Judging Freedom - Ukraine War_ Leaks, Testimony & Reality - w_ Tony Shaffer

Episode Date: May 2, 2023

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Hi, everyone. Judge Andrew Napolitano here with Judging Freedom. Today is Tuesday, May 2nd, 2023. It's about 1145 in the morning here on the East Coast of the United States. Tony Schaefer joins us for his weekly session with us. Tony, always a pleasure. Thank you for coming back on the show. Thank you, Sir. It's good to be here. This morning, there were reports of another high altitude balloon somewhere off the coast of Hawaii, 36,000 feet above sea level. Not getting nearly the publicity that the last one of these had when it was over Alaska and then the continental United States and the government shot it down off the coast of South Carolina. A, what is this likely to be? And B, is it something the average American should be concerned about?

So I actually spent some time with a colleague who spent time as a planner. The technical term is a military planner that they go about, he's a senior intelligence officer, retired, worked to figure out what to do regarding China. He did this a long time. And we're talking about the China threat. What does it really mean? I do believe that there is a threat from China. I don't believe they want to go to war, but I do believe they want to increase their ability to influence things globally. Soft power, they're doing this already. Many folks are worried about a potential war with them. I think the Chinese PRC's desire is to increase their throw weight regarding military influence without firing a shot. That's the best way to do it in their judgment. I'm not here to judge right or wrong. I'm saying that, but I think that's where it's going. What do these balloons actually do?

So that's what I was going to get to. Other than an act of intimidation and getting some of us to talk about it. So that's why I'm trying to build the foundation. So there is, I think, desire by the PRC to increase influence. As they build that up, they have to essentially do things in a way that the U.S. will observe. The observables by the U.S. have to be something that sends a message. The Chinese are sending a message that they're expanding their influence in the Pacific. They've done that through the Spratlys. They've built bases on little islands that are barely bigger than a football field. And this is the part of their coming out, if you will, saying we are serious. The balloon, I believe, based on what I've seen so far and what I've read so far, is very much like the one that came over the United

States. It's a similar configuration, flying at a similar altitude, looks for all intents and purposes something that looks the same. What I think is going on is that the Chinese continue to do a form of reconnaissance. And two things to help illustrate this. We see, we the United States, the intelligence community sees these things coming out of China. They see these things, Judge, instantly. We have such extensive surveillance. The moment this thing pops up beyond 500 feet, we see it. We see everything. So this thing they know is coming. And this is not the first one. Before the January of that,

Judge, the Pentagon was tracking these as well they they had already made incursions into hawaii and mexico like this one this so it just wasn't reported uh what i and secondly what i think is going on here is yeah i think that the chinese and let me be very clear i don't want to give up any get anybody in trouble regarding classified information i we've, we've been told by a lot of folks, pundits in the media, that, oh, the Chinese have satellites. They do. They have satellites to do surveillance. There are certain types, there are certain things that we can do from orbit they can't. I don't want to get into specifics, but there is reasons why the Chinese may be using these balloons to create helps give the Chinese a better understanding of

what's going on, better resolution. So on the political side, I think that the Chinese do know what they're doing. They're trying to intimidate a little bit, but these are practical intelligence collection systems. And yeah, there's certain things balloons can do. These balloons can do that they can't do from orbit at this point in time based on what we know to be their shortcomings. So that's a long answer, but that's, I think, what's going on. It's a fascinating answer, Tony. Thank you for it. Is it me or balloons seem so 18th or 19th century?

Yeah. It's a balloon. It is, but it gives you, again, persistence is what we're looking for here. So if you need a certain area covered regarding surveillance, balloons will give that to you. They have a long dwell time. And I actually worked on a program looking at this very technology back in the mid 2000s. I was actually brought in. They said, hey, if we were going to design something, what what kind of capability would you want to have on it regarding surveillance? You know, so persistent surveillance. That's why we built all of these drones. now, Judge, we have enormous investment in drone technology, either through the Predator and Reaper drones or the smaller aperture drones which do things on the battlefield. But it's all about

what we call ISR, intelligence surveillance reconnaissance. So a poor man's ISR is going to be a balloon because balloons are pretty inexpensive, to your point. They're fairly primitive in technology. But if you put the right collection platform on it, it will give you pretty detailed information from a high altitude that our satellites give us. So I do believe there are shortcomings within the PRC's surveillance capacity, which the balloons may well fill based on what I understand to be their shortcomings. Okay. So educate us a little bit more. You said that as soon as any of their reconnaissance is up 500 feet, we know about it. And I assume that as soon as our reconnaissance is up 500 feet, we know about it. And I assume that as soon as our reconnaissance is up 500 feet, they know about it. Is there an unwritten rule that we won't shoot their stuff down and they don't shoot our stuff down that we know they're watching us and they know we're

watching them? Oh, no, not at all. No, not at all. I think given an opportunity, either side will take down the others. Look, to me, my my belief, my understanding from my context is NORAD was recommending that the balloon, the first balloon, the big balloon that got shut down, shut down off the South Carolina coast, be taken down early. Like as in like the moment it incurred within U.S. airspace in Alaska. That was the recommendation from officers below the political levels, like, no, this is not good. And it was, they were denied, obviously. And the whole idea that, oh, we didn't want to bring it down over populated areas, like Montana is not well populated. That's boulderdash. But no, there's no rule like that. During the Cold War, between us and the Russians regarding spy games, yeah, there was kind of unwritten rules that I wasn't around back then. But when I was trained in 88, there were indeed kind of unwritten rules that existed between us and the Soviets. But none of that exists now as far as I can tell. So I forget if it was Larry Johnson or maybe it was you, maybe it was Ray McGovern,

said if the Chinese wanted to, they could listen to conversations between Joe and Jill Biden and the White House. Maybe a little bit of an exaggeration. Where would the devices be that would enable them to do that? And why would we allow those devices to stay wherever they are? There's three category of devices that could do something like that. First, depending on the shielding or the technical countermeasures, you could technically get signals between phones from orbit. There are collection platforms so sensitive that communications between devices on the surface of the planet can be detected. I'm not sure if the Chinese have that level of sophistication. It's possible. I don't know. I don't know what level they do secondly is essentially judge uh remember the old landlines remember you had things that have cords and all that sort of thing right if you have a and the white house is wired if you've got phones which are wired you've got a

you know an old rotary phone or a digital phone those things can be tapped and oh by the way they can be tapped even if you're not picking them up. If it's just sitting on your desk, because of today's technology, you can actually figure out a way to activate the speakers on that so you're listening in. So that's the second one. And I don't know if they're that sophisticated or not again. The third way is simply line of sight. We did this during the Cold War. You basically can put up something that basically can see at a building, hit windows or even walls where there's even more sophistication now. And that would be a line of sight kind of microwave type thing, which actually will allow for either a reflection, something to reflect back so you get patterns, and that can be analyzed as well. So those are the three categories of collection devices I think that could be used. I'm not sure of how sophisticated the Chinese are in any one of those three categories that they could do that,

but I think it's possible. For a hardwired landline to be surveilled? Does it require a physical connection or can it be done remotely? Both. So again, I have to be careful because of some of the programs that I used to work. Technology can be embedded on anything. I mean, one of these, Judge, you could take this, stick it in something, a computer, a device. This may have software then that essentially takes over your computer and makes it a collection device for someone else. Another way is hardware. Say I sell you this and it's been, you know, modified by someone. This becomes a thing that takes over your entire room, essentially. It can go and put viruses other places. So the answer is there's a number of ways, very sophisticated ways to compromise technology within a room or a building.

And that's something that people need to be aware of. Heck, at one point, I don't know if you remember this, there was something called done by Israelis. Say again, I missed what you just said. So there was a software program called Checkpoint One done by the Israelis. It was an early firewall program. And this is back in the early days of the Internet. I think it was 93, 94, the Air Force, U.S. Air Force bought all of this Checkpoint One software that's supposed to be a firewall to prevent hacking. Well, it turned out, Judge, the firewall itself was the hack. The Israelis were actually plugged in and listening to everything the Air Force was doing.

So buyer beware. You know, if someone manufactures this, they may actually be selling you something that compromises your security by the fact that they protect you against others but they're the ones hacking so all that those things are possible regarding compromising of technology great uh lesson in all this now uh it has developed that um the documents that Jack Teixeira shared with his chat room group first appeared on the chat room website in February of 22, not 23, 22, right about the time that the conflict in Ukraine began. Right. Is it conceivable that the Russians knew that Teixeira was revealing this stuff and the Americans didn't because he doesn't get caught for another 13 months? The answer is absolutely. Look, the Russians have an extensive cyber program, offensive,

defensive, and collection. So we know for a fact that they, the Russians, have a significant interest in everything we do. I was actually once targeted. I was given a defensive briefing by the FBI at my old think tank, Center for Advanced Defense Studies. They came in and briefed my boss and said oh by the way Tony's being targeted because they they are interested in the policy work he does so uh that was in the early it was about 15 years ago now so I have no doubt that they're out there actively looking at this one thing so if it was on the internet I bet money that the Russians had it very early on. Why didn't the Americans, whoever surveils this stuff, know that this young buck sergeant, part-time National Guardsman, weekend warrior, I'm not demeaning his work or the week.

No, I get it. I get it. Distinguish him from people that work full-time. Sorry. No, I get it. Why wasn't he caught in the 13 months that he was doing this? Well, two things. First, one of the three investigations we talked about last time we spoke about this,

I said one of them would be kind of reviewing the security clearance process. And they are doing that. It's clear from the recent reporting. This guy may have, should have not had a clearance based on some of his own habits. Some of the things that came up incidental to the review of his security jacket. It's like, really? How'd this guy get a clearance? To that point, Judge, we have the most expensive national security apparatus in the world, yet we're not doing the one

fundamental thing we need to, which is looking at ourselves regarding real breaches. Everybody's looking for white supremacists and are you using the right pronoun? We're not actually looking at people for are you compromising national security by doing things like putting information out? In this case, back in the 80s, when I came into what we do, we had something called the, the, the, the, the version and espionage directed against the army. Basically judge that was a program that looked at vulnerabilities and potential compromises and looked at things being put on the internet that gave the bad guys an understanding of what we're doing. We don't have that now. Nobody's willing to actually do those hard things to examine

how much are we giving away to the adversary that tips them off on what we're doing. To me, the whole Ukraine thing, no matter what side you're on, the amount of information that's being put out there is insane if you're trying to beat the Russians, because you're telling the Russians exactly what you're doing constantly. So it's kind of like, you know, I'm neutral on, I don't care. Look, our interest should be U.S. interest, not Russian or Ukrainian interest. So my position is we need to protect U.S. equities. With that said, what we're doing doesn't protect U.S. equities. It telegraphs to the Russians all the time what we're doing by the fact you put all this information out there. So it's kind of like, I don't know what side we're on, to be honest with you, because no one's actually

looking at what we're doing, what's going on. Are you of the view that this was a controlled leak by people significantly superior to him in the government who are adverse to the president's policies in Ukraine? or are you of the view that this kid acted on his own? I'm of a view that that kid should never have had that information based on the fact that it's highly protected. It's highly tailored to the audience it goes to. Again, Judge, as we talked about last time, and I stick with what I said, the documents which I saw are produced and retained at a very high level, and they're not typically put on an automated system, even if it's JWICs, even if it's a top

secret system, because of the very thing we're talking about. It was operational information. You don't generally put information that relates to ongoing operations onto a system which is widely circulating information. So that to me tells me someone had to make a decision to put it out there. So even if it wasn't leaked to the kid or it wasn't directed, the fact they put it out there indicates to me that they wanted it out because you it indicates to me that they wanted it out because you just don't put code word information on an open system even if it's considered top secret so something something had to happen the documents we're talking about uh demonstrate unambiguously uh the government's belief that ukrainian Ukrainian air defenses are substantially degraded and will be totally degraded in early June, a month from now. The documents put out there demonstrate conclusively

the view of American military leadership that Ukraine is not doing well. Right. Has anybody in the Biden administration challenged publicly the authenticity or the accuracy of these documents? No, the only challenge has been from the media. The media has inferred that maybe some of the statistics regarding Ukrainian losses and Russian losses were modified, but not saying how they were modified or who. So, no, as a matter of fact, John Kirby's statements pretty much have confirmed that they're authentic by the fact he said, don't look at them, don't look at these. You know, it's not proper for you to be looking at them. If you want somebody to look at something, tell them not to look at it.

It's ridiculous. As we know from my book. Yeah. It's like, don't read Operation Dark Art. You know, it's going to find out things. Correct. After the documents became known to the government, but before they were known to the public, Secretary of Defense Austin said the following to the Senate Armed Services Committee. I think you've seen this,

but I'm going to compare it with what General Cavoli said just last week. So first, Secretary Austin. With regard to your optimism about Ukraine having the upper hand, that is what you told me yesterday. It is. Now, Ukrainians have inflicted significant casualties on the Russians and they have depleted their inventory of armored vehicles in a way that no one would have ever imagined. And so now we see Russia reaching for T-54s and T-55 tanks because of the level of damage that Ukrainians have inflicted on them. And we have, in the meantime, been reaching for T-54 and T-55 tanks because of the level of damage that the Ukrainians have inflicted on them. And we have, in the meantime, been... And reaching for those tanks demonstrates what to you, sir?

It demonstrates that their capability is waning. And we've continued to witness them being challenged with artillery munitions and other things, and they're reaching out to Iran, they're reaching out to North Korea. I think, you know, we'll see an increase in the fighting in the spring as conditions for maneuver improve. Do you believe there's a real chance for significant Ukrainian advancements between now and the beginning of winter? I believe there's a chance, and we're doing everything that we can do to ensure that they have their best opportunity to be successful, Senator. He saw the document, so he can't possibly mean what he just said. No, I think best opportunity, he's using very soft language, Judge. Well, you know, we're

going to help them. We're best opportunity. Well, that best opportunity may not be all that good in the end, because again, to your point, he knew at the time of his testimony that the actual status of the Ukrainian military was not favorable to a victory. They did not have, and let me be very clear on this. United States and NATO has not given Ukraine sufficient military power to win the war. They have not. I'm not saying they should. I'm just saying if your objective, if you're if your state of objective is to help Ukraine beat the Russians, you ain't doing it. It ain't going to happen. So then if that's the case, if that's's the premise i think most rational people who see what's going on will come to that conclusion what are you actually trying to do then because all you're doing is embattling the people of ukraine in a battle that that makes their lives miserable

and i feel sorry for soldiers on both sides of the fight because they're the ones being pushed into this for and for basically no no potential gain for either side. So the Secretary of Defense said significant casualties imposed on the Russians. A month ago, he said that. Right. After he knew what was in the documents, which would be released a few days afterwards. Here's General Cavoli, four-star, commander-in-chief all U.S. military forces in Europe, testifying before Congress three days ago, last Friday. I'd like to underline your comment about the specificity of the degradation of the Russian forces. Much of the Russian military has not been affected negatively by this conflict. Much of the Russian military has not been affected negatively by this conflict. One of those forces

is their undersea forces. It's hard to talk in public, as you well know, sir, about undersea warfare and our efforts in that regard. But I can say that the Russians are more active than we've seen them in years. And this is, as you pointed out, despite all of the efforts that they're undertaking inside Ukraine. Okay, Tony, so which is it? The Russian forces have not been degraded, General Cavoli, or the Russian forces have been degraded, Secretary Austin? So General Cavoli is correct the Russian forces have been degraded, Secretary Austin? So General Cavoli is correct. This is what we've been saying. If you simply look at the numbers, the numbers of troops and military forces available,

the Russians have two orders of magnitude more than the Ukrainians, much of which have not been affected or tapped into. I think General Cavalli is saying that. So then when you examine the actual combat losses on the battlefield, there's been at least, I think it's closer to 10 to 1, but the official number is 7 to 1. For every one Russian loss, there's been seven Ukrainians lost. Let me just stop you for a second. Our friend Jack Devine says the opposite.

He says for every one Ukrainian killed, the Ukrainians have killed seven Russians. He's the only one saying this. I think he's totally misread. I know. No. So again, by the sources I trust, by my team who advises me, the losses have been lopsided in favor of the Russians. And again, I'm not taking sides. I'm just trying to tell people what I understand is happening because I am not on either side here. But with that said, the fact that we have one general saying one thing and the Secretary of Defense saying another, is significantly important for people to pay attention to because Secretary Austin's comments

were fundamentally political in nature, not reflective of the current circumstance which the Ukrainians face. And that's dangerous. It's dangerous because if that's what he's telling Joe Biden, then we're in a lot of trouble because it's just fundamentally not correct. Tony Schaefer, always a pleasure. Thank you for all your insight, my dear friend. Thank you, sir. Always good to join you. Thank you. Thank you. If you saw that and you did and liked it, I suspect you have. Like and subscribe. Judge Napolitano. More as we get it. Judge Napolitano for judging freedom.