Judging Freedom - Sharmine Narwani : The Slow Strangling of Syria and Lebanon

Episode Date: January 29, 2026

Sharmine Narwani : The Slow Strangling of Syria and LebanonSee Privacy Policy at https://art19.com/privacy and California Privacy Notice at https://art19.com/privacy#do-not-sell-my-info.

Undeclared wars are commonplace. Pragically, our government engages in preemptive war, otherwise known as aggression with no complaints from the American people. Sadly, we have become accustomed to living with the illegitimate use of force by government. To develop a truly free society, the issue of initiating force must be understood and rejected. What if sometimes to love your country you had to alter or abolish the government? Jefferson was right? What if that government is best which governs least? What if it is dangerous to be right when the government is wrong? What if it is better to perish fighting

for freedom than to live as a slave? What if freedom's greatest hour of danger is now? Hi everyone, Judge Andrew Napolitano here for judging freedom. Today is Thursday, January 29th, 2006, we are very, very happy to welcome a new guest, hopefully a soon to be a regular. Charmine Narwani. Charmine is an expert on Middle Eastern Affairs, a world-renowned journalist and the editor of the publication, The Cradle. Charmine, you are so highly recommended by our viewers and some of our regular guests. It's a pleasure to meet you, and I'm happy that you're here with us to give us your of you, your understanding of events in the Middle East.

I know you want to talk about the UAE and Saudi rivalry, but before we get there, just some basics, how did an ISIS killer, a human being who cut people's heads off become the president of Syria? Self-proclaimed president of Syria. He had a lot of support throughout the Syrian conflict. He was groomed and prepped for the,

this. We saw it in the latter days, meaning after he had taken Damascus, we saw the suit and tie go on, the trimmed beard, etc. But of course we have pictures, which we compare him with, you know, just a few years earlier, what he was dressed as, what he was doing. You know, the man has beheaded people. But he was fully supported by a Western and regional allied coalition who tried to during the Syrian conflict basically rehabilitate al-Qaeda. I don't know how Americans have managed to, you know, find this palatable. They rehabilitated al-Qaeda and changed the name of the organization several times in order and, you know, helped promote ISIS as the dangerous one. These two are the same.

Their fighters are fungible. Their funds, their arms have been fungible throughout this conflict. They're one and the same, but they created that. I mean, it's propaganda 101. Propaganda 101. You say the self-proclaimed president of Syria. We know it's self-proclaimed, but recognized by the West, is he recognized by the Syrian people or just a certain sector,

whether it's ideological, religious, ethnic, or geographical, that recognizes him. I think there are a lot of Syrian who recognize him, certainly within the Sunni populations, you'll have a big chunk of that. Certainly the minorities in Syria have a real problem with him being the self-proclaimed president. Shara himself has shown antipathy towards elections, and so we will not actually know if the Syrian people are majority in support of him, unless we have elections. I mean, that's the clear syndication. Right, right.

Why does Donald Trump seem to love this creep? Because he's good-looking, according to your president. Do you know, Trump is not nuanced in his understanding of this region or much of the world. And so when he's presented with his sort of like fluffers in the background who tell him this is a good guy, this guy's with us. You know, we can work with this guy. He's just going to go for gold. And it's kind of embarrassing. I'm sure all the sort of mid-level people in the national security complex and the U.S.

who have slogged through two decades of fighting al-Qaeda that are horrified, you know, but it doesn't reach the top levels, and that's where Trump gets his guidance from. Interesting. So tell us about the control of Syria. I mean, this so-called government of Al-Jolani clearly doesn't control all of Syria. Is some of it controlled by the Turks? Is some of it controlled by the Israelis? Is there a portion controlled by the Russians?

The Russians aren't on the ground yet, though we did hear mutterings, I think, two months ago, that they would position Russian military forces, not a huge number, but enough maybe to deter the Israelis in the South and the Syrian Golan. And I think this is something that was backed by the White House. They, in fact, wanted to get to normalization. Trump is all about normalization. It's how many notches he can get on that Abraham's Accords belt. And the Israelis keep moving the goalposts on that.

So he thought, well, maybe we can contain them a bit. Because in any normalization deal, the Israelis will have to be out. Why would Syria normalize with Israel unless they were, you know, respectful of its territorial integrity? The Turks are in the north, but the Turks are very closely allied with the government in Damascus right now. They're sort of glued at the hip. And right now they're working on reducing the U.S. back Kurdish autonomous zone and removing the SDF, the Syrian Democratic forces, which are basically Kurdish secessionists from the picture. And that's where the struggle is going.

Israel invading Syria has made Turkey sort of switch positions a bit. They are in a hot rivalry now. So lots of things happening. Of course, there's a Druze corridor right at the south of Syria that has now started working with Israel. And when I was in the Syrian theater, I can tell you that Druze did not like Israel.

They often said to me, the ones on the border, said to me that when Al-Nusra fighters would come in and try to take their villages, they always received cover from the Israelis. So they've never liked the Israelis. But now they're colluding with the Israelis because better, you know, the devil. Well, we know this is the devil, but we're more frightened about what could come out of this Tukfiri, hateful minority-hating government in Damascus. And that might even happen with the Alawites, you know.

So Syria's everyone's, it's up there. grabs. There are some countries, however, who really want Syria to maintain territorial integrity. Israel is not one of them. The U.S. I think the U.S. establishment is always split. You have the Israel firsters and then the

others, right? So there are those, certainly the Israelis lead that pack, who would like divide it and weaken Syria. Doesn't Netanyahu and his right wing coalition covet Damascus?

I don't think they could rule Damascus. I mean, Damascus has so much significance to Arab populations, you know, like 300 million plus of them. It is a historical capital. It's a capital, you know, that Damascus has shown the best times in Arab history and Muslim history. I don't know if they need that. I mean, Israel, I think, wants to maintain. There are several things they want to do. I think they just want their foot in there and never to have to leave because it's kind of like what they're doing in Lebanon, what they're doing in Gaza.

You know, we're going to change the rules of engagement forevermore by having a footprint in your territory. But for instance, Mount Hermon, which overlooks the Syrian Lebanese border, that's a height, right? So in war, you're always thinking about whether you can maintain some strategic height. The other thing the Israelis will want is the water resources in the south in the Yarmouk Basin, which borders Jordan. This is a problem, as I'm sure know, that the region has suffered drought for many years, but has an extreme water shortage. It is a national security issue for most of these countries, but Israel wants to grab their

resources. Has is, does Israel control a portion of Syria now? I mean, hasn't the IDF seized a substantial amount? amount of real estate, including this mountain? Yes, but if you look at the map, it just looks like a tiny sliver. The point is they've laid their footprint there, and from there, they have intermittently launched assaults in different areas. And ultimately, what the Israelis would like is a clear-cut route along the South of Syria,

along the Jordanian border through the Druze areas into potentially Iraq, you know, where they then can share a border with Iraq, you know, even though it's occupied territory. So there's a lot of strategic interests that the Israelis have in this. And this is why when Ahmad al-Shara went to Washington late last year, everyone expected normalization to be announced. But at the 11th hour, the Netanyahu government, as he has wanted to do, their want to do, move the goalposts. And it is essentially Netanyahu scuttle that deal, which made the White House very unhappy, but they've regrouped and they're pushing it on another front now. They have

a Jordanian room where they all meet to talk about these things. And we'll see, we'll see. But the Israelis ruin every chance for a ceasefire they can. They kind of like that they can move into Palestinian territories, into Lebanese territories, into Syria at will, even in northern Iraq, where they're very well embedded with Kurdish autonomous authorities there. Is Hezbollah still in existence in Lebanon? Absolutely. It's still in existence, but it has really been scaled back in terms of power projection. As the months go on, you hear the kind of discourse from sort of pro-U-EU. US types and even pro-Israel types that you've never heard.

I've never heard in the 14 years I've been coming to Lebanon. I mean, absolutely stuff that, you know, would get you jailed before, not against Hezbollah, but any Arab leader. You can't. And in fact, the Lebanese government is now really clamping down on freedom of speech. You can't criticize Lebanese leaders, but, you know, it's a fair game for anyone in Hezbollah. And the Israelis, of course, have moved the goalposts on the ceasefire here. They've not seized fire from day one. They've escalated very recently, but that's because there's

talks they're trying to push to force the Lebanese government, which abided by the ceasefire and disarmed Hezbollah on the south of the Latani River in Lebanon. They are now trying to make it countrywide thing. They have not abided by any terms of the ceasefire, but they want Lebanon to go over and beyond. Is Hesbola still a threat to Israel? Well, that remains to be seen. I have to say in the last four months, you don't hear a peep from Hizbullah,

whereas over the years they'd become much more lax in security, much more lax in what they were maybe complacent, which is dangerous, in what they would say to journalists and others they met. There's nothing you hear from them now. It's hard to say from public statements. the Secretary General of Hisbalah very recently said that, suggested that if the Americans or Israelis tried to decapitate Iran's leaders, specifically the supreme leader, Ali Khomeini, that Hezbollah

would jump in. We don't know if that's real or not. I think they're holding their cards close to their chest. They certainly have weapons still. And, you know, even at Israel's estimates where we took out 80% of their military. military hardware, even if that were true that that's a very solid 20% that remains of medium range missiles and advanced missiles. Further to that, Hezbollah has continued to smuggle weapons through Syrian territory. Some have said it's even easier now because you just have to

pay off people. So we don't know. We really don't know. Tom Barack, the U.S. ambassador to Turkey and President Trump's envoy to Syria. What is he trying to accomplish in the region? And I see an unhappy look on your face when I mention his name. Well, you know, Tom Barack is, he just sets fires everywhere. I mean, it seems clear to me that he wants to weaken this region. for Israel's benefit. He seems very ideologically committed

to remapping this region territorially, actually, and has derided Sykes-Picot, which divided the region into its current nation-state incarnations after sort of colonial powers left the region, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, Palestine, etc., he derides the Sykes-Picot and talks about new borders and new territories. So I frankly find him more in line with the Israeli line of thinking.

He does present himself more as an Israeli firster in the kinds of things he does here. Very anti-Hizbolo, not reasonable or rational. On Syria, it seems he's okay with divisions. But like I said, there are two camps in the U.S. establishment. the Israel firsters and then the MAGA folks. And their foreign policy visions are very different. And they're quite at odds with each other now. As you can see in social media and the various podcasts that are going on,

there is a real split there. Yeah. Of course, everybody that Trump sends there is either, well, they're all Israel first. Some of them are very hardcore Zionists, like his son-in-law and Steve Whitkoff and Mike. Mike Huckabee and Tom Barrack, there's no question about that. They may have friends that are on the other side of the Republican Party,

but they are serious, serious Zionists. Huckabee is beyond the pale. He might as well be the Israeli ambassador to the United States as he is the American ambassador to Israel. I mean, he's an ideologue. He's a clear ideologue. There's no rationality with him. The things he says, I mean, it's laughable.

Right? So, yeah, but right now on Israel and Israel's interests, Trump has given a lot of leeway to the Israel firsters. I've always contended that when his massive ego comes into a clash with Netanyahu's massive ego, that's the only time we might see a shift. And I think, you know, it's only year one of Trump. I think we have three more years to see this happen because Netanyahu gaslights the U.S. president like no other. And at some point, I mean, Trump's not dumb. You know, at some point it's going to be too much for him.

One hopes. Yeah, our mutual friend, Alistair Crook, who knows so much about this part of the world, agrees with you about the clash of egos between Netanyahu and Trump as the impetus for a change in American policy. What is the current rivalry or coming conflagration between the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia? And why should we be concerned about this? I don't even know if it's concerned. This rivalry is very, very serious. And it opens up a reexamination of this region very, very dramatically.

So just a little bit of backdrop, Muhammad bin Zayed, al-Nahian, who is the president of the UAE right now, took over from his father, who died a few years ago, was very much seen as a mentor to Muhammad bin Salman, al-Saul, who is the crown prince of Saudi Arabia, and because his father has been in declining health

since he became, and even before he became king, King Salman, he has, kind of assumed leadership of Saudi Arabia. And he was mentored apparently by Muhammad bin Zayed and looked to him as an elder brother and friend. And then they went into Yemen. So, you know, it's possible that Muhammad bin Zayed behind the scenes was telling Muhammad bin Salman, let's go for this.

You know, we can get it now Yemen's week. Ansarala has taken over Sana'a. This is our time to strike. Muhammad bin Salman went in thinking this would take days or weeks at most. Within two years, he had realized that Yemen had different plants than the Saudis, undercover of the Saudi-led coalition against Yemen. The UAE was very much focused on the south of Yemen and creating ports and controlling port areas, the entire waterways around Yemen.

Now, I don't think he noticed that this so much, but there was some kind of rivalry that started developing then. I think we've heard that Muhammad bin Salman just overall started to announce to multinational companies in the West that, you know, you either place your headquarters in Saudi Arabia or you don't do business with the Saudis. So that frenemy kind of relationship, the rivalry has always been there. In 2002, bin Salman said in a meeting with local journalists, the UAE has stabbed us in the back. They'll see what I can do. It will be worse than what I did in Qatar. In 2022, that rivalry continued and we could see it,

but we had, you know, that kind of language was very surprising. what's really going back on behind the scenes. But if you look back to even 2009 in the WikiLeaks cables, the Emirates were saying that the UAE considers Saudi Arabia its biggest strategic and security threat after Iran, not Israel, Saudi Arabia. I can tell you from my own observations, the UAE has, I mean, certainly since the Arab Spring and before,

been building up quietly, these mercenary armies of Colombians and other nationals. They've been building out ports and other countries. I think they tried to take over port in New York, and there was a big hoo-ha in the U.S. about it. They've been setting up military bases in the Horn of Africa, but very quietly behind the scenes, you know. and now we can see that the UAE has had an actual plan.

Oh, they brought Eric Prince in as well, right? Blackwater to come in and create a blueprint for using these mercenary armies and creating networks to smuggle out gold from Sudan and other places. Let me just stop you for a minute. What are you talking about somebody

tried to take over a port in New York? No, no. I think there was a deal. This is some years ago that it was a UAE company that wanted to buy. control over, not takeover as in. Okay, got it. Is the region, Chris, if you want to put the map up again? Yeah.

Is the region ready for the consequences of a major Israeli slash U.S. war against Iran? Wait, before we go to that, if you don't mind, Judge, I want to explain this map because, you know, pictures worth a thousand words. I had to explain the map to keep it up there. you're explaining it. So that you can understand what the UAE has been plotting for years, for years, okay, is, I mean, you can see the Persian Gulf on your right there, right? And you can see the UAE abutting it and the straight of Hormuz, which the Iranians could shut off, right? The UAE wants to be part of the massive rush towards controlling trade corridors, okay?

and then having strategic say over who can move here or not. That is the big global, geopolitical power struggle right now that's manifesting since the Chinese launched their Belt and Road initiative, right? You can see the UAE has no way

to get to Europe by land. Saudi Arabia cuts it off. So the UAE's massive attempts to buy ports, to situate military bases all along the Indian Ocean, the Gulf of Aden, you know, into the Horn of Africa, and then up the Red Sea through Israel, not through the Suez, but through Israel, and then on to Europe.

While the Saudis have a land route, cheaper, faster, you know, within their territory, that they can build across from the Persian Gulf to Jordan, then through Syria and Lebanon, to the Mediterranean Sea, correct? The Saudis figured out that the UAE are trying to get chokeholds for the Saudis, okay? If they can get control over the Bab al-Mandib, right, where you see across from Yemen, if they can get control of that, with Israeli help coming down the Red Sea, they can, you know, unless Saudi has its land corridor,

they can also choke Saudi Arabia from two places. You have the Strait of Hormuz and you have the Bab el-Mandib. When the Israelis recognized Somalia, the penny dropped in the biggest way possible. It's not Somalia, Somaliland, right? Because you can see Somaliland is right across from Yemen, right? That meant they were going to encircle that strategic, you know, opening, Babel Mandab and exert control over it. Further to that, the Israelis and the Emirates are very happy with crisis-laden Lebanon and a crisis-laden Syria, okay, and a divided Lebanon in Syria, which would mean that a Saudi land route would be difficult, correct?

So you understand what I'm saying? I mean, this map really shows the picture. UAE needs these ports. but what the Saudis have done in response to Israel's declaration, you know, recognition of Somaliland was huge. It's hit Saudi media. They're calling the UAE a Trojan horse for Israel in the region. They absolutely, the Saudis went ballistic.

They've kicked the Yemenis, not just out of, sorry, the Emirates, not just out of southern Yemen, but out of Sukhotra. island in which we understand that there was a base. There was an Israeli base there alongside a UAE one, you know. That's all been put. Let's move to the likely consequences of Israeli U.S. attack. I don't know if invasion's the right word. Trump says he doesn't want to put boots on the ground.

Attack on Iran. Okay. So that's why I wanted to explain the U.A. Saudi thing to you because now you have a new block in this region, which is, Everyone against the UAE and Israel indirectly, correct? So all the so-called moderate Arab states, even members of the axis of resistance,

even Turkey and Qatar, who had their own axis, are now vehemently against the UAE and its projects, which kind of puts Saudi Arabia and Iran also in the same corner in many respects, which is I think why the Saudis so fiercely are against a U.S. attack on Iran. the the the the the the the the the the Saudis you know is kind of head of the gcc gc gulf cooperation council um are you know are having a fight from within and they don't want to fight from without outside as well right this will put a lot of

pressure on gulf states if the americans try to as trump is promising to encircle iran and block iran's roots iran has a cassi belly right the right to respond to that and could shut off the strait of hormones which absolutely impacts Saudi Arabia's, you know, oil exports and all its trade. And the whole region shifts. This could bring down some Gulf monarchies. If Iran wins, on the other hand, if Iran strikes a real blow to the Americans or Israelis, that would make a much more powerful Iran.

Something also the Gulf countries will be worried about. This is, I mean, whoever in the Gulf who has Trump's years now, we know that the Gattari's and the Saudis do very much after Trump's last trip to the region. because they promised him trillions, right? They are saying, don't do this. You know, this could be gunboat diplomacy with the USS Abraham Lincoln heading there. It could just be for show.

There could be a limited strike. We don't know, but Iran has rejected even a limited strike. They're like, no, we will react to this. So it's hard to say. Can you put the map up again? Where is the American Armada? Where is the USS Abraham Lincoln? and its support fleet.

I don't actually know. I should have looked at this before we came on the show, but the Yemenis are now saying if they come into the Red Sea, they could be attacked. So there is a limitation. You know, Judge, there's, for a long time, the Pentagon has war-gamed, has run war game exercises against Iran.

And I don't know if this idea that if you have an aircraft carrier in the region, that means war is more likely. Because for a while now, since Iran developed its, it's, you know, very advanced missile capabilities, I think the Americans worry that they, that would be an immediate target. And in, you know, the very famous Millennium Challenge war game of 2002,

that actually happened. The Iranians took out, even though the U.S. cut off communications, they used past World War technologies to, to take out almost all of the U.S.'s naval assets within 48 hours. This was a three-week game. And the Americans stopped the game, rewrote the rules, and restarted it, at which point the colonel who represented the Iranian side quit and went public with this information. So who knows?

I mean, it's 2002. A lot could have been developed in asymmetrical warfare by the Pentagon. Since then, they've certainly worked theoretically on the same. scenarios for a very long time. How imminent in your view is a U.S.-Israeli attack on Iran or a preemptive strike by Iran on Tel Aviv? The Iranians are, in my view, too well-mannered. What country sits there after attacks? I mean, there is a war on Iran. Sanctions is, you know, economic tools is warfare, and they could legitimately respond to that in different theaters, and they don't. All this politeness may well soon end if the Americans strike.

I don't know. Iran is now, as we know, through their new national security body, now permitted the use of preemptive strikes. So that's on the table. We don't know if they'll use them, if they can change past behaviors. in terms of, you know, here's a thing, why aren't the Israelis leading with this? They were leading with these strikes on Iran and Iranian interests for the last two years. They're so afraid after what happened to them in the 12-day war that they've pushed the Americans up front. Will Israel attack Iran directly itself?

I don't know, but, you know, the Iranians view Israel as the U.S.'s biggest forward-operating military base in the world, not just in the region. So if the U.S. strikes Iran, Israel might be Iran's immediate target. We really don't know. We're all guessing at how this could play out. There are many scenarios. Got it. Charmaine, we have to go.

Thank you very much for a fascinating, fascinating conversation. Will you come back and visit with us again? I would absolutely love to. Thank you for having you on charge. You're a great explainer and you have great sources in an area of the world. very much of interest to the viewers of this program who do not get it from the Western media. Thank you, Charmy, and all the best to you, my friend.

And coming, a great conversation. Coming up later today at 11 this morning, Aaron Maté at 1 this afternoon, Colonel Douglas McGregor at 2 this afternoon, Colonel Lawrence Wilkerson, at 3 this afternoon, Professor John Mearsheimer. Judge Napolitano for judging freedom.