Making Sense with Sam Harris - #204 — A Conversation with Jonathan Haidt
Episode Date: May 18, 2020Sam Harris speaks with Jonathan Haidt about the maintenance of a healthy society. They discuss the problem of orthodoxy, the history of political polarization in the US, the breakdown of public conver...sation, remaining uncertainty about Covid-19, motivated reasoning, the 2020 election, the future prospects for Gen Z, the effect of social media on the mental health of girls, Jonathan's experience with psychedelics, positive psychology, loss of self, the experience of awe, and other topics. If the Making Sense podcast logo in your player is BLACK, you can SUBSCRIBE to gain access to all full-length episodes at samharris.org/subscribe.
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Welcome to the Making Sense Podcast.
This is Sam Harris.
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I am here with Jonathan Haidt.
John, thanks for joining me again.
My pleasure, Sam.
So we're planning to do a two-part conversation here,
starting with the topic that has been omnipresent
and on everybody's mind for now some months,
which is the COVID-19 pandemic.
And I wanted to talk to you about that just because of your expertise in social psychology
and the way in which it's informing or should be informing our view of political polarization,
political polarization, the fraying of societies, concerns about social cohesion,
and everything that is a kind of knock-on effect of the, or a potential knock-on effect of the immediate concern here, which is epidemiological and economic. And so we'll dive into that.
And then in the second half, I thought we could talk about our mutual interest in self-transcendence and the nature of consciousness and the kinds of methods people
have used, and you and I have both used to explore that terrain, psychedelics and meditation being
two. So this will be kind of a two-chapter conversation, and I'm looking forward to it. So before we begin,
John, just perhaps summarize your background briefly in terms of your intellectual life
as it relates to psychology and politics, perhaps.
Yeah, so I think in a lot of ways, I started out on a very similar path to you.
I was a philosophy major in college, and I wanted to understand the meaning of life.
And then I went to graduate school in psychology, and I shifted over to social psychology and
morality and emotion.
And I began studying how morality varies across cultures.
But as the American culture wore heated up, I shifted over to looking at left-right as
being like different cultures. So I started studying political polarization back in 2004. And boy,
is that a stock whose value has risen. I mean, it's just reached insane valuations right now.
So that's what I've been studying. And so I actually got into it in part to help the Democrats
win. I was so upset that the Democrats in 2000, 2004,
just had no idea how to talk about morality. But as I began to write The Righteous Mind, I really
started reading conservative ideas and intellectuals and discovering that there
are actually a lot of ideas out there that I didn't know, and it's very valuable to hear
other sides. I kind of stepped out from being on a team. And since then, I've really just been trying
to help everyone understand across the divide. And I'm extremely alarmed about our democracy
and its health. So that's what I've been working on for the last 10 or 15 years,
especially, is how do we help people understand all the different moral matrices that they live in,
and thereby turn down some of the anger and make it possible to have pragmatic solutions of the
sort that a democracy should be able to reach. Yeah, you were one of the earliest people on
some of these points. You might have been the first person to signal just how dysfunctional
the ivory tower's view of the political landscape has been. I mean, so it's just natural within the academy to have a level
of political bias that just would be starkly dysfunctional anywhere else, which guarantees
an echo chamber effect. And you were very early on talking about how a lack of diversity of ideas
was really socially and intellectually problematic.
And so you started the Heterodox Academy to shine more light on that. Do you want to say
something about that? Yeah, sure, because it's very well connected to what we'll be talking
about today. So once I stepped out of the matrix and stopped being a member of a team fighting the
other team and just started being just a social
scientist trying to figure out what the hell's going on, I started noticing not just that we
lean left. That isn't a problem. A field can function even if it leans two or three. If you've
got two or three times as many people on the left as the right, that's not a problem and it wouldn't
be a problem to reverse either. We don't need balance. What we need is a complete absence of
orthodoxy. So orthodoxy means that if you dissent, you will be punished. And that's fine if your goal
is cohesion. If you're an army marching into battle, maybe that's fine. But if you're scientists
seeking the truth, anybody who's read John Stuart Mill knows he who knows only his own side of the
case knows little of that. So that's what alarmed me. As soon as I started looking at the polarization
in the country, I saw it happening in my own field of psychology and saw it happening in
most of the social sciences and humanities. And I could see orthodoxy. I could see bad social
science thinking. And I started getting alarmed by it.
I gave a talk in 2011 on how this was a problem for social psychology. And to my field's credit,
I didn't suffer. I wasn't kicked out. People didn't get angry at me. People generally agreed it's a problem, but it's been hard to really change things. And that's what Heterodox Academy
is trying to do. Well, it was a problem way back then, but in 2016, the reckoning really
seemed to happen because what we witnessed there was a country divided along seams we had seen
before, this heartland revulsion against the coasts and against the cosmopolitanism and elitism or perceived elitism of big cities
and their liberal inhabitants.
And Trump managed to magnify that divide to a degree that I still think we're trying to
grapple with what happened there and try not to repeat the same psychological experiment
over the next six months.
trying not to repeat the same psychological experiment over the next six months.
And then I should also say that now the pandemic has somehow,
if it were possible to amplify that dynamic, it has.
That's right. So how are you viewing the current moment and what this quasi-quarantine has done
to further expose this intellectual and tribal schism in the country?
Yeah. So to understand where we are, you have to go back at least to the, well, let's go all the way back to the 1950s and 60s when America was pretty unpolarized. The post-war world was an
unusually, historically was quite unusual in the mid-20th century and having very low levels of
polarization. There were liberal Republicans, there were conservative Democrats. And for a variety of reasons in the 70s and especially
in the 80s, we began to see almost like tectonic plates moving around. We began to have one party
that had psychological progressives and one party that had psychological conservatives.
So before then, things were all scrambled.
And rural people were often Democrats.
And the Democrats were the party of the working man.
There was a lot of mixing and matching.
And there was the possibility of bipartisan legislation.
A lot of legislation was bipartisan back then. But for a variety of reasons, we start getting sorting into types of people who are sorting
by values.
I think Ronald Reagan put together a coalition that was not just economic, pro-business,
it was also with Christians and religious right and family values.
And this is much more dangerous because if you have coalitions based on interests, well,
you can make deals, you can trade off.
But when you have coalitions based on personality types that share values, well, now the other
side is evil. They are bad
people. And as the parties increasingly then became more purified in terms of density,
that is, if there's a lot of people per square mile, it votes Democrat. And if there's few
people per square mile, it votes Republican. And also very alarmingly by race, as the Republican
party is becoming more of the party of white people, these splits are very dangerous.
So I'm extremely alarmed.
I was extremely alarmed even back around 2010, 2012, and it is so much worse now.
And then there's the media environment.
We can get into that later, perhaps, but changes in social media between 2009 and 2011 gave us much more of an outrage machine, adding on to cable TV,
which has been causing problems for a while as well. So the table was really set for an election
in which reality had little grip on a lot of people and passions, anger, fury gripped a lot
of people. I mean, it's basically straight out of the Federalist Papers where Madison writes about faction and the human tendency to faction. If we hate the other
side so much, we don't care about the common good. And there was a lot of anger in the 2016 election.
Had there not been so much anger, had we not been so polarized, there's no way Donald Trump
could have gotten elected. So I think everyone needs to think, whatever side you're on, if you
care about the country, we need to figure out what do we do about this? How can we turn things down in the future? of information or messages that they don't want to hear. I mean, there's a level of confirmation bias and just allergy to data that doesn't fit your narrative and conspiracy thinking that doesn't
even recognize that it's conspiracy thinking in terms of just the public conversation we're
having with one another and failing to have. There's something unrecognizable about this.
I don't know if that's just some kind of delusion that I've acquired based on it being delivered through new channels like
social media, or if it's some recency effect, or if I'm just getting older. But to some degree,
it's even ramped up in the context of this pandemic, where I see otherwise very smart,
otherwise very smart, rational people, i.e. not the usual tinfoil hat crowd, succumbing to degrees of motivated reasoning that without apology and without apparent bandwidth to
check themselves ever and proving completely unsusceptible to argument. There are no universally trusted sources of information that
can resolve disagreements at this point, it seems. Well, that's right, because you have to see
people not as creatures seeking information, but as social creatures enmeshed in games of
competition or war or conflict. And when the conflict level is low,
and you put us in the right circumstances and institutions, we actually can find the truth.
And that's the magic of a university. That's the magic of science. But imagine a scientific field
in which suddenly, let's take all the normal dynamics of science, and then let's put a lot of money in so that there's a huge amount of money riding on whether you get this discovery or patent.
Well, that would corrupt things.
And of course, that has happened to some degree in medicine in some areas.
In the social sciences, money doesn't play much of a role, but politics does.
And so you get, as tribal passions and hatred of the other political party rises, you get the same kind of corrupting dynamic there. So I do think it is a theme of the 2010s, and I suppose of the 2020s, that it is actually getting harder to find the truth than it was 20 or 30 years ago, I believe.
I believe. That is, despite the... Obviously, some kinds of facts and truth are just fantastically easy. I'm very grateful for Google and the internet. Obviously, many things are getting
better. But anything that is politically or morally tagged, so that one side wants to believe
and the other doesn't, in some ways, it is now harder to find the truth than it used to be.
At least that's what I'm coming to see. In my own field in psychology,
we've had this replication crisis. And so this is a different mechanism. But we used to think that,
you know, when I was in grad school, we learned that correlational studies are not very reliable.
But experiments, wow, that's the gold standard. You know, if it's a random assignment,
double blind, you know, boy, that tells you what caused what. But now we're finding that even a lot of
our experiments don't replicate. And so I think the attitude we have to take into the 2020s is a
lot more humility. We simply don't know what the truth is, no matter how fervently we believe we
do. And I imagine you're quite familiar with that kind of a mindset and issues of faith,
but it infects all of us. And I'm hopeful that this
virus, this pandemic has humbled everyone because we were pretty much all wrong about a lot of
things. We're still wrong about most things or many things probably. Yeah, this has been an
interesting ordeal of epistemology really, this pandemic, because so we've been dealing with
patently unreliable information, you know, rumors leaking out of
China and then the overt attempt to suppress those rumors or a message against them by a
communist regime that has every reason to worry about the perception of it in the world.
And then, you know, all of the tribal spin given to that circumstance by our own politics,
we have a completely deranged president who is concerned about the stock market and its
effect on his chances of reelection. We have a personality cult amplifying every one of
his errant ideas. But then we have just all these different
vested interests and people without much political partisanship exposed to very different or likely
very different outcomes with respect to the single variable of deciding to lock down society. So you
have people whose businesses can still be maintained once we lock things down, and then some of them even
improve, right? And then you have people for whom every aspect of economic life is going to grind
to a halt. And these people may, on either side of this divide, they may be equally reasonable and
equally respectful of science, and yet you can see the consequences of
your economic concerns trimming down your ability to think clearly about what the data is suggesting
at any time point. It's been very interesting to witness, and I continue to believe that at every
point along the way, even when we, the truth is we still don't know how lethal this disease is.
That's right.
But at every point along the way, it has been prudent to try to stop the spread of the contagion,
to spare our healthcare system because we could see what was happening in Italy and other countries,
and to use the time we were thereby gaining for ourselves to ramp up testing and our ability to trace and isolate cases and to understand the virus and obviously develop therapeutics and ultimately a vaccine.
Now, we have proven surprisingly inept at using the time well, and that's something we have to figure out how to improve and understand
going forward. But it has always seemed prudent, even given the absolutely predictable economic
costs, to err on the side of caution here, because at every point along the way, this has seemed
considerably worse than the flu. I mean, the analogies to the flu have always
seemed inaccurate. And the question is, how much worse is this than the flu? Then reasonable people
can debate that. So for instance, there are very prominent people who are making claims like
hospitals are coding more or less every conceivable death as a COVID death. So the mortality statistics are completely fake right
now. I'm sure that that's happened in a few places, but this is either a very dangerous
conspiracy theory or something we have to get to the bottom of immediately. And it's very hard to
tell, right? I mean, you can't figure this out in two hours. And who would you trust to
put this claim to rest or not? The New York Times isn't good enough, apparently. So I don't know how
you think about how we move forward in this space where there are very few trusted gatekeepers of
information, and the disparity between believing one thing and believing its antithesis is enormous.
That's right. So I'll go with you on your analysis on the first few weeks or a month or two of this,
which is that as long as we didn't know much about this thing, we didn't know what the death rate was,
it could be 3%, 6%. And for God's sakes, our doctors didn't even have masks. So I think there was really no
dispute that we had to do lockdowns at first when we just didn't know what was going on and we could
not deal with it. We had no idea where the high water mark would be. And I'm sitting here in
Manhattan where everything is peaceful and the streets are quiet, but it was pandemonium in the
hospitals and we had no idea how high the wave of death was going to crest.
And I think to their credit, Americans actually really did accept that. I mean, Americans really did. I was surprised that I think in those first weeks, we actually did get, obviously not like
they did in China or other places using a lot more force, but Americans did go along with it.
And the surveys still show that most people support that. But once we got through that first wave,
with enormous economic cost, which is also a personal cost, now I think there are at least real alternative views that need to be discussed. And if we had some sort of a reasonable, rational
media system, reasonable democracy with reasonable discourse norms, we could actually do it.
What I mean is, especially, say, the Sweden model, it is at least reasonable discourse norms, we could actually do it. What I mean is,
especially say the Sweden model, it is at least reasonable to say, okay, you know, they're doing
it differently in different countries. Well, let's look, how does it work? You know, do they get
immunity faster? So as long as there was so much unknown, it actually would be really important to
listen to the other side, to listen to critics. And that's the way that we all get smarter, is by having our confirmation
biases challenged. So I'm a big fan of that. Now, unfortunately, we live in this crazy funhouse,
madhouse, in which, as you said, there are national interests trying to distort things.
There are Russian operatives trying to use rumors to divide us. We have a president who, when George W. Bush
gave a call for us to come together, it was a beautiful call from a former president and for
Trump to attack him on the spot. That to me was one of the several just horrible low points
of this whole thing. It also just shows us how far from normal politics we've
wandered. Because here we have a current Republican president vilifying a previous
Republican president who was making nothing more than a call for national unity and a
transcendence of partisanship. And the current president can't even transcend his own thin-skinned
concern. No, that's right. I know when that happened, I didn't get angry at all.
I was laughing.
It's like, oh my, this cannot be happening.
This cannot be happening.
So now we are so far beyond,
we're just so deep into the absurd.
And so, yeah, that's what we have to figure out.
Let me just put one distinction on the table
is most Americans are pretty reasonable.
Most Americans are not that polarized.
You have to distinguish between the average and the dynamics of the system. And so let's take just to take one example on a college campus, most students are pretty reasonable, but we've been, because of social media and other things, the people who will use social media or mount protests, can have a disproportionate voice.
Same thing in a democracy.
There's wonderful work by a group called More in Common, a British organization that surveyed
America.
They've done really wonderful work on studying polarization in the United States.
They find that Americans fall into about seven different groups based on their political
attitudes.
And four of the groups,
which is a large majority, they call the exhausted majority. And these are people who are quite
reasonable. Two of the groups are on the left. One is centrists. One is people who are just
disengaged. So most Americans, you can't blame most Americans. But because of the nature of social media, the nature of Congress, the nature
of cable news, various people have megaphones that are pursuing either commercial interests
or ideological interests. And so you get absurdities, well, like Fox News saying,
you know, that remdesivir is bad and chloroquine is good. And this is after the scientific studies have come out showing the reverse.
So what I'm saying is don't give up on Americans, but it's almost time to give up on the system
or the network that we have.
And by give up, I don't mean that there's no hope.
I just mean like, man, we can't just go back to normal.
We got to dig deep, figure out what's wrong and fix this so that this becomes the bottoming
out, that 2020 becomes the bottoming out,
that 2020 becomes the worst year in a long time, and that something changes by the end of this
decade. How do you view the next, let's say, six months? So the next six months is overshadowed
entirely by the 2020 presidential election, right? It's just going to be politics all the time. When it's not pandemic,
it'll be politics. And we obviously don't know how much the economy is going to unravel in the
meantime, but it seems like it's poised to unravel to an impressive degree. I mean, we're certainly
flirting with a real depression if joblessness numbers are any indication.
And again, the most hopeful predictions for a vaccine, which is really the only thing
that will fully reset our circumstance with respect to public health, nothing arrives before
something like, it would be a miracle if it arrived in January, right? And even that is,
very few people are imagining that it's sooner than a year from now. And again, we've got to
remind ourselves of how amazing that would be. I think the fastest vaccine we've ever developed
was four years for the mumps, and the average is 15 years. One year would be a massive breakthrough.
And let's say we improve on that and we get a vaccine by January. Still, we have this period
where not just our country, but the entire world has been pitched into a circumstance of
real uncertainty financially, economically, and I think as a result, politically. How are you viewing the
next six months? And there's just so many concerns on the table, like how do we even have a safe
election, right? If we can't vote by mail, right? How do we get people to actually vote? What are
you thinking about for the next six months? So, you know, I completely agree that it's going to be all pandemic and Trump all
the time with just sideshows over Biden and other things here and there. So there's no chance of the
fever breaking until after the election. I'm certainly hoping that Trump is not reelected.
I think that, you know, as many people said, oh, well, you know, there are adults in the room.
The first year or two, there were many good people in government. And I think there are not so many
of them at the upper level anymore. So the point is that the craziness we've seen in the last year
or two, it would get even worse. So I think that if Trump is reelected, I think the damage to our
democracy and our reputation in the world, our standing in the world, I'm terrified to think what would happen. If Biden wins, or there could be some route in
which he's not the nominee, or who knows what's going to happen. But if Biden wins, it would be
great if we had a bold and inspiring leader. And I'm not expecting that Biden will rise to that level, but who knows?
Of course, there's a chance for a reset of a lot of things. It's very hard to predict
how things would play out. The one thing I would question what you said is you say nobody is
predicting a vaccine for a very long time. Yes, that's true. But this is one of those things,
like we've been told a lot of things about the, about the virus, like don't wear masks and, you know,
don't wash your hands for 20 seconds. And it turns out a lot of that was either wrong or at least not
based on evidence. It is true that experts tell us it's likely to be a long time. And you're right
that no vaccine has ever been invented that quickly. But, you know, there's a hundred,
I just saw on the news the other day, there's a hundred vaccines that are in development and three or four of them are going into clinical trials
now. And of course, we're not, there's no way we're going to follow the old protocol where we,
you know, inoculate a lot of people and wait a year to see how many got sick. No, we're going
to do challenge trials. People are going to volunteer like crazy to be infected with the
virus to see if they have the immunity. So I just raised this as just one example of how
a lot of things
that are put forth as facts about this, you have to at least actively look and say, okay, is this
really a fact? Do we really know this? And under what scenarios might this not come true? And of
course, if, suppose one of these, there's one just starting at NYU, just they saw it on the news on
Friday, they're injecting, well, they're giving the vaccine to people this week, and then they'll
start exposing them, or some of them, I think, I'm not vaccine to people this week, and then they'll start exposing
them, or some of them, I think. I'm not sure what the plan is exactly, but they'll have an answer
within a couple of months. And so let's just suppose it works. Well, that would really change
everything, and in a way that I think obviously could greatly benefit Trump. What I'm hoping,
you know, presidents, leaders often get a bump because of a crisis. Trump got hardly any.
But, you know, it's the incompetence, which is what I'm hoping will turn off the middle of the country. It's the bumbling incompetence that I think is likely to be powerful for a lot of people
who are not part of his base. But if somehow, you know, if there's a scientific breakthrough and the
vaccine comes quickly, a lot of people will say, see, it's just like Trump said, it'll just magically go away. So I just think we can't,
it's very hard to game out how things are going to play out, both scientifically and economically.
Yeah, yeah. I would place a bet on what seems to be the pervasive incompetence at the moment. I
mean, just because even if we had a vaccine today that we knew worked, we have to roll that out to, in our case, 350 million people.
And our struggle to even get testing going is instructive.
So you just imagine having to produce the vials of vaccine, and if this is an injectable, as opposed as opposed to something that you can inhale. Yeah.
It's daunting.
Yeah, but, you know, look, it could be invented in China. You know, we're all assuming that it's going to be invented by Americans, but, you know, there's a lot going on in Europe and Israel,
China.
Then all the more reason to worry that we're not first in line to get it, right?
That's right.
Well, so I don't know how in the weeds you've gotten with Trump supporters.
This is a, I've commented on this in several places.
And the thing about the Trump phenomenon that has been most mystifying to me is that among
his supporters, and not even people who are unsophisticated, even people who I'm just,
I'm surprised to even discover they are discover they did support him at all.
What I find that is truly mystifying and really just confounds any effort to have a reasonable conversation about politics
is a total unwillingness to admit that there's anything consequentially wrong with him, that his lack of understanding of complex
issues, that his bluster, his dishonesty, that any of this is in any way negative, right?
What I feel like I meet in trying to convince Trump supporters of anything is just an absolute stonewalling on points that
just seem objectively true. And my noticing them is not at all a sign of my own partisanship.
Just to say that Trump lies more than is normal in a politician. That is as objectively true as
the Pythagorean theorem. There's just no possibility of debating that. And yet, even that will not be conceded. Or if conceded, there'll be some assertion that it just doesn't matter.
at that juncture in the conversation.
And there's something like 100 points like that.
It's hard to understand what is at the root of it because this is not an ordinary form of tribalism.
This is not like members of the Christian right
who are Christian fundamentalists
and they have a whole worldview organized around their,
having grown up evangelical or whatever,
and now they're voting for whoever it is, George Bush, because he's on their side and he's going to put in the
right conservative judges and block abortion. And it's not part of a whole system of belief like
that. It's just, in many cases, the only thing that seems to be organizing it ideologically is a revulsion at the status quo that was repudiated in the 2016 election.
The business as usual that Hillary Clinton represented, we don't want any more of that.
And also, we probably don't want to pay any more in taxes. And you get those two variables
clattering around a person's brain, and it has summed to something like a cultic unwillingness
to admit the obvious just across the board whenever the conversation turns to Trump.
Yeah. So let me give you a handy little psychological tool that can explain this.
So there's a wonderful term. There's research by Tom Gilovich at Cornell
who studied motivated reasoning. And I got this little formula from him. He says,
when we want to believe something, we don't look at the evidence and say, is the evidence mostly on
the side that I want to believe? We just say, can I believe it? Do I have permission to believe it?
Meaning, can I find one example, one argument, one piece of evidence? And if I can, I'm done. I stopped thinking because if someone challenges me,
I can point to this piece of evidence. Whereas if you don't want to believe something, you say,
must I believe it? Am I forced to believe it? So I've had the same experience as you. I have
several, you know, I communicate with a lot of people on the left and the right, and I have some
very smart correspondents who are Trump supporters. And I've had that exact debate with him about whether there's something wrong with
him. And the psychologists, the psychiatrists say the most likely diagnosis is narcissistic
personality disorder. He makes everything about him. And you and I think that that's as objective
a fact as the sun rises in the East, that he does that more than other people. But once you understand that everybody's asking not, is it true,
but must I believe it? Well, the answer is always no. There's almost nothing that you have to
believe. Certainly not anything about politics or anything that can't be measured exactly precisely
and with no questioning about what the rules are. So you and I can point to, well, look at the fact checkers.
They find 10,000 errors.
Well, the Trump supporters will simply point out that the fact that those fact checkers
work for the Washington Post or Snopes or other places that have known left-wing biases,
and they're right.
So it's very hard to get at the truth.
And I think, of course, there is a truth. But when Trump supporters ask, must I believe it? The answer is always no. And one of
the best ways to get a little bit more humility here and calm down the anger a little bit is to
say, just always turn it around and say, is there some different issue on which my side is just as
obtuse? And, you know, I think people on
the right would point out that, well, you know, people on the left, pretty much anything about
race and gender and LGBT and, you know, immigration, I mean, there's all these issues
that are sacred issues on the left, at least in my part of the left and, you know, universities.
But as you know, I spend a lot of time hammering the left for its
epistemological vices as well. Yeah, I admire you for that, for your guts, yes.
So I get it from both sides. Yet, I mean, when you just look at the way in which we have shed
influence in the world in the last few years, where we have just by turns terrified our allies and gratified our actual adversaries. It's mind-boggling that you have
something like 40% of American society that sees absolutely no problem with this. I mean,
they see this as some form of progress. Yeah. Okay. So here's the metaphor that's
helped me understand the otherwise just unfathomable state of our country now.
So I began to feel around 2014, 2015, that something was deeply wrong, like something has changed about the universe.
And I played with this.
I just had this uncomfortable feeling for a couple of years.
And finally, like a year or two ago, I started working this metaphor into my talks. Suppose that God one day just doubled the gravitational constant. So, you know,
in our universe, there's like 25 physical constants, you know, the mass of an electron,
things like that. And if God just said one day, let's just double the gravitational constant just
for fun, like everything would go totally haywire in the physical world. And planets would
move in their orbits, and planes would come out of the sky, and it would just be bizarre and
disastrous. And I think that what happened is basically that, but in the social world.
And that is, connectivity is generally good, but we're now hyper-connected. That's changing a basic
parameter of the universe. We're so connected,
but it's more than that. It's not just like, oh, because giving us telephones and email,
I mean, we've been getting more and more connected for centuries, and that's generally been a good
thing. It's the nature of the connectivity. It's connectivity in which we are communicating,
not privately, but in front of an audience, and the audience rates the communication.
So this, I think, is what social media has done to us.
That is, when Facebook and MySpace came out, it was just, you know, look, here's my page,
here are all my friends, here are the bands I like.
You know, there's some showing off, but it wasn't toxic and it was not bad for democracy.
I have an article in The Atlantic last November with Tobias Rose Stockwell,
where we show how beginning in 2009, when Facebook added the like button, and then Twitter copied it,
and Twitter added the retweet button, and Facebook copied it, and then they both algorithmized their
news feeds much more. So between 2009 and 2012, the nature of human connectivity changed radically
in ways that I think are very, very bad
for democracy. That is, it wasn't just that we could now talk to each other privately for free.
It's that a lot more of our conversation was now in public being raided, which means it was
inauthentic, often dishonest, and with a lot more intimidation. You know, I hate Twitter. I hate
going on Twitter. I'm also fascinated by it. It's like
opening a garbage can and watching rats and cockroaches fighting, and there's something
fascinating about it. But things really changed after 2012. And the Russians noticed it, and
they've been trying to mess with our democracy for 50 years. In 2014 is when they realized, hey,
there's this great outrage machine that the Americans have built for us. And we don't have
to go over there. We don't have to go over there.
We don't have to fly agents over to mess them up.
We can just sit here in St. Petersburg and do it.
So I think that I hear your incomprehension.
I hear your frustration.
Things are terribly wrong.
And we could blame those Trump supporters.
We could say they must be insane.
They must be badly motivated.
But that's not likely to be true.
They're likely to be normal human beings.
And so I think we have to look elsewhere.
That's why I'm so mystified, because the people I have in my personal life who are Trump supporters, I know to be smart and well-intentioned.
And it's just that they're completely aloof with respect to all of the downsides of his personality.
And what, to my eye, are the obvious risks being magnified by those downsides.
Yeah, what an amazing species we are that we can believe such obviously false things.
I think there's some people who've done some work on that. Yeah, yeah, yeah.
I think there's some people who've done some work on that.
Yeah, yeah, yeah.
So, yeah, no, I agree that the style of communication and it's created an information space where it really is just total war all the time in information terms.
That's right.
Yeah, and that's no way.
Yeah.
And I don't think our democracy can survive that.
I think that if things keep going the way they're going, our country is going to fail
catastrophically. I'm not predicting that it will because I don't think things will keep keep going the way they're going, our country is going to fail catastrophically. I'm not predicting that it will because I don't think things will keep on going
the way they're going. But the trends are really bad and they've been really bad for at least 10
years, more than that even. So what would you change? I mean, if you could actually get Jack
Dorsey and Mark Zuckerberg and other people to just take your advice, what would you change?
So yeah, there's, I mean, there's all kinds of systems I'd change advice, what would you change?
So yeah, there's all kinds of systems I'd change, including elections and Congress and all that.
But if we're going to focus on social media, Tobias and I offered a couple of suggestions.
The most important one, the most important single thing that we think needs to change is there has to be some kind of identity verification for our major platforms.
We're not saying that you have to post with your real name. We understand that there's often a need
to use an avatar or a fake name. But if democracy is moving into a virtual public square,
if what's fundamental to our democracy is how we engage with each other, and we're no longer doing
that in newspapers and
real public squares. We're now doing it on Facebook and Twitter and Instagram, places like
that. I think these places have an obligation to create a kind of public square that fosters
some sort of understanding, some sort of working out, and that really cracks down on intimidation.
It is stunning to me that you can make death threats, rape threats,
racist rants. You can say anything you want. And the worst that'll happen to you is, you know,
eventually your account will be closed down and then you can just make 10 others with no
verification. And the Russians figured this out long ago, and a lot of Americans do it too.
So if we're serious about having a democracy that has a public square
and that public square happens on these platforms, I think there has to be at least enough skin in
the game or accountability that when people open an account on Facebook or Twitter or Instagram or
any of the major platforms, let's suppose it worked like this. The platform would send them
out to some other entity. Maybe
it's a non-government agency entity. It's a nonprofit. The internet has a number of those.
And that entity just verifies that you are a real person associated with a country and that you are
over 18 or not. If you're under 18, there might be another cutoff like 13. Because right now,
any 11-year-old can get on any platform that she wants to, and that's a whole other set of issues
we can talk about, mental health effects on girls and all kinds of other effects on teenagers.
But I think that's the most important thing, is that we have to reduce trolling, intimidation.
I don't want to go into a public square where anybody can hit me over the head or throw acid
in my face and run
away laughing, and there's nothing I can do about it. That's number one.
Yeah. So is there a tension between that and our broader concern about free speech? I mean,
obviously, these are private platforms, and they can regulate speech however they want. But
given that they're essentially becoming internet infrastructure and they are becoming a kind of public square for which there's no alternative, the erring on the side of just basically defaulting to the Constitution has seemed tempting.
How do you think about free speech concerns?
Sure. So I would hate to live in a country in which if somebody espoused an opinion that somebody else or the government didn't like, that that person could be arrested or punished. So to me, that's the core of free speech. There are no thought crimes. There are no speech crimes other than, obviously, intimidation threats. There are certain categories that are not constitutionally protected.
I don't want a solution in which platforms have to look at what you say and judge each thing you say.
What I'd rather is that it's not focused on the thing you say, it's focused on the features
of the space.
And so if as long as we allow anonymous trolls in, well, do you have a constitutional right
to say whatever you want without anyone knowing who you are? I don't think so. Do you have a right to reach millions of
people? No, you have a right to say what you want without being punished. But as is sometimes said,
freedom of speech does not mean freedom of reach. The platforms are under no obligation to let you
reach millions of people with claims that chloroquine is a miracle cure. That's not free
speech. So I think these platforms, they're not individuals talking in the public square,
and they're not newspapers. They're somewhere in between. And our law doesn't quite account for
that yet. But I think just as we have a lot of responsibilities placed on newspapers and
magazines, I think we need some sort of in-between thing for these platforms. And that means, no, you can't just open 100 accounts and say whatever you want all day long and his viability, really on two fronts.
So that we have the Tara Reid allegations, and surrounding those, we have this fairly
credible charge of hypocrisy against the left, because on the left, we're all about Me Too and Believe All Women. But then the inconvenient woman shows up making fairly shocking claims about the only candidate standing between us and four more years of Trump. even hear the allegations. And once that becomes untenable, what we've now seen is an analysis of
the allegations that does frankly suggest a kind of double standard where we could go hard against
Brett Kavanaugh when he was nominated for the Supreme Court based on more or less nothing but
the fairly dim memory of one person. And we're in a similar situation here
and behaving rather differently. I mean, the way I reconcile this, you know, is just that I think
Trump is so dangerous. I think four more years of him would be so awful for many of the reasons you
mentioned. And I do think there's something especially awful
about doubling down on Trump for a second term. I mean, what that says about our country.
That's right. It would validate that it wasn't a fluke. We really meant it. Yeah.
Yeah. We know exactly what we're buying here and we're going to buy it again for four more years.
Yeah. I mean, it's just, I don't know how American standing recovers. I mean, we literally have to have the Messiah come for 2024 to reboot. But so given that, you know, I honestly don't care what is true here. I mean, it's like I can own that he might have done something absolutely awful, which should in a normal world disqualify him for the presidency.
which should, in a normal world, disqualify him for the presidency. I don't feel like I know that.
I don't feel like I don't know that. I just feel that whoever Joe Biden is or has been,
he's better than Trump. Just his facade of professionalism as a normal politician and a normally empathic person is so much better than what Trump manages to muster as a person that there's really
nothing to decide here. For me, that seems to skirt hypocrisy. I'm not inclined to treat Tara
Reid's allegations differently than Blasey Ford's, if that's the apt comparison. It's just that the
context is so different that in this case, they don't matter. I consider this
a political emergency that only has one adequate resolution, which is somebody other than Trump
becomes president. Yeah. So without getting into the details, I have not been following the story
closely enough to have a view about what might have actually happened. But the key thing that
I would want us to focus on here, if you're asking about the implications for the election,
want us to focus on here, if you're asking about the implications for the election,
is enthusiasm, passion, things like that. So Trump won the election. He didn't in 2016,
not because people loved him and wanted him, but because we have negative partisanship in this country. That is, since 2004, we vote more. Political scientists tell us that the strategy
for president used to always be you run to the outside to get your party's nomination. And then because America is a fairly moderate
country, you have to run to the center to get to win in the general. And in 2004,
Karl Rove correctly calculated that the center had shrunk so much that the key was turnout.
And so they went with gay marriage to try to inflame the evangelicals, and it worked. They got higher
turnout on the right. So since then, that has been more of a winning strategy, and negative
partisanship, voting against what you don't want, is more powerful than voting for what you do want.
And that, I think, explains how Donald Trump was able to win in 2016, when it seems as though he
didn't even want to win.
He made no preparations for it. He didn't spend any of his own money. He didn't campaign that hard.
So Hillary Clinton ran a terrible campaign against someone who wasn't trying to win,
and was a complete mess, and had no ground game, and didn't play by the normal rules.
And even though she won the popular vote, he still did win by the
recognized rules of the game. And that's because her people were not passionate. And the tone in
your voice just before when you were saying, why, of course, you're going to vote for Biden,
was similar to what a lot of people were saying about Hillary. Obviously, there were very different
issues, but people weren't passionate about her. But they would say, well, yeah, but I mean,
but she's better than the alternative. So that is how Trump won. He should have lost in a landslide,
but he didn't. My fear is that while Biden is not an inspiring candidate, I do believe the people
have known him for a long time who say that he's a fundamentally decent man. That doesn't mean that
he didn't do something inappropriate with a young woman in the Senate. I have no idea.
But there was not a lot of enthusiasm for him before. People generally like him. Democrats,
I think, were okay with him, but a lot of groups were not. And that was the big question was,
will the people who wanted Bernie Sanders or Elizabeth Warren, you know, will they come back to vote for him in the fall?
And now you add in this, which is going to alienate a lot of people, particularly women and particularly young women for whom these issues are much more salient these days.
I'm extremely concerned about the fall election because I think the Democrats, you know, the Republicans, I was fully expecting the Democrats to win no matter who the nominee was, unless it
was Sanders. I was expecting the Democrats were going to win because of the passion issue. But now
I don't know. I don't know what's going to happen. And if Biden is not, if a number of
constituencies are not enthusiastic, they're not going to turn out, especially if there are still risks to turning out.
And especially if mail-in voting is not easy and universal.
For God's sakes, it's, you know, during a pandemic, of course, we should all be voting
by mail or by internet or by other remote methods.
But everything's so politicized and there's so much incompetence that that may not happen.
So I don't know what is going to happen.
And it's another reason for alarm.
What about the perception?
This is the second thing that's dogging Biden, the perception of his senescence, essentially.
I mean, he's obviously lost a step with respect to his speech and memory.
And again, we're in an environment where there is an asymmetry here with respect to the way his glitches play to the average audience and the way Trump's glitches play. I mean, Trump is a producer of word salad much, if not most of the time, and yet it doesn't make him seem old.
make him seem old. That's just more Trump, right? It's like he's got the energy of a 20-year-old on Adderall. So he's full of life and he's just chaos. Whereas every single glitch, every hiccup in his
speech for Biden, you're holding your breath, hoping he can get to the end of the sentence.
The optics are so different. It's surprising. And I mean, this is the other thing that worries me. No, that's right. This is why I was not a fan of
Joe Biden. I mean, I like him personally as a person. I agree with you. He's a reasonable person.
But he ran for president twice before, and he was a bad candidate. And he's not a good campaigner.
He's not eloquent. And as a psychologist, what I can
add is that the research on cognitive aging is just stunning. People are at their peak in terms
of fluency and speed in their 20s, and then it's kind of downhill from there until you get to your
50s or 60s, and then this downward slope accelerates. So in your 70s, it really accelerates.
So most 70-year-olds are still doing okay on cognitive tests, although they're not nearly
as sharp as they used to be. But as you go beyond 70, by the time you get to 80, most 80-year-olds
are not doing so well. Obviously, some are. But if Biden was not a good candidate long ago when
his brain was much younger, I think there's not much reason to think that he's going to
be much better now. And
I think we're seeing the signs of that. So as you say, it's also the issue of vitality, and that
matters in politics. People want a vigorous leader, not one who seems frail or scattered.
So for a lot of reasons, I think that obviously many Democrats wish they had a perfect candidate.
Many Democrats think that there were better candidates.
And with the Tara Reid allegations now, the candidacy is even weaker.
So my God, is this a drama.
I mean, just when you think it can't get more insane, it gets more insane.
So who do you think he should pick for his VP?
That I don't know.
I've not given any thought to.
I imagine that he committed to, well, I don't know why, but, you know, he committed to picking a woman, I suppose, knowing that these allegations were coming. So, you know, once he's done that, I don't have, I'm not, so I'm not a political prognosticator. I can't read the, you know, the horse race politics. I don't have a view on that. with a cohort of people for whom social media is as common a fact of the world as water,
which is to say there's never been a time where they were without it.
And we're also having a younger generation that seems destined to graduate into a
economic environment that is just as objectively punishing as any in our lifetime.
I mean, when you think of what it would be like to be looking for a job in six months,
unless we reboot here in some way that just ushers in a renaissance of a sort
that will be fundamentally surprising,
it's hard to see how we escape a fairly dismal economy for
a good long while. How do you think about the cohort you're currently teaching as undergraduates?
What's the near future hold? Yeah. So paradoxically, it could end up in the long run
being good for them. That is, clearly, it's going to be devastating to their economic
prospects in the near term.
And research on previous generations that graduate into bad economies shows that it does hurt their earnings for the rest of their life, on average.
So I'm not saying this is good overall.
But the trajectory, the outlook for Gen Z was horrific.
It was terrible.
Their rates of anxiety, depression, self-harm, and suicide have been spiking upwards since
2012, roughly, especially
for, well, suicide is up for both genders, but depression, anxiety is especially up for girls.
And so Greg Lukianoff and I wrote this book, The Coddling of the American Mind. And we think the
two major causes, there are many, but the two major causes are the vast overprotection,
the safetyism that we put on kids in the 90s. We stopped letting them play outside.
We told them the world was dangerous. We let them just play with devices inside. And the normal
risk-taking, the normal adventures, the normal testing the limits of your physical abilities,
that we denied them beginning in the 90s and early 2000s. And so this, we think, is the major
reason why Gen Z is coming out so much more
fragile and depressed and anxious than the millennials were. So we're talking about kids
born in 1996 and later. The other factor, we believe, is too early exposure to social media.
And here, I actually have some news to report, brand new news. The long-running debate over
screen time, I think, is actually nearing a resolution. That is,
in the coddling of the American mind, Greg and I focused on social media. That's what we thought
was worst. But we did sometimes refer to screen time or that parents should limit screen time.
And some other researchers pushed back on us and said, no, look, you know, here's our evidence is
that the amount of hours spent on screens isn't related to mental illness. And then Gene Twenge and I reanalyzed data and are basically able to show that consistently,
if you look at almost all the data sets that show no overall effect of all screen time,
well, if you dig in and you say, okay, not all screens, including TV, but rather just social media,
and not all kids, but just girls, then you consistently find
a relationship between heavy social media use and depression and anxiety. And it shows up in lots of
data sets, lots of different studies, and experiments back this up that when people go
off of social media, they tend to get happier. So anyway, all I'm saying is, I don't think parents
need to freak out about screens per se, if what they're concerned about is depression,
anxiety, but they should still look out if what they care about is that their kids actually
do other things like go outside or learn to climb trees or go out with their friends in person,
which of course will happen again someday, but not this year.
Yeah. Well, so what do you do with the fact that now a concern about the dangers,
even invisible dangers out in the world seems all too warranted,
right? So now we have a cohort of kids. I mean, I've got two daughters, six and 11,
who are now quarantined and having a fairly unusual experience. I mean, they're happily
our limitations on screen time have been impressively relaxed. So they're enjoying that.
But tell me about social media.
Is your 11-year-old on Instagram?
No, no, no, no.
I mean, I'm going to be as conservative
as can be achieved on that front.
But there are elements of it
that are starting to leak into her experience now
just because of the classroom is on Zoom
and they have common projects where they're
commenting on each other's work. And so they're texting. And so there's communication in front
of an audience happening a fair amount. And how that differs from social media really is just that
it's not open to the rest of society. It's just her among her friends. But even there, it just
seems to me like a whole new module has been
installed in her brain, which is, you know, her attention is being captured by somebody else's
response to something she put out there. And that, you know, that has many of the features that would
concern one with social media. Yeah, that's right. So to the extent that screens foster direct
face-to-face interaction, talking on the phone by FaceTime,
that's all great. There's no problem at all there. I actually bought my son an Xbox when this all
hit. He'd wanted one for a long time. And the research doesn't seem to show that it's related
to anxiety, depression, although it is very addictive and it does tend to fill up all the
available time. So he has three hours a day on Xbox, but it's great that he's really playing it with his friends. So to the extent that these
devices facilitate real direct interactions, that's great. But yes, as you say, the problem is
a lot of these are indirect interactions where people are rating and commenting,
and that seems to be especially hard on girls. So I think this could get worse.
But here's where I think things could get reset. There is actually
danger out there now because of the virus. Now, not that much for kids, but it's a physical thing.
Whereas what we were getting to before this hit was emotional safety. We were treating kids as
though they were so fragile that if they were exposed to bad news, that they would somehow be damaged. And what I'm hoping is that this pandemic will
reset some of our safetyism and move us away from sort of the trivial things we've been looking at,
the effort to protect kids' self-esteem, the effort to protect them from words and ideas.
So having more adversity in your childhood could end up being beneficial. And this is the idea of anti-fragility, which is really central to our book. The word was coined by Nassim Taleb. Lots of people have many views about him, but I'll just say that noticed. But I don't want to miss this one point.
But what you just said suggests to me there's another trap to fall in here, which is if I'm trying to curate, just go back to what you just asked me with respect to my allowing my daughter the social media experience. I mean, one, the impulse there is to protect her from the onslaught of
negative or destabilizing or anxiety-producing information that I don't want her to have.
And it seems to me there are two potential pitfalls there. One is just this, it's another
form of coddling, right? I'm trying to protect her from something that she should develop the
tools to just assimilate, or one could say that. And then there's just this other feature, which I think
is natural to worry about, which is if all of her friends are on Instagram and she's the one who
isn't, well, then there's just a social exclusion penalty that you would imagine a young teen would
pay. Yeah. So to take your first point, it does seem as though I might be contradicting
myself. I'm saying that in general, kids should be exposed to adversity. They should learn from
experience and you should let them make mistakes. Yes, in general, that is true. But there are
certain things such as, let's say, alcohol, heroin, prostitution, gambling, where we say,
you know what? My 11-year-old is not ready for that, maybe when she's 16, 18,
or well, obviously not prostitution. But the point is that there are certain things that an adolescent
brain is just not ready for. And what I found from speaking with a lot of middle school and
high school kids is I ask them, all right, so how many of you have been shamed on social media?
All hands go up. And I say, now, how many of you think that being shamed on social media toughens you? That is, you go through it and you say, you know what?
I don't care what people think of me. I've been shamed so many times. I don't care anymore.
No hands go up. How many of you think it makes you more cautious, more fearful?
You double check and triple check yourself. You're not authentic. Most hands go up.
So there's something about public shaming and exposure that is especially unhealthy for middle school kids and especially for girls.
So I'm not saying, you know, it's a losing battle to keep it out of high school.
But look, the minimum age, you have to be 13 to get an account.
But by fifth or sixth grade, most of the girls have it in many schools.
And that is something that I'm really trying to change.
As long as there is now evidence that social media is particularly bad for girls.
Now, the millennials weren't harmed by it. They didn't get this until they were in their 20s.
But I suspect that middle school is the place to focus. I think we really need to try to get
social media out of middle school. And that would solve your second question. Because yes, if it's
only your kid, you know, when I kept my son off of video games, he did feel excluded because the
other boys were all on it all day long. So it has to be done systemically. And that's why I think middle school is the place to
focus. If anybody's listening to this who has any influence over middle school, try to get a
school-wide policy that discourages parents from letting their kids, discourages anyone from having
a social media account until they get to high school. Wait till they're 14 or so, wait till
they're in high school. But middle school is so hard already, especially on girls. So don't make it harder.
So now let's pivot to topics which on their face may seem impressively detached from
the current concerns, but not really. I mean, I want to talk about human well-being and
experiences of the positive end of the spectrum of human psychology and how we
conceptualize this terrain. And this is, if anything, an interest in this has been heightened
by our current circumstance because so many people have been forced into something that
impressively resembles a kind of retreat, right? I mean, people are experiencing
solitude to a degree that is not normal for them. And for most of us, there's been a forced
reprioritization of values. We have a vantage point from which to see how we've been living
all these years and the kinds of things that have captivated our attention.
And much of that has been stripped away or at least shuffled to a degree that many people are
experiencing even a silver lining to this quarantine because they're experiencing better
time with their families in many cases, or this heightened sense of uncertainty, the sense that really anything
can happen at any time. And that's always been true, right? But we live most of our lives as
though we take a lot for granted, and taking those things for granted amounts to a kind of
death denial and a sense of control that has never really been factual. So there's a lot to motivate a conversation about things like
meditation and psychedelics and what they can reveal about the nature of the self and
experiences of self-transcendence. So let's dive into the deep end of the pool, John.
Yep.
Perhaps to start, give me a sense of your background here. I know you spent some time
in India at some point, either in graduate school or as a postdoc, but remind me how you came to be
interested in these topics. Sure. So because I study morality, I've been interested in moral
transformations. You get that from religious experiences.iam james book varieties of religious experiences
full of all these sudden moral rebirth from an encounter with with with god so i've always been
interested in these self-transcended experiences and their capacity to change people's moral nature
but actually there's a there's a very personal reason for it and and i've been looking forward
to talking about this with you because you know you've been out on this for a long time talking about psychedelics.
Thank you.