Motley Fool Money - GE’s Legacy & Lessons for Investors

Episode Date: January 22, 2023

You wouldn't know it from its recent struggles, but for most of the 20th century General Electric was one of the most important companies (and stocks) in America. William D. Cohan is a founding partner of digital news business Puck and the author of “Power Failure: The Rise and Fall of an American Icon.” Cohan joined Ricky Mulvey to discuss: - The mythology behind General Electric’s birth - How corporations struggle mightily with CEO succession - Jack Welch and the religion of earnings consistency - Why he believes a combination between Warner Brothers Discovery and NBCUniversal is “inevitable” Companies discussed: GE, DIS, WBD, CMCSA Host: Ricky Mulvey Guest: William D. Cohan Engineer: Rick Engdahl, Tim Sparks, Annie Franks Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

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What? Oh, boy. Fantastic. You guys go hard, man. Daredevil Born Again, official podcast Tuesdays, and stream season two of Marvel Television's Daredevil Born Again on Disney Plus. You know, I think it becomes psychological almost. Either they don't want somebody to choose somebody as their successor who will outperform them and show them up.

That certainly was the case. It seemed like that was the case with Bob Eager. And I think on some subliminal basis, it might have been the case with Jack Welch as well. I'm Chris Hill, and that's William Cohen, a founding partner of the digital news. News Company, Puck, and author of the recently released book, Power Failure, The Rise and Fall of of an American icon. Ricky Mulvey caught up with Cohen to talk about the origins of General Electric and what caused the fall of one of America's most powerful companies.

Key differences between former CEO's Jack Welch and Jeff Imelt and why Cohen believes a merger between Warner Brothers Discovery and Comcast is inevitable. So General Electric is this myth-making machine. That was one of the key things I picked up from your book. It was born on a myth of Thomas Edison's involvement. And possibly it may be dying even on myths such as John Flannery's ouster. When you were researching General Electric and doing these interviews, I know you worked there for a couple of years. Was there any ideas that you held to be true that turned out to be myth that surprised you in the process?

No, absolutely. you know, right from the outset. In fact, you know, it was always sort of drummed into not only employees' heads, but, of course, everybody's in America's head that, you know, Thomas Edison was one of the founders, you know, was the founder of GE. I mean, and if you go to the research center outside of Albany, you know, you walk into this incredibly big place and the lobby is filled with Thomas Edison sort of memorabilia. But in fact, you know, he had very little to do with the founding of the company. He was against the founding of the company and the merger that created the company.

And he very quickly sold the stock that he had that resulted from the merger. And he was never an executive of the company. It was always this guy, the first executive was this guy. Charles Coffin, who was quite a remarkable businessman and a leader of the company. I mean, that's just one example. This company then becomes one of the largest in American history, or it becomes the largest by market cap at the time in the 20th century. And one of its major problems that a lot of companies face is finding a CEO. Your book highlights sort of the pageantry involved in general electric succession process. Jack Welch had to participate in a letter writing contest. He had

to be very, it was sort of this reality show style elimination thing where the CEO at the time, Reg Jones is keeping all the contenders very, very close. He ends up rejecting that in looking for his CEO maybe to his detriment in Jeff Imelt, but he still makes Jeff Imelt give a sort of the sales pitch to the board, right? So whether it's General Electric or recently at Disney, you have very smart people who know these jobs very well, and yet they seem to have sort of so much trouble finding successors for the CEO seat. Why do you think these smart people who know the job well struggle so mightily with that process? You know, I think it becomes psychological almost. Either they don't want somebody to choose somebody as their successor who will outperform them

and show them up. That certainly was the case. It seemed like that was the case with Bob Eiger. And I think on some subliminal basis, it might have been the case with Jack Welch as well, you know, choosing somebody who on some level, you know, they thought would do a good job and certainly endorsed when they first announced the choice, but maybe on some level knew that they would not do a particularly good job and would not somehow supersede their own performance as CEO. Beyond that, I mean, you know, people are people, it's hard to know how someone is actually going to perform in the job once they have it. You know, people are very good sort of politicians sometimes and, you know, very good at sucking up to get what they want. And then when they actually get the job, they may never have been qualified for it.

I appreciate the complex picture you've given to Welch. I think a lot of his legacy has been turned into. to headlines of this is good or bad when really it's a complex person who did some terrible things. He was abrasive. He was a womanizer. He also helped develop CEOs and created one of the most valuable companies in American history. He also encouraged disagreement dissenting opinions among the people who worked for him. So why did so many of the people you spoke with you think I actually enjoy working with Neutron Jack? I mean, you know, that's an important, important point.

All of the, to a person, all of the people who I spoke with who were senior GE executives really appraised Jack and the opportunity they had to work for him and his willingness to get the most out of them to, you know, get the most out of them to, to, believe in them and to support them and to welcome dissenting opinions, being sort of a fun guy to be around, and to really giving them huge opportunities that they wouldn't have had elsewhere. Now, obviously, I didn't talk to the people who he felt tormented by him. or, you know, they were much harder to find and, you know, they were not in the company after, you know, he sort of got rid of them. But, I mean, even just taking one example of Dave Cody, who Jack fired when he was head of the major appliance business at GE, which was probably the most poorly performing business. and who went on to become the CEO, the very successful CEO of Honeywell. In fact, at one point, Honeywell's market cap was higher than GE's.

And even Dave Cody, who was fired by Jack and didn't understand why, you know, praised him to the Hilt. So he did engender an incredible amount of loyalty, at least among the survivors and the ones who would talk to me, clearly the people who he insulted or made fun of or was, you know, fired early on, probably don't have a whole lot of love for him. Yeah. Well, one of the greatest legacies was his ability to consistently hit earnings estimates that Wall Street analysts would say you're going to hit X sales, X earnings, and he hit it to a penny with great consistency.

GE Capital was one of the ways, was one of the levers that he was able to pull in order to do that. bit of a two-part question, setting the table, what would it have meant if General Electric in the Jack Welch era missed earnings by just a penny? We came in one penny short of earnings. Because in my mind, it almost would have given the company a little bit, those numbers a little bit more legitimacy to say, nope, you guys were off by a penny. And yet it was so important to Welch at the time and many CEOs to consistently hit earnings estimates if only by that single cent. Yeah, I mean, part of what Jack was able to do is create a cult of Jack among Wall Street research analysts, most of whom were, had followed the company for a long time, knew well the industrial side of the business, but not the G capital or financial side of the business. and they came to rely on Jack's promise of the earnings numbers that he would project to make every quarter.

And along the way, as you point out, I think it was like 80 straight quarters, Jack hit those numbers to the penny or a penny over, never under. And that's how GE, which had a AAA credit rating, was the most valuable company in the world for a period of time and the most respected, you know, never missed earnings. And Jack just felt like this was his religion, in effect. You know, if he told the analysts what he was going to do, he was intent on doing it. And, you know, he tells the story in his own book, which I asked him about and repeat the story in my book. When after he had bought Kidder Peabody, which turned out to be a disastrous acquisition, and Kidder, you know, Kidder did something in one quarter that was going to make Jack miss his numbers. he actually went to the other division heads and said, you know, can you generate? Can you give me something so that I can make sure that I make these earnings, that we make these earnings? And they all sort of coughed up some sort of profit number or some sort of contribution to the gap that was created by Kidder Peabody to make it possible for Jack to, you know, and GE to make the number.

number that quarter, which was kind of premaficia evidence of earnings manipulation. And, of course, he was trying to convince me the whole time that he never did that. But it was, and yet he's sort of admitting it in his own book that he pressured everybody to come up with what he needed. So he really, just was, as I say, this was his religion, making those numbers every quarter. And it was very effective. When Jack took over the company, it was worth $12.

billion, you know, in August of 2000, you know, nine months before he, or, you know, or 11 months or so before he left, the company was worth 650 billion. So, you know, that's quite a increase in value, and that's basically the job of the CEO is to do that kind of thing. So to set the table a little bit, Kidder P-Body was a Wall Street investment bank that, when it joined GE, there was a severe culture clash between the general electric capital folks and the Kidder P-Body investment banking folks. So both Melt and Welch used GE Capital, to my understanding, I could be totally wrong, is sort of a candy store to hit a lot of earnings numbers.

In Melt's case, he gave himself maybe loftier expectations, this sort of $2 earnings per share mantra. And Welch was just kind of consistently hitting those earnings numbers. So how did both of them use GE Capital, is that sort of candy store to hit earnings? numbers and do you think Welch was better at his better at the manipulation or was Imelt unlucky? So Jack sort of before he became CEO, one of his final tests was to take over the running of GE Capital. You know, Jack did not have a finance background.

He was an engineer and he ran the plastics division and made the plastics division at GE incredibly commercial and incredibly profitable. But he took to GE Capital like a duck to water. He really sort of got off on this ability to arbitrage GE's AAA credit rating, which allowed GE Capital to borrow very cheaply in the commercial paper markets and then lend out to customers and clients rather expensively. And I, you know, when I was there, I was financing leverage buyers and we would get complaints all the time from customers that we were, you know, charging more than Wall Street charged and other banks. And, you know, we were so pricey. But in fact, I think really what we were doing is actually charging appropriately for the risks

we are taking. But Jack really got that into a well-oiled machine. I also spent a year working for the chief credit officer at G-E Capital, so I got to see all the businesses at G-CAPTal and, you know, how they generated an incredible amount of earnings and how, really, how clever they were under Gary Went to, you know, become an earnings machine. And, you know, over time, G-E Capital became the most important business at GE, which most people didn't recognize or realize, you know, 40% of the earnings under Imalt, it was 50% of the earnings. Now, you know, so by the time Jack turned it over to Jeff Immolt, G Capital was generating between 40 and 50% of GE's earnings.

And it was a well-oiled machine, first under Gary Went and then under Dennis Naden. But, you know, Jeff Immelt was in part unlucky because, of course, he started as a CEO on his first day in the office was September 10th, 2001. And the next day, of course, was September 11th. And he was in Seattle. And, of course, the world changed. GE made the engines on those jets, had reinsured the buildings down at the World Financial Center. Owned NBC, which went without advertising for at least a week after 9-11, costing the company hundreds of millions of dollars.

in revenue. And of course, there was the scandals involving big companies like Enron and WorldCom that resulted in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act being passed, which was much more stringent and required CEOs to sign off on financial statements. So, but nevertheless, throughout that, G-CAPT continued to perform. And I just think that Jeff didn't understand G-CAPT as well. as Jack did and didn't understand the risks as well and didn't have the same team in place that Jack did. And so come the 2008 financial crisis, people didn't really realize it at the time because everyone was focused on what was going on on Wall Street, which was, of course, a meltdown. But GE Capital also melted down. But unlike the Wall Street banks,

wasn't regulated by the Fed. And so, you know, or wasn't regulated really in the same way by the SEC as they were. And basically Jeff Immolt had to go hat in hand to Hank Paulson, the Treasury Secretary, and Sheila Baer, the head of the FDIC, to get included in the various lines of credit that were being made available to banks. so that GE Capital wouldn't be at a disadvantage to the other banks. And, you know, essentially he just did not like the price that he had to pay for that protection and keeping GE Capital out of bankruptcy, which would have happened. And when GE Capital became a SIFI, a systemically important financial institution,

Jeff Emily hated that even more and eventually made the decision. to sell G.E. Capital, which, you know, getting back to your $2 a share proclamation that he kept making that they were going to do in 2018, by then he had sold off G.E. Capital and bought back, using the proceeds, had bought back, you know, $35 billion or so worth of G.E. stock at a high price and could never make that $2 a share a number, even though he kept promising it over and over again. and people told him that they weren't going to make it, but he insisted that they were. And essentially, that's what cost him his job. I want to talk about Jeff Immelt for a little bit because you have a fantastic anecdote in the story

where he has this security guard named Ed Gallenick, and he forces, essentially forces the guy to climb Mount Kilimanjaro with him. And I think this is illustrative of the way he ran GE of essentially not listening to others, even in very serious circumstances, and essentially only listening. to opinions that affirmed his own. Ed Gallinick was, you described him as sort of this tough East Coaster who had no business climbing a mountain. And he even says to Imel quote, and I'm going to paraphrase, I think it's really unfair to kill me just to have a court gesture go up a mountain. So this is to say, you spent time with Jeff Illmelt. Did you get a chance to ask him

about his side of the story on this? Or were you focused on other, understandably focused on other things? I was focused on many, many other things, but of course I asked him about the trip up Kilimanjaro. And he didn't want to talk about it. Really? So that was one thing for some reason he didn't want to talk about,

maybe because he knew or maybe he didn't know what Ed Gallenek had told me. And by the way, you know, speaking to Ed Gallinick was total serendipity because I, it turns out that after Ed Gallinick was working directly for Jeff as his, you know, head of security, he ended up when I met him, he was working sort of at the security door at CNBC in Times Square. So when I would go and be on CNBC, you know, Ed Gallinick would be the guy to let me in the door. And, you know, he eventually figured out that I was the guy writing this book about GE. And so he just, you know, kept pulling me aside and couldn't wait to tell me all these various stories that he was on the record for in the book, including this story of Kilimanjaro, which, you know, I just think is the most revealing, as you said, story about Jeff and forcing poor Ed. had Gallinac, who had, you know, I mean, Jeff had trained, you know, because this was his daughter's

graduation from college wish, you know, he said to her, you know, I've been preoccupied with GE, you know, I probably haven't been the best father, you know, and you graduate from college, what do you want to do? I'll do anything you want. I'll go anywhere you want. And she said, I want to climb Mount Kilimanjaro. So, you know, she had trained and her friend that came with him had trained and Jeff had trained, you know, such as you can to climb.

a mountain, but Ed Gallinick had not trained and did not want to go. And Jeff forced him to go. And literally, I think it almost killed Ed Gallenick. He was very good-natured about it when he told me about it. He thought it was kind of like a lark, even though, you know, he was very dangerous for him. And he never even made it to the top because he had to turn back. And I just couldn't believe that Jeff had forced this. And, of course, Jeff didn't want to talk about that because he knew what he had done.

it sort of was over the bounds. One of Imelt's most famous deals was selling NBC Universal. Emelt described it as a luxury that it could no longer afford. I don't know if I necessarily agree with that. But one of the things going on is NBC Universal was being prepared to be sold was that they would make these random cuts to programming and content. We need to get X, or what was it, like $100 million of expenses off before the end of the year. And then we're going to reposition this production schedule to fit in better with our

expense management. Now you might be seeing a similar situation at Warner Brothers Discovery, where the company is slashing and burning content. You have some of the similar players of David Zazlov running Warner Brothers Discovery. Does your studying of the history of NBC Universal influence your viewpoint that perhaps Warner Brothers Discovery may be prepared for getting sold or combined into another company? Well, I've been writing at Puck regularly about my sense that NBC Universal, which is now owned by Comcast, and Warner Brothers Discovery, which is, of course, run by David Zazlov and a public company, that they're both sort of, they kind of need each other. And they're both undersized compared to Disney and, you know, the threats posed. to their business model by Amazon and Apple, which obviously are much larger, capitalized companies,

much bigger. And so I've been sort of advocating, you know, for the last, you know, six months or so, the inevitable combination between NBC Universal and Warner Brothers Discovery, of course, you know, the people at those companies, you know, poo it at the moment because, of course they have to, because of the rules that allowed Warner Brothers, you know, discovered it'd be formed in the first place under the Morris Trust, reverse Morris Trust rules. And under those rules, you know, there can't be a change of ownership or a change of structure for two years. So that would put it at April 2024. However, both, there's no question that they need each other. And I suspect, At some point, soon, those discussions will begin if they haven't started already, even though there won't be any announcement for some time.

It takes a long time to figure out the structure of that kind of complicated combination and as well as any regulatory approval would take a very long time, too. So I suspect that it'll happen. you know, David Zaslov is really a pioneer in cable business and has, I think, you know, done a good job leading discovery. He probably got snookered a little bit by the ATT folks who loaded up Warner Brothers Discovery with $55 billion of debt, which was sort of the price of admission for David Zazlov to get control of the old-time Warner. and then now he's got to sort of live with that burden. So I think that's why he's cutting and burning, slashing and burning as best he can to make sure that the Ivet off or Warner Brothers Discovery is what he's telling the street.

It is, you know, the good news is that after pretty bad 2022 or the stock fell something like 60%. It's sort of off to the races so far this year. up, it was up like 18% last time I checked. But I think the combination of the two is pretty much inevitable, even though I may be among only a handful of people who believe that at the moment. Well, what makes it, corporations don't necessarily have to merge. They can exist and live and die on their own. What makes it inevitable?

Well, what I think makes it inevitable is just the competitive landscape and the ambitions of the people involved. you know, Brian Roberts has always been, you know, ambitious for Comcast to make it, you know, as big as it is, a $200 billion market value company. But I think, you know, he clearly got NBC Universal at a bargain price from GE. Jeff Immelt sold it without an auction, you know, soon after the financial crisis in 2009. And, you know, at one point pre-pandemic, that business was probably worth about $100 billion. The pandemic has been kind of rough on linear TV. And so those numbers are down.

And so, you know, I'm sure Brian Roberts is smart enough to know that NBC Universal is, you know, no longer a size where it can compete effectively against, against Disney or Apple or Amazon. And, you know, the streaming business, you know, is costing him a lot of money. And also, you know, Warner Brothers Discovery is sort of subsized and has a lot of great assets, but too much debt, as we were talking about, you know, struggling kind of on the Evita line. And it's got its own costs related to the streaming business. So combining, the two would make for a major league competitor to Disney and Apple and Amazon and would help spread out that debt over more assets and more cash flow. And so it might mean that, of course, Comcast has to control 51% of it because I think Brian Roberts would want to have at least ownership

control as he did during the first phase of the NBC Universal deal. But I think it was a that could get done that would allow David Zazlov to run the combined company, which is, I think, his goal. So I think it's a way to make it all worthwhile and make a major league competitor to Disney. Appreciate your perspective on that. And as we get towards the end of the conversation, going to turn it back to General Electric, you've described your book as a corporate autopsy. Do you have a time of death?

There's plenty of finger-pointing reasons. and those can be found in the pages, but do you have a time of death for your corporate autopsy of General Electric? You know, I think that, boy, there were a number of important moments where the death spiral began. among them the decision to sell NBCU in 2009 without an auction for a total of around $30 billion to Comcast. That was number one. Number two was the decision to buy Alstom and wildly overpay for it when actually Jeff probably could have gotten out of the deal and chose not to and chose to close the deal. That was number two. Number three was the decision to sell GE Capital and, you know,

making an announcement that you were doing that. So buyers knew that you had to sell it and probably got his pocket picked by some smart buyers like Blackstone and Wells Fargo. And number four was bringing in Nelson Peltz and Triang Partners as a hedge fund, an activist hedge fund, you know, Jeff's idea was he was going to sort of ratify his brilliant recreation of the company. And of course, with Nelson Peltz, there's no such bargain. And when it was clear that he wasn't going to achieve this $2 a share, that was the end of Jeff. And frankly, the end. end of the company because, you know, as John Flannery, who took over from Jeff Imold quickly discovered, there were, you know, hidden time bombs that Jeff had not really

addressed, shall we say, that Jeff, John Flannery had to address and announce. So, I don't know, the time of the death was probably when Jeff Imelight got fired in June of 2000. what was it, 17, I guess. So that was probably, you know, the end of it, even though it took, you know, a few more years for the plug to finally get pulled. It's basically in hospice from June 2017 on. William Cohen, he's the author of Power Failure, The Rise and Fall of an American Icon, the co-founder of Puck as well. Thank you so much for joining us on Motley Full Money.

I appreciate your time and recommend the book. It's a thorough and engaging history of one of the most powerful icons of American history. Thank you very much for having me. As always, people on the program may have interest in the stocks they talk about, and the Motley Fool may have formal recommendations for or against, so don't buy yourself stocks based solely on what you hear. I'm Chris Hill. Thanks for listening. We'll see you tomorrow.