Judging Freedom - Alastair Crooke: Can US Cap Middle East Violence?

Episode Date: February 26, 2024

Alastair Crooke: Can US Cap Middle East Violence?See Privacy Policy at https://art19.com/privacy and California Privacy Notice at https://art19.com/privacy#do-not-sell-my-info.

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when the whole world knows without the U.S. funding there would be no slaughter in Gaza? I think that it's very clear that the White House does not want an intense wider war in the region. But nonetheless, the reality is that it is tethered to Netanyahu and to the cabinet in Israel, and they have different objectives. Whereas I think that particularly in Gaza and in Lebanon and in the region as a whole, as Amos Hochstein, the envoy of the White House, said very clearly, yes, it's going to happen. We're going to have more interventions in the

region, particularly in Lebanon. But the object of the United States is to keep the level of violence down to the lowest that's possible. Now, is that going to be realistic? Is that going to happen? Well, what I think we're seeing is really two distinct types of warfare facing off at one another. On the one hand, Israel's type of warfare, which is derived in the same as the American, is still, if you like, the shock and awe inheritance before.

You go in a quick military action dominated by air supremacy. You smash everything up and then you see what happens afterwards. And this has also been the Israeli policy for years, if or less, except when they lost Fort Hezbollah in 2006. Because even then, Hezbollah had started to move to a new form of warfare. Everything was buried underground. The rockets, the men, everything valuable buried far underground. And so they just allowed the air force to roll over it. And it destroyed

buildings and it destroyed bridges and whatever. It rolled over it. And when it was finished, Hezbollah started firing its missiles and rockets. And this proves something that was essential in understanding what we're dealing with now and why the war is so different, is that in doing this, when they did this, they discovered that actually Israel doesn't have military endurance. They'd used up their smart bombs within the first few days. It was continuing. But at the other end of this equation, Israel's population was not coping with the regular daily missile attack on them. It was causing great strains. And Israelis said this very clearly. Our population is not capable of sustaining a prolonged attack. And Hezbollah was able to prolong it, and they prolonged it ultimately for 33 days.

And this is why we have this great difference in approach of warfare. On the one hand, that developed out of 2006 and also the thinking of Qasem Soleimani, the sort of, if you like, the Clausewitz of our modern era, was that you have everything buried, you have it deeply down. And the two things, and this you will see from Iran, and also from the resistance, is the key way to win this war is that the enemy, in their case, as they view it, being Israel, doesn't have long breath. It is not

capable of mounting prolonged war. America is rather similar in this respect. So they want a long war of attrition. And to do that, you have to do two things. Because, of course, America has forces in the region. They call them tripwire forces that are there if you like to promise retribution if they're attacked. But what Iran and the resistance want is that they want to calibrate the intensity of the war, that this is careful to make sure it doesn't slip into a full-scale violence, into a full-scale war. So they want control of calibration. And as you've seen, we've seen that Iran has persuaded the Hashad, the Iraqi militia, not to go on firing weapons for the time being at American bases in the region, because they understand that those American bases, yes,

they're a tripwire, but they're also the, if you like, the conveyor belt, allowing the neocons to move closer and closer to war with Iran, which Iran is not wanting that. So Iranians said, okay, hold on. So they calibrate the intensity, but they keep escalatory dominance. They can escalate when they want. They can go back to the hashad and say, okay, go for it now, push all of it. It's more complicated because Iraq is at the same time, the government is trying to negotiate, if you like,

a withdrawal of American forces completely from the area. But that is basically the two things that make it. So what you have is you have a quick, fast, Air Force-led war on one hand, and slow attrition population away from the north of Israel. They can't bring them back to the area near Gaza. They're not winning in Gaza. They already, again, Hezbollah is managing this to, if you like, control the intensity by setting direct exchange. All right, you hit us in Sidon, which they did last week. Hit us in Sidon, the price for Sidon, we attack Haifa. The price for hitting us in Beirut is we'll take the whole area from Tel Aviv of the industrial area to the south. In that way, they control, if you like, the intensity and therefore can keep it and allow the internal tensions in Israel to build up, and they keep the control of the escalatory dominance as much as they can.

And that's what's happening now in Lebanon. I'm detecting below the surface of your arguments a conclusion which would be heresy for the neocons, and that is both the United States and Iran are against a wider war. That's correct. Is that a fair conclusion from what you just said, Alistair? It's a fair conclusion. The question is whether the United States or Iran will be able to stop it becoming a wider war. And it'll be the conflict with Hezbollah that will be the real test of that. Even this weekend, just before, you know, yesterday, I think it was, the defense minister, Gallant,

was on the border with Hezbollah, talking to troops, preparing them. And he said, we are going, and this is his words exactly, and he said, we are going to increase the level of far power against Hezbollah,

which they've already done and are in the process of doing. We are going to increase the assassinations of Hezbollah figures and military officers. And we are going to continue this war, even if there's a ceasefire in Gaza, or even if there is a hostage release agreement. We will continue increasing the pressure on Hezbollah. And he ended up by saying, we will drive Hezbollah away from the border area. So it's clear this is coming. So we're at this sort of interim period where Hezbollah is setting its rules and Iran is equally trying to maintain and the resistance trying to maintain, if you like, a very careful calibration of this escalation in such a way it doesn't become a big war.

So it's true. They don't want the neocons to get, you know, to use what's happening to the Hashad, which is all about Gaza, but they want to use it to get at Iran. And Iran is just blocking this, managing the level of violence, just as the White House thinks it's going to be able to manage the level of violence when Israel does finally invade into Lebanon. But is it going to be able to manage it? Because Hezbollah is much more sophisticated than 2006. They have a vast range of missiles.

Just to be clear, they can reach Eilat in the far reaches of Israel. Israelis know that. And they can reach other places. And this goes back to the 2006 war. It was Israel who called a halt to that war, because its population couldn't sustain a prolonged period under attack from missiles every day, day after day, continuing. So it's a question of that, the balance of Lebanon or Hezbollah into northern Israel, whether you consider it northern Israel or not, whether you're talking about the West Bank or just Israel? Who's been more active up there? Well, Hezbollah begun this by, it did establish, let's call it a buffer zone inside Israel, about 10 kilometers deep and about 100 kilometers in length. And then now Israel is preparing for to take its buffer zone up to the Litani. And now they're signaling that they may want more than that because their recent strikes

have been 40 kilometers inside Lebanon in Sidon. Sidon, however you pronounce it, Sidon for English speakers. And that's a Sunni town. It's nothing to do with Hezbollah. They don't keep their weapons there. This was the base of Rafi Qairi and the Sunni alliance predominantly. So it's signaling they want to change the rules of the game. And I expect that Hezbollah, they're thinking about it, will probably extend their buffer zone inside Israel further,

displacing more Israelis from northern Israel to the hotels around the Dead Sea. And indeed, Israel has already started moving its, if you like, its no-go area, where Israeli citizens are not allowed to go into the north of Israel, been extending that, I think, in preparation for the next stage that's probably coming. Over the weekend, Amos Hochstein, he's the American negotiator, even though he was born in Israel and fought in the IDF and came to the U.S., became an American citizen, worked his way up through the State Department. He's President Biden's chief negotiator over there.

I guess the proper way to describe him is he's supervising numerous negotiations, said the settlers must return. On the same weekend, Secretary Blinken said, we're changing the policy of the United States government from the Trump years. The settlements are illegal. Which is it? No, they want the, they want, we call them settlers, but not all of them were settlers in the formal way that they were in occupied territory. But these are the people that live in the north. And what Hochstein was saying, and it's quite interesting that he calls them settlers and not residents of the north, but he's saying they must come back. And you can understand why Israel insists on that, because, I mean, you know, what is a Zionist project if Israelis or Jews cannot live freely on the land of Israel and have security. And that security exploded on the 7th of October. And now the residents are too fearful of living anywhere near Hezbollah on one side and anywhere near Gaza on the other side. And so they've got to find a solution to this.

At the same time, they want the whole of the region to be more frightened of Israel. That's their deterrence, that's their main weapon, and this is what is in jeopardy. They've got to try, in their view, if you like, a sort of a biblical view of how to restore deterrence, which is shock and awe, essentially. The shock and awe that we saw in Baghdad and other places, they've got to make people frightened of Israeli military might. And so Hezbollah is going to be the example, if you like, the trial for this test. I think this is a huge gamble because it is partly built on hubris that the Israeli defense force is so

wonderful it's going to be able to do this. But is it? We'll see. Hezbollah might have some surprises for them. But let's get back to Secretary Blinken, who couldn't have made a statement like that without running it past the president, without there being some consensus in the Oval Office or the West Wing or Foggy Bottom, where the State Department is, why would they say now something contrary to what the previous administration said and contrary to what they said for the first three years of this administration in the midst of a great crisis for Israel and the so-called alliance between Biden and Netanyahu, that the settlements are illegal? They need to because this is the cornerstone of their policy of trying to lower the level of violence. They need to get, if you like, first of hostages coming out

and someone who's going to take over Gaza as they see it. I don't think that's going to happen, but that's the policy. And therefore, to do this, what they need most of all is to give some idea that a Palestinian state is going to come. Because without that, the Saudis are not going to budge an inch. It's been clear. They've actually put it in writing on a formal text. No diplomatic relations with us until you sign up to the 2002 agreement.

And also that you leave Gaza and the ceasefire is complete. And of course, we're nowhere near it. So they're trying to suggest, now go back from what Pompeo originally tried to say, that, you know, that these settlements were legal, to say, no, the settlements in the, if you like, occupied territories of West Bank and Gaza are illegal. And it's important because also at the same time, the Court of Justice is looking at the question about whether the Israeli position of settling occupied territories is internationally legal or that

they should, under law, evacuate from those regions. Of course, Israel has no intention of doing that, no intention of evacuating from the West Bank. There are too many people there. How pressing a problem is it for Prime Minister Netanyahu's government of the displaced settlers, those who've left voluntarily in order to avoid the violence? I mean, about a month ago, you told us you thought there might be as many as a quarter million of them in Israeli hotels at the expense of the Israeli government. I mean, how much longer can that go on? Well, it can't. And this is why I'm talking about those two ways of war, and that the one way from the resistance and the Iranian policy is this

attrition, the squeezing of Israel. And it's also financial and economic squeezing that's taken place. The last quarter, the GDP in Israel dropped 20%. Not all of that was financing these people in the hotels. Some of this was because so many reservists had been called up for duty and were no longer available for work. But it's certainly having an impact on the high-tech sector, which is largely closed down, this sort of Silicon Valley that runs between Tel Aviv and Haifa.

I mean, many of those firms are just not functioning. They've actually I don't know that they'll restart again at the end of whatever's happening. But I mean, 20 percent drop in GDP. And then at the same time, Haifa port, I mean, Eilat port is closed. Haifa and also Ashkelon are both being attacked by missiles. Not now by the ones in Iraq, which did promise to do that. But as I say, the Iranians said, okay, you know, let's just, let's not escalate the intensity at this point. That might come later. What will happen in two weeks at the beginning of Ramadan when a huge number of Arab folks want to enter the Al-Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem?

The right-wing fanatics and Prime Minister Netanyahu's cabinet has said that absolutely can't happen. Even Ariel Sharon permitted it to happen. I mean, what's going to happen then, we don't know, but this is crucial. I mean, you know, this is a war to a certain extent about Al-Aqsa Mosque. It's called now the conflict of Al-Aqsa, the war. And the last, if you like, the last conflict with Israel was called the Al-Aqsa Intifada. And there's clearly Ben-Gavir who said, well, no one, no Arab will be allowed onto the Temple Mount Haram al-Sharif where Al-Aqsa Mosque is during the spirit. And this is where they go every's going to be a fight about this, don't forget this is

a month of fasting. And people spend their whole day largely not working, watching television, seeing the images coming in from Gaza, getting angry and angry. I've been in Ramallah at that time when this is happening during the second intifada. And the whole, the atmosphere becomes very different. It's really harsh atmosphere that takes place there. And it is a dangerous point. And actually, I think people have been warning the White House, you know, this thing could blow up this Ramadan because people, it's a holy month,

people not allowed to pray, not allowed to go to the, I mean, you know, it's like saying you're not allowed to go to the Vatican. The Vatican forbids anyone to go to it or something. You know, this is something people do. At Easter, people come to the Vatican. And at Easter, Arabs go to the Al-Aqsa Mosque on the Temple Mount Haram al-Sharif. That's how it's always been and will be a big blow up if this is prevented and particularly if violence is used against those trying to reach the mosque in order to pray. They're going there to pray. I just want to underline.

Are you, with your extraordinary knowledge of international diplomacy and from your place in Italy, able to assess at all President Biden's pretty drastic domestic political problems in the state of Michigan in the United States, which has the largest population of Arabs, and almost all of them are Democrats, and it seems as though many will vote against him in the primary. The primary there is largely symbolic. The person running against him doesn't stand a chance of taking the Democratic nomination. But the president is torn between his being wedded at the hip to the donor class and to the Israeli leadership on one hand, and needing the votes of young left-wing progressives on the other, the latter, of course, condemning the U.S. funding of the Israelis in Gaza. Do you see any change? I mean,

the only change in the Biden administration, the only change that you and I have noticed was what Secretary Blinken said over the weekend. That's not going to change anything on the ground, but diplomatically and legally, it's significant if the U.S. considers those settlements to be illegal. Is there a creeping realization, in your view, by the White House that its financing of this slaughter in Gaza is catastrophic to the interests of the White House itself? Absolutely. It's very clear that that's the case. Of course, that statement. I mean, the other effort to sort of, if you like, put under sanctions for settlers has no And what makes the impression is that America continues

just as it did in 73 to provide an air bridge supplying smart bombs, dumb bombs, weapons all the day, every day into Israel. And they all know who they're intended for. And don't forget, it was the Israeli president himself who signed one of those bombs. I mean, he actually put his sort of name and signature and good wishes on one of those bombs that was about to be dropped onto Gaza. People, I mean, you know, to be told that four settlers have been sanctioned by the White House is absolutely irrelevant. And it's going to make a difference in Michigan and in those other swing states,

which has quite a high proportion of Arab constituency. What a mess. Well, Alistair, thank you so much for having your thumb on the pulse of all this and explaining it so beautifully for all of us. Much appreciated. Look forward to seeing you next week. Thank you, my dear friend. Thank you. Thank you very much. Of course. Coming up later this morning at 10 o'clock Eastern, Ray McGovern. At 2 o'clock Eastern this afternoon, Kyle Anzalone. and at 4.30 Eastern this afternoon,

the inimitable Scott Ritter. Judge Napolitano for judging freedom. Thank you.