Judging Freedom - Alastair Crooke : How the West Lost Russia

Episode Date: July 1, 2024

Alastair Crooke : How the West Lost RussiaSee Privacy Policy at https://art19.com/privacy and California Privacy Notice at https://art19.com/privacy#do-not-sell-my-info.

Thank you. Hi, everyone. Judge Andrew Napolitano here for Judging Freedom. Today is Monday, July 1st, 2024. Alistair Crook is here with us this morning on how the West lost Russia. But first this. You all know that I am a paid spokesperson for Lear Capital, but I'm also a customer, a very satisfied customer. About a year ago, I bought gold and it's now increased in value 23%. So $100 invested in gold a year ago is now worth $123. If you have $100 in the bank, it still shows $100, but $100 in the bank is now worth 24% less. Inflation has reduced all of your savings, all of your buying power and mine by 24%. And gold is largely immune from that. If you want to learn how gold will soon hit $3,200 an ounce, call Lear Capital, 800-511-4620, or go to learjudgenap.com.

Get your free gold report. Same experts who predicted the 23% rise that I've enjoyed have predicted this $3,200 an ounce gold. Learn about how to transfer this to an IRA. Protect your savings. 800-511-4620. Learjudgenap.com. Tell them the judge sent you. Alistair, good day to you, my friend. And of course, welcome here. Last week, the Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov called into his offices the United States ambassador to Russia and famously said to him, we are no longer at peace. What did he mean by what are probably very carefully chosen words. I think it's fairly clear that Russia considers itself now in a low-intensity state of war with the United States.

And this was said, I have to underline, in the expectation that there's likely to be an escalation. Russians generally, the elites, are fully, if you like, embracing the idea, because of what they saw at the G7 and what they hear from the Europeans, that the West is looking for an escalation in Ukraine and to continue the sort of attrition of Russia so that, you know, it's weakened and it will be ultimately, they hope, it will cause some sort of political eruptions within Russia that will affect Putin and affect his ability to survive. So that's what he was meaning.

But what he said was, he said it in very cryptic language, but you may recall, and I'm sure those that are listening will recall, Putin said, and he underlined this in his talk to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, he underlined it emphatically, I am not looking for a ceasefire and then to the war in that respect. I'm not looking, if you like, to enabling the Ukrainians to rearm and to start all this thing again. No, I'm looking for a permanent end to the Ukraine war. And how do we get there? And then a little later, Yuri Vyoshkinov, who is the head of the, he's the principal, he is the principal advisor to Putin on foreign affairs,

made this rather obtuse comment very understandable. And he said, we think we're in this for the long term. There's not going to be a change in the mentality and the outlook of the West for some time. It's in the long term. And therefore, to get a proper security architecture in place in which, of course, Ukraine would be an important part of that Russian security architecture, would have to be part of that

Russian security architecture. He said, what we have to do, and others have amplified on it, we have to make our own, if you like, alternative NATO. We have to bring all the bricks together, if you like, as an alternative, as an alternative security architecture for Eurasia. Eurasia in the big sense of the world. And this explains exactly what was going on in North Korea and Vietnam. This is part of the security architecture for China, Russia. They are now out of the game with trying to find some accommodation with the United States. And they realized, and they said that very specifically, we realized we've got to do

it ourselves from inside. We've got to make our own security architecture, waiting on discussions with the United States on whether it's missiles or anything else like that. It's too late. And so that is the prime element of this, is now that they've given up sort of waiting on the US and on Europe, certainly on Europe, but they've given up waiting on people coming to the point and saying, well, let's sit down and talk about the European security architecture and about how the Atlantis group is going to be able to live with this Eurasia. How do we find a modus vivendi?

That's not going to happen in their view. So the alternative is they're going to mobilize a military security alliance of their own, a Eurasian one. And please note, of course, that many of the members of it, not only North Korea, but India, Pakistan, China, Russia, also nuclear powers. So in a sense, it hasn't even got off the ground yet, but it has the sort of latent potential even to become a nuclear, if you like, a nuclear umbrella, a deterrent umbrella, not an offensive one.

All of this is a deterrent structure, but it has to, they've understood, the only thing that actually works now is to make it clear that you have deterrents that people respect and take, you know, take seriously, and not as read in the Financial Times as we've been doing in recent days. Oh, you know, what Putin says about nuclear weapons, we've come to understand it's all bluff. His warnings are wearing rather thin, it says. Well, then you don't have deterrence. I mean, you don't have the means of deterrence.

And that's why this nuclear part is also in the debate as well. A couple of follow-up questions. It appears that the attack on Sevastopol did result in some communications. The Secretary of Defense, the American Secretary of Defense, Lloyd Austin, called up his counterpart and they actually spoke for the first time in a year and a half. Tony Blinken didn't do that. I'd like your comments on that. I'd also like your comments on what we're talking about, this newly harsh Russian rhetoric. The United States government has not really responded directly, as far as I know, to the killings on the beach in Sevastopol, but they've sort of leaked it through the media

that, oh, it was a mistake, the Russians shot it down at the wrong place, and that caused the bomblets, the cluster bombs, to come down. But does it appear to you as though that attack on the Sevastopol beach was intentional, intended to put pressure on President Putin by infuriating the Russian public. Either question, in whatever order you want to take them, please. Okay. I think, by the way, I'm not sure there is a correct pronunciation. I call it Sevastopol, but other people call it different things. Well, you know, the great Ray McGovern has corrected me twice and insists it's Sevastopol.

But when I heard Foreign Minister Lavrov pronounce it, he said it the way we do in English, Sevastopol. Sevastopol, yeah. Sort of historically, because, you know, it goes back a long way, Sevastopol and the Crimea War, you know, European history. Anyway, yes, the question you asked, I think this was really a turning point, a very strong turning point. I would say we've seen two important shifts, can I call it in the Russian zeitgeist, their sort of mental outlook on the world. The first occurred because I was there just literally in the wake of it I think it really occurred in the aftermath of the crocus concert hall massacre and I think

at that point the the the lingering sort of ideas of you know the European inheritance that Russia has and that you should, the old idea of going a larger, greater European project sort of disappeared at that point. And people actually just now feel, even if you go to St. Petersburg, I'm sorry you didn't get that, but you'd find people are still bitter

about not Biden or the government, but they're just bitter actually at what they hear coming from Europeans. I mean, you know, who they always thought understood Russia. And they say these extraordinarily Russophobic statements and demonizations of Russia, not just the government or Russian people's culture and everything else. I mean, you know, their sports people, their culture, their image, everything sort of trashed. And so there was a shift there. And then I think now what's happened is I think the whole balance is now towards a harder line altogether. I think that ultimately there's been a big debate, particularly about the nuclear issue

within Russia, and I think it's now sort of slipped very much towards the sense that people are much more not aggressive but hard-nosed and saying, you know, we just have to rely on ourselves. We have to do or make our own security. We have to have our own system because, you know, we can forget the West for the next 10 years. Now, I mean, whether they're right or not, I mean, that's how people are feeling and seeing it. So I think, yes, it made a big impact. I mean, Russians were furious with that attack. I've looked at various traces of the sort of where the flight path should have come if it was heading towards that airport or not. I think the jury is very much out on whether it was actually in some way

a missile that was knocked off course or whether it shouldn't have been there at all. But anyway, it was there, and it created this big impact on Russian thinking. And so I think the message that we didn't hear or wasn't made explicit in the talk between Belousov and Austin was, he said, warn him, you fly drones into the Black Sea from which you provide the electronic guidance and the support to these attack homes and storm shadow missiles attacking into Crimea, into civilian targets in Belarus, we give you a warning.

I mean, we will shoot them down. And I'm not suggesting that that applies yet to manned intelligence, AWACS-type aircraft, but I think it does apply to the drones. There's been huge pressure in Russia from ordinary people who say, look, if the Houthis can shoot down these American drones, I mean, why is it we don't do this? Because that's the eyes and ears of the NATO. Without that, they have no eyes and they have no ears to hear the radar traces, the radar, the chatter between aircraft and other things that they scoop up and feed back to the Ukrainians and to their team that is setting off the missiles. So I think it was a very serious message which came saying,

now the question is, how's America going to react? I mean, are they going to then put fighter escorts to their drones? And are we going to see it escalate? I think it's a good chance, and the Russians think there's a good chance. I think this is why we had such a serious speech from Mr. Putin at that foreign ministry talk. I think it was serious because of this. They've come to the view, and I think they are going to change, if you like, the doctrines on nuclear weapons. And easing is the wrong word, but redefine it to make it more appropriate if there is a sort of

tit-for-tat escalations take place, that we will go. And actually Putin says it could escalate to a nuclear exchange. But we hope that that means just a tactical one, if that's what we're talking about. You wrote in your piece this morning, or it came out just a day or two ago, that escalation is inevitable. Is that your view or is that your understanding of the Russian view? That is my very strong understanding of the Russian views, that escalation is for them almost inevitable. And not only that, now they are looking to the sense of what's happening in the Middle East and they think that Russia becoming involved, and Russia said it is likely to get involved. They've talked about giving missile support to the Houthis.

Even Hezbollah, not Putin hasn't said this, but officials have been talking about some reciprocity in terms if America gives missiles to the Ukrainians to kill Russians, then there's no reason why Russia shouldn't give some of their missiles to other groups that can hurt American interests in a nice symmetry. So yes, I think that escalation is really expected. And I think they are also looking at the Middle East and seeing, you know, that if there is an invasion of Lebanon, which seems really to be gathering steam every day now from Israel, if there is some invasion of Lebanon, then of course, it's likely that Israel will extend it to Syria because the Iranians are there and because the weapons supply routes pass through Syria. What is the Russian interest there, to back up its new ally, Iran?

No, it's not. Iran doesn't really need backing up. It's got most of the weapons it needs. It doesn't need backing up. What we're talking about is the sense of a more sort of organic look at the whole Middle East. What Russia is doing is seeing that it's just not feasible to have an attack on Lebanon without us not spreading and affecting crucially Syria and Iraq and who knows what other parts of the world as that takes off. Because I think, you know, Iran has made it very clear that if there is an invasion of Lebanon, then all the elements of the resistance forces will combine. And Hassan Nasrallah has said this is, you know, the Ummah,

that is the Muslim community in the biggest sense, everyone who's Muslim. This is a battle for the Ummah on a par with 1948, which is a very strong message saying that this is an existential conflict that is taking place. And Russia is clearly looking at this in the bigger picture sense. It hasn't, it's not there to defend Iran. Hezbollah has well equipped.

Syria may need better air defenses unless they've already provided them. But altogether, they're looking at the need to try and maintain, if you like, some sort of strategic control over the region as a whole, so that it doesn't damage the interests of Russia and China, and the whole of the BRICS structure, this new sort of military structure that they're forming. And I should just say, for clarity's sake, this is not just a military security structure, because the other aspect of it, of course, is trade and the dollar. And these two things are the further and, you know, and sanctions. Once you talk about de-dollarization, it makes no sense to talk about de-dollarization,

which is definitely something they're talking about for Kazan. There's no sense in talking about that without talking about sanctions. Well, the idea, the logic of what we're talking about now, about creating the alternative, the alt-NATO, if you like, to NATO, stretching right across to North Korea, and I say Vietnam, and probably others too, as a military structure, is also the logic of this, is if you're going to be sanctioned, well, you have the strength with more than half the population and a greater proportion of GDP than the G7 has. Why don't you sanction the West? Why does it always be the West sanctioning you?

You should have the ability to sanction the West, particularly in raw materials and key strategic materials and energy that the West cannot survive, cannot produce. It cannot mount a military response to China. If those elements were switched off, I mean, it would change the strategic balance in the entire globe. And so I'm not saying that's on the agenda. I'm just saying by the very logic of things, it's obvious. D-dollarization is very much trading system, very much on the agenda. But it seems to me, you know, by its own logic, then you look at the question of managing because part of this process is to get control of commodities. For too long, commodity prices have been set in the United States and Europe

by paper commodities and the paper commodities, which are managed and manipulated by the hedge funds and big banks in America for financial gain, not just political gain, but sometimes for political gain. We can remember how they crashed the price of the dollar on Iran twice, in 1987 and on another occasion, in order to try and create civil unrest in Russia. So the Russians are saying, well, you know, we can play this game too, by the way, maybe a higher oil price, maybe rather than a lower oil price, maybe something that will make the Europeans and the Americans understand

and pull back from the very aggressive stance that they're taking everywhere, both in support of Israel in their approach to China, Russia, and Iran. So my next question was going to be when President Putin, you've already answered it, when President Putin spoke to the foreign policy establishment last week, I didn't spoke to the foreign policy establishment last week, I didn't listen to the entire speech, but I heard part of it. And he issued a very profound statement, the world will never be the same again. He obviously was talking about just what you were talking about, a new security architecture and a new financial architecture, which doesn't ignore the West,

but doesn't take them into account. So now I have two follow-up questions. Does the West, particularly the United States, grasp that it has lost Russia? And do they, if so, do they grasp the gravity of a new security architecture and a new financial architecture under the leadership of Russia? Let me just add first, because for to say it wasn't just Yuri Ushakov, who of course is absolutely the person who can provide this light on who is the head of the defense and foreign policy.

Like the, if you like, like the American equivalent of that, a policy and defense system, where they come together, the ECF. This is, all of them are saying that they expect escalation now. And he is looking at this whole change. And I think this is one of the reasons why we saw a very important statement from Lavrov. And he said, at the next BRICS meeting, we're not going to entertain applications for new members, which surprised a lot of people. He said, we're going to keep it at 10. But this, I think, is very much related to the question of the trading system and a new currency, if there is to be a new currency, because it's complicated enough.

Technically, the process is complicated enough with 10 members. But if you have another 20 joining at the same time, it's impossible. So I think this is very much in view of the idea that the hard discussions that need to be taken in terms of how to make a currency, whether it seems that some part of it will be digital. Russia is one of the leading proponents and has the most expertise in blockchain technology, along with Iran. So one part of it between the central banks, maybe more sort of blockchain technology, and another part maybe more of a sort of like the Chinese have been experimenting with a sort of digital currency. But I just want to say quickly, I don't know, because this is not something that you discuss in Moscow. They don't talk about this

for obvious reasons. It's, you know, I mean, this is market sensitive stuff. And so all of this is very carefully kept under wraps. But what you can say is that these debates are he was apparently with President Biden in Atlanta at the so-called debate the other night. Do you think he and his team grasp the gravity of these changes that events plus Vladimir Putin are bringing about? Absolutely, they don't. You know, unfortunately, I think that, and we can see it in the events of these recent days, we're stuck in a particular mindset, a global, if you like, a particular, if you, a liberal globalist mindset. And they believe that any disruption of this is troublemaking. These are the autocrats. These are the troublemakers that are trying to upset democracy. The thing is that makes it so difficult is what they define as democracy is not the democracy of the American constitution, not the legacy that we've all taken in Europe. This is their revolutionary values that they are imposing on it, the woke values, the DEI, the diversity values, the equity values that have made our countries so

dysfunctional in many ways, so that we now have a sort of counter-revolution that is taking place against these, not least because they made it dysfunctional, but also for the practical political reasons that for Europeans, the standard of living is dropping like a stone and is going to continue. We will fall further and further behind the United States or other countries. But more than that, we have huge immigration problems, open door problems, all of these things. And the people just don't believe that the leaders even listen or understand. So if they won't listen to their own electorate, look what we've just had in Europe. Millions of people voted,

and they voted in a very evident way. And what happened, the new leadership of Europe was carved up by six old hands together in a little backroom deal before it started. You know, this can't go on like that. It won't go on. If they won't listen to them, do you think they're going to listen to Putin? Do you think they're going to understand what they're saying to them?

I mean, they can't even understand their own public saying, look, you know, life is getting worse and worse for us. And no, we don't want to pay several times more for running a car or flying or anything like this. Do you not hear? They don't hear. They don't hear. And they certainly won't hear what Putin has been saying to them because they are. It's it's a sort of mindset that is a sort of psychicably because when Farage first of all said, well, maybe our problem in Ukraine is because NATO expanded up to the Russian borders, was expanding up there. And the outcry against that, oh, you can't say that. That is outrageous. And now starting to get people commenting. I mean, I'm talking about, you know, the elites are saying, well, you know, actually, there's something in what he was saying, you know, it might be true.

So it changes a little bit. But I think Putin and the leadership in Russia are quite right. It's going to take many years for Europe really to rid itself. We have to go through this catharsis, through this sort of turbulence within, and try and come out the other side. We will come out different from what we go into it. But I hope soon. Well, the catharsis is coming soon with voters in France, and on the 4th of July with voters in Great Britain. Alistair, always a pleasure, my dear friend. Thank you very much for your time. Have a great week. I hope we can see you. I hope we can see you next week. All the best. Eastern, Professor Jeffrey Sachs at 1130 Eastern, Larry Johnson at 12 noon Eastern, Ray McGovern, Judge Napolitano for Judging Freedom. Thank you.