Making Sense with Sam Harris - #275 — The Russian War in Ukraine

Episode Date: March 10, 2022

Sam Harris speaks with Garry Kasparov about Putin’s war of aggression in Ukraine. They discuss Putin’s larger objectives, the perception of the war inside Russia, whether US and EU foreign policy is to blame, the expansion of NATO, American weakness, Republican support for Putin, the sanctions regime, whether the US and EU should impose a no-fly zone over Ukraine, whether to openly seek regime change in Russia, how we can avoid WW3, what post-Putin government in Russia might look like, Western economic entanglement with autocracies, and other topics. If the Making Sense podcast logo in your player is BLACK, you can SUBSCRIBE to gain access to all full-length episodes at samharris.org/subscribe.

Thank you. of the Making Sense Podcast, you'll need to subscribe at samharris.org. There you'll find our private RSS feed to add to your favorite podcatcher, along with other subscriber-only content. We don't run ads on the podcast, and therefore it's made possible entirely through the support of our subscribers. So if you enjoy what we're doing here, please consider becoming one. No housekeeping today. We will jump right into it. Today's episode is a conversation first had on Zoom for podcast subscribers with Gary Kasparov, who perhaps needs no introduction. He's been on the podcast before, one of the greatest chess players of all time,

world champion for many years, but in his more recent incarnation, he has been a tireless advocate for democracy and Western liberal values in his home country of Russia. And as you might imagine, he now has much to say about Putin's war of aggression in Ukraine. So we really cover the whole topic. We talk about how we got here, what the perception of the war is inside of Russia, the allegation that U.S. and EU foreign policy is to blame,

that NATO expansion has been too threatening. We talk about the perception of American weakness and how that might have provoked Putin. We notice in passing the otherwise unimaginable Republican support for Putin. We talk about the sanctions regime and how effective that may be, the extent to which Putin miscalculated in this war, whether he might be the victim of a popular uprising, whether the U.S. and the EU should

impose a no-fly zone over Ukraine, or insist upon regime change in Russia, and if we do either or both of those things, how we can avoid World War III. We talk about the role of China in all this, and discuss the larger implications for the defense of the Western liberal order. Anyway, a useful and all-too-timely conversation.

I think I may do some more of these live on Zoom, because you all seem to like that, and I hope you find the conversation useful. And now I bring you Gary Kasparov. All right. Well, just to remind everybody, this is a live recording of a podcast. So this is an opportunity for all of you to just watch us record a podcast, and I'm very happy that you're joining us. And I'm especially thankful to you,

Gary, for taking the time to have this conversation with us, because I know you're inundated with demands on your time here. Many people know you as one of the greatest chess grandmasters who's ever lived, and it's always fun to talk about that, but we've got other priorities now. Maybe remind us how you come to have such strong opinions on the topic we're going to touch today. I mean, you for years have been politically active in and outside of Russia and a great advocate for democracy and Western liberal values. And you're working now with the Renew Democracy Initiative and other orgs. Just tell us what you're doing on this front.

I grew up in the Soviet Union and I had my own experience living in an unfree country and dealing with KGB, that's as every other Soviet citizen. And of course, as being a chess prodigy and a top grandmaster and eventually world champion. So I was under very special attention of party officials and KGB operatives. And when I saw Vladimir Putin taking over at the end of 99, year 99, I have to say I was stunned because during these glorious days of August Revolution in the Soviet Union, August 1991, when the jubilant crowds toppled the statue of the KGB founder, Felix Dzerzhinsky, at Lubanko Square in Moscow, I don't believe anybody could bet one to a million that in less

than nine years, KGB Lieutenant Colonel would be in charge of Russian affairs again. And it was not just about a KGB officer. Vladimir Putin was quite frank explaining his views of the world even before he became president of Russia. Yeltsin. He spoke at the gathering of KGB officers in the headquarters, which was televised. And he said there were no former KGB officers. One KGB, always KGB. He never tried to hide his thymphysis for the Soviet Union. It's his famous phrase, repeated many times, the collapse of the Soviet Union was the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the 20th century. The first thing he did as the president of Russia, it's a restoration of Soviet national anthem.

And of course, the war in Chechnya, carpet bombing of Grozny and other Chechen towns and villages, very mysterious explosions of apartment blocks in Moscow and other Chechen towns and villages, very mysterious explosions of apartment blocks in Moscow and other Russian cities as a pretext for this war. I didn't know what could have happened, but I knew that the guy could be a great danger for the world if given the chance. And every time he did something that was a warning signal to me, I tried to communicate my concern to the rest of the world.

And I think it was more than enough to listen to Vladimir Putin in person. If nobody cared what Garry Kasparov or Boris Nemtsov said about Putin, and repeatedly said Putin was our problem, but at one point, it will be everybody's problem. But Putin himself, at a certain point, decided that he could express his views about the future of our planet in public. 15 years ago, in Munich, at Security Conference in Europe, he talked openly to the world leaders about what he called spheres of influence. Returning to not even the 20th century, to the 19th century, where the big countries, big guys, as he said, would be in charge of all affairs and will dictate to smaller countries how to behave. And he believed that Russia, under his command,

was entitled to control, not just former Soviet Union, but Eastern Europe. It was within Russia's hereditary rights. And every time that he did something to materialize his views, like attacking Republic of Georgia in 2008, or annexing Crimea in 2014. I thought that the world would wake up because he did it. And unfortunately, nothing happened. So basically, we are now in this tragic situation. And Ukrainians are paying with their blood every, not day, every second as we speak. it's because for so many years, nobody wanted to take this threat seriously. We read history books about 1930s. And many of us, I guess, as myself, were surprised. How come that nobody could see the danger coming from Hitler?

Because in 1933, it was one story, 34, another story, 35, 36, 37. But when I mentioned Hitler or just German Berlin Olympic Games in 1936, compare them to 2014 Sochi Games, I was ostracized by international media saying, how could you compare anyone to Adolf Hitler? And I said, look, Hitler is a monster with no comparison, but it's Hitler of 1941, 42 and onward. But in 1936, just read your newspapers, American, Canadian, German, French, British, and he was treated differently. So again, dictators never ask why, so why not? And Putin attacked Ukraine now because he believed that he could get away with this crime as he did many times in the past. And vis-a-vis Ukraine, Putin said many times also, we just, you know, again, you don't have to take my word.

Ukraine was not a real state, according to Vladimir Putin. He believed that Ukraine basically belonged to Russia and could be split between Russia, maybe Poland, Hungary. And Ukraine for him was something like Poland for Stalin, an obstacle on the way for their geopolitical plans. So what do you say to people who you hear from now, both on the left and the right, certainly in American politics, that there's been something provocative about certainly in American politics, that there's been something provocative about U.S. and EU foreign policy, that NATO expansion is really the reason why Putin has done this, that you have to sort of see it from his side and sympathize with his security concerns. We're hearing a fair amount about this. And there are other, I guess you might even just run through some recent presidents and

just how their dithering has enabled Putin's sense that he could do this, right? I mean, there's been something provocative about American weakness too. So I wonder, I guess I've asked you two questions there. I mean, what's the role played by NATO and NATO expansion? And what's the role played by just the perception of American and European weakness and internal division? I think we're dealing with two separate questions. So one is more strategic. One is more tactical.

So I use the chess metaphors. So I'm always reluctant to use chess metaphors discussing Putin. I prefer poker. But in this case, let's start with this. The argument about NATO expansion and provocative foreign policy of NATO, you said, did I hear you say EU, European Union, provocative politics? It's a toothless organization that, you know, just- They buy a lot of gas.

It's a shadow. But it's good because that's the way everything has been mixed. It's like a salad. Oh, it's NATO, EU. I mean, all sorts of the guys that are trying to attack Mother Russia. That's a classical Russian propaganda. Unfortunately, parroted by people on the right and on the left. Some of them are on the payroll.

Some of them are useful idiots. But these arguments, you know, these could be discussed before Putin's invasion of Ukraine. Now, looking spread the blame emboldened Putin to move beyond imaginable. Because so many times we heard, no, Putin would never do that. The list of things that Putin would never done because it's so bad, I mean, it's too long. And now I think everybody recognizes that the man cannot be stopped until he's stopped. And same people who said he would never do that, now they are seriously discussing whether he can use nukes. or Estonians or Latvians who rushed to NATO because they had an experience, a genetic memory of being occupied. The price they paid for Soviet occupation was too high, I mean, just to blame

them for their desire to join NATO and to hide under American nuclear umbrella. Now, speaking about threat to Russia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, the three Baltic states, they joined NATO officially in 2003. The distance between Estonia and St. Petersburg is about 150 miles. I never heard about any threat coming from Estonia or Latvia or Lithuania or even Poland to Russia. It's about Russia. or Lithuania or even Poland to Russia. It's about Russia. It's about Russian aggressive wars and open threats to the neighboring countries

that we reached this climax. Now, speaking about American aggressive policy, Clinton, Bush, Bush 43, Obama, Trump, Biden, I'm not here just debating their political views, but until very recently, it was concession after concession. And I think that if we try to understand Putin's rationale, if you may call it rationale, for attacking Ukraine, it's not NATO's strength, but it's a weakness.

It's lack of American leadership. And he's believed that he could get away with direct assault on Ukraine, de facto, if not de jure, liquidation of an independent nation, and installment of a puppet government and continuation of his imperial policies beyond Russian border or even beyond former Soviet Union. I mean, let's not forget, you know, this is Putin had other, call it foreign adventures. What about Syria? So this is, I don't think there's any argument about Syrian rebels threatening Russia, but Russian planes carpet bombed Aleppo. Gary, do you share the view that Putin significantly miscalculated how the West

would respond and just how world opinion would turn against this war so quickly? Yes and no. I mean, he made mistakes in his calculations, but it's probably not so much about Western response, immediate response, because he had a simple plan, the way I see it and what I read from Russian propaganda machine. And Putin, by the way, he has been building his military presence around Ukraine for quite a while. Unlike the dictators of the past that tried to hide their plans, Putin was quite open about it. He even brought part of his Pacific fleet to the Black Sea. Last time I looked at the map, it's quite a distance.

And he surrounded Ukraine from East Russia, South Crimea, and also from Belarus, from the North. So the Ukraine was surrounded and he had Russian fleet in the Black Sea ready to shell Ukrainian infrastructure. And last year, there was an argument that Putin did it all for blackmail. He wanted to squeeze concessions out of Ukraine. Maybe. But I think that is just, you know, after he met President Biden in Geneva, we all remember the summit. And the summit was, according to American administration, all about Ukraine. And Biden and his team said that they looked at Putin, straight in Putin's eyes and said, forget about it. If you do it, we'll impose sanctions just that's beyond your imagination. I don't think Putin believed

him. It's just that there was, as we were told, some decrease of the tension around Ukraine. But Putin hasn't removed his troops. So he looked around. And then he continued his buildup. Then there was one call between Biden and Putin. Same result. Then the third call. I think that is is what Putin's reading of these calls

was America was not ready, was not ready to oppose him decisively. And also, while American intelligence, it's not me, it's US intelligence, and Biden is not Trump. Trump didn't trust American intelligence, Biden did. Kept repeating over the last few months, attack was imminent. The question is, why, if attack was imminent, Ukraine received no military support that could inflict much greater damages to Russian troops, especially to Russian warships and Russian planes? Why do you think that is? Why didn't we support them earlier? I think that because Biden administration played a game again. Either we say on many chess boards or if we use poker analogy on many tables. United States viewed Russia as a partner

in climate change talks. You have to listen to John Kerry, who even mentioned the climate change talks after Putin's attack on Ukraine, but more importantly, on Iran. I think it's some sort of the cognitive dissonance to have Russia as a part of the Iranian deal, which is, as we've been told, to prevent Iran from getting nuclear. And Russia has to stockpile enriched uranium from Iran. And Russia today is a country that is overly threatening to use nukes in conventional conflict. So I think that's the US administration trying to separate these issues, and Putin saw nothing but weakness. So he could downplay Americans' warnings about Ukraine because he could always negotiate. And he's quite good.

Give him credit. He's very good in negotiating and shifting these bargaining chips on this table of geopolitical casino. It's poker. He's a great poker player who used to bluff and to win because even if he had a weak hand, he raised the stakes so high that opponents always folded the cards. Can you generalize about the perception of the war inside of Russia? Or is it just, I mean, I guess the question is how effective do you think the propaganda is domestically in Russia? Oh, it's a question.

It's not just about information that's available or not available in Russia, because Putin now is closing every hole that we could use to send messages to Russian people. The internet is still functioning there, but Facebook is now banned, Twitter, now YouTube is just slowing down. So there are very few channels left for information to travel back to Russia. Because the pictures from Ukraine, they are very different from what Putin expected. And I think now this is talking about information war. So Putin is losing it because his main plan to take over Ukraine failed miserably. No doubt that he wanted to, and he believed he could, to take over Kyiv within two, three days

after the beginning of his advance, since the distance to Kyiv from Belarus was very, it's much shorter than from Russia. And he thought that the moment he takes over Kiev, Zelensky is on the run. Ukrainian government is paralyzed or just, you know, it's gone. The infrastructure is, military infrastructure is broken. And his puppet is sitting in Kiev as the newly proclaimed leader of Ukraine, maybe Viktor Yanukovych, the post president who was hiding in Russia after he was kicked out from Ukraine in 2014. And he expected, and not without a reason, that the free world would be talking to him. And we'll hear so many pragmatists saying, oh, it's a new geopolitical reality.

The same way they told us about this after Crimea. Oh, it was bad, but we now had no choice but to accommodate Putin, because what else we can do? So this is classic. Nothing is being done, and eventually say it's too late for anything. So nothing can be done now. And the failure to take over Kyiv and to break stiff Ukraine resistance in Kyiv and Kharkiv and other major cities, I think led to the change of the strategy and bombardment of Ukrainian cities. In the first three days, they tried to avoid direct hits. The campaign was very different. Obviously, they hit occasionally a few buildings, but it was very clear that they had an order to avoid civilian casualties because Putin wanted to present the story of liberation

of Ukraine. Only when he failed in Kyiv, they changed it. And now, they try to bombard Ukraine into submission, same way they did in Grozny or in Aleppo in 2015. And I think the information actually is traveling to Russia, even through this Putin's information bubble. One of the reasons, massive Russian losses, massive losses. I think we can trust Ukrainian sources because they count. It's a good head count.

There are more than 11,000 soldiers being killed. We don't know how many wounded. The reports that are finding its way through the censorship in Crimea, telling us about the hospitals there overcrowded with Russian, was wounded, sick and wounded. we can trust with some level of confidence that public opinion in Russia is slowly shifting because you can't deceive people all the time. It's nearly two weeks we are at war. And by the way, now the word war is banned in Russia. So there's new laws that have been adopted by Russian puppet parliament. Now, if you are protesting against the war, if you are standing in the streets of Russia with a poster, no to war, three years in jail. If you try to tell Russian people using your social media account in Russia about Russian losses in Ukraine and about just anything that contradicts

official version of events in Ukraine, which is called special operation of war, up to 15 years in prison. So that tells you that the truce is a mortal enemy for Putin's propaganda. They are afraid of it as much as vampires are scared of daylight. afraid of it as much as vampires are scared of daylight. On that point, do you think Putin is vulnerable to some domestic uprising at this point? I mean, whether it's coming from the top, from oligarchs, or it's coming from an anti-war movement lower down? What's the prospect that we could see Putin actually unseated by this and see a complete reset of the Russian

government? I mean, Navalny coming out of prison, et cetera. No. As for Alexei, I've been saying that Alexei got life in prison, Putin's life. As long as Putin is in Kremlin, Alexei will be in prison. The moment Putin is out, Alexei is also out. And I'm sure if he survives, I mean, God forbid anything horrible happens to him in Putin's jail. So he will definitely play a role, a very important role in the future of my country. But analyzing the probabilities of some sort of uprising. And you might put together all these ingredients, oligarchs, police, army, security apparatus, popular uprising, and political and social economic protest. I think what we're seeing now, it's quite a significant political protest.

When I say significant, it is quite amazing. And I was very proud for tens of thousands of people who made it to the streets of Russia. You say, oh, country of 145 million, and you have, what, 20, 30, 40,000 people protesting against the war. But that's not demonstration in New York or in San Francisco or in Berlin or in London. You go to the streets protesting as a war, almost guaranteed, beaten, arrested, detained. And then you can end up in jail for many years. So for people of different ages, you can look at them. This is demographics. It's very broad.

To take this risk just to defend, I don't know whether they think about the owner of the country or about their own feelings. I feel ashamed. I'm a Russian citizen. When I just talk to Ukrainian journalists and I do it every day, I know it's tough because it's being done. It's not on my behalf. I'm one of the staunchest opponents of Putin from day one. He's day one in the office, but still, it's Russia that brought deaths and destruction to Ukrainian soil. Many people, I think, feel the same, and they just believe that they have no other choice,

even with a huge risk, but to show up on the streets, nobody's going to defend them. Nobody knows their names, but it's a very personal choice. That's not something that can shatter Putin's dictatorship. But if sanctions are working, and I say real sanctions, sanctions that will throw Russia back to the technological Stone Age, sanctions that will include financial, will include financial, economic, technological measures, also total isolation, and eventual military defeat in Ukraine, this combination could create an explosive mixture that could lead to a social economic protest. And that's a revolt that will bring millions of people to the streets.

And that's a revolt that will bring millions of people to the streets. And if Putin is running out of cash, and it looks now that he is no longer in charge of the greatest fortune in the history of humanity, because most of the assets are frozen, so how is he going to pay for his military, police, and propaganda? So that's why I think the chances for massive revolt against Putin within the next month or two, if the situation doesn't change on the ground and the war continues, more losses, and the free world stands firm, united against Putin, might lead to internal conflict. Because loyalty to Putin- Preston Pysh- You don't see a possible backlash against the sanctions? I mean, if the sanctions are really biting the people of Russia,

could they be perceived through a Russian nationalist lens, basically confirming that the West is the enemy of Russia and that Putin is right to view it as- I hear this argument all the time. I think it's just, it's not realistic. Yeah, for maybe for a day, maybe for a week, for two weeks, they can blame the West. At the end of the day, you have to feed your family. And it's Putin who started the war. And people have to find solution. And free world is far away.

The West is far away. And Putin's cronies are just nearby. So I don't think that we should now worry about the economic hardship. I sympathize with these people, but please don't tell me about that when Ukraine is being killed. It's not about economic hardship. It's people, women, children, elderly being killed as we speak now. So it's time for Russians to make a choice. And I wish they could rise earlier and it will influence people around Putin, his henchmen, his cronies, because they're loyal to him, not because of ideology, great ideas, communism, imperialism, Russian nationalism. it's a mafia state.

Every state has its mafia, but in Russia, mafia has its state. And Putin is a mafia boss, capo di tutti capi. And he, again, give him credit, he built this very sophisticated system where loyalty is just it's being changed for personal gains. But people who always show loyalty to him for personal gains, for benefits, I don't think they're willing to die for him, whether they are just from his government, security apparatus, or his military. That's why I'm so adamant demanding the no-fly zone, because I don't think that Russian pilots will be willing to sacrifice their lives to give Putin a pretext to start a war against NATO.

I want to see how many Russian pilots or Russian generals will follow Putin's orders to enter confrontation with NATO because for them, it's a suicide. And I don't think that the morale in Russian army, in Russian political circles, in security apparatus, can resemble anything that we witnessed in Hitler, Germany, or Stalin, Soviet Union. Because many old dictatorships, they had this ideological craziness and fanaticism. I don't see it in Russia. It's all about, oh, we do it because we can do it. If we cannot do it, I'm not so sure that they will be willing to put their lives at risk. Well, so I want to talk about the strategic logic of a no-fly zone, but one more question on

sanctions. What do you think about the strategy of rolling them out incrementally the way we have? I mean, naively, when I look at this, it seems, I mean, I understand the logic of holding something in reserve so that you can, you know, when Putin calls our bluff again and again, we can ratchet the sanctions on him. But why on earth are we still buying Russian oil and gas? We're directly funding his war on a daily basis? What do you think of the sanction regime thus far, and what do you think we should have done differently?

This is a very important question, Sam. It just helps us to understand the roots of the current crisis. Because in theory, incremental sanctions could influence decisions of a potential aggressor. But it's important that you have an adequate response. Now, even 50% of the sanctions that have been imposed lately, maybe 25% of the sanctions, in 2014, after annexation of Crimea, it could have saved us from this nightmare. Some sanctions imposed, let's say, between Geneva Summit and first Biden-Putin Zoom call, so from June 2021 to, I think, November last year, also could actually send a message to Putin and his inner circle that America was serious. I think the big mistake was to threaten the sanctions without

actually doing it. So now we reached a point where, unfortunately, no half measures will work. And that's another rule that I learned from history books, and unfortunately, we're all learning today. Every day of our delay responding decisively to the threat of a dictator, the price goes up. And something that could have worked before the invasion doesn't work now. When American administration talked about sanctions as a threat, I said many times, I put it on, it was on my Twitter, on my Facebook, sanctions cannot stop tanks if tanks are rolling, if planes are just dropping bombs. So sanctions could actually help to prevent it maybe. But now we reached a point where it's

no longer prevention. It's about solving the problem. You do not compromise with cancer. You have to cut it out. And I think now there's no other choice for us to see that the end of the war must lead to the collapse of Putin's regime. Because as long as Putin stays in Kremlin, there will be no peace. So would you favor ramping up 100% sanctions at this point? I mean, so that we exert every feature of economic war we can all of a sudden? Look, oil embargo sounds great, but I said it was not even necessary if America could impose technological embargo, because Russian oil industry will not function without, or gas industry, without our full tech support from the free world.

But obviously, oil embargo has a psychological effect. My only concern is just that doing this oil embargo, we are helping other bad guys. As much as I'm concerned about Putin and his criminal war in Ukraine and people being killed all the time. Look, helping Iran, Saudi Arabia, or Venezuela, those are also bad guys with blood on their hands. So I understand there's a balance, so you just have to find a balance. What I think is important now is to come up with a strategy.

Because at the end of the day, look, we're all concerned about climate change, but what's the difference? More oil from Venezuela or more oil from America? At the end of the day, you could... Or from Canada. So I think it's important to agree on priorities. And if priorities are about Putin and about the... Let's be honest, about change of the regime in Russia, then we have to concentrate on this goal. And I think it can be done, but I'm not sure that there's an agreement about the future goals and how we're going to solve Putin's problem, which does not disappear with the defeat of his armies in Ukraine. And also, we are all talking, you just mentioned in the beginning of our conversation, about Putin's attempts, crazy attempts to spread the war beyond the Ukrainian borders.

So I think it's time to recognize that we are playing the game, again, let me use chess analogy this time, that cannot end in a tie. That's why it's not exactly chess. Either we win or Putin wins. And I think we just have to do whatever, mobilizing all the resources of the free world, and from political to call it spiritual and ideological, because Ukraine, I think, gave us very powerful spirit to show how to fight and die for freedom and democracy. And to make sure that as a result of this war, not only Ukraine will be safe

and will restore its territorial integrity, but Russia will become free. So you've spoken two phrases that I think are going to strike fear in many people. The first is a no-fly zone, and the second is regime change. And each, in their own way, by a slightly different logic, seems to invite a serious escalation of the conflict and even the threat of a nuclear war, right? Many people are looking at this situation and all of their bandwidth is taken up with a concern about just avoiding World War III. How do we prosecute this conflict in such a way as to know that we're

not going to go over the brink here? And so let's take them by turns. A no-fly zone. A no-fly zone seems synonymous with a shooting war between the US slash EU and Russia, which is to say a shooting war, a conventional shooting war with nuclear armed powers where one is run by a psychopath who increasingly has less and less to lose, and who's already threatened in some form to use nuclear weapons if he's antagonized. So talk to me about a no-fly zone. How is it that you can advocate that? Talk to me about a no-fly zone. How is it that you can advocate that? Again, we're dealing with a strategic question, because you raised a very good point, and I, again, hear it all the time. No-fly zone involves considerable... If you'd like to continue listening to this conversation, you'll need to subscribe at SamHarris.org. Once you do, you'll get access to all full-length episodes of the Making Sense

podcast, along with other subscriber-only content, including bonus episodes and AMAs and the conversations I've been having on the Waking Up app. The Making Sense podcast is ad-free and relies entirely on listener support, and you can subscribe now at SamHarris.org.