Jocko Podcast - 287: Be Sure You Can See The Pathways To Victory... Then Start.

Episode Date: June 23, 2021

0:00:00 - Opening / "Strategy" and the indirect approach.1:29: How to stay on THE PATH.1:47:38 - Closing Gratitude.Support this podcast at — https://redcircle.com/jocko-podcast/exclusive-content

This is Janko podcast number 287 with Echo Charles and me Janko willing. Good evening, Echo. Good evening. And joining us again is Dave Burke. Good evening, Dave. Good evening. So listen, if you've been tracking, we have been talking about B.H. Liddell Hart. We've been talking about his strategy of the indirect approach.

We've been covering his book, the strategy of indirect approach. Then we rolled into his book, which is just called strategy. This stuff is... It is just, it's so important to wrap your head around this stuff. It's a lot of it is counterintuitive when you hear it. It's counterintuitive when you hear it. It's sometimes even more counterintuitive when you try and do it. And if you understand it and you do it and you execute it, it is a game changer in the way you execute.

and it's also a game changer in the way you think. So if you haven't yet, listen to 285 and 286 to learn a little bit about B.H. LaDelle Hart, who he is. You know, a veteran, a soldier, a British soldier, World War I, wounded multiple times sent back from the front, multiple times sent back to the front multiple times,

fought in the battle of Somme. I mean, just almost his whole battalion wiped out. Gravely wounded with gas he was gassed I mean Been to hell I'm back quite literally and There's there's not too many people we can talk about obviously that fought in the battle of Psalm and and on the last podcast. I was talking about the fact that he You know battle you know we throw the words battle tested around like all this battle tested How about battle tested in what's actually the worst battle ever?

That's where he kind of started to think about a the strategy and tactics that were being used. This is what sort of, when he talks about the indirect approach, is the antithesis to what World War I was. So if you haven't yet, go back and listen to 285 and 286 and then join us right now with 287. Dave, any intro remarks? No, Matt.

You were writing down that badly over there. Just thinking about the last, podcast that we did and just where he's coming from. And I'm actually super stoked to get to these concluding these, the end of this section or this, this, this trilogy. Because I was saying this last time, I think, this is all new. Like, I get to hear this in real time. And sort of the chronology of your very first introduction from 285 was like, hey, a little

bit of the background of heart. But I didn't really, it didn't really sink in. you were saying it of what you just said, like what he went through. And you said it left a mark on him. But I don't, I did not, I did not appreciate the depth of that mark. And what it compelled him to do to try to course correct this massive, this, this massive mistake that, that he had to endure in witness. So I have.

I think I've been able to understand what he's been saying a lot better as you've been reading it, thinking about where he came from. You know what I should have done is I should have gone, well, first of all, I should have given a little bit more detail there. But I also should have gone back. There's so many references to B.H. Liddell Hart in so many manuals, it's ridiculous. And I should have pulled some of those up and said, oh, when we did this Marine Corps manual,

when I did this Army manual, here's where this come from, here's the roots of this statement. because they cite him. So I guess part of it is there's some other podcasts that I have in the hopper in my mind that I want to do that I really can't do without people understanding this idea of the strategy of the indirect approach. I just can't. I can't go forward. It's like I had to do this. So I will go back, I'm sure, and do some more historical context around.

His life and what he went through But I also man, I wanted to get this stuff out there You know it's it's like a prioritized and execute drill to be quite frank with you I would I wanted to get people to understand this and and see how beneficial it can be for their thought process because it's been so beneficial for my for the last 30 years of my life Maybe 20 25 years of my life where I realized wait a second going direct isn't always the best thing. In fact, the more I figured that out,

the more I was like, oh, going direct is usually not the best thing. Quite often, the indirect approach is correct. It's the correct thing in Jiu-Jitsu. It's the correct thing in battlefield. It's a correct thing as a leader. It's a correct thing interacting with other human beings. So that's kind of where we got here.

You know, a lot, a lot, that's a weird thing about having a podcast and doing things via podcast is, part of the benefit of it is the immediacy of it, right? Like there's not, you know, if you write a book, if I was to write a book about this stuff, it would take three years, no, two years. Like if I just gave up everything else and said,

I'm gonna write a book about this, it would take two years to do. To get it written, to get it published, to get it, or start to get it written, edited. Like, there's so much lag time. To do a podcast, it's like, cool. You know what? Here's a book.

I've had this book for a long time. I actually gave you my extra copy of this book. So but to be able to say you know what I want to get this done now is the time boom you can go and execute it and it's and what you sacrifice is you sacrifice Some perfection right you sacrifice some perfection because had I sat there and thought about the best way to do this Maybe I would have said you know what I need a I need an entire episode about the battle of the psalm I need an entire episode about What gassing does to you I need to do an episode about his battalion with the Yorkshire light regiment, right, and talk about exactly who is in. There's a whole bunch of different things I could have done.

And it's not, and that's, that would have made this better. And that's one of the, one of the compromises that you make in moving forward and executing. Like, you know what? I'm looking back now, hindsight, 2020, cool, should have done that. Didn't do it. We'll do it in the future. It's the way it goes. Yeah.

And even for me, as I, as I contemplate what I'm trying to say, you talk about, you The perfection of your sacrifice, even the way I'm trying to say what I'm thinking is not exactly right. It's not how I would say it if I spent time to sit down with a pen and paper and write out what I'm thinking or what I'm thinking about or the references I'm making in my head. But to be able to sort of reflect in real time as you're reading this as inaccurate or not as eloquent as I'd like it to be, it's a really cool exercise as a listener of leadership. to think about hearing what he's saying, contemplating the frame of reference he had, and how it applies to our world, which is you don't need to be in World War I

to recognize how absolutely directly affected you can be by thinking about what he's saying and applying it to your day-to-day life and how you interact with other people, which is kind of crazy to think about it. But it's also true. And I guess if there's a problem with any of this, If there's a problem with any of the things that you're saying is that there's nothing sexy about the indirect approach.

It doesn't like, it doesn't play well. Like, you're not, I'm going to get up and to give a speech about the indirect approach. Men, we're going to subordinate our egos today. Like, it doesn't, the language doesn't work. It doesn't, it doesn't give you that sad, that immediate satisfaction that people want with Klaus Witsy in total war. but what's crazy is how obvious it is to think about how it helps you achieve the ultimate objective, which is winning the war and how much more satisfying that is than just winning a battle or then losing the war.

So for whatever it lacks in the excitement of the language of we're going to destroy every single aspect of our enemy down to the ground. This actually is the tool that you need to be successful in anything. This is how you actually win. That's how you win. Yeah, it's very countercultural. It's very, like you said, it doesn't sell well. He doesn't sell well.

I mean, you could imagine so while Jackson standing up and saying, all right, guys, the enemy is a half mile down there. We are going to take the fight to them and people getting fired up as opposed to saying hey the enemy's right down there and we're gonna walk 14 miles right now To go and hit him from where he doesn't really expect it Because we don't want to have to face his Really we don't want to have to face his strength. We're a little scared to do that So we're gonna walk around and kind of sucker punch him You guys with me right? It's just like it's like it's really as opposed to you know?

forward into the breach, right? No, not really. We're going to sneak around and soccer punch somebody who's with me. But it's how you win. So let's jump back into it. Further revision of theory. In trying to revise any theory and readjust it for better balance, oh, isn't that interesting? We're talking about balance because everything is a dichotomy. Again, I owe royalties to the, to the, to the, the Liddell Hart family. It is a help to have a background of study in the subject, as long as one is willing to modify one's conclusions. Isn't that interesting?

We have to actually be willing to modify our conclusions. Change our mind. I was, so far as I know, the first student of war after 1914 to 1918 to make a re-examination of the prevailing doctrines derived from Klauswitz about the objective in war. After calling it in question in a number of articles in the military journals, I was, I dealt with it more fully in Paris or the future of war 1925. This little book began with a

criticism of the way that the orthodox aim, quote, the destruction of the enemy's main forces on the battlefield, end quote, had been pursued in World War I, pointing out its indecisive and exhausting results. To your point earlier, like, hey, we want to go and confront the enemy head on. Cool. We did that for three years, four years, and we had not only, we had indecisive and exhausting results. We were exhausting.

We didn't get anywhere. God, what a, what a freaking sin. What a sin to expend all those lives and be exhausted from it and have no real decisive victory. continuing it went on to argue that the advantages of the moral objective showing how armored forces might deliver a decisive blow against the Achilles heel of the enemy army which is the communication and command centers which form its nerve system and two how air forces besides cooperating in this strategic action might also strike with the decisive effect direct at a nation's nerve system and that is its static civil centers of industry so he's the first guy that said, hey, what we did in World War I sucked and we shouldn't do it again. How about we use freaking tanks and aircraft to pierce the enemy and cut off their communication and ruin their industries?

Continuing, the general staff prescribed the book for the study of the officers of the first experimental mechanized force when this was formed two years later. The air staff, less surprisingly, made still fuller use of it. There was then a lack of textbooks on air strategy and it fitted the development, the developing trend of their views on the subject. The chief of staff, the chief of the air staff distributed copies to his fellow chiefs of staffs. What I have said now is thus a revision after prolonged reflection of what I wrote a quarter

century ago and an avowal of error over part of the thesis. It shows, so he's taking ownership of something that he screwed up. It shows how in correcting the balance, one is apt to tilt too far the other way. This is something I call a classic team guy over correction. I would make a, I'd go and guys be coming through my training. They make a mistake, hey, you're micromanaging. All of a sudden they let people do whatever they want. Or the opposite.

Correcting the balance, one is apt to tilt too far the other way. T.E. Lawrence observed in a letter he wrote me in 1928. This is Lawrence of Arabia. This is a guy that fought in the Arab revolt in the Sinai and Palestinian campaign in World War I. I mean, this guy is legendary. And Lawrence of Arabia says, quote, the logical system of Klauschwitz is too complete. What an opening line. The logical system of Klauswitz is too complete.

It leads astray his disciples, those of them at least, who would rather fight with their arms than with their legs. What a freaking statement to open up a letter. Rather fight with their arms than with their legs. What an epic statement. Actually, it's kind of a kind of goes in with my Discipline equals Freedom Field Manual talking about, you know, oh, you want to fight?

You want to, you want to know self-defense? Cool. You want to punch me? I want to run away. You want to kick me, cool. I'm going to run away. I'm going to fight with my legs, not with. my arms continuing on you at present are trying with very little help from

those whose businesses it is to think upon their profession to put the balance straight after the orgy of the last war when you succeed about 1945 these are like little jokes he's making because he's writing this in 1928 when you succeed about 1945 your sheep will pass your bounds of discretion and have to be shivied back to some later strategist. Back and forward, we go." End quote. In 1925, I myself went too far in arguing the advantages of the air stroke at civil

objectives, though I did qualify this by emphasizing the importance of executing it in such a way as to inflict the least possible permanent injury for the enemy of today is the customer of the morrow and the ally of the future. Who would think that that's possible? Who would think that Germany would become our ally, right? Who would think that the Japanese, we would rebuild them to a point of, like, you know, economic power where we're in total cooperation with total. My belief then was that a decisive air attack would inflect less total damage and constitute less of a drain on the defeated country's recuperative power than a prolonged war of the existing type. In further study, I came to realize that an air attack on industrial centers was unlikely to have an immediate decisive effect and more likely to produce another prolonged war of attrition in fresh form with perhaps less killing, but more devastation than from 1914 to 1918, World War I.

But when one began to point this out, one soon found that the air staff was far less receptive to the revised conclusion than to the original conclusion. They continued to cherish faith in a speedy decision and when war experienced compelled them to relinquish it. They pinned their faith instead on industrial attrition as fervently as the general staff of the last war had done to manpower attrition. We're not learning lessons. Collective egos at play. Just not learning lessons. A lot of this is why, like I said, I've said a couple times now that this book and this strategy is a setup for me. for another series of podcasts that I want to do,

and it's all going to become so clear. Nevertheless, a realization of the drawbacks and evils of taking the civil fabric as the objective does not mean the restoration of battle in the own sense of the objective. The drawbacks of that Klaus Witsian formula were amply shown in World War I. In contrast, World War II demonstrated

the advantage of new potentialities of indirect, or strategic action against a military objective amply confirming what had been forecast in that respect. Is he saying, yeah, I told you so? Yes, he is. He's saying, I told you so. I told you that these things, I told you that this air, that this mechanized, fast-moving elements could change the face of war, especially when coupled with air power.

I told you so. even in the past such action had been effectively exploited by some of the great captains despite the limitations of their instruments but now with the help of new instruments the airplane the tank it proved still more decisive despite the increased strength of tactical resistance the new mobility produced a flexibility in varying the direction of thrust and threat which disarmed such resistance and that's what we talked about in the last podcast France, Poland, the Balkans, just disarmed resistance. The time has come for a fresh revision of the doctrine of the objective or military aim in light of recent experience and present conditions. It is much to be desired that it should be undertaken on combined service basis to produce an agreed solution for there is a dangerous discordance of doctrines at presence. the outlines of a revised theory fitted to present conditions and knowledge have emerged,

I hope in course of this discussion of the subject. The key idea is strategic operation rather than battle, an old term that has outlived its suitability and utility. So get rid of this whole idea of battle. Battles may still occur, but should not be regarded as the aim itself to repeat an earlier, conclusion that was strikingly vindicated in World War II, quote, the true aim is not so much to seek battle as to seek a strategic situation so advantageous that does not of itself

produce the decision, that if it does not of itself produce the decision, its continuation by a battle is sure to achieve this. That's what we're looking for. And have your opponent recognize that before the battle takes place? optimally, yes. Optimally, they go, you know what, we don't even have a chance. If they don't recognize it, cool,

you're in such a good position that it doesn't matter anyways and the battle's over very quickly. Yeah. I mean, I'm writing things down. I mean, just the things inside what he just said. How about just the first thing of the comment about study is designed to modify conclusions?

Not to validate your conclusions. Like, I'm going to go to research and I'm going to literally just overlook and bypass anything that doesn't align with what I already think I know. I'm just like, that's not convenient. I'm going to skip that. So I'm going to study so I can find information to reinforce what I already know. He's like, no, I'm doing the study to figure out what I thought that's actually wrong.

To modify my conclusions. The inherent humility in that approach is I'm going to study to find out where I'm wrong, how hard that actually is to do. And then he used the air staff, these example, And of course, the air staff is a thing that didn't even exist. And now it's this thing where the counterculture there, they're the opposing view of, hey, we need to look at these things differently. And then how quickly, how quickly they solidified around their new approach

and became the inflexible, rigid, we are going to stick to these conclusions, we are going to stay to these, we are not going to change our viewpoint of this. And how quickly that process happens to. Human beings do not like change. No. They really don't. And they really like to dig into whatever they got a hold. What do they got a hold of something?

They hang on to it. Totally. It's like trying to pry a toy. It's like a little freaking kid, a three-year-old with a rattle. You know what I'm saying? They got that rattle. Go and try and take that away from that. Why is that?

It's a human instinct to hang on to what you got. And you see the general staff after 32 years of military service and 150 years of combined military service between these three, four generals, and they have that new rattle that they got a hold of and they won't let go of it. Yeah. And they're going to kick and scream. It's disturbing. It's crazy.

And he said something, too, that he's referenced, you've already said it. And this one kind of finally stuck is he's making the connection to leadership. He's not talking about Klausowitz so much. He keeps saying about his students, his disciples, the influence he had on a generation of leaders. And the tragedy that was created by that based on Klauswitz's influence over people. And he's made the illusion too, like that really wasn't his intent. It wasn't his intent. He definitely, last podcast, he definitely pointed out that that was not his intent.

Totally. But the power, for better or for worse, the power of that leadership. And if you have disciples and you've said this over and over again, and again, I don't remember the exact quote, but the, the uneducated disciples are more dangerous than the enemy. And to just blindly follow the language or the words of the leader and just try to go implement them without truly understanding the context and then the evolving application of that to the world that they're going to be in. It's I put that from from those two pages just pulling out those three those things how critical those things are Can you fathom the freaking group think that's going on? Check it out. Not only is everyone on my side bought into this bullshit. So my entire freaking army of millions of people is all bought into this idea and you're Your side and your millions of soldiers and leaders are all bought to the same idea.

Imagine how crazy that is. Imagine how crazy it is that our group think is so strong that both opposing sides, both are bought into the same group think. At the peril of millions of soldiers. Like that's nuts to think how strong that group think is to think I'm looking at you and you're doing the exact same thing as me. and I'm thinking, well, we're just going to keep doing it. And you're looking at me thinking, we're going to keep doing it. And neither one of us is able to say, you know, this doesn't make any sense. Hey, are you looking at what our enemy's doing?

This seems kind of dumb. The power of the group think there, the power of, you know, we always talk about, right, you got to detach and you got to take a, you know, take a more strategic few. These are the freaking generals on both sides. At the same time. At the same time wrapped up in the identical group think. when they are getting a daily dose of reality, the most stark reality that human beings have ever seen,

ever, the most stark reality that human beings have ever seen, they're getting slapped in the face with that on the daily basis and they never look around and say, hey, you know what, this is freaking stupid. What are we doing? This is the sickest group think fathomable. It's crazy. So it's detach.

It's detached, but like detaching to the strategic levels, not enough. If you're surrounded, if you're completely surrounded, if you're in the virtual reality goggles on, right? No matter where you look, it's like you're in the game. You need to take those things off your head. All right. This is the last chapter that we're going to cover in this book. It's called Grand Strategy. and it's going to tie into a lot of things.

This book is concerned with strategy rather than with grand strategy or war policy. To deal adequately with this wider subject would require not only a much larger volume, but a separate volume. For while grand strategies should control strategy, its principles often run counter to those which prevail in the field of strategy. For that very reason, however, it is desirable to include here some indication of the deeper conclusions to which a study of grand strategy leads the object in war so this is an interesting setup right the setup is hey what i've been talking about at this strategic level we're actually

gonna we're actually gonna have some principles that are counter to that when we go up one more level so this is a very interesting setup the object in war is to attain a better piece even if only from your own point of view hence it is essential to conduct war with constant regard to the peace you desire. That would appear to be common sense. What are we trying to get done? How can we get it done? Not just to win right now,

but how can we set ourselves up in the grand future so that we're doing what we want to, so we're in a situation we want to be in? This is the underlying Klauswitz definition of war as a, quote, continuation of policy by other means. quote the prolongation of that policy through the war into the subsequent peace must always be born in mind so you can you always have to think about the future you always have to think about

the future you have to think strategically all the time all at all times a state which expends its strength to the point of exhaustion bankrupts its own policy and future again what's the ROI. What's the ROI and what we're doing? We're expending all of our capital to make something happen and we look up and cool, we made it happen, but we have no capital left. We can't pay our employees. We can't order any more of our supplies. Good job. No, not a good job. If you concentrate exclusively on victory with no thought for the after effect, you may be too exhausted to profit by the peace while it is almost certain that the peace will be a bad one containing the germs of another war this is a lesson supported by abundant experience i brought up this quote again

one of the previous podcasts about hey cool you want and now you're in charge of a wasteland how about a leadership capital perspective cool i got dave to do what i told him to do and now he hates working here and he's not going to do a good job and he's putting his resume out there to everybody else good job cool but i got him to do what i want him to do to do i i won but he's got the germs of another war yeah and by the way go look at what happened between world war one and world war two that's exactly what it is that's what he's referring to and there's other examples but there's that's a freaking perfect one no one was happy at the end of that war The risks become greater still in any war that is waged by a coalition.

For in such a case, a two complete victory inevitably complicates the problem of making a just and wise peace settlement. Where there is no longer a counterbalance of an opposing force to control the appetites of victors, there is no check on the conflicting views and interest between parties of the alliance. What a brilliant statement, right? This is 19, I guess he's what. Yeah, this is, this is after World War II. Yeah. It has to be, I mean, that reference to America and Russia, like that.

Yep. Cool. Yep. We work together. And as soon as we don't have our common enemy anymore, now we're pissed at each other. Yeah. The divergences then apt to come so acute as to turn the comradeship of common danger into the hostility of mutual dissatisfaction. So the ally of one war becomes the enemy in the next.

There you go. Hello, Soviet Union. Yeah. versus America. This raises a further and wider question. The friction that commonly develops in any alliance system, especially when it has no balancing force, has been one of the factors that have fostered numerous attempts

throughout history to find solution infusion. So joining together, this is like in a platoon. You have a platoon? If you leave them alone for a little while, they'll start fighting each other. That's just what's going to happen. There's no balancing force.

There's no one to go against. Even if it's just the trading cadre, that's enough of a, you know, we'll go against those guys or another platoon. Once they're alone, they're going to start fighting each other. So we look for solutions and fusion, but history teaches us that in practice,

this is apt to mean domination by one of the constituent elements. And although there is a natural tendency toward the fusion of small groups and a larger ones, the usual result of forcing the pace is the confusion of the plans to establish a comprehensive political unit. I will say that's a pretty pessimistic view.

It's a realistic view, but it's a pessimistic view. Moreover, regrettable as it may seem to the idealist, the experience of history provides little warrant for the belief that real progress and the freedom that makes progress possible lies in unification. And this is something we need to pay attention to. For where unification has been able to establish unity of ideas, it has usually ended in uniformity paralyzing the growth of new ideas. And where unification has merely brought about an artificial or imposed unity,

it is irksome. Its irksomeness has led through discord to disruption. I love that from a leadership perspective, right? We get everyone on board of the plan. Hey, listen, everyone just lock it up. We're going with my plan. It seems to help, right? It seems to help, but by the way, no one's now thinking.

And on top of that, people are pissed. Discord. So now as soon as something goes wrong, you know, we got an element that's breaking off. You got people complaining. Why is that? We're trying to force uniformity. We're trying to force people to think the same way. It's a problem.

Vitality springs from diversity, which makes for real progress so long as there is mutual toleration based on the recognition that worse may come from an attempt to suppress differences than from acceptance of them. Again, if you're in a leader and you've got someone that's a little outside the lines and all you do is beat them into submission, it's not helping. For this reason, the kind of peace that makes progress possible is best assured by the mutual checks created by a balance of forces alike in the sphere of internal politics and of international relations.

So he goes into a little bit about the, you know, the balance of power and politics, right? He says any monopoly of power leads to ever-repeated demonstrations of the historical truth epitomized in Lord Acton's famous dictum, all power corrupts and absolute power corrupts, absolutely. Another conclusion which develops from the study of grand strategy against the background of history is the practical necessity of adapting the general theory of strategy to the name. of a nation's fundamental policy. You got to make sure you're aligned. Got to make sure you're aligned. It goes into the difference between an acquisitive state and a conservative state, meaning, hey, my state is going out to acquire other properties like we're going to go on

the attack and a conservative state, which is, hey, we're just trying to maintain what we've got. The acquisitive state inherently unsatisfied needs to gain victory in order to gain its object. and must therefore court greater risks in the attempt. The conservative state can achieve its object by merely inducing the aggressor to drop his attempt at conquest by convincing him that the game is not worth the candle. In victory, its victory is in a real sense

attained by foiling one's bid, one side's, by foiling the other side's bid for victory. Indeed, in attempting more, it may defeat its own purpose by exhausting itself so much that it is unable to resist other enemies or the internal effects of overstrain self exhaustion in war has killed more states than any foreign assailants and how often do we see that in companies how often do we see in companies where they are just going so hard and investing in so many different places and chewing up their teams we have to you have to

be cognizant of that. Weighing these factors of the problem, it can be seen that the problem of a conservative state is to find the type of strategy that is suited to fulfill its inherently more limited object in the most strength-conserving way so as to ensure future as well as presence. Now, there's a reason I'm covering this part because of this statement. At first glance, it might seem that pure defense would be the most economical method, but this implies static defense and historical experience warns us that it is dangerously brittle method on which to rely economy of force and deterrent effect are

best combined in defensive offensive offensive method based on high mobility that carries the power of a quick repost and a quick repost is a is a move in fencing it's a thrust and fencing. So it's cool to think, you know what, we're just going to conserve, we're going to stay here, we're going to be on the defensive. But we have to remember that,

historically speaking, when he's talking about historically speaking, he's talking about a massive swath of history that he's looked at to confirm that you've got to have some offense. You've got to be on offense. And we say this a lot. Like if you're just, if you're not growing,

you're losing. Totally. He's also clearly learned the lesson that he's kind of accused Klaus Woods of not applying, which is the context to the statements where you say, hey, the conservative approach. And oh, by the way, if you're over there thinking that I'm telling you, dig in and be conservative, that's not what I'm saying. and to clarify and have the understanding of the comment itself. So the comment or the headline doesn't become the story, which he referenced so many times of,

hey, this statement became its own, the interpretation of the statement became its own truth when it's not really what he meant, but he didn't actually take the time to make sure his disciples, his learners understood, I'm not saying dig in. I'm not saying that.

And I know if you're hearing that, let me be more clear what this approach. which really means. And that's clearly a lesson he's taken from the other leaders that didn't do that, and the outcomes that that creates when you don't actually explain what you mean. We talked about it almost as a joke inside of here of don't care or, you know, hold the line. And if you're hearing, I hold the line on all things. Let me be more clear.

That's not what I'm saying. I'm saying this, this and this. And this is how you apply this. So I really like the idea that he's taking the comment and then giving the context around us so people can understand what he's talking about. The people that are actually studying what he's saying. The idea of the dichotomy of leadership, that idea came to me because I was working with these young junior officers. And you know what they want to do? They want to do good.

Totally. They want to do good. So if you tell them to be aggressive, cool. Got it. They are on freaking level 14 berserker mode. They're charging into whatever. You tell them not to move You tell them

Hey make sure you take the high ground Cool guess what they're doing they're running to the top of every freaking hill that they see So so anything that I would tell them there was a there was they had a proclivity to take it to the extreme and so within like one or two iterations at our land warfare training facility, I was like, okay, I got to tell these guys that there has to be balanced. Everything that I'm saying has to be balanced. Every single thing that I'm saying has to be balanced. If you take anything that I'm saying, and you take it to an extreme, it's going to be bad. So I tried to do the same thing. It's kind of a universal. Man, I hate to say it's like a cop out, you know, because it's like, well, you know, if your ego's, you're saying

ego's no good. No, actually it's a balance, right? And it kind of sounds like a cop out. Does it sound like a little bit of a cop out echo Charles you seem to agree with me yeah I mean it can yeah but no yes but no I mean it's a real bummer I think some not a bummer but someone will say well you're saying that you know you're saying that the ego is bad but the egos the ego is what you know I don't want to hire people the bunch of pushovers yeah it's like yeah I know man that's the dichotomy and they're kind of like oh like they think I don't have that they forget that I have that you know and And that's why I feel like bad sometimes pulling the dichotomy card. But it's the truth.

Yeah. The truth is, man, you take something to the extreme and it's bad. Yeah. That's the truth. You still don't like it? No, I agree with you. Uh-huh. Where it's like, you know that it's not a cop-out.

In fact, it's the opposite of a cop-out. It's like you've got to be real specific and you got to use judgment. You got to, you know, there's just more to it than that. In fact, when someone doesn't recognize the dichotomy, that might be the more. of the cop out. It's kind of like, oh, you say go here. Oh, I went there.

I went there. That's what you said, right? And it's like, right, you gotta start using your judgment a little bit, you know? Yep. You were talking about does it sound like a cop out? And in these scenarios of Top Gun, you know, everything is like a scenario.

What do I do in this situation? And how do I react this? And like the classic answer, the classic answer was always, it depends. Which had this feeling of like, Yeah, it's a cop out. It's a cop out and like, oh, you don't really know or you don't have to be definitive because there are times of people want a black and white.

They want a black and white answer. Hey, if I have this situation, what do I do? It depends. Well, it actually depends. And, but it actually does depend. Yeah, yeah. It depends. It's not a cop out.

It's not a cop out. It does. And because it's not satisfying and it requires like contemplation and understanding of the nuance. And how did I get here in the first place? What am I trying to accomplish? So I was just thinking to myself when you were talking about this, this, this feeling of it sounds like a cop out was the answer I gave 5,000 times a top gun to the students. It depends. And then you got to dig in and go through it and go, well, actually, in the case that you're describing, this might actually be a better answer than in the same situation, but driven by another goal or got there for a different reason.

Hey, I might go a different direction here. And then you as a leader have to actually apply some judgment in real time as opposed to, This situation requires this response. Well, it's not that simple. Hey, assault team leader, what are you doing way back there when they're all bogged down up in the front? Yeah. Well, you told me not to get engaged in like the room to room clearance. Totally.

Yeah, but they're bogged down. Yeah. Your example of where should the platoon commander be in a patrol? It depends. Yeah, where it makes sense. Totally. Could be in the front. Could be in the back.

Could be in the middle. You know, and I guess we've hit this. I'm probably beating a dead horse a little bit. But the unsatisfying nature of that answer, when I got to the basic school, I'm a brand new second lieutenant. And we get to the basic school. And right outside of the main headquarters building is this giant bronze statue of a lieutenant. And he's in this pose. He's got his rifle.

He's pointed his arm up and it says, follow me, you know, which is what they push you is lead from the front, get out in front of your men. And in a lot of ways, that's right. That's right to have that mind. But in a lot of ways, it's actually not right. But place yourself where you need to be is nowhere near as cool as cool as follow me. Lead from the front. But if that's what you, hey, I lead from the front like, cool, you have no idea what's going on back here. And half of your guys just got hammered because of that.

there's this I think this compulsion which is why the Klausowitz thing plays so well to even just the catchphrases of leadership which don't actually serve a leader very well lead from the front who's going to say like that's a that's a terrible leadership philosophy but actually sometimes you don't want to be in the front yeah which is why I have a section in leadership strategy and tactics which is actually called lead from the rear totally so it kind of like you have to like the more under because there has to be the formula right at some level like obviously at the surface the formula is like or you might someone might make the mistake the formula is lead from the front at all times right but that's not the formula formula is it depends okay

on what and there's a formula under there but then under there you're like okay well if this and this and this oh well it depends a little bit more and the deeper you go there has to be some formula right no Okay, so that, and that's what I was going to say too here. So the solution. No, wait, I have the formula. You know what the formula is? It's a dichotomy.

Or Dave will tell you the formula is it depends. Yeah. So I feel like. You're like, yeah. So both those are cop out answers. You don't want to hear them. No, no, no. No, I'm actually agreeing with you.

Like that, that's what I would have said to. It's going to always depend. So, and also on top of it, there's more than one right answer a lot of the time. Or pretty much all the time. pretty much, with very few exceptions, I would think. There are wrong answers. Oh, yeah, yeah. I agree with that, too.

Okay, but you're saying there's more than one right answer? In many cases, yes. So I would say the solution is, the more you understand about all of it, the better decision you can make. And the better educated you will be on what decision to make, given the parameters of all the dichotomies you're dealing with. Except for the fact that you may not have enough information to make the decision that seems like it's going to be the perfect decision, in which case you kind of screwed up by not moving a little bit more quickly and making decision based on the information that you had at that current moment. Yeah, but what I meant by knowing, like, educated yourself, not on any specific scenario.

I'm saying on how it works, on the dichotomy of leadership or on the laws of combat or whatever. Okay, yes. Understanding. Well, yeah, then you're going back to what I said, which is the formula is the dichotomy. Yeah. And you got to be balanced. Yeah.

That's the formula. The formulas be balanced. Yeah. Like some, the more you know about the whole game, we'll say, the more you know when you're going to be on this side of the dichotomy or leaning on this side of the dichotomy.

The more you know about yourself, the more you know about your guys, building relationships, by the way, the more you know about this, the more about how this works, then you're going to know more about under what types of circumstances

you're going to lean here or lean there. You know what's, cool, we have a business called echelon front. The reason we have a business called echelon front is because we have to help leaders work through these issues. We can't give them a formula that they can then apply across the board in all situations. But like you're saying correctly, if they learn and understand the principles, they can start to make better decisions and write decisions based on their understanding of these principles and applying them holistically to their scenario.

Right. Yes, exactly right. I was going to say, yeah, exactly what I'm saying. Where do you get the formula from? Oh, you're probably the most educated on this whole game as far as the game goes, right? So the more you, let's say, you consult with a client, right? The more you consult with them, hopefully the more they're going to learn that same game and they're going to need you less and less.

Yes. You know what I'm saying? That's the goal. Yes, sir. Absolutely. All right. Back to the book. The East Roman Empire was a case where such an actively conservative strategy

had been carefully thought out as a basis of war policy, a fact which goes far to explain this empire's unrivaled span of existence. Another example more instinctive than reasoned is provided by the strategy based on sea power that England practiced in her wars from the 16th to the 19th century. The value of it was shown by the way that her strength kept pace with her growth, while all her rivals broke down in turn through self-exhaustion and war, traceable to their immoderate desire for the immediate satisfaction of outright victory. A long series of mutually exhausting and devastating wars, above all the 30 years war,

had brought statesmen by the 18th century to realize the necessity when engaged in war of curbing both their ambitions and their passions in the interests of their purpose. On the one hand, this realization tended to produce a tacit limitation of warfare and avoidance of excesses which might damage after the war prospect. So he's going back in time and saying, look, we kind of learned these lessons. It was a regression. That's why earlier in the last podcast we talked about, he talked about Klausowitz was a regression. We were going backwards because they had figured this stuff out.

The 30 years were. I mean, that's the 1600s. You got Germany and Sweden fighting Spain and Catholics versus probably all kinds of crazy warfare going on to know to no real decisive victory. It's a problem. They realize that. Their ambitions and passions frequently carried them too far so that the return to peace found their countries weakened rather than strengthened.

But they'd learned to stop short of national exhaustion, which again, you take that for leadership capital. And we're expending more than we have. have at the most satisfactory at them at and the most satisfactory peace settlements even for the stronger side proved to be those which were made by negotiation rather than decisive military issue this gradually education in inherent limitations of war was still in process when it was interrupted by the French Revolution which brought to the top men who were novices in statesmanship statesmanship the directory and its success

successor Napoleon pursued the vision of an enduring peace through war after war for 20 years. There you go. Napoleon going for peace, 20 years of war. The pursuit never led to the goal, but only to spreading exhaustion and ultimate collapse. The bankruptcy of the Napoleonic Empire renewed a lesson that had often been taught before. The impression, however, came to be obscured by the sunset haze of the Napoleonic myth, the lesson had been forgotten by the time it was repeated in the World War I. Even after that bitter experience, the statement of the Second World War were no wiser.

Although war is contrary to reason, since it is a mean of deciding issues by force when discussion fails to produce an agreed solution, the conduct of war must be controlled by reason if its object is to be fulfilled. And here he goes into how we reasonably conduct war. One, while fighting is a physical act, its direction is a mental process. The better your strategy, the easier you will gain the upper hand and the less it will cost you.

Very important thing to think about. Two, conversely, the more strength you waste, the more you increase the risk of the scales of war turning against you. And even if you succeed in winning victory, the less strength you will have to profit by peace. Just apply that one to World War I. And it's like, okay, we need to stop this. Three, the more brutal your methods, the more bitter you will make your opponents with the natural result of hardening the resistance you are trying to overcome. Thus, the more evenly the two sides are matched, the wiser it. will be to avoid extremes of violence which tend to consolidate the enemy's troops and

people behind their leaders I mean okay war yeah what about leadership perspective on that one no like the more brutal the more you the more you shut up Dave and do what I told you to do shut up team this is what we're doing the more you do that the more resistance you're gonna have to overcome for these calculations extend further the more intent you appear to impose a piece entirely of your own choosing by conquest, the stiffer the obstacle you will raise in your path. So when I make a piece that's completely, you know, in my favor,

cool, I'm going to end up with problems. And the more I impose a plan on Dave and his team, the more I'm going to end up with problems. And I can see the looks on the people's faces in a company when I tell them that. It's so hard to believe. It's so hard to believe that, hey, actually the more efficient way is to say, hey, Dave, how do you want to do this? It's so hard to believe that. It seems so much more efficient for me to say, hey, Dave, here's the plan.

Shut up and do it. Here, give this to your team. Here's the orders. Go execute. Which is funny because people go, oh, you know, these military wave leading wouldn't work in the civilian world. It's like, what are you talking about. It's always fun. Laf's like, yeah, yeah, this is exactly what you're talking.

go do with me he'd be like hey how do you want to do it and I'd be like how this sounds like a good plan okay okay cool five furthermore if and when you reach your military goal the more you ask of the defeated side the more trouble you will have and the more cause you will have to provide for an ultimate attempt to reverse the settlement achieved by war again when you impose your plan on people when you impose your will on people there will be organ rejection of that. Force is a vicious cycle or rather a spiral unless its application is controlled

by the most carefully seasoned calculation. Just think about that. It's a common thing I tell clients. You want to lead with minimum force required. That's how you want to lead. If I don't have to say anything, that's the best. If I have to say, hey, this is maybe an idea. If I get to a point where I have to bark and order at someone

and tell them shut up and do what I told you to do, that's bad. That's the vicious circle of force. We don't like it. Thus, war, which begins by denying reason, comes to vindicate it, vindicate it throughout all phases of the struggle. The fighting instinct is necessary to success in the battlefield. So the fighting instinct, we got to be ready to fight.

The fighting instinct is necessary to success in the battlefield. Although even here, the combatant who can kill. keep a cool head has an advantage over the man who sees red. So that's his little caveat. And then he says, but the fighting instinct should always be ridden on a tight rain. The statesman who gives that instinct its head loses his own. If you just want to scrap, cool, guess what's going to happen? You're going to lose your own head.

He is not fit to take charge of the fate of a nation. Victory in the true sense implies that the state. of peace and of one's people is better after the war than before. Victory in this sense is only possible if a quick result can be gained or if a long effort can be economically proportioned to the national resources. How much are you investing? How much are you investing of capital from your company? How much are you investing in leadership capital?

ROI, where's it at? The end must be adjusted to the means. we throw that one out all the time and it's and it's got like the connotations of being a wimp focus on your goal there's 48 freaking inspirational memes a day

set your goal and never fear from it cool I got a better idea how about the end must be adjusted to the means right I want that Lambo I want to dream Green board. I got a Lambo and I got an infinity pool. Cool. How's that Wendy's salary kicking in? Right? Adjust your means a little bit, man. Adjust the end to fit the means. Yeah. Sure. Oh, this is this again no one's there's no there's no there's no there's not one single for inspirational meme on the gram that says that says the end must be adjusted to the means. No one says that.

Actually, it's the opposite as far as in the inspirational quotes industry. Well, for lack of better term. It's the exact opposite. Oh, yeah, yeah. It's like, hey, basically it's like, okay, adjust them in to the means, right? Or the ends of the means, right? So it's kind of like, hey, don't freaking have this goal that's like unrealistic, essentially. Essentially, yeah.

Fact, like, it's unrealistic, right? Like, it's irresponsible. It's irresponsible. You have an irresponsible goal right there. You can, like, whatever, kill yourself doing it, right? You should go in the comment should be like, you're dumb. Should be, right, given that. Right.

But if you say it, but they'll talk about. There's someone right now that's going to hear this and be like, that's kind of bullshit, 100%. You got to fucking set your goals. You're down. Oh yeah. If you're down for the thing and I get it because.

Double tap a heart like if you want to be a, you know, for your first hundred million. Oh yeah. Yeah. Full. Oh, yeah. Oh, yeah. Right?

100%. Yes, sir. And like for a moment. They're kind of like pumped. Yeah, I'm sure they're pumped the whole time until the ends, really. But no, well, if you're the guy, if you're the guy who says this, what this book is saying, hey, like. The end must be adjusted to the means. That's a good goal.

Like, that's a lofty goal, which, you know, obviously I can't hate on lofty goals. Wait, that's not even really a lofty goal. That's just a realistic thing to do as a human. But the realistic guy. We should start making realistic human memes. Yeah. Well, in a way, you know, it's not inspirational. The first one will be the end must be adjusted to the means.

It's very not inspirational. They would get downvoted. Yeah. You'll be branded as the hater, really. Like that's the point where they'll brand you as a hater. It's like everyone's always hating. This goes into the whole idea, Dave, that you were talking about of like, about, hey, this isn't really sexy.

This is the absolute like non. This is getting downvoted. This is getting haters. And what's interesting is who you're going to, who's going to get the, up vote, right? Yeah. This person is getting, you're getting hated on it. Because you're like, actually, it's an unrealistic goal.

You should check yourself. Right. Oh, the downer, the doubter, right? Oh, yeah. The doubt or the people who do. Yeah. And the thing is, I get it because every once in a great while, you'll get someone who achieved this super lofty goal.

Not to say that they didn't adjust the ends to the means because they had the means. Apparently, at the end of the day, the means were there because the end is there too, right? But here's the thing. They had that un- Un-inspirational memes. We'll just say realistic memes. Realistic memes. Yeah, yeah.

But nonetheless they achieved that goal that was kind of un-tipped, not typically realistic. It was unrealistic, right? Comparatively speaking or whatever. And they achieved it. I mean, we could easily argue that, like, oh, this person did this because they had the meme. The means, right?

They had the intellectual horsepower. They had the educational thing. They had all these things set up. So it's actually a realistic goal. I know that. That's what I'm saying. But they'll take the crazy, quote-unquote, unrealistic ends, right? The goal will say president of the one, right?

The classic president of the United States. You can do anything you want. Well, I'm going to set my goal the highest I possibly can in life, president of the United States. Right. So they'll be like, all right, cool. therefore we should all essentially set goals as high as President of the United States, right? Okay. That's kind of the inspirational message, right?

Okay. Meanwhile, the very few individuals that became President of the United States had the means. So their ends technically, by definition, were adjusted, their ends were adjusted to the means because they had the means. You see what I'm saying? Not everyone has the means. So you've got to adjust those. Yeah, yeah, yeah. Meanwhile, everyone's saying, no, no, no, no, no.

If he can do it, I can do it too, right? Which, hey, I'm not saying they can't. I'm not even saying that. But I'm saying, hey, man, you got to be realistic on that kind of stuff. Yeah. See what I'm saying? But then if you say that, you just can't say that out loud. You know what's really crazy is, like, I just got slapped in my own face thinking about this

because we're kind of joking about this. But what he's saying and what he saw was. hundreds and hundreds of thousands of soldiers that were killed because the leadership didn't adjust the ends to the means. Totally. Which is crazy to think about. And as you guys were talking, I was thinking in my mind, like, people have figured this out. There are even phrases out there.

The one I kept thinking of as you're talking about this is, I remember the phrase, live within your means. Like, I've heard that's a phrase. what it's not is it's not hanging on a poster in any kid's bedroom anywhere. Like I don't go to bed and night like it's a nine-year-old going, I'm going to live within my means.

The irony inside that is the best way to actually ultimately expand your means over times your means get greater and greater is to do exactly that. Yeah. Like that's the trick to it is is the dissatisfaction of the reality is something people overlook.

And the, the, unfunny part of that, which is the sobering piece that you just mentioned, is that it can actually lead people down a path to do exactly what you just said, which almost seems not possible except for the fact that these, that he specifically lived that in a way that goes, what are we doing here? What are we doing? What are we expending to a con, and what are we accomplishing by doing that? So it wasn't just the national exhaustion. It was the national exhaustion with nothing to show for it. And in the scale of that, which is impossible.

As opposed to, hey, why don't we operate within our means here? Why don't we do that? Yeah. And if you fast forward, the kid, if there was a kid that had a poster on their wall that said live within your means, and therefore they're saving and they're putting together. And you look at them in 20 years and they're in a way better position than someone that was like, you know, you need the Lambo. Whatever, right?

Because they're going to end up in debt and they can't invest properly and they have to work a job that they don't really like and it's a job that's a dead end job. Like all these things add up. You said something about you being a NBA basketball player. I would say on record on a inspirational or demotivational post saying, hey, bro, that's unrealistic. I would tell you that. And I think factually it is unreal. Well, as far as factually goes, it is. unrealistic. I don't know that I would tell a high school kid that when he's really into basketball.

I don't know if I would I would say that. Like it'd be unrealistic in certain ways, like if under certain circumstance or whatever, but given like how you consider it most people, how they get into like professional sports, whatever they work hard, they really love the sport, you know, they go through trials and tribulations or whatever and they end up making it kind of a thing. So if you get someone that that's kind of in the beginning of that type of path. Right. where that path is not straight up blocked off for whatever reason like it would be in your case. I wouldn't really say that's unrealistic.

The point is there are really cases where it's unrealistic. So if you tried to be an NBA player, hired the best coach in the world. I get it. You would wind up exhausting all your resources. I should adjust my end to my ends. Yes, sir.

You might want to make sure that your kid who you don't want to stifle that dream, you might want to make sure that they're not putting all the eggs in that one basket, too. Like, hey, listen, go for it. But you're not going to drop out of school. You're not going to stop doing this and this with the ultimate meme of focus on your goals and block out every distraction. So I'm done with school because school's stupid because school ain't going to help me be an NBA player. Meanwhile, you're five, six, you're done growing.

You're not that good of a shot. But you've got this passion. You might want to keep that kid on the track of, hey, cool, I'm not here to crush your dreams. However, comma, let's consider some other things as you're doing that. Actually, you should never have a plan B. That means you're not fully committed to your plan. That's right.

You got a plan B? I guess you're not committed to plan A. Another inspirational meme for you. Actually, he addresses some of this here, going back to the book, failing a fair prospect of such a victory. So the end must be adjusted to the means. Failing a fair prospect of such a victory,

why statesmanship will miss no opportunity for negotiating peace. Peace through stalemate, based on a coincident recognition by each side of the opponent's strength is at least preferable to peace through common exhaustion and has often provided a better foundation for lasting peace. It is wiser to run risks of war for the sake of preserving peace than to run the risk of exhaustion in war for the sake of finishing with victory. A conclusion that runs counter to custom, but is supported by experience. So it's better to like, maybe we don't have war and we just kind of maintain peace with

kind of what I've got. That's a better deal than, you know what? We're just going to exhaust ourselves and hope for some kind of a victory. perseverance in war is only justifiable if there is a good chance of a good end. The prospect of a peace that will balance the sum of human misery incurred in the struggle. Each one of these statements, Dave, you just shake your head knowing where it came from. That's all I'm thinking is every one of these is what this comes from and just how savage that experience had to have been for him. Indeed, deepening the study of past experience leads to the conclusion that nations might often have come nearer to their object by taking advantage of a lull in the struggle to discuss a settlement than by pursuing the war with the aim of victory.

History. So look, man, you got to look for those opportunities. We got a little low. Hey, do you want to keep going with us? Or you want to maybe stand down. History reveals also that in many cases, a beneficial peace could have been obtained if the statesman, of the warring nations had shown more understanding of the elements of psychology in their peace feelers So you get the peace feelers out there like what let me sense about what's happening here

And people don't have good understanding of their peace they don't recognize their peace feelers Their attitude has commonly been to akin to that scene in the typical domestic coral right so now we got to fight with our wife each part of is afraid to appear yielding with the result that when one of them shows any inclination towards conciliation, this is usually expressed in language that is too stiff, while the other is apt to be slow to respond, partly from pride or obstinacy and partly from a tendency to interpret such a gesture as a sign of weakness when it may be a sign of returning to common sense. Classic, right?

I'm not going to apologize. Just say you're sorry. Yeah, just say you're sorry. They don't look weak. Thus, the faithful moment passes and the conflict continues to the common damage. We are killing ourselves over something that we could easily say, hey, look, I'm sorry, it's my fault. Rarely does a continuation serve any good purpose where the two parties are bound to go on living under the same roof. This applies even more to modern war than to domestic conflict since the industrialization of nations has made their fortunes inseparable.

It is the responsibility of statesmanship never to lose sight of the post-war prospect in chasing the mirage of victory. Where the two sides are too evenly matched to offer reasonable chance of early success to either, the statesman is wise who can learn something from the psychology of strategy. It is the elementary principle of strategy that if you find your opponent in a strong position costly to force, You should leave him a line of retreat as the quickest way of loosening his resistance. Get a person a way out. It should equally be the principle of policy, especially in war, to provide your opponent with a ladder by which he can climb down. Give people a way out.

Give your wife a way out in that argument. Give your subordinate a way out in that argument. Give your boss a way out. Don't make them dig in. Don't make them fight to the death. The question may arise as to whether, such conclusions based on the history of war between so-called civilized states applied to the conditions inherent in a renewal of the type of purely predatory war that was waged by the

barbarian assailants of the Roman Empire or the mixed religious and predatory war that was pursued by the fanatical followers of Mohammed. In such wars, any negotiated peace tends to have in itself. even less than the normal value. It is only too clear from the history that states rarely keep the faith with each other, save insofar and so long as their promises seem to them to combine with their interests.

That's a good thing to note, right? I'm not going to keep any promises if they're not for my benefit. That's what history tells us. And now we're, so now we're talking about extremists, whether it's the barbarians attacking, the Romans, or the Islamists attacking the West back in the day. But the less that a nation has regard for moral obligations, the more it tends to respect physical strength,

the deterrent power of a force too strong to be challenged with impunity. So you got somebody that's not going to, you know, you make peace with them, but you don't trust them. Guess what? You better be strong. People that don't respect the moral obligation. They respect strength. In the same way, with individuals, it is a matter of common experience that the bully type and the robber type hesitate to assail anyone who approaches their own strength.

Check. You don't see the bully picking on the big, yoked up guy with cauliflower ears. It is folly to imagine that the aggressive types, whether individuals or nations can be bought off or, in modern language, appeased, since the payment of dangled stimulates a demand for more dangles. What's dangeld you asked? It's Viking protection money. Like, hey, you can live here. I need some dangeld. You got to pay me a little bit of, you know, a little bit of something, something.

And what does that do? Makes me want more. Oh, the Viking. Yeah. I asked you, I need some protection money from you. You know, you can work this corner, but, you know, you got to give me my cut. Yeah. What does that make me want?

More cut. Yeah. So you can't buy them off. But they can be curbed. Their very belief in force makes them more susceptible to the deterrent effect of a formidable opposing force. This forms an adequate check except against pure fanaticism, a fanaticism that is unmixed. So you get pure fanaticism.

It doesn't matter if I'm going to kill you or not. You're going to come. While it is hard to make real peace with the predatory types, it is easier to induce them to accept the state of truth. and far less exhausting than an attempt to crush them whereby they are like all types of mankind infused with the courage of desperation. So we have to be strong.

You have to be strong. And look, if you're stronger than these predatory fanatics, it doesn't necessarily mean you want to go to war with them because they're going to fight desperately. But if you're strong and you can keep them check, that's sort of a good balance of power that's acceptable. I don't know how many more you've got on this, but I'm just, I'm thinking of all the things he's describing, all the behavior and the reaction, the action and the reaction.

It's all human nature. It's all, this is how they will respond to this. And the repetitiveness, and he keeps coming back to this idea, like, this is not a, this is not a sample size of one. This isn't just one thing that's happened in history. And I think that's the power of the idea of human nature is this is how people will react. This is how people will respond. And if you understand human nature, I mean, that to us is the foundation of leadership.

This is a human nature endeavor, understanding how people will react. And anytime we behave in the extremes, there will be a reaction to that. To us operating in the extremes, there will be a natural human reaction. to some other extreme. And he's like, hey, do you want to subdue human nature? Be moderate. Limit the natural reaction. Hey, have a little bit of something over here.

Have a little something here. But just listening to all those things you're saying is like, human nature, human nature, human nature, human nature. Yeah. And the response, be balanced, be balanced, be balanced. Be balanced. It's fine to be in the middle to limit to, to minimize the reaction that you're going to get. Total war. Cool.

You win. Guess what you got now. You got an insurgency. It's going to last. for 20 years. Yeah. And is that really what you want? Or could you maybe operate with some restraint,

understanding that what you're really trying to do is not beat them. What you're really trying to do is create a piece for a couple of decades, maybe? Could you think of the long game here? Again, that's probably not going on a poster somewhere. You're not getting recruited into the Marine Corps with that one. Here's a little, maybe a little warning for us. The experience of history brings ample evidence. that the downfall of civilized states tends to come not from the direct assaults of foes,

but from internal decay combined with the consequences of exhaustion in war. Yeah, that's a little warning. A state of suspense is trying. And his usage of the word suspense there is like mental indecision. A state of suspense or mental indecision is trying. It has often led nations as well as individuals to commit suicide because they were unable to bear it. But suspense is better than to reach exhaustion in pursuit of the mirage of victory. That's a bold statement.

So indecision can be so bad, this existence of indecision can be so bad that you can destroy yourself. You can kill yourself. You want to kill yourself. but that's actually better than to just exhaust yourself completely in pursuit of a victory that can't be had what's kind you know what's counterintuitive about that is you know this idea that humans we need a goal we need something to go towards right we need a goal we need something we want to struggle we want to fight what he's saying here is like well let's think twice about that one.

Let's think twice about that one. And I think it's probably because he understands what the true exhaustion of a state looks like on a scale that most people can't comprehend. Yeah. And he said this before. The mirage of victory. The mirage. What you are seeing, this goal that you're working towards, it's actually not a thing.

It's not a real thing. It's a mirage. And you've convinced yourself, victory for me is I defeat Jocko. That's victory. And I am going to move towards that until it happens. But that's actually not a real thing. It's not a real thing. Yeah, it's not a real thing.

And what you'll end up with is an insurgency. Or exhaustion. Or whatever else. Or you'll rule over the barren wasteland that I left. Right. Moreover, a truce to actual hostilities enables a reconnaissance. and development of strength while the need for vigilance keeps a nation on its toes So we're looking for a truce. It's okay peaceful nations are apt however to court unnecessary danger

Because when once aroused they are more inclined to proceed to extremes than predatory nations Interesting, right this is like the guy that's sort of quiet keeping to himself But when you piss them off you know then they freaking go ham. That's a technical definition as well. For the latter, making war as a means of gain are usually more ready to call it off when they find an opponent too strong or too easily overcome.

And this is really the last point for this book that we're going to talk about. It is the reluctant fighter, impelled by emotion and not by calculation, who tends to press a fight to the bitter end. Thereby, he too often defeats his own end, even if he does not produce his own direct defeat. For the spirit of barbarism can be weakened only during a cessation of hostilities.

War strengthens it, pouring fuel on the flames. So by attacking people, by attacking people, by attacking the barbarians. When we attack them, we make them stronger. We make them fight harder. War makes them stronger. Makes them fight, makes them resist. Pores fuel in the flames.

We can only weaken them by backing off a little bit. Again, this is not the recruiting poster. And it's so counterintuitive. It's so counterintuitive to the natural reaction of push harder. be more dominant to get to get the outcome that you want so look we're we're here for the truce we're we're here for the compromise like it's just it's so counterintuitive to what we what we preach what we want which is total total victory I like total victory that sounds good it's a mirage

yeah just never compromise you know no compromise that's a that's another great you know inspirational me because there's that say hey it's really good to compromise oftentimes and kind of take what you can get and work out a good deal and you know that's fair We're gonna get hammered for this. Oh, yeah, some inspirational mean people are gonna be mad at us Yeah, and what's crazy is I mean you probably you know open up a discipline equals freedom field manual We'll pull out some stuff like this I got all kinds of stuff in there getting crazy Right? Sure.

Are you to make me crack it open and start reading some? No, I'm not. Guilty as charged. I'm kind of wanting to. Well, the good thing about your book is that it's not like you've done a good job, whether it be in the book itself or. Compromise. Page 32, Discipline equals Freedom Field Manual.

When working with other people in dynamic. Oh, this is, see, this is kind of cool. Here's what it says. This is just the first thing I opened up to. When working with other people and dynamic situations and relationships and deals, a person, especially a leader, must compromise. Finding the common ground between teams, merging different approaches to the same problem, bridging personalities with people who might not get along,

reaching agreements in courses of action. All of these require compromise. And in many cases, a failure to compromise is a failure to succeed. I guess maybe I'm wrong. Yep. I mean, maybe I'm wrong about me writing stuff that's inspirational meme crap. But those are external compromises with other people, other humans that have their own personalities and ethos and issues. And compromises needed to unify.

So work with them compromise. So to work with them compromises a must. Not with yourself. And then I wait. But internally, it's different. With myself, I have to hold the line. There are areas within myself where I cannot compromise. I'm going to work hard.

I'm going to train hard. I'm going to improve myself. I'm not going to rest on my laurels. I'm going to confront my own mistakes. I'm going to own my mistakes and confront them. I'm going to face my demons. I'm not going to give up or give out or give in. I'm going to stand.

I'm going to maintain my self-discipline. And on those points, there will be no compromise. Not now, not ever. Whoa. It's pretty inspiration. Pretty, uh, we might go. meme on that one. Sure.

Yeah, if you go from the headline to the conclusion there and skip the content in the middle where it says compromise, not now, not ever. You got a little clause with seeing an issue here where your disciples were like, I didn't quite read the context, but I saw the page that said compromise.

You know how it ended? It said, not now, not ever. It's not good. I think if we go through this book, here's one called fight. Go down swinging. And I'll tell you, if you fight with all you have

more often than not, you won't go down at all. You will win. But you have to make that attitude part of your everyday life. Do the extra repetition. Run the extra mile. Go the extra round. Make the right choices.

Give the full measure. I'm in the game. I think I'm in the inspirational meme game. Yeah, you are. But I was going to say, it's like, yeah, yeah, you do that. But the good thing about having a whole book and a whole podcast and eight million other books or whatever, you're going to explain the whole situation rather than just have. the one post. You see what you're saying? Yeah. I mean, look, the entire book is predicated. I think

the opening salvo you have is this is about you. And you say, I am nothing but weakness. I am nothing but flaws. I am nothing but these things. So this is the, this is the, this is what you are with yourself, with self-discipline as opposed to how I'm going to treat other people around me. Yes, this is aimed internally. Totally. I mean, in a literal sense. And that fight is against, I mean, it's even in the video that we show it at the most, I am nothing but weakness. And I'm going to fight against that weakness, that compromise, all those things that my mind is telling me to do to myself, which is, I think also you could look at in the terms like the difference between imposed discipline and self-discipline. Imposed discipline does not work and self-discipline does. It's simple as that.

and as we impose ourselves on other people in war, in leadership, in parenting, and insert any human interaction, human and another human, when you impose your discipline, when you impose yourself on them,

in the end you will lose. But it's much more efficient just to impose your way. Yeah, it's faster. Oh, man. So there we go. That's what we're going to cover for this book.

I've kind of, I guess, foreshadowed some of the other things we'll do in the future. and it's one of those things. If you can take these lessons, these lessons written in blood, not just in one war,

but in war after war after war, and the exclamation point of World War I, you can learn a lot and you can apply this, and we know that it's not as striking, we know it's not as sexy, we know it's not as meme-worthy, as some of the more direct approaches. We know that.

But this is, to give the original name, this is how to win wars. With that, speaking of winning wars, Echo Charles, we want to, you know, win the war on ourselves. We do. Yeah, that, you know, when you say win, Wars, right? Win wars. You don't, this is one of the takeaways that I think, hey, dang, that's something good to remember. Where when you think about warfare and winning the war, you don't think about the peace that afterwards, you know, like the aftermath. So I grew up on Kauai.

You know that. So the thing about Kauai is like, if you get in a fight with someone and you don't resolve it in a peaceful way, I don't care how. I don't care if it's the kind, hey, we don't like each other for no good reason. And we just fight him like, okay, we're cool. We're cool. We fight. and we're done. If you don't resolve it in some peaceful way, you got to deal with somebody's cousin, somebody's brother, somebody's, you know, whoever neighbor who's just down for the cause or whatever,

and you're going to see him again, too. That's the thing. You go to the store, he's going to be there, like next week or whatever, you know? So it's kind of one of those things where it's kind of in the back of your mind. If I'm going to fight this guy,

I sort of got to deal with that, contend with that long, that long game, you know? Is there a methodology to get that resolved post-fight? Yeah, I think so. I mean, all the fights I've ever been in have never been like lasting like it'd be like a fight and then we're friends afterwards but I was a kid so I have very little I had very little understanding of

that but nonetheless the point is where that's something when we think of warfare we think of oh defeat crush your enemies having driven before you see what I'm saying and we don't think about that oh wait you know you got your neighbor his freaking dog or whatever is barking his tree is growing over your fence and you're getting you guys are warring years it's like bray you don't have to do that you know you got to live next to that guy when you go to the post office or whatever you go to your car and you see him getting in his car too you're like oh it's all awkward or whatever like bray you don't have to do it like that you know are you really going to achieve the piece that you hoped for by beating this dude's ass right now yeah well chances are you're not really if you

think a little bit chances are you're not thinking hey i'm going to go the distance right now Like I'm ready to just go I'm ready to go all in I'll fight every Cousin nephew brother sister no I don't care like but that's where you can end up Yeah we don't want we don't want to in fact that's a common thing especially like with the neighbors or whatever I'm gonna tell them all it's usually that kind where I'm gonna tell them off I'm not gonna take that from him or her whatever And meanwhile 10 20 30 years you're worrying with this neighbor right next door by the way the feud The feud that's yeah it's total total common thing you know when all you got to do is be like hey like you know make a peaceful discourse and you guys can live

neighborly you see what I'm saying preferable but anyway yeah so the point is like thinking about that aftermath or considering that it's a thing you know I'm gonna do that like if you roll with someone in jiu jitza and you fight dirty because you want to win you know do that stuff then when you're done rolling you tap them out hell yeah everyone's talking about you oh yeah you dirty nobody respects you nobody likes you in the community It's true. You've got to be careful with that kind of stuff. All right.

So how can we, you know, win the war that we're all fighting kind of on an individual basis day to day? With unmitigated daily discipline in all things. I like it. I like it. So when I say daily discipline, I mean the energy drink. So it's healthy for you. And it gives you the payoff that you'd expect from an energy drink. So I'm saying?

So this is good news for us. Anyway, so on this path that we're all on, we need some supplementation. We could benefit from supplementation, right? So we got Jocko Fuel to the rescue in a sense. Got energy drinks for you, healthy, good, short term and long term. We got protein, additional protein. Tastes real good. We got dessert, basically.

Dessert. That's good for you. Yeah, good short term, good long term. The aftermath of the milk of the protein, the dessert, it's good aftermath. It's a peaceful truth. That's a very peaceful truth. Yes, sir. Also, when your joints act up, when your immunity acts up, we got some stuff for that as well.

How about you don't let your joints act up? How will we get into a continual state of peace with our joints? Yeah, yeah, like, because that's what I'm thinking. Because to wait, waiting for your joints to act up as a bad call. And I was about to say preemptive strike on your joints. Yeah. I mean, you're like, hey, I bet a cooperative, you know, you're going down like the right path there. I'm like preemptive strike.

Yeah, yeah. See, you're more attuned with the Marine Corps recording poster as opposed to the- It is called joint warfare. It is called joint warfare. I know, bro. Preemptive strike on joint issues. Joint issues. Yeah, you got to beat them down.

Beat them into submission. Yes. Beat inflammation into submission with joint warfare. Don't wait until you have joint issues. That's a dumb call. That's what Echo Charles just told you to do. I'm here to help. hope.

I'm just saying, hey, if you don't want to worry about joint issues, you take the joint warfare and the super cruel oil. Yes. That's it. If you don't want to worry about colds or sicknesses or flus or whatever, you take the vitamin D3, you take the cold war. That's going to help you. Yeah.

Preemptive strike. Preemptive strike. Go to war. Total war. Yeah. Fully. So you can get all the stuff at vitamin shop. You can get all the energy drinks at Wawa, and you can get all of, you can get all of, you

can get all of everything on joccofuel.com. And if, look, if you want to save a little bit of money and you want to save brainpower, get a subscription. Get a subscription to whatever you want. It'll show up at your house once a month. Boom. There's the Mulk. There's the joint warfare.

There's the Super Grill. It's coming in. Coming out, you don't worry about it. You can focus on something else. You can prioritize and execute some other tasks. Yep. Speaking of brain power, origin, USA. They got some American-made stuff.

How's that to do with brain power? Right, you know what I'm talking about. Don't act like you don't know. American-made denim as far as jeans go. I was going to call you on a couple of those last podcast. Speaking of whatever, I'm going to talk about something totally different. That's sort of like become your new mode. Yeah, because you've got to make the association.

You know what I'm saying? Speaking of pickles. That's the brainpower. Origin. USA.com. You can get some jeans. American-made denim. That's a big deal.

As far as American-based. made stuff goes you got the denim you got your jeans you got your geese rash guards you got athletic wear you got belts you got boots all made in america origin USA boom see see what I'm saying about the brain power yeah that was definitely had a lot to do with brain power also speaking of a lot of brain power you expended making that connection is pretty ridiculous speaking of ridiculous jaco has a store is half a watt it's called jaco store if you your discipline equals freedom shirts right merch as far as merch goes you know shirt that says good on it boom you can get it there you get all kinds of stuff uh hats shirts shirts hats

hoodies rush guards still sell the shirt with your head on it do you still sell the shirt with your head on it you design that shirt you still sell that shirt with your head on it yeah we still sell it cool best seller really yes uh it sells double the amount of the one with your head on it if you must know nonetheless yes the shirt that Jaku design with my head is on it on there a bunch of other stuff on there as well

we have a subscription situation for the shirt some other shirts they're exclusive I said it exclusive okay it's called the shirt locker if you're part of the short locker you have you get one of these shirts every month it's a new their new kind of creative for lack of better term designs

if you're not part of the short locker you don't get them sorry it's like the nature of the locker See what I'm seeing. Okay. You went a little more simple this time, which was good. I appreciated the simplicity of it. You still can't describe what the shirts are with any, with any sensible words.

Well, some things can't be explained. That's even better. That's even better. I like that. Yeah. You even say, look, I can't really explain this, but trust me, you know, you're going to want one of these shirts. Okay. These shirts cannot be explained, Jocco.

They can only be experienced. Dang. So you make this choice. Whether or not you experience it by you wearing them or by you seeing someone else wear them. That's up to you. That part is up to you. I think you either regret what you have done or what you have not done. I think it's going to be a lot.

A lot more regret on what you have not done. I think so too. You see somebody representing in a shirt. We're like, oh, that's cool. I'm going to pick one of those up. You can't. It's true. Yeah.

That's what the field is telling me as far as feedback goes. So, yeah, I agree. The field now. They're fueled now. The field, you know, the people. Check this out. The field. Anyway, like I said, jocco store.com.

That's where you can get this cool stuff. Speaking of cool stuff. Yeah. You can subscribe to this podcast if you want to. Because Echo seems to think that you haven't to subscribe to it yet. Because you've been listening to 285 episodes, 287 episodes. That's where you're at. You're like, you know what?

Maybe today's the night. Maybe I want to get down. Hold on. Let me whip out my iPhone and just hit Sub. Subscribe. Smash the subscribe button. Button. I don't think that's the way it's going.

But yeah. So anyways, we got this podcast. We got the Jocko Unravelling Podcast with D.C. Darryl Cooper of Martyr Made fame. We got the grounded podcast. We got the Warrior Kid podcast. We also have Jock Underground where we have a sovereign location, a virtual sovereign location,

where we will not be. impeded upon by forces, we will do what we want in the jocco underground. Look, hey, here's what's going on in the world. There's things happening on these platforms. There's things happening in these platforms. We don't control the platforms. We don't control the platforms. There's a possibility that things could happen that could hurt what we're trying to do,

whether they start charging you money to listen on these platforms, whether they start inserting advertisements into the middle of us talking about World War I or Vietnam. And all of a sudden you're listening to an advertisement about mattresses. Right? So we don't want to have that happen. We definitely don't want to be censored for whatever reason. So we've got to have an alternative platform. We made our own jocco underground.com.

Look, hopefully we never have to go to it. It's possible. But if we do, we'll be ready, and we appreciate the support to get us ready. If you want to subscribe to that, we do a little extra podcast, and we answer a bunch of questions. We give some amplifying information. If you want to join it, it costs $8.18 a month. And if you can't afford that, it's cool. Email assistance at jocco underground.com.

We're just trying to. We're here to hook you up if you need it. But we appreciate you hooking us up as well. Freedom isn't free, by the way. Yep. We got to maintain that freedom. We got a YouTube channel. Speaking of smashing the subscribe button.

And freedom. Speaking of post, like, and comment. What is it? Post, subscribe. Subscribe, like, and comment. Yeah. Wouldn't it be annoying if the, like every video, that's what somebody's got to put in the front of it.

Like and subscribe, that's what it is. And hit the notification. Comment, too. No, they say comment. Oh, yeah, and plus it to know. What are you doing, dude? Let me know in the comments. Yeah, let me know in the comments.

And they always have some dumb thing to talk about. Yes, most of the time. Yeah, you know, I was thinking, if you want to see more videos like this, go make, let me know in the comments. Shut up, bro. What are you talking about? You know what you're, we'll just say, I'm not going to say you're salty. I'm not going to say that.

You're salty, but that's not what I'm saying. The reason that you feel what I think that you're feeling right now about that is because it's like it's super obvious like what they're doing they want to like they want the intel for the algorithm right the more they want the engagement right obviously they want the comments they want the likes they want to because that's for the algorithm so they can rate their video higher so they can whatever and you we know that we know that we're not even mad at that really kind of mad at it but they're no but the I think we or you are mad quote unquote at the part where they try to like fake

like that's not it they try to fake like oh yeah you let me know all it you know you're talking to each other we're friends almost kind of a feeling and you're like you don't want to know you don't want to know what I think you know that's what it feels like I can't read the guy's mind so I don't know if you really want to know or not but that's how it feels that's why I feel it too well I'm I don't say uh in the videos like comment but I read the comments because they're funny they are funny and they're good and some of them are interesting yeah it's true I've gotten some good tips on books to cover and stuff from YouTube comments, literally.

That's kind of crazy, right? Yeah. So I'll read the comments because they're interesting. They're funny. Yeah, YouTube comments kind of have a reputation. Well, not kind of straight up. YouTube comments have the rep, the stigma of being like a cesspool of just like unreasonable negativity. But I think usually with our stuff, they can be constructive most of the time.

I'm down. Yep. So if you want to leave a comment, leave a comment. leave a comment like subscribe smash anyway yes the point is we do have a YouTube channel so if you want to look at that bowl there you go also Psychologic Warfare is an album that Jocco did I recorded back in the day for the purpose of yeah very hard no man it was I recorded it it was very helpful literally pressed record bro yeah that's what recording is you press record on the thing you think everybody's like super pumped on that I think they're

very impressed yeah nonetheless Okay. It was recorded for the purpose of helping me through my moments of weakness. Then we added some other stuff about weaknesses that I don't have, but that other people might have, which turned out to be the case. So yeah, if you have some moments of weakness,

you want to listen to Jocko telling you how to get over and boom, psychological warfare. If you want to see a visual representation of how to stay on the path, go to Flipsidecanvas.com. Dakota Meyer, his company. He's putting all stuff, kind of cool stuff to hang on your wall.

It's good stuff. And plus it's Dakota Meyer, which is just, well, it's Dakota Meyer. Got some books. Final Spin. Coming out soon. Well, coming out in November. Is that soon? Depending on when you're listening to this.

So final spin, novel, book, poem, transcript. What did the other thing you called it? Text. Text. The text. Literature. Literature. Sure.

Hell yeah. If you want that first to dish, get on it. Leadership strategy and tactics. The code. The Evaluation of Protocol. Disciplineers Freedom Field Manual read a little bit of that today Way the Warrior Kid one, two, and three for your kids for your neighbors kids Just for every kid that you know get them on the path when they're young Mikey and the dragons about face by Hackworth Which I wrote the forward to extreme ownership and the dichotomy leadership

Eschelon front what do we do at Eschlam front Dave? We solve your problems to leadership That's what we do what about problems that aren't leadership problems if I've said it once I've said it a thousand times All your problems are leadership problems. I stole that though. Who'd you do it from? Somebody. Go to Eschelonfront.com.

If you need help inside your company, that's what we do. We have eFonline.com where we teach leadership principles online. This is your leadership gym. That's where you go in and get some sets, get some reps. Get it done. Work up a little leadership sweat. Do some role playing. Ask some questions.

We're there all the time. We have a conference that we put on. I don't know if that's the best word, but we have an event that we do. I don't even know if that's the right word. Anyways, there's a thing you can come to, which is called the muster. We talk about leadership for two days.

We do activities. Come and check it out. Phoenix, August 17th and 18th, Las Vegas, October 28th and 29th. We have something called the FTX coming up July 12th and 13th. If you want to check that out, it's tactical training with the emphasis on leadership. And you can take the leadership principles that we talk about all the time and imply them in a tactical environment, which will then you will then be able to transfer to whatever environment you're in. And if you want to help service members active and retired, their families, Gold Star families, check out Mark Lee's mom.

Mama Lee. She's got a charity organization and if you want to donate or you want to get involved and then go to America's mighty warriors Dot com.org. Sorry and if you want to hear If you want to hear more of this of my cringingly long just reading of texts If you want to hear echo Charles randomly ranting about God knows what. If you want to hear Dave getting hyped up

on things that don't matter, find us on the interwebs, on Twitter, on the Graham, on Facebook. Echo is at Echo Charles. Dave is at David R. Burke and I am at Jaka Willink.

And to all of the uniformed personnel out there in the military, who take these strategies and put them into action to protect our way of life. Thank you for what you do. And to our police and law enforcement, firefighters, paramedics, EMTs, dispatchers, correctional officers, border patrol, secret service, and all first responders. Thank you for protecting our way of life here at home.

And to everyone else out there, remember that Napoleon, the great military leader, Napoleon Bonaparte Remember that he pursued His vision apiece For 20 years of war And ended up Defeated and in exile Don't do that

Don't do that Think strategic Adjust your ends to your means Make sure you can actually win Make sure you can actually win Make sure you can see that pathway to victory make sure you can see those pathways plural to victory and then start down that path and give it everything you got and until next time this is Dave

and Echo and Jocko out