
and now I want to get hit with a bolt of lightning for the new name.
It hasn't hit me yet.
Normally I get hit with bolts of lightning.
You know, it's a rare occasion that you get.
I actually get hit on a fairly regular basis.
Whack, here's a new idea.
Whack, here's a new idea.
So we're a little bit, we're waiting.
I got my lightning rod out and I'm waiting to get cracked,
But we'll bring that back.
Grounded podcast where we talk about you to the Warrior Kid podcast for the Warrior Kids in your life.
And don't forget to give yourself some Warrior Kid Soap from Irish Oaks Ranch.com.
Is that available on jaco store.com?
Yes, sir.
Oh, is that 100%.
100%.
Boom.
Well, actually, technically, Warrior Kid Soap, I think that's a new one.
Yeah, yeah, yeah.
But there's Jocko soap, Trooper soap, Killer soap.
Killer soap.
All there, yep.
All different kind of options so that you, your kids.
family the people you know you can all you got a stick uh we got a YouTube channel
yeah YouTube video version of this podcast so you can subscribe to that yeah if you want if you're
walking down the street and you're thinking you wish that things were exploding you're
wishing that things were just shaking you wish that there was military vehicles
smashing into walls well you can you can subscribe to uh the
YouTube channel. You can see all that stuff.
Sure. Sometimes. And robots.
Robots. You know, every once in all throw a robot in there.
And there's, if you want to, you can watch this video. There's also little excerpts that you can,
there's a little point that got made. You go, I'd like to share that with Fred.
Sure. You can share it with Fred. You don't have to share them a two hour and 42 minute podcast.
You can just give us 12 minutes. Maybe 17 minutes because Echo doesn't like to edit things down.
Well, he's not going to make it into a three-minute video, not without putting some damn Star Wars effects in it.
Check.
Anyway, yes, sometimes I do that.
You know, it's fun.
Also, psychological warfare, if you don't know what that is.
It's an album with tracks.
Yep, album with tracks, jaco tracks.
Anyway, when you're having moments of weakness, psychological warfare will factually help you through those moments of weakness.
as if Jocko is there personally helping you through that moment.
Same thing.
Flipsidecanvus.com, Dakota Myers Company.
He's selling psychological warfare for your wall.
Check that out.
I also got some books.
We got the code, the evaluation of protocols.
We got, that has a very direct methodology for you to grade yourself,
for you to know exactly what you're trying to do,
for you to project your path, write your path,
follow your path to victory.
Get the code, the evaluation, the protocols.
We got leadership strategy and tactics field manual.
We got Way of the Warrior Kid 1, 2, and 3 for all the way of the warrior,
for all the warrior kids out there.
We also have Mikey and the Dragons, which is just live.
Teach your kids, your young kids, how to overcome fear.
Think of what that does to a little kid's life.
It changes their life.
Get a Mikey in the Dragons.
Discipline equals freedom field manual.
Extreme ownership and the dichotomy of leadership.
The books that started it all.
Also, we have Eschelon Front, which is my leadership consultancy,
where we solve problems through leadership.
Go to Eschlonfront.com for details.
If you want me or one of the guys at Eschlon Front
to come and talk at your company
or to come and start working with your company,
or start consulting at your company.
Don't go to a speakers bureau.
Go to ashlinefront.com.
EF online.
If you want to interact with me, go to EF online.
I will be live.
I am live multiple times per week pre-scheduled.
You come on.
You can ask me questions.
You can ask the rest of the team questions.
It's not overloaded with people.
It's not like when I do an Instagram live
where there's 87,000 questions coming in,
every second. No, these are, this is much more controlled. So if you want to interact, if you want
to ask me a question, go to EFonline.com and come and get some. Also, we have the muster,
which is our leadership conference, our leadership event. We're going to be in Phoenix, Arizona,
on September 16th and 17th. And then we're going to be in Dallas, Texas, December 3rd and 4th.
Extreme Ownership.com if you want to come, every event that we've ever done is sold out.
If you want to come, go and register.
And of course, now we have EF Overwatch.
If you are in a company and you want leaders that understand the principles of extreme ownership that we talk about here, go to eFoverwatch.com.
And if you're a veteran that wants to get hired by a company that understands these principles, same thing.
Back at you.
If you want to support a charitable organization, go to a member.
America's mighty warriors.org.
It is Mark Lee's mom, Mama Lee.
And she works all the time tirelessly to help service members,
their families, gold star families,
and military personnel that are deployed around the world.
You can go to that website to either donate or get involved.
And if you haven't heard enough of my monotonous,
monologues or you need more of Echo's uncoupled orations and you can find us both on the
interwebs on Twitter on Instagram and on Facebook Echo is at Echo Charles and I am at
Joaquin. Thanks to our military men and women who signed on the dotted line and wrote a check
with their lives in the service of our country.
and thanks to police and law enforcement and firefighters and paramedics and EMTs and dispatchers
and correctional officers and border patrol and secret service who do the same write a check with their lives for our safety here at home.
And to everyone else out there, make sure you build on your lessons.
Do not regress.
Check with the past.
Question what you're doing.
pressure test yourself and your methods, question your methods, your old methods, your new methods.
Make sure that you never get complacent and that you never allow your ego to overrule
moving in the right direction. It is easy to slip. It's also easy to think that just because
you're getting after it, just because you're training hard, just because you're pushing
yourself, that you are doing it correctly. Don't settle for that.
Yes, get after it, but do so in the smartest possible way with humility and an open mind to learn.
Until next time, this is Echo and Jocko.
Out.
