Judging Freedom - Prof. John Mearsheimer: No Peace in the Middle East
Episode Date: February 20, 2025Prof. John Mearsheimer: No Peace in the Middle EastSee Privacy Policy at https://art19.com/privacy and California Privacy Notice at https://art19.com/privacy#do-not-sell-my-info. ...
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Thank you. Hi, everyone. Judge Andrew Napolitano here for Judging Freedom. Today is Thursday, February 20th,
2025. My dear friend, Professor John Mearsheimer from the University of Chicago joins us now.
Professor Mearsheimer, always a pleasure. Thank you for joining us. Thank you for letting me
pick your brain. I want to talk to you about whether you believe Donald Trump can bring about
peace in the Middle East and what he should do and what you think he's going to do. But first, a couple of questions
about a topic of interest to you, China, and a topic of interest to all of us, certainly this
week, Ukraine. The Financial Times reports that a group of Chinese warships, naval ships, about a half a dozen of them, came within 150 miles of Sydney, Australia, which has the Australians bent out of shape.
This happened last week. It was reported today.
Also last week, a Chinese military helicopter buzzed a Filipino military helicopter on international waters. The Filipino military
helicopter was providing security, according to the Financial Times, to a Filipino fishing fleet.
If these events occurred as reported, you know this better than anybody in the West.
Why do the Chinese do these things? Well, I think it's important to emphasize that the Chinese are hardball players.
They are interested in dominating East Asia, just the way the United States dominates the
Western Hemisphere.
It's commonplace in this country to make the argument that it's the United States, the
source of all trouble in East Asia,
and that the Chinese are basically satisfied with the status quo. And if the Americans would just back off, we could live happily ever after. I think that's a misreading of the Chinese. The
Chinese are not a status quo power. They want to dominate the South China Sea. And this explains
a lot of what's going on with the Philippines. And they want to reduce American influence as much as possible in East Asia. And if anything,
push the Americans beyond the first island chain, then beyond the second island chain.
But are these McGiven treaties the United States has with Australia and with the Philippines? Are these tests of Donald Trump?
No, I don't think they're necessarily testing Donald Trump. I think what they're doing
is they're asserting their influence in East Asia. China has grown more powerful economically.
It's turned a lot of that economic might into military might. And as you would expect, they're beginning to, you know, throw their weight around.
They're acting much the way the United States acts. As you well know, the United States has a Navy
that has a significant forward presence. And we're constantly roaming around in the waters
right off the coast of countries like China.
This is just sort of the normal course of events for us.
And what you should expect to happen is, as China gets more powerful,
that it's going to build the Blue Water Navy with a lot of power projection capability,
and it's going to try to throw its weight around.
It's going to try to send signals to the Australians, send signals to the Filipinos that we're in charge here.
You would probably agree with me that President Trump's statements yesterday and two days before
that, when he said things like, Zelensky is a dictator, the war should never have been fought,
Kiev started the war, okay, a bit of an exaggeration,
but perhaps an understanding of the Western provocation of Russians,
manifest a 180-degree change in the official American foreign policy attitude toward Ukraine.
Where does that leave the European elites?
Well, the Europeans just don't matter much. There are three players in this situation who
really matter. One, obviously the Russians, two, obviously the Americans,
and three, obviously the Ukrainians.
But the Europeans don't matter much.
To make this deal work, what Trump has to do is he has to satisfy the Russians.
And then he has to get the Ukrainians to go along with the deal
that Trump works out with the Russians.
That's really the essence of what needs to be done here.
And the Europeans just don't matter much.
They don't have much power.
And furthermore, without the United States on top of them coordinating things,
they're just huge collective action problems at play.
And they're at each other's throats.
So they just
don't matter much. And they'll, in the end, go along with whatever Trump and the Russians work
out. The key is the Ukrainians. In the negotiations with Secretary of State Rubio and Foreign Minister
Lavrov and their teams, and in continued working groups and
negotiations going forward, Professor Mearsheimer, what leverage does the United States have with
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Hardly any leverage, right? I mean, I don't know what leverage we have. I mean, we're losing on the
battlefield. There's no way we can rescue the situation. And the other thing is, if you think
about this, Trump has no exit option. If he walks away from the negotiations, what does he do then? He ends up as Joe Biden too,
and that's not what he wants. And the Russians have surely figured this out, that Trump really
has no option but to just go forward with this deal.
What happens if Trump, either in a measured decision in conjunction with his advisors or in one of his fits of pique,
turns off the Biden spigot and stops the flow of ammunition and military equipment to Ukraine?
How long can they last?
Well, they can't last very long at all.
But you want to understand that from Trump's point of view at this point in time, the name
of the game is to make sure he does everything possible to get the Ukrainians to agree to
the deal that he works out with the Russians.
That's going to be mighty difficult to do.
And it might make sense.
It's very hard to know for sure from outside the Trump
administration, but it might make sense to let those weapons that are now in the pipeline continue
to go to Ukraine and use the threat of cutting them off as a lever to get Ukraine to go along
with the deal that Trump works out with the Russians. I mean,
that may be their thinking. It's just very hard to tell. But there's no question, you're right,
that if we just cut off the flow of weaponry completely, that Ukraine would be doomed very Let me transfer to the Middle East.
Trump made a threat 10 days ago.
If all the hostages were not released by Saturday, last Saturday, there would be hell to pay.
Under the agreement, Hamas only had to release three at precisely noon.
It released three.
They were in good shape.
They're home.
Not all the hostages were released, and there was no hell to pay.
What is the geopolitical ramification of a threat as extreme as that?
All hostages have to be released, not dribs and drabs, one and two and three and four,
even though this is the agreement that your emissary crafted and for which you took credit.
And then he tries to upend it.
And then when his demand doesn't happen that he doesn't carry through on that the costs of making these sorts of boasts and then not delivering is not very great.
It's like when he says Canada is going to become the 51st state.
Who seriously believes that?
Or who seriously believes that he's going to turn the Gaza Strip into the Riviera of the Middle East?
Even Lindsey Graham has told them that this is a foolish idea.
So he just makes these boasts and people don't pay much attention to them.
Ah, so made these boasts about Zelensky as a dictator and he started the war and it should never have been started.
Does he really mean that? Does that manifest a change in American foreign policy? Is he sincere?
Of course he's sincere. Of course, that really does matter. I'm not arguing that there are
statements that he makes that are of no consequence at all. Some statements that he
makes are of huge consequence. And what he's doing on Ukraine, and in particular what he's
doing vis-a-vis Zelensky, is of great consequence. Okay. Okay. Is his Middle East policy
nothing more than a continuation and perhaps acceleration of Joe Biden's.
We just sent, the U.S. just sent, I think you know this,
and certainly as an ex-Air Force person, you'll appreciate it,
1,800 MOABs, mother of all bombs,
which Ritter and McGregor tell me are so large and so heavy,
the Israelis don't even have a plane with which to
take them up into the sky and drop them. Even Joe Biden didn't send that.
Well, the point that I would make in response to what you just said is there's no question that Trump, like Biden, is going to give the Israelis all of the deadly
weaponry that they want and that we have, with some small exceptions. So in that sense, there's
a continuation. But I think the key point you want to keep in mind is that Trump is operating
in a very different environment,
strategic environment in the Middle East than Biden was operating in. Biden was president when the genocide started,
and Biden had all sorts of opportunities to act to stop the genocide
and to influence Israeli policy in Gaza in ways that would put an end to the killing.
This is not an issue for Trump at this point. Trump is walking into a situation where there
is a ceasefire and where the Israelis really don't have an incentive to start up again with
the genocide. So the question is, how does Trump operate in that situation,
which again is very different than the one that Biden confronted when he was president?
Doesn't Prime Minister Netanyahu want and politically need to resume the slaughter? I'm not sure. I mean, what he wants to make sure doesn't happen,
I believe, is that you get a second phase of the ceasefire. And if you do get a second phase of
the ceasefire, you don't get a third phase. He doesn't want to cease fire. But that's not the same as saying that he wants to
go in to Gaza and start the genocide up again. You want to remember the IDF is in many ways a
spent force. You don't hear much about this here in the West. But I believe the principal reason
that you got to cease fire on January 19th. And one of the principal reasons
you're likely to get a second phase is because the IDF is not interested in starting the war
up again. Now, Netanyahu may have inclinations in that direction, but I think even he realizes
that's not in his interest. His interest is just to make sure you don't have a ceasefire so he can keep his
coalition together. Very interesting. A ceasefire without a ceasefire. Suppose he does go into
Gaza again with the IDF. What do you think Donald Trump would do? Chair him on or call him up and
say, Bibi, dial it back, or send Witkoff to tell him, Bibi, dial it back?
Very hard to say because he is beholden to the lobby in all sorts of ways. But I would not be surprised if he sent Witkoff and told him to dial it back in a serious way. I mean, you want to
remember that the United States has a deep-seated interest in having stability in the Middle East. You remember Jake Sullivan about two weeks before
October 7th was really pleased to announce that the Middle East had never been so peaceful in a
long time, and this was really good news for the United States. Well, what applied then applies
now. Trump has a deep-seated interest in having a peaceful Middle East. He has a deep-seated
interest in solving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, just. He has a deep-seated interest in solving the Israeli-Palestinian
conflict, just like he has a deep-seated interest in solving the Ukrainian conflict.
The question is, what can he do to achieve that end? And I would say in response to your question
that if Netanyahu starts the genocide again, or even just large-scale killing, that I think Trump
has very powerful incentives to get Bibi to shut it down. And I would not be surprised if
Trump has allies inside of Israel. Again, I think the IDF has had enough war for the time being
and would be sympathetic to any moves that Trump made to prevent Bibi from
starting the genocide again. Could you foresee the lobby in the United States
remaining silent and being reticent if Trump told Bibi no more war? No. And the question is then, how would Trump react?
I mean, to cut in the other direction here, the problem that Trump faces is he has so many
different problems on his plate, so many situations where he's fundamentally trying
to fundamentally alter policy, and he's running
into resistance in every one of those cases. So he has to be careful that he's not overwhelmed,
and he may just not want to spend the political capital to defeat the lobby or to confront the
lobby on Gaza because he wants to save his political capital for dealing with Ukraine. So one could
argue that at this point in time, from Trump's point of view, Ukraine is the number one issue,
and how he thinks about the Middle East will be heavily influenced by what's going on vis-a-vis
the Russians. Will President Trump's policy on the Middle East be influenced by Mohammed bin Salman, the crown prince of Saudi
Arabia? Stated differently, how key is Saudi Arabia to the resolution of these issues? Where
is Saudi Arabia on Netanyahu's genocide? Well, I've heard Chas Freeman on your show talk about this issue a number of times,
and I agree with him completely, which is that the Saudis are not interested in the Abraham Accord
unless there is serious movement towards a Palestinian state, a viable Palestinian state. Now, Donald Trump...
And not a Palestinian state inside of Saudi Arabia, as somebody foolishly and frivolously
suggested, and the Saudis erupted over it. Yes, I think that's correct. Nor did the Saudis want
a Palestinian state in Jordan or in Egypt.
They want a Palestinian state in the West Bank and in Gaza, with the capital of that
Palestinian state being East Jerusalem. And I think the chances of that happening
are remote, to put it mildly. And therefore, it's hard for me to imagine that you're going to get an Abraham Accord anytime soon, despite the fact that Trump wants it. And of course, the Israelis
want it as well. And will there ever be normalized relations, diplomatic relations between Israel and
Saudi Arabia if there's no Palestinian state, as long as Mohammed bin Salman
is the head of the government? That's what appears to be the case. I think that the Saudis
are at a point now where it's almost impossible to imagine them backing off from their demand
that there be a Palestinian state before you have an Abraham Accord. Let me take you back to Ukraine. Do you think that Donald Trump can bring about
a sea change in the thinking of the vast American foreign policy apparatus with respect to Russia?
No. I think the foreign policy establishment in the West, not just in the
United States, but in the West, is so deeply committed to the narrative that Vladimir Putin
is the equivalent of Adolf Hitler and that he is solely responsible for the war in Ukraine and that we bear no responsibility, that it's almost impossible to get most people
or the overwhelming majority of people in the foreign policy establishment
to face up to reality, which is to say that argument is dead wrong.
So I think what Trump is going to have to do here, to put it in rather crude language,
is he's going to have to shove this deal down the throat of the foreign policy establishment.
They're going to argue against what he's doing for the foreseeable future. And he's just going
to have to say, I don't care. We're going to have an agreement with the Russians, and then we're
going to coerce the Ukrainians, and to a lesser extent, the Europeans, because they don't care. We're going to have an agreement with the Russians, and then we're going to coerce
the Ukrainians, and to a lesser extent, the Europeans, because they don't matter that much,
but coerce the Ukrainians into accepting that deal. Here's a person who was, you probably know him,
Michael McFaul, an integral part of that foreign policy establishment. He's the former United States ambassador to Russia under President Obama. Not very happy about the statements attributed to him, and he did make them,
President Trump in the past four days. Chris, cut number one.
As an American, I'm embarrassed. I'm embarrassed for the soldiers that I just met in Munich
fighting for their freedom in Ukraine against the Russian invasion.
They knew who who started this war.
And it's not in America's national interest to have the president of the United States of America talk in this way.
This weakens us, not just in Europe, around the world.
Everybody is looking at the president thinking
he's flipping sides, just like you said. My next book coming out in the fall is called
Autocrats versus Democrats. And now I have to question which side will the United States be
on by the time it comes out in the fall? And I just want to be crystal clear. We can have
opinions and whatever. President Trump says falsehoods all the time.
But when it damages America's reputation in the world, this is a really serious matter.
And I hope the people I know, there is no way that Secretary Rubio agrees with that analysis.
There is no way that National Security Advisor Waltz agrees with that analysis. There is no way that the majority
of senators, Republican senators and members of Congress, agree with that analysis. Now is the
time for them to speak up because this could have catastrophic consequences for America's place in
the world in the long term. Thoughts, Professor Mearsheimer? I think he's dead wrong. He represents the establishment view on what caused the war in Ukraine, and he represents the establishment view on where we are at in the war. blood on their hands. They're principally responsible for causing this war and prolonging
it makes absolutely no sense, not only from our point of view and not only from the Russians'
point of view, but most importantly from Ukraine's point of view. What happens if we listen to Mike
McFaul and his ilk? The end result is the war will go on and on. More Ukrainians will die, Ukraine will lose more
territory, and the United States will face an even bigger disaster in two years than it faces now.
I think his whole approach to this has been wrong from the beginning.
I often, I mean, this attitude that because your advisors disagree with you, you as the president of the United States can't go along with your own views is really absurd.
If Marco Rubio, and I want to pick on him, or Mike Walsh profoundly disagree with the president and they feel they can't serve him, then they need to leave their jobs. One of the comments that, I'm going back and forth here,
that Trump made about Zelensky is that Zelensky played Biden like a fiddle.
Does Netanyahu play Trump like a fiddle?
It's too soon to tell. I mean, there's no question that any president of the United States
is going to have incredibly small amounts of maneuver room when dealing with Israel because
of the power of the lobby. So Netanyahu is going to play Joe Biden like a fiddle, and you can make the argument that he will play in due course
Donald Trump like a fiddle. We'll see what happens. But if you look at precedence,
there's every reason to think that Netanyahu, if he goes toe-to-toe with Donald Trump, will win.
Isn't that interesting? Thank you, Professor Mearsheimer, for your thoughts
and your analysis on all of these things. Always a pleasure to chat with you. Look forward to
seeing you here again next week. Likewise. Thank you. Thank you, my dear friend. And coming up at
four o'clock, we found him. I don't know where he is, but we found him. Max Blumenthal, Judge Napolitano for Judging Freedom. Thank you.