Judging Freedom - Prof. John Mearsheimer: Who Makes US Foreign Policy?

Episode Date: February 13, 2025

Prof. John Mearsheimer: Who Makes US Foreign Policy?See Privacy Policy at https://art19.com/privacy and California Privacy Notice at https://art19.com/privacy#do-not-sell-my-info.

You Hi, everyone. Judge Andrew Napolitano here for Judging Freedom. Today is Thursday, February 13th, 2025. Professor John Mearsheimer joins us now. Professor Mearsheimer, always a pleasure. I have three topics I want to cover with you. One, a broad-based one. Who really makes U.S. foreign policy? The other, the latest odd turn of events because of the president's offer to purchase Gaza, whatever that means, in the Middle East. And the third, the rather significant turn of events in American foreign policy on Ukraine. We'll start with the president. Geopolitically, how has President Trump's Gaza Riviera, it's hard for me to say this with a straight face, been received. Well, there's no question that outside of Israel, this proposal has been seen as outlandish and

ridiculous and not realizable. And there are even a good number of people inside Israel and, of course, inside the United States who understand that it is morally bankrupt and unworkable. So I think there's hardly any doubt that this is not going to work. You have a gifted understanding of Prime Minister Netanyahu. Do you think he truly favors this, or he's just buttering up the president and was as surprised by it as the rest of us? I think he was probably surprised, and I don't think he's really that wild about the idea, in the sense that in Trump's telling of the story, the United States ends up controlling Gaza, not Israel. And what the Israelis want is they want to control Gaza and, of course, control the West Bank, and they want to get rid of the Palestinians.

So I think that Netanyahu was surprised and unhappy from that point of view. But I think that what Netanyahu was very happy about was that in a certain way, Trump legitim hardly ever talked about ethnic cleansing, because again, it's a morally reprehensible strategy. But now it's out in the open in Israel in a big way, and that is due in part to what Trump said in his comments about turning Gaza into the Riviera of the Middle East. I mean, in this respect, Professor Mearsheimer, the Trump foreign policy vis-a-vis Israel is just a continuation of the Biden foreign policy vis-a-vis Israel. Add this outlandish Trump commercial transaction, which will probably never happen. But in terms of the attitude about they're not humans, they don't have human rights, we can ethnically cleanse,

that's all the same. There's no way any president of the United States can break from what is the basic U.S. foreign policy toward Israel, which is unconditional support for whatever Israel does. The Israel lobby is surely the most powerful lobby in the history of the United States. And there's no way any president can wander off the reservation and pursue a policy that is seen as fundamentally at odds with what Israel wants. So you should expect Trump to basically act like Joe Biden. And if Kamala Harris had been elected, she'd act like Biden and the way Trump is acting. Who makes U.S. foreign policy, Professor Mearsheimer? Well, the president does. There's no question about that.

It's just that when it comes to Middle East policy, the president, whoever he or she is, is boxed in in a really serious way. Who makes U.S. Middle East policy? Well, I think what you're hinting at is that the Israelis and the lobby working together do that. And I think by and large, there's much truth in that line of argument. Well, you and Steve Walsh have written the treatise on the power of the lobby. And with every tick of the clock, everything you've said in that book is more and more realistic and probably more and more realized by more and more people. What would become of Trump if he were to say to Netanyahu, Bibi, you're on your own, leave me alone?

Well, there would be a tremendous uproar in this country, and the lobby would go to work to do everything it could to force Trump to change his position. And the lobby in the past has been very effective. And President Trump surely understands this. He's not interested in picking a fight with Israel. He has too many other fights to pick. And if he had only one fight to pick, and it had to do with Middle East policy, he's a person who may be willing to challenge the lobby and challenge Israel in a serious way. But as things stand, he's fighting a multi-front war, and he is behaving in very aggressive ways on each of those fronts. And the last thing he needs is a fight with Israel, and then getting into a fight with the lobby as a result.

In one of his many, many, many pronouncements, I don't know if this one was reduced to writing. I don't believe so. He declared that the Israelis are free to settle the West Bank, notwithstanding the moral, notwithstanding the legal impediments to this. By what authority could he make such a declaration which brought such rejoicing from the right wing in Prime Minister Netanyahu's cabinet? Well, he's the president of the United States, and he is free to say things like that. The question is whether it's responsible or not. The fact is, the Israelis are settling the West Bank. They have a huge number of settlers in the West Bank, and many people argue that the most interesting question about the West Bank. They have a huge number of settlers in the West Bank. And many people argue that the most interesting question about the West Bank and Donald Trump is whether or not he will recognize

the legal annexation of the West Bank by Israel. It's just de facto at this point in time, as is the case with Gaza. But a lot of Israelis would like to see Israel be allowed to annex the West Bank. And the question is, will Trump do that? Is he free to tell Netanyahu to take a hike? I guess no, because he'd have to deal with the domestic uproar that Mrs. Adelson and her buddies would visit upon him. I think most people just don't understand how powerful the lobby is. And I think most people are afraid to admit that the lobby is as powerful as it is because they know they'll be accused of being an anti-Semite. I mean, when Steve Walton and I wrote the original article and then the book where we described the power of the lobby,

and by the way, we were just describing what was the tip of the iceberg, by the way, we were roundly attacked for being anti-Semites, just the way it operates. And nobody wants to be called an anti-Semite. So people dance around the whole subject of the lobby. And the end result is you do have a certain sense that most people don't fully understand just how powerful the lobby is. So when Donald Trump says Israel will sell Gaza to the United States, perhaps he is planning to recognize Israeli ownership of Gaza, notwithstanding that profound violation of UN resolutions and international law. He doesn't seem to care about that. I don't know how else he could have reasoned

this in his own mind. I mean, a purchase of real estate requires a willing seller. Who would sell it? The Israelis are not going to sell it. It's a preposterous statement. The Israelis are not going to sell Gaza to us. As I said before, the Israelis don't want the Americans to occupy Gaza and turn it into the Riviera of the Middle East. The Israelis want Gaza for themselves, just like they want the West Bank for themselves. They don't want the Americans getting in the way. If the Americans owned Gaza, would we have access to the deposits of natural gas that are under the ocean off the coast of Gaza. Well, I think we would. But again, this is preposterous. We're not going to end up owning Gaza any more than we're going to make Canada the 51st state. It's just not going to happen. All right. What is the significance of the dramatic change in American foreign policy articulated yesterday by the Secretary of Defense vis-a-vis Ukraine? I'll summarize it. You can accept or modify or reject my summary that Ukraine will not be in NATO and it will not return to its pre-2014 borders. two of the key arguments that Hegsith laid out yesterday in Brussels. And it's very important

to understand that those two arguments or those two points that Hegsith made dovetail with what were the two principles or what are the two principle demands of the Russians for getting a peace agreement in Ukraine. In other words, the Russians have said Ukraine cannot be a NATO, number one, and number two, the West has to recognize that we have annexed Crimea and those four oblasts in the easternmost part of Ukraine. And what Hex has said and what Trump said yesterday is that Ukraine is not going to be a NATO, number one. And number two, that the pre-2014 Ukrainian borders are never going to be seen again as the real borders of Ukraine. And Ukraine is going to have to accept the fact that it's going to lose a sizable chunk of territory. Now, how much territory the Americans are willing

to allow the Russians to take was not spelled out. But by implication, it sounded like Hegseth was saying that the Russians can keep those four oblasts plus Crimea. So what's happened here is, in effect, the Trump administration has said they are accepting the two key parameters that the Russians have put forth, which up to now, a former national security advisor and former U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, John Bolton, cut number two. Putin has scored a whole series of victories today. It's hard to encompass them all. But I think one, in addition to these substantive concessions, is that he has now, it seems, exactly what he wants. Putin doesn't want to negotiate with Zelensky. He wants to negotiate with Trump because he thinks he'll get more out

of him. And he's absolutely right. Is John right? Yep, he's exactly right. I mean, we want to understand that what Trump and Hegseth did yesterday was to radically alter American foreign policy toward Russia and toward Ukraine. And they are cutting against the conventional wisdom. So you would expect John Bolton and the vast majority of security experts in the United States and in Western Europe or Eastern Europe as well to be beside themselves, to be enraged by what Trump and Hex have done. And of course, the Ukrainians themselves are not going to be happy about this, to put it mildly. Well, the Ukrainians can't be happy about a lot of things, not the least of which is this idea. Tell me what you think about this, that President Putin and President Trump

will meet in Saudi Arabia without President Zelensky. Hardly surprising. Right. It's not a surprise, but they're going to come out presumably with some sort of a deal. And for him, it'll be a take it or leave it. No. I think that that's basically right. And you want to think about the Europeans in this context as well. There are really three players on our side, the Americans, and here we're talking about the Trump administration, the Europeans, both West and East Europeans, and then the Ukrainians. And the question you want to ask yourself is, are we really going to pay serious attention to what Ukraine wants and what Europe wants, or are we just going to negotiate a deal for ourselves? Listen, let me make a very important point about the comments that were made yesterday, especially by Hegseth, which reflects on this. And I don't think most

people are focusing on at this point in time. There are two dimensions to his comments yesterday. One has to do with what we're talking about, which is the deal to settle the war in Ukraine. But Hexeth also makes it very clear that the United States is moving away from Europe, and we are shifting the burden for security in Europe to the Europeans, and that the Americans are going to pivot to Asia in a serious way. If you read Hexeth's comments yesterday, and of course, Trump has been talking like this for a long time, there is a divorce coming down the road that is of great importance. That tells me that if the Europeans don't like the deal that Trump works out, Trump is not going to be very bothered. And he's not

very bothered if the Ukrainians don't like the deal. Correct. Here is Trump talking about meeting with Putin in Saudi Arabia. Chris, cut number four. I'll be dealing with President Putin largely on the phone. And we ultimately expect to meet. In fact, we expect that he'll come here and I'll go there and we're going to meet also probably in Saudi Arabia the first time we'll meet in Saudi Arabia, see if we can get something done. But we want to end that war. That war is a disaster. It's a really bloody, horrible war. Why is he keeping the pipeline open? Why are we still sending military equipment to Kiev? The horrible war that he has condemned, the condemnation in which you and I joined, could be stopped in a very short period of time if that pipeline were turned off. Don't you agree?

Well, I think the point is that you have to give the administration some time to put all the pieces of the puzzle together and to get this working. I mean, he's only been president for three weeks, and they're thinking through how they're going to deal with this. You know, this is actually a very tricky issue. If we were to cut the flow of aid to Ukraine right away, it's likely that very shortly thereafter, the Ukrainian military would collapse. The Russians would end up conquering a lot more territory. And then the question becomes, what does the deal look like between Russia on one side and the United States on the other side regarding how much territory the Russians get to keep? If in this scenario that I'm positing,

they end up taking a lot more than the 20% of Ukraine that they now control. So the Trump administration has a vested interest as they negotiate this to make sure that the Russians don't take too much territory. Because if they take a lot more territory, it'll make it even harder to sell the deal. So what I'm saying to you is that the devil is in the details here. And the details Putin only wants a certain amount of territory. He doesn't want to conquer Ukraine. We both know that. No, but he doesn't want to conquer Ukraine. But the question is, does he want 20% of Ukraine or 40% of Ukraine? Why would he want more than what he has? He doesn't want a governor. He only wants the Russian-speaking parts of Ukraine, the parts that he claims with legitimacy have historically been Russian. strategic reasons and historical reasons for the Russians to claim that they should take more than the 20% that you're talking about. I'm not saying that will happen. I'm just saying you have to be

very careful here. Got it. Got it. What will become of NATO if the U.S. leaves? It'll probably collapse. I think that that's right. You know, Hegseth made it very clear yesterday that the United States is not going to provide a security guarantee to Ukraine, that it's the responsibility of the Ukrainians, or excuse me, it's the responsibility of the Europeans and other non-Europeans to provide security for Ukraine moving forward. And under no circumstances can NATO do that. So you see what's happening here, and this is my earlier point, is that the Trump administration is basically telling the Europeans, you're responsible for Ukraine. We're walking away. And if we're walking away from Ukraine, we're also walking away from Europe. We're walking away from NATO. Now, I'm overstating the case, but there is a large element of truth in what I'm saying here. Yeah, there is. There is. I want you to listen to exactly what Hegseth said. It's only about a minute long long and then you can weigh in on it.

Cut number 11, correct. A durable peace for Ukraine must include robust security guarantees to ensure that the war will not begin again. This must not be Minsk 3.0. That said, the United States does not believe that NATO membership for Ukraine is a realistic outcome of a negotiated settlement. Instead, any security guarantee must be backed by capable European and non-European troops. If these troops are deployed as peacekeepers to Ukraine at any point, they should be deployed as part of a non-NATO mission, and they should not be covered under Article 5. There also must be robust international oversight of the line of contact. To be clear, as part of any security guarantee, there will not be U.S. troops deployed to Ukraine.

I'm sure the Kremlin is happy about there will not be U.S. troops deployed. And obviously, they're thrilled that NATO won't be involved and Ukraine's not going back to the pre-2014 borders. But Putin cannot be happy about somebody patrolling and securing his border, somebody with arms doing that. I don't know what the heck that means by non-European. Who does he have in mind? Well, it could be, let's say, the South Koreans or the Japanese. But the point is, there's going to be no security guarantee without the United States. Right. You need the United States to have a security guarantee. In fact, you need NATO to have some

sort of security guarantee. And what Hexeth is saying, I mean, you want to understand how radical those comments were. He's basically saying, we're washing our hands of Ukraine. We're washing our hands of Europe. I wonder why he said it instead of Marco Rubio, other than a difference in personality and style. I mean, this is really a radical change in American foreign policy. You'd think the Secretary of State would articulate it rather than the Secretary of Defense. What leverage does Trump have with Putin when they meet in Saudi Arabia? He doesn't have hardly any leverage, but he doesn't need leverage. The fact is, and again, Hegseth made this clear,

we are cutting a deal that reflects the hard realities of power, the power balance on the battlefield. Our side is losing. The Ukrainians and the West are losing to the Russians, and there's no way we could shift the balance. So what leverage do we have? Not a lot. And furthermore, Trump is not interested in playing hardball with the Russians. Trump is interested in having good relations with the Russians and basically getting out of Europe, or at least reducing our commitment to Europe in a fundamental way. And again, this is why Trump, in terms of yesterday's comments or the Trump administration, in terms of yesterday's comments or the Trump administration in terms of yesterday's comments is acting in such a radical way. Are there other, I'll use a Mearsheimer word, flashpoints in Europe

of concern to President Putin outside of Ukraine, which he will bring up in Saudi Arabia. Absolutely. And Peskov said, Dmitry Peskov, who is the spokesman for the Russians on these issues, that what the Russians were interested in is not just an agreement on Ukraine. They want a broader agreement that deals with the security architecture in Europe overall. And I think from their point of view and from our point of view, this is a very smart idea, because the fact is there are a number of potential flashpoints outside of Ukraine that could blow up. And we want to make sure that doesn't happen. And I'll just quickly- What are they? Yeah. The Arctic Ocean, the Baltic Sea, Kaliningrad, Belarus, Moldova, and the Black Sea. And I could tell you a story about each one of those. We just have to be very-

That is an enormous landmass that you've just traversed. Well, this is Eastern Europe, and you know the history of Eastern Europe. It's not been peace, love, and dope over time. This has been a very dangerous area. And we started this conflict in Ukraine by expanding NATO into Ukraine. And now we're paying the price. And we have upset all these delicate relationships that existed before the war started. And we have to think now, moving forward, about how we can come up with some sort

of security architecture that makes sure that none of these flashpoints turn into another war. Do you think and do you expect a third person in Saudi Arabia, President Xi. No, and I think that both Putin and Trump have no interest in having Xi there, because at this point in time, you just want to negotiate together, two people in the room. Trump doesn't want the Ukrainians there, he doesn't want the Europeans there, he doesn't want Xi there. He doesn't want the Europeans there. He doesn't want Xi there. But you know Trump. He's seen pictures of Yalta, and he wants the big three to meet somewhere sometime soon, maybe in Yalta. Well, maybe they can do that, and he can get lots of pictures taken and feel good about it. But this is serious business. And in this case, I would be shocked if it wasn't just Trump and Putin.

The stakes are too high here. Professor Mearsheimer, a pleasure, my dear friend. We don't have time for you to go through each of those six or seven flashpoints, but we will. I hope you'll come back and join us again next week. I definitely will. Thank you, John. Real pleasure. Real pleasure. No matter what we're talking about. Coming up at 4.15 this afternoon, we found him somewhere in Latin America. He's ready to go. Max Blumenthal, Judge Napolitano for Judging Freedom. for judging freedom. Thank you.