LPRC - CrimeScience – The Weekly Review – Episode 191

Episode Date: September 5, 2024

This week our host discusses the latest in LPRC news, research, visitors, and events! In this episode, our hosts discuss the concepts and basic levels of the LPRC/UF SaferPlaces Program, the latest in cybersecurity topics, and so much more. Listen in to stay updated on hot topics in the industry and more!

Hi, everyone, and welcome to Crime Science. In this podcast, we explore the science of crime and the practical application of this science for loss prevention and asset protection practitioners as well as other professionals. Welcome, everybody, to another episode of Crime Science, the podcast, this the latest in our weekly update series. And I'm going to talk a little bit here about a macro level view of what we talk a lot about, and that's Safer Places Lab. And this will be a fairly short briefing. We're in heavy preparation for LPRC Impact 2024 version, 6th to 9th of October here in Gainesville. So far, record enrollment again for the conference. But let me just talk a little about the Safer

Places Lab. So, you know, the idea is a place that provides innovation to safeguard the vulnerable. So that is, in fact, our tagline, innovation to safeguard the vulnerable. And when we talk about that, what are we primarily focusing on? We're trying to conduct lab and field research, mostly field. We can certainly do things online. We can do things with simulation in the labs and online, digitally, in other words. But we also can work and do work extensively in the field, individual places, groups of places, and also very, very frequently evaluating data sets or studies or results or R&D research that's going on or being currently conducted by a retailer or a group or a solution partner, of course, a technology provider, for example. That's going on all the time. So, a lot of field research, lab research, data analyses, where, of course, you've heard this and seen this,

leverage ESRI's mapping dashboards that our teams put together, specifically for each and every research area that we're involved in. Those provide a whole lot of insight before we go into a project, help everybody understand, buy in, get excited about what we're trying to do, but very visually by zooming in and zooming out and moving across the map board, understanding what we're trying to do, why we're trying to do it, and how we propose to do it. But these mapping dashboards also, of course, help us stay focused, identify what we're looking at, find new opportunities for the research, but also evaluate if the needle moves a little bit. We see crimes go down in study area A compared to study area B,

We see crimes go down in study area A compared to study area B, and A is where we apply the treatment or the treatment package, the interventions. So that's the type of dashboard and mapping research that we're looking at. We're trying to improve always. Again, this very frequently comes up. Improve always. Again, this is very frequently comes up. Individual place protection by getting better at that place and individual and area avoidance by people that are concerned and fearful and pessimism. All of us can think of places we just won't go, period, or won't go during certain times of day. And why? What is it about these places? Why are they intimidating of concern to us uh that's what we're always trying to understand explain that variance why is this place just see seem or feel safer it's a place we'll go or or be comfortable if our loved ones go there that that's what we're talking about so we are trying to always understand uh how crime and disorder harms people and harms places and areas and creates

pessimism because of this concern, this fear, this area avoidance and so on. And how theft, fraud and violence suppress stability and community opportunities. Nobody's going to invest in something they believe is unstable. They're not going to want to work there. They're not going to invest money to put in a business there or build a business, relocate a business there, provide jobs and opportunities there if they don't think that the area is safe and secure and stable. So these are research areas. And by research, that means literature, views, understanding, reading all the prior research, the premise that they went in with, the research and methods that they conducted and used to conduct that, and then what the findings or results were, what the implications might be, what the weaknesses and

strengths of the research were, as it builds theory or how things work. So that's part of our research in trying to understand these things in addition to what our research is supposed to find and is finding and what it's not finding and what the opportunities are to improve the research, but improve the individual and area protection. So, you know, we're trying to understand how and why crime clusters by type. Why are robberies happening here and not there? Or these stores or this area has more shoplifting than this area or other areas. than this area or other areas. And so always that why, why not, or why more than another place or by type of crime location is critical. You know, why is it going on here? This type of crime. So they're interacting this type of crime, not other types of crime, but this type of crime

at this place or at this time of day. And then maybe it's even the tactics that they use. Those can change and so on. So there's a whole lot, a whole lot here to understand. But also, so crime does cluster by type. Those types of crime cluster by certain places, times of day or days and weeks or months of year, that the tactics might change, but that the tactics typically are going to cluster in certain places and times of day or days and weeks or months of year, that the tactics might change,

but that the tactics typically are going to cluster in certain places and times. And all of this is for reasons. And why do certain people, offenders, red actors commit more problems than others more frequently, or some not at all in some unbelievably off the chart high levels. So those types of variants are what we're trying to explain through the research at the University of Florida Safer Places Lab and with the LPRC's research team focusing on those. And we're always looking for so what? Here you go. Let's go to work. What are the under the hood issues that we need to look at? How do we test and trial those and get them better? Throw out those that don't work or work to improve those. So everybody wants practical go-to-work solutions and should. It should demand that. But by demanding that, we need our practitioners, our retailers, especially the APLP professionals, as well as our law enforcement practitioner partners and others in the community.

Whether it's code enforcement, that could be huge. Fire rescue departments can also enforce codes that might provide additional safety and security and stability there. Mayor's offices. We can look at city or county commissions and commissioners, state legislators. All these people can play a role and should be stakeholders and are stakeholders. And these are the kind of folks that we're looking to include in our research. So that's a big part of what we're doing there is understanding how crime and disorder harms people in areas, creates fear, area avoidance and pessimism. How these theft, fraud, violence events and issues suppress stability and community opportunities in that way. And what are the dollars and ways that we can measure that, and then, of course, why and how crime events cluster by place, time, time of day, type, tactics, individuals, and so on.

So that's what we're doing in all this to come up with improved go-to-work countermeasures somebody can take. Use this type of camera. It should look like this. It should have this type of signage and or lighting to draw attention to it. It should be placed here. You should look to maybe deploy between this many and this many and so forth, right? Here are some of the responses you would have if they are not deterred by the cameras that are deployed or dosed in these ways. That's that kind of go-to-work efforts that we're looking for.

We're looking for tactics. And again, as my father, a physician, all the research going on all around the United States and around the world, medical research, trying to understand better ways to earlier and more accurately diagnose situations, to prevent situations, pathologies and injuries. For example,

how to best treat them when they happen and what types of polytreatments or combined things can, interventions can be put together. What's that look like? How do you use them? How do we improve them? Getting better and better tools and medications and procedures and information sharing, diagnostic tools, diagnostic interpretations, becoming more accurate and rapid and so forth. Right. So that's what we're doing here. Trying to understand this. You know, the biggest issue we have is, and this is my issue as a leader, if you will, is trying not to do everything for everybody all the time and wearing myself and, but most importantly, my team out. Each individual has their own work style, their own capabilities that are always're always improving, by the way, capabilities, but can only take on so many things. So we're trying always, particularly our director of research, Dr. Corey Lowe, to keep an eye, a pulse of our team individually and as a group, always trying to make sure we are focused on the most important and most deliverable options.

But we try and keep a pathway open to look ahead, to also create discoveries. A lot of what we're doing is deductive and a lot of it's inductive. But the inductive part is, you know, we are discovering things that we didn't even know about, didn't expect, didn't look at it that way while mostly focusing on these inductive things. While I think this, because of this past research and practical experience, shows this, let's test that versus, hey, we'll test other things and just see what happens. That's the minority of what we do, not the majority, but we want to maintain both pathways, keep both avenues open. We think it's in everybody's best interest that we're trying to find out if some things work or work better, but always having an open mind and having pathways and discover new things, new ways. Oh, my gosh, didn't see that coming.

But, wow, now that we've sort of seen this, now we can deduce that we want to move that over to inductive. Now let's test that. Let's see what that looks like and so on. So maybe TMI here, but just giving you some looks under the hood here at the LPRC and at the University of Florida's Safer Places Lab, always bearing in mind that we are trained and we're driven to use theory, but that means using frameworks, platforms to kind of help guide us and keep us focused,

to help be able to explain and understand with others in the organization and beyond. I've talked a lot about collective efficacy, that there's a lot of good research over the last few decades showing that, again, if individuals kind of work together a little bit, they don't have to love and like each other, but just know each other, but have a few things going for them. There's maybe some social cohesion in that little block segment there in a street within that apartment complex, or at least part of it, in that shopping center, or at least part of it, or in the, of course, in our case, like the shopping centers between stores. Maybe there are five stores co-located, and at least three or four of them seem to know each other and cooperate a little bit.

That's it, right? That there is some cohesion, social cohesion. They are sort of similarly defining problems and solutions. This is a problem if people are just camping out here or there are these signs of disorder that are depressing and people that are causing this place avoidance, they're like, I'm not going there. Avoidance behavior is rainy. I don't feel safe there. I don't want my loved ones going there. If that kind of attitude is there, and particularly if it's persistent, that's the problem. And so if the people that have businesses and or live in that area, live and work, say, you know what, this is an issue, this graffiti, people shooting the lights out, abandoned vehicles, just groups hanging out, not shopping, not working, and so on, whatever it might be that they similarly define. So that's what we look for with collective efficacy. Efficacy is to create social cohesion with people that similarly define things. Okay, this is not good. This is preventing good people from wanting to work,

to shop here, to invest here, including myself and my family maybe. So you know what? That's wrong, including myself and my family maybe. So you know what? That's wrong. And I've found others that feel the same way. This isn't right. And though to have collective efficacy, that group not only has to identify these things as problematic in somewhat similar ways, but they're willing to do something about it, right?

They're willing and able to intervene for the collective good. Hey, if I work together with this person and this person or this business and this business, with the law enforcement in my area, cover this area, if we kind of work together here and coordinate, we're willing and able to intervene for the collective good. It's going to help me and mine, but it's going to kind of help everybody. It's going to raise all boats, not just one or two. So that's collective efficacy. And that is, you know, we're building social cohesion with individuals and groups or businesses and organizations that similarly define problems that are willing and able to intervene for the collective good

and actually this is the last part do something about it they actually exert these joint efforts they erase graffiti they call 9-1-1 or for protection when they need it instead of being afraid or just ignoring it or maybe even approving of some of the social disorder. So that's kind of it, collective advocacy. Get them together and give them some tools. And that's where it drives our research. And so we think the Safer Places Lab and the LPRC research enables collective advocacy so that nobody is on an island, nobody's isolated, that they feel like, okay, people are vandalizing my business they're

burglarizing my business they are stealing rampantly from my business they're committing robberies there they're intimidating people that they are defacing and so on my place they're damaging things they're hurting me and i can't get and keep good employees and team members here people don't want to work and shop here. So that's what we're talking about. You're not on an island. You're not alone. You shouldn't feel isolated and desperate that, hey, guess what?

That person over there, that business there, that law enforcement agency, these officers or deputies, they're on board with you and so on and identifying those and pulling together. That's what we're doing with LPRC, particularly with the east side and parts of Fort St. Lucie. And then as we continue to expand to our other study areas of Atlanta, Albuquerque, and it looks like Scottsdale and Detroit to do some remote work is creating that collective efficacy, learning how to do it and enabling that. So when we talk about affect, detect and connect,

that's what we're doing. You can see that we're grounding what we're doing into good science, as well as common sense, that we're trying to help people individually and collectively or collaboratively work together with each other in law enforcement and have the right tools and do things the best way we know how so far. This is all iterative and it's always changing, but that's what affect is affecting the criminal offender or that crew, that individual or that crew, their perception of what's ahead of them, how desirable that target is, how vulnerable that target is that that place that individual at that place um change the equation a little bit wow that doesn't look so great to me as a bad guy to go and hurt them to steal their stuff or otherwise uh worse so that's what we're doing

with affect and working to do that before they leave their house or wherever they hold up at night as they move through the community as they are there. So that's affect through the five zones influencing them. That's the five zones of influence, their perceptions and their responses to the good, helping them make better choices. Detect, again, how do we put sensors and leverage sensors that are online, picking up dangerous, threatening, planning, other types of acquisitions that they might have, that kind of thing that's leading to harm. with more data points or generating marker or identifying these markers that there's a problem coming up we'll just have one we have multiple markers maybe you know we're hearing this person tap saying this online we have another one responding we see whatever those vehicles out there leveraging license plate readers working together as retailers collect collaboratively and with law enforcement in zone 5 4 3 2 3, 2, 1, all the way through.

That's what DTECT is. We're enabling. We're enabling collective efficacy here, right? We are working together. And we're working together, leveraging the scientific method to help select, test individual, and group solution sets. And then, of course, CONNECT. and group solution, solution sets. And then, of course, connect.

That's where the third one after affect and detect is connect, provide denser, faster, and more enduring or persistent communication tools, right? What are the protocols and tools to do these things? How do I communicate with my neighbor and do it over time, not just do it right now, Do it to warn and inform. Warn during an emergent, exigent, dangerous situation that seems imminent or is happening right here and now. Or how do I do it beforehand and after there's problems? So that's what we're working on in Connect. Provide denser, faster, and more enduring neighbor and guardian communication.

The law enforcement in our parlance and criminology they are it's guardians they're formal guardians informal guardians are those that know and care and pay attention to do something they're they're efficacious right they're collectively doing things for the greater good um in this case police are there as formal guardians just like security security officers or loss prevention or asset protection people, detectives or agents, specialists, and so on. But how do we connect everybody together with the right tools, radios, with online tools, apps, things like that, just maybe megaphones to yell, speakers and things like that. But how do we

connect them together? That's connect. So that's where I wanted to go today is explain again, the baseline and leading to what all we're up to here at the Safer Places Lab at the LPRC. Instead of just flailing around and doing stuff, we really try to leverage evidence-based practice, not just eminence-based practice. And again, eminence is somebody that's eminent in their field, says something, they give a speech, they have a session at a conference, or a group of them do. That is very helpful. But that is not scientific. is not scientific that should be part in our opinion of the equation not the only part of the equation but part of it and that's where eminence-based practice is different but complementary to evidence-based practice and probably the lowest standard is emotionally

based practice right so we have emotion we have eminence, and we have evidence. And so you can imagine emotion kind of gets us going. This is a problem. I'm getting passionate about doing something about the problem, but we shouldn't drive what we do and how we do it based purely and reflexively on emotion. That's what's going to trigger us, inspire us maybe, the same token with eminence. Just because so-and-so's got a big title, works for a large law enforcement agency

or retail corporation or solution partner company, that doesn't mean what they say is any more valuable in some cases than another it could be should be but not always is so we combine that eminent space with evidence base that we now are going to leverage the scientific method we're going to stand up what we think we're going to see a hypothesis we're going to test that by collecting evidence that's either already out there in data sets that we can study. That's an observational study. That's pretty rigorous. Or we could go even to a higher level where we can construct an experimental design, go out and do a field experiment, a randomized controlled trial. So I'll leave it there to say that that's what we're doing in our organization,

the combination of the two, LPRC and UF Safe Replaces Lab. That's what we'll be talking about at IMPACT coming up that first full week in October. And that's what we talk about on our webinars and our lab visits on all of our six events that we do, is talk about evidence-based combined with evidence-based and emotionally-based practices out there. But you can see the grounding, and that's the scientific method. There's a framework. I'm going to turn it over to Tom. Today, I'm going to go through some current events around risk and cybersecurity as I always do and I'll start with something that I keep getting questions on both personally and professionally which is a recent cyber incident or data breach from the National Public Data.

The National Public Data is a company that provides background screening and public record searches. A couple things to note about this breach that's interesting. There's a lot of information out there. The company initially said that 1.3 million people were impacted, and that's what their first release was. There's now reports that up to 2.9 billion records were compromised, which affected up to potentially 272 million people. So I don't want to get into the specifics here because it's not super relevant. There's a couple things that I keep hearing is, what do I do?

What do I do as a person if I was impacted by this or if I think I was? And the first answer is put your credit on freeze. You can do this by reaching out to Equifax, Experian, and TransUnion and you freeze your credit. What does that mean? That means that if someone, yourself or anybody else, went to open a car loan, get a new credit card, there'd be a block which needed to be removed. It's just another layer of protection. And I recommend everybody has this, even if they don't think they're involved. The other thing is monitor your financial accounts.

Get a credit monitoring service. Look at what's out there. If you notice any unusual activity, act in real time. So what I would also say is that while this is a very large data breach with really, really sensitive information, if you think back to a few years ago when Experian had a breach, it was a very similar scenario. Now, I think in this breach, one of the things that's a little different is a lot of information was released and there's still noise out there about it. But again, I'm not going to get into what was or wasn't released because I'm not sure it's super, super clear in the industry today of, well, what exactly is

missing? Why do I say that is, well, it doesn't feel like to me that there is a clear picture of what's missing and what's not. So I think that that will come in time. You will see kind of what we always see, lawsuits and things of that nature. But at the end of the day, the key factor here is to protect yourself and do everything that you can from a protection standpoint of credit freezes and monitoring that you can. We'll continue to update here appropriately, but at the end of the day, these breaches or cyber instances are not going away.

They're just going to continue. And it's more important now than ever to make sure that you're having good cybersecurity hygiene and good credit monitoring hygiene and protect your data, use strong passwords, use multi-factor authentication and continue to drive good habits. With that, I want to switch gears a little bit to some social media or some IT related things that I thought were very interesting. CEO Mark Zuckerberg last week released a letter that essentially was seen pretty much in every major news outlet globally.

The Wall Street Journal, I'll use that one as an example. But there were a lot here where essentially, you know, Mark Zuckerberg, and I am paraphrasing, and I want to make sure I say that, is regrets, you know, regrets caving or leaning into pressures from the U.S. President Biden administration to remove COVID-19 posts that were either humorous or satire. Zuckerberg said Meta should have challenged some of these. The New York Post story about Hunter Biden's laptop that was suppressed, that was also part of this, Hunter Biden's laptop that was suppressed, that was also part of this, where essentially Mark Zuckerberg came out and said, hey, we regret doing some of these things or responding the way we did. This kind of aligns with some of the things that when have these massive tech companies with huge reach that are susceptible to government influence or donor influence or investor influence or even CEO influence.

So why is this important? We continue to talk about the media and social media and people using that to gather their news. The reality here is when you have a trusted source internally, you believe something's trusted. My recommendation is and will continue to be to let's make sure that you are, you know, validating the information and reading the information and using some judgment here. reading the information and using some judgment here. Now, you use COVID-19 as an example. This is something, we started this podcast during COVID-19 and we did it every week religiously. And Dr. Hayes did a really good job of talking about some of the things that occurred, but the, you know, some of the mandates, some of the changes. My, my key point here is that that information was fluid. We really spent a lot of time trying to read what was news media and what was driven from information that we weren't sure.

And we were really, really careful to make sure that we didn't give information that we weren't sure and we were really really careful to make sure that we didn't give information that we weren't sure about and if we found something that was different we went out and said hey this is what we learned this week general rule of thumb here is if you're using social media to do any type of active threat monitoring validate whatever you can because the information could be skewed this is also one of the things i keep saying about the ai storm is that data poisoning the ability for someone to poison data and make it seem different um and the enhancement of spreading of misinformation which is my next topic i want to talk about is the wall street journal had a really interesting article about misinformation in election cycle and how 91, I want to reference 91 accounts, had spread videos that have been viewed over 10 million times with

misinformation about campaign, about Donald Trump, about Biden, about Harris. And out of these 91 accounts, they were originated from companies like Vietnam, China, Russia. And the interesting part here is that not the 10 million views, that 2.1 million, or I'm sorry, 2.5 million active real accounts recirculated this information to help validate it. So here's the biggest challenge with some of this misinformation is it leans into confirmation bias. If you are on the fence about something and you feel some way and then you keep seeing videos that or news stories that look real, you can start to believe something. So again, this goes back to what I keep saying in a cycle of AI and social media, please, if you're seeing information, double, triple check it to make sure that there's not a misinformed portion of it.

And another really interesting story is the Telegram CEO, Paolo Durar. He was formerly a Russian citizen. He moved to France, became a French citizen, and also actually has a Dubai passport, was arrested over the weekend, accusing Telegram of not responding to requests from French authorities to help identify persons involved in cases related to child pornography. There were money laundering charges. And why I bring this up is because we're in this pivotal moment of you have a CEO of a tech company like Telegram, which gives an encrypted app for encrypted communication being essentially charged for things that are happening. for encrypted communication being essentially charged for things that are happening. It's almost a complicity charge on his network. A couple key points if you use Telegram is that it is not encrypted automatically. You have to opt into encrypted conversations. So be very,

very aware of that if you think you're using Telegram and it's safe the other thing here is that any technical app any app that you're using today you really want to validate and vet what you're using it for so that you can understand what the the risk is now there was this story is a tangled web of you know countries russia being involved, a whole bunch of other things. But then there's also some talk of governments hacking people's phones to read messages. So at the end of the day, what I find the most interesting about the story is that this is a theme of you have tech CEOs that are now being held responsible for activity that's occurring on their platforms. Now, there was some talk about where is the line between freedom of speech and how tech founders should moderate. But at the end of the day, if you are a company that is for-profit or nonprofit and someone is using your tool to commit a crime and you are aware of it

and you're not following some of the mandates especially in the EU but outside the EU you could be held accountable what I find really interesting about this story for the listeners here is that here's an app that was assumed to be the most secure app available for communication and it was very quickly realized that oh well you know you got to make sure this is opted in and these are occurring and then there is some kind of um information around well is is he complicit or is the team too small to respond where does you know where did, pardon me, the line in the sand get drawn when you have a tech CEO who is, yes, certainly responsible intrinsically, but at the end of the day may not be able to effectively control what's occurring. So what do I mean by that?

I actually mean exactly what I said is, hey, how do you manage that if it's a situation where the CEO is aware that things could be happening but doesn't have the resources to respond to it. This goes back to just understanding corporate responsibility and what your responsibilities are if you are an officer in an organization. But additionally, it also really should open everyone's eyes to, I'm using this app and wow, I did not realize wow, I did not realize that there was risk here. I did not realize this could be occurring.

So I think, you know, when I sit here and I hear this out loud, my first initial response is we need to be aware of the impact that these type of things could and will have on us. And when I say these type of things, I want to be clear in my statement of you have an impact of complicity because either you didn't do due diligence, pardon me, or you thought you did due diligence and you missed something. In this case, it kind of feels like there's a lot more moving parts with governments involved and hacking the phones. But at the end of the day, it just shows there's a theme of accountability, right, wrong, or indifferent being held to tech moguls and tech CEOs. And I think it's just something to

be very, very aware of. Last, but certainly not least, we've seen, you know, kind of a host of outages in the past few months, where you have the CrowdStrike outage, you have several cellular outages, you have Microsoft outages. With all of these outages happening, I think we need to be very, very aware of what occurs when we rely too heavily on technology. AT&T has had multiple outages over the past few months. And I would argue that they always do. It's just that they had a really prolific, large outage. And then they had outage um either on the 27th or 28th i don't know what day it was to be honest with you um and that affected 911 service but i think these outages are occurring we are becoming more and more dependent on technology um and i think the

the biggest thing that i want to kind of say to folks here is make sure that you have a plan. Make sure that you have a backup. Get to the point where you might have your old paper Rolodex available. And I know that sounds crazy, but, you know, I was at a conference and I tell this story all the time in Los Angeles, California. It was a very, very small 20 person intelligence conference with a very, very select group of individuals. And one of them shared a story of a Microsoft Teams outage and how their manual book of phone numbers was recently updated, but not updated enough and they struggled with finding contact information and everybody on the call will go that you know that we've got a great system for that but the reality is um it you can update that weekly and you would still have the risk of of losing

something when someone's new and printing and moving things around. I know in my past life, I worked for a retailer that every quarter would release, and I don't know if it went to yearly, but at one point it was every quarter, or at least a very small trifold with every executive that could even fit in a wallet. It was a trifold size of a credit card. And one of the things I would say is that was better than nothing, but there was a process to keep that updated. But in today's day and age with the turn and all the things that go on, I would ask yourself the question is, do you know how to get in touch with your boss, your risk leader? Do you know how to get in touch with your subordinates if you didn't have a cell

phone? Is there a way to do it? Do you even call them or is it all text message driven? Do you have a backup method? If you don't, when you listen to this podcast, create one. If you use Slack every day and that's your method of communication, come up with a secondary method of communication. I use both an Android and an iPhone, one on Verizon, one on AT&T. So I have two different text messaging platforms. I also have WhatsApp and Teams. Now, here's the challenge. I've been in a position where Teams as well as one of the phone carriers didn't work. So now I'm not sure everybody's in a risk professional role where they need to have that layer of security. But if you're dependent on one form of, of technology, one form of

communication, I implore you to go out and do the best you can to find a backup. Today is the day that you want to do that. So when you listen to this podcast, do it. Most of them are free. There are a lot of options out there. And this is just even if you said, hey, in a dire emergency, we're going to use this platform, you have a method. The other thing is, if you can write down some of those key phone numbers, fold them up, put them in your wallet, put them in your laptop bag so that if there was a challenge, you could at least try to call that person. And with that, I will turn it back over to Reed. So everybody, I encourage you, please check in. Let us know what we need to do more of and less of at lpresearch.org.

Operations at lpresearch.org is the best way to get a hold of us. Of course, we have a huge and very prolific presence on LinkedIn. So please stay safe and stay in touch. Thanks for listening to the Crime Science Podcast presented by the Loss Prevention Research Council. If you enjoyed today's episode, you can find more crime science episodes and valuable information at LPResearch.org. The content provided in the Crime Science Podcast is for informational purposes only and is not a substitute for legal, financial, or other advice. Views expressed by guests of the Crime Science Podcast are those of the authors and do not

reflect the opinions or positions of the Loss Prevention Research Council.