Motley Fool Hidden Gems Investing - Aswath Damodaran on Valuation, Inflation, Bezos, and Musk
Episode Date: September 11, 2022If you know you’re impatient, then value investing isn’t for you. Aswath Damodaran teaches corporate finance and valuation at the Stern School of Business at New York University. Motley Fool CEO T...om Gardner caught up with the “Dean of Valuation” for a discussion on: - Inflation’s new questions for investors - Tesla valuations (from $50 billion to $1 trillion) - Incentives, correlations, and costs in ESG scoring - Jeff Bezos, Elon Musk, and the companies they've built Stocks mentioned on the show: TSLA, MO, BLK, AMZN If you're a member of any Motley Fool service you can access the full interview here: https://www.fool.com/premium/live/video/4056/coverage/2022/08/31/navigating-inflation-behavioral-investing-and-mark/ Host: Tom Gardner Guest: Aswath Damodaran Producer: Ricky Mulvey Engineers: Dan Boyd, Austin Morgan Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices
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If you're naturally impatient and you try to be a value investor, you're going to fail.
You're going to fail because no matter how much you tell me about how much you believe in value
investing, you're just temperamentally unsuited to be a value investor. Now, that's why I end
the book with a statement, which is the best investment philosophy is the one that fits you
as a person. The person you need to understand the most to be a great investor is not Warren
Buffett or Peter Lynch, it's you. I'm Chris Hill, and that's Aswath Damodaran.
He teaches corporate finance and valuation at the Stern School of Business at New York University.
Damodaran is a top valuation expert. He's written textbooks on the subject.
Motley Fool CEO, Tom Gardner, caught up with him for our recent FoolFest investing conference.
We wanted to bring you part of that conversation as Damodaran weighs in on how the Federal
Reserve could misread inflation data, the cost of ESG scoring, and how Jeff Bezos and
Elon Musk have built their companies in different ways.
I wanted to just start with your reflections on inflation and maybe teaching those who are
encountering inflation for the first time in any significant way, what are the domino effects of
high levels of inflation for corporations, individuals, etc.? I'm going to start by saying
it's not high levels of inflation per se that are the issue. It's high unexpected levels of
inflation that are the issue. And to illustrate exactly what I'm saying, let me give you a choice
of two economies to operate in. One is 8% inflation, the other is 5% inflation. And first
side to saying, I'd rather operate in the 5% inflation economy, it's got lower inflation.
But let me add something to that example. Let's assume the first economy is 8% inflation,
but it's guaranteed to be 8% every year in perpetuity. In other words, it's 8% and fix.
The second economy is 5% inflation, but it goes from 2% to 8% back to 2% to 8%.
The average inflation is 5%.
I would argue that as a business or as an investor, you'd have an easier time operating in the first economy than the other.
Why?
Because if inflation is fixed, it's easy to build in.
Your contract's incorporated.
So if you go out and buy a bond, you charge a 9% coupon rate, you know it will cover inflation.
It's unexpected inflation that's so damaging to us.
not just as businesses, but as investors. I mean, imagine buying a bond with an expected
inflation rate of 5%. So you charge a 6% coupon rate, but inflation comes in at 8%.
You've been, you know, you've in a sense given up some of your value because inflation came in
higher than expected. I think what has us in the place we're in is we've been spoiled. We've had
a decade of low and stable inflation. It's not just inflation has been low. I computed the
standard deviation in inflation by decade going back to the 1930s. 2010 through 2020 had the
lowest standard deviation in inflation of any decade in history. We've had low and we've been
spoiled. In fact, the way we've been spoiled is most of us haven't even thought about inflation,
including me, for a long time. I wrote my first two posts on inflation in the last two years.
Why?
Because inflation is now back in the game, and we've got to think about it more consciously.
So if you're 25, 30, 35, you've never dealt with inflation before.
It's not that you cannot learn, but there's going to be a learning curve.
It'll mean requiring you to build in inflation explicitly into almost every decision you
make.
And that's going to take a little bit of work.
Stanley Druckenmiller, a wonderful investor, has said recently that when inflation or CPI
rises above 5%, you really do not get soft landings. So what does a hard landing in this
scenario look like? Well, the first thing it looks like, it could be personal. You could lose your
job. I mean, people talk about recessions and recoveries in the abstract, but the reality is
recessions are painful. People lose jobs. Their wages get cut. And sometimes and often the only
time to deal with inflation that's out of control is to bring the economy to a crashing halt.
So a hard landing here would be a recession that is long and painful.
A soft landing would be a recession that's much milder and much less painful.
But there's going to be pain no matter what.
And the question is, how much will the pain be and how long will it last?
So I think it depends, again, very much on how quickly inflation comes back to levels that we can live with.
I mean, the last month has been an upbeat month in terms of inflation.
But that's often the case when you have inflation that's out of control.
You have periods of hope where you say, hey, maybe inflation is coming back under control.
In many ways, that can actually be damaging because what happens then is central banks ease up.
They say, okay, the worst is over.
Why put the economy into recession now?
In fact, I think we're going to find very quickly whether Jerome Powell is more Volcker or more Burns
because Arthur Burns was, you know, I feel sorry for the man.
And he had a long and distinguished career as an economist, but with a way to remember
ministry as the Fed chair from 1970 to 78, where they repeatedly started on an attempt
to fight inflation and repeatedly gave up too early.
So I think that the worry I have when inflation has a couple of good months is the Fed will
say, you know what, let's ease up now.
So let's see if the Fed is staying power here to fight inflation, because it will require
a lot more than what's already been done, which would also mean more pain for people at the very
bottom of the spectrum, because they're not investors. They often work for their wages,
and their wages are the ones that are at risk most when you have to fight inflation.
So your preferred scenario would be to see someone like Paul Volcker step in and take the medicine
now. And maybe Jerome Powell has the backbone to do it, I think, because it will require a backbone,
because politicians hate hard landings.
Why?
Because elections happen during the hard landings.
You lose your job as a politician.
So politically, it's never been easy to have a hard landing.
People forget that even Paul Volcker felt a great deal of pressure.
And you got to give Ronald Reagan enough credit to say,
look, he let Paul Volcker continue on his path of,
we're going to fight inflation first and worry about the economy later.
because that often is the mindset that might be needed to fight inflation.
And really any category, any financial asset can become overvalued or undervalued. And some of them
you can be rewarded for tremendous patience, even with overvaluation. But what are some of
the key principles of valuation that you would apply to at the asset class level? And then we
can talk individual companies and how you think about that in this environment.
It's all about cash flows, growth and risk, no matter what asset class you're looking in. If
buying a bond, you're buying constant cash flows, no growth and only default risk.
So, it becomes a much simpler asset class. If you're buying equities,
growth is a much more dicey component. It's subjective. You've got to make judgments,
but it's cash flows, growth and risk. And there are some asset classes where you might not be able
to put a value. Why? Because there's some investment classes. Let me not use the word
asset. Assets by definition of cash flows. So if you're thinking about adding collectibles to your
portfolio, fine art, gold, recognize that those are not investments that can be valued. They can
only be priced. I mean, after all, gold has been around for 4,000 years. The pricing of gold is
very much a function of what you're holding instead of financial assets, which is if you
don't press financial assets to hold their value, you go to gold. So if you're investing in
collectibles or gold, then you're pricing things. You're making a judgment on the pricing of these
asset classes relative to others. But if you're looking at traditional asset classes, businesses,
equity, bonds, I think you need to keep your eyes on cash flows, growth, and risk. That'll give you
the value part. But as you pointed out, the price part is not in your control. It's demand and
supply, mood, and momentum. So when you talk about undervalued and overvalued, we're recognizing a
very simple truth about markets, which is you control the value part. You can do all your
homework. The price part is not in your control. You can't force the market to do what you want.
It's going to do whatever it does, which means the price at any point in time can be very different
from value. Let's face it, all of investing is about hoping and praying that that gap between
price and value closes. So my only suggestion is if you're an investor, which means you value
business is and you're hoping the price adjusts to value, then start doing some research on
catalysts. What is it? Because this isn't magical. It's not like there's a moment of revelation
to markets or price adjusts to value. There must be some catalyst that causes price to adjust to
value. In some cases, it can be as simple as a new management team coming into play. In other cases,
it might be a macro event that happens, another company that collapses, that makes people look at
the realities of what it is that should be driving. So hopefully today's Bed, Bath, and Beyond action
will lead some of these people investing in meme stocks to think about, hey, what is it that causes
these prices to go up and down? I'll be quite honest, in investing, I think we've spent a lot
of time on the value part of the process. We haven't really spent enough attention on the
pricing part. In fact, we dismiss people who use charts and technical analysis because their
chart is, they don't do the things we think should be done. I think we need to pay attention
to those people who drive prices. So I've actually been paying attention to the traders who drive up
these AMCs and GameStops because they affect me. It's not because I want to be like them,
but their actions can affect me because they're the ones setting prices. And guess what? I'm at
their mercy when I buy something that's undervalued. Because they often are the ones that
will push the price up to the value and allow me to take my benefits. So I think the key is to get
out of whatever groups agree with you and talk to people who disagree with you. If your investment
philosophy is built upon value, talk to people whose philosophy is very different. Maybe they're
pure traders. My favorite show on CNBC to be on is Fast Money because they put me in with five
traders. And I like the fact that they have no artificial. They're not going to talk about value
because they truly believe that value doesn't matter. They believe the way you make money is
you buy at a low price, you sell at a high price. And I prefer that honesty because it allows me to
talk about where I'm coming from and how we each need each. I mean, traders can't exist without
investors in the market. Investors cannot exist without traders in the market. And I think we
need to accept that and be more willing to accept those differences when we think about when should
we invest and where should we invest. When you talk about being at the mercy of those who move
prices, can you talk about the variable of time and time horizon to diminish that zone of risk?
And what would you say is your time horizon when you make an equity investment, for example?
I think time is your ally as an investor, but I think you also have to recognize that
sometimes you run out of time before the adjustment happens. I mean, the old Keynesian
saying of, you know, the market can stay irrational for longer than you can stay solvent. In fact,
here I would add live. Didn't he also say in the long run, we're all dead?
The long run, we're all dead. I mean, he was full of expressions that I think we should keep in mind.
So I think time is your ally, which means as an investor, you need a long time horizon. The
problem is we all claim to have long time horizons because that's what we're expected to say in fact
in my class you know I have 400 MBAs I asked them at the start of the class how many people long
time horizon to a person every person in the room claims to have a long time horizon I wonder how
much of that is because that's what we expect good people to do sensible people to do but ultimately
your time horizon is not always entirely in your control. If you're a portfolio manager,
your time horizon is only as long term as your shortest term client.
That's a reality that actually gives individual investors an advantage over portfolio managers.
My advantage as an investor is I have one client, actually two, me and my spouse.
And since I've turned off statements and my statements are all paperless,
She has no idea what we own.
So in a sense, I control my time horizon, and I can hold as long as I want.
So in a sense, individual investors have an advantage of our portfolio managers,
and it's a really big advantage, something we should be taking advantage of.
So if you believe something is truly undervalued, you've done your homework,
you buy the stock, the only pressure you should feel to sell that stock comes from within you,
unless you have liquidity needs, which, of course, can shorten your time horizons.
So, long answer to your question, time is your ally, but for most people who manage
other people's money, their time horizon is not under their control.
It's determined by their clients.
So, if you manage your own money, that's a power you have.
Take full advantage of it.
I've always thought that beta is not a measurement of risk, of course, in the way that it is
trotted out.
It's a measurement, if it were to be a measurement of risk, it's a measurement of the risk of
your client abandoning before they should.
it's not a measure of the risk of the business. It's the price movement that's obviously shaking
a lot of people out of the stock. That's what it is signaling in part. In some cases, it can be
both. It measures the risk of a business. It measures the risk to investors. It measures the
risk that people will bail out because the price moves so much. So it measures all of those.
So I think I know your answer to this. You've just trotted it out. So if I buy a stock,
it falls 50%. I hold it for 10 years. And at the end of those 10 years, it's up 12% a year.
you would say that's a wonderful investment as long as you're willing to endure a 50 percent decline
that's you know and that's i think something i and i can't say that's the right thing to do
the wrong thing to do you have to have the stomach for it i mean i wrote a book on investment
philosophies it was driven by the by what i saw in markets which is that if you go to any bookstore
that time you actually had physical bookstores and you walked in the investment section you had
all these books about great investors you know warren buffett no and then you could go down the
list. And you'd see people buying these books, and these books would describe in excruciating
detail what these great investors did to make their returns. And of course, the people who
read the book would say, okay, I too want to be like Buffett. I know exactly what he did. I'm
going to replicate it. But actually, if you look at the history of people who've tried to read the
books and be like Buffett, I would, in fact, I asked this question at my last stint in Omaha,
where I was invited by portfolio managers
to come and talk to them about value investing.
I don't think they're going to invite me back.
I asked them a question.
I said, if I took their returns of the people in this room,
and these are long-term returnees to Omaha,
they come every year, they pay homage to value investing,
they claim to follow its adages,
I would wager that the returns of the portfolio managers,
the so-called value investors in that room,
would have been beaten by an index fund over a long period.
So the question is, what is it that happens between the time we set off to imitate these
great investors and are trying to do it that causes this leakage?
And the reality is, it's not just an approach, it's a mindset.
And you need a psychology that actually allows you to adopt the mindset.
If you're naturally impatient and you try to be a value investor, you're going to fail.
You're going to fail because no matter how much you tell me about how much you believe
in value investing, you're just temperamentally unsuited to be a value investor. Now, that's why
I end the book with a statement, which is the best investment philosophy is the one that fits you as
a person. The person you need to understand the most to be a great investor is not Warren Buffett
or Peter Lynch, it's you. You need to know what makes you tick, what makes you comfortable, what
makes you uncomfortable. So I tell investors to keep note of things that happen that make them
uncomfortable in their portfolio? What happened today that made you uncomfortable? Keep a journal
because it'll allow you to understand what it is that makes you uncomfortable and try to reduce
that. Because if you let those discomforts stay on, you're going to get in the way of your own
success. You're going to be selling things too early because you just can't take it anymore.
So I think understanding yourself is key to being a successful investor. And that means being open
to the fact that sometimes you look at your portfolio and it makes you really uncomfortable.
We try to push it away. We try to deny it. We try to act like it's not there.
But I think it's a mistake. Among the many things that I love about your work
and your approach is that you're a skeptic, a contrary voice. You're a lifelong practitioner.
I see you as those things anyway and experience you that way and a philosopher.
And so I've loved your take on ESG. And I also want to ask you a little bit about Tesla as we
come to the close. So, I'll just lay out what I think is your view of ESG, which is that there
will always be these expressions that come along, and they are really as much about the sales
opportunity and kind of the marketing hype around them as something that could be truly evaluated
for its merit and seen and thought through what the unintended consequences are, the implications,
et cetera. And so for you, ESG borders on an outright scam or sales-driven, but however you
would express it, it is not beneficial to the world that we are concentrated on ESG. And I want
to hear, again, you explain why. And then I'd like to hear, do you have an alternative?
I think that what made me suspicious, 2019 was the first time I wrote about ESG because it had
kind of invaded the corporate and investing world. You know, BlackRock buying into it,
CEOs buying into it. And what made me suspicious was a pitch that seemed too good to be true.
And let me explain. Through humanity, being good has always been the tougher choice. Otherwise,
you don't, you wouldn't need religions, right? Being good was the easier choice.
Then you won't need religion telling you don't be bad. Being good has always been the tougher
choice. It is required sacrifice. And what struck me as off-putting in the ESG sales pitch
at least as it was made in 2019, is ESG advocates were going around telling companies and investors
that they could have it all. They were telling companies, you can be good and you'll be more
valuable. They were telling investors, you can invest in good companies and earn higher returns.
And that struck me as unlikely. So I decided to take a look at the research supposedly that these
advocates were using to back it up. And the more I looked at this research, the more inclined I
to take the word research as my descriptive of it, because these were advocacy pieces,
some of the most shoddy pieces of empirical work that I've ever seen backing up any concept,
written by people who are true believers. I mean, I'll give you a classic example. One of the ways
that they justified ESG being good for companies is, it's almost like every paper did the same
thing. They ran a regression of profit margins or returns on capital at companies against ESG
scores. And guess what they found? They found that there was a positive relationship and they
jumped to the conclusion that must mean that good companies are more profitable.
Sounds reasonable, right? But let me offer you an alternative hypothesis.
What if more profitable companies can do all the things that give them higher ESG scores?
Let's face it.
If you look at ESG scores, at sustainability or any of the others,
there are a set of things you have to do as a company to get a higher score.
And they're all things that require resources, that require money.
If you're barely making any money or you're a company at the very edge,
there's no way you can come up with the resources to play these games
because these are gaming systems.
So much of the, almost all of the research I found making the argument that ESG was good for companies was fundamentally flawed.
Then I looked at ESG returns to investors.
And of course, if you look at those studies, almost all of it comes from the fact that at least over the last decade, ESG portfolios have been overweighted with tech.
This is a tech stock phenomenon you're discovering.
So to me, ESG strikes a false note
because its advocates are promising things
they cannot deliver.
So here's my alternative.
We all want to be good,
but accept the fact that being good will cost you money.
As a business, being good will cost you money.
That's okay.
As long as you get your shareholders
are sent to do these things,
go ahead and be good and say,
no, we're accepting less profitability
because we want to do good.
If you're an investor,
Being good might mean avoiding certain groups of stocks because you think that they do more
damage to society.
So if you think tobacco is the ultimate sin, avoid tobacco stocks, even though they might
deliver high returns.
But it's a choice you and I should be making.
Goodness is a personal choice.
I decide what's good for me, but S&P is in no position to make that judgment for me.
We're outsourcing our consciences to S&P and Morningstar and whoever else might be delivering these ESG scores.
And that never ends well.
So I think if we want goodness, and I think this is the pushback I get, which is, but I want to be good.
That's why ESG is a good thing.
You want to be good, then you have to do the homework on what kinds of companies you should be avoiding,
rather than buying companies with high AST scores because you have no idea what you're actually
getting in your portfolio. So the mistake is to propose that you can get better returns by being
good rather than saying, if you want to be good, the returns should be the second factor. Otherwise,
let's not pretend that that's what's happening when we come up with these scoring systems and
that these scoring systems can be gamed by the companies that are already high enough margin,
have tremendous balance sheets. But when you get closer to the break-even line and to a troubled
balance sheet, it's going to be hard to really make a case to the shareholders, let alone other
stakeholders of the company, that they should be prioritizing it in the same way. I remember
talking to an executive who said, really, when you compare the cultures at Google and Starbucks,
I would say, this person said, somebody I admire said, I would say Starbucks has the better culture
because they have a much greater challenge.
At Google, you have tremendous margins.
You have $100 billion sitting on the balance sheet.
You can offer every perk in the world to attract the best talent.
At Starbucks, it's a tough decision to say we're going to provide health care,
we're going to provide university access.
Can you imagine if you go from Starbucks to GM, how much tougher the task becomes
because you're, in a sense, fighting for your existence as a company.
How the heck can you play these games that ESG scorers want you to play
because you want to get a higher score you don't have to share the factor or the companies but do
you have a personal approach that says i would not buy a company like that or into an industry
like that or i mean i'll give you i'll give you a very personal example about 25 years ago
i valued monsanto no maybe 20 years ago and i found it undervalued but i knew that if i bought
the company, I would be divorced. Because for my wife, Monsanto is the Satan of all companies. She
hates Roundup. She hates the fact that, you know, and this was well before the Roundup problems even
came into existence. So I think, you know, I don't own any tobacco stocks in my portfolio,
not because, you know, it's a legal product, I perfectly understand, but it doesn't fit into my
moral rubric of something I'd invest in. But I do it with open eyes, which is Altria might be a
great stock to have in my portfolio. It's solid cash flows, maybe exactly the kind of company you
want if inflation is coming back. So that choice still has to be a personal choice. There are
groups of companies. I generally don't invest in Chinese companies simply because I find that
whenever I invest in a Chinese company, the Chinese government is part of my story, whether
I like it or not. And I generally don't trust the Chinese government as a partner in any business
venture. So it has left me out of some markets, which were high return markets, but I'm perfectly
okay with it. It's what I need to have a conscience that I can live with. And that's true for all of
us. So we can all bring in goodness and virtue into our investment decisions. So that's not what
the fight we're fighting. The fight we're fighting is whether you want to outsource that
to S&P or Morningstar or some other service to do it for you. And I'm not willing to do that.
Closing questions here, a quick stop in the world of Tesla, and then just some rapid
fire fun questions to end. But with Tesla, two zones I'd like to just hear your thinking.
One of them is, how do you run a valuation on Tesla? There are many people who think it's
one of the most overvalued companies in history. I know whether you are invested in it or not,
I know that you invested in 2019, maybe you continue to own your full position or some
position or you've sold. How do you go about valuing Tesla? Then the second is, I really
loved your opinions of Elon Musk and Tesla and viewing it as a corporate teenager. This is an
adolescent with so much potential and so much unpredictability. And that must have made your
choice to invest in 2019 more complex. So how to think about what CEO should we be looking for?
Should we be looking for more corporate teenagers and having a little risk on area of our long-term
portfolio to make sure we don't miss because it looks odd, but so do many 15-year-olds and so did
we when we were 15 making decisions out there in the world? I heard Adam Neumann is coming back
with a new company. Who knows when that company will go public, right? Let's start with the first
question. I've always believed that when you value companies, you're telling a story about a company.
In fact, I wrote an entire book on converting stories. And the reason I did that is I've become
troubled by how much valuation has become financial modeling. Big Excel spreadsheets,
people have lost the skill, the craft of storytelling. And Tesla, to me, is a perfect
example of how stories will drive your ultimate judgment. If you view Tesla as an automobile
company, you're absolutely right. It's one of the most overvalued companies you can ever see in the
face of the earth. Why? Because automobile companies, even the very best of them, have
single-digit margins. Why? It costs a lot to make. So from that perspective, I can understand where
people who think Tesla is overvalued is coming from. The problem with Tesla is I'm not sure
what the story for Tesla is. I don't think Elon Musk is sure, right? One day, it is an automobile
company. The next day, it's a green energy company. The third day, it is, I don't know,
an environmental company. The fourth day, it's transportation. No, it's one of those morphing
stories, which is one of the reasons my valuations of Tesla have shifted over time, because as the
story shifts, I've had to value the company differently. I'm an optimist on Tesla as this
hybrid company, hybrid of automobile slash technology. You might be aware that if you buy
a Tesla, without the software from the company, your electric car becomes just a hunk of steel
in the garage. I mean, this is a company that's very reliant on its software for all of its
different functions to work. I mean, right now it's bundled with the car. But there could be a
time when the software is actually unbundled and offered as a separate product. Why is that
significant? Because software companies are 40% margins. If Tesla at some point in time becomes
70% automobile, 30% software, its margins are going to be three or four times higher than any
automobile companies you see out there. And you can bet they're getting the best developers relative
to the automobile companies that wouldn't be able to recruit that talent.
And I think when people adopt a sense of certitude on Tesla,
which is I'm absolutely sure it's overvalued
or I'm absolutely sure it's undervalued,
I don't see where they get that certitude from.
This is a company where I can get, based on the story I tell it,
a range of values ranging from $50 billion to a trillion.
They're all possible.
Some of them are plausible.
A few are even probable.
So Tesla is one of those companies where I'm going to continue to value the company,
try to adapt my story to what I'm seeing on the ground.
So I constantly am looking to see whether they're trying to unbundle software.
What else are they offering that have higher margins?
And trying to adjust my story to reflect that.
And it's also a stock where I'll be maligned from both sides because I get hate from both sides.
I get hate from the Tesla love and say, how can you even challenge the notion that Tesla
is going to be the greatest company ever?
The other side, I get people who come from the point of view, this is a scam.
Why would you ever attach a value to a company run by a man like Elon Musk?
And that gets to the second question of the corporate teenagers in this world.
I'm halfway through Brad Stone's wonderful second book on Amazon, Amazon Unbound.
Thoroughly enjoyed the first, The Everything Store.
and the second. And you see that there is a high level of unpredictability in the methodology and
the willingness to fail, to trot out a number of ideas. In fact, that's one of the things that
criticisms that Musk gets is, well, you've had all these ideas. How many of them have really
materialized? But I guess I say, all you really need are SpaceX and Tesla to know that there's
something pretty extraordinary there happening. And any venture firm would love to have the
collection of those different assets. But Bezos with the fire phone, he was opposed to Alexa
initially, as I understand it. He was with the Fire Phone, and then the Fire Phone failed,
and he said, well, here we go. Let's go with Alexis. So he was willing to change his mind
frequently. But that sort of dynamism, we associate that a little bit more with youthful
indiscretion and decision-making and embracing risk. And do they really think through all of
the process? So how many corporate teenagers should we be looking for for our portfolio,
or how should we evaluate those companies? I know there are some people who will take this
the wrong way, but we should be glad we live in a world where Elon Musk and Jeff Bezos have had
a chance to do what they did. I mean, I've said this half jokingly, that if Elon Musk had been
born in South Africa, but if he'd stayed in a part of the world and not come to the U.S.,
he'd probably be more likely to be in jail than to be running one of the most wealthiest men in
the world. He's a rule breaker, right? And then that's the nature of his being. And it often gets
him into trouble. He's a rule breaker. He thinks outside the box. I mean, this guy is so much,
he has enough vision to cover a thousand CEOs. And that sometimes is, I think, upsetting to
Tesla shareholders. They focus, you need to focus on building the greatest car company.
But it is who he is. You take the package. The difference between Musk and Bezos is they both
were rule breakers. They both were willing to try things and change. But Bezos was willing to
build a company that outlasted him. I mean, I remember in 2014, by then, Amazon was already
one of the greatest companies. I was talking to an investor group in the U.S., and I asked the
group, how many of you know who the CEO of Amazon is? You'd be surprised how many people in that
audience did not know Jeff Bezos' name. I mean, we forget that the reason Jeff Bezos is part of
Post. Now it's because he bought the Washington Post and then got entangled in political disputes
that basically made him a household name. For the longest time, Jeff Bezos was, in a sense,
building a company and a management team that could outlast him. The problem I have with Elon
and Tesla is I think he's an incredible visionary, but he needs to seem to want to make everything
still about himself. Tesla is a personality-driven company. I ask people, you know, what if you woke
up tomorrow to a new story? You're a Tesla shareholder, you own shares at whatever,
$1,000 per share. What if you opened up, you know, woke up tomorrow to a new story that Elon Musk
has checked into rehab? It's not an outlandish story given Elon's history. Who knows what the
next story will be? What do you think will happen to Tesla's stock price if that happens? And in my
you the company is so entangled with the founder here that one goes down the other goes down with
so if i were giving advice to elon musk and he's not a man to take advice kindly
now my advice is that he built a team at tesla that can outlast
that he make this less about him and more about the company but i'm not sure he's going to listen
As always, people on the program may have interest in the stocks they talk about, and
The Motley Fool may have formal recommendations for or against, so don't buy or sell stocks
based solely on what you hear. I'm Chris Hill, thanks for listening. We'll see you tomorrow.
