Judging Freedom - Prof. Glenn Diesen: Why the US Misunderstands Russia.
Episode Date: January 13, 2025Prof. Glenn Diesen: Why the US Misunderstands Russia.See Privacy Policy at https://art19.com/privacy and California Privacy Notice at https://art19.com/privacy#do-not-sell-my-info. ...
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Thank you. Hi everyone, Judge Andrew Napolitano here for Judging Freedom.
Today is Monday, January 13th, 2025.
We have a new guest for you coming up in just a moment,
Professor Glenn Deason of the
University of Southeastern Norway, on just why does the United States misunderstand Russia?
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800-511-4620, 800-511-4620, or go to Lear Judge Napa. Professor Deason, welcome here, my friend. The audience already
recognizes you because we have so many mutual friends and colleagues, and it's a pleasure
to have you on the show. What is the Kremlin's understanding of America's neocon foreign policy in the past 30 or 40 years?
Well, first, thanks for having me on, Judge.
I'm a huge fan.
Well, I think they see themselves as having been betrayed, I guess.
And this is also something a lot of American leaders recognized in the 1990s,
be it George Kennan, William Perry, Jack Matlock,
they all recognized that we effectively didn't reach
a mutually acceptable post-Cold War settlement
between the West and Russia.
So as a result, we tend to have a lot of conflicts
and they all derive from this one
problem, which is the failure to establish this post-Cold War settlement. And all of the conflicts
we have, the competition in the common neighborhood, the territorial conquests now, a lot of
this are the symptoms of this problem. But I think often, not just in the United States, but in Europe as well, we tend to
interpret all of the symptoms or the consequences of this problem as being the main source of the
conflict. And I'm going to guess that your opinion is that this got substantially worse
in the Biden administration, in large measure because Joe Biden and Vladimir Putin weren't
speaking to each other. Tony Blinken and Sergei Lavrov weren't speaking to each other. I don't
know if their underlings were speaking, but the principal actors in American and Russian
foreign policy were not speaking. And it seems to have been the decision of the Americans not to talk.
Yeah, suspending diplomacy obviously has exaggerated or exacerbated a lot of the conflicts. But of course, Ukraine was also a very unique country because, again, we have
this gradual expansion now towards Russian borders. And it's always been a problem that is because
it's worth remembering that after the Cold War we actually had some agreements for a pan European
security deal that is we signed agreements in 1990 in 94 but as Russia got weaker this is when we
really decided to expand NATO instead and create a Europe without the Russians. Now, this always created conflicts as we went along, given that
NATO would expand it or enhance its security at the expense of the Russians,
but also force those deeply divided societies in between to choose between us or them.
But my point is Ukraine was always very special.
This is why
the current CIA director, William Burns, warned back in 2008 that attempting to pull Ukraine into NATO would trigger likely a civil war, given that the country was so divided, but also Russian invasion.
He added that this is not something the Russians wanted to do, but it would be as if the Russians were setting up the weapon systems in Mexico.
It would just be an existential threat.
Right, right.
You're talking about then U.S. ambassador to Moscow, William Burns, famous telegram or cable, whatever it was.
Nyet means yet, no means no. Why do you think that Joe Biden and Blinken and the American foreign policy establishment,
Victoria Nuland, all the neocons that seem to be hovering around foreign policy decisions,
why do you think they rejected that?
I think it's just been a slow rolling disaster, to be honest.
But I think it might also have been the assumption that the
Russians would not, I guess, dare to push back. And I think this is also an area where we haven't
really appreciated the fact that the Russians sees this as being an existential threat, which is why
they would go all the way. And this is also something Obama recognized to some extent back in 2016,
not only that the Russians would have the advantage of logistics when you have a conflict
on this border, but it would also be more important to the Russians. This would be seen as
a fight for their survival. So it's really hard to say why they would go down this path.
But it's also, I think, the dependence on,
if you can preserve the unipolar moment,
it's often an advantage to divide the world
into dependent allies and weakened adversaries.
And I think this is simply the same path
we've been following for so many years.
Why do the neocons hate Russia?
I think it's just a continuation, to be honest, of the Cold War.
We tend to see Russian actions and Russia as an extension of the Soviet Union.
But of course, this is not the case.
Even if we look at the historical competition for control over Eurasia, be it the
British in the 19th century or America now, Russia doesn't neither have the capability nor the
intention to dominate the way it did in the past. Furthermore, we also don't have this ideological
rivalry of communism versus capitalism. If anything, the Russians are attempting to stabilize
the country and seek unity by rooting it in more traditional values.
So elevating the role of the church, again, not ideas which should be that alien to us in the West.
But I think it was convenient because after the Cold War, when we decided to go for a hegemonic system,
we redivided the continent and we reinvented the dividing line. So we recast
all relations or all tensions as the struggle between liberal democracy and authoritarianism.
And I think that Russia just plays this role well. It ensures the solidarity within the west and of course russia is always a big power which could i guess
undermine some of the west's collective hegemony here's uh jake sullivan still the
president's national security advisor uh just uh three days ago talking about russian sanctions
chris cut number two if we we had sanctioned Russia's oil
18 months ago at a time when oil prices were high, gas prices were high, it would have meant a spike
at the pump in a way that would have put pain on working people in the United States. Today,
oil prices are much lower. The oil market globally is very well supplied. And so we have an opportunity to hit
Putin in his pocketbook without hitting the American people in theirs. What we're giving
the incoming team, the incoming administration, is real leverage in a negotiation.
Why on earth would they want to hit Putin in his pocketbook? Wouldn't a prosperous Russia be a more peaceful, amicable Russia in
their own minds? Well, I saw also Jake Sullivan recently argue that the Biden administration had
elevated the security for America because it had weakened Russia, weakened Iran, weakened China.
Now, I would contest most of this,
but it also shows a very strange conception
of what it means to enhance your security.
It's always this zero-sum, just weakening adversaries
as opposed to pursuing some way of enhancing mutual security.
But I agree.
I think the idea that weakening or destabilizing Russia,
which is the largest nuclear power in the world, that this is an objective in its own, I think is mistaken or a wrong one to do.
But also the idea that if Russia has economic trouble, it would somehow leave Ukraine.
Again, Russia, I think, prepared itself for having a much greater cost in doing this.
But again, this is the way they see it, a struggle for their existence. So they're not going to pull back just because they have some
economic problems. But I do think this is the heart of the conflict, because what we learned
at the beginning of 2022 is a key objective for the US and NATO was to weaken Russia. This is a strategic objective of this war.
Here's Jake Sullivan yesterday saying just what you said. I think it's hogwash, but
here he is. This is the closing argument, if you will, of the Biden foreign policy cut number one.
Where across the globe could you point and say the United States is safer because of what we did here?
Well, I'd start by saying our alliances are stronger than we found them four years ago.
They're stronger than they've been in decades. NATO is more powerful, purposeful and bigger.
Our alliances in the Asia-Pacific are at all time highs and our adversaries and competitors
are weaker across the board. Russia's weaker. Iran's weaker. China's weaker.
And all the while, we kept America out of war.
So I think the American people are safer and the country is better off than we were four years ago.
And we're handing all that off to the next team, as well as having the engines of American power humming.
Our economy, our technology, our defense industrial base, our supply chains. So the United States is in a stronger, more secure position,
and our competitors and adversaries are weaker and under pressure.
I think that's the main handoff that we will make.
Professor Deason, is Iran an adversary to the United States?
Well, it's an adversary of Israel, at least.
So it's... But also, it wouldn't have to be.
And I guess this is a key criticism I would have of Sullivan,
which is that enhancing security would mean often
to mitigate the security competition.
This is something that Kissinger pointed out in 2014 with the Russians, by the way, is if we recognize them to be a great power,
you should look for areas where you can reduce security competition. Instead, it's this obsession
with attempting to defeat your adversaries. And I think this is the main destructive part.
When he says NATO is more powerful, he really doesn't know what he's talking about. If Donald Trump pulls the United States out of NATO, or if the right-wing in
Germany pulls Germany out of NATO, NATO really collapses as a military entity, right?
Yes. And I think this is something you hear more from especially countries like hungary and slovakia they you know
they joined nato because they wanted a collective defense but now they see the alliance becoming a
tool against russia so so i think a lot of the europeans after a while they might see nato as
being something that undermines their security, actually something that makes them excessively dependent,
something that continues to fuel the conflicts with Russia.
In short, it becomes an institution or a security organization whose main purpose is to deal with the crisis,
which results from its own existence.
So I don't necessarily, I don't agree with the argument that NATO is getting stronger.
Yes, we added Finland and Sweden,
but they're going to see that their security will likely not increase as a result of their NATO membership.
On the contrary, it will get much worse.
So it remains to be seen.
I think also Trump has less interest in NATO.
So again, I would challenge some of the measurements.
None of this is true.
NATO is not more powerful.
Russia is not weaker.
China is not weaker.
Iran is not weaker.
This is all profoundly misleading, is it not?
Yes, it is.
And not only in the military aspect,
because we see that the Russians have modernized greatly,
but also the whole idea of sanctioning Russia or China for that sake.
It harks back at this 1990s with the unipolar idea
that if you cut them off, they would either be isolated,
so they can either bow to Western interest or become irrelevant.
But this is a multipolar order. So we see that one of the main objectives of, for example, Russia now
would be to diversify away from not just the US, but the West, that is the technologies it uses,
the industries they rely on, the supply chains, the transportation corridors,
the banks, the currency, the commodity exchanges,
insurance systems, so across the entire board.
And who is the main partner for this?
Well, this is China, because they are pursuing
exactly the same objectives.
So I think over a while, we might see that what we measure
as success, all of these sanctions,
is something that might end up isolating the West instead.
How strong is BRICS today and how much stronger is it likely to become?
I think BRICS would continue to increase in relevance because, yes,
it's the Chinese and the Russians who are pushing the hardest
because they are the ones who are deemed to be strategic adversaries of not just the US, but of NATO as
well. But there's a need to see why there's such a huge demand. That's because even the friends of
the United States, be it India, they don't want to need the permission of Washington, if they want to trade with China, even Turkey, which is a NATO member, they don't want to be
dependent on Washington either, if they want to do business with the Russians. So it's, I think
it's this whole effort now weaponizing all economic dependencies, which is driving most of the
countries to look for an alternative economic
infrastructure that is, you know, what currencies can they use, what transportation corridors,
the banks. I think when the West sees the funds of Russia, the sovereign funds, this is something
that spooked large parts of the world. And this is why the trust in the financial system of the West, as well as
our entire supply chains, is now deeply harmed. And I think in that vacuum, this is where you
see BRICS really moving forward and creating an alternative. Is lasting peace between the United States and Russia feasible,
given the neocon mentality in the American foreign policy establishment, no matter who occupies the White House?
Well, I think it's going to be very difficult, but it is possible at least.
But we really have to go back to the source, as I mentioned,
the source of
the conflicts we have, which is this lack of a mutually acceptable post-Cold War settlement.
Now, obviously, this whole idea that the source of stability in Europe would be for NATO, a military
alliance to gradually expand towards Russian borders and move its military infrastructure along. This was always a very foolish idea. So I think it is possible. Again, this is why I'm
somewhat cautiously optimistic about Trump, because at least he's recognized that it was
NATO expansion that contributed to this war, even though he blames it solely on Biden, which isn't
necessarily correct. But at least if we recognize this foundation, even though he blames it solely on Biden, which isn't necessarily correct.
But at least if we recognize this foundation, then there's a possibility to return to some of the mistakes that were done in the 1990s. Perhaps we can begin to negotiate a new European security
structure, not as a benefit or a favor to the Russians, but simply based on the recognition
that it's the security competition which creates
the conflicts between the East and West. But again, I'm cautiously optimistic. At least Trump
seems to recognize this. So yeah, we'll see. Here he is last week blaming foreign policy woes on Biden's push in Ukraine.
Cut number five.
A big part of the problem was Russia for many, many years,
long before Putin said you could never have NATO involved with Ukraine.
Now, they've said that that's been like written in stone.
And somewhere along the line, Biden said, no, they should be able to join NATO.
Well, then Russia has somebody right on their doorstep, and I could understand their feeling about that.
But there were a lot of mistakes made in that negotiation.
Every once in a while, the non-Neocon, somebody around him gets through. I mean, you heard what he just said there,
and of course we all know what he did last week
when he ran Jeff Sachs' very, very harsh criticism
of Prime Minister Netanyahu,
and he posted it on his own Truth Social.
I don't know why he did that,
but it obviously sent a message.
Yeah.
No, I spoke to Professor Sachs about this as well,
and we tried to look into what we could read into this.
But overall, I think this is very important
because this punches a hole in this idea
that the Russian invasion was unprovoked.
Now, this is a very dangerous narrative,
and it laid the foundation of the other narratives
we had in the West as well.
Now, if you believe that it was unprovoked,
then suddenly a lot of the things we've done
starts to make sense.
That is, then we have to send a lot of weapons
to increase the cost and reduce the benefits.
Any efforts of compromising or even negotiating
with the Russians will be seen as a reward
to this, again, unprovoked invasion.
This is how we end up with people like Stoltenberg,
who argue that weapons are the path to peace,
and we're treating diplomacy as if it would be treasonous.
Now, once you recognize that this was provoked,
it doesn't mean you have to justify it or support the invasion of Russia,
but once you recognize it's provoked,
then at least there's possibilities of looking for solutions to find some sort of a compromise. So I think what Trump has done by simply recognizing
NATO's contribution in terms of triggering this war, I think is immensely important.
And it gives us some optimism for finding some peaceful settlements.
Professor Deason, thank you very much, my dear friend.
It's been a pleasure to pick your brain that time went by like that.
I hope we can do it again soon.
That would be great. Thank you, Judge.
All the best to you.
Coming up later today at 10 o'clock this morning,
Ray McGovern at 11.30, Larry Johnson at 1 this afternoon,
Scott Ritter at three this afternoon.
Matthew Ho, Judge Napolitano for Judging Freedom. I'm out.