Moody's Talks - Inside Economics - The Trump Whisperer

Episode Date: February 27, 2025

Inside Economics was fortunate to have Trump whisperer John Carney of Breitbart News join the podcast to provide his insight on the Trump administration’s efforts to rework government and reshape economic policy. Urban Institute scholar Jim Parrott helped guide the conversation. Listeners will get a wildly different perspective from that provided by Robert Reich of UC Berkeley on the podcast last week. Hopefully, these back-to-back podcasts on Trump’s policies help put things into clearer relief. Guests: John Carney, Finance and Economics Editor at Breitbart & Jim Parrott, Nonresident Fellow at the Urban Institute If you would like to read more, check out the resources below:John Carney's Time to Put Tax Cuts on the Front BurnerMark Zandi's U.S. Outlook: Wealth EffectHosts: Mark Zandi – Chief Economist, Moody’s Analytics, Cris deRitis – Deputy Chief Economist, Moody’s AnalyticsMarisa DiNatale – Senior Director - Head of Global Forecasting, Moody’s AnalyticsFollow Mark Zandi on 'X', BlueSky or LinkedIn @MarkZandi, Cris deRitis on LinkedIn, and Marisa DiNatale on LinkedIn Questions or Comments, please email us at [e-mail]. We would love to hear from you.  To stay informed and follow the insights of Moody's Analytics economists, visit Economic View. Hosted by Simplecast, an AdsWizz company. See pcm.adswizz.com for information about our collection and use of personal data for advertising.

Welcome to Inside Economics. I'm Mark Zandi, the chief economist of Moody's Analytics. And this is a special bonus podcast, but we'll get to that in a second. Let me bring in my two trusty co-host, Chris DeReedies and Mrs. Dean Attali. Hi, guys. Hey, Mark. Hey, Mark. How's it going?

I feel special. It's special. It's special bonus podcast. Yeah. Yeah. Good, good. Did you see the new, I just, before I got on, I saw that the President Trump announced that the tariffs on China.

they're going up another 10%. And I'm a little confused. They started off at 10 before President Trump's re-election. Now they're at 20. Now they're going to 30, I think, 30%. Is that right, Chris? Do I have that right? Do you know?

You know, I'm also having trouble reading the following. Is it a cumulative? Is it absolutely? We'll figure that out. Yeah. And this just broke, right? So we need to... Just broke.

Yeah. And the tariffs on Canada and Mexico, that's the 25% tariffs. Although I think there are 10% on Canadian energy imports and exports to the United States. I think that sounds like that's going through. And then he also made a comment about the EU, the European Union and tariffs going on going up on the EU. So it feels like we're going down the tariff path here pretty fast. That seems to be the case. Well, and with that news, is that propos.

to introduce our guests. We've got two. We've got John Carney. John is from Breitbart. Hey, John. Hi. And you're the finance and economics editor for Breitbart? That's right. I think it's officially economics and finance. I don't know which one. Oh, I got it backwards. No, well, hold on. You sent me an email. Did I get the email? Maybe, you know, maybe I have it backwards. I'm not a big titles person. They, you know, they ask me what I wanted to be called. I'm just Oh, you're right. Sorry. No, no, wait, it's finance and economics. Is that what you said? Yeah, if that's right. Okay. Are you just trying to confuse them out of the gate? Is this a weird host dynamic? Did I say economics and finance? Did I say economics? You know, it should be

finance and economics because I started my life doing finance and I now write a lot about economics. So, you know, sort of that works out. I always, you know, maybe it's just my, my biases, but I always start with economics. Economics number one and then finance and then finance. But okay, finance and economics, et cetera. And John, oh, and Jim, Jim, you heard Jim Parrot's voice. Hey, Jim. Hey, Jim. Hey, guys. Thanks for having me back. Yeah, it's good to have you back. You know, last time you were on, I was just thinking about this, was almost two, three years ago now, I think. And we were talking, I think it's been that long. And the reason why I remember the podcast is because my wife, it was my birthday and my wife slinked up.

Do you remember this? Yeah, I do. And put a little note in front of me, do I want brownies or chocolate chip cookies or something for my birthday? Do you remember that? Yeah, we're all guilty into saying happy birthday in public. I thought that's right. That's right. You're all guilty.

And of course, everyone knows that Jim and I do a lot of research together. I've been doing that for many years going back. I think Jim, all the way to the financial crisis, right? I think we've been. Yeah, the first paper I ever wrote when I left the administration was opening the credit box. So 2013. And that was your title idea. hated it because it felt like Pandora's box.

It just seemed too evocative of like opening a box you don't want to open. But I lost and it turned out you were right. Opening the bad became like a thing. Opening the credit box became like a catchy, you know, meme before there were memes. But I was nervous about the title. But yeah, so it goes back to 2013.

We go back. It's funny you say that because all the papers that we write, the only thing we argue about is the damn title. The most important part. You lose like half your audience. that to that. We spent all our energy on the damn title. Nothing else matters.

Well, John's titles are very racy too, though. I mean, his are, you know, a little apocalyptic or, you know, he's good with titles. I think he's got a discrepressing. Things we learned at the Wall Street Journal when I was there was how few people scroll. They'll read your headline. They'll read what shows up on the screen. But they don't, they don't push it at all. They, you know, they just move on.

They're they they they by the time you get to the bottom of your story it's like five percent of readers got that far oh yeah so so when i when i made it on to the front page new york times with a terrible story by um the valdemort of journalists who i won't name um timrose uh read style nick your old colleague at the journal and and as a consolation pointed that out he said well you're fortunate because you were were the third bad guy in the story. And so you can come up until the last third. And so the percentage of people that would have gotten to the part where you're thrown under the bus is very low. So you shouldn't worry about it. That made me feel much better. I always have the theory that it's at the bottom of the stories where journalists hide the things that they really feel like should be in the story, but they don't want people to see. So they're, you know, it's all the way at the bottom. So you have to almost read them in reverse if you want to know what's really going on. Interesting.

As everyone can tell, John and Jim go a long way back too. You guys have been talking for a long time since John was at the Wall Street Journal. And John, you seem to know a lot of all kinds of stuff, this whole thing about the scrolling. And then you were telling us about McDonald's Happy Meals or, you know, you can, what's the story there? You can actually ask for the little toy and they'll give it to you? Yeah, a lot of people buy the Happy Meals just to get. the toys, the kids want the toys. Yeah.

But in my experience, if you really need one of those, you know, a lot of times they come in sets, my own daughter really liked the Wizard of Oz. And we were going, we couldn't get one of them. It was the witch. She needed the witch. And we wrote to McDonald's. And they were like, oh, sure, we'll send you, we'll send you the witch. So apparently you can get the toys.

Very cool. I don't know, I don't know if you, you know, if you told them like, I will never eat a hamburger, please, you know, send me the toys. They might not send it to you. We were like, you know, we are loyal customers. Please said it, you know, and they were, they sent it to us. Well, they Googled your name and they saw the headlines. That's what it is.

So probably not how old was that. Yeah, I was at the Wall Street Journal then. So maybe they were, you know, uh-oh, we're going to end up on the front page of the Wall Street Journal with a bad story if we don't get, you know, get them the toys. Get Carney the toys. Hey, so John, tell us, how did you go from the journal to Breitbart? And a little bit about Breitbart. And I should preface this by saying last week, we had had Robert Reich on, former

Labor Secretary Clinton, and obviously a very critical, very strong critic of President Trump and his administration. And guys, I don't know about you. I thought it was a really good interview. But, you know, I thought it would be very good to have you on back-to-back with him, because of your different perspective on things. But maybe you can tell us a little bit about how you got the bright part and a little bit about Bright part itself.

Yeah, sure. So actually, I'm going to start even earlier. So I was, I'm a lawyer. I was trained as I went to Penn Law School. I practiced law at big New York City law firms. I started as an M&A lawyer. I became actually a leveraged finance lawyer. So I did like LBO deals.

And around 2016, I was a little burnt out from that. Or sorry, 2006. Wow. I was a little burnt out from that. I left. I helped start a website called Deal Breaker, which was focused on Wall Street. I then helped turn what was Silicon Alley Insider into Business Insider, still around. And I then went to CNBC for a few years where I launched a website called NetNet, and I did a lot of on-air reports.

Then I went to the Wall Street Journal. I worked originally on the Hurt on the Street column, which was great fun. I mostly covered financial institutions. I then became a sort of general Wall Street columnist for the Wall Street Journal, again, covering financial institutions mostly, but also trends in finance and what was developing not just in the institutions and how they were affecting the economy. And then when Donald Trump got elected the first time around, Brightbart was looking. I had been a reader of Breitbart. I was very impressed. They were clearly on to something in that, you know, the rest of the world hadn't given Donald Trump a chance of winning the Republican nomination. They definitely didn't think he was going to win the election. Breitbart had. So I was very curious about them. And they were looking to expand their coverage. They needed more people. They wanted to hire somebody who could write about finance and economics. And I was, you know, covering the banks at that time. And one of my thoughts was like the action, you know, the action had been in banking, right? Like, I mean, we had the financial crisis. I was, you know, right there writing about that the whole time. Then we had, you know, Dodd-Frank, where there was all, you know, there was a lot going on with banks for the, you know, eight years following the financial crisis. But I really thought, okay, the action is going to move now. Donald Trump. Trump's coming in. There's going to be, you know, we're going to have tariffs. That's, you know,

brand new things going on. Can I do that where I am? No, not really. You know, I was the, I was the Wall Street columnist for the Wall Street Journal, which was a, you know, again, super cool title, right, to have. It was, but when, so when Breitbart came calling, I was like, this is an opportunity to do something new and we'll see how it goes. And it was terrific. I had a ball. It was really fun. I got to, like I said, expand what I got to write about. I now, and we started putting out a product called Bright Bart Business Digest, which is one of my, you know, the favorite things I do. Every weekday, except on bank holidays. I take off if the market's closed because really it's just an excuse for me to like just take a day off. I probably could do it anyway.

But it comes out every day. It's free. It's a newsletter. It comes to people's mailbox, emails. And it has, and we cover everything. You know, I cover, I covered yesterday I did companies abandoning their DEI, you know, pledges. That's all that. A day before that, I did tariffs.

And I do, you know, taxes and budget. I do, you know, even stuff like, you know, people's shopping habits. it's changing. Two years ago, I wrote a lot about how economists and Wall Street analysts were getting stuff wrong when they were like, oh, September shopping was really strong. And now December shopping will be even stronger because it always builds. But people, they were wrong because everybody had moved their shopping to earlier in the year. So in other words, I just get to do a little bit of everything, which is, you know, really fun. Very cool. Thanks so much for coming on. And Jim says you're a bit of a Trump whisperer. Is that right? I am, I like to think that I do, you know, I have a lot of contacts

in the administration. And I also, uh, so I was, uh, to go even further back when I was a very young man, I worked for Pat Buchanan's presidential campaign. Uh, okay. I helped do research for his speeches, for his books. So, you know, and Pat was in very many ways like the paleo Trump, right? like the proto-Trump. A lot of the ideas that are now actually, you know, in coming out of the White House, some version of them were coming out of the Buchanan campaign back in the 1990s in 2000. So I understand the economics in a way. And I think I'm pretty good at explaining it to people who don't necessarily understand it.

So one of the things I do look at like as my mission is a lot of people I think have trouble. like seeing things, things seem crazy to them, or they seem, they have trouble seeing things from the point of view of what Trump is doing. And a lot of the mainstream media is actually pretty bad at trying to figure it out. You know, if you open the New York Times and you try to say, well, what is, what do the Trump people think about this, right? What does Scott Besson? How does he approach it? Stephen Moran, how does he approach it? Kevin has, Kevin's a little more, you know, a little more traditional. So, you know, but I get Kevin. I get Kevin. Just saying, I get Kevin. But the other guys, I think people don't get. And so I get them. And so I think I do a pretty good job. And so that is also

part of the mission of Bright Bar Business Digest is to try to explain to people, here's how to think about this stuff and how how the people inside the administration are thinking about it and how and like try to make sense of it. You don't have to agree with it. But I think it always held. to understand, you know, why are people, why do they think the things they do, what do they think it means, how do they think tariffs work? I think it's, you know, important to understand. Even if you don't ultimately say, yeah, no, I agree with that. You could say, I disagree, but at least you understand what you're disagreeing with. God, it kind of reminds me that. You ever see that movie being John Malkovich? You ever see that? Yeah, I love that movie.

Who's a star in that movie? I can't remember the name. right Jim i'm going to turn this over to you and maybe lead the way here a little bit because i know you're kind of a john carney whisperer so carney knows trump you know john and because you you you indicated to me that you guys have these conversations where you whenever you're confused you will call john up and say hey john can you explain this to me i should charge him for that they should you should personal newsletter

service, yeah. But let me hand it over to you because there's a lot to be confused about, at least from my perspective, and maybe yeah, you take over here. Yeah, one of the reasons why I thought you would be really good on this podcast is very much what you, John, just said, which is

there is an enormous amount of confusion outside of Magaland about what the big picture is here, you know, what the strategy is. It just feels like a lot of chaotic noise. And, you know, it's like the cat running around after the flashing light thing. And it's a little hard to, you know, make sense of. And so you're the best person I've run across to explain these things when I get confused about what sense to make of what's going on in the administration.

And so where I thought we might start is there's been a ton of angst and control. fusion over the movement against the agencies, the different federal agencies. So we start out with an attempt to basically freeze funding or spending out of various agencies. Then you've got a pretty aggressive move to, you know, to fire large numbers of folks at agencies. The courts have sort of gum this up a little bit. But those are these sort of opening moves.

And so the opening moves felt like just a giant cost-cutting sort of exercise. which I thought I sort of understood. But then accompanying that, not long after those opening moves, you had a pretty aggressive move to consolidate power within the executive branch. And so the cutting off of spending at the agencies, you know, felt like a power grab away from Congress in effect to the executive branch, a pushback on the impoundment control act. And then there was more recently a move to really pull power back from the independent

agencies by forcing them to run their regulatory decision-making through O&B, you know, taking away some of their independence in the past. So what began to feel like a cost-cutting exercise seems now to feel much more like a pretty radical restructuring of how the government operates. Is that the right way to think about it? Is that the right way to connect the dots? Yeah. No, it is a, so it is a radical rethinking about how the government works. I will say I don't think it's about consolidation of power within the executive branch, because these are all within the executive branch. So the executive branch has all of this power. The question is who controls the agencies that are executive branch agencies. And there's

both a sort of theoretical background to this, and I'll say a personal background. The personal background for Donald Trump is that he feels like he completely failed to get control of the executive branch when he was president, that large parts of the U.S. government were working against his policies. And you can see this when you read the books that like people who worked for him wrote, they confess like, oh, I hid, you know, Gary Cohen says he hid papers from the U.S. president. So, you know, they would go to his desk and take documents off so that they wouldn't get signed. This is a quick, quick point that he was the former chief of, he was the first chief of staff, wasn't he? No, Gary Cohen is N.C.

And he was NEC, the head of the national economic. Yeah, that's right. Yes. And he would tell, you know, and people would tell Trump things that weren't true. I don't want to pick on Gary Cohn, but there was the large parts of the government were clearly just felt like they didn't need to do what the president was telling them. So one of the things that happened when Donald Trump left office was. and all the people around him said, let's not make that mistake again. Let's not assume that just because we are the president, you know, we hold the White House,

that the rest of the government will do what we say. Now, this is a unique problem that Donald Trump had. Joe Biden did not have this problem. Barack Obama did not have this problem. George Bush didn't have this problem. They did not have, Bill Clinton didn't have the problem. George Bush Sr. didn't have the problem. Ronald Reagan,

maybe had it very early on, actually. But there was a, they didn't have the government basically refusing to obey executive orders, to obey just, you know, to not follow the agenda of the president. So they came in this time with a very clear directive to not let that happen again. So that's part of it. The other part is more almost lawyerly, which is there has been, you know, the theory of the unitary executive that has been, you know, hatched in the Federalist Society and brewing up for years in conservative legal circles,

which is that all of these agencies, everybody, works for the U.S. President. And you've seen this in decisions from the Supreme Court where they say you cannot establish single director, independent single director agencies. They have to be removed. You can't say that they're only removable for cause. They have to be removable at will by the U.S. president. And so the court has backed this up. A lot of people in the administration really strongly believe the idea of that

if you're the Department of Justice, you work for the U.S. president. If you are USAID, you work for the U.S. president. Congress can appropriate money, but the president executes the laws and executes the spending of that. So those are like the sort of two pillars of what's going on. And then with the funding thing, there's an even. Can I ask John really quickly just to make that concrete? Does that mean that Trump believes that he should have control over the Federal Reserve Board's interest rate policy?

I mean, the Federal Reserve is a part of the executive branch. If you just take an extension of what you just said, yeah, he would say, yeah, I should be able to control interest rate. interest rate policy. Does that, does he believe that? You think he's, no. And it's actually, that is super interesting, because you do see a lot of people actually saying, oh, no, you know, like that's sort of the end game where they fear things will go, right? Like, oh, he, you know, he controls the FHFA now. Will he control the Fed someday? He controls, you know, and the answer, and he controls CFPB. Does that mean the president gets it control? No, the reason is because the The U.S. Constitution actually says Congress has control of the creation of money and the

assignment of value. So the Fed's monetary policy is actually a legislative function according to the U.S. Constitution, which is very different from what most of the agencies are doing. They are exercising executive power. The Fed, arguably, is actually, even though a lot of people think it's an agency like the other agencies, it's probably formally best thought of as a kind of super committee of Congress, that Congress has delegated the responsibility of monetary policy that the Constitution assigns to it to a, you know, to a little congressional committee, like the congressional budget office in a way, right? The Fed is that, but for monetary policy. And they that, but there are functions of the Fed that the president probably does have to control.

So the chair for supervision, that's an executive function. Reggie, you know, supervising banks is something, you know, is an executive function. So the question would be, could the president remove the chair for supervision? We don't know, right? Legally, the law says, no, he can't. He serves a, he serves a term, is removable for cause. But every chair for supervision has stepped down when he is no longer serving at the pleasure of the president, including Michael Barr just recently. Donald Trump came in.

So I think that's great, by the way. I don't want to have to, I don't think it's great to like maximally test the legal theories of the Constitution all the time. It's much better if you're like, okay, I'm out of sync with the president's view. I'm not going to make him fire me and cause a crisis and go to the Supreme Court. I'll step down. But I don't think Trump would try to do that to Jerome Powell. And he's actually been pretty explicit when he says, I think I should be able to say what I think monetary policy should be.

I think I should be able to say that they're wrong when I think they've made a mistake, but I'm not going to tell them what to do. They're going to do what they want to do. And I will, you know, I'm the president of the United States and I'll voice my opinion. If you look at the executive order in which the white, House says all independent agency decision making needs to run through O&B, they carve out monetary policy from the Fed's order. So the Fed's included in the executive order, but only in its regulatory functions, not on its monetary function. So they're pretty explicit. If you read the order,

consistent with what you just said, it's clear their theory is all encompassing within the executive branch, including independent agencies on the regulatory side, but they've got this carve out for monetary policy for the Fed, which John just mentioned. So it's interesting. Yeah, I mean, there is an argument that Congress actually has delegated too much power to the Fed, that they, that perhaps they're not allowed to delegate that much power, although one of the Supreme, but the solution to that actually wouldn't be that the president gets to be in charge of it. I don't think they could actually make the president in charge of monetary policy. The constitution assigns it to Congress. So it's a solution.

got to stay in some way with Congress. But, and perhaps the Fed was originally unconstitutional, but the 1970s reforms, which created the dual mandate, actually create what the Supreme Court calls an intelligible principle, which means that there is a direction that the Fed is required to follow set by Congress. So it's not actually that independent. They have a, you know, Congress has created them. Congress has said, here is what you must do pursue maximum employment and price stability, and the Fed operates within that framework.

That may constitutionally save the Fed, make it an acceptable delegation of congressional power. And as I said, even if that was wrong, if somebody, you know, if a court decided somehow, no, they've delegated too much authority, the Congress has to set monetary policy more directly. It would be Congress doing it, not the president. And like you said, I think the people in the office of legal counsel and in the White House now agree with my, you know, what I'm saying. Yeah, I don't want to belabor the point because I do want to get back to impoundment because that's also a critical issue. But when you say the president can opine about interest rates, so let's just say it feels like we got tariffs, inflation's kicking in. inflation expectations are up. These are things the Fed looks at and they say, hey, you know,

by my playbook, the playbook I've been following since the beginning of time, that says no rate cuts and maybe a rate increase. Of course, President Trump may take exception to that and probably would and then start so pining publicly about, oh, the Fed should be cutting interest rates, not raising rates. Don't you think that's interfering with the Fed's independence at that point? No. He's the President of the United States talking to a part of the the executive branch. He's saying, I want lower rates, guys. You don't feel like that that's going to impinge on their independence? Now, Reagan, for instance, was very critical of the Fed. Actually, this has sort of been swept into the dustbin of history, I guess. But people don't remember

that Ronald Reagan's people actually really worried that Paul Volcker was going to crush the economy, which it did happen, and that that was going to undermine support for Reaganomics. They were trying to get the economy going with their tax cuts. And instead, we kept falling into a recession because interest rates were so hot. And Reagan actually, not just Reagan, but Reagan's people as well, were very, very critical. Later on, everybody wanted to pretend that didn't happen because everybody agreed that like, oh, it was a good thing. They crushed inflation.

And so, but, you know, so that nobody, but you can look it up. You know, it's in the history. Yeah, yeah. I didn't know that. Yeah. It's in the archives. And I actually don't, I've seen a lot of, like when Trump spoke in Davos, or to Davos, I guess he didn't go there. But when he spoke, had his, you know, Zoom call to Davos, he said, when inflation comes down, I will demand that the Fed cut right away.

He made it very contingent. That got kind of misreported because the headlines said Trump demands, Trump says he will demand the Fed. cut, right? But he actually and his economic advisor certainly realized that inflation basically undid the Biden presidency and is the biggest threat to the Trump presidency. He has inherited a high level of inflation. If inflation continues at a high level or gets much worse, that will be very bad for everything Donald Trump wants to do, bad for the Republican Party, bad for, you know, who ever comes next, J.D. Vance's chances to win in 2028. So they, I do not expect that if there is, you know, a rising price level or a rapidly accelerating rise in price level that Donald Trump

will be demanding cuts from the Fed. But last time around, we had very low inflation. And he I don't know. The point is that whether he's, he's an agreement or not agreement, the point is that he's weighing in on it. Yeah. And the way he weighs in on things, he weighs in heavily on things. Although, again, like, you know, I'm not sure it's going to be Ronald Reagan-esque the way he weighs in, you know. Well, like we're saying in the beginning.

And it's about perception, John, isn't it? It's about what global investors think. It's not, that's what matters. It doesn't matter what Trump is actually saying. It's how they interpret it to what he's saying. And if they think, oh, you know, he's going to impinge on the impendence of the Fed, that has implications, real life implications. I don't think people think that he's going to do that.

One, because he didn't. He was really mad the last time around when they were raising rates right after he got elected. The Fed started hiking after, you know, 10 years of zero. They started raising rates right after he got elected and kept raising, so much so that later on the Fed basically admitted they were wrong. They should not have kept raising as long as they did. But Trump didn't interfere. And also one of the things we were talking about earlier is vast.

parts of the U.S. government seem to think that they can ignore Donald Trump, right? They, they, people, you know, they get an email that says, tell me five things you did last week. And half of the, you know, the federal employees are like, nah, definitely not going to send you an email about that. Right. So if Trump can't. I could tell you, if the Moody CEO sent me an email like that, I'd say, nah, I'm not responding to that. I assure you, I assure you, I would not. Because, you know, what, I mean, come on, really? But my point here, though, is that if Trump can't get USAID to carry out Trumpian policies, why would anybody fear that Jerome Powell is going to cave to Donald Trump, right?

You know, what's funny about this, though, is that argument's probably much stronger in a Jerome Powell world because we've come to believe the guy's got a backbone. And so in a dynamic in which Trump is banging on the pulpit, as it were, and yelling by interest rates, you know, I can envision Powell being very statement, statesmanlike and pushing back in his Fed-like unintelligible way that those of us who understand feds be, you know, see as being statesman-like. But I could also imagine Powell eventually being succeeded by somebody who's not like that and who does respond much more quickly to Trump for whatever reasons. And then you've got a tricky, I don't know what that outcome is,

but I can imagine a world in which Trump puts somebody in who is more malleable to, you know, to Trump's liking. And then the dynamic is different. He bangs at the bully pulpit. The other person moves for whatever the reasons. The market's going to do that differently. I feel better about all this in a Powell world than I would in perhaps a Powell's successor world, I guess.

So that's actually super interesting because I've thought about this a lot because Powell will be, his term is going to run up halfway through, halfway through. 26th, right? Yeah. So he will be replaced. Donald Trump is not going to reappoint him. Really? That's definitely news.

He is not going to reappoint. And so what, so what happens? Well, interestingly enough, and this is kind of weird, I will say. The people who people talk about being the next chairman under a Republican president are all Uber Hawks. They are, you know, they are people who really worry about inflation. They think the Fed, you know, they were super critical of the Fed's cuts. A lot of them think that QE went on too long. A lot of them think the Fed kept interest rates too low for too long.

A lot of them said things that turned out to be really wrong that like, you know, during the post-financial crisis that QE was going to cause massive inflation, all those things. But these people are pretty hawkish. So I don't know what Trump does with that, to be honest. Like, does he find a guy who is Trump, you know, who wants, you know, to have, you know, and Trump is a, is not a hawk. He is somebody who likes low interest rates. Maybe because he's been such a huge debtor in his life.

You know, that's his instinct, right? Is like, I borrow money. I want it to be at a low rate. I'm now in charge of the federal government. I want to borrow at low rates. So I want the Fed to have a low rate policy. That may be what's going on. but does he have somebody lined up to do that?

I don't think he does. And then the other thing is by the time Powell resigns, by the time his term is up, Trump will be on his way out. We will have a, you know, he will have two more years of his presidency, almost a lame duck. I'm not sure that the next chairman,

who will be in there for four years, will actually be that worried about Donald Trump. Right? He'll say, even if he was somebody who, you know, might really love Donald Trump. Could Donald Trump push him around? Probably not because he would say, well, you know, I got to really worry about what happens next. And that might be a Democratic president, might be a Republican president. We may have a Democratic Congress at that point. You know, midterms don't often go well for the party in charge. So I'm not that worried about like the next guy

either because I just don't think, I don't see the scenario. I'm actually more worried that Donald Trump actually appoints somebody who is an Uber hawk and then is like really, really upset about it. It's like, what did I do? This guy just, you know, the slightest whiff of inflation, these guys are jacking up interest rates. I thought that was my guy. He might be really upset about it, but I don't think there'll be nothing he can do because, again, that is a legislative function. I think the feds, the chairman of the Fed is actually a pretty safe position. And I don't think they'll be, I think they've been, I know this. They've been told by the. office of legal counsel that you probably cannot remove the chairman of the Fed.

So they know that they, you know, while they can kick out the heads of, you know, every other executive agency and at least anyone that's run by a single director, that's the other thing. The Fed is also run by a board, even though we all talk about the chairman. The board actually also helps it be more constitutionally appropriate in the Supreme Court's view. but they know they can't remove the chairman. I actually was more skeptical than they were, to be honest. I had to be talked into the position that you can't remove the chairman, but that's how they see it.

Well, we got so much to talk about in so little time. You've got to come back. But I want to talk up. There's a bunch of questions I've got. Let's first talk about impoundment a little bit because that is really critical. with regard to the separation of power between the executive and, uh, and,

in legislative branch. I also want to talk about, um, you know, what seems from my perspective and I think others the kind of the drama and chaos that is coming from everything that's being thrown out there on policy. There's a lot going on and get your, your, your, your comments and feelings about that.

Uh, and I also want to get an understanding of, um, do you think there's any, guardrails here on what the president might do. You know, my, and we'll come back to it, but my thought has always been that he's very sensitive to the economy's performance, the stock market, and probably now the bond market, and that if those, he's getting signals from those places that things aren't going in the

way he thinks. By the way, I think tariffs are a really bad idea. Broad-based tariffs are a really bad idea. You're familiar with your views on tariffs. Yeah. And it's, and I hope I'm wrong, but I'm going to be right. And the question is, when will President Trump see that and will he react to? But let's come back to that. Let's go. So that's where I want to go in the time we have. So just so we know, because we're all going to run out of time here. So impoundment. Jim, you want to explain empowerment? And. Oh, yeah, sure. So there was a law passed in the mid-70s, 1974, I think, that effectively says that executive. branch has to spend the money that Congress is appropriate if the executive branch to spend. Because up until that point, the presidents prior to that act had felt that they had some flexibility and that basically appropriation set a ceiling, not a floor, for what the executive branch was to

spend. And so in some cases, in this case, Nixon decided, thanks, but no thanks. you know, there's some programs I don't want to fund at the level you funded, so I'm not going to. Congress didn't like this. They passed this law that requires, on the terms of the law, the president to spend what Congress is appropriated. And so the question then, which, and I'll have to turn over to John, the question then is by freezing funding at the agencies, if it seems temporary, then perhaps it's not an impelment control act problem. But if it feels like you're telling them, do not spend this money that Congress is appropriated, it seems like a violation of the Impoundment Control Act, raising the question of what's going on, why are they doing this, what's the long game? And so, John, you want to sort of take it from there? Yeah, no, that's really good. Yeah, Nixon, by the way, was he was almost the, you know, the maestro of

impoundment. He just impounded everything he could get his hands on. That's probably what, you know, of why Congress changed the law, because they were like pretty upset about it. Plus Congress was feeling very uppity in the Watergate era, right? Like they were like, okay, we're gonna really get into this and we're gonna tell, I mean,

that's where the Fed reforms came from, you know, the Humphrey Hawkins Act to be, you know, the, and the Empowerment Control Act. So a couple of things are going on there. One, there's a lot, there's a very influential people the administration believe that impoundment control act is unconstitutional, that you can, that the

Congress cannot tell the president he must spend funds. They can appropriate funds, but it is up to the U.S. President to do it. You can come up with a lot of scenarios where it's actually impossible for the president to do something. So let's say Congress creates a subsidy for a certain type of solar panel. And it's a grant. And you have to apply for the grant. And so the Department of Energy writes down the criteria for who can get the grant. And they put out the request for proposals and people sent it in their grant requests. But nobody qualifies. Does the president have to spend the money that Congress appropriated if nobody qualifies? What if nobody even applies? Does the president have to spend the money if nobody even applies for the money?

That's absurd. Clearly not. So at least in some cases, the president can say, no, I am not going to spend this money. The president probably does have to carry out the program that Congress has put in place. But if he can do it for less money, for instance, let's say Congress appropriates a billion dollars to build electric vehicle. chargers around the country. And, you know, Elon Musk figures out, you know what, we could do it for $500 million. And they build all of the ones that, you know, there's no more chargers to build. They're everywhere. They're saying, can, you know, is the president violating the law if he has

accomplished the goal of Congress, but not spent all the money? Probably not. And so I think, and certainly as like a matter of constitutional law, it has been a theory. among conservatives for quite some time, that at least in the extreme cases, the law is unconstitutional. And so I think one of the things we're seeing is they're lining up tests for this. So they're trying to see, first, you know, they're going to try to defund things that Congress hasn't directly appropriated. So USAID was one of those, where Congress actually didn't created, it was created through executive order. There's no direct, there's, you know, I don't forget, actually, whether USAID is one that gets direct congressional appropriation. Anyway, so the point is,

what they want to do is actually take some of these cases and test them. They think they're right. They think that the Supreme Court is going to side with them. They know they will be sued. I mean, all of these lawsuits, all of these district court judges that are issuing nationwide bans on parts of the government following Donald Trump's orders. This was absolutely in the plan. They knew that they would be blocked everywhere and at every point. They want and they said, that's great, because we are going to bring this to the Supreme Court and we're going to win.

They actually think they're not only going to win that. They think they're going to get the judiciary to rein in the judiciary. They think that the Supreme Court is going to tell all of these judges that you may not, may not issue a nationwide ban. If you are a district judge, you can ban something in your district, but a nationwide ban has to come from at least an appeals court or probably the Supreme Court, and they'll probably win that as well. So play this out for me. So let's say they run the table on all this. So let's say that ultimately once the judicial dust settles, whenever that is, they've knocked out the Impoundment Control Act. And so now the executive branch has

control over what programs it wants to fund and what it doesn't want to fund. They run the table on their ability to fire employees and sort of compromise the independence of the independent agencies by running through OMB. So they succeed in all of that. So now the power, much power shifts, not just Wednesday branch, an executive branch, but to your point, to the White House within the executive branch, what's the ideal governing, like what do you do with that new finely tuned, I guess, more narrowly targeted kind of structural power in the executive branch? Like where do they go with this? I guess.

So one thing I want to just add, and then I'll try to answer this, is interestingly enough, the conservatives on the Supreme Court actually weakened executive power through their Chevron decision. So they used to defer to what these agencies were doing. Now, they say no we're not going to so they so there that's actually pulling in a different way and I think it's important to keep in mind because Donald Trump cannot say I interpret this law to mean this and therefore and the Supreme court will sorry the judiciary will defer to my view on that because of Chevron he doesn't have that armor anymore Chevron armor for agency decisions is gone and so he so he's so even though power may be, I would say, democratized, right? It is being given back into control of somebody who

gets elected by the United States people. It is, it is, there is a, there is a stronger check on it than there has been in 40 years because the judiciary will no longer defer in statutory interpretations. So it's, it doesn't, it's not as much power as people think if you put Chevron together with the unitary. Just quickly, Chevron for those folks who are. Sorry. Yeah. No, that's right. Jim and I are lawyers. Yeah, right. So Chevron, prior to this decision, there was a long tradition and judicial support for a great deal of deference to executive branch agencies deciding how to interpret ambiguous congressional mandate. So if they got a a rule that said, DoE, you've got to do X, Y, and Z.

And there are multiple ways in which you can interpret what that meant. The courts largely deferred to the agency to decide how to figure that out. Recently, the Supreme Court weighed in and said, no, if it's ambiguous, the court gets to figure that out, not the agency. And it's a pretty significant, as John put it, retrenchment of power, you know, back into really Congress. because now Congress is going to have to take all those ambiguous areas where now it's going to get locked up in the courts over whether or not the agency is supposed to do X or Y because it's not clear. So now it's going to get kicked back to Congress to ultimately clean all that up so that the agencies have some more clarity about what they're supposed to do. Notably, we're doing this at a time when Congress can't tie its shoes. So it'll be interesting to see, you know, how effective all that works.

But yeah, to John's point, that does cut the other way in this whole consolidation of power argument. So, John, though, just to complete the conversation around impoundment, I mean, you went to the extreme to make your point. Let's go to the other extreme. I mean, what's the role of Congress then? So I think Congress gets, what the president can't do, right, is say, you know, so Congress says like, okay, we are going to provide funds for, for emerging, for, you know, flooding the Mississippi River floods and Congress votes that they're going to. do it. What the president can't do is say, no, I'm not going to help the Mississippi flood victims. But instead of spending the Congress appropriates $25 billion for that, he could say, I'm going to only spend five. Yes. Or I could spend $1 of that. No, because I do think the courts will say, no, Congress may have to get very explicit about this, right? Here is what we are going to, we are appropriating these funds, and we are going to tell you what you need to do with them.

You have to accomplish the mission to the extent you can with the funds we have. And then, you know, post-in-post the without the Impalment Act, the president would at least have to show that he did everything he could do, accomplish those goals. Okay. So the way to square this circle might be just legislation, the way legislation is written. And this goes back to the Chevron case. It's just got to be more.

You got to, you guys, there's no gray area here. You got to give me the black and the white. And the courts have been saying, like particularly the conservatives on the courts, have been saying this for years, that Congress has basically fumbled its job, that they write these statues, and that the way that Chevron and that stuff was actually encouraging that. And perhaps the impoundment control act was encouraging that as well. They could just do big things, say, spend this much.

and, you know, figure it out. Now Congress will probably have to be more precise about it. And I think that's probably good. You know, like Congress, one of the reasons Congress may not be all that competent is because they haven't had to be. And so to the extent they do, I think that could be actually an improvement in the governing system. By the way, I just want to point out that this could, this, everybody right now is looking at this through the Trump lands. right? They're saying, oh, what if Trump doesn't do it? Let's say we have Kamala Harris as our president and a Republican Congress says, build the wall. Here is $50 billion, right? Does Kamala Harris

have to spend the $50 billion? Not if the Empowerment Control Act is gone. She will have to build something, but she will not have to spend $50 billion. So this is, you know, conservatives should probably also be, you know, prepared for the fact that this, if we, get rid of the Empowerment Control Act. This will become a power that Democratic presidents will be able to use as well. And Democrats should also realize, okay, yeah, like, I might not like Donald Trump doing it, but man, I'm going to love it when we get to turn down spending on this nonsense, you know, Congress could have appropriate defense spending that we don't have to spend. We have to defend the country, but we don't have to do. There's a lot of things where, you know,

it can go both ways. It does suggest that the pin, what this does, is if they run the table in all these legal cases, by taking us to almost a more UK-like governance structure, where power is consolidated enough, where whoever has won the White House can toggle the HUD, you know, spinning switches up or down in whatever way they want, the pendulum will swing politically in a way that will flow through to policy in a way that it hasn't a long time. You know, if you don't like block grants, we won't have block grants for the next four years. If you don't like Section 8, you know, maybe, you know, so in whatever the other version swing the other way would be as well. So it's a, it does seem like it makes the,

the White House part of the executive branch a more powerful instrument, but that cuts, that can cut either, either way. Maybe it increases voter turnout, right? Like, we're, we are really increasing the stakes of democratic elections. And I think actually that's kind of what people want. At least that's the, that's the, you know, Trump populist theory of it, that that's what people voted for, not just for Donald Trump, but for, you know, more popular control of the U.S. government. Chris, you want to weigh in? I'm just curious, does this open us up for more impeachable offenses as, you know, going down the UK models? Is this more of a non-confidence, no confidence votes? If, You know, if the president is now not spending fully, but, you know, there's that debate about,

did you make a good faith effort? Or did she? Yeah, I mean, I think that's actually right. And the Supreme Court has said that a bunch of times, like, oh, okay, well, if Congress thinks that the president is violating the law by not spending money, by not carrying out its wishes, it's probably not the job of the judiciary to say, no, we're going to force you to spend the money. It's the job of the legislature to say you've broken the law. Now, is that a high crime and misdemeanor? Maybe it has to be a really, you know, really egregious thing. Like shutting

down an agency, maybe? I guess that depends on your view of shutting down agencies, but sure, you know, it could be that I do think it raises the possibility of impeachment fights over policy in a way that we haven't seen for a long time. But we did see that, by the way, in like the post-Civil War era, you know, like it has happened before. We're running out of time. So let me, I know. And if you're a game, I'd love to have you back. Absolutely.

Continue to conversation because there's like so much. And it changes hourly. But let me just tee this last bit up with the following. You know, a lot of economic policies being made very quickly, tariffs, immigration policy, tax spending policy. We just talked about regulation, fed independence. descendants, doge cuts. I mean, I, you know, I'm having a hard time keeping it up.

There's so much stuff I can't even list all the stuff that are going, that's going on. It's definitely creating uncertainty out there. There's a lot of uncertainty. Just take the tariffs. Right. Are they on? Are they off? Which countries, which products over what period of time, you know, and you can see

then the uncertainty measures, the NFIB small business organization survey. You can kind of feel it's having impact on the economy. It feels like the economy is getting softer here. People are getting cautious. You can feel it in the equity market, the equity market. Now, maybe I'm reading too much in the recent days. I think that's right. I think we see a lot of stuff.

Okay. So what's the, is the president focused on these things? Will he change his mind? Will he pivot? Like in our forecast, let me just be frank. In our forecast, and I'll take the, tariffs as the example. We have tariffs going from effective tariff rate going from 3%. That's where we were before President Trump's second term to a little over 10% over the course of the year. And then we

have it coming right back, the tariffs coming right back in for the most part except on China by the end of 26 and 27 because in our view, in our modeling, and this is just very standard stuff from the macro or economic perspective. Tariffs are bad for growth, especially if you have retaliation. And we're assuming the president responds to that weakening in growth and the poor performance and the impacts on the equity market. And that's why the tariffs come in. We don't go into recession.

The economy continues to go forward. But it all depends on the president's being responsive to what's going on. So I just said a lot. What do you think? So I think that's not an unreasonable projection. I would actually, the causation is what I don't think we will get a lot of retaliation. I actually think particularly now that Trump has said he wants to do reciprocal tariffs, I think that this will actually cause a lowering of tariffs across the world and that we will see,

except with China, because most countries probably can lower their tariffs and do very well. China's system is very different and requires them to run giant surpluses against the world. So they will have a very different problem. And so I think you're right about that as well. But so what I see is tariffs going up. The world replying to this by saying, okay, well, we have the secret formula to get Donald Trump to take away those tariffs, right? How do we get, make sure we continue to have access to the U.S. market? But we have to overcome our internal special interests, which who are the ones who are demanding the tariffs that probably are, you know, not very helpful to their economies.

But now that we are being hurt by tariffs because we can't export to the U.S. without paying them, then we have the problem. Then we have enough political power now and an economic excuse to lower our own tariffs. So Donald Trump is actually empowering free traders around the world to get rid of their tariffs in response to his terms. So I say it as not retaliation, but as reciprocal lowering. And I think that's where this goes. But so, you know, that actually ends up puts us on the same place, interestingly, right? Like you and I would then project the same thing. Tariffs go up and then they come down.

It's just the causal mechanism is different. Oh, it's not caused by weakening in the economy, you're saying. The economy is going to be fine. Yeah, I think the economy will be fine. I don't, I disagree. I do think that tariffs can be used to actually increase national income. I don't want to get too into the technical details of like optimal tariff theory, but I do think that we can, that it will not hurt the U.S. economy very much. As you said, a lot of the work on why tariffs hurt.

actually depends on the retaliation, right? That it is when we then lose our ability to export, that's where the, you know, that's where the real damage comes from. And you're not alone in seeing it that way. You know, that's the way a lot of Wall Street analysts, it's the way a lot of economists see it, that the retaliation will be what hurts.

I think we're not, I don't think we're, we may get some retaliation because people will test Donald Trump. But when they retaliate and then Donald Trump retaliates to the retaliation because he said they're reciprocal, right? So if you raise it, then they come down. Okay, okay. Let me just stip. Let me just let me stipulate.

They come from, you know, they're all important. Let's suppose you're wrong. And this hurts the economy. Sure. And then there's more stuff going on than just retaliation. I mean, the uncertainty effects here are pretty significant. Sure. And we're in a different inflationary environment than we were in Trump one.

And I'm not so sure that this is a one-time pop to prices. You know, it feels like this could. And people are really very sensitive to inflation, as you can see in the survey. It's having an impact. But so let's say Mark Zandi is right. And this is going to hurt the economy. Do you think President Trump's going to respond to that and pull back or we're going down this, we're going down the rabbit hole with him on this one? I don't.

So I think he will try many things. before backing off on tariffs. So in other words, remember, there's a whole list of things. And if none of them work, sure. So he wants to, you know, incentivize energy production to lower the cost of energy. Now, that's a difficult thing to do. We don't have time to go into all of that. But so.

Which is not going to happen, John. He wants to massive, he wants massive deregulation. He wants to encourage, they are, they've begun to announce, how they are going to build a lot more home. So there's a lot of things that they're doing. Now, if all of those fail, like you said, there's reasons to doubt. You know, rational people can disagree about whether or not we can really increase energy production and lower prices. Because, you know, in the past, when prices fall, our production falls off, right?

So can you do both, right? That's it. I agree, a challenge. And so if that stuff fails, and it does, and it does seem like the tariffs are hurting, I think Donald Trump would back off. I don't think, though, I don't think he is as sensitive to stock market movements as maybe he was in the first term or people believe he is now. Well, now I'm more scared. Yeah. I think, yeah, I, you know, this is going to sound like Uber bearish, but I would be worried.

that Donald Trump is willing to let the stock market take hits more so than people give him credit for. A lot of people think the stock market will be a break on Donald Trump. And I do not think that. John, did you, you may not read the Wall Street Journal anymore. I'm not sure. I do. I read that piece a couple days ago. There's this guy Zandi talking about the wealth effects.

Did you catch that? Yeah, yeah. I'm just saying the link between the stock market and the economy. It's a huge believer in that, by the way. I also like I think it's Roger Farmer's work who has shown that you know like the stock market actually influences employment pretty directly. And so I'm a believer in that. So I do think that you cannot really ignore the stock market for very long because that's a car carrying member of the capitalist system. I'm part of a.

By the way, John, I started my own company. I grew up with a small business. I sold it to Moody's, but I've been part of it. So I've seen American business from all angles. And I know American business. And I totally endorse what you said. Everyone is looking at that stock prices as a real-time test of how they're doing. Stock prices are up.

I'm hiring. I'm investing. Stock prices are down. Can I clarify something you said, John, to make sure I have this right? What I heard you to say up until the very end, which is, well, I want to make sure I understand this, is he's not going to be as sensitive to the same. stock market as he was last time, by which I took you to mean, at least initially, that we may move further into a downturn in the stock market before he's willing to back off

of whatever the plan is, whereas in the first term, it would maybe take a few days for him to think twice about whatever Manichita had told him this time around, you know, we'll cut through some fat and get to muscle before he gets concerned. But at some point, I assume, matters to him and becomes a constraint. It's just not as soon as it would have been earlier. Is that fair? Yeah. I don't. And look, Besson and Lutnik are, you know, guys who came from Wall Street. They're not, you know, they're going to tell him, yeah, you can't just, you know, stock market drops 50% where, you know, the country is doomed. We, you cannot, you know, have that happen. So we, they will, you know, there, there are people who will pay very close attention to this.

And I think just psychologically, I think Donald Trump does like it. All presidents do what they don't all talk about it quite as much as he does. But all presidents like it when the stock market's going up. They look at it as a testament, you know, just like CEOs look at the stock as a testament to their, you know, their company's stock as a testament to how amazing of a CEO they are when, you know, some studies have showed that it really doesn't matter that much who the CEO is. Except, you know, except Moody's CEO. Yeah, so of course, right.

And of course, the CEO of Reipart is the most important, you know, person. Yeah, there you go, exactly. But, you know, but presidents, I think, tend to look at this as like an objective indicator about how things are going under their presidency. So Donald Trump is just uniquely, like, you know, doesn't conceal his opinions as much as a lot of other presidents have. Hey, we're going to have to call this a podcast. I mean, that was really, really appreciate it.

I mean, I really have a better appreciation. of kind of your perspective, a different perspective, and I thought it was very valuable. And, hey, Jim, thanks for helping flushing all that out. No, I enjoy. Thanks, John. And we didn't even get to GSE release. We got a lot of time. Yeah, we're definitely getting you back. I mean, if you will have us.

Hey, guys, thanks again. And dear listener, I really appreciate it. And we'll talk to you soon. Take care now. Bye, bye.