Modern Wisdom - #068 - Rachel Kleinfeld - Fixing The Most Violent Countries On Earth
Episode Date: May 2, 2019Rachel Kleinfeld is a senior fellow of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, and the founding CEO of the Truman National Security Project. How can the world's deadliest countries fall apart?... From electoral violence to organised crime, it's not difficult to tear a society to pieces. And then how can these decimated countries be put back together again? Rachel proposes a fascinating framework for governments to follow, framed by historical examples from the mob in Sicily vs Naples, Nigeria vs Mexico and the US South vs The Wild West. Extra Stuff: A Savage Order - https://amzn.to/2LfVwGj Rachel's Website - http://www.rachelkleinfeld.com Follow Rachel on Twitter - https://twitter.com/RachelKleinfeld Check out everything I recommend from books to products and help support the podcast at no extra cost to you by shopping through this link - https://www.amazon.co.uk/shop/modernwisdom - Get in touch. Join the discussion with me and other like minded listeners in the episode comments on the MW YouTube Channel or message me... Instagram: https://www.instagram.com/chriswillx Twitter: https://www.twitter.com/chriswillx YouTube: https://www.youtube.com/ModernWisdomPodcast Email: https://www.chriswillx.com/contact Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices
Transcript
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Hello friends, welcome back to Podcastland.
Today my guest is Rachel Kleinfeld and we're talking about the most violent societies on
earth.
Sounds like an existential crisis waiting to happen, but it's actually quite hopeful.
So Rachel is an advisor to the UK and US government among many other organisations.
And a new book, A Savage Order, looks at all of the different
ways that societies can organise themselves into disarray. So from gang violence to electoral
violence, organised crime and a whole bunch of other nasty situations you don't want to be involved
in. Rachel's done a fantastic analysis of why those situations arise. But more importantly, she's looked at the strategies
which can be implemented to stop corruption and to halt and reverse these issues and situations.
It's the mark of policy makers to strategize but not execute, I think, based on some of
the things that she says today. And it does fill me with quite a bit of hope that we've got people like Rachel who are not only grappling with the data,
but also making plans to make the world a better place.
So please welcome Rachel Kleinfeld, modern wisdom, how are you today?
Very well, great to be here Chris.
I'm really excited to speak to you today. It's a turbulent time in politics and the 21st century for
governments trying to make themselves work effectively. So I think it's going to be a really
interesting conversation. I'm reading your bio here, a senior fellow of the Carnegie Endowment for
an international peace and the founding CEO of the Truman National Security Project. Is that right?
and the founding CEO of the Truman National Security Project. Is that right?
Mm-hmm.
Those sound like situations where there's lots of serious stuff happening all the time.
Well, there's certainly a lot of attempts to have serious conversations about serious issues,
yes.
But, you know, the world of think tanks in Washington DC is one of advising.
So we advise our government, we advise your government in Britain,
and all around the world trying to make a difference.
Yeah, something tells me that you don't get much time to just like crack jokes
and kind of chill out. It's probably a lot of serious stuff.
We have our fun, but you know, I'm not present there very often. I spend an awful lot of time at
40,000 feet, so flying from place to place, so my fun is generally on the fly in different countries
doing eating street food in Afghanistan or riding lorries in Bangladesh, that kind of thing.
That's pretty cool. So we're going to talk about a sabbage order, which is your new book.
Can you tell us why you started writing this and what did you want to find out when you began?
Absolutely. So when you work in a think tank, there's a lot of serious talk as you've discussed,
but there can also be a lot of talk that doesn't really go anywhere. And so I wanted to see
could we do anything about the problem of violence?
I spent all my time reading about it, thinking about it, how do we end conflicts?
What do we do about violence?
And it turned out we knew very little about what actually worked.
And so I pulled together a big conference.
I brought together the experts on electoral violence, on organized crime, on gang violence.
You have it. We had them all in a room together. If a bomb had gone off in that room on gang violence. You know, you have it. We had
them all in a room together. If a bomb had gone off in that room, you know, the mass of
brain power on violence would have been ended. And I said, you know, what do we know? And we put
together a literature review on, here's all that we knew, which was quite a lot. We had a great deal
of knowledge actually about how you fight gangs, how you get better policing, all sorts of things.
actually about how you fight gangs, how you get better policing, all sorts of things. And then I said, okay, well, how would you get a corrupt police force in X country to adopt these
ideas? And, you know, the room just went silent. And I thought, okay, that's the problem I need
to focus on for this book. Wow. So you must have had to include certain areas and exclude other ones
with a certain geographic
locations that you focused on. Yeah, so when I first wrote the book, I thought it would be a
pretty typical thick-tank book of lots of little ideas that, you know, lots of little different kinds
of violence and different ways to fight it. And so I picked case studies on every continent on earth
that was settled, not Antarctica, but everywhere else. If this was going on in Antarctica and gangs, roving gangs of...
Emperor penguins, they really upset each other.
I've been to Antarctica, but I focus on my husband would be thrilled.
So, you know, we went to Italy and we looked at why the mob ended in Sicily.
Or prettier was really decimated in Sicily and was still very present in Naples and was spreading in
the rest of Italy. We looked at the Republic of Georgia which was an ex-Soviet
state broke away. Why had it gotten so much better when T'Gi-Khistan had fallen
into kind of an authoritarian dictatorship, Nigeria versus Ghana, Mexico versus Colombia,
white and Colombia, and its civil war, and really fight its
violence while Mexico is just getting worse and worse in terms
of violence there, Bahar India versus Jharkhand.
And that was one state had a lot of
Maoist violence and criminal violence and insurgency and
right below it, the state that had been the breakaway,
the two had been one state and they'd been separated by the federal government.
The other one couldn't fight in one thought.
And then my sort of fun case, you ask about whether we have fun and things.
My fun case was looking at the US, the US South, after the Civil War versus the Wild West,
and why did the Wild West actually get better pretty quickly?
It went from wild to not particularly wild in and about 30 years, whereas the US South
is still the most violent part of America
and certainly was back then.
And after the Civil War, it became more and more violent
over time.
And so that was probably the key to the whole book, actually,
was that case.
That's interesting.
So did you find any common principles amongst all of these areas?
Obviously, there have been characteristics that were particular to within them, I suppose.
What were the overarching narratives that you came up with?
Yeah, so as I said, I thought I was going to write lots of little things.
I mean, what does the mob have to do with the post-Civil War, American and West?
But what I found as I went from place to place was these themes kept recurring.
I kept seeing the same ideas, the same thoughts.
And I was trying to figure it out. When you do a book like this, you travel all over, you're
really jet lagged, you're talking to everyone, you can get your hands on. So you might do
80, 100 interviews in a country, you're reading everything. And my husband laughed at me because
he said, you know, for five years, you never read a book that wasn't about violence. And
I'm starting to worry about you. So I'm just, you're taking all this information
and you're trying to make sense of it.
And as I was trying to make sense of it,
I was doing my fun case about American history
and that was the key because the Wild West
was a very violent week state.
And when we think about states in my profession
that are very violent and that are democracies
and I should say I only looked at democracies
because I wanted to know how they got better
and autocracies have a very different way of getting bad
and getting better.
It's just a different kind of a situation.
So when you look at a very violent democracy,
people tend to assume that they're weak states.
After all, if you can't protect your voters,
you must be too weak to protect your voters
because your voters must be asking for protection.
It just goes to reason.
But the US West was that.
So I tell the story in the book of Theodore Roosevelt,
who was a president of ours 100 years ago,
but he was also a cattle rancher
before he was a president in South Dakota,
and someone stole his boat.
And he needed to get his boat back.
And so he got together a posse,
a typical wild West fashion,
and they went down the river to get the criminals.
And after three days on the river to get the criminals and
After three days on the river they found the bad guys. They arrested them They put handcuffs on them or whatever they had back then you know tied them up onto their raft and then it froze the river froze
And so for two weeks they were stuck on a frozen river with three criminals that they had to feed that to keep everybody alive
They had four disfrozen river they They finally hit land, the Pasi leaves, they have jobs,
they need to go back to their ranches.
Theodore Roosevelt was independently wealthy,
so he takes his criminals and he walks for 36 hours.
He walks with them to the nearest jail.
And you can imagine that not being a particularly fun
experience.
And when he got to the town that had the jail, someone there
said, well, why didn't you just shoot them? And that made a lot of sense, actually, because
in that kind of a circumstance, you can't sleep for 36 hours because it's you against
three criminals. You can't, you know, just the sheer logistics of bringing someone to
justice in a weak state that has poor capacity is a mess
and so you get a lot of violence that is people trying to solve these problems for themselves
and you see that in a lot of weak states today and
That's the theory when we go to help Afghanistan or we go to help Nigeria
We say oh, they're too weak. Let's bulk up their security services. Let's train them in how to shoot
Let's train them in logistics and so on and help them fight people that they clearly want to fight.
But that was not the issue in the US South.
And so that was the key, because in the US South, you had courts, you had judges, you had police, you had all the things you need for a state.
It wasn't a weak state at all.
What it was was a complicit state. It wasn't a weak state at all. What it was was a complicit state. And so in
the US South after the Civil War, the old Confederate leadership wanted to be back in power,
but they couldn't be because blacks had been enfranchised. And so they weren't going
to vote for their former slave owners and so on. And most Confederates had been disenfranchised.
So what do they do? Well, at the same time you had the Ku Klux Klan start up and you
had a bunch of groups,
nightrider groups as they were called, these white supremacist groups all over the South.
They didn't start because the politicians made them start. They started because they were racist, horrible people.
But the politicians saw a confluence of interest.
What the politicians saw was that if you harassed and terrified African Americans,
you would also be terrifying the voting base for the other party because they were going to vote
for the other party. And so if you chased enough of them out of town, if you killed enough of them,
if you scared enough of them, they wouldn't vote. And so that's what happened. And so you saw
pogroms and lynchings and so on
spike right before elections. And you saw people get away scot free because the deal that the
Confederates made an implicit deal, but fairly explicitly implicit. The Ku Klux Klan had their
big annual meeting the same weekend at the same hotel in Tennessee as the Democratic Party
tell in Tennessee as the Democratic Party of Tennessee. So you know, they just happened,
but you saw a lot of parties back then
write violence into their electoral plans.
You know, they're get out the vote plans,
have these parts in them that talked about electoral violence
and using that as part of their strategy.
And the Congress at the time, yes, really,
people don't know this part of the US history.
We don't talk about reconstruction.
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recounts that it was so bad.
But as Confederates got back into power through these violent means, as they suppressed the
vote of the other side and got back into power, they of course turned back the clock on
federal legislation that would fight that kind of violence.
They made it harder to do.
And the Supreme Court
was quite conservative and it worked with them and said, no, no, murder is a state issue.
Federal law doesn't cover murder. So you can't try people. There was a Ku Klux Klan Act that
was a law to make a murder a federal crime because they knew that the Southern courts weren't
prosecuting it and they turned that back. So gradually within about a decade, decade and a half,
the old Confederates who had lost the Civil War won the piece
and they were back in power.
And the deal they had made with these violent groups was,
okay, you can commit your violence.
We're not going to help you.
We're not gonna give you arms.
We're not gonna give you money,
but we're gonna give you impunity.
You're gonna be allowed to do it as much as you want
and you're not gonna to go to jail.
It's going to be impossible to convict a white person for killing a black person or raping.
That's what I saw in country after country.
Were these implicit deals that are being made with states that aren't weak, but have deliberately
chosen to allow a certain amount of violence by non-state actors, as we say in the business,
by groups that are not part of the state, for their own reason.
Sometimes it's bribery.
Sometimes it's electoral violence like in the South.
They want to suppress the other vote.
Sometimes they want money.
So, in Colombia, a third of the Colombian parliament was being, had their campaigns paid
for by paramilitary groups.
The paramilitary groups were deeply tied
to the drug cartels. So, you know, who's not going to get prosecuted? You see that same kind of
thing. You also see just personal enrichment, you know, a some particular leader, you're seeing
that in Central America right now, where Jimmy Morales and Guatemala just kicked out the UN
Council that was looking into corruption as soon as they started moving from organized crime corruption to campaign finance corruption.
Suddenly they got kicked out of the country.
Are you allowed to do that?
You're allowed to just get rid of the UN?
In that particular case, yes, because they'd been invited in and the UN has to work with
the member state mandate.
So the attorney general, basically the law enforcement had invited them in and said,
hey, we want the UN to clean up our business here. And the executive who had been elected on an anti-corruption platform, but clearly with some problematic background to that, would let them do
what they wanted to do to a certain point, but not too far. Within the confines. So there's a
couple of things that have come up. First off is the campaign violence that you mentioned
to me sounds exactly the same as the rule
that you guys have in ice hockey
where you're allowed to punch each other in the face
until one person falls on the floor.
Like it just seems like a completely bizarre rule
that's kind of loosely associated with the actual game,
but totally should not be allowed.
Like you shouldn't be allowed to punch another sportsman in the face.
In the same way as you should be allowed to use tactics, which encourage people,
persuade people towards your particular point of view, but not punching them in the face.
Like, it's just a...
That seems...
But it's how electoral democracy is supposed to work.
Your violence is supposed to be a shoot by all sides.
But it's so easy, right?
If you can get away with it in these states
and you don't think you can win legitimately, why not?
You can fall back, right?
You have to be pretty grateful.
And so you see this being used over and over and over again
in these countries because they have impunity,
they can do it.
Yeah, I get that.
The other thing, so you mentioned right the very start of that little segment, you mentioned
about countries that have weak democracies or people that generally think about weak.
What do you think the general public at large or potentially even your colleagues as well?
What do you think that they think of when they think of a weak democracy?
What do you think that word brings up?
Sure. So I mean a particular thing. I mean a democracy that is highly, highly polarized
and highly unequal. That's where you see this happen. Highly polarized, highly unequal. So the
people are at each other's throats and won't necessarily believe facts about the other party. So you see
in Italy, for instance, the Christian Democratic Party was pretty tied together with the Mafia.
For many, many decades, they were using them for Get Out the Vote. The Mafia would then get
contracts. The Mafia would be able to hire more people for construction and what have you.
Those were more people to get out the vote and it was kind of a tidy little system. The Communist Party kept saying this. They kept saying, hey look,
the Christian Democratic Party is working with them off you. And the Christian Democrats would say,
that's just the Communist talking. Do you want to believe the Communist besides their
tied in with the Soviet international? And that was also true. The Communist Party of Italy was deeply, deeply paid for by the Soviet Union.
And so they could dissuade people from looking into the mafia contacts by undermining the
credibility of the Communists.
So you see that kind of polarization making it impossible to solve the problem.
And you see high, high levels of inequality.
And the inequality matters because it makes it really hard for the middle class to imagine
what's going on in other people's lives.
When these democracies become violent, the middle class doesn't tend to face the violence.
They tend to look different.
You know, Guatemala, for instance, they're lighter skinned, they're taller, they can be
a head taller than an indigenous person, they live in different neighborhoods.
And so the violence is happening to poorer people, more marginalized people, people who look different.
And when it happens, you read it in the newspaper maybe.
Maybe it doesn't even make the paper
because it's so normal for people to be harmed
in those parts of town.
And you say, well, they're in the bad part of town.
It's just criminals killing criminals.
That's what happens in those parts.
And so you see a lot of rationalization
on the part of the middle class where they say, it's over there, it's not touching me, I can ignore it. And besides, they're probably
involved in the business as it's usually in Mexico, for instance, even though 20,000 people
are dying a year, they say, oh, it's probably just people involved in the business. It's
not regular people like me. And so I can distance myself.
Yeah, yeah, I mean that, I'm going to guess as well that the middle class will be a heavy bulk of the voters as well.
And probably the ones who would be the ones that will swing also and make big differences in elections.
That's exactly right. Because the poor and the marginalized, they just don't vote as much. Maybe they're being maybe they're facing election violence that's keeping them from voting.
Maybe they just exactly exactly who's going keeping them from voting. Yeah, pushing the face here.
Maybe they just, exactly, who's going to play ice hockey following apparently Americans
do.
I don't follow ice hockey, but a lot of people won't play ice hockey if those are the rules,
right?
You're not going to vote with that.
But it might also be that there's just nothing on offer, right?
If it's an oligarchic system, it's a democracy, but basically it's the same elites who run
the show, whether it's right or left, whoever you vote for, nothing's going to change for you. Why take the
time to bother voting? And so you see a lot of people choosing not to vote because they
don't see an option, even if the violence isn't specifically targeting them. So you're
right, the middle class or the voters, and if they can pretend the violence won't hit
them, it can go on for a really long time and get pretty darn bad. I get that. So other than the issues of personal safety and personal privacy and then the,
I guess the manipulation of particular parties getting into power within these countries,
is there a wider problem than this? Is there downstream? Is there something that happens that you can see if these inequalities and these weak, weak democracies continue to roll forward?
Is there a 2.0 version of this, which is a big and nasty abyss that we really need to be worried about?
In fact, yes, so that structure was very...
I was really, really, really hoping you're going to say no, really hope to a good say.
I wish I could say no.
I wish I could say no.
The book I should say is positive.
You know, the book is about how you get out of this system.
So we can talk about how you get into it, but I'd love to talk some about how you get
out of it.
Because that was what interested me.
But yes, it does get nastier because what basically happens is you have a group of politicians
who think we can't win a legitimate clean election. We're not going to
get in power. We want campaign finance money from organized criminals. We want to enable violence
that's electoral violence. We want to take bribes ourselves. And if the voting public knows how corrupt
we are, they're not going to vote for us. So for various different reasons, they think they're not
going to win a particularly clean election. So they enable this violence and use these violent groups to help them fill up their campaign
coffers.
You know, maybe they don't care about the violence, they don't want that to happen, they
just want the money, but they're going to let it happen so they can get the money.
Whatever the cause, that violence starts continuing.
With a middle class buy their way out.
So they buy private security, They live in gated communities.
They buy houses in nice parts of town,
like anyone in any normal place,
they try to do what they can to provide for their kids and so on.
So you see this proliferation of private security services
in a lot of these places.
In Spanish-speaking Central America,
every single country, they outnumber a police, these private security.
And you see that everywhere in Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Pakistan. So that's what the middle class does.
So the violence falls on the poor and the marginalized. And that's kind of the implicit deal with these
countries. You know, you don't kill the voters, you don't kill the middle class. That only happens
by accident, or if it's sending a particular message to someone who's getting nosy and investigative journalist or something.
The violence falls on the marginalized.
What do they do?
Well, they can't turn to the state because state has been politicized.
So the second thing that happens is the leadership, these politicians, politicize their police
and security services because they can't have the police and security services arresting the violent groups that they've promised
to give impunity to, that would break their promise.
So they have to make those groups more political.
And it turns out when you politicize your security services,
good people don't wanna stay in them.
Perhaps not surprisingly, morale just plummets
for people who really wanna do their job.
And what you see is a lot of violence.
If you're a good policeman in a bad system like that that's letting off bad guys, what
do you do?
Some people turn to violence and they say, look, I'm a white hat.
I'm going to use extra-digitial violence because I know that the judges aren't going
to convict these people and the prisons aren't going to keep them.
So you start seeing these death squads that start up from...
That's a terrifying word. ... you start seeing these death squads that start up from terrifying. That's a terrifying word.
Death squads.
I was working the word terrifying.
No, no, just death squads is really what I don't want to bump into. Like at all.
Yeah, you really, it's true. It's true. But you see them proliferate. And then
so those death squads are often conceived of themselves as white hats, right?
They're just going to target drug dealers.
But, you know, first you kill the drug dealers, then you extort some money from the drug dealers,
so as not to kill them, then pretty soon you're a policeman running a criminal gang that's
affecting regular people.
And so that's what you see as this kind of trajectory.
And suddenly, if you're a poor person who's being targeted by the criminals,
you also can't turn to the police because for all you know they're working together. They frequently are.
And if you call the police, you're just as likely to run into the person who's kidnapped
your brother that you're calling the police about as to be helped. And so you don't do that. So what
do you do? Well, the mafia comes in or insurgents come in, the Taliban in Afghanistan or gangs come
in and they say, look, we'll protect you for a price or we'll protect you against the
other gangs or you see vigilante groups start.
And the vigilante groups tend to be young men who want to do the right thing at first,
but you give a lot of 18-year-olds guns and a lot of license and pretty quickly those groups all go downhill too.
And so what happens is you get these self defense groups that become criminal groups.
You get criminal groups that come in and act as more legitimate protection than the state does.
And so you see these things like in Columbia, you had people at Pablo Escobar's funeral,
Pablo Escobar ran the Medellin cartel.
He killed hundreds and hundreds of regular people.
He killed hundreds of police officers.
He set up bombs at bookstores for little kids.
I mean, not a good guy.
But he also built lots of low-income housing, and he built soccer fields for people.
And he gave away a lot to charity.
And at his funeral, people said, we're going to go to his tomb the way we would to a saints
to pray
Because he did so much for the regular person right so you get these Robin Hood criminals who poses Robin Hood and they give away charity
And you see them all over the world and
They're they're doing all these horrible things, but their persona is that
They're the good guys fighting a bad state And they can lodge within these poor and marginalized communities
because the state is even worse.
So in the market, right?
For some of the... Absolutely.
...and stepping. So we've talked about the bad stuff. How can we fix it? Did you come up with
any solutions and if so, what were the roots that you found that seemed to be the most
efficacious at getting around these issues? Absolutely. So it was a positive book. That was my goal. If I couldn't come up with something
good, I was just going to go to Mexico City and open a cooking store or something. I like
it. I could do that. There's no reason to keep studying violence if there was no way to
solve it. Yes. But thanks goodness for my livelihood and my normal life. I did come up
with a very common pattern that you saw in all these countries.
The first step was with the criminals. The criminals would overstep. The criminals would
bring too much violence to the middle class. Usually it was by accident. Usually it was that
criminal groups were fighting amongst themselves and the violence just spilled over.
Or terrorist groups were fighting for recruits and so they were getting more and more elaborate
in their terrorist attacks.
But for whatever reason, the violence finally starts
hitting the middle class.
And then the middle class had a choice.
They could either vote for a more repressive state
in the Central America, it's called Manodura,
Iron Fist Policies in America, they call it three strikes
in your out, but it's basically give the
state more license to kill, give the state more license to lock people up for smaller
reasons.
And if they did that, the violence would get even worse.
And I talk in the book about why those repressive measures tend to backfire.
The gangs meet each other in prison, they learn from each other, they make class the
size behind bars,
because what more can you do, they're already arrested,
so they learn how to run transnational networks.
And so you end up with a much worse problem
if you throw a lot more young men in jail really quickly
for all sorts of reasons.
The other way the middle class could go
is to vote for a more inclusive state,
a less
unequal state. And that was the beginning of things going well. Usually they needed kind
of a social movement to help them make that choice because it's much easier to vote for
repression. It makes a lot more sense, you know, tough on crime and politicians could claim
to be tough on crime while not changing the basic governing structure that was holding
up all this violence. So to fight for inclusion, you tended to have a social movement that said,
wait, wait, wait, this governing order is rotten, it's corrupt,
it's violent, there's bad things happening. In the book, I tell the story of the US
Civil Rights Movement, and then I kind of show how that parallels what happened
in the Republic of Georgia and Colombia and so on. But if you get a lot of people
who vote for a good politician, who runs in order to fight this violence, then you have
a chance. But the politician then has to do a couple of things that are really hard for
one person to do. And in the book I found that sometimes one politician could do all these
three things. In India, that happened. But often it was politicians at different levels
of government.
Because what they had to do was make dirty deals
with the violent groups.
Because the state was so weak that they can't just fight
their way out of the situation.
It's too weak to fight.
Because in Italy, one of the reformist mayors, for instance,
said, I don't even trust my secretary.
I think the mobs infiltrated that far.
And so how do you fight when your
whole state is rotten in Columbia when they were trying to fight Pablo Escobar, the intelligence kept
leaking out of the police and right back to the cartel. So, you know, when you've got a
leaky situation like that, so they need to make deals where they give these criminal groups,
some kind of get out of jail free card, often the chance
to make corruption from jobs in the state.
In Georgia, they put the two big warlords into the state.
They actually give one the Ministry of Defense and one the Ministry of Interior so that
they would stop killing each other in the streets.
So, something not so pleasant, number one, but then number number two they have to make the state more inclusive
So those things are absolutely at odds right the state has to then
Help the poor and care about the marginalized people and make them feel part of the same state
Really hard for the same person to do that and then the third thing they have to do is fight the remaining
Criminal groups and violent groups. So you make it make a deal with, get rid of as many as you can through the deal, create inclusivity which gets you more intelligence and gets you the poor people who had been
inadvertently your undesired, you know, they didn't want to harbor these criminal groups but they
didn't have a choice. They start turning and they start turning to the state and then you need to fight.
If you can do those three things and I saw that that happen, and I know a number of places, but often it was, you know, in Columbia, the president made the dirty deal and did the
fighting, the mayors were the ones who were willing to build a more inclusive state.
So, fine, together it worked, and together they made it happen.
If you could do those two things, or three things, then the state would get much, much better.
And then people could start self-policing and really taking on the role of making sure violence came out of their society and wasn't normalized anymore.
That's not an easy task, is it? Like, we said at the very beginning, I just think that there's a
lot of serious conversations that you probably are a part of. Like, that is to sit down with someone
and go, right mate, congratulations, you've become like King of the Hill for the time being first on the agenda, second on the agenda, third on the agenda, like that guy is not going to be sleeping very well. Well, so one thing I found out about these people who run for office on his platforms is
that first of all, they don't sleep.
They're like the Energizer Bunny.
In fact, in the Republic of Georgia, Sakushvili, who's one of these reformer types, was
known as the Energizer Bunny.
That was his codename because he just didn't sleep.
He had meetings at 12.
He had meetings at midnight.
He had meetings at four in the morning.
He just all night.
They're all like that.
They're all hyperactive. At first, I thought it was just an aberration.
But, and also, I should say, they're not really reformers.
They're very interesting people.
The people who look at a country like that,
you imagine, you look at a country that's basically
a failed state.
There's violence everywhere.
There's corruption throughout the whole system.
It looks like a complete basket case. And you say, you know, look at Venezuela right now and you say
I'm gonna take over and make this place good. You know, what kind of person thinks they can do that?
Well, it's a particular kind of person. It's a very egotistical kind of a person
very high energy and
Someone who really believes in themselves a lot. And you need those characteristics.
So they're good characteristics.
And they need those things to get through
and to do these incredibly tough tasks.
But they have a dark side.
And so you see these reformers start out as reformers.
And then as they start doing things that are more and more
gray and people start challenging them,
they get upset and they get more autocratic and they
get more authoritarian and they need to be thrown out by the same population that voted
them in.
So you see this kind of loop of reform that goes up and then down.
And so it's really important for outsiders to help the reformer at the beginning, but
then recognize when that curve starts to turn and not hold on to them too long. Because if you keep thinking they're a former when they become an
autocrat, that's the story of an awful lot of the independence fighters in a number of
African countries, for instance.
Yeah, I get that. Were there any really surprising stories or any kind of shocking moments while
you're doing your research? You said that you'd traveled to an awful lot of countries,
an awful lot of interviews.
Was there anything in particular,
which I mean, it sounds like there would have probably been
quite a lot of highlights on the highlight reel,
but was there anything in particular that stood out?
Oh gosh, so many stories.
We could talk for another half hour,
but I guess one of them, when I was in Columbia,
I was trying to track down this
investigative journalist. There was an investigative journalist who went by the name of Nacho, like
the chips.
And it sounds like a completely normal, definitely, definitely.
Absolutely. Like the guy who had, he knew what had gone on inside the colleague, Cartel,
and the Meda-Een Cartel. He knew what was going on inside the paramilitary groups.
He had been targeted for assassination 22 times.
Everyone wanted to kill this guy because he knew so much.
The Columbia military had tried to kill in there.
Intelligence services, both the cartels,
the paramilitary, just everyone had it in for him.
I wanted to know some of what he knew because trying to figure out
the violence in Columbia is really difficult.
It's a really complex situation.
So we'd make appointments and cancel the appointments, and I'd make another appointment and cancel,
and I was getting ready to leave Bogota, and I really needed to meet with them.
And finally, main appointment, it is a forced-story walk-up apartment building, and I said, okay,
I'll be there, and he kept that appointment.
So I go up to the apartment building, I walk up the four floors, I'm heavily pregnant.
I should add at this time, I was six months pregnant when I was doing that part of the
research.
So I'm this bowling ball walking up these four flights of stairs and get to his little
tiny apartment, he locks maybe five, six padlocks on the door and then he says, my bodyguard
didn't show up today.
Now in Colombia, bodyguards are given by the government because the violence is so much
that if you've been targeted a lot, you can request a state-funded bodyguard.
Oh my god.
It's an old tactic in Colombia that if the bodyguard doesn't show up, that's when you're
going to be targeted next, because the state will withdraw the bodyguard and then someone
will target you.
They lost a number of presidential candidates this way.
So, he says, my bodyguard didn't shut today.
And I'm thinking, I'm sitting on your couch six months pregnant. But, you know, his teenage
daughters in the room, bite behind me and she's this like lovely, beautiful teenage girl.
And I'm just thinking, well, she doesn't seem scared. She's making a snack. I guess I
will, you know, do this interview. And so, you know, I just sat watching the padlocks on
the door hoping that they held and we did the interview
and he gave me incredible information that was really useful for the book.
And so far so good, he's made it through.
Wow.
Easily in contact with him, I'm going to guess he's a difficult man to get hold of.
Often on, I had to ask him for permission to use the language that I used in the book and things like that.
That's cool.
That's really cool.
Yeah.
Well, those are the guys that are in women who are really doing the brave work.
You know, this, the kind of violence inquiry that they do.
That's why journalists are the canaries in the coal mine for all of this.
That's why they keep getting killed all around the world because they are really the ones
who expose what's going on in these countries.
So they're a degree of lifeblood, I suppose.
So carry on.
Yeah, I'll just do that.
So before we finish, I want you to ask, most of the audience will be from the UK, but
we are exposed to the American politics without exaggeration, probably almost as much as we
are to our own, especially in
the last few months we get the news. It's as newsworthy to hear Trump as it is to
hear Theresa May, which is I think a marker for how kind of dramatized to a degree the
American political system has become. Moving forward, if you were writing an open letter to Donald Trump and to his
advisors, what would you say with regards to trying to improve these inequalities and improve
the way that certain areas of the country are at the moment?
That's interesting. So, first of all, I should say to your UK audience that all the research
was funded by Diffit. Diffit is really trying to figure out how to fight violence in better ways because the taxpayers
passed a law in your country that not .7% of the money has to go to development aid and
of that money, half goes to conflict-affected states and violent states.
They fund research like this to figure out what do we do better.
I'm in deep contact with Diffid and I feel very strongly that they do much better work than they get credit for.
Really, really good work.
What I say to our government, I don't think I would start with Trump to be honest.
I mean, one of the findings of this research is that if someone is complicit with violent groups and wants to run this kind of criminalized governing order,
you can't make headway with that group. That's how they stay in power. implicit with violent groups and wants to run this kind of criminalized governing order,
you can't make headway with that group.
That's how they stay in power.
How does Trump stay in power?
He's staying in power in part with the very nativist audience in America.
They're not necessarily violent, but their interest is in an nostalgic return to whites
being in charge of the country.
A pre-1960.
If you look at the 20% of the voters that propelled Trump forward in the Republican primaries.
So the other half of my brain worked on American politics.
I do international work at the time.
So I think about this a lot.
And if you break down the polls, there were about 20% of voters who weren't all Republican
I should add.
These were often swing voters, typical half-democrat, half Republican, they vote for either side, who propelled him in the primaries after they
voted Republican for that.
They heavily, heavily believed that you can't be a real American if you're not white,
if you're not Christian, if you're an immigrant, you can't be a real American.
Those are not common views in America, but they're the majority among his primary electorate in the electorate. And so that's who he's
campaigning to. That's his base, as you would say. And those people are not wanting to change
the inequality. In fact, they want to turn it back. So I wouldn't go to them. I would
go to state-level governments where, you know, in America America we have a federal system that's quite real,
and there's a lot of states that have leaders who do want to change things.
And if you wanted to fight inequality, there's a couple of things you need to do.
I think the first thing to recognize is that political equality has to come before and
kind of with economic equality. It's not enough just to give away money. There's always talk now about a minimum wage,
a guaranteed minimum wage.
That's fine.
It's good to give poor people some help,
but what you see in places like Bahar India and Colombia
is people need to really be able to vote.
They need to believe those votes count.
They need to be able to change power.
When they have the ability to change power, politicians have to cater to them too, and a democracy. And so ultimately,
that allows them to get the economic help that they need, to get the jobs that they need,
even more than the handouts, and things like that. So the inequality has to start from that level
of political power. And in America, that has a lot to do with lobbying power.
And who gets the right to get some time.
And all of that has a lot to do with campaign finance
in America.
The rules that say that the floodgates of money
can open make elections so expensive in America
that people think it's just pure corruption,
just money for politics.
It's not like that.
I worked for a decade running a very political organization.
And I didn't find almost anyone, there's a handful, but almost anyone who's just corrupt.
What you find is that they have to campaign.
To campaign, they need a lot of money.
To make that money, they need to go speak at fundraisers with really, really rich people.
And so they spend a huge amount of time with extremely rich people, even if they're people
who care a lot about equality and inequality, they're spending all their time with really
rich people so they can get the money together to run the election.
So they're really rich people's ideas rub off.
You know, they can't help but rub off.
And so even if you start off wanting to help the poor, you're thinking about it through the eyes of a very rich person has no idea what really would help the poor.
And over time, it becomes hard to separate those things. So it's the system of money in
itself. It's not the corruption per se.
I totally get that. I'd be absolutely fascinated to have you back on so that we can discuss.
I feel like we've got a really interesting conversation that you could enlighten some of our listeners about the difference between the US and the UK
political systems and why those are the case. I've always been fascinated to work that out. So that
that may have to happen another time, but I've absolutely loved today Rachel. Thank you very
much for coming on. I will make sure that a link to a savage order your new book will be in the show notes below. Where can the listeners find
you online? And also if there's any other resources, if or videos or websites, if people are
interested, have you got anywhere that you could recommend that they could go?
Sure, so they could go to my website, RachelClientField.com, and then they'll find, you know,
the same name is on the book,
and they'll find most things that I do in most videos
and so on, and I can also send you some things
to link to that would go directly to the heart of the matter.
Fantastic, that sounds awesome.
Rachel, it's been a blast.
If I can twist your arm and if the audience want you back
so that we can talk about some UK versus US stuff, that will be cool.
If that's the case, make sure to comment below, drop me a message on Instagram or wherever else you are listening.
But for now, thank you very much.
you