Judging Freedom - Origins of Hamas/Israeli War w/ Prof. John J. Mearsheimer

Episode Date: October 12, 2023

Origins of Hamas/Israeli War w/ Prof. John J. MearsheimerSee Privacy Policy at https://art19.com/privacy and California Privacy Notice at https://art19.com/privacy#do-not-sell-my-info.

Resolve to earn your degree in the new year in the Bay with WGU. With courses available online 24-7 and monthly start dates, WGU offers maximum flexibility so you can focus on your future. Learn more at wgu.edu. Thank you. Hi everyone, Judge Andrew Napolitano here for Judging Freedom. Today is Thursday, October 12th, 2023. Professor John Mearsheimer from the University of Chicago joins us now. Professor Mearsheimer, always a pleasure. Thank you very much for your time and your insight. You are, of course, a world-renowned political scientist and theorist and historian, but you're also a graduate of West Point and spent some time

in the United States Air Force. Do you have any idea, any analysis that you can share with us as to how the Israeli intelligence services and military had such a spectacular failure, such a catastrophic perfect storm last Saturday? My sense, Judge, is that the Israelis expected an attack at some point in the near future. I mean, the fact that Hamas attacked Israel, that in itself is no great surprise. In fact, Hamas has attacked Israel. That in itself is no great surprise. In fact, Hamas has attacked Israel on numerous occasions over the past two decades. So this is no great surprise. I think what's a great surprise is the scope and the nature of the attack. The Israelis had no idea that Hamas could carry off an operation of this magnitude and inflict this much death and destruction on Israel. It was a complete shock to them. And the truth is, it was, I think, a complete shock to almost everybody who's been following this conflict.

And so it's not the fact that Israel was attacked that's the great surprise. It's the nature of the attack that was the great surprise. And by the way, they were completely unprepared for what happened. There's just no question about that. They really did get caught with their pants down. Well, the lack of preparedness will have extraordinary, I think, political consequences in Israel. It's hard to believe the Prime Minister Netanyahu's prime ministership, for lack of a better phrase or word, can survive this. Yeah, I think it's analogous to the 1973 war when Golda Meir was the Prime Minister of Israel, and Israel was surprised then as it has been surprised now. And Golda Meir survived in the short term,

because what happens in the short term is you have a rally around the flag effect, and she benefited from that back then, and Netanyahu is benefiting from that now. But once this settles down and comes to something of an end, then there will be recriminations. And it is, as you say, hard to imagine that Netanyahu survives this. Some of our guests, all of whom you know, have suggested their views have coalesced around two areas for these failures. One is arrogance, a belief that we're stronger, smarter, richer, better, so we can't possibly be breached. And the other is a peculiar, so this is a relatively new phenomenon,

peculiar reliance on AI rather than on human intelligence. Do you have any views on either of those issues or either of those explanations as a rational basis or the lack of preparedness? And I'm sorry, the question is way too long. The lack of preparedness is also military because of the way they were spread so thin to concentrate on this celebration of a religious festival in the desert and left huge gaps in other areas.

Well, I don't think it was so much AI. And I do think there is a certain amount of arrogance among the Israelis. But I think the key here has to do with, let's call it the conception of what was likely to happen that the Israelis had in their head. When the Agronaut Commission studied the Israeli failure in 1973, they blamed it on the conception, the picture that the Israelis had in their head as to what an Egyptian attack across the canal would look like. They had the wrong conception. And as I said to you in my initial comments, I think the Israelis had the wrong conception in their heads about what the Palestinians attacking out of Gaza could do to them. And this is why they were so completely surprised. Again,

it was the fact that Hamas attacked Israel is not a great surprise. And they thought that if it happened, they could handle it. But what they missed was that the Hamas attackers had a clever strategy, one that they just didn't anticipate, and they were not prepared to counter. So the conception, in my opinion, is the problem here, as it was in 73. How did Hamas come about? How did it come into existence? Well, it was originally the Islamic Brotherhood in Israel. And after the first intifada in the late 1980s, it began to get radicalized. And amazingly, the Israelis over time, especially hard-nosed Israelis who were opposed to the two-state solution- Like Benjamin Netanyahu. Yes, yes. It's quite amazing here. They liked Hamas because they knew that Hamas had extremist views

on a two-state solution. In other words, no two-state solution. And people on the right in Israel wanted no two-state solution. So they, in effect, the Israelis, allied to some extent. We have to be careful with the language here. But they allied to some extent with Hamas to undermine the Palestinian authority, first under Arafat, then under Mahmoud Abbas, because they were interested in a two-state solution. So in a very important way, Israel has been willing to live with Hamas, right? And this is the reason they didn't view Hamas as that great a threat, because to some extent, to some limited extent, again, we have to choose our words carefully here, Hamas was a partner with Israel in undermining the Palestinian Authority, which was there a financial relationship? Did Israel at any point in time fund Hamas? I know of no evidence. It may be the case. I think that most of Hamas's funding comes from outside, from countries like Iran, Qatar, and so forth and so

on. I don't think the Israelis felt any need to do that. They might have done that if they thought it was necessary. Again, the Israelis viewed Hamas as useful for undermining a two-state solution, which people like Netanyahu and many other Israelis have been interested in doing for a long time. What is the relationship between Hamas and the Palestinian Authority headed by Mahmoud Abbas? It's terrible. There's no question about that. Mahmoud Abbas is interested in the two-state solution. Hamas is not. And they just, you know, have been loggerheads since at least the election of 2006. But I would imagine that this event has forced them to come together. I would imagine that there's a show of unity among the Palestinians in the same way that there's a show of unity among the Israelis at this point in time.

But how this plays out over time is very hard to say. Is it fair to say that Hamas is not the government of Gaza, that the Palestinian authority is, but Hamas is some aspect of Gazan society that the Palestinian authority can't control, like the drug gangs in Mexico, which can't be controlled, but they're not the government of Mexico, but they're not subject to the government of Mexico either. No, I think it's quite clear that Hamas controls the Gaza Strip. They govern the Gaza Strip, and that the Palestinian Authority controls the West Bank. You want to remember that the last time you had an election was in 2006, and the Israelis warned us, don't hold that election, because the Israelis anticipated that Hamas would win, and then Hamas would have influence not only in Gaza,

but in the West Bank as well. The Americans didn't listen to the Israelis. We held the elections. Hamas won. We then undermined the results of the election, which we could do in the West Bank. And we basically installed Mahmoud Abbas there and the Palestinian Authority. But we couldn't do that in Gaza. And the end result is that Hamas is in control in Gaza. I want to play a clip for you of Admiral Kirby, the official spokesperson for the President's National Security Council, declining to ask or to answer a question about whether or not there was foreknowledge of this event, this catastrophic assault by the Egyptian intelligence services. The tape is actually of a show on Fox News. My friend and neighbor and former colleague Neil Cavuto has on set with him Mike McFaul, the chair of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, who disagrees with Kirby and states outright that he knows from what he's been briefed that the Egyptians did warn the Israelis.

Take a listen. Can you speak to the reports that Israel was warned by Egypt? I can't. McCall from Foreign Affairs made that allegation this morning, saying that that was something that members were told on the Foreign Affairs Committee. So has that been discussed at all, or is that something you're looking into? I can't speak to specific intelligence matters. Again, there will be a time to look back at this, as we always do and we will. Right now, we're sharpening the intelligence gathering and cooperation and sharing with Israel, as we should,

since they're involved in active operations, and we're making sure that they get the tools they need. All right. So your intelligence might be saying one thing, Chairman. John Kirby might be holding cards close to his vest, his and at the White House as another. Who's right? Well, we do know the Egyptian intelligence did refer this to Israel. I can't get into any more depth. He must have been the recipient as the chair of the House Foreign Affairs Committee of some intelligence briefing, and then he publicly revealed some of what he learned, put aside whether that's a breach or not.

But if the Egyptians told the Israelis, did the Israelis ignore it? Well, everything depends on what the Egyptians told the Israelis. Did they tell them that it was going to happen in a few days' time, or did they tell them that over the next month or so there may be an attack? That's one big issue. The more important issue, which gets back to my earlier set of comments, is did the Egyptians tell them what the scope and size and magnitude of this operation would be? Did they tell them that this was going to be an unprecedented attack that was going to have devastating consequences for Israel.

I don't think. I'd bet a lot of money that they never said that. And if they had said that, then the Israelis would have paid serious attention. But just telling the Israelis that Hamas is going to attack is not that big a deal, because what the Israelis are going to expect is a few rockets and maybe a few individuals trying to breach the French. And their view is they can deal with that. What they couldn't deal with was this clever strategy that they just didn't anticipate and nobody else anticipated. And I would bet that includes the Egyptians. I want your opinion, Professor Mearsheimer, on an interesting analysis of this by Russian President Putin, who, as you can imagine, in a statement that he made, which we'll run in just a minute, is critical of American foreign policy in the Middle East. But his critique is very interesting. Unfortunately, we can see a sharp deterioration of the situation in the Middle East. I think that many will agree with me that this is a clear example of the failure of the policy of the

United States in the Middle East, which tried to monopolize the resolution of the conflict, but unfortunately wasn't concerned with finding compromises acceptable to both sides. On the contrary, it promoted its own ideas about how this should be done, put pressure on both sides, first on one side, then on the other, every time without taking into account the fundamental interests of the Palestinian people, bearing in mind, first of all, the need to implement the UN Security Council decision on creation of an independent, sovereign Palestinian state. Is he right? Yes. I think that what Putin is saying is something that many Americans and many Israelis have been saying for a long time, that the only way out of

this mess is the two-state solution. And that means the Palestinians have to have their own state in Gaza, the West Bank, and East Jerusalem, and it has to live side by side in peace with Israel. The United States has been theoretically interested in a two-state solution for a long time because most American policymakers, and this certainly includes people like Jimmy Carter, George H.W. Bush, George W. Bush, Barack Obama, understood the importance of getting a two-state solution, but they were unwilling to push hard enough to coerce the Israeli leadership into accepting a two-state solution. And this is in large part because of domestic politics in the United States. Pro-Israel forces in the United States were opposed to putting pressure on Israel.

And this includes many people who thought a two-state solution was the right outcome, but they just did not want us coercing Israel. So I think what Putin is saying, and again, it's not just Putin, this is a commonplace argument inside Israel and inside the United States, is that it was necessary for Israel's good and for America's good for us to get tough with Israel and push for a two-state solution. Because the alternative, Andrew, is that you end up with a greater Israel, which is what you have now. And you want to remember that there are over 7 million Palestinians inside greater Israel. Correct. And there's 9.5 million people in Israel itself.

Israel is the size of New Jersey and its population is the size of New Jersey. It gets a lot more money from the federal government than New Jersey does. I want to segue over to Ukraine while we have you, Professor Mearsheimer. Is Ukraine finished? Yeah, I think that Admiral Kirby's comments that we are not going to continue funding Ukraine for the long term basically means that they're finished. I mean, as everybody understands, if we pull the plug on the Ukrainians, they're doomed. They don't have the weaponry. They don't have the financial resources to continue this fight. And the Russians will roll over them. President Biden and others have

made the argument that we're behind the Ukrainians until the end. We're not going to bail on them. Well, we're bailing on them now. And it's hard for me to see, especially in light of the failed counteroffensive, how the Ukrainians don't collapse. I want to play for you two clips from Admiral Kirby. You've summarized both of them nicely, but the picture's worth a thousand words. In the first one, he repeats the mantra of President Biden for as long as it takes. In the second one, which is just two days ago, he says, well, we can't freeze aid, quote, when we're at the end of our rope. What do you mean by that? As long as they need? What do you mean by that? What winning

looks like for you in Ukraine? Well, as long as it takes means as long as it takes. And it means that I'm unable to give you a date certain on calendar for when that support won't be necessary anymore. It's necessary now. It's going to be necessary in coming weeks and months for certain. And we want to make sure that we're meeting the need as best we can for Ukraine. And you had what is winning look like? President Zelensky gets determined, gets to determine what victory looks like. But in the near term, we've got appropriations and authorities for both Ukraine and for Israel. But you don't want to be trying to bake in long-term support when you're at the end of the rope. And in Ukraine, on the Ukraine funding, we're coming near to the end of the rope. I mean, this is truly a remarkable and astonishing statement

from him. We're coming near to the end of the rope in light of the number of times that he, the Secretary of State, the National Security Advisor, and the President himself have used that phrase that the questioner asked about for as long as it takes. It actually kind of turns your stomach to see this. I mean, as I've argued from the beginning, and I know you agree with me, we've led the Ukrainians down the Primrose Path. Yes. Completely horrible. I mean, we pushed this country into this war. We're principally responsible for it because of our efforts to make Ukraine a Western bulwark on Russia's borders. And we encouraged the counteroffensive. We forced them to attack week after week when they were suffering enormous casualties. And now when they're in really deep trouble, we're pulling the plug on

them. It's just, it turns your stomach. It's really horrible. How do you see this ending? I mean, if we are literally at the end of our rope and we are going to suspend or dial back aid to Ukraine. And he's got a lot of neocons in both parties in Congress who want more money for Ukraine. It'd be hard for me to imagine him vetoing it, but we'll see what happens domestically, politically here once the House of Representatives gets in order. But what kind of an off, let's talk politically, what kind of an off-ramp is this? After promising aid for as long as it takes,

after spending $100 billion, theoretically borrowed from the Chinese, interest paid for in created digital cash by the Fed. How could this possibly be justified politically summarily to depart? I don't know. I mean, it's just very hard to figure out what's the best policy for the Ukrainians at this point. I mean, one could argue that they would be better off just going to negotiations right now, doing everything they can to cut their ties with the West before the West cuts off the funding, because they would probably get a better deal now than if they continue to fight. I mean, the truth is, as you pointed out, we're going to continue to give weapons and money to the Ukrainians for at

least a while, and that will encourage them to continue fighting. And the question is, will they be better off, let's say, a year from now if they continue fighting and then try to cut a deal versus cutting a deal now? And my sense is that they would be better off cutting a deal now. They're not going to get a good deal. This is a disaster for the Ukrainians. But given the situation they're in, it's almost impossible. Maybe it is impossible to tell a story that has a happy ending for them. Right.

Before we go, just to go back to where we started, I mean, how does that end? Does Gaza get decimated into a desert? Does Hamas win by staying alive and in control and underground? Does Bibi Netanyahu go to jail over this? Well, I think this is very hard to predict because a lot depends on whether the Israelis go into Gaza with ground forces. There's been a lot of talk about them going into Gaza and tearing the place apart, finding Hamas and eradicating Hamas. But I think the Israelis, this is just a guess, but I think the Israelis have come to realize that this is not a smart idea, that going into Gaza and trying to eliminate Hamas will cause more trouble than it's worth.

And then at the end, even if you were to eradicate Hamas, you'll just get a new radicalized group in its place. You're not going to solve the problem with military force. This is a political problem. So one question is, do they go in or do they not go in? But they're in a damned if you do, damned if you don't situation, because if they don't go in, Hamas lives to fight another day for sure, and they're well armed, and they're going to continue to cause problems. Then, if they don't go in, they bomb Gaza. But this is a total disaster, not only because from a human rights point of view, just seeing civilians killed is an absolutely horrible thing, but also it does no good strategically. It doesn't solve the problem. It just enrages people inside the Palestinian world, inside the Arab world, and it even loses support over time for Israel in the West.

So bombing is no solution either. So the Israelis are really between a rock and a hard place. I don't know what they do to fix the problem. And this gets back to my earlier point that the solution to this was a two-state solution. Right. I have to ask you this because you're so well regarded internationally. What would you do if Bibi Netanyahu calls you up and says, Professor Mearsheimer, give me your guidance? Well, I've thought about that question. I would tell him to back off from the bombing as soon as possible and not go further down that road. And I would advise not to go into Gaza.

And I would tell him that what he ought to do and what his colleagues ought to do is reverse gear and or reverse direction and move towards a two-state solution. But he's never going to accept that. And he heads up a governing coalition that includes a number of people who are much further to the right than he is. And if you look at the demographics in Israel over time, right, this is a country that's going to get more and more hawkish and more and more anti-Palestinian over time. That, coupled with the present events, makes it almost impossible to see how you get a two-state solution. So I think I could give him that advice, and even if he were willing to listen to me, which he wouldn't be, he couldn't execute it because the politics inside Israel no longer facilitate a two-state solution. That train has left the station.

Professor John Mearsheimer, always a pleasure. Thank you so much for your insight and for your time. Much appreciated by the audience and by me. Thank you so much. You're welcome, Judge. Of course. More as we get it. Matt Poe on who's killing whom at four o'clock Eastern. Judge Napolitano for Judging Freedom. We'll be right back. Resolve to earn your degree in the new year in the Bay with WGU. WGU is an online accredited university that specializes in personalized learning. With courses available 24-7 and monthly start dates, you can earn your degree on your schedule.

You may even be able to graduate sooner than you think by demonstrating mastery of the material you know. Make 2025 the year you focus on your future. Learn more at wgu.edu.