Lenny's Podcast: Product | Career | Growth - Twitter’s former Head of Product opens up: being fired, meeting Elon, changing stagnant culture, building consumer product, more | Kayvon Beykpour
Episode Date: April 28, 2024Kayvon Beykpour was the longest-serving head of product at Twitter and was GM of Twitter’s consumer division until the platform was acquired by Elon Musk. He originally joined Twitter in 2015 throug...h the acquisition of his company, Periscope, the largest live video streaming platform at the time. Periscope pioneered technology that inspired Instagram Live, TikTok Live, Facebook Live, and other social networks’ expansion into video streaming. In our conversation, we discuss:• The story of being let go from Twitter after Elon’s acquisition• How he turned Twitter’s stagnant culture around• Kayvon’s thoughts on the limitations of frameworks like Jobs to Be Done• Why Periscope failed• Advice for building consumer products• When to copy, when to innovate—Brought to you by:• Enterpret—Transform customer feedback into product growth• OneSchema—Import CSV data 10x faster• Heap—Cross-platform product analytics that convert, engage, and retain customers—Find the transcript at: https://www.lennysnewsletter.com/p/twitters-former-head-of-product-kayvon-beykpour—Where to find Kayvon Beykpour:• X: https://twitter.com/kayvz• LinkedIn: https://www.linkedin.com/in/kayvz/—Where to find Lenny:• Newsletter: https://www.lennysnewsletter.com• X: https://twitter.com/lennysan• LinkedIn: https://www.linkedin.com/in/lennyrachitsky/—In this episode, we cover:(00:00) Kayvon’s background(04:31) Getting Elon up to speed at Twitter(11:34) The story of being let go from Twitter after Elon’s acquisition(21:09) Changing the product culture at Twitter(29:44) Building the “hide replies” feature(32:02) Sacred crows, taking bold bets, and reigniting growth(34:28) Aquihires and their impact(42:40) Tips for successful acquisitions and staffing(47:00) The limitations of frameworks like JTBD(53:20) Signs you’ve gone too far with a framework(57:44) Lessons from building Periscope(01:00:41) Reasons why Periscope failed(01:07:24) The challenges of implementing video at Twitter(01:12:05) Copying ideas in good taste(01:17:58) How to get better at building consumer products(01:19:51) What Kayvon is building(01:20:31) Lightning round—Referenced:• Lessons on building product sense, navigating AI, optimizing the first mile, and making it through the messy middle | Scott Belsky (Adobe, Behance): https://www.lennyspodcast.com/lessons-on-building-product-sense-navigating-ai-optimizing-the-first-mile-and-making-it-through-t/• What it’s like to sell your startup for ~$120 million before it’s even launched: Meet Twitter’s new prized possession, Periscope: https://www.businessinsider.com/what-is-periscope-and-why-twitter-bought-it-2015-3• Walter Isaacson on LinkedIn: https://www.linkedin.com/in/walter-isaacson-b8b81520/• Elon Musk on X: https://twitter.com/elonmusk• Parag Agrawal on LinkedIn: https://www.linkedin.com/in/parag-agrawal-5a14742a/• Jack Dorsey on LinkedIn: https://www.linkedin.com/in/jack-dorsey-a43b07242/• Blackboard: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Blackboard_Inc.• Keith Coleman on X: https://twitter.com/kcoleman• Esther Crawford on LinkedIn: https://www.linkedin.com/in/esthercrawford/• Twitter acquires Chroma Labs: https://tech.hindustantimes.com/tech/news/twitter-acquires-chroma-labs-story-aqvcRPAoYXqXJuAbefA6cN.html• John Barnett on LinkedIn: https://www.linkedin.com/in/johnbarnettt/• Jobs to Be Done framework: https://jobs-to-be-done.com/jobs-to-be-done-a-framework-for-customer-needs-c883cbf61c90• Hot takes and techno-optimism from tech’s top power couple: https://www.lennyspodcast.com/hot-takes-and-techno-optimism-from-techs-top-power-couple-sriram-and-aarthi/• Nike Is Unveiling the Kobe 11 Tomorrow Using Periscope: https://sneakernews.com/2015/12/13/nike-is-unveiling-the-kobe-11-tomorrow-using-periscope/• Chris Sacca’s website: https://chrissacca.com/• Facebook Live: https://www.facebook.com/formedia/tools/facebook-live• Kevin Hart on X: https://twitter.com/KevinHart4real• Clubhouse: https://www.clubhouse.com/• Vine: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vine_(service)• Paul Davison on LinkedIn: https://www.linkedin.com/in/davison/• Rohan Seth on LinkedIn: https://www.linkedin.com/in/rohanseth/• Cryptonomicon: https://www.amazon.com/Cryptonomicon-Neal-Stephenson/dp/0380788624• Reamde: https://www.amazon.com/Reamde-Novel-Neal-Stephenson-ebook/dp/B004XVN0WW• The Name of the Wind: https://www.amazon.com/Name-Wind-Kingkiller-Chronicle-Book-ebook/dp/B0010SKUYM• Star Trek official site: https://www.startrek.com/• Dune: part 2: https://www.dunemovie.com/• Oppenheimer on Peacock: https://www.peacocktv.com/stream-movies/oppenheimer• Tokyo Vice on Max: https://www.max.com/shows/tokyo-vice/e7d93204-7f98-4e62-ab52-6c1da053f942• Devs on Hulu: https://www.fxnetworks.com/shows/devs• Nick Offerman on X: https://twitter.com/nick_offerman• 3 Body Problem on Netflix: https://www.netflix.com/title/81024821• Perplexity AI: https://www.perplexity.ai/• Particle: https://www.particle.news/• Crokinole board game: https://boardgamegeek.com/boardgame/521/crokinole—Production and marketing by https://penname.co/. For inquiries about sponsoring the podcast, email podcast@lennyrachitsky.com.—Lenny may be an investor in the companies discussed. This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit www.lennysnewsletter.com/subscribe
Transcript
Discussion (0)
The first time I ever met Elon was over FaceTime.
It was just like, do you want to just like come, like, hang out?
You can swipe left or swipe right.
You're kind of known for at Twitter,
someone that turned the culture of the product team and Twitter in general
from a very stagnant, nothing is changing product, to shipping all the time.
We wanted to change the lack of ambition, the lack of creativity,
the lack of customers feeling that the product had changed it all.
So here's a list of stuff that you or teams shipped while you were there.
Superfollows, communities, newsletters, topics, fleets, testing reactions,
edge-to-edge photos, Twitter blue, spaces, and obviously live video.
The sacred cows are like their own roadmap.
What are all the things that you think we're not allowed to change?
Let's start there.
And this was all relatively quickly.
I was like, I might flame out completely, but hell if I don't try.
Today, my guest is Kvon Bakepour.
Kavon was the beloved and longest-tenured head of product at Twitter,
and also GM of the consumer business at Twitter, up until the day that it was sold to Elon Musk.
He landed a Twitter through an acquisition of his company Periscope, which was the world's largest
live streaming platform, which ended up inspiring Instagram Live, TikTok Live, Facebook Live,
and basically every other social network getting into live video.
He sold the company to Twitter in 2015, continued leading Periscope for a number of years,
and then moved into leading product and then the entire consumer business.
In our wide-ranging conversation, Kavon shares what it was like getting Elon up to speed
at Twitter, what it was like to be fired from Twitter, which actually has to be fired from Twitter,
which actually happened during his pat leave.
He also shares all kinds of lessons and stories
from transforming Twitter's internal culture
from a risk-averse stagnant product org
to one that was shipping major features regularly.
We talk about how they used aqua-hires
and up-and-coming hungry product leaders
to lead new initiatives and break through many of their sacred cows.
We also get into jobs to be done.
Elon's layoffs of most of Twitter staff after the acquisition,
his lessons from building and shutting down Periscope,
and also building consumer products in general.
And so much more, this episode is full of stories and lessons
and a bunch of stuff that you haven't heard anywhere else.
With that, I bring you Kavon Bakepur after a short word from our sponsors.
And if you enjoy this podcast, don't forget to subscribe and follow it in your favorite
podcasting app or YouTube.
It's the best way to avoid missing future episodes, and it helps the podcast tremendously.
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Kayvon, thank you so much for being here and welcome to the podcast.
Thanks so much for having me, Lenny. Great to meet you finally.
It's amazing to meet you. I think this is going to be quite a unique and interesting podcast.
A big thank you to Scott Belski, illustrious, former podcast guest for introducing us.
So when he introduced us, the one thing that he told me is that hopefully Kavon will share the story about our time getting Elon up to speed at Twitter.
I would love to hear that story.
I bet other people would too.
Are you able to share that story?
You know, when all the drama went down with Twitter and Elon ended up buying the company and after the eight-month saga of legal back and forth ended up actually taking control of the company, there was that first like two-day period.
where it was complete chaos at Twitter with the sink and, like, Elon spreading his tentacles
trying to find out, like, you know, who are the people that he wants to keep?
And what are the projects that are interesting?
In the midst of all that, Scott ended up getting contacted and being asked, like, you know,
who should I, who should, you know, Elon talk to?
And Scott recommended that Elon chat with me.
And so I, the first time I ever met Elon was over FaceTime, where, you know,
Elon was just very curious to ask, like, hey, you know, you were at Twitter for a while.
You seem to, you know, have done some things.
Like, what should I be digging into and who should I be talking to?
At the end of that conversation, we ended up arranging an in-person meeting where Scott and I
went to Twitter HQ to actually meet Elon.
I think this was like day two of Elon having, you know, brought the sink in.
And so we had this really bizarre, wild, but really fun experience of,
walking into Twitter HQ.
In my case,
walking back to Twitter HQ for the first time
after having been fired,
which was a very strange experience for me.
And, you know, we walked into the building.
I was sort of like, like scurried through the back door
because I didn't want to make a scene and make it, you know.
There was a lot of like rumors around like his cave on coming back.
And I just wanted to avoid all of that.
And so it was just like a very weird experience of being like
scurried through the elevator and through the back door
and go to this.
like massive conference room, which we had on the second floor of the 110th building.
And in that massive conference room, it was me, Scott, Elon, and then at the very, very end of
the room, Walter Isaacson, who, by the way, like, I had a hard time.
I knew I recognized.
I never met Walter in person, but I was like, is that Walter Isaacson?
But he said nothing the entire time.
And we had this very, you know, we had probably like a two-hour conversation, you know,
talking about the past, the future, Twitter, the good.
bad, the ugly. At the very end of the conversation, Walter came up and introduced himself.
I was like, hi, I'm Walter. Like, can I get your information just in case I need to ask any follow
questions? And I was like, oh, shit. I guess that whole conversation was on the record. I don't know.
So it was a very surreal experience for a bunch of reasons, including just being weird for me
since I was very conflicted about coming back to Twitter, even physically in the office.
But it was, I must say, it was like, it was really fun. It was fun. It was fun.
talking to someone.
I mean, obviously, Elon, I'd never met him before
and he's one of the most, you know,
successful entrepreneurs of our time.
And so that was exciting to kind of like go into that meeting.
And also, I had been spending so much time dreaming about Twitter
and trying to mold Twitter in a direction that I thought was compelling
and working with a team of people to do that
and to meet someone who also had a similar sort of ambition
but obviously in different ways
he had his own dream for Twitter
but it was sort of really bizarre
and unique and surreal
seeing that glimmer in someone else
who was like, yeah, I also just bought this thing
so I can actually do whatever the hell I want
and by the way here's some like crazy dreams I have
for doing it. It was just a really
as someone who had
had their own dreams for the product
like witnessing that was
it was really unusual
and cool.
So I think that's like
probably what Scott meant when he said to you should ask Kavon about that was I think we both
kind of recognized that like something's about to happen here obviously like you have this
very public spectacle of someone essentially having a takeover of a public company but all of that
stuff aside also you could tell Elon was scheming and cooking up like you know what am I
going to do with this and that was it was cool to see that that's an amazing story I love the
Walter Isaacson component of it. Do you feel like you made a dent on his approach and way of thinking?
Obviously, he made a lot of big radical changes. Do you feel like you made a dent in his view of
where Twitter should go? I don't know. I certainly don't think I've made any impression on how he should
run the company. I think that's, you know, Elon's going to Elon in his way. And I think,
you know, he certainly has had some radical moves in terms of, you know, how he's running the company.
The decisions he made, like how many people he let go, how the company is.
structure, the culture, and all that stuff is like, you know, we didn't even talk about that stuff.
I think, you know, what we spent time talking about is, I, you know, shared my perspective with
him of, like, people I thought who were exceptional, who were at the company. And if I was in his
shoes, like, who I would spend time with and embrace. And, you know, most of the people that I mentioned
are still there, which is, which is awesome. And they seem to be, A, empowered, which is great. And
be, like, having fun, which is, which is awesome. So, you know, hopefully that stuff is useful.
We spent a bunch of time brainstorming products. And, and, you know, I had sort of my set of
projects that I was very passionate about because we'd sort of given birth to them. And, and, you know,
I think a bunch of those projects, it seems like Twitter's still investing in and putting a lot
of energy behind, like community notes, which at the time was called Birdwatch. But, you know, I always felt
really bullish on that being the future of how,
essentially how content is moderated on Twitter,
just because it was very clear that the way we were handling content moderation,
among many other flaws just wasn't scalable.
And spaces and communities and the creator program of helping people make money on the platform,
like it's,
those are projects that we started, you know,
over the year-ish prior to Elon taking over.
And my hope, you know, having left the company and having had a new leader come in,
was that those things would be given more oxygen.
And it's been, it's been awesome to see that those have been continuing to sort of grow and be molded in a different direction.
So yeah, I think in that sense, I hope that, you know, our brainstorm was useful.
But, I mean, for all I know, he doesn't even remember the conversation.
I forget love community notes is such an amazing product.
Let me ask two more dramatic, oriented Elon Twitter questions,
just to get these out of the way.
The first, as you said, you were fired.
I don't know if you've shared that publicly.
People always wondered, I think, what happened.
I know you tweeted during your Pat leave.
I'm leaving Twitter.
And no one really knows the story as far as I know.
What actually went on there?
It was weird, to say the least.
Honestly, it took me some time to kind of come to peace with it
because it was frustrating and surprising.
I guess the story of what happened starts with Jack
resigned. Jack resigned in, it was like November of 2021 at the end of the year. The board, you know,
I chose Parag to be the CEO of the company. And, you know, I've had a long relationship with Parag.
I respect him. But I had mixed feelings about that. But to his credit, you know, Parag very quickly
addressed one of the biggest things that I was really frustrated about, like in the last three years,
essentially, at my time at Twitter, one of my biggest points of feedback and points of
nation was the structure of the company and that we had a functional organizational model,
meaning we had a had a consumer product, me, we had a head of revenue product, Bruce,
we had a head of engineering, we had a design, we had research.
It was like functionally run an organization.
And the combination of that model and the type of leader that Jack was wasn't working in my view.
Like I think if you're going to have a functional organization to have a GM or a CEO who's like
extremely leaned in to tie break and that resolved.
conflict and make sure the team is moving quickly. And Jack, for all of his amazing qualities,
just wasn't operating that way. And so you had a group of highly opinionated people that
often disagreed and would create either the need for consensus or deadlock. And that just was
driving a lot of people crazy, including me. And I think it really helped us back from living up
to Twitter's potential. Anyway, all of that was super frustrating for me. And the combination of that
And, you know, a new, a dramatic change in leadership with Jack Levin and Prague coming here.
You know, I wasn't feeling too stoked.
Prague to his credit when he became CEO, quickly changed that.
And, you know, shifted the company to be a GM structure.
So, and he, you know, promoted me to being the GM of consumers.
So for the prior three-ish years, having been responsible for growing Twitter's consumer product,
I was only responsible for the product management team.
I didn't have engineering or design.
And that honestly was like difficult.
It's like trying to, it's very difficult to change culture with like one hand tied behind your back.
Still no regrets had a lot of fun.
You know, I think we had some impact, but it was it was frustrating.
So Parag changed that.
You know, and the irony of this, by the way, is he was one of the biggest proponents of the functional structure.
You know, when he became the CEO, he changed the structure, promoted me to be the GM of consumer.
And that was, you know, I was at that point like one month, this is one month.
before I went on Pat Lee because my daughter was due.
And so I sort of went into my paternity leave being like, all right, I'm going to give
this a shot.
You know, like we'll see we'll see how this goes.
Like, you know, is Parag addressed to the biggest frustration that I had with the company
and how it was being run?
And so I kind of like, you know, had some trepidations, but went into my patly feeling
optimistic.
Mind you, this was all before Elon was even part of the picture.
He had not become a board member.
He had not.
There was no, like, news about him.
having beef with the executive team or for that matter, like trying to buy the company.
So I went on Pat leave, you know, maybe a week and a half for our daughter's due date.
Three weeks goes by.
In that three weeks, Elon joins the board, leaves the board, makes an offer, has a short,
dramatic feud about whether that goes through.
And also during that time, my daughter was born.
Some drama at the hospital for us, but a week a week afterwards, we come
home, mom's healthy, daughter's healthy. The day after we get home from the hospital, Parag
called me and said that he was letting me go and that he was taking the team in a different
direction. And that night, Twitter signed a term sheet with Elon to sell the company. So,
you know, a lot happened in a very short period of time. And the, you know, the reason that Parag
gave is exactly what I shared publicly, which was that he wanted to take the team in a different
direction.
You know, the only other thing he said is that given that new direction, he thinks that
the things that I'm good at, Twitter doesn't need anymore, and the things that Twitter
needs are not particularly in my skill set or in my interest.
He wasn't particularly expressive about what those, what that direction was, but that was
the reason he gave me.
And that was a huge bummer for me for a bunch of reasons.
One, I love the company.
I love the product.
And also just like sucks to leave not on your own.
terms. And two, it was just confused. The timing was very frustrating and confusing for me,
not least of which because I had just come home from the hospital while on paternity leave,
but also because, you know, at that time especially the fact that Elon was buying the company
was, well, I was conflicted, honestly. I was very excited because Elon is someone that I
looked up to immensely and, you know, just look at things that he's achieved in the world.
and you can't help up be inspired by that.
And two, Twitter, for all of, I think, the impact and progress that we had made had a lot of challenges associated with its governance and the fact that it was constantly vulnerable as a public company.
So there's just always this drama associated with Twitter as a public company, even a private company before that, that made it extremely hard as a builder to get shit done and have the product live up to its potential.
And one of the benefits of this particular takeover was that Elon offered a path towards solving all that.
It was like, oh, cool, now you've got one owner who happens to be, by the way, extremely opinionated about the product and a voracious consumer and creator of the product.
And there was something, I think there was an incredible opportunity in that that now you have this organization and this product and this incredible ecosystem that can be devoid of all the political bullshit associated with being a public company.
and now it has this like conduit to just living up to its potential.
So it was a bummer to have to be removed from that, I suppose,
without having any agency myself.
So that was very long with an answer to your question,
but that's kind of what happened towards the end there.
And like I said at the beginning,
it took me a while to come to terms with it and to be at peace with it.
And I did eventually, I mean, listen,
there's like a huge silver lining of I spent the first, you know,
year of my daughter's life.
with her and my family and my wife Sarah had left Twitter like eight months prior to me leaving.
And so, you know, when's the next time we could all be together and have time and space to just
enjoy each other and our new family? And frankly, to avoid a lot of the drama that ended up
ensuing that not a lot of people could have predicted, the deal was on, the deal was off.
You know, it's just a whole lot of drama that I got to miss, which, which, you know, is the
silver laying. And then it was confusing there for a bit because when, you know,
when Elon did end up buying the company.
You know, in that conversation that I had with him, it was definitely, I was conflicted about,
like, do I want to maybe spend some time working on this still?
And, you know, Elon was very cool about, he actually used this phrase at the end of our
conversation, which I still find hilarious.
He was just like, do you want to just like come?
You seem like you care about the product and you don't have dumb ideas and like, do you
want to come, like, hang out?
And I was like, what would my job be?
And he was like, don't know, you know, just like hang out.
And you can swipe left or swipe right or I can, you know, he used the swipe right, swipe left,
Tinder metaphor.
And I thought that was kind of hilarious coming from him.
For like ideas that came up, just like here.
No, like swipe right on whether you want to be here or swipe.
Like we did, he's like, you don't have to, we don't have to make this a thing.
Just like, you know, you want to hang out and, you know, work on the product with us.
And so, you know, I sort of ended up deciding.
that actually I'm just ready to I'm ready to move on you know I've spent enough time at this
company at this product trying to shape it into something that I was passionate about I think it's
someone else's turn and you know especially Elon like buy it it's your turn you know as you can do
whatever you want with it so that was conflicting for a bit but I would say towards the end of the year
it was pretty pretty clear in my mind that I was ready to move on and and start thinking about other
problems. What I think about is there's always this tension being a PM at a company with a very
strong minded product oriented founder. And I feel like you would have been in the epitome worst
possible situation there where your product leader between Elon and the rest of the York. So I think
it probably would not have worked out. I'm not sure I would have been able to articulate it as
succinctly as you did just now. But I think that is the feeling that I had that like it's just
it's not it's not my place anymore. You know, like I don't have a can.
this to try and exert my my dreams on this place.
I think it's, you know, Elon took that mantle and, you know, I'm excited to see what he's,
what he's, what he's going to do with it is kind of the feeling I had.
Yeah.
So you touched on this.
You, you're kind of known for at Twitter, someone that turned the culture of the product
team and Twitter in general from a very stagnant, nothing is changing product to shipping
all the time, all kinds of stuff.
So here's a list of stuff that I've gathered your team ship while you were there.
Twitter Blue, which is I think called premium now, spaces, super follows, communities,
newsletters, topics, fleets, being able to see Instagram photos in line, testing reactions,
edge to edge photos, tons of UX improvements, and obviously live video.
What did you learn about how to change a product culture from a company that's very risk-averse
and essentially just not shipping a lot to taking big bolt bets and becoming a lot more open
to new stuff. Trying to drive culture change is both one of the most challenging things and rewarding
things. Like, you know, for the first year of my role, there is a, there was a chapter of my time
at Twitter, maybe just a backup that was just leading Periscope. And in that first chapter,
maybe two years, I was not really involved with Twitter stuff all that much. That started to
change when we really tried integrating Periscope with Twitter. But the sort of chapter two of my time at
Twitter was when I became the head of product. And that first year of being the head of product was
like one of the most difficult of my career, not because the work was difficult, but because it was
so politically and bureaucratically exhausting to try and change culture in a way that just there
wasn't alignment around. And it comes back to the point I was making earlier around like the
organization of the company was functional. And so it's one thing for me to have some ideas and a plan and a
strategy that I felt compelling, but, you know, when, when you have to essentially drive consensus
amongst your peers across the other functions, it's, you know, it's, that's a different game.
That's not execution. That's like politics and consensus building. And I both can't stand that stuff,
but I'm just, I think like, this is going to sound like I'm too doing my own, but like good enough
at it and I have enough patience at it that I kind of like, you know, I invested the time in, in the energy.
I think a less patient person wouldn't have bothered and would have thrown their hands up.
But I think honestly, a lot of it just comes down to like I had practiced.
Like my first company that I started in college was one of my best friends, Joe,
who I ended up co-founding Periscope with.
We got acquired by a big public ed tech company called Blackboard.
And like we were 19 at the time and we got thrown into like a public, you know,
I was the senior executive at a public company that was like not your phone to central tech
company.
It was even more difficult to kind of get things done.
through the four years I spent there, I learned a lot about how to like navigate that type of
environment. And so it all kind of came coming back when I was given the product role at Twitter.
You know, that first year of changing culture was like, you know, walking through mud.
And it was really difficult. But I think when we started building that alignment and sort of like
building excitement that like, oh, actually, maybe this, maybe we should be taking some bigger swings.
And when we started seeing through the execution against some of those plans, I think it ended up, it got easier and easier, right?
Because it's sort of, it becomes addicting.
I think people end up feeling like, oh, wow, maybe these sacred cows we had didn't need to be so sacred.
And so I think, you know, after that first year, it became a lot more fun.
It was still difficult, but it became, it felt like we were all swimming in the same direction a lot more.
But I think my takeaway there is like you just you can't change culture without having alignment from the from the top.
You can't change culture.
It's difficult to change culture when you have like a pocket of the company trying to, you know, advocate for change.
So I think we got there in the end.
We didn't move as much urgency as I think we drove.
We were not fast enough.
We were not bold enough.
Like I'm like I was consistently dissatisfied with what I was achieving and what our team was achieving.
but I think, you know, we did make a change, you know, like Twitter was an organization that
had a lot of sacred cows and became very calcified in its ways. Literally when, you know,
in the first two years I was at the company, the stated product strategy for Twitter
was refine the core. It was like, you know, don't, we're not, you know, we're not making any big
bets here, team. Like, our goal is to like keep turning the knobs that are working. And listen, like,
as much as I was kind of throwing stones from the sidelines through that period when I was in Periscope land at our separate office, few blocks away from the mothership, that focus actually did help the company for some period.
The reason why Twitter went from stagnant to declining DAU growth to growing DAU again is because they refined the core, right?
This is when they went from the reverse chronological timeline to the rank timeline.
And the year after that was a lot of knob turning.
It was like, how do we make these recommendations better?
How do we make our push notifications more relevant?
Now, that is not an inspiring product strategy.
That does not result in the product feeling materially different
or adding new capabilities,
but it did return the company to user growth.
And I think that the fact that it did actually calcified
the organization's sort of reticence to take any risky bets even more.
So it was a very interesting sort of predicament
because when I got a, you know,
got into the role, the goal wasn't to change that progress.
We wanted to continue reaping the benefits of refining the things about the product
that we're working really well.
What we wanted to change was a lack of ambition, the lack of creativity, the lack of customers
feeling that the product had changed at all.
Because you would hear people, I mean, one of the beautiful things about working on Twitter
as a product is that you have literally like customers being injected into your veins.
Every single day, whatever you change about the product or whatever you don't change,
they're telling you what they love and what they hate.
And it is both exhausting and exhilarating.
It is like one of the most ridiculous luxuries of product development is working on a product that that many people use and therefore you get that much feedback around.
And it was a very common thing for us to hear people say, what are you all doing over there?
Like the product hasn't changed in like eight years.
And that was horrible to hear.
That was like, and I felt it too as a critic on the sidelines, as a user who wasn't an employee who eventually became an employee.
like I had the same feedback.
And so that was my,
that was my mission.
I was like,
I'm somehow ridiculously in this fortunate position
that I've been entrusted some responsibility here.
Like I might, you know,
flame out completely,
but hell if I don't try.
And so that was both fun and exhausting,
like I said,
but it was really,
it was as simple as starting with like,
we are voracious users of the product ourselves.
And if we aren't,
by the way,
that's its own problem.
Like, I don't,
I think the,
in order to build, in order to build something wonderful, like, you have to be a customer
or the product.
Sure, I'm sure you can point to businesses and products where that's not the case.
And I'm sure there's a flaw in that philosophy somewhere.
But, like, I've always believed that, you know, one of the best ways to build products is to
be a customer yourself and to find your own pain clients and to, you know, build the product
that you want to use.
And so that's, like, actually not that hard to do.
If you're a user of Twitter and you, like, you know, can think critically.
we was ripe with opportunity.
And so it was actually really fun and amazing to be able to kind of craft a plan
that started to take a swing at some of these things.
And the other thing I'll add to this is that there were so many sacred cows at Twitter
that the sacred cows are like their own roadmap.
It's like a built-in free roadmap of like, all the things that you think we're not
allowed to change.
Let's start there, you know?
Everything from like moving from reverse tron to a ring feet, that was a sacred cow.
text and 140 characters, that's a sacred cow,
not letting anyone control any tweets that they see on the platform.
Like the notion of Lenny owning his reply space was anathema at Twitter.
You know, it's just like if the tweet gets, you know,
if you get an app mention and you don't like it or it's abusive or it's like,
we're not touching that.
We can't annotate tweets with community notes.
All that stuff.
Those are all sacred cows.
And, you know, the process of starting to address those one by
one reveals a lot of the cultural hesitations that exist it.
So, yeah, I'll number for that day, one of the first features,
and this is such a tiny feature that we worked on, you know,
after I, after I started enrol, we're building this feature called hide replies.
Still exists in the product today.
If someone replies to one of your tweets, like in the tweet details area,
like as a reply to one of your conversations,
before you had no ability, the only way you could kind of like address
unwanted content was reporting it. So that was like Twitter acting as policeman and
policewoman, completely unscailable and challenging, especially in the context of like someone
replying to one of your tweets. And so we wanted to add a feature that let you hide a reply to one
of your tweets. And it's not impacting what people say. It's not impacting free speech in the sense
of like, you can still broadcast whatever you want. But if you're going to like come into my reply
space and say some shit that I don't want to see in my feed, like I should be able to hide that.
You know, tweet what you want, but don't app mention.
You can't scream in my face, basically.
And I remember we had a PM on our team who was leading this feature, who, you know, a few weeks into this project mentioned to me that she had had a conversation with someone on the engineering team that told them, don't work on this feature.
This is bad for your career.
This is not going to launch.
And you don't want to work on this.
You don't want to be seen as having worked on this because it was so.
kind of anathema to, we can't let people hide replies to their tweets.
And I just remember hearing that and my blood was boiling.
Like that is like the most, it's such an interesting representation of the culture, like,
not just like hesitation to try new things, which by the way that their product might have
failed and that's fine, but which doesn't mean you shouldn't try.
But like to go so far as to dissuade someone else who was excited about experimenting with
the hypothesis to see if it could help customers on the platform.
and telling them, like, don't work on this is bad for your careers.
Like, as a microcosm for some of the cultural challenge we had around trying big, bold bet,
which, by the way, this wasn't even a big bold bet.
It was like such an innocuous thing to try.
But there was a lot of that.
And it made it very difficult without like some sheer force of will and also like just a lot of,
just a lot of effort.
So there was a lot of that.
Kvon, there's like fractals of stories that I can infinitely follow.
so much interesting stuff here.
One that just stands out as this idea of the sacred cows become like your future roadmap.
It's like flipping it from here's the thing that we're all afraid of.
No, this isn't not what we should be doing.
I think that's really interesting and could be a lesson to people.
The other is just, I love this point you made about like the growth was most accelerant
when you're just focusing on the core.
Like that's what actually like optimize.
Like people bash on optimizing the existing experience and just micro-optimizing and improving
versus trying to take all these big, bold bets.
and new experiments. Obviously, that's also valuable. But I think it's really interesting that that's
what regnetic growth and was responsible for growth for a while. Yeah. And continue to be, by the way,
like one of the lines that we had to maneuver was creating a portfolio of bets where some of them
were not speculative at all. We knew that if we continue to invest in ML and getting better with
recommendations in the main feed and through notifications and, you know, things like improving
the onboarding flow.
Like, it was just, it was rife with opportunity.
You'd have, like, really dumb things happen.
Like, we would learn, there was one, like, just bizarre and incredible meeting we had where
we finally had got more rigorous around instrumenting our onboarding flow.
And we found that, like, in a couple countries, like, we, like, one of the, we had a bug with
our, like, SMS verification flow, where, you know, we wanted to, you know, we wanted to,
verify users who were signing up a phone number.
And our telco integration to send SMS verification cards just wasn't working.
And so like a huge percentage of people signing up in like the UAE and other countries just
like couldn't use Twitter.
And so like, of course, at the scale that we were operating in with hundreds of millions
of users, you need to be able to refine the basic building blocks of the product.
And that's going to lead to reliable growth.
But we wanted to balance that with a portfolio of other bets and product improvements
that would materially add new capabilities.
And that was a balance that I don't think existed.
And by the way, I don't think we nailed it either under my tenure,
but it was the driving force of what I wanted to achieve
was to create a better balance that would result in evolving the product
and introducing new capabilities.
And so that's what we tried to do.
In terms of what actually helped turn things around,
things that I kind of gathered from what you shared so far,
One is just building a little momentum, having some quick wins of new products that people start to get excited about.
So creating more excitement down the, oh, wow, we can actually try new things.
There's also felt like there's like a sense of trust that you built with Jack and execs of just like, okay, we can actually trust this team.
Also, it feels like because growth started up, there's probably a sense of like, okay, we can try some new crazy ideas.
It feels like another part of your strategy was aqua hires and bringing in these like entrepreneurial folks to take the lead on some of these big ideas.
Can you talk about that?
Was that something you actively thought about it?
And was that a big part of the impact there?
Totally.
Yeah.
So I think a couple things.
One, the only thing I'd add to what you said in terms of the ingredients, it was also
just like storytelling and just like repetitive storytelling around like, this is the vision.
These are the best we're making.
And here's why.
And like you can't just tell that story once.
I'm talking internally by it.
There's a whole other component of this, which is like externally, how do you tell, especially
for product like Twitter where, you know, you have it's a consumer.
product that hundreds of millions of people are using. And you have many constituents, you have
users, you have advertisers. And so it was very important for us to tell the story of like,
here's what we're doing and why. Here's why you should believe in us. And by the way,
give us all your constructive criticism too, because like we're listening and we're going to
build that into, you know, so that storytelling was really, really important. And, you know,
there's is like over simple finding the world, but there's two types of internal team members.
There are people who hear that story who have been a part of the organization who's been
slow or maybe they've been outside the company as a user of Twitter and they're like,
I'd never really want to work there because like doesn't seem like a particularly ambitious
product company. And one of two things happens when you hear that story. Either you're inspired
and you're like, yeah, we can finally like take a swing at making this product better. Maybe
I wasn't interested at working this company before, but I mean, this is an iconic product and
to have an opportunity to reshape it. It's really exciting. Or, you know, again, over simplified
world, but there are people who are very pessimistic and maybe aren't excited.
by that vision of like, why, let's just stick to what we know works. You know, we're not going to
take any big swings. That's a waste of time. I think one of the really important things about
driving cultural change at the leadership level is you've got to identify whether someone's
on the wagon or off the wagon and either quickly convincing to get on the wagon or if they're
not on the wagon, like they shouldn't be there. And that's something that we were terrible at.
And we didn't have the, we didn't have the organizational structure to be able to enact that.
The wagon is they're excited and bought into this vision and want this to happen?
Correct.
And contribute towards it.
And off the wagon is like, you're not at the company.
And we didn't have an organizational structure that could allow for that.
Nor frankly, the fortitude.
I include myself in this.
I feel like I've learned a lot about, you know, how to make that determination.
So I think we were terrible at that.
And Elon is like the whatever, like if that's a spectrum, Elon is like the opposite
spectrum of that, like his tolerance for people who are not aligned and his tolerance
for low performers is famously extremely low.
And I think it's, you know, it's, it's one of the things that when I said AB test, it's like very interesting to see the extreme to which he has operated.
And I think like I've learned a ton around like we just, you know, we didn't have the organizational structure and with a fortitude to be swifter.
And that made cultural change way slower.
We still were able to change the culture, not as much as we should have and not as certainly not as quickly as we should have or efficiently as we should have.
Because, by the way, a lot of high performers who are aligned with that desire to change and build, they don't have the, there's not like a equal distribution of patience, right?
If you're extremely talented and you're dealing with like organizational bullshit, you're going to go find someplace else that lets you do your craft and have impact.
So it's very difficult.
But anyway, going to your question, one of the things we found that was a really effective way of accelerating cultural change and also.
also helping drive some of these product initiatives that were particularly speculative was
doing small acquires. And really the benefit of that was, A, you bring in a founder type
who is an entrepreneur, who drives urgency, who has ambition, who's ideally savvy enough to also
work in the context of a large organization, which sometimes is a totally different skill set.
I mean, it is a totally different skill set. And a lot of our most ambitious bets that were
the riskiest and most kind of misaligned with how the product worked or, you know,
it wasn't like easy, there was no easy staff within built on top of.
One of those bets were driven by founders who we basically acquired and said, here,
you know, you're going to run this.
And they believed in it.
They were able to rally a team around them.
And it's all the attributes of a startup, but with the canvas of a product that hundreds
of millions of people use and more resources.
So, you know, spaces, community.
community notes called Birdwatch back then.
These were all projects driven by fleets as well.
These were all projects that were run by small teams led by entrepreneurs who we acquired.
Like Keith Coleman runs community notes slash Birdwatch, you know.
He actually was my predecessor.
We acquired his company so that he could be the head of product.
And then when he moved on from that role, he was extremely passionate about this idea of sort
crowd source moderation and letting people annotate, you know, misleading content on the platform
without Twitter acting as a policeman. And that was a very speculative bet that, by the way,
a lot of people thought, most people thought was a terrible idea. We gave keep a little silo to go build,
you know, build this vision. And then, you know, it was, it was our job to make sure that
bet didn't get suffocated in the context of the big organization that would otherwise
had not had not had patience for it. You know, all of the community effort or the creator efforts
started with superfollows and tipping. All these things were led by Esther Crawford, whose company we
acquired and who had her own couple of viral moments with the Elon acquisition, but she's a
phenomenal leader who, again, is a perfect example of balancing that sort of entrepreneurial
startup muscle with the savanness to be able to get things done at a large organization.
Fleets was run by Mo Aladam, who's an entrepreneur. And,
communities was, you know, it's gone through a few iterations, obviously, and still is in the product,
but John Barnett and a team of people who acquired from Chrome Labs. So I think that that story
of acquiring hungry, ambitious founders and giving them responsibility and latitude is a success
story of Twitter's history. I mean, I'm a beneficiary of such a bet as well, right? Like, my company
Periscope was acquired.
And I was given the responsibility to eventually lead the product team.
So I feel like we ended up realizing both through the company's history and through learning
is that this is actually a very effective way to drive cultural change and to deliver impact
because you need a special type of person to be able to both operate within the existing
structure and change the structure, to know when to use the system and to know when to
fuck the system. And that, I feel like my whole life has benefited from other people taking bets on me
like that to the point that even I was like, really? You sure you want to, you know, and so I think
I've enjoyed trying to pass the buck and do that for other people. And I've never regretted it.
It's always like taking a bet on people and especially throwing them in a deep end, which on paper they
may be unqualified for, I think is like one of the, one of the best ways of driving change.
And by the way, supporting growth.
Like you've learned so much more when you're thrown in the deep end than in other contexts.
And so I think it's a fantastic, it's an expensive strategy if you're going to go buy a bunch
of companies, but it's a great strategy for the situation that we found ourselves in at Twitter.
It feels like every big bet was like one of these companies from the list that you just shared.
And I'm glad you shared it to Periscope.
Obviously, that's a great example too.
I guess maybe just a follow-up question here.
Is there anything you learned about how to do this well?
I know you talked about maybe creating a little silo for the team
because so many companies acquire and acquire and they just go nowhere.
So I guess just like a two-part question, just like,
what are some tips for how to do this well at a company?
And then, too, we were talking offline about this previously,
and I think it's a really interesting point that a lot of companies staff
based on who's available versus who is right for the role.
And let's wait until that person is there for us to bet on this.
You just talk about lessons there.
Yeah, the last one is like a huge pet peeve of mind that I feel like we learned the hard way.
And it's particularly, it's a common pattern, I think, in highly functional organizations
where you have different people making decisions on how to staff projects.
And there's nothing inherently wrong with that.
But I think in the situations we in the situation we found ourselves in where we had this sort
of like cultural evolution that we were going through where,
some people just didn't like agree with the things that we were prioritizing.
They're sort of like begrudgeoning going along with it, but you would end up in a situation
where the combination of that sort of like cultural shift and strategy and the fact that the way
teams were being staffed was not.
There's no ultimately no single decision made other than the CEO.
And like Jack is not going to get in the weeds and debate a staffing decision on the team resulted
in a situation where oftentimes we have projects like the one I mentioned about hiding replies
where there wasn't even agreement on the team
about whether this was a good idea
and whether this is worth trying
or how to do it.
And imagine it's hard enough
to build something from nothing.
It's even harder if the team doesn't believe in it.
Like, this is like to the point of just being toxic.
Like the startup would never succeed
if all the people who are working on that startup aren't,
like to the point of being perhaps irrational,
obsessed with that idea and still willing to see truth.
Like you need to be able to see whether the thing is working
or not. But if you don't believe it in the first place, you know, I'm not betting on that
succeeding. And so this was common. This is, and sometimes not as extreme as the examples I mentioned,
but, you know, I think one of the lessons I learned, and it's not even, it's quite intuitive,
actually, is like, you need to staff projects with a team of people that are well equipped from a
skill set standpoint, but more importantly, have an obsession with the idea of they want to pursue.
It's going to make them work harder.
It's going to make them be more creative.
It's going to make them have the sufficient level of ambition and desire to will this thing into existence.
Because every project, whether big or small, like there is an element of you need to like will this thing into existence because it's hard.
Right.
Like the only way you're going to get through that pain is by having that desire.
And I think a very easy cheat code for an organization to employ is to say, if you're going to work on something, especially if it's speculative or risky,
staff it with a set of people who believe in it and really want to really want to learn whether
this solves a customer problem or not. Because if you don't have that ingredient, it's going to
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This kind of touches on something I wanted to touch on, which is jobs to be done.
This is like one of the most recurring controversies of the podcast is like, is jobs to be
done amazing or is it really bad and not something you should do? We've had many guests share
their opinions. I feel like at Twitter, it like Jobs to Be Done was implemented so strictly that it
burned a lot of people out on. It's like, oh my God, this is not any things anyone should ever do.
I'm curious just your lessons and experience of just with frameworks in general, with Jobs to
be done specifically, maybe even OKRs. I've only seen one interview on your show that covers this.
And it's, you know, Suriram was particularly spicy when he talked about Jobs to Be done, which is
unsurprising because I've done a lot of time talking this room without jobs to be done.
I mean, I guess I'll just start by saying, like, I was not a fan of how we leverage jobs to be done at Twitter.
I thought it was exhausting and not particularly helpful.
And so it's a particularly sort of subject for me because, you know, I was sort of charged with defending it and rolling it out.
It's hard to do that when you don't really believe in something.
But to me, the critique is less about jobs to be done, though there are many critiques of it and more about like every framework.
at its limit, it's followed to such a religious extent is just unhelpful. You need to have nuance
in how you leverage these frameworks. Otherwise, people, you lose the force through the trees and you
end up following a process for the sake of following a process. And that's what happened with jobs
to be done. So I think that's my real critique of it. It's not the, I mean, listen, the premise of jobs
to be done. And my most charitable take on jobs to be done, which is actually useful, is that it forces
you to look at things through the lens of customers and understanding what their needs are and
understanding what their true alternatives are outside of the narrow lens of your product.
And I think that's just like healthy product thinking, right?
Like you don't need a framework called jobs to be done or you're going to think about milkshakes
in order to be able to do that.
It's like you could employ common sense or you could leverage something like jobs to be done
to be able to like force your mind to think of things through that lens.
So that's like my charitable view on what jobs to be done can help you do.
but as a framework into and of itself as a sole governing principle of what to build,
it's just not useful.
By the way, in the same way as, and I think Twitter had this problem as well prior to our
detour around jobs to be done, if you are, if the only way the organization is trained to
think about what to build and what not to build is OKRs, it's equally unhelpful at the limit.
Because, you know, sure, you can have a good sense of like what you should build to drive
metrics, but by the way, you might be focusing on the right, wrong metrics, or that might not
help you have the right balance of things to build. That might not help you see when the things
that you're building are actually hostile to customers. So, you know, it just says an interesting
example, the thing that I remember about your interview with Sriram, if I'm not mistaken,
he, I think he mentioned, and I love Sriram, I'd be happy to debate him about this on his
podcast. But he mentioned one of the examples, I think, was the Amazon,
Amazon doesn't send you, when you get order confirmation from Amazon, they intentionally bury
the order details.
You click the link and authenticate to go see what you ordered.
I don't give two shits what metrics that drive for Amazon.
That is one of the most customer hostile things I experience in my daily life.
I order a lot of things from Amazon.
I hate the fact that I can't search my email to see what I ordered.
And so I think the problem with these frameworks is that you lose nuance.
And ultimately, and this is where I agree with Drewam,
he actually mentioned this on your podcast as well.
You need to be able to make trade-off decisions
that balance what's right for the organization
and what's right for the customer.
And sometimes, based on how you devise your frameworks,
your metrics aren't actually aligned with the customer's benefit,
like the Amazon example.
And we had many famous examples in Twitter's history,
which were the same.
Like, you know, one of our key metrics
that we always optimized right and growing with DAU.
And we had a, you know, obviously the rank timeline
did wonders for growing DAU.
and it was a great experience for many customers,
but we often had features that would not lead to a good customer experience.
And the team would just be blind towards leaving sort of like hostile customer experiences in place
because it was good for metrics and aggregate.
And the famous example of this is we had this toggle, which we called swish very affectionately,
but it was like a sparkle icon.
Before you could switch between the rank timeline and the following,
that reverse chronological timeline, which is still in the product right now,
it was just a toggle, right?
You would press a button and it would turn your feed reverse cron,
which very few people use as a percentage of our users,
but you had power users who really cared about having a reverse chronological timeline.
And we had the, you know, we took so many baby steps on the evolution of this product.
But the very first baby step was you press the toggle,
it turns you to reverse cron,
and then we would pull the rug out from underneath you
and make the experience go back to the ring timeline after like, I don't know,
24 hours or something like that. Oh, wow. And the reason that the team felt strongly about keeping it
this way is because it was better for metrics. Why? Like, even if Lenny wants a reverse
cron feed, we knew that he would spend more time in the app if we put him in the rank timeline.
And this was like, you know, the number of debates that we had about this because, you know,
the team, understandably, was like, this is good for metrics. But at the same time, you'd have
customers being like, I fucking hate this experience. I'm telling you, I want reverse cron.
randomly changing it for me.
Instagram has, I think, gone through their own struggles with this as well.
They sort of tiptoe their way towards ultimately getting people control.
And like the difficulty in making product decisions comes down ultimately to making
these tradeoff decisions.
And you have to look at things through the lens of the customer.
You have to balance that with, you know, what's driving the right business outcomes.
And sometimes those things are aligned and sometimes they're not.
And the answer isn't any one framework.
Sometimes it's just good old-fashioned judgment and product taste.
And so that's where like my take is different.
I don't think the issue is jobs to be done,
although I'm not the biggest fan of jobs to be done.
The issue is just having the right nuance
and ultimately the right leadership to be able to weigh these things
and see when your frameworks are not actually helping you make the right decisions.
I think that's really important advice.
And I love hearing the details if I actually think about this stuff.
Actually finding these balance is very hard in practice.
I'm curious if there's something you could recommend or have learned about how to know when you've gone too far with the framework.
Like signs like you have implemented this too religiously and maybe you should be thinking a little more broadly.
There's two, I think, simple and obvious ones.
One is if the result of your framework is that subjectively bad decisions are being made, then something's got to change, right?
Like assuming you have the person who's making this assessment has good product taste, which is in of itself subjective, obviously.
but my personal view on this would be like in the role that I had,
if I saw that our organization was being incentivized to make decisions that to some non-trivial
degree of the time were just bad decisions that I don't like as a user,
I can't stand by as a user or builder, then something's got to change.
Either bad judgment was made in following the process or the process was wrong.
Or if that framework did not, it didn't even lead to the right debates.
then that's how you know, like either you have an incentive problem.
And like the team did what they were incentivized to do or, you know, that there is bad judgment.
And that's a different problem, obviously.
But I think, you know, in the situation we found ourselves in where the team was, again,
understandably hyper-focused on driving DAU because that was the strategy for so long,
left so little room for even, you know, taking ambitious bets that in the short term wouldn't drive DAU.
Like, some of our bets that I still to this day believe in hurt DAU in the short term,
but you know, you had to squint and believe over time would improve some metric DAU or otherwise, right?
Like a product like spaces, in order for spaces to be actually used, you needed to make sure that when Lenny starts a space, that people would join, right?
And how do you get people to join Lenny's space when they're used to having an asynchronous, you know, feed of tweets?
Well, you can send push notifications.
you can occupy really prime real estate at the top of the app that lets people know,
hey, Lenny's live right now.
He's in his face.
There's people here come join.
Guess what happens when you put a bar at the top of the app that tells people when they're
live?
You move tweets down.
You move ads down.
DAU goes down.
Revenue goes down.
And so if you have an organization that's like just hyper-focused on like the thing
that matters is driving DAU quarter over quarter, then that doesn't leave enough
room for nuance to accommodate new speculative bets that might.
might hurt one metric, but over time have other consequences that are positive and beneficial,
like enabling an entire new vector of content creation and conversation on the platform.
I guess the other answer to your question in terms of like, how do you know when the
framework is not serving you right? When you start imagining and planning for a bunch of bets
that the organization then sees is like disincentivized to make successful, then something's got
to change. Either your strategy is just not the right strategy because it doesn't abide by the
frameworks or the framework needs to accommodate the fact that actually we're going to try some
things that in the short term either might not show up as blips on our DAU radar or are going
to help some other metric that's important. And so that took us some time to get. And we tried a
variety of schemes to make that work, right? Like community notes, like the project that I was mentioning
Keith, you know, started. We intentionally structured that like a startup. Like it was literally like
we made a seat bet on Keith and his team, and we were like, you don't, like, don't worry about the
OKRs. We're not going to judge you on the basis of your OKRs. And there's some pros and cons to that.
Like a lot of our projects worked that way. Fleets started that way. Community notes started
that way. And some other projects started more kind of like part of the core organization
because they were so intertwined with how we were like the nature of the product that it just
made sense to separating it was going to be, it was going to do more harm than good.
So you just have to figure out based on what, like, based on how execution is going,
whether you've got the right framework and you've got to be willing to make adjustments
when it's not working.
That's actually really helpful.
Kind of the two that I'm taking away here is how often are you feeling bad about the features
you're shipping?
Like they're bad for users and you think they're bad for you as a user potentially.
And the other is it keeping you from taking big bold bets that don't necessarily drive
the metrics you're focusing on.
Okay.
So before I'll let you go, I want to spend some time on Periscope.
I don't know if everybody knows the history and story of Periscope.
Basically, it was the biggest live video streaming platform in the world.
And I imagine inspired basically every other social network to build a live streaming platform, Instagram,
live Facebook, TikTok, obviously Twitter.
So I want to spend a little time here and see what you learned and also just broadly consumer products.
But first of all, I hear there's like a story with Kobe Bryant and Periscope about him using it in some form.
Can you share that story?
Before a Periscope launched publicly, which was in March of 2015, I want to say.
We had a small beta that grew to maybe 500 people in total before we actually released the app publicly.
And in that time, while we were still in beta, I was personally onboarding.
I was trying to personally onboard every single user.
And I had sort of like a schick that I did, which was we'd get them in the app and I would start a broadcast.
We had a feature called private broadcasting that we basically built for this use case,
which is someone joins, I'm going to go live,
and they're going to join them,
and I'm going to show them how the app works.
And we were studying a lot of time in our office.
So, you know, Kobe, you know, one of, Chris Saka actually invited Kobe to the beta.
And so, you know, Chris connected us.
And I did a private broadcast and Kobe joins.
And I was like, it was like 10 p.m. in the office.
And my routine was like, let me just walk around the office,
kind of like talking through the mechanics of Periscope,
through the lens of this demo of like, hey, let me show you around the office.
and like, here's how the chat works,
and you can tap the screen to send hearts.
And if you want me to do something,
like go to the room over there.
Just type it in the chat and they'll come up.
And it sort of showed the,
one of the things that was unique about Periscope was,
you know,
it was a multi,
it was a one to many broadcasts,
but still low latency enough that it felt like in FaceTime.
So you could have the bidirectional communication
between multiple viewers and a broadcaster.
And so I was teaching him how to use the chat
and showing him the office
and he was playing with it.
At one point through the end of the demo, he posted a comment that was like, why the fuck would
anyone want to watch someone else stream live?
And I remember like my heart sank and I sort of like fumbling through like, well, we think it's,
you know, cool.
And like before I could even get the words out, he posted like, I'm just fucking with you, bro.
This is incredible.
And I just remember it was just such a surreal moment that has, I'll never forget.
I mean, Kobe's a legend, obviously.
But like to have that, to have him essentially troll me,
while also like putting a point on like what was cool about the experience
and that it was like bidirectional and like something he commented on
could cause the broadcaster to kind of like change their behavior or change their,
change the experience.
It was like a really ironic full circle of showing off how the product works.
But yeah, it's one of my favorite early Periscope stories.
Oh, man.
If I kept doing that on.
manual onboarding and be like, who's coming?
You just always worried that someone else fancy is going to join.
You never know what Chris Saka is getting who he's talking to.
That's amazing.
Okay, so it's been about 10 years, I believe, since you sold Periscope.
And about six years-ish, since you stopped running at a CEO, something like that.
Now, as I shared, every single platform basically is doing this.
They added live video streaming.
I'm curious if there's anything you learn about just competing with these major platforms.
Well, there's a few reasons why Periscope failed ultimately and why we shut down the app.
Obviously, Periscope, the technology, and the mechanics still lives on because you can go live
on Twitter.
You can watch live broadcasts on Twitter.
You can do audio conversations in Twitter.
And all of that is the Periscope stack still there, which is awesome that the legacy lives
on in a different form factor.
The reason that the Periscope app failed, it really comes down to a few things.
One, we did not address the core problem that retention was.
could. Our poor retention was
mapped by just an incredible surge in
top line user growth.
And for Twitter was very
for Periscope, it was interesting
because like every month or two
we would kind of blow up in a new market
that would just bring along an incredible
surge of usage.
You know, we blew up in the U.S.
We then blew up in France. We then
blew up in Turkey. We then blew up in the Middle East.
You had these like incredible surges.
But underneath that surge, like the
core product have retention issues.
And it was, we ultimately just did not, we didn't spend enough time prioritizing, addressing those.
And in fact, we shipped product changes that made those retention issues worse.
Compounding that was the fact that one of the feces behind our acquisition, the Twitter acquisition,
was that we would leverage the scale in the community and the product mechanics of Twitter
to make the product grow faster and also become more durable.
And I think that sort of connects to one of the reasons why I feel like one of the, one of my
learnings and one of the things that we knew but just failed to execute on was that I still
am very skeptical that there can be a consumer product that is just focused on live video,
like a generalized synchronous live video application for short form video, I don't think can
be durable on its own. I think you have to surround that product with enough features and
capabilities to allow a community and an ecosystem of users to be able to stay in touch with
one another asynchronously and synchronously. This is why
a lot of the other products that you mentioned that incorporate live capabilities and were shameless
about copying, you know, or what was working about Periscope, they're surrounded by a scaffolding
that lets people also stay in touch with each other asynchronously, like Instagram. It's an asynchronous
product that has synchronous features like Live. Same with TikTok, obviously. And I think we were in
this position where it was a live-only product, right? Like, you know, you're connecting
with your audience and having a great time when you're broadcasting live, but you're not
using the product to keep in touch with that community when you're not broadcasting.
How often throughout the day would you broadcast live from your phone?
And my jude, this is different for products that are live, like, there are live consumer
products that focus on a specific vertical like whatnot for selling or Twitch for gaming that
have very different properties that make it more durable as a standalone live product.
But Periscope was really in this sort of consumer generalized live streaming from a
own land, and I think it was just not durable to have the product be live only. And the time it took
us to integrate with Twitter was way too long. And there was reasons for that that, you know,
come down to just how distracted Twitter was with its own roadmap and refining the core. They just
had other fish to fry, basically. And that, all of that leads us to competition, because at some
point, Facebook woke up and decided this is cool and we need to go build this. And, you know,
obviously wasn't, wasn't there on the inside, but like legend has it. Mark says, hey, like,
you 300 people stop what you're doing, go, go basically, you know, make live exist in our product
as a first. Oh, wow. I don't know that. And, you know, if you have that level of organizational
effort put on building something that, by the way, isn't even, like, there's no, you don't
to spend any time wondering what the product it looks like. Just go like copied these features basically
and make them make them work. And they did a lot of other savvy things too from a partnership
standpoint. Like we know, we have a lot of prominent streamers that ranged from kind of like
influencer or just creative people that became known on Periscopes all the way up to celebrities like
Kevin Hard and others who were like ProLotech Periscopers that Facebook just went and bought out.
They were just like, cool, we're going to pay you like a bunch of money to stream exclusively with us.
So they kind of hit us from all sides.
They had the entire company put their effort towards building live in a way that was cohesive in the core product,
first with Facebook and then and then Instagram, and then also attacked it from the creator side as well.
And we were too slow.
And it was, you know, very painful to think about because it was, you know, like many other insights that Twitter had early,
Twitter has the right insight, but botched the follow through.
I'm not pointing fingers.
I blame myself for that just as much.
But there's a pattern where Twitter is really great at spotting
meaningful consumer behavior changes, right?
Like they spotted Vine and acquired Vine.
Batched it.
Spotted Periscope, botched it.
Spotted Instagram, by the way, before Facebook tried to buy Instagram.
Twitter was trying to buy Instagram.
And there are other reasons why that didn't fall through.
But it's interesting to me.
It's one of the interesting aspects of Twitter's history.
They were phenomenal at spotting meaningful changes in consumer behavior,
consumer social behavior,
and actually putting their money where their mouth is in terms of trying to follow through
on bringing those bets in-house, but then bouching the execution.
And so that was one of the things that was really motivating for me
when I was in my role leading product of Twitter was like,
I didn't want to make that mistake.
and, you know, we didn't end up buying anything as, we didn't end up buying anything like Vine or Periscope and keeping the product in house.
We obviously bought lots of small aqua hires, but, you know, we did, we did obviously have a bit of a story with Clubhouse that ended up with us building, you know, building spaces and competing with that.
But anyway, that was a long, rambly story.
Hopefully that answered your question.
Yeah, there's so many, again, it's all these fractals of threads I want to follow and ask about.
Real quick on the Vine and Periscope point, I was going to ask this.
Twitter, as you said, had the opportunity to win in video in so many ways.
Vine was amazing killing.
Everyone loved it.
And then it's like, yeah, then it fades away.
I guess you already shared a lot of challenges Twitter had with executing shipping,
sacred cows, things like that.
Is there anything specific with video?
Was it just like, oh, this is not actually a huge priority.
And we're just going to kind of ride it for now.
And that's why it didn't work out.
Is there anything more of it?
No, it's even more, like, pathetic than that.
because I think Twitter did believe in video, but it made this classical mistake that we also
unfortunately recreated with Periscope, which was they had the insight around short-front
video that bought Vine.
They then competed with Vine internally.
So Vine was a separate organization within Twitter, separate office, obviously, in New York.
And then Twitter, rather than integrated holistically into the product and sort of pour gasoline
on it, they built a native Twitter video feature that was like a different stack, different team.
It became what you think of as Twitter video now.
It's like, you know, simple active uploading video and all the professional video tools
called Media Studio that let publishers like ESPN put content.
Like all of that was basically built as a separate team, separate organization,
separate product that was fundamentally competing with mine.
You had like two visions for short form video that were manifesting.
And that's like that's like the quickest way for.
for like for things to get messy and for of course like the the separate startup team is going to get um you're not going to be able to make good on the vision of buying the company and integrating it in all the right ways if you compete with it internally um and we had a similar thing happened with with periscope um you know we were very focused on on periscope with you know separate organizations separate structure separate app periscope at the time primarily was focused on uGC live
video. So user-generated content being streamed from the phone. Twitter then, you know, decided to get in the
premium live video business, very famously with, you know, acquiring rights to Thursday night football,
the NFL. Guess what happened? We competed internally. Rather than have a cohesive technical and product
vision for how to embrace live video across the spectrum of UGC and premium live video, Twitter, you know,
put a separate team in charge of premium with a separate product separate technology stack.
And so you had like two ways to manifest live video on the product.
It was like you just see live video, which was kind of like awkwardly not even really
implemented well with Twitter at the time.
And then premium live video, which had totally different UX, total different team,
totally different architecture.
And by the way, like the company put a tremendous amount of energy and investment in
talking about Twitter being a place to watch the NFL.
And meanwhile, you had this burgeoning UGC ecosystem.
So this was like, we're making the same mistake all over again.
Now, luckily, in the Periscope case, with a lot of persistence and impatience and table pounding,
we eventually fixed that mistake.
But we wasted a tremendous amount of time, right?
It was just a lot of headbutting in politics.
And eventually it took us a lot of time to technically reintegrate things together.
And now it's clean and awesome, right?
like ESVN can go live with behind the scenes content at Wimbledon
and it's like the same technology stack and the same user experience
the powers Lenny going live from his from his iPhone but I think that was like one of
the reasons why it was an example of failed execution that ended up wasting time
resources and just leading to a subpar product experience that other companies I think
have avoided making such mistakes Facebook being a prime example as as frustrated I
am with them as a competitor for having
having, you know, really taken over the use case for live video, got to hand it to them.
Brilliant execution.
Have a lot of respect for them.
So we made sure to not make that mistake moving forward.
I imagine there was reason for that partly.
I imagine this calcification of just like, we can't get you done.
We just need to start a new team and do this thing.
Like I imagine it always comes from like, oh, this makes sense.
And then you realize, okay, this was a terrible idea down the road.
Yeah.
and also leadership.
When you don't have unified leadership around these things,
you end up making decisions that are in conflict with one another.
They're just a highly opinionated person at the top,
but avoids that kind of messiness from a product and engineering standpoint.
You mentioned Clubhouse.
So I think what's interesting is, one, many people copied Periscope as a product.
I don't know if you'll describe it as copying,
but it feels like spaces very inspired by Clubhouse.
Do you have just a current philosophy on when it makes sense to be super inspired by another product
and build it into your existing product versus like, no, you should not do this?
I think it's always about doing the right thing for the customer.
Everyone has always been shamelessly inspired by other people's ideas.
I don't think there's anything wrong with that.
I think copying ideas can be done in poor taste and can be done with taste.
I think some of the people who copied Periscope did so in poor taste.
Can't blame them.
I just, you know, I wouldn't have done it the same way, but, you know, it worked.
So you can't say it's the wrong thing.
I just, I think that it's possible to take ideas in good taste and take ideas in poor taste.
And I think, you know, with Clubhouse, we actually had been working on audio.
Audio was one of those bets I mentioned that we structured very separately.
with a team of people, many of which were the former Periscope team, that when we wound down Periscope,
I felt very strongly that there is still something to the idea of synchronous conversations.
Because one of the famous things that I think we botched with Periscope is that we always,
our dream and our vision for Periscope and how we talked about it was it was a mechanism for
teleportation. You could see through someone else's eyes and be teleported somewhere else.
It was like, that was the story we told ourselves. That was the thing that inspire Periscope.
And to a certain extent, a lot of people did use the product for that way.
You could go see what it was like someplace in the world where there was something amazing
happening or civil unrest happening or some important moment happening with breaking news or otherwise.
But it turns out the vast majority of our users were not using Periscope that way.
It wasn't a rear-facing camera experience where you were showing someone in the world.
The vast majority of people were using it to just talk to other people.
They were bored or they were lonely and they wanted to just have a conversation
with other people. And it turns out video and audio is a very interesting way of doing that that allows
for more nuance, more long-form conversation, more in-depth conversation, especially in-depth
to Twitter, which has mechanics that really incentivize, you know, quick, snappy sort of
broadcasts that don't sort of lead to much depth. And so when we shut down Periscope,
we were like, man, we really need to enable a new form of conversation on Twitter that has some of those
properties. And so we had a team that was working on a project that we sort of
code named Hydra. Hydra because, you know, there were multiple heads on this monster,
and those heads are participants in a conversation. And so well before Clubhouse was on the map,
we had many different iterations of both video and audio-only experiences that just didn't feel right.
We weren't working right, but we kind of felt like we were on to something.
And when Clubhouse kind of came on the map, it really recentered, it put into focus a user experience
that felt a lot more right.
And I'll give them complete credit for that.
Paul and Rohan and that team did an exceptional job crafting an experience
that really enabled that mechanic and that premise of enabling these longer form conversations to shine.
And so we did shamelessly seek inspiration from what they had done and what had worked.
And we put our own spin on it, right?
Like the execution of spaces within Twitter, you know, I think has some similarities,
but also really took advantage of the mechanics that you had available to you in Twitter.
It's a different product.
And so we took the ideas that we felt were shortcuts to making the experience work,
and then we put our own spin on it.
And so I have no problems with what we did there.
And having had experienced the pain of not moving quickly enough with Vine from the outside
and Periscope, having lived that experience, you know, we were not willing to not be
the winner in this
with this use case
and so we put
like it was one of the projects I'm most proud of
that we worked on at Twitter because we were very radical
in our execution.
Hydro went from this like tiny
project that like six people were working on
that no one knew or care about to
we made space as the number one priority of the company
literally like above any other project period
and we put a bunch of people
on accelerating that product and making it, you know, making it come to life within
Twitter.
And a lot of that was having felt the pain and burn of fucking this up with Vine and Periscope.
And so I'm really proud of our execution.
And it was also really energizing, I hope, for the company to see.
Wow, we pulled that off.
So, yeah, it was good.
It was nice to have that full circle experience.
And also nice that, you know, personally, like I love.
that aspects of Periscope continue living on within Twitter.
I did not know that. That is extremely interesting.
And speaking of Full Circle, when I joined Clubhouse the first time Paul was there introducing me
to Clubhouse in exactly the way you described Periscope.
So I feel like he drew some inspiration from you one step back.
Paul's amazing. I feel like we're kindred spirits.
And I could see the, it was one of the things I love about that team is just you could just feel
how palpable their excitement was and their passion was for what they were building.
You know, another universe, we could have worked together more closely.
But I think what they built was incredible and we took inspiration from it for sure.
And yeah.
So you've built some of the most successful, most beloved, most used consumer products.
You continue to help other founders with their product.
I'm curious just if you have any advice for how to get better.
at building consumer products in terms of maybe craft a product, product sense.
What have you learned about what it takes to build a successful consumer product?
The best cheat codes for getting better at building products is just being a voracious
user of products.
And just trying new things, feeling out what works well, what doesn't, what you like, what
you don't like.
There's just no replacement for that.
It's such an effective way of honing your own taste and seeing like what's superficial but not useful, what's ugly but useful, what's beautiful and useful.
And you just, you hone that by having practice and building muscle memory.
And so I think, you know, that's, there's not a lot of science to it, I think.
I mean, obviously, science can help you become more affected at lots of things.
but like I feel like I've just always been very curious about trying new things.
And I'm a very hungry consumer of new things that people are building.
And I'm not quick to judge, you know, like I'll try it even if it seems dumb because
sometimes things that seem dumb at the beginning become very meaningful.
And so it's always been a very helpful cheat code for me.
And it's also just personally interesting.
I'm always like every tool, even the silly ones, like people put their heart and soul into it.
And it's like an expression of themselves.
And it's always interesting to see that, to see people's creations and to learn from them and see what you like, what you don't like and how you might create something of your own that borrows from that.
So if I could give people any advice through the lens of like what's worked for me, it's that.
Speaking of trying new things, what are you up to these days?
and building something in the consumer space.
I started the company with a couple co-founders late last year.
We're not quite ready to talk about it yet,
but hopefully you'll be hearing from us pretty soon.
But it's really nice to be back building something again,
particularly like building something with a small team again
after kind of seeing the opposite extreme with a really large company.
We've just talked about lots of large company things.
but yeah hopefully you'll be hearing about it soon.
Oh man, I think this is breaking news.
So mysterious and exciting.
Kavon, is there anything else you wanted to share or leave listeners with
before we get to our very exciting lightning round?
No, no, I think we've covered quite a bit.
We have, we have indeed.
With that, we've reached our very exciting lightning round.
Are you ready?
We're going to take a sip of water and then I'll be ready.
Okay, here we go.
First question, what are two or three books that you've recommended most other?
people. I love reading sci-fi. I just feel like sci-fi and mystery books are so healthy for jogging
the imagination. And so some of my favorite books are by Neil Stevenson. I love Cryptonomicon.
I love Riemd. I love a book called Name of the Wind by Patrick Rothkis, which is more like a fantasy
fantasy book, but I just love kind of escaping, escaping reality and thinking about sci-fi,
thinking about fantasy is just, it's helpful for the soul and helpful for the imagination.
So those are some of my favorite reads because it helps me.
I feel like in some weird circular or wandering way, it helps me be more creative and imaginative.
And by the way, that's true outside of reading as well, like some of the content that has
shaped me, I feel like, and help motivate my curiosity and a lot of things I've built is
sci-fi TV, right? Like, Star Trek is incredible. Like, we used to use as a metaphor for what
Periscope was, we would think about, we would think about Star Trek. Like, it'd be really cool to be
able to teleport or, you know, get beam somewhere else in the world. And like, we're not smart enough
to go build that device, but what's the closest approximation to that that we can realize through
software, live streaming. So I think like that kind of literature or or content has always
been inspirational for me. And I think getting that through books is really healthy.
On that note, is there a favorite recent movie or TV show that's inspired you in addition
to Star Trek back in the day? I mean, most recent movie I saw in theaters was Dune too. And it was
incredible. I just saw that. It's insane. I also thought Oppenheimer was, I'm a huge Nolan fan.
Oppenheimer was like was captivating.
To have that level of like high octane in a biopic consistently for like two and
half hours is like so hard to pull off.
And I thought it was exceptional.
TV shows, we're watching Tokyo Vice right now, which I really like.
I think one of the best TV shows I've watched recently, I mean, Succession was amazing,
but maybe I'll pull a less popular one, which is devs also in the, essentially,
sci-fi realm. I think it was a Hulu show. But if you're interested in tech,
an AI, anyone great acting in Nick Offerman,
does this is a pretty amazing show. I haven't heard of that. Have you seen three body
problem yet, by the way? It feels like it's squarely in your real house. I haven't seen it yet.
And it's funny. Like some content, people are talking about it so much that I'm like
kind of, I kind of want to not watch it now because I feel like it's really hard for shows to
live up to the hype when you're mid hype cycle. So I haven't gone around to it yet,
but it's definitely on my own list. I know it's the type of show that I would love, but I just
haven't gone on. Okay. Do you have a favorite? Any of question that you like to ask candidates
you're hiring? The thing that I find is both very illustrative and helpful is just asking people
like to talk about something they worked on that failed and, you know, talk about something
they built that succeeded as well.
But I think you just learn a lot about someone's self-reflection and their passions.
But in particular, their self-reflection, if they talk through something that they really
cared deeply about that didn't work.
And why didn't it work?
What were the takeaways?
What did you learn from it?
I think it teaches you about how willing people are to take risks.
It tells you, like, have they experienced failure, what they learn from failure.
So I think it's always, you just get to know someone.
really well. It ends up in a well-rounded understanding of a person if you can dig into that.
Is there a favorite product you recently discovered that you really like? I love perplexity.
It's really interesting to me how perplexity is a product that fits in your life and replaces
a product that is so ingrained in people's behavior, which is using Google search for some
set of use cases. And it's just really incredible to me how quickly perplexity took that over.
It's very hard actually to rewire your muscle memory if you're like used to using Google
for something for, you know, for searching for 15, 20 years or whatever. It was just amazing to me
how quickly my go-to became perplexity. And frankly, it's like one of the only non-development
tool AI products that actually has retained. A lot of people trying to consumer AI products
that just aren't really, haven't retained,
but perplexity is one that it's a daily driver for me.
It's on my home screen, and I love it.
I'm very impressed by it.
Also a huge fan.
Yeah.
Here's a biased one.
My wife is actually working on a startup called Particle,
and they're reimagining the news experience with AI.
And what I love about what they're doing is that for the first time,
they're sort of like, they've rethought what the form factor,
unit of content for news stories should be.
You know, like articles are a failed format is my belief and certainly their belief.
And so they've really come up with an elegant and an engaging experience for understanding
what's happening in the world in a way that's like purely powered by AI.
And it's awesome.
Again, hashtag biased husband, but it's amazing.
It's in beta right now.
You can sign up on the wait list.
The URL is particle news.ai.
they're letting people in on beta if you sign up.
Use coupon code.
Hashtag Kvon Lenny.
That's not a real code.
But yeah, so that's amazing.
So that'll be my second pick.
I'll give you a non-software one,
which is actually a board game that I ran into.
I was gifted actually for my birthday.
And it's called Krocronol.
Have you heard of this game called Krokenol?
I have not.
So Krokenol is like a Canadian.
I think it's a Canadian board game.
And it's amazing to me because I've never seen a game be captivating to all age ranges.
Like, I love it.
I play with my friends.
My parents over Christmas were like obsessed with this game.
My daughter loves, it's like a physical game.
You kind of like flick a puck, kind of like shuffleboard style, but like miniaturized with a totally different set of mechanics.
And it was just like seeing this game captivate people of all.
age ranges was mind-blowing to me. And it's just, and it's really fun. So maybe a curveball
answer for you there. But I think those are some of the products that I've been really enjoying
and appreciating lately. These are all, these are all some answers. What's the name of that game again?
Procanol. Proconol. Okay. I don't know how to spell up, but I'm sure Google will help me figure
out. We'll link to it in the show notes. C-R-O-K-I-N-O-L-E. Great. I'll put the K in there. That makes it
really fun. And by the way, I think it's also
particle.com. News. I'm looking at it. It's so
cool. It's basically bullet points of
news items and then the links to all the articles
that have written about it. So it kind of just
summarizes here's the things you need to know. And it's beautiful.
Basically, they consume and
aggregate everything that's happening in the world
by, among other things,
ingesting articles and then
crafting these story modules
through them that are summarized
by AI. And then they let you actually
interrogate the news and ask questions.
So leveraging, you know,
LOMs and tool calls, it's able to actually help you understand what's happening in the world.
And they also are building a social layer as well. So it's very cool. I'll definitely get you in the
beta. This is actually amazing timing because I was a huge fan of artifact in the news app and they're
going away. So this is the next news app. So thanks for sharing that. Okay, two more questions.
Do you have a favorite life motto that you often come back to or share with people that you find
useful in work or in life? Something that definitely shaped my work.
ethic and like how I work that came from my first boss, actually.
When I was like 14, I had a summer job basically replacing and doing maintenance on fire extinguishers.
So I would drive in San Francisco.
My boss would pick me up in his truck.
We'd go to like big commercial buildings, hospitals, high rises, and we would take all the
fire extinguishers in the building, hundreds of them to the garage, empty them, fill them,
fill them, tag them, inspect them.
And, you know, that was my first job.
And I don't even remember if I was getting paid.
I was probably getting paid a very small amount.
But it was just like first work experience.
And I remember there was this moment that I had finished like, you know,
dealing with my extinguishers.
And I was just kind of like sitting in his truck, kind of like twiddling my thumbs,
doing nothing.
And he, my boss, you know, came up to me and was like, when you've got nothing to do,
sweep, like never sit around.
And that, it was just, it was so funny because it was just like,
very, you know, tiny moments, but I've never, ever forgotten that. Like, when you got nothing
to do, sweep, and it had such a profound impact on my work ethic of, like, there's always something
you can be doing to move the ball forward and being productive and being impactful. And, you know,
I'm so grateful that Fred, my boss, you know, had that moment with me because it was like, I don't
even think he understands how impactful that was. But it's, it's also much.
a life motto, but it's, it definitely stuck with me and shaped it how I work.
I love that you shared that story. I was going to, I found that quote and story in GQ
magazine, turns out is where you were talking about this. And I was going to ask about it.
And I didn't. And I'm glad you shared it because I love it. Final question. We're going to go
full circle, Scott Belski, your friends with him. What's something people would be surprised about
or don't know about Scott. That might be interesting. Well, I'll tell you one funny story.
I'll first tell you something I love about Scott.
Scott is a great example of someone who I think has driven immense cultural change
at a massive legendary company in Adobe, obviously,
but the number of transformations that Scott oversaw and led and contributed to at Adobe are incredible.
And I'm sure having a fraction of this experience at Twitter,
I can appreciate how difficult and challenging and rewarding that was, right?
Going from, you know, packaged software to cloud, going from non-AI to AI, going from kind of like discrete tools to an integrated suite that worked really elegantly together.
I think, you know, Scott oversaw a lot of this stuff.
And it's pretty incredible to see that transformation have been so successful at Adobe.
So I love that.
The thing, I guess, like a funny story about Scott that people might not know.
I consider him to have been the first periscoper.
So, you know, Scott, Scott believed in Periscope before it was Periscope.
You know, like before we had turned it into live video, we had like a previous version of our
beta that was static photo sharing.
Same vision, same concept, but the product was called Bounty.
And it was like you put a pin somewhere in the world, like the Tokyo Fish Market and
someone would respond with a photo of like what, you know, what it looked like there.
Our vision was still to help you see through someone else's eyes,
but the first manifestation was really static
and had this marketplace dynamic.
And it took us a while to get to the point where we were like,
press a button, go live and have a be live video.
Because by definition, it's like real time rather than static.
Anyway, before we built any of that,
when we were kind of like playing with the idea and Scott was really encouraging us
to go in this direction, I remember probably the second time I ever met Scott.
We did at FaceTime.
And he was at the TED conference.
I want to say it was in Vancouver.
And just to illustrate how cool it would be when he accepted the FaceTime, he's like, cool,
and I'm going to take you on a periscope.
And he, like, flipped this camera and sort of walking around the TED conference.
And basically pretending like he was like prototyping the product but using FaceTime.
And it was such an amazing, it was such an amazing experience because, you know, having an investor
essentially, like, encourage you down a product direction by showing rather than telling.
It was such a great encapsulation of how supportive Scott was and inspiring Scott was as one of our cheerleaders.
And I respect him so much for everything he did to help Periscope made happen.
And also for betting on us because he was one of the first people who said yes to investing.
He didn't know us.
He just believed in us.
And that helped everything else come together.
And yeah, he's amazing.
What a man.
We've got to get him back on the podcast.
the story reminds me of your Elon's story where he facetamed you.
And it also makes me think about your lesson of building consumer products,
just using it, being obsessed with it.
Scott just like hears what it could look like and actually using the product,
not just talking about.
Yeah, he's a great example of that as well.
He's definitely a voracious user of all tools and products.
And that's why he is really great, really great product sense.
Kayvon, you're amazing.
This was so freaking fascinating.
There's so many nuggets here.
Can't wait for folks to hear this.
Two final questions.
Where can folks find you if they want to reach out and learn more and maybe follow up on anything?
If there's things you want to follow up on potentially.
And then how can listeners be useful to you?
People can find me on Twitter slash X slash whatever we're calling it these days.
My handle is Caves, K-A-Y-V-Z.
And yeah, if you're a viewer of this podcast and you're working on something cool and you need some help or advice
or you're looking for an angel investor, don't hesitate to reach out.
and we'd love to try what you're building.
Amazing.
And also check out Particle.
That news.
There you go.
Support the wife.
Exactly.
Amazing.
All right, Kavon.
Thank you so much for being here.
Thanks, Lenny.
Great to meet you.
Hi, everyone.
Thank you so much for listening.
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