Jocko Podcast - 295: When Things Change, Don't Get Caught Back On Your Heels. With General Don Bolduc.

Episode Date: August 17, 2021

0:00:00 - Opening0:04:00 - General Don Bolduc3:27:54 - How to stay on THE PATH.3:53:32 - Closing gratitude.Support this podcast at — https://redcircle.com/jocko-podcast/exclusive-content

This is Jocko podcast number 295 with Echo Charles and me Jocko Willink. Good evening, Echo. Good evening. On November 14th, 2001, the troops of General Fahim Khan rolled into Kabul and liberated the city from five years of despotic rule by the Taliban. To win over the Pashtuns in the South and begin operations against the Taliban, the coalition planned to insert two ODAs, near the city of Kandahar. Major Donald Bulldoch was a member of Special Operations Command and Control Element 52, which had tactical control of the two ODAs.

Bulldoch explained the mission, quote, basically from November 2001 until complete, we were able to provide C2 and conduct unconventional warfare in order to advise and assist Hamid Karzai and Ghul Shersai in organizing anti-Taliban forces, which was what they were called at the time, and to conduct combat operations against the Taliban and al-Qaeda forces, end quote. Bulldoch further described the key tasks that the ODA had to accomplish with their Afghan partners. We were to secure Kandahar City, develop a plan to stabilize Kandahar City,

and operate from a secure base. and then concentrically improve that security from Kandahar City, which was considered the cultural and religious center of gravity out to other provinces in the south, and then on order, exfiltrate the operational area. Coalition leaders also understood that they could not simply leave the area once Kandahar was out of the Taliban grip, but had to set conditions for the next phase of the campaign. Major Bulldoch asserted that the end state for the ODAs was the creation of a, quote, stable, safe, and secure Kandahar City, ready to transition to more formalized humanitarian assistance and nation building operations. And that right there is a excerpt from a document that was written by the Combat Studies Institute Press out of the U.S.

School at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, and the document is called a different kind of war. The United States Army in Operation Enduring Freedom from October 2001 to September 2005. And when you think about that segment that I opened up with, that's 14 November, that's just over two months after September 11th, 2001, 60 days. And in that minimal amount of time, America went from peace and relative tranquility to war and to chaos. And men in the military who had been planning another standard day at work or preparing for another training exercise or maybe planning to take a billet where they could go get some more time with their family. suddenly these men were at war. The opening piece I read mentioned Major Don Bulldoch.

He was obviously one of those men that shipped off to Afghanistan to begin trying to sort that place out. And that first deployment in 2001 was just the beginning for him. Over the following years, he would deploy to Afghanistan over and over and over again, and also to Iraq and other parts of the world that were under threat. And that major would finish out his career as a brigadier general. And it's an honor to have him here tonight to share some of his experiences and lessons learned. General Bulldoch, thank you for joining us. Well, thank you for having me.

It's an honor to be here. You know, as I was reading that and just saw that date of November 14th, 2001, and I I was in the military at that time, but to think of the radical transformation that was about to take place and how quickly we went from this sort of peacetime military to a wartime military and all that that entailed. That's a heavy situation. Let's do this. Let's rewind a little bit and learn a little bit about you, where you came from, how you grew up. sort of how you ended up in the situation that you're in right now. Sure.

So let's start at the beginning. So the beginning, I was born in Laconia, New Hampshire. I've been a resident of the state of New Hampshire for 59 years, and I'm 59 years old. I learned my work ethic on our family farm in Guilford, New Hampshire. We had a dairy farm. We had a vegetable farm, maple syrup. The farm has been in existence since 17. 79. Our family is the second owner of that farm. My grandfather bought it in 18, my great-grandfather

bought it in 1899, coming down from Canada. And my grandfather had 13 children and my dad was seven of the 13. And what our Spaldics did was we worked farm. That's how we learned, right? We planted gardens, chopped wood. You know, back in the day, in the deep snow, my brother and I, like, we had our harnesses and we would pull the sleds and we would dump the maple syrup into the container. Now it's all done by gravity through plastic pipes right into the sap house. before it was done by good old-fashioned grandchildren, right?

You know, and so I wouldn't trade that for anything. It got me tough in the winter, tough in the summer, tough in the fall. I built more stone walls than I needed to do, so moving rocks from point A to point B was never a problem. I went to Catholic school and got my butt kicked by nuns on a regular basis. And so when I went to basic training in 1981 after high school, what are they going to do to me? Wake me up early? Yell at me? I don't know how many times my dad told me I was about as useful as a snowball in hell.

You know what I mean? But he loved me, right? He was just trying to prepare me for the world. You know, it's not going to be easy out there. You've got to use your head, right? What made you enlist in the Army? My grandfather on the Baltic side had a policy that all Baltic males will serve their country. He didn't care if it was the National Guard Reserves active duty or what service it was,

but you will serve, and if you don't serve, you're not welcome. And he never served because when he got here, he was too old. He was too old for World War I. But he, nonetheless, I had uncles that served World War II. Korea, Vietnam, every conflict the Baltics have been in since World War II, right? And we didn't get here until 1899, and so my grandfather had to establish some children and some grandchildren before he could start populating the U.S. military. But when I went into my recruiter in the 11th grade because I knew I had to do it,

So I went in in 11th grade, and at that time they had the delayed entry program where if you joined early, you got credit for that service. Plus, you went in as a mosquito wing private, you know, instead of just a slick sleeve private, right? Which was like, you know, $5 more a month, right? And back then it was – Double your basic pay. That's right. Back then it was $200 a month, so I was pretty happy, right? So it was good.

And, you know, before – that, though, in high school, I joined the police cadet program in La Coney in New Hampshire. And it's a funny story how that started, right? I was in 10th grade, and we were walking over from high school. It was after school, but before we had to leave for a football game. And it was an away game. And I was walking over with a group of the guys over to the little store to pick up some chow for the bus, right? And I, there was this Coke can set up perfectly right on the curb of the road. And I thought, man, I'm going to go kick that.

So I started talking about, you know, five seconds left in the game, blah, blah, blah, you know. And I kicked that ball. I kicked that can. And it hit the side of a police cruiser, parked at the light. And so I know him now, Sergeant B. and I's, jumps out of that car, and he is pissed off. And everybody get on the ground, so we're all laying on the ground. And he's like, who did it?

So I raised my hand. I go, I did it, sir. And he puts me in the back of the cruiser and yelling at the other kids and, you know, my friends. And they ran off and I'm sitting in the cruiser. And he goes, so what did you do that for? I explained a little bit of what I was doing, and he said, all right, sounds like an accident to me. He goes, have you ever heard of the police cadet program? I go, no, sir.

He goes, well, I think you'd be a good kid for that program, right? Because you had enough balls to own up to it, you know? And I said, all right, so I did it, and I got selected, and I started out, and I really loved it. So in 1980, a year before I graduate from high school, I had the opportunity to go through the part-time police academy program. And so I did it, and I ended up getting qualified as a police officer. So when I went into my senior year at 18 years old, I was a qualified police officer working for Laconia Police Department. And I did that for a year before I went into the office. Army and went into the Army from 81 to 84. And were you active duty? I was active duty. Okay. It's basically

a little bit like a break for you because you're not out on the dairy farm. That's right. It's a huge break. Well, it's a huge break because it's not, you know, you can imagine being a police officer while you're in your senior year of high school. Mr. Popular? That's right. Mr. Popular. Every party that got busted up was my fault. You know, I obviously had inside information that I passed on to the police. And it doesn't work that way, right? I mean, we don't care about parties, but your neighbors do, particularly when it gets too loud, right? So they call.

And I just couldn't get that point across. But nonetheless, you know, after serving as a police officer and, you know, I mean, you know, my dad was a taskmaster, right? I mean, he was a strong, good man who is no longer with us, but nonetheless, served 35 years as a city councilman and mayor for our city, school board, just a great pillar of the community in addition to being a, you know, a guy that would do anything for anybody. And so anyways, I learned all that stuff, but working on the dairy farm, you know, Haying.

Haying is the worst thing you can do in the world, right? I mean, I hated haying season. When July rolled around, I prayed for rain because you can't hang in the rain. But it didn't happen, right? I had a guy who was a new guy, came to work for me when I was at SEAL Team 7, and he was a hardworking kid up, ready to move sandbags, fill sandbags, move steel around, dump ammo, pickup ammo, Whatever I need him to do finally after a couple weeks and I'm not too impressed you have to be a really hard worker To impress me and after a few weeks I said to him I said hey man you're because I he had he had kind of just shown up in my

Patoon he didn't go through our workup or anything he was a new guy just showed up in Iraq He showed up in Iraq and he's working his ass off and I look at him one day and I said hey you're you're you're a hard worker Where are you from and he said I grew up in a dairy farm in Minnesota And I said well I appreciate your hard work he said he's said, sir, I'll do whatever you want me to do as long as it doesn't have anything to do with cows. And he told me his schedule it. He was up at 4 o'clock in the morning every day to milk cows, get home in the afternoon, after wrestling practice, milk cows.

And it was, I don't know what he had, but 300 or 400 cows he had to milk. So the dairy farm seems to breed some hard work. Yeah. Well, you know, after practice, whether it was baseball or football or whatever happened to be, my dad said I'll see at the farm and so I would jog from the high school up Moral Street to the farm

and did whatever he asked me to do up on the farm right and so when I got to basic training and met Sard & Mules my basic training drill instructor you want me to make my bed you want me to do this you want me to do that

you know I was up before he threw the trash can down the aisle because that's just the way it was. And he, you know, he would say to me, Balik, you don't sleep. I go, and I'd say, well, drill sardin, I do sleep, but I don't require much, right? And, you know, so, yeah, that kind of hard work did it. And then the discipline that the nuns instilled in me,

I mean, come on, right? Sister Lucille, right? I mean. She sounds scary. She is scary. She was a flaming redhead. none that just scared the hell out of me. And she got her pound of flesh out of me.

Were you an athlete in high school? I was. What sports did you play? I played football, baseball, and basketball. And I was told, you're too small to play football. But by my sophomore year, I was starting on the varsity team. Too short to play basketball, but I was a starting guard on the basketball team. I was, they told me I couldn't pitch, but I ended up being a pitcher because my arms were too short and I wasn't tall enough and I couldn't get a good stretch off the mound.

But, you know, so I think the farmer in me, you know, don't tell me I can't do something kind of thing, right? Because I'm going to try and prove you wrong. So anyways, you know. When you enlisted in the Army, did you do it? Did you plan on, was it a career? Was it reserves or was it active? No, it actually, it was active duty. Okay.

But my plan was to, you know, pursue law enforcement. So when I was coming out of the Army in 1984, I was a sergeant, and I was going to ROTC, green to gold program, not to go on active duty, but it was through the National Guard. And they were going to pay for my education, and I was going to get my commission through ROTC, through ROTC, not to go on active duty, but it was through the National Guard. education and I was going to get my commission through ROTC. The beauty part about prior services you don't have to do the first two years of ROTC because you've got basic training and AIT under your belt. So you started your junior and senior years, right? And I didn't, I didn't anticipate making it a career at all. I wanted to be in law enforcement, but I got called down to my company commander's office and my first sergeant was there, first sergeant,

Kingston and Captain Jeffrey L. Ames was there and he I reported to him position of attention and he said, Sergeant Baldock, I know you're getting out. But I want to talk to you about that because I think you should stay in. I think you should reenlist and I you just came down on drill sardin orders and you should go be a drill sergeant. He goes, what are your plans? And so I just explain to him what I explained to you and he said, yeah, I just don't see you being successful as an officer. He said, you're enlisted material. You're a sergeant major in the making, you know. He said, I think you should stay in and you should follow that track, because you're going to have the most success with that. And again, this little light in the back of my head, did you just tell me

I can't do something, right, kind of thing? And my, you know, I took his advice and I said, thank you, sir, very much, but I followed a different path. Well, Sergeant, first Sergeant Kingston calls me out into his office. He puts me in a front-leaning arrest position, and he says, You count loud to 50. And he gets down real close to my ear, and he goes, hey, listen, he goes, you take and you go to ROTC, and then when you get commissioned, you find wherever this captain is in the United States Army, and you take those bars and you put it somewhere the sun doesn't show. That's what he says to me. And I go, yes, first sergeant, as I'm, you know, 22. for a time, 23.

And, you know, he's so he's like, he's like, get up. So I get up, and he dismisses me. I am a first lieutenant in special forces training at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, and who's the command sergeant major of the 16th military police brigade? Sergeant, Command Sergeant Major, Kingston. So here I am, a first lieutenant in SF training, and I called his office, and I told him who I was, and I asked if I could come over and have a meeting with him,

So they did that, and I went over and I met with him. And he was so happy to see me, right? He goes, have you found Captain Ames? And I go, no. And he goes, you know, he's a lieutenant colonel now. And I go, no, I didn't know it. I haven't tracked his career. But anyways, he goes, I remember that day.

That was hilarious. And he goes, I'm glad you're doing well. You're in special forces training. He goes, that's really great. And so we, you know, it's just, I didn't plan on going back on active duty, but I did well in ROTC, and I qualified for an active, you know, regular Army commission. And I said, you know what? This is 1988, and it is not looking good for jobs out there, right?

So I said, ah, I'll just go in the Army, and we'll see how that goes. And I really didn't anticipate staying too long as an officer, you know, fulfill my requirement, you know. and, you know, perhaps get out. But as time went on and I went in Special Forces. Were you, so what was your job as an officer? Were you an infantry officer? I was, I got commissioned into the Chemical Corps, which was another thing. I was like, what the heck?

You know, I graduated number one from Northeastern University Liberty Battalion. I was number one. And the explanation I got is, well, you know, the quality has got to be spread out across the Army. and it's based on needs of the Army. So I was like, okay, sounds like a good explanation. So what was it, chemical officer? Chemical officer.

Nuclear biological and chemical officer. But you know what? When I was looking to get out after my requirement, wow. That's some good opportunities. Big bucks, great opportunities. I was like, well, the good Lord was smiling on me. Because, you know, and I went to Ranger School and I did all those things that you're supposed to do. So when I showed up at the combat arms units, right, I had the, you know, I wasn't just a support guy, right?

You know, okay, this guy prior enlisted, ranger school graduate, you know, airborne school, you know, the whole nine yards. And so it just gave you more credibility. And as an enlisted guy, served in the fourth ID in the second airborne. So I had that in my background. And so it was all good. But, you know, yeah, chemical core, you get put on the battalion staff and you have to do the, you know, you get, you get all the, you know, nobody's really interested in doing nuclear biological and chemical training.

So you get, you know, you get all the, you know, the interesting assignments. And I did those with a smile on my face and the best of my ability. And then, you know, I was the first chemical officer to make it through special forces, selection, and training. So did you, at what point did you learn about special forces? Well, I learned about special forces in 19. 1968 when I watched the Green Beret movie with my grandfather. And so I was like, oh, wow, John Wayne, the Green Berets, you know.

So it was always something in the back of my mind. And then I was in Korea on my first lieutenant assignment, and the Green Beret recruiters showed up. And I went, and I said, I'm going to do that. And so that's what I did. Where were you in the first Gulf War happened? I was in 10 Special Forces Group. Okay.

And so we did that there, and then we rotated over to provide comfort, the humanitarian assistance thing up in northern Iraq, which was great experience with the Kurds. And, yeah, so, I mean, God just kept opening up these little doors for me to, like, you know, scoot through. And before I knew it, it was, you know, I was a major on my way to command. General Staff College and halfway to retirement, you know, 20 years. And I had a few extra years because of enlisted time. So I was like, you know, hey, if I make it to Lieutenant Colonel, I'm going to be doing pretty damn good.

So I was pretty happy about that. So you went through special forces in what year through the selection? I went through selection in 1992, February of 1992. How was that? Was it challenging for you? enjoy it? Was it what you expected it to be? Yeah, I expected a smoke show, and that's what I got, right? And I really liked the special forces selection process because nobody said anything to you, right? All your instructions were

written up on a board, and you had to be conscientious enough to check that board frequently because they would do things like change it, right? And then try and catch you, right? Not paying attention. And it was athletic events, you know, that you had to do. It was like right up my alley, right? So it was like, yeah, good quality smoke show. Nobody yelled at you. They sleep deprived you, and they gave you really good. I called it building Barney Rubble machines, right?

Because it was like, oh, here's a trailer with only one tire, and here's some straps, and here's some poles. And, you know, you got to move at 10 kilometers. And, you know, they would set up these tasks. And you had to build like, so it was like on the farm. Like our farm was like an OSHA nightmare. You know, we really didn't believe in ocean. Yeah, it was a huge safety hazard, right?

And so, you know, coming up with a fix for the tractor or for the, for the hay baler when it went down or something like that was, you know, it was always right there, right? And, you know, my dad's like, hey, we don't have, we don't have time and we don't have the money to go pay for this. some machines so let's you know use some nylons and some straps and figure this out right and so that's what s f training was about you know it was like hey you know here's a bunch of pieces of equipment figure out how to get it 10 kilometers and good luck right and work as a team and support each other so you know that's what farming's all about and not one person makes that farm run it's a collective team that's where my grandfather had 13 kids that's why he has over you know 500 grandchildren to make it work. You bring everybody together and you just make it work. So

that's what I liked about, you know, special forces training. And I like the idea, but not everybody could make it, right, that there was this huge attrition rate. And so I thought that was cool too because it was this special thing, right? Not everybody can get through and only a certain type of person can get through it. It doesn't make you any better than anybody else. It just makes you different, right? And that's what America's about. Was there anything that was hard for you or especially hard for you?

Yeah, anything that required height. Because I'm short at 5'7. So, you know, these things that required height and then keeping up with guys with long legs on the ruck march. It was a ruck jog for me. to keep up because these guys had just this incredibly long stride. And it was like, God, bless America. You know, come on, cut that stride in half, you know.

But, you know, they move at their pace and they can't be slacking because, you know, then the instructor sees they're slacking. For me, I'll pick up a job, right? So that's the way we did it. And you're married when you were going through special forces training, right? Yes, yeah. I got married as a second lieutenant. I met my wife, Sharon, and college.

We were both in the ROTC program together. She was studying nursing, and she joined the Army at 17 years old. I had to get her mom's permission. She went into the medical field, right, and down to Fort Sam Houston did her training. And she's as hard as woodpecker lips. I always like to say, you know, So as a pride for me is that, you know, I married a woman that wore combat boots.

So that was always a cool thing. But, yeah, she was great and, you know, became a nurse. And she understood the Army and understood what you were going through. And I always asked her, right? I said, hey, I want to do this, right? You know, can I get your support? You know, I mean, it's not going to be easy for the family. And that's why, you know, leading up to 2001 when we had 9-11, we were gone a lot because during the Clinton years where he downsized the conventional forces, a lot of the engagement and stuff fell to special ops, right?

We had to go deploy on all kinds of different things out there. So we were gone a lot. And so when we were gone a lot after 2001, my wife just took it in stride, right? And so when she started hearing people say, well, you know, never home anymore, and she would be able to use her experience to explain, hey, you know, this is this is what it's all about, right? And so she was very, very good inside the family readiness groups and, you know, very, very supportive, particularly during deployments and, you know, when we had casualties. and she had that frame of reference, you know, and she was always there. We've been married for over 32 years now, and I have never, she's never, ever faltered.

Even when I, you know, even when I wasn't a very good version of myself because of post-traumatic stress and traumatic brain injury and, you know, pain management issues, you know. I mean, that negatively affected my personal and professional life, too, right? you know when when before we get into that when you are talking about the 90s so now you're what's what special forces unit did you check into when you got done with special forces school fifth special forces group fort campbell kentucky and then you were doing lots of j sets heading overseas building these relationships filling some of the gaps that were left by the downsizing conventional

forces what was your what was you did you do a platoon command did you do a team did you do a company command like what was your billets there so I was a detachment commander ODA 582 and third battalion fifth group and were you guys doing like regular deployments would you go on deployment so yeah when I in the 90s when I was in the seal teams we would go on a six-month deployment maybe we'd go to Asia maybe we'd go to southwest Asia maybe we'd go on a ship but you were doing a workup and you were going on a long deployment yeah were you guys on a schedule like that exactly like that Exactly like that. But with fifth group, I went to one or two places. It was either Eastern Africa, normally Kenya, or it was in the Middle East. You know, and we had, you know, Kuwait, UAE, Oman, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, you know, those places. Yeah. Yeah. We must have crossed paths at some point along the 90s.

We had to. Alar the dry years. I did a bunch of shipboard deployments in the 90s and one where I wasn't onboard a ship, but yeah, we were constantly pulling into all those places and doing whatever kind of exercises, just always, always over there. One of the interesting deployments that we went on that I thought was really, really good to work on your trade craft was JTF Bravo. the drug interdiction missions that we did on the southern border. And we would deploy for 120 days to the southern border.

And we worked from the Texas border to the New Mexico border, Arizona, and California. And we culminated in California in the Cleveland National Forest searching for marijuana fields and getting scared to death by booby traps, right? because they were everywhere. And we would track somebody, and then we'd find out they're actually tracking us.

So it was like, holy crap, right? In America, you know what I mean? And so, but we would get into our spider holes, and we would, you know, we would, you know, I mean, we would practice. I remember giving my battalion commander a briefing, and I would say, hey, we're going to be in these holes, The guys are going to be in the holes for 72 hours,

and then we're going to, under the cover of darkness, rotate them out, get them back to our mission support site, get a debrief, and then we're going to send them back to Phoenix to recover in a hotel, right? Clean all their kit, and we had this whole process. And we're going to be, we made our spider holes and all our camouflage out of PVC pipes and all that stuff. right and we break it all down you put it in your pack and then you set it all up and you dig your

your hole and that's what you're going to be in right and we we even came up with you know different exercises in the spike because they couldn't get out of the spider holes right and so he goes so what are you going to do with the with the human waste well we're going to carry it out with us and he goes oh you're going to carry it out with you and I said yeah we're going to carry it out with us and he goes I'd like to see that so I delivered to him him, a hefty bag, full of extrament pee. And I put it right on his desk. And I said, there it is, sir.

And I'll never forget the look on his face. The command sergeant major pulled me aside, and he said, that was either the most brilliant thing that you ever did as a detachment commander or the dumbest thing. Time will tell. Yeah. That's good. you said, I'd like to see that. I said, oh, he didn't. Oh, yes, he did. He did see it. Yeah. So, yeah, those were interesting. I never did those missions, but I remember platoons getting

sent out to do them, and it's basically doing reconnaissance of drug transport routes coming across the border, all across the southern border. We would radio it into the police, and they would do the interdiction. And it was just, it was just a great mission because we knew we were doing something for our country. And then we knew we were also training the hell out of ourselves with these, these, you know, special reconnaissance techniques that, hey, if they see you, they compromise you, you're done. So, I mean, it was good. It was real good. So where were you when September 11th happened? Oh, I was the operations officer for third battalion, or second Battalion, Fifth Special Forces Group, and we were getting ready to go to Jordan for what was

the largest SOC sent, you know, Special Operations Command Sentcom, Joint Chiefs of Staff missions. They basically took about five Joint Chiefs of Staff missions and combined them all. we were going to be headquartered in Jordan and include Egypt, Oman, UAE, Kuwait, and it was all over that geographical area, and we're going to be doing all kinds of decentralized missions and stuff in these countries. And airborne operations, and we had a ranger company with us, and it was awesome, right? We put this all together. First time they were ever going to do something like that. And I really liked it because it was a regional approach to solving.

problems, right, instead of a country-by-country focus. So it was really great. And I'm a big, big believer in this, you know, regional thing. I think it works out better when people get together and try and help each other solve each other's problems as opposed to just focusing the one country at a time. But anyways, I don't want to digress. So we were getting ready to go over for that mission. I'm sitting in my office the day before we're getting ready to deploy at 9-11 hits, right? And I go down the hallway to my boss's office and I put on the television, And I go, sir, check this out. By the time I turn it on, the second plane hit, hit, you know,

and I said, sir, I think we're under attack. And I said, it looks like they're going to hit every single one of our national elements of power. And, you know, then the Pentagon gets hit. And then the plane goes down in Pennsylvania, obviously headed probably towards the capital or wherever that was heading. So they, you know, they hit the economic. they just hit the military, they're on their way to the political, you know, I mean, holy crap. President of the United States canceled every single exercise

except for the Jordan exercise because it was so important to the King of Jordan to have this exercise because he was the hub country, right? And so we deployed and we did it. And it was shortened from 45 days to 30 days. And that's, you know, we went directly from Jordan to Uzbekistan for mission planning. And then into, into Taryn County, Afghanistan. So you complete this training operation in Jordan.

Yeah. Which must have been strange doing this freaking training operation when you know that the world is like a ticking time bomb. Right. It was. It was. We're watching the news all the time. and, you know, I'm actually getting messages from higher headquarters. Get ready, you're going to go, you're going to leave.

So we got the log guys and ops guys and everybody planning to move us from Jordan to Uzbekistan, but at the same time, we have 560,000 moving parts for this five-country operation, and people doing airborne operations, live fires, you know, CQB, you know. I mean, just all kinds of high adventure training, right? And, you know, we're doing joint and combined airborne operations. So you got, picture this. You got Americans, Jordanians, and Egyptians on the same plane, getting ready to jump out. Yee-ha, right?

Because, you know, as far as I'm concerned, that's a, you know, I mean, we trained them, but they're not necessarily following our training, you know. And the way some of them exit the aircraft, it was like, holy crap, are you kidding me? So it was like, you know, a lot of the sergeants are looking at me going, you're killing me, sir. You know, I'm like, okay. I hope not. Yeah, we're not. That's not the intent, right?

But I'm like, hey, we got to do this, right? I mean, that's what it is. And they would make sure it was great. And it went off without a hitch. So then from there, you go to Uzbekistan? Uzbekistan. And now are you guys getting, you guys got the tasking, okay, you're going to Afghanistan, go to Uzbekistan to start planning?

Right, because that's. How many guys? It was, let me see, 15 of us. And Colonel Fox had to pick them. So he picked him. 15 of us went off. And then he turned over the battalion to the X-O. And the X-O stayed in place in Jordan.

And then slow but surely he would rotate. the teams into Uzbekistan as space opened up. So what you get to Uzbekistan, I mean, what's the damn, what's the atmosphere with the team? How much do you guys know about Afghanistan prior to this? Nothing. Nothing. Absolutely nothing. Did you, did you learn a language as a special forces officer? I did. I learned Egyptian Arabic. Okay. Now, I passed the language test. Uh-huh. But we're not putting you on an Egyptian quiz show or anything.

Yeah. With the lowest score that you could get on the defense language aptitude battery test. Apparently, God didn't give me the ability to learn foreign languages. And I did. I struggled through what, Spanish in high school and college, but I struggled through it. I got through it anyways. But nonetheless, so the lowest score qualifies me for a romantic. language like French and Spanish and Italian. And what do they send me to? Fifth Special Forces

Group with Languages Egyptian Arabic Category 4 language. And I'm like, really? You want me to fail? Is that it? But, you know, like anything else, test scores, you know, they mean something, but they don't test, they don't test your will to do your best, right? So I ended up graduating with a 2 plus 2 plus and got language pay at $75 a month. Woo-hoo. And I was just, you know, I called 2-plus, 2-plus just being dangerous enough to, you know, use a foreign language. You know, it's like being a first-level black belt in martial arts, right?

You're just dangerous enough to get yourself hurt. But it looks cool, right? But nonetheless, it is what it is. And I, yeah, I did that, but Egyptian Arabic does you absolutely no good in Afghanistan with Pashto and Urdu and, you know, Tajik and Uzbek and, you know. So you're in Uzbekistan. You're coming up with a plan. And who's giving you direction at this point? What are you guys getting for a mission tasking?

Are you getting clear directives? or is it more, hey, go start to put something together? So to the credit of our seniors, everything was moving so fast and everything was coming out of the Pentagon and the National Command Authority so quickly, so rapidly that, you know, we weren't getting anything, right? And so basically we had two teams and then a command and control element that had to be led by a lieutenant colonel, and that came directly from the Secretary of Defense.

So it's not even the standard way that we would deploy into a theater of operations. So you've got two teams with a battalion commander and a very small staff that were C-2ing. Now, third battalion had the north, second battalion had the south, and First Battalion had, you know, the Kabul-Bagram area. And so when we got there, it was like, all right, you got the South.

You got to go link up with Harman Karzai. You got these two teams. One's going to come from the South. One's going to come from the North. You can't figure it out. So we did. And I was happy to figure it out because it was good. How did you guys get in?

So we went M-H-1, excuse me, MC-130s. to Jacobabad, Pakistan. And this is really, it's really funny because we were told, okay, you're going to get there, and you're going to go find the Special Ops Air Force Unit. And they're the ones that are going to fly you in to Taryn Cout, Afghanistan, where you'll link up with a group of Afghans,

and then they'll take you to Harmit Karzai. So that was the plan? That was the plan. That was the plan. and where did I find the Air Force guys? In the mess hall. Because I looked all around, Jacobabad farm, right? And my boss is like, I go, sir, let's go to the mess hall.

Good call. And so there they were. They were in the mess hall. And so, you know. And would they bring you up in, like pavloes or something? Yes, yeah. That's exactly at MH53s. We went right in.

We took fire going in. One of them was hit. They still brought us in. We did what I like to call a controlled crash land. I mean it was a hard landing. We all fell all over the place inside the damn thing. We jump out the one advantage we had was night vision goggles. We didn't know where they were or who they were. But I had worked on, I had worked on one poshtun sentence, please take us to Harmad Karzai. I worked on that over and over and over again. And we land, we hit the guard,

ground, dust everywhere. It takes a few minutes for the dust to settle. We get into a V formation, and the plan that we had was, I go, Colonel Fox, I go, sir, we'll move forward. Once we see him, we'll set insecurity. I'll walk forward with my rehearsed sentence, and, you know, we'll go from there. You guys point your weapons. I'm not going to point my weapon at them, but I'm going have it at the ready just in case I need it. And I can see them. They're all, all these, there's about 10 Afghans there, and they're all pointing their weapons at me. And I'm walking up and I look at them and I got these AK-47s right in my face. And all I could come out with was Harmed Karzai. That's the only thing I could say. That well-rehearsed sentence, gone, gone.

And they, you know, gave me the, you know, good to go. And, you know, I called up the guys. We came up. They put us in trucks. And 20 minutes later, we were meeting Harmon Karzai in a mud hut. And then we started doing mud hut diplomacy. So what's mud hut diplomacy look like? It looks like a bunch of Afghans sitting on the ground with us in front of a map.

And we're telling them, you know, what we're seeing from our aircraft. in the sky and are they bad guys, are they good guys, and then we're coming up with intermediate places on the ground to go to. And our first convoy that we did this was a disaster. Little did we know that they would all huddle around Karzai's vehicle because they didn't want anything to happen to him.

And we had Karzai in the wrong spot. So we had motorcycles and Toyota Corolla's and pickup trucks. We lost complete control of this convoy, and then we stopped to pray. Right in the middle of the operation, right? Is this really a safe place to stop and pray? But it didn't matter. It's time to pray. We're going to pray.

So we did that. So what we did was we figured out on the next one that we would put our guys up front for security. and we put Karzai back there and nobody would pass Karzai's vehicle so we maintain control now if you turned around and looked at that gaggle back there it was like... Mad Max. Oh yeah, Mad Max.

Yeah, really, that's a great way to explain it. But it worked and so that's what we did and as we move forward we got more and more village elders and tribal elders into the meetings and then of course people were talking about security concern and, you know, what if someone comes in and just opens up and sprays the place?

And I said, well, it's a chance we have to take. I mean, it's just part of the operational environment. Yeah, you can't mitigate all risk. You can't. You do your best, but there's going to be some risks that you're going to have to take to achieve your mission. And they weren't in the mood for us to disarm them. They weren't in the mood for us to search them. They weren't in the mood for any of that, right?

We had to prove ourselves to them, and then they had to get comfortable with us. and we just had to trust, you know, Karzai. And trust me, the CIA guys that were there with Karzai were just as nervous as we were and just as concerned as we were because the last thing we wanted was Karzai to get hurt because he's on the phone with all of the news outlets, right? In the middle of a briefing, we'd get a call, hey, you know, you know, whatever is news outlets.

name is Dan Rather or whomever want to talk to him, right? And so he would take an interview right there. And then you had the bond committee that was meeting to figure out, you know, the government and who's going to be the interim prime minister. And of course, Karzai is at the top of a list. They want to talk to him. So in the middle of that, they call up and they want to talk to him about stuff. And, you know, he just, and just sit there and listen to it. He was really good. He was really good in those days. He did a really, really good job. And I had a lot of hope, right? But, you know, things get politicized and things happen,

and, you know, the longer things, you know, go on. He just, you know, I really thought he did a great job, particularly at the beginning there. And, you know, the way he managed risk and the way he made decisions and the way he handled and the respect that he got, He was the right guy at the time, right? And so it was just very, very interesting to see that.

And, of course, in subsequent deployments, I had a personal relationship with Karzai. So I could leverage that pretty easily as a result of that very first rotation to explain something that had looked like in Kabul had gone. wrong, but there was a lot of things in between where it happened and what was being told and what was being put out by the Taliban that weren't true. And I was able to get communications to him to be able to say, hey, that's not the way it went down, sir. Please, please understand that my heart's in the right place.

And he would. Now, speaking of things going wrong, weren't you involved in a fractricide? incident where a bomb was dropped on your on your location. Can you debrief us on that one? Yeah, I blame myself for that. What a day. So we were at Shawalewa Kot, 20 kilometers north of Kandahar, which was our operational objective. We had to take Kandahar from the Taliban, the religious center of gravity. It was more important to take, take Kandahar than it really was to own Kabul or Harat or MES, you know, Majan Sharif, because of the significance of it. And we had one presidential mission, and that was to determine whether the

cloak of Muhammad in the mosque in Kandahar was still there, because it was a huge concern in the Muslim community, all the way back to Mecca, right, with Saudi Arabia. I mean, this This is a big deal. And so, you know, we were doing combat operations for three days north of here. I mean, we had to go through a pass, and this pass at high ground was a bridge. It was a orchard in front, and it was very well defended by the Taliban and al-Qaeda. And they weren't giving this ground up very easily. And we were doing combat operations, leading patrols, trying to disrupt them.

We were engaging them with, you know, F-15s and so on, so forth. And it was going pretty, you know, it was going real well. And we were getting people that were switching sides, you know, Afghans that would come and switch sides. And they were giving us great intel and stuff. Which is always shocking for Americans to hear about people switching sides. And it's very common, especially in the Arab culture. And I know that there's a, I want to say this is an Osama bin Laden quote that, you know, the people are going to bet on the winning horse. So basically, if you're strong and you're winning, people are like, okay, that's who we're putting our money on.

And so this is what you were seeing on the ground was as the coalition grew and as cars I got more people, people are. looking around going he's got more people and they it's almost like a mob mentality of joining joining that team oh absolutely absolutely and and it you know required flexibility and adaptability on our part and i know i know colonel fox was just never real comfortable with it all right don where did all these people come from and i said well sir they came they came from overnight and they came from over there and he goes these guys were fighting us and i go oh yeah they were fighting us and now they're with us and we got the we you know they're all vouched for because you know oh this is my cousin this is my brother this is my you know and so hey all right and you know we got the sardin major

telling us you know it's okay and then we got you know Elvis going thank you very much thank you very much you know so he you know and he goes and we're going to arm him give him bullets and everything and I said well yes there we are and and he goes oh Jesus so he was never really quite comfortable with it. And he goes, he goes, you're good with this? And I said, hey, sir, I don't know if we have a choice, number one, but yeah, I'm good with it. You know, I grew up in a small town in New Hampshire, and I can see the same thing happening there, you know, people sitting on the fence, you know, historically, we've seen that, you know, where the passive people start joining the people that are winning. And, you know, before that they're passive, now they're active,

you know, vice versa. So yeah, I think we'll be okay, right? And it's all right. I'm coming for you, though, if you're wrong. And I said, all right. That's fair. That's fair. So anyways, we're doing this, and it's about 8.30 in the morning, and we get some good intel, and, you know, we get with Karzai, and we get a good decision from him, and we start our operations up. Well, we had a a very, very good process for clearing our fires. We had a great STS guy on the ground, and we had absolutely no errors. And we needed to build up our force structure going into Kandahar. So we took this point, we took this point in time to bring in some additional augmentees, right? And it was about 24 hours.

before this had happened. So what we did was we did a good transition with everybody. We had a TACP come in and he did good transition with the STS and learned all the SOPs and everything like that. And our SDS guy and the TACP had changed over. So just so everyone knows, these are the guys that call for fire from the air. That's who we're talking about. The TACP and the STS, these are individuals that are trained, that are. That's what they do. It's, I mean, obviously it's a really hard job. One mistake can be deadly.

And that's what they're focused on. And it's great to have those guys because that's what they do for a living. Right. And so you had a transition taking place where you're going from one guy that had been with you. Now your force is growing. You've got some extra guys that are going to be able to help out, but they're just showing up. So they're not quite up to speed yet. That's correct.

That's correct. And so they did their transition. We had got mail in for the first time. So guys that weren't directly involved in doing anything were opening up their mail. And, you know, I had done a walk around our defensive area, which was an old Soviet mortar pit, right, up in the high ground. And I had walked around and I had gone down the hill, just got to the bottom of the hill, and this big explosion, right, out of nowhere. And I don't know how much time had passed, to be honest with you, but I picked myself up off the ground.

I had pieces of body parts, stuff all over me, blood all over me. I'm doing a quick assessment of myself. I got a real bad injury with my leg and, you know, dazed, looking around, and it is utter mayhem. We got Afghans down, we got Americans down, we got rounds cooking off, we got RPGs cooking off, it's going all over the place. I start walking around, I start grabbing our guy. we go down to where Karzai was and we made sure he was okay and he was with his CIA guys and they had secured him. And the guys that were with him securing him, I asked them if they would go out and recone a safe place to bring in helicopters

because I knew we were going to have to cast a vac here. And out 200 meters we had casualties, right? It was a mess All 20 of the U.S. guys on the ground were injured some way or another, some more than others. And we had I designated a casualty control point and I got with my comms guys

and we had to find some, we had to kind of like take comms equipment from, you know, cannibalize it from other stuff to make to reestablish communications with higher headquarters. I found Colonel Fox, and he was dazed and confused just to the point where he was just not coherent about what was going on, so made sure that he was taken care of.

And I went up on the hill, and we started pulling bodies off, right? With all these rounds cooking off and everything, getting guys off the top of the hill, getting them down. And we knew we had to get complete accountability of everybody. And we did that, and I was missing one. And went back up on the hill to where his position was, and that was ground zero with the impact of the 2,000-pound bomb from a B-52 up 35,000 feet. And I searched everywhere.

and I found his hat and I took his hat and I started picking up bits and pieces and I put it inside the hat and I put the hat inside a bag and I marked it and that's how he was identified but there was nothing to send home

absolutely nothing to send home and another one of our guys that was killed was completely torn in half I found him under a vehicle his chest was still heaving his legs were over here his chest his body was separated from it and I start doing

CPR on him and someone finally grabs me on the shoulder and goes sir no it's not going to work he's torn in half so anyways we get him in a body bag and we get him off there and then we had one guy that was not going to make it

but was still alive and we kept them alive and we got them evacked when the when we had coordinated the evac we got a B-team Special Forces Company and an ODA to come in to backfill that came in from higher headquarters we got all the guys out and then we started doing the after action and grouping because we still had this was five December we still had to go and take Kandahar so me my assistant S3 the battalion commander and a commo guy despite our injuries we stayed on the ground in order to be able to coordinate the push to Kandahar so we did that we regrouped we got as many Afghans out as we

possibly could that were injured that wasn't something that hire wanted to do, but we talked them into doing it because it was the right thing to do. So we got our Afghan partners Evac out. We helped with the casualties for them as well in the village, and everybody came out and helped from the different areas around the village. And we just said, screw it, we're going to, we're going to, hit that. We're going to hit that bridge, we're going to hit that pass, and we're going to knock them out of there. And we went through, nobody was there. Right?

This was 8 December, and we went right into Kandahar, and we took Kandahar. And the afteraction on that, though, and I blame myself to this day. The transition between the STS and the TACP was really good, but the TACP. had to change batteries, and those old soft lamps that we use to target designate, when you do that, the grid resets to your position. So before you send anything or confirm anything with the aircraft, you've got to make sure that you have your grid system squared away. And that was the mistake that was made.

And as I go over this in my mind, over, and over and over again, even to this day, I think, to myself, I should have been there to make sure that I should have got an in-person briefing from the TACP that he knew all those procedures. I should have got that, and I didn't get that. And because I didn't get it, because of we were in combat, and because of all the things that you talked about earlier. You know, the mistake was made. And I was in charge of those operations

on behalf of Colonel Fox. That was my job. And I didn't do my job, in my opinion, to the best of my ability. And we had that event occur. And, you know, well, I learned a big lesson. And I'm sure a lot of people learned a big lesson. But at the end of the day,

it's you know there's a and I think you talk about it you know in your in your book there extreme ownership the fog of war right and Clausewitz and his explanation of the fog of war and I mean it's all there right and you do what you can do in some cases you can only do so much there's a lot of things going on but in retrospect it becomes clearer and as you say you've got to take extreme ownership, right? Not only on those things that go well, but most importantly, on those things that don't go well. At what point did you realize it was a friendly bomb? Wow. It wasn't until I was talking to the TACP who was seriously injured, and he was apologizing. And he said, sir, I made a mistake.

I don't think that I cleared that grid like I was supposed to do. And I said, hey, listen, mistakes happen. These things happen. Please, you need to focus on keeping yourself. I mean, he was seriously. You need to focus on keeping yourself alive so you can get home to your family. These things happen. Don't blame yourself.

Now, I know to this day, because I've spoken to him quite a bit, you know, the burden that he carries. But at the end of the day, you know, fog of war, mistakes happen. It's a leadership responsibility. But it wasn't until then that I realized, oh, crap. We got a friendly fire incident here. And so when the investigation team came down to investigate, gate. We were already in Cannedahawk. We were already

set up, but we had already written our statements, and I had a pretty good packet form, knowing, you know, anticipating what was going on. And I think you'd talk about that in your book as well, you know, when the friendly fire incident said, okay, let's, we know a whole bunch of shit's going to come raining down on us, so let's

get ahead of the power curve, and let's make sure that we find out what went on, and we tell the truth, and we get the accurate assessment of what went on. And when we came down and it was Brigadier General Burford, he was the deputy commander for U.S. Special Operations Command. He's one that came down and led the investigation and sat down with his team. We said, this is what we got. We got him out to the spot so we could see it. And, you know, we gave them, we gave them a, you know, a good briefing on

that and what we were doing and how we were doing it. And we had taken that soft lamb and we had isolated it. It had been damaged, but nonetheless wasn't being used anymore. And so we had everything for him in a nice package. And I go, hey, listen, this is a combat environment. You know, we don't want to have them come down here and have to expose themselves to danger here while they're doing their investigation. But at the same time, we want to make sure they get to where they need to go to do a thorough investigation. And the most important thing is lessons learned. so this never ever happens again. And I tell you what, nine more rotations,

never happened to me again. Never happened in a unit that I served in again because we made sure that those kind of lessons were applied and over and over and over again, right? Yeah. When I took over the training for the West Coast SEAL teams like the tactical pre-deployment training, I would put those guys in positions all the time.

And they would, every single group, every single platoon, every single troop, every single task unit, they'd get a blue-on-blue. And I'd sit down and say, I want this to happen here. So you realize how it happened, so it doesn't happen overseas like it did to me. So that's the best thing you can do

is take those lessons learned and spread the word. So it doesn't happen again. And I can tell you that there's still guys on that ODA. There's all three of the guys that we lost, still blame us still blame the chain of command for that right and that's okay

I take that responsibility fully I accept it and I understand where they're coming from and that's just that's

hopefully it has made me a better leader as a result I mean what else am I going to do right except acknowledge it and you know move forward because my responsibilities in leading didn't end as a result of that yeah yeah and i mean even to those those guys that were lost and god rest their souls but at least they're the lessons that were learned from that horrible as they may be at least there's, you know, as you said, no operation that you oversaw after that ever had another

incident. So their sacrifice saved lives. And I know that's horrible in one way, but it's the truth. It's also the truth. It's also the truth. And yeah, I didn't never had another blue-on-blue incident. And as a battalion commander, as a siege soda fade commander, and as a general officer-level commander in Afghanistan in combat, never, ever had another one. And, you know, we attribute that to, of course, the experience of the guys as we go through. But most importantly, you know, leadership and learning, they're indispensable, right? And so you got to move forward. And that's what we did.

So you guys roll into Kandahar, and it's pretty much no factor? Like, what was the resistance level rolling into Kandahar? The resistance level was minimal. We got ambushed going in, and we took care of that, and we kept going. We get to the Mullah Omar's compound, and it is, there are vehicles everywhere covered with mud, because that's what they did to try and hide from. our aerial observations, right? They covered their vehicles with mud.

They saw a predator. Right. So we said, and that was a way for us to identify if they were, if they were bad guys or good guys, because the bad guys were covering their cars with mud. But here it is again. I looked at Colonel Fox and I said, hey, sir, look, the parking lot full of bad guys. And now they're on our side, right? And he goes, I don't get this. This is unbelievable.

And then we went to the jail and we brought John Muhammad. John Muhammad was a very, very close friend of Karzai, and he had been imprisoned by the Taliban and tortured for a very, very long time. And he became the governor of Erzgan. And he got up there and he met with Karzai. And this is a guy that I developed a very good friendship with over the years. no matter what job I had going back into Afghanistan, in his mind, I was the commander of all special forces. I just was not.

And I would tell him, I go, hey, listen, I'm just the battalion commander here. I just got these guys. He goes, oh, no, no, no, you are the commander of all special forces. And he would tell people that, and it would get in the news, right? And I'd get a phone call, and I'd go, I didn't tell him that, right? And so, yeah. I probably knew he was getting you in trouble. He's like, ah, Commander of All Special.

Well, he was a wild man. Always had been a wild man. If there's one guy that you wanted in, because Orsgan Province was, you know, I mean, it was full of Taliban. It was full of al-Qaeda. And we needed a guy like that to go up there and, you know, a clean house.

But the way he was clean in house and the way that, you know, it was acceptable in the international community was two different things. And so we had to keep a very close eye on that. nonetheless, he gets there and he goes, all right, I'm going to need some furniture. So he starts going in the rooms and he starts going, I want that, I want that, I want that, I want that. And he goes into Mullah Omar's office. And I wasn't with him, but one of the guys was in there. And he comes running over to me and he goes, sir, you've got to get over here.

He goes, the guy that we just let out of jail, he's going to the bathroom on top of Mula Omar's desk. And I go, what? And I go in there, and he left a mess on top of that desk. And that was his, just what he felt he needed to do. And then he told Karzai, I'm on my way to Orsgan Province. When I get the Terran Cout, I'll let you go, I'll let you know, and we'll start clearing that place out. And, you know, Karzai put governors in Orzgan province,

Zabul province, Farrar province, Nimruz province, Helman province. Helman was the one that we got the largest number of Taliban al-Qaeda and operational Russian equipment out of. And we had to negotiate that, right? We had to negotiate that with the Taliban leader there that, you know, he wouldn't, you know, he'd be free to go off and do whatever he wanted to do. And, you know, Karzai said, yeah, I don't care. and Sharsai was the governor of Kandahar.

Now, the governor of Kandahar is the senior governor in the south. That's just how it works out. Wields a lot of power, even though you have governors in all the other provinces. So he pretty much laid down the law and organized things. And slow but surely, you know, we started seeing security in southern Afghanistan just, you know, shape up. And then... And how long did you stay in Afghanistan for? For that first rotation, from November to March and then the...

So he left in March of 2002. Right. Had the governor's been put in position yet? Oh, yeah. They were all put in position in December. So at that point, there's a pretty good... It's looking pretty good at this point. It looks real good.

It looks real good. They're doing it the Afghan way. and the airfield in Kandahara was something that we wanted to secure so that we could use it to bring in and bring out supplies and stuff like that. So General Mattis, one-star general general at the time, the Marines got that mission. And so there, operational area was really confined to

Candahar Airfield. And then we had the Cedasota North up in Uzbekistan. And then then Commodore Harwood came in to do Siege Sot of South, Kandahar. And he worked side by side with General Mattis. And we were in Candahar. And our sole advise and assist responsibilities centered around Shurzai at this time, because Karzai had gone up to be the interim prime minister, up in Kabul.

And so everything that we did, we did through with and by Karsai, or Shurzai, in coordination with Seedisote of North, who was C-2ing us, and then Commodore Harward, who was C-2ing a separate direct-action unit out of the Candahar Airfield. And we got this task list from Sifflik, right, the combined forces. Anyways, it was the three-star headquarters, right? And so it was about 180 different places they wanted to go to. and that was our tasking to go do that. We had to get that done.

What do you say go to? What do you mean go to? Like they thought it was places that had intel or had bad guys in it. And all under 180 of them were dry holes. Like towns or villages or like actual target packages? Targets, right. Without the target packages. It was just a location and we think there's something there.

But the places that. all 180 of them were dry holes. But the places that we got all the computers and all the stuff that Osama bin Laden was working on and Mubal Omar was working on were given to us by the Afghans that were on the ground. Hey, they worked out of that one.

They worked out of that one. They worked out of this one. And we would get a call saying, hey, we got al-Qaeda there. See, that's where it became tricky, because Taliban were Afghans. So you get them, and they either switch sides or they didn't switch sides, right? And if they didn't switch sides, well, you know, the, you know, Afghans, you know, would deal with them through Afghan law, right, and custom, whatever. Al-Qaeda, different story.

They were Arabs. And, ooh, we had to be very, very careful because there was only one fate for them if they got in the hands of the Afghans, who had been, families had been killed. tortured, so on and so forth. And they didn't have any real love for them, right? So that was a, whenever we got a report in saying, there's al-Qaeda suspected al-Qaeda guy, we would go, boom. And we would take them into what I would call a protective custody, right?

And then we would move them by our own means to be interrogated and by, you know, coalition side of the house, right? And so, I mean, that's kind of difference between the Taliban and al-Qaeda at the time there on the ground and how they were just, you know, dealt with differently. And we didn't really worry about the Afghans because they always switched sides, but it was the al-It was the al-Qaeda because they were from Oman, they were from Saudi Arabia, They were from Pakistan. They were from some other place, right?

Not welcome. No, they were not welcome. And, you know, one of the worst places to go when we first got there was the soccer field because that's where all the hangings, the beheadings, and the stoning of women took place. I mean, stoning women and the killing of children for flying a kite. we handed out thousands of kites when we got down there because they're huge kite flying folks. They have competitions, you know,

where they attack each other with the kites, you know? It's just like this huge thing. Anyways, they loved it, right? We got them their music. We got them things to play with their music. We established businesses. One of the first businesses that we established was a woman's laundry.

And then we used it to clean our own stuff Because by the time we got to Kandahar, we stunk, right? I mean, it was pretty bad. So anyways, we did that. But I'll never forget. I was on, it was 4 o'clock in the morning. I was up on the Kandahar governor's mansion, and I was doing my, had my night vision goggles, and I got my Afghan partner with me.

And to keep them awake, all you had to do was give them the goggles, because it was like, because it was amazing to them, right? It was amazing to them to see that technology and they could see because they'd go, and then you'd go back down, right? And I know you can't see me on the radio, but, I mean, it just is what it is. But I'm up there, and I see the bakery that we had established them, you know,

and the guy goes in for work, and he gets in there, and he starts opening up. And that's where we got our bread every morning, and that nan bread, that football-shaped bread, it was warm, it was delicious. By that time we were getting peanut butter and jellies, sent to us. My wife sent me a tub of marshmallow

because I'm from New Hampshire and fluffinutters are really good, right, peanut butter and marshmallow sandwiches. So I was looking forward to it, but I'm watching this guy and I go, oh, there he is, you know, doing his thing.

Well, he starts, you know, he gets the dough all done and he gets in the bowl with his feet and starts needing it. And I'm like, no, I did not just see that, right? You can't unsee it now. And I'm like, and I know what his feet look like, right? And I'm

thinking to myself, it's done. I can't eat bread again, right? And we go get the bread and I'm sitting down and the battalion commander sitting there and watching the guys. And I go, all right, guys, I got to tell you. I got to tell you. This is what I saw today. I got to share this with you. I hope I don't ruin it for anybody. You're morally obligated to share this with you guys. I got to share it with them. And I did.

And they looked at me and they go, I don't give you fear. I'm eating this bread. And he goes, the brick oven burned it all off. And I go, I can't get there. I can't get there. Right? So it kind of ruined it for me.

But anyways, it's good. So by the time you leave for the first time in March, You know, it looked like things are going pretty as good as you could want them to go. 2002. When do you get back there again? So, you know, it was interesting. I get selected to be the fifth special forces group S3. So I get bumped up from the battalion, go up to the group level,

and we're now, of course, sustaining operations. Well, it had gone to a different group. So we didn't have to worry about Afghanistan anymore at fifth group, because we didn't have anybody there. Because it was third group. But then we got the warning order for Iraq. So we start planning Iraq. And then I get called into my group commander's office. He says, hey, you just got by name requested to go do an interview to be the secretary of the Army's aide.

Oh, joy. I go, sir, I just got the job that I've always wanted. Group S3. I mean, it doesn't get any better than that in a special forces group, right? In my mind, anyways. And I was like, sir, I don't want to do that. And he goes, well, you don't have a choice.

And he goes, and you better not blow it because we need an SF guy at that level. It's never happened before. So we need you there, right? We need you there. So you go there and you do the best you can. If you don't get picked, don't worry about it. But don't sabotage it.

So I go. I go there and Tom White is a secretary and I do my interview and I'm sitting at home and I get a call. It's Tom White. Don, you're going to be my aide. You got two weeks to get here. And I go, holy crap. So I call my boss and I tell him and he goes, yeah, congratulations, it's great, it's going to be great for the SF community, blah blah, blah. It's funny because the entire time I was the aide there, I never got to go to call.

I never got a call from the SF community. Not once. But I did what I was told to do, and I went there, and I was the aide for Tom White, and what a great experience that was. How long do you do it for? What a great? One year. That's all you get, right?

And then you move on, and then... So that's... What year was that that you were the aid? June of 2002 to June of 2003. Got it. Right? And then I went... What did you before you jump into where you went next?

What did you? You know, you said it was a great experience. I was fortunate enough, you know, as fortunate as you can get when you become an aide. I was fortunate enough to be the aide for the seal admiral, Admiral McGuire. And definitely was, he's a great guy, great guy. But I was very lucky that I was able to do that job because I got to see a lot and got to understand what was happening and understand how these high level decisions were made and see a little bit into the future. What was it from your experience? What did you see that, what did you learn that was important?

Well, all of what you just learned. But more importantly, I learned how all the, you know, how these decisions have made inside the political level, right, from the top. And all these things that are done. So when I got back to the tactical level, I could explain to the guys what's going on at the strategic level. And although they may not like it, at least I had a familiarity and an understanding and be able to explain to them what's going on in the whole process and why we're sitting here,

you know, waiting to be ordered to go do something or what have you. But I learned how the Army worked. They didn't know how the Army worked. And a lot of us go through, hell, there's a lot of guys that get promoted to General Officer, and they don't even know how the Army works, right? Because they've never been in a job that taught them how the Army works. works. It's just a matter of, so, you know, there I am, you know, I'm, you know, I'm the, you know, battle buddy of the Secretary of the Army, you know, and he depends on me for everything, right?

And it was just a phenomenal opportunity to learn how the Army works and how the Army fits into the larger service and how the Joint Chiefs of Staff works and, you know, how all these things go. And so, you know, I did not want to leave the group S3 job at all. I just, you know, I didn't want to. And when I got asked the question by Secretary White, you know, do you want to be the aide? Do you want this job? And my answer was, sir, I'll be honored to serve as an aide. But I'd rather be the Fifth Special Forces Group S3. Jack. And I was told later that's why I got the job because everybody else they interviewed and wanted to be the aid and I didn't so they gave it to the guy that didn't want it yeah and I went there and I gave him

110% like I would do any job if they made me the floor sweeper it'd be the best damn swept floor in army right that's just the way it goes right you just go do whatever job they give you and do it the best of your ability and then you know you know good things will happen and so I did that and then I went over to, I got picked up for Lieutenant Colonel and I got picked up for battalion command, first battalion, third group, and I had to do some joint time. So I went over and I worked for, I was the executive officer for the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations Low Intensity Conflict. So then I got to see how the OSD worked, right? And how all of that went. And I always like to say how it works and doesn't work, right? Because there's both sides of the

coin, right? But it is good. Excellent experience. And I met some really great people there that I have relationships with to this day. But that was three, June of 2003. And then I went and took command of Fifth Special Forces Group, First Battalion. Third Special Forces Group, the Desert Eagles, and we did two back-to-back tours to Afghanistan there. And that was awesome. One of the only battalions that ever did back-to-back tours, it's just the way it worked out. So we went there for nine months, came back for six, went back for another nine months. And then I went up to Ussesauk headquarters.

The amount of continuity, you know, it's one thing that when you compare, let's say, World War II with either the end of Korean War or the Vietnam War, where you have guys coming on tour, they're going to do a year, and then they're going to leave. And that's that. That's almost a continuity. When you do nine months there, six months home, and then nine months back there, you start to get some real continuity. What did you see in that deployment, or those two deployments, you get to see like a bigger arc of the story? Yes. With a better thread through it. So we really saw the reemergence and the resurgence of the Taliban and al-Qaeda in 2005 when we got there. May of 2005 is when we got there. Now, obviously 2003, I think I might have cut you off when you were about to say this before, but 2003, things are looking about as good as we could hope. In Afghanistan, the war kicks off in Iraq.

That means people are, you know, American soldiers, resources are now pouring into Iraq. That sort of becomes the focus. And that allows over in Afghanistan where we had had a big presence. Now all of a sudden that's drawn down. Now all of a sudden the, you know, Al-Qaeda and the Taliban start to see opportunities. Yes. And so when you roll back in, it's now 2005. And now they've taken advantage of some of these opportunities.

They have taken advantage of the opportunity. opportunities, yeah. And I'll never forget, September 11th, 2005. I was on a hilltop with Charlie Company commander and in the Kandahar province. And there were 1,500 wave after wave. of Taliban fighters coming at us. It was unbelievable. September 11th, 2005. That was, that was, I had been, you know, I mean, 2011, I mean, September 11th, 2001, one that long ago, right? And you're right.

I mean, we had, it looked good in 2002, 2003 and four, We didn't have the resources that we needed, but we were still doing nation building. We were still building an army. We were still building the police. We were putting together their justice system. We were putting together their constitution, so on and so forth. All that was working. But there wasn't anybody to keep the pressure on them, right?

And so they researched. And so we saw the brunt of that in Kandahar province in 2005. September 11th, Operation Medusa. And, you know, it was a big operation. And it was just unbelievable what was going on during that time frame in terms of, you know, enemy capability, capacity, strength, numbers. And it wasn't just southern Afghanistan,

which is where my battalion was, It was in the north. It was in the east. You know, predominantly at that time, in the east, we were on the border, right? Wow, that was just incredible, right? So it's going on all over the place. Right. You know, when you talked earlier, you mentioned that, you know, we were helping them.

We were writing their constitution. We were setting up their government. And there's a, you know, when I talk about leadership a lot, which I do, I talk about what happens when you try to impose your plan onto your subordinates, onto your team. You impose your plan onto them. Look, you can kind of get away with it sometimes, depending on the authority that you have, depending on the amount of leadership capital that you have, depending on how much oversight you're allowed to kind of sit there and if you're going to impose a plan on them and then you have the tenacity and the ability to sort of continue to put the pressure on them,

then maybe you can pull it off. But it's much better from a leadership perspective to say, hey Don, you know, here's this mission. How do you want to do it? And kind of let you come up with the plan. It seems like America has a tendency to want to impose, you know, our way onto countries, whether it's Vietnam. There's the Vietnam thing, the way that unfolded and the way we tried to sort of impose what we wanted it to look like. And the Vietnamese don't like that.

They've fought against that forever and they've never been beaten. And so they weren't going to be beaten. And it wasn't that they didn't like what we were saying. It's just that they wanted to say what they wanted to say. So, you know, here we are with the Afghans, doing some imposition on them. And the way that turns out, it's sort of like from a leadership perspective, if you don't have the constant pressure to say, nope, this is exactly what I want you to do. and I have the tenacity and the leadership capital and the resources to kind of make you do it,

which again, this isn't ideal. How do you think we find ourselves in a situation where we seem to make that, that seems to be our tendency to want to impose our way, our plan onto other people? Well, to your point, I mean, it doesn't work out well, right? And the way we had set it up there was the U.S. was doing the military. The Germans were doing the police. The Italians were doing the justice system. And then there was this collective body that was writing the Constitution.

And we factored out one of the most important things that goes in a constitution or a document, whatever they choose to call it, that establishes their government and how their government is going to govern in a Muslim country. and that is they don't separate church and state, right? And that was one of the big mistakes of that document, right? And then we named the government for them as well, which, you know, they didn't like either. So once they got it turned over to them, they made, you know, Garzai went in, they made the changes, right? And we were building a top-down Western police and military force, which isn't culturally the way they do things. It's very decentralized.

Very decentralized. And we're trying to centralize it. And we're trying to centralize it from Kabul down. And they don't do that either. Their political system is very democratic to begin with. It's sureas and jurgas and it's local and its consent among the tribal elders and the village elders, which are different, right? Because you have the tribal elders, and they may not be the elected village elders, right?

But they still work together and they understand. And then they have a pecking order of the tribes. And so when stuff goes, when stuff is available, the tribes get their fair share based off of where they sit in the pecking order. And they're okay with this. But we don't like that a lot of times, right? Because we want the minority one to get the stuff. But they're okay with the stuff they get because it's good enough, right?

So we went in and we mucked all that up. Right? Because we just aren't familiar with the tribes and the sub-tribs system. It's almost like we're too idealistic about the way we think things are going to be. I remember a very similar example. We had these young Iraqi soldiers and the officers were skimming their paychecks. And, you know, my guys come to me, you got to, they're skimming the paychecks of these young enlisted guys. So I start talking to my interpreters and I go, hey, what's going on?

Can you help us? I want to understand what's happening. He's like, well, of course they are. The soldiers know that That's their boss and he's going to take a little piece That's the way it works That's fine So us going and trying to impose

What we have this ideal of the way things should be It doesn't always match up culturally And it turns into a problem Yes and that's exactly what you know I mean the same thing happened in Afghanistan Right and we were obligated to fix it Which puts us in a position We don't have any real authority to fix

Right They're not going to listen to us. They're still going to skim it. They're still going to do their thing. They'll just figure out a different way to do it. And although we see that bad, that is bad, I'm not saying it's good. I'm saying it's just the way it is, right? And over time, these things will change, like we saw in Afghanistan.

Right now, the ambassador to the United States in Afghanistan is a woman. Never would have been that way in 2001 or 5 or 10. But in 20, it's a woman. that's great, that's progress. They'll figure it out, right? They have a great university system that they figured out. You know, it's one of the things we really didn't get involved in, and it works, right? And I don't mean that that everything we did was terrible, because obviously it wasn't.

But when you start getting involved in a country's institutions and you start getting involved in their culture and their society and you're an outsider, it's never going to be received well, and you're probably going to be. you know, trample of or something that you should just, you know, just stay away from. But the good things will happen as they, you know, continue to move forward. And another thing that a lot of people in the villages, they didn't want to go from the 7th century to the 21st century, right? They didn't want to. They were very happy being in the 7th century. You know, one of the things that I would always tell folks that would come to, you know, to do humanitarian work in Afghanistan, I say, don't give them coats, don't give them shoes.

They don't want that. All they're going to do, they're going to smile at you. They're going to say, thank you so much. They'll even have kids running around with this stuff on. But as soon as you leave, the kids are taking it off, putting on their sandals. They wear sandals, you know, even in the wintertime, right? They're not going to put on winter boots. They're just not going to do it, but they're going to take those winter boots, and they're going to put them on trucks, and they're going to go to Pakistan, and they're going to sell them, and then they're going to come back home because they don't have any use for them. What they have use for is paper, pencils, and school products and things along those lines, that they will use, and they won't go sell because they want their kids to be able to draw, they want their kids to be able to write, they want them to be able to, you know, so stop giving them converse sneakers. You know, it's, they're not going to, you know, they're not going to wear them, you're not going to see basketball courts break out, you know. They want soccer balls and they'll play soccer barefoot and they'll outrun us, right, in their bare feet.

So let's just, you know, I think it's, you know, to your point, right? I mean, it, you know, it kind of is, it kind of is what it is. And our guys would see it because our guys would stay there and, you know, all the boots and shoes and the jackets and, you know, they don't wear hooded sweatshirts, you know, give them blankets, right? They're not going to sport a hooded jacket with a hood on it in the middle of the Afghan villages. They stick out like a sore thumb. It's not what they wear, right? So, you know, they like cooking equipment. You give them cooking equipment. They make a great stew, you know, you might, you might pay for it for a few days. If you eat it on our stomach, right?

And the other thing that we were doing was we were introducing medical supplies that were causing more harm than good because we needed the medical supplies because the way we grow up and live in America, our immune system is much different than what they look. And I used to tell stories. I used to tell a doctor we'd get an Afghan in with a head injury, right, and a bullet wound through the head, right?

And the guy, he's expecting. And I go, oh, no, I wouldn't be so sure. Please don't call them expecting. This is an Afghan. They have incredible healing. Just the way it is. I get a call from the doctor the next day. Hey, Don, you're never going to believe this.

The guy's sitting up spouting all kinds of things in, you know, Pashto. And I go, well, of course he is. He's an Afghan. Yeah. You know, that might have put down an American soldier, but not an Afghan. That's just the way they are. So please, you know, I used to go over when our. when our Afghan partners would come in and I would make sure, I'd say, please, and I'd have my medics there,

and I'd say, just watch this guy, because they're going to say expect him. And we know that he might not be. Sometimes, yes, most of the time, no. And, you know, they just have a different constitution because of the way they have to, you know, operate. And if we bring in all of our amenities, we weaken them. and we make them more susceptible to getting sick and dying. Yeah, and it's not their way of life. It's not their way of life.

And they don't want it, right? You know, they do have their idea of medical care, so don't exceed it, right? Just come up to it. Bring it back. Bring the doctor back. Bring the nurse back. Bring those skills back that the Taliban had attritted down to nothing. and that's what they need.

So those two deployments back to back, that's 2000, was it 2006, 2007? So it was 2005 to 6 and 6 to 7, yeah. And those, so what type of operations were your guys doing? Because now you were the first battalion commander of third special force. What operations were you guys doing? So we were doing, we were assisting the Afghan National Army at the time with, you know, shaping and clearing operations, right? And then we'd want to put, we'd want to hold that area in a way that we hadn't been holding it before. So we introduced kind of the hold, because it used to be shape it, go clear it, and then leave, they'd come back in.

So let's hold it. Let's figure out a way to hold it. And that's where the first ideas about bottom-up security came into play in 2005, six, and seven. So you're setting up, was it Afghan police? Was it local police? The idea of Afghan local police, right, came in there. And at that time, we were just calling them the Arbukai, right? And we had the support of the-

And Arbukai means like security, local security? Yeah, it means their local security. So, like, back in the day when they were fighting Alexander the Great and Genghis Khan and the Brits and the Russians, the Kabul, the king of Afghanistan, wouldn't send down national troops to deal with the problem. He would organize local, Arbukai's. And the village elders and the tribal elders, they'd go and they'd get their weapons out of their, you know, out of their heart. and they mud huts and they would come and they would report and they would defend Afghanistan. Yeah.

And that's how they would do it. Yeah. There's so many similarities, you know, from my experience in Iraq and in 2006 in the city of Vermont. The, when the army came in, look, the army worked hard. When the Iraqi army came in, they worked hard. They sacrificed greatly. They fought hard. they were a bunch of Shia going into a Sunni city.

And that right there, you're already starting off on the wrong foot. I mean, and that's not even putting, that's putting it extremely mildly to say you're starting off on the wrong foot. You deal with people that have a history of killing each other. And so you got the strong Shia army coming into the Sunni city. And look, the Sunnis inside Ramadi realized, look, they're after al-Qaeda. They're after these insurgents. They're after these foreign fighters.

So we were able to get through it. But it wasn't until the sons of Iraq and the Iraqi police, the local, the local Sunni tribesmen, tribal leaders, the Sheikh said, you know what? We want to defend our own city. Let us put our tribesmen in the police force. That's what we did. And then it was a game changer.

Because now you had the local tribal leader, had his tribesmen with police uniforms on, authorized by him, saying, yep, we don't want bad guys here. And the local populace going, yep, that's our tribe. And there's several tribes. There are multiple tribes,

but they all agreed that that's what needed to happen. So this idea of, you know, decentralized command, but also this idea of, hey, the people that are on the ground that are from there, they know who's good and who's bad. And the local populace is going to support

the neighborhood kids that are now, neighborhood police. And that's just it's it we were lucky enough to kind of watch that unfold. I was lucky enough to watch that unfold and and see those the what they called the sons of Iraq and it was interesting too because in Iraq there had been there had been out in al-Qaim the Marine Corps had pushed through Al-Qaim and when they did it there was a bunch of locals going hey there's bad guys in that building over there just bad and so the Marines said hey you know what let's organize these guys and they made this this thing.

called Desert Protector, which was, hey, if you're a local and you want to help us out, cool, you can join this program called Desert Protector. And they started this and it was working pretty well. Well, when Maliki got elected, all of a sudden he looks out at Al-Lombar province and they got all these desert protectors out there. And he goes, wait a second. Now I got a bunch of random rogue security forces running around. I can't have that. I can't have that. So he shut it down.

which was not a great move. But you can see from his perspective, he doesn't want a bunch of rogue paramilitary units running around. But we were able to convince the shakes in Ramadi, because they were asking, we want to do Desert Protector. We want to do that. We were able to say, look, we can't do Desert Protector. It's not around anymore, but you can be Iraqi policemen.

You can be local and we'll help you train. And that's what we did. So what you're talking about is very similar, very similar. Yes. Yeah. Well, you know, I mean, as you pointed out, the cultures are, you know, very similar in the way they approach things. And there's the principles that really work and apply from one place to the other. The techniques and the tactics and the approach might require adjustment.

But nonetheless, standard principles remain the same, and that's what you're talking about. And I think that one of the biggest things that we saw in 2005 to 2007 was that this bottom-up approach has merit over a top-down approach, right? Although there are aspects of the top-down approach that you still need to apply. But really, if you're talking about security and safeguarding a population and making that area, an area that the enemy can't operate in. that's going to be the way that you need to go. And from 2007, 5 to 7, we learned that. But the other thing that we learned was during this time frame, you know, the U.S.

transitioned the mission to NATO. And that's when it became a full-fledged NATO operation. And a very good friend of mine, Dave Frazier, who's written a book about Afghanistan and about his time there during this time, took over. that's when they went from 06s, colonels, and in some cases Navy captains commanding the regional commands, you know, north, south, east, and west in Afghanistan to general officer level headquarters.

And Dave came in, he was a Canadian special ops guy who I had had a relationship with, It's a really, really good guy. And when we got into Afghanistan, he said, hey, I need you to come over here. I need to talk to you about what we're going to do and how we're going to do this because we got a problem. And we came in here to do peacekeeping operations. And although it's not a popular thing to say, my assessment is that we're fighting an insurgency and a deadly one. And he knew that that was our assessment as well, our intel guys and everybody had the same assessment going in there from First Battalion Third Group and our group headquarters up north. So anyways, he called me in and we said, well, I think we can come up with an operation using the Afghan National Security Forces to come up into this district,

Pangeway and take over this stronghold of insurgents. And so we went back, we did some planning, we came back and briefed them, and so what Charlie Company, First Battalion, got the mission. And it was a, instead of coming at them from, you know, Kandahar province, you know, directly, or Helmand Province, where they expect you to come, We went all the way down south into the reg desert, which is the red desert. Now, when you fly in southern Afghanistan and you're flying, you know, east to west or west to east, there's the reg desert that heads all the way down into Pakistan, and it's nothing but desert.

And then there's a distinct line that goes into the built-up areas and the green areas and so on and so forth. And it's just so blatant. Nobody goes down there. Only Bedouins go down there. So we did our infiltration in the Pangewee district that way. It took three days. We did vehicle recovery operation. I mean, it was ugly, right?

But we got there. And completely surprised the Taliban in Pangeway. And it was a huge victory. So we routed them up. And then my guys were up for over 96 hours. hour straight. Me and my command sergeant major went in once we took Panjouet district and this is where I told you earlier we got up on top of the hill and saw all the Taliban coming. It was unbelievable. Well anyways, once we got control of that situation, our guys, those guys hadn't slept for 96 hours

and I called my headquarters and I said, hey, I'm going to stay, Sar major and I are going to stay here overnight so canceled the CH-47 coming to get us. And so we did that. and I knew if I had told my guys that the Sardin Major and I were going to pull the entire night shift so they could sleep. I would have got a bunch of pushback, right? No, sir, you're not going to be pulling guard. So I just kept my mouth shut. And I said, hey, I'll take first watch.

And they go, oh, you don't have to do that. And I go, no, I'll take first watch. Well, these guys went down hard. And the Sardin Major and I just stayed up all night. Well, about 2 o'clock in the morning, my company commander, Jared Hill, comes out. He goes, sir, what the heck's going on? It's 2 o'clock in the morning. I was supposed to have shift.

You know, I slept through it. I'm sorry. I go, no, no, no, no. We got this. Go back to bed. We're good. And he didn't argue with me. He went back to bed.

And none of them had to pull shift. It was just me and the SAR major. And we did radio watch and did the whole thing. and we called in all the times, right? And that was that. And these guys got up. Not only did I have that, but I also had the helicopter come in with hot chow.

Right, hot breakfast, right? And so I said, you guys get your hot breakfast, and Sergeant Major and I will hand it back over to you, and, you know, you got it, right? And, you know, it was just, just amazing what these guys had done. General Fraser and his book writes today about our guys, and he says, they saved the NATO mission,

because if we didn't have these special ops guys to do this, we would have been routed by the Taliban, and it would have been a huge political nightmare for NATO. First Battalion, third group, my guys, got awarded for the first time the equivalent of the Canadian presidential unit citation, the only foreign military in the history of the Canadian military to get that award. And they got that award, and it sits in the battalion headquarters at Fort Bragg proudly. And, you know, they sent down their equivalent to their chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Fort Bragg,

and all the guys got it pinned on him. It took him four years to get it approved, but he didn't quit, and he finally got to approve it. And I was just getting out of the war college at that time. It was 2009 when they did the award, and I was just so proud to see these guys get the award and do their thing. But, yeah, it was, I mean, and that's really what,

What kind of got us thinking. And you know who got thinking? General McChrystal. And when he came in in 2010 to take over, he was all about bottom up, all about it. And then when General Petraeus came in to take over for him, oh, he loved village stability operations in Afghan local police. So when you, before we get into that,

so you get done with your battalion commander tour, 2007, something like that? Yeah, July of 2007. And you change command and then you go to war college? Yep, I go up to Ussesark headquarters from basically August to May of 2008, and I get selected for the war college, and I go off to the war college.

But another great opportunity when I went to our three-star headquarters, which is a place nobody wants to go. But, you know, you go there. I got put to be the deputy G8. And the deputy, what the G8 does in that headquarters is they do all the combat developments and the resources and the budget and, you know, all that stuff.

And so I learned that. And then I learned how Yusasak not only fits into SOCOM and how we compete for resources there, but also how we compete for resources in the Army and how our Tier 1 guys, how they get all their resources and how the Rangers get all their resources and everybody, and so that was huge, right?

And so I was right in the middle of that process because we were right in the middle of doing all of that for the next five years and I got put in charge of the movement of 7th,000, group from Fort Bragg to Destin, Florida for their new headquarters, and setting that up and what that would look like. And although not perfect, we really, really did create an optimal special forces group headquarters with all the ranges and all the things associated with it so they could do

all the levels of training right there. and what you learn about working with communities and briefing communities because there's noise things and noise studies and this, that, and housing issues, you know, is there going to be enough housing? You know, how's this all going to, I mean, it was just unbelievable, right? So that was another part, you know, like I told you before, with the Secretary of the Army and then working at ASD and then the joint staff and all that all coming together really gave me tremendous insight on how UssS.C, you know, United States Army Special Operations Command works. And again, I got a lot of guys that make very senior ranks and don't have any idea how that works because they don't get the opportunity to go there. And that was because I come out of battalion command, I get selected for the war college, and it's like, oh, now what the hell are we going to do with them, right? They had no place for me, right? And they said, report the Usasak headquarters, and they'll have a job.

And I originally was going to be in the G3, but then I got moved over to the G8 because an old boss of mine was the Ussesauk G8, Jeffrey Putz. And he goes, oh, no, no, no. I want him, right? He's a farm boy. You're going to work his ass off for me, right? And he may not like it, but he's going to do it. And so, boom. So I went there and, yeah, it was great, great, really great experience. Learning how that works. And then what did you study at War College? So I went to the War College and I just studied that, you know, their curriculum and you get a master's degree in strategic studies. So I was like, oh, this is great, right? So I've worked at the strategic level, right, in three different assignments, and I've worked at the operational level, and now I'm going to go and I'm going to get an education in the strategic studies. And so it really, it brought together the job experience and the job experience and the, then an education and kind of mesh that together for me. I got a business degree when I went to

Command and General Staff College because I'm like, you know what? When I take over a unit, it can shoot, move, and communicate like nobody's business, right? But God, do we suck at admin, budget, you know, all that stuff that nobody likes to do and they're not comfortable doing it. So I ended up, you I got a business degree because I thought that's what officers do, right? And so learning how to run a business, I said, you know, that's going to help me out. And it did, right? So I had the business thing going for me, and then I had the, got to the War College, Carlisle, and that was just a great experience there as well.

and but I learned one thing at the war college it's not necessarily the war college and what you learn there it's winning the Jim Thorpe sports event where all the war colleges come to the Army War College

and you compete right in a variety of different sporting events and the Army has only lost it twice Who'd they lose it to? They usually lose it to the Navy War College. What are the events?

The National War College, their teams are so small, right? Because the school is so small, they get their butts kicked all the time. But the Army War College, and, you know, you got the Army, the Air Force, the Navy, the Coast Guard Academy. You know, you got all those guys that come down, and it's a, it's three days. of feats of strength. I loved it. And you play all these sports, right, during the War College, only so that the coaches of the different teams

in the Jim Storp sports competition can draft their athletes. And then you start training in January after the first of the year. You get put on a team. and then you train all the way up to May when they have the event. What event did you do? I was in the 800 meter relay and the five-mile run.

And we won both those events. We had a ringer. We had a... Some guy with a 357 mile or something. We had a guy on our team, he was a Marine, on our relay team who was a, you know, Division I relay champion on a team, right? Yeah, that's not fair. And our coach was in the 1972 Olympics as an 800-meter relay guy. And so the coach, you know, so he taught us.

you know, how to run, you know, and how to pace yourself and how to do it. Yeah, it was a blowout. It was pretty cool. But I had the leg that I had. I had the first leg. Yeah, that's right. I had the first leg. He even knew how to set up people for the, what, legs.

And he stood right at the place, and he said, turn it on. So as I ran by, he goes, turn it on. And it was, you had so much left in you, right? even though I was last, I picked everybody off, right? And that was the whole idea of it because people don't get trained on how to run it. They just go, you know, in two laps around a track, you know, you're going to start feeling it, you know. No, the 800, which I never did, but I was reading an article about it somewhere along the way. And the 800, they say, is like the most painful event because, you know, you're running 100 yards.

It's over. Yeah. You run a mile or a 16 or even a marathon. It's at a lower level of intensity. And this article that I think I read, I think it was an article I read, but it pointed out the fact that there's zero recreational 800 meter runners.

They don't exist. There's people run marathons. There's people that do little sprint triathlons. There's no one that just guts through 800 meters, like for fun. It doesn't happen. All right. So we wrap with this.

the Jim Thorpe championship. That's right. And it's time for you to go back to work. And your next thing is you go back, do you go back to Afghanistan again? I do. I go back for Afghanistan again, what proved to be 22 months.

And this is what, 2010, 2010? 2010. And I go back to Afghanistan as an advisor to the RC South commander. And at the time, it was a Dutch commander by the name of Major General DeCroif. He was a Dutch guy. And we were having some, General McChrystal was concerned about the problems with soft coordination.

So he said, hey, you're going to take command of Siege SOTIF A. So the SIGJOSDAF A, that's the combined joint special operations task force, Afghanistan. This is the person that's going to be in charge of all special operations in Afghanistan. That's correct. And you get tasked with that? Outside of the tier one guys. Right. Yeah.

Tier one guy's not included. Mm-hmm. Anyways, we, I'm going to take command of that. That's going to be my brigade level command opportunity, and I couldn't have been more excited. I have Admiral Olson, in general, Kearney, to thank for that. they're the ones that picked me so I was had a great relationship with Admiral Olson

and General Kearney General Kearney was then the deputy the deputy of Socom but before that and during my time as a battalion commander he was the SOC special operations command Central commander as a two star

so that's how I built that relationship with him and General Ols or excuse me, Admiral Olson, I developed a good relationship with him, and so they picked me for that command. But there was some time there. So I went to, I said, hey, I'll just go early, right? And I'll, you know, do whatever you need me to do.

I'll work on a staff. I'll do whatever, you know, pick staples out of the rugs. I don't care. Just, you know, just get in there early and get myself, you know, ready for, you know, the command. They said, hey, General McChrystal wants you to go down south and be the special operations liaison to General de Croix, who was not very happy about the coordination with his headquarters in RC South and the soft guys. So I went down there, and I got myself established and did that. Well, the interesting thing is General DeC. Croix went to the Army War College.

And there's 20 seminars in the Army War College, and you get assigned at a seminar. And there's a 21st one, and that's for all the guys deploying out of the war college, whose families stay. Right. So my wife was in Seminar 21 when I left. She stayed right there, which was great continuity for her and the kids, because they were there. my kids wrestled so one of them wrestled for the high school so they were that was just good continuity and we thought it was only going to be for a year but it ended up being for 22 months so they ended up staying there almost three years which was really good for them but general de croif went to the war college and he was in seminar eight and I was in seminar eight and we called ourselves the eight balls and so when I went in to introduce myself and he said where are you coming from and I

said the Army War College. He goes, oh, I went to the Army War College, too. And I go, really, that's great, sir. I mean, I loved it. And he goes, oh, I loved it too. I was in Seminar 8. And I go, well, so was I. And he goes, no way. And we had the same instructors, the same guys there. So we were able to share that. We were able to share stories about being an eight ball, right? And it was automatic, you know, relationship, establishment, rapport, and everything. And so all I did was go to his morning meetings, be available for him whenever he needed. Whenever there was operations coming up, I made it sure that they were deconflicted. And I end up traveling with him everywhere he went in Afghanistan on his plane.

Everywhere he went in the south, that's what he wanted me to do. And it was like simple. General McChrystal was happy because he was not getting any more complaints from the RC South commander. And, you know, and they were valid complaints, I might say, right? I mean, you know how that goes. There's just so much going on, right? And everybody's trying to do the right thing, and they're trying to get it done. And, you know, things slipped.

So, you got 06 now, you know, a colonel there to make sure that doesn't happen. And if it does happen, he got one guy to blame. Me. Nobody else. So it was good. And then, you know, we just tighten that up. And, you know, it wasn't just soft. You know, it was conventional aside.

It was all kinds that, you know, everything's going on. The State Department and what they're doing and then the, you know, other things going on. So, hey, it just worked. And how long did you do that for? I did that for six months. Let's see, from June to December, six months. And then after that, you took over the C.G. SOTIF?

Yeah, I went home for two weeks for a break. Take a nice vacation. Yeah, two weeks. Two weeks. Went home for two weeks. Came back, took command and stayed in command of the special operations there, you know, the Siege of Sotomay until May of 2011. And this is when you started or at what point did the VSO,

the village stability operations start at, Was it at this time? Yes. So. Because I remember I was getting ready to, well, I retired in 2010. And I was running training. And as I was running training, we were starting to have guys do training missions based on VSO, based on going out and doing tribal engagement and key personnel engagement and going to meet people in villages and having them, how they're going to set security and all that stuff. We started doing that in 2010.

So I don't know exactly when it came. came to fruition, but from when did it? So it would have been about April of 2010. Okay. That it all started coming to fruition because I got there in 2009. I did that. Then I took command. Yeah, June of 2009.

And then I didn't leave until May of 2011. Right. So it was about that time frame. and, you know, it was a collection of people that were, you know, putting this together, but I happen to be the commander that did the bulk of operationalizing it, which is the hardest thing to do, right, the first guy in the breach, right? You know, it's hard because you got people pushing back against it, and you got people that are all for it, and, you know, even though General Crystal wants it to happen,

You know, there's many people there with him that don't want it to happen. And you got the international community. And even my own community, right? They were skeptical of it because they saw it as a special forces mission. So bringing in Marsock and bringing in the seals to do this kind of mission. They were like, hey, that's not their mission, and this is a bad precedent, and this, that, and the other thing. And I'm like, hey, but, you know, okay, so give me more ODAs, right?

I mean, you know, I came up with a term and the joint staff because everyone was using the word fungible, right? And I happen to be given somebody a brief, right? And it was about using special ops. And, you know, we're better when we work together, right? Because we have just, we just are, right? So anyways, I said, and you know, special ops puts the fun in fungible. You know, because that was the big. strategic word at the time, right?

And so the more you could show you were fungible, the better off you were. So we're fungible as hell, right? And that's what we do. So anyways, we just, you know, came together and did it. And every single, whether it was Marsock, whether it was, you know, their teams or the Navy SEAL teams or the Navy SEAL teams or the special forces teams, these platforms did really, really well. And just give us a quick brief on the idea of the VSOs, of the village stability operations. So if I was an ODA team leader, I was a SEAL platoon leader, what was my mission?

What was it going to look like? So your mission is to go into, say it's, you know, Kandahar province and it's district X. And you're going to go in there and you're going to figure out what is the best village to start a village stability platform which consists of your team and additional augmentation of intel guys and other things that you're going to need in order to be able to operate there.

You're going to go in, you're going to talk to the village elders and the tribal elders, and you're going to figure out where you need to be. Now, they're going to tell you where you need to be, and you're going to go with it. And if it's the wrong place, don't worry about it.

We can change it. So just go with the flow. go in there, they're in charge, they're the guys that are going to tell us where to go, and over time you'll figure out if it's the right place or not. And then working with them, if you've got to change the place, you don't want to. Because what's going to happen is they're of this top-down mindset. Okay, the U.S. is coming in, and they're going to come in with a whole bunch of good stuff. And we're going to be able to take advantage of it.

Well, they're going to realize over time, we're not coming in there with Jack. Right? Yeah, just go talk to the ODIM. And the seal platoos that are out there in the middle of nowhere. That's right. And so. Some hesco barriers and a freaking sack comment. Have fun, boys.

Right. And we're not coming in with a big bag of money and a whole bunch of things that they're going to be able to, you know, take advantage of. And then they're going to realize, well, holy crap, right? And but what we are going to do is we're going to come in with the ability to be able to prove to them that they can secure themselves. And we'll develop this Afghan local police program. And they're in charge.

in nominating the people for this program, so we get their fingerprint, their thumbprint on that guy. And so if that guy does something, it discredits the village elder and the tribal elder. So you're not going to really get back at it. Now, did we have some problems? Yes, we did, but the problems were minute. And we started clearing and holding these areas

and with the Afghan local police program. And it's based more on relationships that you form with the locals, more than it's based on imposing your will on the locals, which you can only do that if you've got the strength and the consistency and to do that all the time. Right. Which is, it's impossible. It's impossible. It's impossible. And so some of the challenges that I was presented with was, hey, you're putting these guys in harm's way. they're going to all get killed. One night, the Taliban is just going to overrun them. And I said, well, I don't think so. Our guys are smarter than that. They're not going to allow themselves to be overrun. They're going to keep their finger on the pulse on the intel. We're going to use the relationships that they have in the Pashtun Walley Code. And people kind of laughed when I said Pashtun Wallet Code. But it is strong. You know, and it consists of, you know, supporting strangers. It consists of revenge.

Right? And that's what they basically operate off of. And they accepted us in, and we became their responsibility. And as a result of becoming their responsibility, anything happened to our guys. Now, did we get guys injured and did guys get killed? Yeah, but that was in combat operations. And they died right along with us, right? that just combat operations or combat operations.

But did we ever get overrun? No. And this was in the middle of the time where you saw conventional outposts being overrun, right? And, you know, all over Afghanistan. And this is conventional units that put themselves in valleys and in places that they shouldn't have put themselves because they were operating independently

of the... the Afghan culture's protection, right? And so ended up by 2011 when I left, we had 90 locations. And none of them ever got run over. None of them ever got attacked. The Afghans were all over. I mean, they knew, they never lost a fight against the Taliban. They were protecting their families, and they took it seriously. And when they saw the progress they were making, and this big, bad Taliban guy was defeatable. And they saw, they were like, whoa. And then they got the will to fight, and they had the mission, and they realized that their freedom and their destiny and their destiny to live life the way they wanted to live was in their hands.

And that they didn't need the American military or international forces to secure their freedom for it. They could do it themselves. but we need you help a little bit, right? We need you help a little bit. But when we got it, we got it. And that's where the transition piece came in. Yeah, it's interesting because, you know, I was saying that not only can we as Americans impose our will on every village in the country, guess who else can't do that? The Taliban.

The Taliban, that's right. So if you got to, you got to make those connections. It's decentralized command. It's building relationships. and had a pretty positive, I mean a very positive impact on what was happening in Afghanistan. 2000, what was that, 2010, 2011 into 2012 and 13, things are moving in the right direction. Right. And, you know, like I said, General McChrystal put it in place. He was replaced by General Petraeus, and General Petraeus became a huge, huge advocate of this.

And one of the things that General Petraeus did was, He said, Don, what do you need to expand this? And I said, well, we're kind of limited, sir, with just our special operation forces. But if we could get augmentation from the conventional forces, then we could expand, right? And we could use the conventional forces to augment and not as guards for our bases, because we don't need those. We got the Afghans to do that. But just as additional people, and we can train them on how to do it, and then we can expand ourselves because we have a little bit more people. But not too big because we can't get too big because then that gets out of ours.

So he went to the Army and got us a battalion, right? And we used that battalion to augment not every team, but certain teams in certain areas. and it allowed us to expand faster. And one of the areas that we needed to do this was Konar, right? And we brought in a guy by the name of Jim Gant who had relationships with the tribal elders out there, both in Pakistan and in Afghanistan. And we gave him the Village Stability Operation Mission.

Now, Gant worked for me when I was a battalion commander, He wrote a paper that General Olson or Admiral Olson really loved, and so did Petraeus, and so did others. And they asked Scott Miller, who was my boss, one star, then two-star, a major general Miller, who was my boss during this whole time and who I worked through in order to get, you know, village stability operations and Afghan local police started. And he was pretty brilliant in, and, you know, how he got that approved through Karzai and so on and so forth, because everybody was in the international community was very concerned about, oh, you're going to arm all these guys

and then they're going to create all kinds of humanitarian violations. They're going to kill people. Karzai was worried that they would get too strong and take over the government. You know, when you go down there at that level, they didn't have those aspirations. They just wanted to control their village. That's it.

They just wanted to live, control their village, have their family, get their family education, bring their crops to market and live, right? And not have anybody bother them. They had no design to take over Afghanistan because they saw Kabul as big a problem as anything else, right? So. Yeah, but there's people that live in Montana and Wyoming

that don't really care what's going in Washington, D.C., and they certainly don't want to move there. They don't want to move to New York. They don't want to move to L.A. They just want to live their lives. Exactly. Exactly. And so same principle applies.

And so, you know, they, you know, we took advantage of that. And it cost us one-eighth, the amount of money that it cost to make an Afghan police officer or military officer or Afghan police officer or army. and you didn't need big garrisons, right? And they walked to work. So there's no infrastructure, right? It's the ultimate decentralized command, right? Right, it really is. And it, you know, it was working.

And they could sustain it, you see. It wasn't anything they couldn't sustain in the long run. So, and every place was different. You know, if you saw one village stability operation and one Afghan local police in a village, well, you only saw one, right? Because they're all different, right? And they're different because, you know,

different people are making it work, right? And the tribes are different, and the ideas are different. You go up north to... The terrain's different. Yeah, terrain's different. The way they're making a living is different. Yes, everything's different. So you've seen one, you've seen one.

So there isn't this. There isn't this, like, you know, magic formula where you, you know, you got one and you take that one and you impose it over here. No, all different, right? And what I really liked was we carved this up into Marsock territory, into Naval Special Warfare territory, into Special Forces territory, and I would get the same guys back all the time, right? They would come in for their six months. They would rotate out in their six months. and we got that kind of continuity, right? And we weren't reinventing the wheel

where special forces are coming in. It happened every once in a while, and I remember when I took command to see, Cesar SOTA, we were coming up. Let's see, this was April. I said, hey, listen, I walk into this headquarters, and I see all these lickies and chewies and all these condiments and ice cream

and all this other stuff. And I go, hey, if our guys on the ground can't have this, we're not having it. I mean, that's just the way it is, right? And let's talk about Thanksgiving. And let's talk about Thanksgiving right now. It's April. If they don't get turkey, we don't get turkey. Right?

And we had the technology. We had refrigeration units we could put out there, not tax anything. We had stuff that would run off of one of those people. panels. Solar panels? We had all kinds of stuff. And we could, you know, there was all kinds of innovative ways that we could get turkey out to them. Now, some guys got the frozen butterballs. They put them in the freezers and they were good to go. But what about those that we couldn't get that stuff out to? Well, I had this. I looked at Ron Reagan, my log guy, and I said, hey, you got to make this happen? And he goes, all right, well, we're going to happen. So Julia Furman, a, uh,

At the time, a young lieutenant log officer comes up with this plan. And she goes, sir, we got it. I think we're going to be able to meet your intent for Thanksgiving. And I go, all right, well, let's get it. Operation Turkey Drop. And our guys figured out how to drop live turkeys in. And I said, okay, is this going to be cost prohibitive or what? And they go, oh, no, it's great.

We do it with the normal runs, but we just, you know, we got our own shoots, we pack our own stuff. We've done several rehearsals. We haven't had any misfires. So I'm not going to get in trouble with PETA by dropping in a turkey, and the turkey, you know, the parachute doesn't, you know, and I was just kidding, of course. And so we did it.

We did Operation Turkey Drop. We got them out there in September, all the turkeys, because we had to drop grain and feed. And, you know, we had to tell them how to take care of the turkeys. And so they did it. And on Thanksgiving Day, I got all kinds of storyboards, right? Of these guys eating their turkeys, everyone's happy. Our guys are happy because they get turkey.

And all the fixings went out there with it, right? I mean, boxes of stovetop stuff and then, you know, all that good stuff, right? And so these guys are eating that stuff. well, come January, I happen to roll out to one of the Marine detachments out there, and at the time the young captain there was the son of the Commandant of the Marine Corps. And I was going out to see him, and I land on the ground and dust settles. And the next thing I know, I got these two humongous turkeys on each side of us. And I go, what the heck of these guys doing out here?

And he goes, oh, those are our turkeys, you know? I go, these are the same turkeys that we dropped to you? And he goes, yeah, yeah, yeah. And he wants to get off the subject as fast as he possibly can. But these turkeys are snuggling up right next to me, and he told me what their names were. Oh, domesticated turkeys. And we continue to walk, and closer we get to the reins, the turkeys break off, and they go into this tent that's got. And I walk over and they go, no, no, sir, it's this way.

And I go, no, I'm going to see what the turkeys are doing. And a farmer in me is now very interested. So I go over to see these turkeys, and they got this, like, they're hooked up. They got hay and, you know, a place to eat and drink and tables that they jump up on and all these things. And I go, what's going on? He goes, oh, sir. And he's looking down at his feet. He goes, the guys, they got the turkeys out here.

They named them. The guys just fell in love of them. and they couldn't kill them. And I go, you steely-eyed Marine Special Operators couldn't take two turkeys down for Thanksgiving. We couldn't do it. And I go, all right, this is great. And I said, hey, I don't blame you.

You know, I get it. And but he goes, you know, the Afghans are waiting for the day. They're waiting for the day, our cooks, right? And so a Special Forces ODA, which I would getting my point is that we didn't always have the flexibility of replacing Marines with Marines and so on and so forth. But SFODA gets out there. And that next Sunday, I got a storyboard, and they're eating the two turkeys. They didn't have the same connection with those turkeys as the Marines did. And the Afghans, the cooks, they're all smiling, you know, they got there, you know,

They're all happy, but anyways. Then, so you were in that tour for 22 months. You're over there in Afghanistan. And then what happens when you get done with that? So I get done with that, and they say, hey, you're going to go to the joint staff and you're going to be the deputy special operations guy in the joint staff. And I'll be working for General Nagata.

Now, the VSO idea seemed to have faded and lost some of its steam, not so much from what was happening in the field, but it seemed like we went in a different direction. Yeah. What caused that? Well, when I got back, so I went to the joint staff, reported there in June of 2011, worked on the staff, and there was emphasis taking. taken off of village stability operations in Afghan local police from 2011 to 12. But I got told, hey, you know, Admiral McRaven was now the Socom commander and General Allen was the commander in Afghanistan, and they wanted more emphasis placed on VSO. So I got told that I would be going back in June of 2012.

to June of 2003. It was going to be a year anyways. And they said, hey, and Tony Thomas was going to be the commander there, two-star commander. And I was going to be the one-star SIFSO-A commander with the portfolio for VSO-A-LP. And I'll think of his name as we go, but Air Force One-Star.

I was still a colonel. I hadn't come out on the O-7, yet. But the one star was going to work as a deputy for General Thomas, and he was going to do all the direct action stuff. So two portfolios, one commander, bringing SOF under one command. And, you know, Tony Thomas got that. And so we went in there under that construct, and I was told, get this back online, get it expanded, so we did that. And by June of 2013, 90% of the, 90% of the rural area was in the control of the Afghan government. And it was due to village stability operations, Afghan local police.

and we started doing transitions. So we were transitioning to the Afghans. They had put a General Ahmadzai became my battle buddy, and he was in charge of the Afghan local police for the Minister of Interior. And so he was my battle buddy, and I worked with him to ensure that he could, he understood and could implement this mission, everything from, you know, making sure they got the training, make sure they got the weapons, make sure they get the oversight, make sure they got, you know, they're doing everything they possibly can, and it

was integrated into the Afghan government fully and 100 percent and we're out. And we had this on a timeline that took us out about, you know, 2015, maybe 2016. And we would have had completely transitioned it. And by that time, nearly 100 percent of Afghanistan would have been fully under the control of the Afghan government. The Taliban at the time were saying, we're done. Al-Qaeda, they were completely ineffective. Again, same thing I was talking about earlier. They don't have the resources to be in every single village

and get down to some local village with 280 people in it and put the resources against it to get control of it and impose their will on it. And meanwhile, the locals, obviously they live there. They're not going anywhere. And there's more of them than there are the Taliban capability to be able to do it. So it was, you know, it was just. It was heading in a good direction.

It was heading in a very, very, very good direction. And so, you know, by the middle of 2013, and everything was, you know, falling into place to where the Afghans. And none of the things that they said, you know, it wasn't a perfect, perfect program, but what program is perfect? It was good enough, right? And it was working. And a lot of the things that people really had a problem with just didn't happen, right? The humanitarian, you know, incidents didn't occur to the extent that people said they were going to occur.

and the, you know, Karzai was not concerned that the Afghan local police were going to form, you know, a huge militia and assault Kabul. It's just one going to happen, right? All these things that they, at the political level, they were really nervous about, just didn't happen. And so, I mean, I mean, it was good, right? And then, you know, it's 2013, and people are wondering, hey, when are we going to get out of there? And so, you know, the political stuff started, you know, filtering in Afghanistan and, you know, the ideas of pulling out and so on and so forth by 2014 and transitioning to non-combat operations coming out of the villages and stuff like that. And so we tried to influence that the best we could with, you know, Rand studies and showing them that, hey, if we just keep this for a couple more years, you know, it's going to be solid and the chance for resurgence will be way low.

And, I mean, look what we've done in terms of the dropping of casualties, you know, lowering of casualties, record lows, record highs in security. The Taliban are pretty much slapping the table on defeat. Al-Qaeda is like, hey, we can't operate here anymore. And that had a lot of do with the top-down stuff going on, too, because you needed that, right? So, you know, the Tier 1 guys weren't involved in the village stability operations, Afghan local police. But what they were doing to take out the senior guys was obviously complimentary,

complimentary, right? So this was good. This was a good balance. And it was soft was in a good place where we were all working together and we were doing a variety of different missions along our very broad mission continuum. And it was way less expensive. have been sending over a division or a brigade to do it, right? You know, did it keep soft busy?

Yeah, it kept soft busy, but, you know, I mean, in a productive way. And the guys saw it, right? I mean, not everybody, you know, even our guys weren't in love with the mission at first, you know. I mean, you talk about it in your book, you know, about having to explain the guys that it's going to have to be an Iraqi solution to this, right? And we're going to have, you know, and it was the same challenge as I had, right? No guys, we're not going to be kicking in doors. The Afghan is going to kick in doors probably, but you're not going to kick in any doors. And if you do, well, that's an extreme, right?

But you've got to work through with and by these guys. They're the ones that have to own it at the end of the day. And so we went through the same thought process. But the guys realized that this was still a combat mission, that this was not a man-be-pambi kind of hand-ringing humanitarian thing. it was a combat mission. And so, you know, they got it. I mean, they really made it work.

Without them, no way. It wouldn't have happened. And so, yeah. So you start hearing this, and we're getting concerned. And the concern is about a drawdown coming? Drawdown coming, right? Changing from a combat operations to now. on-combat operations, coming out of the villages too early, handing this program lock, stock,

and barrel over to the Afghans at the senior level too early. And, you know, we gave them the warnings. We said, hey, likely the security situation will reverse. Likely there will be a resurgence. And Al-Qaeda will come back. Right. Well, nobody thought that ISIS would come back. But by 2016, we had a complete reversal.

Because we did. They made the decision. They slapped the table. We came out of the villages. We went strictly top down. We put all our emphasis on the Afghan National Army and police to fight and gain security. We didn't support the Afghan local police program anymore. It fell, you know, it fell apart.

And I think it could have been avoidable. I think a lot of other people who have done assessments on it, thought it could have been avoidable. But nonetheless, you know, our guys on the ground, regardless of what mission you give them, still do it with honor, integrity, and they get done what you want them to get done. But at the end of the day,

We saw ISIS come back, we saw al-Qaeda emerge, we saw the Taliban come back in full force, the security situation was reversed, and we had an all-time high-in casualties in 2019. So here we are in 2021, and, you know, President Trump, I think, had the right idea. Let's figure out how we can come out of Afghanistan. Well, nobody gave him a plan, right? When he asked for it, two years a new administration, just didn't have a plan to come out. So, you know, hey, the political situation, you know,

overcomes everything, right? Going into a presidential election year, a big year for the Congress, you know. And that starts driving decision-making? Starts driving decision-making. And really... Instead of the guys on the ground. Right, exactly.

And so here we go. and, you know, the president was response to the current president, who's got to make a decision, right? I mean, it is what it is. But he was also in charge of, when he was vice president, you know, coming out of Iraq in 2011 and going to zero. And, you know, he just used, I think, what he learned there and the experience he had there and applied it to Afghanistan.

And boom. know we're out lock, stock and barrel. And we, although I am an advocate of, you know, figuring out how to come out of there, I'm more of an advocate of coming out of there the right way. And there's a lot to lose there, particularly. I mean, I'm signing a lot of letters today from 20 years of working with people there in Afghanistan, interpreters and workers, barbers, you know, guys, you know, gardeners, guys that really put their life on the line to support us and to help us, them and their families,

and now they're left there. And so I think I got 45 letters signed right now. And I send everything I do to Congressman Crenshaw and Tom Cotton because they're, you know, they're putting together some sort of process to expedite getting these guys out of there. But, you know, it, yeah, it's a, everything's political, right? And, and, you know, we just, we're, you know, we're at a point in time now where, you know, strategy and policy and security inside our country and outside our country is, you know, I mean, I think it's an issue. I think a lot of Americans see it as an issue, right?

Yeah, well, especially when we see other, you know, nations. States that are making moves, big moves, and playing the long strategic game. And we're looking to the next election. That's our long strategic game sometimes. Yeah, right now, 2022 is our long strategic game, right? I mean, how are we going to change the House and how we're going to change the Senate and how we're going to get the majority there? Not so much in how we're going to deal with China and how we're going to deal with the potential invasion of Taiwan and how we're going to deal with Russia and their encroachment on the Crimea and Europe and their pipeline issues and Iran and, you know, their proxy war and what they're going to do against Israel and North Korea is

going to follow China everywhere it goes and now it's working more on its nuclear program than it ever has been. And we got, you know, no visibility on that. And those are some existential threats that we really got to pay attention to. And they're real. And they're happening. And we got Africa, right? 28 countries in Africa that are just getting eaten alive by China and Russia. They're getting eaten alive by terrorist organizations that are taking advantage of the ungoverned spaces.

And that's dangerous for Europe. You know, the French and the British and the Dutch and the Germans and the Italians, the front line for the war against violent extremist organizations is in Africa. for them. You know, it's Mali, it's Libya, it's Tunisia, and it's Kenya, and it's Somalia, and it's Nigeria, and it's Senegal, and Mauritania, and Morocco, you know. It's all these different places, right? And, you know, I mean, I spent four years in U.S. Afrikaan, and two years, 26 months of that was commanding Special Operations Command in Africa, and we had 28 countries, over 2,000 special ops troops on the ground, advising, assisting,

training, and conducting operations through with and by our partners to get after al-Shabaab, right? ISIS Somalia, right, out in the east there. Central Africa, the Lord's Resistance Army, and now ISIS is there, in Nigeria, with Boko Haram, and ISIS West Africa. and Chad and Cameroon and Pekina Faso and Mauritania and Senegal and all of the affiliates of Al-Qaeda that are out there reaping havoc, right? The French have over 4,000 troops on the ground from Mali to Nigeria because it's their war on, it's their front line, right? And you have a huge coalition of European partners there.

I mean, I dealt more with our European partners. than Special Operations Command Europe did because they're fighting in Africa, right? And so I was always, you know, coordinating with Mark Schwartz. Hey, Mark, I'm going to, I'm going to Denmark, I'm going here, I'm going there. You know, I went to French five times, right, to talk to the highest levels of their government about, you know, what was going on there. And, you know, so what was going on in Africa is, you know, is something that America has taken its eye off of.

And 1.4 billion people, by 2050, it'll be 2.4 billion people. And it's employed. Incredible amount of resources there. Incredible amount of resources. Huge. And what goes through South America into the United States, you know, South America is not very far from the African West Coast. And you've got all those traditional lines of illicit trafficking that go through Europe.

Iranians have been able to establish multiple places where they have infiltrated Africa all over Africa to move men, weapons, and resources at a drop of the hat if they need to. So, I mean, we've got other problems out there. Right. You know, we have to keep our eye on. In Afghanistan, we shouldn't be tied to one country. But we got tied to that country. There was a good way to go out. But moving to a regional perspective with everything going on in that region is a whole heck of a lot smarter.

And, you know, we just need to start considering that. But I still think we have some responsibilities to Afghanistan that we kind of overlooked in our exit there, you know. You know, looking at the global perspective and the global issues, clearly, that's all stuff we have to think about. But I know that there's one more issue that you've dealt with personally and you've tried to help out our troops with it and that's what's going on and what happens to our troops and what's happened to our troops. Well, I guess as long as we've been around, but we've definitely noticed it for sure since these wars kicked off. The war on terror kicked off. And that's post-traumatic stress and then the traumatic brain injuries. What was your how did you address?

that? How did you experience that? What was that like for you? And I know we've been talking for a while, but I wanted to cover this because, I mean, this is something that a lot of people are dealing with. Yes. Well, I think it's the number one health issue that we have in the United States military today, and I believe it's the same when you look at our veterans. And it's leading to the significant amount of suicides in both on active duty in the Reserves National Guard. And again, in our veteran community, right? And I think it's all has to do with this mental injury issue

and physical injury and spiritual injury, and it's that triad that I think is hugely important that we have to work on strengthening all the time in the military because, you know, as well as I do, if you're physically hurting, you need that taken care of. And mental injuries, right? You need that taken care of. And we know by studying all the way back to Sparta, right, that traumatic brain injury and post-traumatic stress was something that they looked at.

They didn't call it that, right? But they knew that a conk on the head created problems, right? And they manifested themselves inside their units, their military units. And they realized that they had an obligation, right? in ancient Sparta there's only two people to get their name on a headstone, a mother who dies in childbirth and a warrior that dies on a battlefield. Everybody else is buried in Sparta with no name, no nothing. But the birth of a child and the sacrifice on the battlefield, the ultimate sacrifice on the battlefield, are recognized in that warrior culture. So when we look back and we see everything that we've done and what we've called it throughout the years,

and I was one that didn't have an appreciation for it either, right? I thought it was a sign of weakness, right? There's no way, right? I mean, you know, you think about patent and you think about, you know, the way our society has shaped us, and I thought it was a weakness as well. Until it happened to me, until I saw it happen in others, until I realized it was a problem.

And you know who educated me on this? my wife. She's a nurse. She started studying it. She started seeing it. She started seeing how I changed every time I came back. And when you get more comfortable being away from your family and deployed in a combat zone, then you do at home with your family, you got a problem. And that was me. And it was affecting my relationships with my family. It was affecting relationships in the military. I was always, you know, wired for sound and go high and right really quick and lose my temper and not want to listen to people. It just negatively affected everything, right? And she started noticing around 2008, and she was talking to me about getting help. Well, there was no getting going for

help in 2008 in the military. I can tell you that right now. In 2010, you said, started seeing programs and they were starting to deal with traumatic brain injury. But I'm telling you, we have all these programs, but what I learned was our approach is wrong, right? Our approach is punitive. We're going to take you off your team. I take you away from the people that you love, the people that you want to be with every single day, and we're going to put you over here, and we're going to say, okay, you're not going to do your duty. You're not going to do your job. and oh, by the way, we're going to take your clearance away or suspend it, whatever. And if you don't get better in a year, we're going to process you out of the Army.

I mean, that's a DOD policy, right? And I thought that was insane. Well, by 2013, I had just been promoted to Brigadier General. I just got to U.S. Africa, U.S. Afrikan. I just started my job as the operations officer there. And guess what? My wife came to me and she said, we can't handle it anymore. I can't handle it.

The kids can't handle it. Your dog can't handle it. You know, Klondike our husky at the time. She goes, you got to do something. I got to draw a line here. She goes, and I said, you're right. You're right. And she's talking about losing your temper, not being around.

socially isolating myself, staying at work till ungodly hours, just avoiding social events. You know, my biggest fear was having to go to a social event, right? And I would look for every single excuse under the sun. Yep, I'm going, I'm going, I'm going, until I call her and say, hey, something came up at work, I can stay at work. Check. And I would go home right after the event was done. So, and she's not dumb. She knows exactly what I was doing, right?

And, but she knew it was delicate, right? And, you know, I wasn't a screamer at home. I would just not involve myself in anything. Just come home and mind my own damn business, not get involved, and that was that. And, you know, if something came up, I would exit stage right and avoid dealing with it, you know. And then I would look for every opportunity I could to go deploy somewhere, right?

Well, when I went to U.S. Africom, that ability to deploy went away. Because as the operations officer of U.S. Africom, the only place I was deployed to was my office, right? That was it. Yeah. So, in 2013, she got me to go. But I had heard about this nurse, Sarah McNary. who had, was up at launch stool and she was really innovative. And so I went up and I had a meeting with her and I said, listen, you know, I got to do this under the radar, right?

I mean, this is not something that would be accepted by the chain of command if I'm going for PTSD help. So she understood. And she put me on a program. I went out and it was easy for me to get away, right? We had Afri-com units up at Lawnstool. And, you know, Ramstein near Lawnstool, and I could always find a way to get up there if I needed to go for an appointment or what have you.

So it wasn't a big stretch, and it didn't put a lot of light on what I was doing. But I went up there in three days. Got evaluated post-traumatic stress, TBI, sleep disorder, pain management issues, neurotoxicity and it was all positive, right? I mean, all the malaria medications

and the vaccines and all these things that we've done all our career and all our life. It was my kidneys, my, you know, other organs, the way your brain thinks, so on and so forth, all that positive, PTSD positive. More importantly, I got put on therapy programs, right? and so I took advantage of this and I did it religiously from 2013 through 2015

I managed to go through this and then I looked at myself in the mirror what do the therapy programs consist of is this like sitting down talking with someone is this what is it? Yeah so they give you a bunch of tests for PTSD right and they figure out exactly what's you know what's wrong with your you know with your brain

and, you know, with your thinking and how social isolation is impacting you, and, you know, and they put you with a therapist, and they work on those things. You talk about it, you come up with strategies to overcome it. You, my wife came with me. That was hugely important because, you know, she's got, there's a quote above my doctor's, on my doctor's office there in Launge Stool

because my wife was with me and he asked me a question and I told him my answer and she goes that's a bunch of bullshit because she knows. So he goes, oh yeah, what's the real deal?

Right? And so I realize the utility in that because sometimes we're embarrassed by our actions, right? And we don't want to fully disclose them. Well, if you don't fully disclosed then people aren't going to really understand how to help you and and when I had to travel and I had an appointment I did it by Skype and so I the TBI had serious balance issues

my eyes were out of focus and there's a machine that they test that on and a machine that they fix it on so my eyes got back into balance and my balance got they put you on a balance machine and you know you feel like an idiot and and I did all my balance exercise my balance got good. You know, I'd go for a walk with my wife, we'd hold hands, and I would, you know, veer off to the right. And she's like, hey, you're killing me, right? And she'd push me back over and so on and so forth.

And so they just have all these strategies to fix your... Now, think about it. You've got traumatic brain injury as a special operator, and your balance is off. And your eye focus is off. And you've got to do a, you know, high-risk, H-H-47, infiltration, into a village, and then, you know, fast-rope onto a building,

and then use a ladder to cross from one building to the other, and your balance sucks, right? These are things we need to fix, but we're not going to be able to fix them if we're not aware of them. And so I started thinking about, what a freaking coward I am, doing this under the radar and not leading the way and so on and so forth.

So I went back and I talked to my boss about it as the operations officer in Africa. And I said, hey, this is what I've been doing. And I am a different man. My wife sees it. My kids see it. My dog sees it. I am different. I'm not perfect, but I'm a better version of myself.

And he goes, yeah, I've noticed you've been showing up to our social events on Fridays here in Africa. And I go, yeah. He goes, before, you wouldn't come near. him. I go, no, I wouldn't come near him. And he goes, he goes, that's good. He goes, all right, because I get it. And I said, I'm going to open it up to guys in the J-3. And I did, and I got them all together, and I talked to him. And I laid it all out, and I told them what I was doing. And I said, I'm a freaking coward, but I tell you what

I'll do right now is you won't get taken out of your job. You won't get taken, you won't lose your clearance. I will back you up 100%. I don't care if it is DOD policy. I don't care. It's not the right approach. So I got you back. We did it. And I'm telling you, a lot of guys that helped. I carried that over when I took command of Special Operations Command in Africa on 24 April.

And I got with them. Unbelievable. 26 months of data. What I thought were indiscipline issues with alcohol and drugs was self-medication. Those guys trying to figure out how they're going to be able to alleviate their pain, deal with their issues, and still be able to do their mission at the best of their ability. And in SOC Africa, we put even the deploying troops that came over, we put them through the program. And it was huge.

Navy SEALs, Marine Special Operators, SF, Air Force guys, we got. testimonies from wives and marriages that were saved. We decentralized the program. Like, I remember I was in Niger, which we were up in Arlet, which is in the middle of nowhere. It's not the end of the world, but you can see it from there. You know what I mean? And I did my Skype meeting with my therapist, right? I mean, I still see a therapist, right?

It's just something that I decided to continue. But I'm a very high-functioning person, and that was my point. These guys are still high-functioning, and they're even more high-functioning if we give them the treatment they need. It's just a mental injury. 52 people we diagnosed with PTSD, 471 with traumatic brain injury. 471. And there's only one guy, and you wouldn't believe how many people with pain management issues. I mean, and sleep issues?

We're the definition of a sleep, you know, sleep problems. Yes, we are. And so we got them the machines or the mouth thing, whatever they wanted. And it was unbelievable. You know, if you get less than five hours of sleep, your brain operates like it's got 0.10% alcohol in it. Legal limit of driving under the influence. So for, I don't know, 25 years or so, I was shit-faced at work without taking a drop of alcohol, you know,

and think about your decision-making and stuff like that. And so the New York Times came into the unit and said, hey, we're going to do an article on Africa. And then she started talking to people and they said, that's not the story. The story is how we're dealing with post-traumatic stress and TBI and getting resilience and readiness back in the end of that story. You should have to ask them about that. So she asked me about it and I told her and that became the story. That wasn't a popular story with the chain of command. Not a popular story at all.

And I was told to stop talking about it. The more you talk about it, the more problems we have. I said, well, I don't agree with that. I think the more we talk about it, the more we understand it, and the least problems we have. And we get guys in the therapy and we can do it without degrading the mission. I had 96 missions in Special Operations Command and 846 associated tasks,

and I had zero, zero detriment in mission, and guys got better. I mean, drug and alcohol abuse, you know, incidents went way down. I went to zero in misbehavior in the workplace. Zero, right? They sent a team from DO. to investigate what we were doing, right? And I said, hey, it's just a matter of taking care of mental, physical injuries, and spiritual.

Socom had a great program that they brought in with, that integrated families. And we had that, and we located it in our headquarters. And that was something that I had nothing to do with because the rules are that nothing gets reported to the chain of command. And I'm okay with that, right? I don't need to know, right? guys there with their families working out problems it was really unbelievable after 26 months of you know of this and yeah you know for me it was a whole process of leadership and learning and understanding and then being able to say you're strong not weak if you ask for help right

And I had three suicides in my units. I'll never forget, Sardint First Class in Kenya, six-month rotation to Kenya, combat operations with the Kenyan Special Ops Rangers against Al-Shabaab and ISIS Samoa, which is great work. Packed up all his gear, cleaned his quarters that he was staying in.

Put a note, day before he was redeploy went out to the range sat in a chair and shot himself in the head it was more painful for him to go home at that point in time in his life and his decision-making process than so he took his life

I tell you what man I took a knee on that one you know I mean I mean a big knee right and so I said we can't we can't allow that to happen You know, it's bad enough to lose somebody in your unit, combat, but suicide. And of course, we missed all kinds of warning signals.

Everybody missed warning signals. You know who knew? The family knew. But the family was afraid to talk because they were afraid that if they say anything, then it's going to hurt their husband's career. And so we need to be better at... making sure it doesn't hurt their career, making sure they get to help,

because we can do it. We get a lot of white space on the calendar when guys come back. We can make it work. And taking these health assessments, it isn't going to work, right? You've got to have, take these programs, and you at the top,

I'm telling you, Rich Paglisi, who was my senior enlisted advisor, Navy SEAL, great guy, love Rich. I know Rich. Rich and I had the same issues, and we would get in front of the unit and we would talk,

and we would share our personal experience, and we had everyone's back. The only person that didn't, that got taken off was the sergeant major of our SIF team, you know, our direct action teams. And that's because he took, after we talked to him, he took all 45 of his guys the next day over the launch tool, ran him through the program. And when he was getting his MRI to see if he had any traumatic brain injury, they found a tumor about the size of an eraser on his brain. He got Medevac to Walter Reed. They took the tumor off, and they said, hey, you know,

if this had gone another year, you would have been figuring out an end-the-life plan. Yes. And they replaced his left hip that he had been, you know, dealing with for years, and he was a new man, right? and an advocate of this whole program. And, you know, after he left the team, he went off to our training

and has been an advocate for this and, you know, promoting it ever since. And this is what you get. You get guys with a better understanding from the bottom up. But they got to have that top-down cover. And I'm afraid it's still not there. It needs to be there. We've got to put it there. And, you know, I went through.

you know what everyone else goes through oh i'm weak something wrong with me i'm less of a man and that's none of that's true right so that's that was your last tour was was at sock africom right that was it um you know it was funny i joined the army 29 june 1981 and I gave up command and had my retirement ceremony on 29 June 2017. I didn't retire officially until 2 August 2017, but you know I came home and went on terminal leave and started helping veterans put together a business called Truth to Power which I was doing really well with. I'd have about four speaking events a month, which was good,

just bringing in the money that I needed. Then I got hired to be an associate professor at New England College, and I just got laid off. And I was trying to find a job. I got laid off in May trying to find a job. So I ended up applying to Hampton Police Department, and I am now at 59 years old, a police recruit in the New Hampshire Police Academy.

I'm the platoon leader And My The youngest guy in the class is 19 years old And I'm like, holy crap And so I'll graduate in November November 19th

And it was funny because in 1980 I was in class number four Because remember I told you about being a police officer And I am now in class 281 And so So, yeah, I'll start working at Hampton Police Department, which is the town right next to Stratom, where I live now in New Hampshire. It's on the sea coast, so it's right there on the beach,

and a majority of the work there is patrolling the Hampton Beach area, which is going to be cool. And, you know, it's going to be a high adventure. New Hampshire Baywatch. Yeah, that's right, that's right. And, you know, I mean, I've always looked at where I can contribute. And I got to tell you, at 59 years old, when I, and it's quite a process, too, because I applied, and I got my test date of 3 May, and I went in and took my test with 27 other young guys, right?

And that was the standardized test, right? So I hadn't taken a standard-eyed test No, 40 years, so I was nervous about that, right? And I took the test that I passed, much to my dismay and surprise, and I got set up for my oral interview, and I had the lieutenant, the sergeant, and a patrolman. And they go, all right, we know who you are. We all voted for you, right, in the last election.

We know who you are. And we know what you've done for our country. Why in the hell do you want to do this? And I said, hey, just looking for a way to contribute. And, you know, there's no more to it than that. And he goes, okay. And the sergeant starts asking me questions, and it gets to the patrolman. And he goes, I don't have any experience to ask you any questions.

And I said, yeah, you do. You're a police officer. So bring it on. But nonetheless, you know, you do the polygraph and you do the physical fitness test and you do the psychological test. It was like going through special ops again, right? You know, all those things that lead up to you getting in, you've got to qualify physically, mentally,

you know, you've got to pass the full physical test. And I have two prosthetic hips and three prosthetic discs because of combat injuries, and that was the thing they were worried about the most, right? And I said, listen, I've jumped out airplanes with these things. I can certainly handle patrol with these things. They go, okay, that's okay. I guess you can, right?

And so my wife thought I was nuts. So that might seem like nuts. And then what seems like even more nuts to me is you entering the political arena. Yes. What brought that about? I was asked. I was asked by, I got a lot of emails, texts, and letters, phone calls from people in all 10 counties in New Hampshire, all 50 states to include

across the military asking me to run for office. And I thought, well, if people think I can help them, I don't have all the answers, certainly not a politician. And I think there are many people in the military would attest to my lack of political acumen because it's just not there. Too straightforward, blah, blah, blah. But nonetheless, if you think I can help you, I'm going to try. And so that's my why for running.

And so, you know, I just want to help our country, our economy, help us become more fiscally responsible, and help us be able to improve the safety and security of Americans so that we can all live the American dream. That's all I want to do, right? The oath I took in the military is still valid. I still believe in the American dream and the greatness of this country.

I have a tremendous amount of exposure to what other people and other places across the world think and feel about America and the promise of America. And I think that regardless of, of your political beliefs or spectrum that you fall on, you know, God, family, community, and country has got to appeal to everybody. And that's my platform. And that's what I'm doing.

And that's what you're doing right now. So what is it you're running for right now, just so everybody knows? United States Senate. In New Hampshire, obviously. Where you've lived for 59 out of 59, or where you've been a resident of 59 years. That's right. And I've been a Republican in that state, for 42 years. My 18 years old. First president I voted for was Ronald Reagan.

What's the, when's that election timeline? So the primary in New Hampshire. So if I get another Republican that run is going to run against me, which there isn't one yet, the primary election is in September of 2022. And the general election, if I win the primary, against Senator Maggie Hassan and a Democrat, who's been our senator for one term now, will be for November 2022. I don't have a political machine behind me.

I've got to get my name recognition up. Fundraising is huge. So I've got to start earlier than those that have already established politicians, right? And so I'm out now campaigning. We're raising money. We're getting our message out there. It's being very well received. In the last poll, you know, four months ago when they did a poll, I was at 30%.

I'm now up at 45%. Right. So we're moving in the right direction. So if people want to help out, where do they find you? Where do they go to help you out? So my website is www. Donbaldick.com. And, you know, you can go there and you can either, you know, if you want to help the campaign out,

if you're in New Hampshire, that's easy to do. You just sign up. You know, everything is right there on the website. My positions are there on the website. So if you're interested in how I feel on the Second Amendment or whatever, it's there. And if you want to donate, it's there. You know, I start pretty low. I ask folks to donate $20 and $22, 2022, to my campaign.

And if I get a lot of people to do that, I get a lot of money. and it's, you know, anything helps. $5, $10, $20 and $22, $2,22. That helps too. But everything helps. And I'm just going to go there to serve as 1.3 million people in New Hampshire. And I'm going there to serve every single one of them. not just the Republican Party,

but you've got to serve everybody once you get in that office, right? You've got to declare an office, and, you know, my political beliefs line up as a Republican, but that doesn't mean that I won't work for and work hard for everybody in New Hampshire, regardless of whether they're an independent, Democrat, or Libertarian, right? And I think that's what we've lost in this country, with the political divisiveness. We can't come together on three very important things. our economy, fiscal responsibility, and the safety and security of Americans. We used to be able to do that.

I'm a big fan of JFK. I mean, big fan of him, you know, and he would not even be recognizable today, right? As a matter of fact, he'd be more of a Republican than a Democrat today. So we got to come together, and we need people that I think have had the experiences in life that realizes that we're stronger if we work together than we are apart. And are we going to have our differences, yes. But today, our differences are just too much

around what's really important, God, family, community. Also, you got social media too, right? Do, yeah. Yes, sir. We're on social media, everything. I would be remiss, though, if I didn't mention the fact that everybody that found out I was coming here to talk on your show

was like out of their mind. And it was across the political spectrum, by the way, which is really neat. And no one more excited than my son, Zachary, who serves in the New Hampshire National Guard, he was speechless. I mean, it was like, G-Gh-Gh-Jocco, oh, he just couldn't speak. Right? And he goes, why didn't you tell me? And I go, I mean, I don't know.

I mean, I just, you know. But. Well, we have, I, I worked with the, with the National Guard extensively. My deployment to Ramadi, they were there when we first showed up. And they were just complete warriors and professionals. And it was an honor to serve with those guys. So I, nothing, nothing but love for the National Guard. That's for sure.

Yeah. Yeah, he's coming up on his six years and he's going to become a veteran. He's already made that decision, but nonetheless, I am proud that he served his country. And my youngest boy, Matt, is a senior at Purdue, and he just finished his lieutenant training. So they're upholding the tradition. He'll be a second lieutenant on active duty. Look out. Another baldock's coming, fellas.

Awesome. That's probably a good place to stop. Echo, you got anything? Oh, yeah, real quick, going back to the marijuana fields. Oh, jeez going deep. Yeah, yeah. Yeah. And you mentioned booby traps.

Yes. Like what kind of booby traps? No, the marijuana growers back in the day would put booby traps around their marijuana fields so people who wouldn't sneak in and steal their girl. Like what kind of booby traps? So you would get the booby trap where you came across it and it would be just a, it would kick off like a ditch of like napalm. Fire would come up. Also like violent booby traps.

Bombs. The old ones with, like you, like the, you know, you know, Vietnam era stuff where, you know, punchy sticks and they would, they were spring-loaded kind of things and they would come and they would just hit you in the thigh or the leg or what have you, upper body, those kind of things, yeah. Dang, that's awesome. Yeah, they were serious.

Scary stuff back in the day. Well, because I'm quiet, and this is back in the day too, when it was either. legal, but they'd have booby traps, but it would be, they wouldn't be violent booby traps. They'd just be, like, alarm type, like, you know, like, I heard one where they had just, like, cases and cases of mouse traps. So, like, if you stepped on it, you nudged it, it would go, and it was like, you know, like a bunch of birds taking off or whatever, but louder, it'd be something like that, like

that kind of stuff. They had those two. Early warning devices. Yeah, yeah, yeah. They'd have that, and, but they also had, the closer you got. the worse off it was for you. And that's why the forest rangers were always, you know, they were very appreciative of us going in there

because we'd take it very slow. And, you know, our guys were trained, very, trained very well. And we had, you know, we had some technology to help us out as well. So, but yeah, it was there. It was ugly. And we're lucky that we didn't set any of them off. That we were able to either go around. them or you know neutralize them different way with you know old-fashioned way with with the

the rope and the grappling hook grappling hook pull them out and watch what happens wow that was a good show glad we weren't around that right on yeah general any closing thoughts well I think The only closing thought that I would have, and since this is, you know, you focus on leadership a lot, is I'd just like to let everybody know that throughout all this, I realized that I was an imperfect leader, and that as long as I remembered really three things, and that is to remain humble, thankful, and grateful, and that I never let my ego get in the way, and I was always self-aware of my weaknesses and worked on those. and let my strengths be what they are, it was better off from me and everybody else around me. And these type of shows and the things that you do and what this show does for anyone who listens to it is hugely important for America

because right now what we need more than anything else is effective leadership. It is a huge, huge, issue and something that I think my experience is teaching in college and being around my own kids and being around others is they're thriving for you know leadership and these examples that we have seen in the past and and you represent that here with the show and I just want to thank you for this opportunity I'm humbled and grateful for it and so thank you for what you do and thanks for

letting me tell my story Well, thanks for coming on. Thanks for joining us. More important, thank you for your leadership, your service to our great nation, your sacrifices overseas. It's been a long war for America. You were there for most of it. And that's saying a lot, and you are still continuing to fight for America.

We appreciate it. Thank you. God bless you. Thank you very much. And with that, General Don Bulldoch, has. left the building definitely seen a lot you always looking to improve I think that's something we can definitely take away yeah maybe we can all look to improve maybe that's a good idea echo Charles yes sir any suggestions on where

we can start to improve ourselves yes what do you got well he did mention how he's he didn't say he was the oldest one cadet And the police. I think it's safe to assume he's the oldest one. I assume that, at 59. Yeah. But he did imply that he,

you know, but the fact, the point is he's out there staying capable. Talking about jumping out of planes with hips a certain way to the extent where they're like, oh, yeah, you pass. Just you can do,

you can still do this kind of stuff. You were this capable. You're in. Meaning the hips passed muster. Yeah. Yeah, exactly right. They're good to go.

Remember they're like, oh, you know, they're concerned about his hips or whatever. And he was like, hey, I jump out of planes of these hips. And they're like, well, and then you can patrol. That's right. Point is, very capable.

High levels of capability. 59, 29, 19 years old, whatever. We're maintaining it. The clock is ticking. The clock is ticking. I heard that today. I heard that today. So we want to keep ourselves capable, mentally, physically, of course.

Through this path of capability chasing. We're chasing capability, of course. Through this path, we're going to take some beatings. 100%. Take it from me. Yeah. You do some jiu-jitsu. You take beating sometimes.

Sometimes that neck gets squeezed on that one. Yes. And that's going to get squeezed on that one. So, you know how, like I said, hey, after I rolled with you that one day and I was like, man, I feel like I got hit by a truck and you're like, oh, yeah, full body doms, right? Oh, yeah. It's way more than full body doms. Psychological. Got some emotional doms as well.

Yeah, man, and that's, that's real. You know, that's just one of the many examples of the beatings you're going to take on this path. No problem, no. Sometimes you need some supplementation to help you through those beatings. In fact, you get through these beatings, that's when the capability starts to emerge. Is you what I'm saying? Additional levels of capability. Anyway, got some supplements for you.

Going to help you, help us. So first supplement I want to talk about is a new era of energy drinks, straight up. like the old new category new category new category new paradigm paradigm shift oh yeah discipline go yeah so no sugar it's a healthy energy drink straight up that actually tastes good yeah I saw someone someone wrote hey I thought jaco didn't drink energy drinks I heard him say he didn't drink them unless he really needed them well why is that that's true that's a fact it's a fact before This came out because you weren't going to want to drink one of the other energy.

You don't want to drink those unless you had to. Yeah, the old era. I've got a 19 hour drive. I'm 14 hours into it. I'm fading. I need something to boost me up for the next three hours. Okay, cool. Overdosed with caffeine.

Get your jitters on, but you get there. So that's what I used to do for sure. Now all of a sudden it's like, oh, I've got something that I can drink. It's actually healthy for me. and it gives me the benefits of energy. Right? It's a no-brainer. Yeah, it's true.

So do I drink traditional, old school, poisonous energy drinks? The answer is no, I don't. I used to occasionally, if I needed to. Now, we'll never need to do that again because we have an alternative that's functional and works. So there you go. And taste good. Do you drink kombucha? No.

Have you ever? Have you ever tasted it? I've probably, it might have almost touched to my lips, but I can just smell stuff and I don't like it. Right. Yeah. Oh, kombucha is no exception in that regard. But it tastes junk. It tastes bad.

I know people, including people that I'm related to that are so down with kombucha. I get it. Do more females like kombucha than males? I don't have those numbers. In my family, that's what I'm going on. My family, females are drinking cambucha. Yeah. kombucha?

What is it? Yeah, cambucha. They're drinking it. Females, males, not drinking it. My father-in-law straight up makes it straight up. It's like a process. It's a thing. And then I assume he drinks it.

Yes, sir, he does. But in my experience, yeah, more females are into kombucha than males. But that's not the point. The point is, if you ever tasted it, you're like, cool, kombucha is so healthy. You know, it's detox and whatever they say about kombucha. I don't know. I don't know. It ain't worth it.

It's healthy. We'll just say, bro, taste it. You're like, all right, I'll endure that taste. for the health benefits. You see what I'm saying? But there's no reason to do that. No, there's not.

That's a thing. So this one, especially the mango flavor. You drink that one, you're like, wait a second, taste good and healthy and gives me energy.

No lose situation right there. Okay. Just so everybody knows the, the mango flavor, there's no difference other than the flavor. Yes.

You can't put it over here on a pedestal of whatever. It tastes the best. In your opinion. Yes. Yeah. think and you know the consensus still getting being formulated because new which is another kind of novel thing new new flavor so you know what you want to look at that one i always go back

to old faithful jaco palmer yeah i can't i can't argue with that right yep it's legitimate yes sir jp dennell pointed out that jaco palmer tastes good whether it's like room temperature or whether it's cold yeah you're you're good to go oranges like that too for sure so yeah get your oh it's called jaco discipline go if you didn't know already which you know Most of us do know, but I do want to kind of reiterate these things about it. Yeah. And by the way, it's available in Wawa right now. And we're working on a bunch of other convenience stores.

You'll be seeing it. But everyone that's been going out to Wawa and just clearing shelves, thank you. Because that makes the other, you're actually helping everyone in the nation. You're helping every nation because other convenience stores look at Wawa and think, oh, how's it? Oh, they go, oh, how's it doing there? Whoa. Yeah. You're selling a lot of that stuff.

So that means other convenience stores go, all right, we want it to. And they're saying that. So we appreciate East Coast troopers out there clearing shelves in Wawa. Yeah, it does make sense, right? If you're a, let's say a convenient store owner. Yeah. Right? The guy who makes the decisions, whatever.

And he's going to be like, wait, a healthy energy drink. He's going to be thinking kombucha or something like this where it's like, cool, it's new. Might not taste that good, whatever. But Wawa's over here demonstrating that, hey, brother, it tastes good, too. You know? So they're like, oh, I get it now. You know, they're kind of connecting the dots a little bit. That makes sense.

Yeah. Well, there's all this data. And it's been great. So, again, sincere appreciation to everyone that's been rolling out to Wawa and just getting it. Appreciate it. That's awesome. And you're helping America because now the rest of other convenience stores are getting

on board. And then other people will have access to this wonderful, nutritious, as Travis Mills said, nutritious and delicious. Nutrition and delicious. Oh yeah, fully. Also other items that do help us on the path is we got some joint stuff, joint warfare. Super krill oil. Another good thing for your joints.

Definitely. And the thing is it's a big deal. And this is like we always say, this is one of those things where this really pays for itself in a way that's like invisible. Because you're not worried about your joints. You'll feel the difference when you don't have it. When your joints are aching. Here's what's interesting. We have a massive amount of subscriptions to those two.

So people, yes, send it to me every month because they want to not miss out on that goodness. Yeah, and they don't want to worry about that. And if you want to subscribe to it, you get free shipping, by the way, which is cool. We don't have to pay for shipping. You can also not pay for shipping. If you go to a vitamin shop,

you can get all the stuff at vitamin shop. They've also been supportive. and everyone has been supportive rolling in the vitamin shop buying stuff. So very cool. We appreciate it. We'll keep making milk. We'll keep making things that taste good and are good for you. That's what we're doing.

Joccofuel.com. Also, origin USA.com. This is where you can get American made denim, shoe or boots, some other, all the cool new stuff that Pete thinks up, working pants. Got some jiu-jitsu stuff on there as well. So if you're joining Jiu-Jitsu. Jitza you don't have a ghee yet or maybe if you do have a ghee origin and they're always coming out with some new keys Yeah yeah I said that in kind of a but let's face it

The geese at at origin like I put a have the first like one of the first rift geese I have I was wearing it yesterday where were you yesterday? I was that you know somewhere okay while I was training on the mats of justice sure I was wearing the first dish yeah white rift key things are freaking unbelievable It's like a whole new thing. Era? Yeah. A paradigm shift.

Paradise shift. Yeah. Yeah. They're the best. The only downside is that you will potentially be spoiled in that way. You will throw away your other geese. Or at least marginalize them.

I put on one to see, oh yeah, does it still fit? And you know, feel the fit. And you feel it and you're like, bro, I would never wear this. I mean, cool, respect. Oh, you put on one of the old ones? The old ones, yeah.

And it just simply went out of the rotation. And plus, you know it has bad karma. Why? Because it was made by slave labor in China. Yeah. Yeah. What's cool too is, and you can see this on the origin YouTube channel. It's like, it's the opposite of slave labor.

It's like, it's one thing to be like, okay, you have slave labor. Okay. They don't want to be there. They're kind of in a way, like obligated or forced in some way to be there and they've got to make this stuff. Okay, that's terrible, obviously. But then you have like maybe the quote unquote stand where it's like, hey, that's the job. They're going to go and they're going to do it. But then you get origin, you go there, brought those.

Every single one, you see them, oh, man, they care. They care about that stitch. You see them saying? They care about, like, the whole deal. Then they make that ghee. Then you get to wear it. That's the, that's the, that's the fun. Then you get positive karma.

Good karma with that ghee. All around. All around. All around. Good karma with those jeans. Oh, yeah. The working pants. Supporting American economy as well.

That's a big part of the whole gig. Amazing. Yeah. So win, win, wins across the board, origin, orgin USA.com. Cool stuff on there. Very cool. Also, speaking of cool stuff, Jocko is a store.

It's called Jocko store. So yes, Discipline equals freedom shirts, hats, some rash guards on there, hoodies on there, shorts on there. You want a shirt that says good with or without Jocko's face. You got the option, though. Anyway, some good stuff on there.

If you look at that stuff, you like something, get something. We do have a subscription situation on there as well called the shirt locker. Cool designs. depending on your opinion. Sure. But we think they're cool designs.

General consensus, they're cool designs. They're fun, you know, a little bit different. So we'll say creative. I don't know. I've heard the word creative throwing around.

Okay. Unless, you can check that out as well. It's all at jocco store. Subscribe to this podcast. Wherever you subscribe to a podcast, you can also subscribe to Unravelling, Jaco unraveling with Daryl Cooper.

We've been making some of those lately. We've been making some of those lately. We have the grounded podcast, which we haven't made lately. Does it need to be revived from the ashes? Yeah, it's possible. Warrior Kid Podcast, it's another one. I got a letter from a little kid.

They had one question for Uncle Jake. Yeah. When's the next Warrior Podcast? Kid podcast coming out. Because I've only made, I think, 37 of them or something like that. Yeah. But they're there. You've got a kid, Warrior Kid Podcast.

We also have Jock Underground.com. That's a little, little sovereign area. of the interwebs that we built to make sure that we can remain free out here. And because look, these people doing are all kind of weird stuff with these platforms that we're on. So far, everything's been cool.

It's cool. We appreciate it. But contingency-wise, you can't just, you can't build your house on someone else's land because they might come around and kick you off, right?

So we made our own land. It's called jocco-underground.com. If you want to help us support that land, If you want maybe a little room on that land, maybe you want a little plot, we can get you one. It costs $8.18 and $18 a month. Look, and if you need to come on to the land, the sovereign land of the Jocko Underground, and you can't afford it, it's okay. We want you there.

As long as you're in the game, you can just email assistance at jaco underground.com. That's, we appreciate it again, for real. If something goes sideways on these platforms, we're going to be there. And as a appreciation, we do another little podcast. It's usually about an hour. We talk about some other subjects. We answer Q&A. Questions that have been sent directly to the underground.

It's true. Then we can tell you what's up. So that's that. We also have a YouTube channel. And a lot of people correctly identified on the latest release of the mayhem movie that Echo Charles made. A lot of people recognize that there was some powerful assistant directing going on in there. I'm serious. That's all in the comments.

Strong AD presence. People knew that the AD presence. I'm the assistant director. Yep. And also, you know, kind of had a supporting role in that one. What did you say? Think so? Actually, you might have been the lead on that one.

I don't know. I had zero lines. Yeah. Which is. Hey, they were powerful, though. That's the thing. Your zero lines. Your whole performance was powerful.

Because big shocker, Echo made a movie and he's the star of it. That's kind of the feeling that most people got. We're a tie, main tie. Yeah. You sent me, like, it was a clip. of us talking about it or whatever and how like you know the time you're you're clicking on the can or whatever in that in that video or whatever it gets me I guess at the end of the day I was giving you props for that or whatever yeah and I feel like everyone

including main tie is kind of just sort of recognizing you straight up you're the AD assistant director see so all right but I still feel like I'm in the shadow of the star The person with all the lines. Yes. And the most camera time. Yes. You are? You are?

No, that's you, dude. Yes, our YouTube channel. We do have, on top of Joccoving the assistant director, we do have the video version of all this stuff. If you want to see what General Don Bulldoch looks like, you can come on here. Yeah. And YouTube. Check up a YouTube channel. YouTube is, you know, one of those things now.

It's not just a video thing anymore. It's like some people, it's their preferred. method to like watch TV listen to a podcast or whatever so I dig it and we got you that's we got this whole thing I think I'm one of those people yeah I mean does anyone watch TV like actual TV like a show yeah is that happening yeah okay some DVR action okay I don't know if people still watch it live like live no I don't think so that might be very low numbers subjected to commercials and stuff commercials commercials Or kind of a non-starter for me at this juncture in my life.

Yeah, you know it's weird. And my kids kind of the same way is like I like I like I like like commercial, not all of them. But well, fast forward to them. But if I see one that I'm like, oh, wait, let me see that commercial. Like it's kind of. There's no commercial. There's like a, because some commercials, there's a little story within the commercial. It's kind of good.

I feel that way. So yeah, anyway, yeah. The point is we have a YouTube channel. Boom. Subscribe to it. Subscribe to it if you want. It's a good one. So yeah, there you go.

Also, psychological warfare. If you don't know what that is, an album, a Jocko album with Jocko tracks on there, telling us how to get past our moments of weakness when we have them. And I have them from time to time. But you don't got to worry about that kind of stuff because Jock will tell you why you should get over them. 100% success on that one.

100%. If you want to hang something cool on your wall, why not make it something from flipsidecanvas.com that my brother Dakota, Meyer made owns he is the I want to make fun how do we make fun of him He's the creative artistic director of that thing There you go Dakota creative artistic director

I think that's the title he's always wanted Yeah I don't doubt it's a good title That's Dakota one of my heroes and if you want to get some stuff to hang on your wall Flipside canvas.com got a bunch of books I've written a bunch of books the one that's coming out next is called final spin We don't know if it's a not We don't know if it's a poem. We don't know if it's a manuscript. We don't know what it is But it tells a story story with some lessons

I let my oldest daughter read the book Final Spin and she got done reading it And she came out the kitchen and Like I could see that she just got done reading it And I go oh well you know what'd you think and she started explaining to me what she liked and what she didn't like And she started crying while she was explaining it. And that's when I said to myself, okay, looks like I found it. It's like we got it.

We got what we wanted. Yeah, that's funny. Which is to have some kind of an impact, right? That's what we want. Yeah. Want that thing to leave a mark a little bit. You ever think about that? Like, why do we, you ever cried during the movie?

No. Come on, bro. Zero. When you're young, you never cried during the movie. Oh, no. You didn't say when I was young. Ever. Yeah.

No, no. When I was young, for sure. Yeah. Yeah. One movie. I'm pretty sure E.T. You know what sucks is I watched E.T. With my daughter who's, she was 11 when I watched it with her.

This was just like this year. Have you seen E.T. lately? No, not lately. Steven Spielberg, no offense. That movie did not stand the test of time. Hey, I went to the theater when I was a kid and saw that movie. And I was with a friend of mine. And we were kind of, you know, little tough guys.

We were probably 10, something like that. Little tough guys, you know. and we were bawling. And I watched this movie. What part? I barely remember the end of it or something. I don't know. He goes home.

I mean, eventually, right? That's like what it's supposed to be the... So I watch it with my daughter, and I'm sort of bracing for her, and I'm thinking, oh, this is going to be... She just... It was bad.

It didn't stand the test of time. Now, look, Jaws, as you know, I mean, Jaws, one of my favorite movies. Steven Spielberg, good job, credit. That stands a test at time, and then some. Now, could we go back? Maybe C.G. Some shark activity?

We probably could. I guess I don't really want him to. Do you want him to? No. No. You like it old school. So keep it the way it is, bro. But you're not going to beat Quinn and Chief Brody, right?

It's not happening. I mean, who's going to do better? Quinn, let's face it. So Stephen Spielberg, Jaws, stood the tested time. Good to go. Credit. However, ET, br. Wait, why?

Because the story or just because of the special effects? The whole thing, the whole thing. The whole thing. It was like an okay movie, but. I don't like okay movies. Yeah. You know, that doesn't do it for me. They got to blow you away.

Yeah, I want to get something. It takes an hour and a half to watch a movie, maybe two hours sometimes. I'm not. And at this juncture in my life, if something's not good to go, I'm done. No time. We're not watching it. Yeah. I will leave a theater.

I will leave. I'm not watching the stupid. Or you know what I'll actually do? Sleep. Dang, straight up. Get some rest. Oh, yeah. If I'm with my wife or my kids and there's a bad.

movie we went and saw okay have you ever heard of a horror movie that's called it yeah it yeah yeah yeah so the first one came out my kids really like that horror movie my wife doesn't even watch one millisecond of a horror movie the first the first one the first of the new ones because it is old school that's the old school movie the new ones they did with the clown face and yeah that's all the penny wise yeah that's always the story okay so i watched the the one of them okay and it was okay but then my kids were all amped yeah and So we actually went to the theater to go see it. The second version of whatever, the new one, chapter two,

Los Dos, whatever. We roll in there. It is so bad. I just was like, I watched maybe seven to 12 minutes of it. Maybe, maybe. And I was out sleeping. Caught up on some sleep. Yep, caught up on some sleep.

They woke me up. I saw the last seven minutes of it. Yeah. It was so bad. And we all walked out of there. My kids thought it was bad. too. Oh, for a thing. Okay. That makes sense. You ever, okay, this is okay, now we're kind of deviating, but I don't care. You're talking about it. It's cool. I've never seen the new ones.

I saw the old ones like they're super long too. And cool. I get what they're doing and they're good. But it, the new, not chapter two, like the first one of the new ones. So the thing I didn't see any of them, but they have a trailer for that. Oh, man. It's a really good trailer. They have a few of them, but it's the one where it's like, hey, um, for, There's Georgie and then the older brother. I forget the older brother's name. I was sleeping. And he's like, hey, you'll float too.

Like, hey, if you come down here or everything floats down here is what the ghost kid says, right? Everything floats down there. I think that's what the clown said first, I guess. Anyway, so he's like, if you come down here, you'll float too. And then like this beat, this horror kind of beat, like starts speaking up. And he goes, you'll float too. You'll float. It's really well done, trailer on that one.

Yep. Well, it must have been better than the movie. I think so. And remember a long time ago when we were talking, you're like, oh, why did you start video or whatever? And the whole phenomenon that some movies, actually a lot of movies, I mean, I could name a lot of movies that the trailer is better than the movie. Like, watching the trailer provides a better, like, experience than watching the movie. Yeah, that's totally true. So that phenomenon is kind of what made me like want to do videos or whatever.

Yeah. It. That's one of them. You have to say the T distinctly for it. Yes. So final spin, we don't really know what it is, but it will withdraw some emotions, some lessons learned, some thought-provoking material. Yeah. Final spin. Cool.

You can pre-order it now. That way you can get the first edition. It's going to be kind of rad to have the first edition of that. I think it's going to be extra cool. So check that out. Leadership Strategy and Tactics Field Manual. The answer to all your questions is actually in that book. leadership questions the answers are there the code the evaluation the protocols discipline

equals freedom field manual way the warrior kid one two three and four mike and the dragons about faced by hackworth which i wrote the forward to extreme ownership and the dichotomy of leadership i got echelom front which is a leadership consultancy and what we do is solve problems through leadership go to ashlamfront dot com for details this is where you can find details for our live events we have the muster we have field training exercise we have eF battlefield the next muster is in Las Vegas, October 28th and 29th. The next FTX is in September, September 20th and 21st, and it's actually sold out. So, yeah, we sell things out.

If you want to come, then go to eshlamfront.com and click on events and you can find all this stuff. We also have online training, the Extreme Ownership Academy. Leadership is a skill that you need to practice. It's a perishable skill. you don't take one jiu jitza class now you can kick people's asses. You don't take one leadership book, read it, and now you're good to go. No, you actually have to train. That's why we made Extreme Ownership Academy.

Online leadership courses, it's a leadership gym for you to go through. We have live sessions. I'm on out there all the time answering questions. Go to Extreme Ownership.com. For that, also if you want to help service members active and retired, their families, Gold Star families, check out Mark Lee's mom. Mama Lee, she's got a charity organization. Go to America's Mighty Warriors.org.

If you want to donate or you want to get involved. And if you want more of my anti-climactic anecdotes, or you need more of echoes yattering yarns. You can find us on the interwebs on Twitter, on the gram, and on that face. Spooky. Echoes at Equich I am Matt Jock-Willink

and again, General Don Bullduck can be found on Facebook, Twitter, and Instagram at Gen, G-E-N,

Don, D-O-N, Bull-D-U-C, B-O-L-D-U-C. So if you want to check out what he's up to or you want to support his campaign, you can also go to Don-B-B-L-D-U-C-com.

D-O-N-B-L-D-U-C. com. And thanks, once again to General Bulldoch for joining us today and for being out there from the beginning holding the line to protect our way of life and the same goes to the rest of our service men and women out there right now also holding the line to protect our way of life and the same goes to the police law enforcement firefighters paramedics EMTs dispatchers correctional officers border patrol secret service and all first responders thank you for holding the line here at

home to keep us safe and everyone else out there on September 10th 2001 we were at peace the next day September 11th 2001 we were at war in one day everything changed and that's the way life can be too things change things happen people get sick people get hurt we lose our jobs we lose our loved ones anything and everything can change in one day and when it does Don't get caught back on your heels. Instead, go forward. Go on the attack and continue to fight. Until there's peace again.

And until next time, Zeko and Jocko. Out.