Motley Fool Money - New Questions for Regional Banks

Episode Date: April 2, 2023

If a bank has to make a statement about its safety and soundness, that’s usually a bad sign. Sultan Meghji is the former Chief Innovation Officer of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) and a professor at  the Pratt School of Engineering at Duke University. Ricky Mulvey caught up with Meghji to discuss: - Where Silicon Valley Bank and the FDIC faltered in the lead-up to the bank run - Ripple effects from the recent bank runs that investors should consider - Hindenburg’s report on Block - How to pack a "go bag" for your savings Companies mentioned: JPM, SIVBQ, FRC, FIZN, SQ, SBUX, ORCL Host: Ricky Mulvey Guest: Sultan Meghji Engineer: Tim Sparks Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

Hi everyone, I'm Charlie Cox. Join us on Disney Plus as we talk with the cast and crew of Marvel Television's Daredevil Born Again. What haven't you gotten to do as Daredevil? Being the Avengers. Charlie and Vincent came to play. I get emotional when I think about it. One of the great finale of any episode we've ever done. We are going to play Truth or Daredevil.

What? Oh, boy. Fantastic. You guys go hard, man. Daredevil Born Again, official podcast Tuesdays, and stream season two of Marvel Television's Daredevil Born Again on Disney Plus. Community banks, regional banks play an incredibly important part of the U.S. economy because the businesses they support account for well over 80% of new job creation, well over 80% of new capital

infusion. I mean, it's just, it's not even, it's not even close. What's happened now is the logic is now changed. And so if I'm a small business owner, instead of looking at the local bank or the local credit union, I now realize, well, if I'm successful, I'm in trouble if something happens to that bank. I'm Chris Hill, and that's Salton Meggi, the former chief innovation officer at the FDIC. Today, he teaches financial technology and cybersecurity at Duke University. Ricky Mulvey caught up with Meggi last Tuesday to talk about what happened behind the scenes before the collapse of Silicon Valley Bank, how to pack a go bag for your savings, and new questions

for regional banks. Before we dive into the Silicon Valley Bank collapse and, and the effects of all that that are continuing to play out. Can you talk a little bit about the relationship between banks and the FDIC for someone who might not be savvy on it? Sure. So, the FDIC actually has two jobs. One is to run an insurance fund, the deposit insurance fund, which is what pays for the up to $250,000 current checking account thing that we all see on our banks. And the second is they have about 3,000 bank examiners and support staff.

And they examine, you know, just shy of 4,000 banks directly. But then the second thing they do is they operate the technical infrastructure and a lot of the examination processes for the other federal bank regulators. So if there is a bank examiner walking around your bank, making sure that it's being run correctly, most likely it's an FDIC person using FDIC technology. The bank examiners have been probably busy lately with Silicon Valley Bank. I'm a little confused on the middle part of the story there. So everything is fine.

It's Silicon Valley Bank up until about a month ago. Then there's a middle part where everybody panics because they write down some bonds. I don't know if anything else happened there. Now there's a bank run. The government insures deposits above 250K. And now First Citizens Bank owns Silicon Valley Bank. What happened in the middle? What am I missing with that story?

Well, can I correct your structure just a little bit? You can always correct my structure. Yeah. So the way to think about it is Silicon Valley Bank, grew tremendously over its 40-year history, especially in the last five or six years, and crossed a couple of different thresholds of size to the point that they ended up being one of the top 20 banks in the United States. In 2019, data started showing that they weren't managing their investments very well.

And that was well understood to the point that the Federal Reserve, I believe, sent them multiple notes saying, hey, maybe you should look at this. And it's kind of one of those, you know, hurl it over the wall. and hope they fix it kind of thing. And that was fine as long as rates stayed low. And then the minute rates started going up, that investment portfolio went from being a concentration risk to now a liability. Your loans were worth less than the, or worth more than the assets they were against.

And that started last year. And the regulators were aware of that, didn't really do too much. They're like, oh, they'll figure it out. There was a letter in December of 2022 that said, hey, it's getting bad. Maybe you guys should do something about it. And then it kind of spiraled out of control because somebody actually started noticing that the bank balance sheet was pretty terrible. And Silicon Valley Bank realized they needed to raise some money. They needed to put more assets on the books.

Goldman Sachs apparently was hired to do that and completely failed to get anything good, mostly because of bad press that was coming out around the same time. And this is about a week before the bank run occurred. And then on Thursday, you know, six different things all happened at the same time that led to that middle part that you're talking about. And that's really how we, you know, so to me, the middle part of your story goes from 2019 until that Thursday. That's fair. I think to the outsider perspective, though, the depositors and the investors watching Silicon Valley Bank, there wasn't, they were being told by the bank's leadership, hey, there's nothing to worry about. We're one of the safest banks in the world. We're fine over here. There's a fine line, and I worry that Silicon Valley Bank's leadership fell on the wrong side of this, between keeping a stiff upper lip and, oh, everything's going to be fine.

the opposite being true. And Silicon Valley Bank, in a lot of ways, had a culture far more like a startup or a venture capital firm or a PE firm and less like a bank. You know, if a bank has to make a statement about their safety and soundness, that's usually a really terrible thing. The other thing that happened is because so many of their customers just kept putting money in the same checking accounts. You know, there were people.

There was, I think, 10 accounts accounted for $25 billion of deposits. Can you imagine having a bank account with a billion? in it. I mean, I obviously can, but that's not great financial management on the part of the companies in question or the people in question. So it was a kind of a perfect storm of bad things. I think you can lay a lot of blame on the bank management for not being clear about what was going on and not enforcing more stringent controls internally. But you also have a fair amount of blame, I think, to go on the regulatory community for not doing something about it. They saw this coming and apparently didn't really do that much to stop it.

One other way the regulatory community is getting a lot of attention is this idea that all banks now have this implicit insurance, especially regional banks. So they may not be covered by being a systemically important bank. However, small banks are now essentially being told, to my understanding, by the Treasury and the FDIC, that your deposits are safe even above 250K without paying necessarily into that insurance fund. What are the consequences of this implicit insurance who pays for it? Is this worthy of attention? Well, it's an interesting point that you bring up because since really 2008, the global systemically important American banks have had that.

It's been a very implicit thing, and there's a very small list. I'll use JP Morgan as an example. It doesn't really matter how much money is in your JP Morgan account because it's so deeply coupled to the Treasury of the United States, you're insured. if JPM Morgan goes under, the U.S. government goes under, right? This non-voted-on, non-policy, outside of statutory authority shift that says regional banks now get the same thing is in lieu of Congress acting in, you know, logically and following the law that the FDIC cannot say this. It is a violation of existing law for them to say this. Now, what the Treasury Secretary and the rest of

the FOMAC, this is like the financial regulatory leadership of the United States have decided to do, is say, listen, we will categorize any bank as systemically important to make sure that we do this because we don't want a bank run. And that's where we are now. Now, it needs, I think, to kind of dot-I-cross-T correctly, the Congress to vote on. So that's part one. Part two is the insurance fund cannot cover this, full stop. You know, the insurance fund actually, as of today, is basically zeroed out between signature and Silicon Valley Bank, between what they already had to pay out when the runs happened and when they were shut down, but then also the liabilities of Silicon Valley Bank that are now owned by the FDIC. I think they've got about 15 billion you left. Three weeks ago,

they had about 130 billion. And so that's basically done. They can't afford another run, which is, I think, why First Republic hasn't been put into receivership personally because of the deposits. The third piece of it is the U.S. government fundamentally has to stop these deposit runs from happening. and it has to keep American dollars in as close control of the U.S. system as possible because of other ripple effects this would have. For example, taxes. This is a great example of something. Tether to go into the crypto universe just a little bit, picked up $9 billion from U.S.

dollars in the last month and a half, right? If all of a sudden, $100 billion leaves the American banking system, which only has $17 trillion to begin with, you know, and goes, let's say a trillion that goes into crypto, you fundamentally weakened the balance sheet of the market. the United States and the U.S. government is doing everything it can to keep that from happening. I want to circle back on something you just said. You said the FDIC could not afford another bank run right now. The deposit insurance fund, if you do the math between the checks they're having to write for signature in Silicon Valley Bank, wiped out 85, 90 percent of the deposit

insurance fund. Last time that happened was 2008. And what happened was the Federal Reserve and the Treasury got together and said, well, we'll just back it by the full faith and credit of the United States government. And they fed it in there. that it spent a few years, you know, upping the assessments that the banks were charged to then reload, to regrow that. You can actually, it's published. You can actually go and look at that curve where it went. It was very high 2008, went to zero, went into negative, actually, and then kind of crawled

its way back up until, you know, three weeks ago. So one of the lessons seems to be that if the FDIC comes knocking at your door, perhaps they need to knock twice if they ignore your first call. What do you think are the lessons being learned from the silicon, or what are the lessons from the Silicon Valley Bank collapse. Do you think bankers and regulators are learning them? No. I mean, simple. I think if you watch the Senate Banking Committee hearing today, you saw, you know, kind of the old guard preaching the old ways, you know, the politicians giving their talking points, but fundamentally, it's not actually changing anything. You know,

they spent a lot of time today talking about the tools at their disposal. The fact is, they had the data, they had the tools and they weren't acting the right way. So when I think about innovating and transforming, you know, and keeping things like this from happening again, I think about three things. I think about the technology, I think about the process, and I think about the people. On the technology side, you know, there's a big tech upgrade needed. They need to be able to be getting data in real time. They need to be analyzing it real time. They need to be doing, you know, kind of a far better job of risk management on these bank balance sheets. And that's across the regulatory system. The second is the processes that the organizations use need to be far better.

So, for example, if I was the chair of the FDIC, I would require any bank in the United States, their chairman to call me, literally, pick up the phone, call me, and tell me if you see more than 1% of your deposits leave in a 24-hour period, or if the aggregate over three days is 2% or something like that. If we knew that, that would fundamentally alter how we think about that institution, how we think about the management, et cetera. Number three is the people involved. There are roughly 4,000 bank examiners in the United States, the vast majority of them work

for the FDIC. Those people should be held accountable to. sure that they aren't just sending memos. They're saying, listen, your balance sheet is off by X. Rates are going to continue to go up for the next year, probably. We're looking at a target of five, let's say. If that happens, you have two days to come back to me and tell me what that does to your balance sheet. And if you can't do that, then great, I'm going to tag you on your examination, and you're going to have to really come to the principal's office and tell me what the heck you're actually doing. And the fact is, is none of those three things have been happening.

Going back to the regional banks, if you're a small to medium-sized business, and I think a lot of them are thinking this right now, why would you do business with a regional bank if you know it's not systemically important? Well, now the logic that you would use as a small business owner is different, right? Up until the last month or so, generally speaking, the big banks were better for consumers, the small and regional banks were better for businesses. They had more organized products and services that made more sense. were a little closer. If you were a Main Street business, it was easier to work with a Main Street bank because they understood you. You know, you've got a car dealer, you've got a coffee shop, whatever. You know, there's a bank three doors down. It's an easier thing. It's easier to get lending and credit facilities without, you know, some guy in New York deciding that you aren't cool enough or Silicon Valley deciding you're not cool enough, right? Community banks, regional banks play an incredibly important part of the U.S. economy because the businesses they

support account for well over 80 percent of new job creation, well over 80 percent of new capital infusion. I mean, it's just, it's not even, it's not even close. What's happened now is the logic is now changed. And so if I'm a small business owner, instead of looking at the local bank or the local credit union, I now realize, well, if I'm successful, I'm in trouble if something happens to that bank. And so now the calculus of where I put my money and how I operate is radically different. So I might keep some deposits in a community bank, but I also have an account with EGIS.

We're going to see a significant recalibration of deposits on the consumer side of. It's already 85% within, I think, seven banks. That's going to go well over 90%, I think, here by the end of the year. And we're going to see a lot of pressure on the banking system. There was already a tremendous amount of pressure on the community and regional system. Because also, it will, no matter what happens in Congress, there will be more examination, more regulatory compliance expense on the regional banks and mid-sized banks. And so that will continue to push on those institutions. You know, we used to have about, you know, in 1987, I think there were 27,000.

Banks in the United States now they're about 4,500. I would not be at all surprised for us to break 3,000 within the next five years. With more consolidation is these large... Consolidation. Yeah, I'm also not convinced there won't be a couple more failures before we get through the end of the year. But that's, you know, I think there's about 15 or 20 banks that I'm kind of really staring at hard to figure out how they manage their balance sheet. But there are, you know, I think we'll see consolidation. That's always been the main driver, you know, of that.

But, you know, we'll see more of that too. Any parts of the story that maybe we haven't gotten to or the second or third order effects that people aren't discussing enough? Yeah, I think commercial real estate is something to pay a lot of attention to right now. I think the bonds side of the story is something to pay a lot of attention to right now. I think as we get through, as we go conceivably into this recession later this year, which seems to be kind of a fait accompli at this point, there are a lot of banks that have made a bunch of investments that are now worth less than they need to be in

order for the banks to survive. And so there's, you know, they're going to be looking for the Fed to, you know, kind of balance, you know, the drop off in rates and the drop off in the recreate, the reactivation of more quantitative easing. That whole story over the next, you know, let's say nine to 12 months, I think is going to be far more important than anything we're talking about right now. Wow. And I mean, with respect to the recession coming, I feel like a recession has been six months away now for about the past 18 months. Yeah. We'll see how that continues. And In a previous interview, I've heard you talk about essentially, if you're an individual, you're worried about these bank collapses, you can pack it to go bag for your savings,

hoping you can share with the Motley Fool audience, how one can do that. So it's really easy. I always keep a clean bank account with far less than the whatever the depository insurance number is at a G-Sib. This one that I know isn't going to fail. I always have a clean credit card. I always kind of keep them all separate. Use them just enough they don't get shut down. that basically create a parallel siloed financial infrastructure.

And that is absolutely critical now because, you know, I think I'm fairly well quoted as saying I think there are only two banks in the United States that I think are kind of fully doing the cybersecurity correctly and managing that correctly. And so you've got to worry about ransomware. And to me, there are two levels of concern. One is, can I pay my bills today? Can I, you know, get a cup of coffee? Can I buy my groceries?

Pay my electric bill, whatever. The second order is, is the industry? institution and the structure itself I'm operating inside of something that I can rely on long term. I worry tremendously about raising the debt ceiling because that will impact the value of the U.S. dollar, which then value credit ratings, etc. You go down that list, right? At some point, it is entirely possible two years from now that I will find a way to operate in a non-banking infrastructure that is independent of the U.S. dollar just because I'm not 100%

certain that a silly political fight in D.C. won't devalue the U.S. dollar so much. that it becomes an inaccessible, you know, payments infrastructure for me. I'd be remiss if I didn't ask you. What are the two banks that you think are doing cybersecurity correctly? Or can you not say? I never, I never name those two. All right. Well, fair enough.

Maybe we'll chat after the program. Speaking of financial regulation, though, Binance is in a lot of trouble in non-bank institutions. They've allegedly encouraged customers to use VPN's virtual private networks to circumvent trading restrictions both in the United States, in China, they have hit a hat trick, in my opinion, by angering the U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission, the IRS, and the Chinese government. What are the laws that Binance was allegedly helping those customers circumvent? I mean, it's an incredible list of laws that they are

alleged to have violated. On the People's Republic of China side, it's basically anything related to crypto and anything related to a Chinese PRC citizen doing banking outside of the PRC. Right. I mean, it's the laundry list, right? On the U.S. government side, it's everything from tax evasion to money laundering to facilitating the financing of terrorism. I mean, you just go down the list. It's an incredible list. And by the way, it's not just the IRS, right? I mean, they're, I think there's more to come on the finance story. And certainly if what we're seeing, you know, if you take what has been, they've been accused of doing as it relates to the PRC and you take what they've accused of doing to the United States, there's a bit of overlap in that event diagram. I'd be curious, you know, how, you know, how much. bigger, the one circle that surrounds them all actually is. But it does, you know, to me say Binance is probably one of the riskiest organizations right now to do something with whether you're a U.S. citizen or not. I mean, if you can upset the U.S. and PRC. government at the same time, I mean, you know, good luck. You know, I'm curious what the shallow grave you'll eventually be found in. Organizationally, I mean, right?

Binance claims that it was their angels, volunteers who are helping customers circumvent trading restrictions. These are folks on Discord, Telegram, not tied to the company. Looking at your Twitter, I think you disagree with that claim from Binance. I have to admit to having a degree of personal impact here that I should disclose. A quote-unquote, volunteer army related to a specific crypto project recently tried to deepfake me and use my voice to shill for a product that is currently being sued by a U.S. regulator. And so these volunteer armies used by various crypto projects or crypto companies, it is, I think, going to come out very clearly that they are not independent at all.

And they are funded, you know, one degree or another, directly taking strategic direction, et cetera, et cetera. It's sort of like saying, if you see an influencer on social media, like, let's say on TikTok, shilling for brand X, of course, there's a financial relationship there. of course, they're doing that on purpose. Maybe they're doing it to establish a bona fides. Maybe they're doing it because they're getting some crypto from one hidden wallet to another hidden wallet, right?

That is entirely operating in this market. And so, to me, that is a weak argument and frankly, one that is going to be very easy to prove that it's a weak argument. I got another dumb question for you. I can bet on whether or not an NBA team will win the championship with a futures contract, with a gambling company. I can bet on the price of oil a year or two from now, and I can bet on a company's stock price. Why does the U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission, why don't they want me to bet on the

price of cryptocurrencies? Oh, such a great question, Ricky. You should ask them. I do not work for the CFTC. Probably the only thing, the good that came out of that is their argument about like Coin, Eif, and Bitcoin, you know, not being securities, which I think was correct. But the fact is the U.S. government is having what I call a Chinese Communist Party moment. They want to control and govern all financial activity.

You are allowed to gamble because there's legal framework under which that operates that you cannot technically violate. And it took decades and decades for that to be created. The thing that is terrifying for, I think, most of the people in the regulatory community is they don't have a system that allows them to control how a U.S. citizen operates in that environment. And if it is inside the U.S. sphere of influence, can we collect taxes on it? A couple of years ago, I think it was 2021. IRS did a survey, something like, like 40% of Americans that filed taxes said they owned crypto. I think that plus cash outflows through COVID into crypto and offshore really terrified a lot of people in the regulatory system, especially the IRS. I want to move on to one big FinTech story in the news as you teach FinTech

at Duke University. Hindenberg, the short research firm. I missed that shirt research form. The short research form. I would totally be up for signing onto a short research forum. Maybe some more uniform sizes. So did anything in Hindenberg's research on Block, Jack Dorsey's financial technology company that has been accused of maybe opening the door too much to folks generating accounts to one address, being able to commit fraud to give the extremely short version of a 100-page report, anything in there surprise you is someone with a foot in the FinTech and regulation world? No.

I mean, lots of financial services firms do a lot of these things. Wells Fargo has been called out multiple times for doing versions of this same kind of thing, creating fake accounts as one example, right? You know, for the last five years, we've seen a lot of people, you know, in essence, one degree or another, exaggerate or stretch where they were with something. And the problem, I think, that Block currently has is that their financial operations and revenue and margin and all that kind of stuff was not in line with what they were talking about publicly. And I think a bunch of people did some really high quality research and

discovered there's a gap there. And that gap is an investable thesis, which now has opened the door to a bunch of other activities. You know, we have a financial system right now where some things are very transparent. Some things are entirely opaque. And the gap between those two is alpha, as we say, right? And the, I think block is a great example of something went from very small to medium to large very quickly. And the math just doesn't seem to add up correctly in some of those cases. I know there is a line somewhere between banks and fintech companies. I use Venmo for a lot of banking activities. A lot of folks use the cash app for banking activities.

Are those products banks? It's a great question. My argument would be if your wallet is holding dollars and it's an American entity, it's a bank, right? That would be an example, right? So Venmo's a bank, PayPal's a bank. Starbucks is an app as the app is a bank, right? That is not the definition that holds up to legal standards, though. And that's not what we've established as a community around that.

And so it's really, there are banks. There are things that touch banks. And then there's financial services activities that touch them or touch banks as a gap. And it's a really interesting problem we have right now because if you were to take Starbucks, I just happen to know the math on Starbucks, and take that app and call it a bank, it would be the 17th or 18th largest bank by value in the United States. Right? One of the video game companies, I can't remember, maybe it's, yeah, I won't say the one. I don't want to say the wrong one. But one of the video game companies out there runs a tremendous amount of payments infrastructure because of, you know, people playing on it buying loop boxes, etc. That would be like the seventh largest bank in the United States if you called it a bank. And frankly, I think, you know, when you get to that scale, it does. We're going to have to create new regulatory systems and structures to allow for us to manage that because you talk to a younger person and you say, what's the difference between, you know, JP Morgan and Venmo, they don't know, they don't care.

Now, some of that's because of the defunding of parts of our educational system, but the other part is, is they just use it like one, right? I have an exchange account and I have a card that's in my Apple wallet, and so I can just buy stuff with it. I said stuff with it, you know, I don't know if I, you know, it is to a degree insured with air quotes around it. But the way we defined banking in the United States goes back to the 1930s. And we haven't really reevaluated that.

And we're going to have to do that at some point. The rest of the world has already done that and has already moved on. And we went from being five years out of date in 2008 to 10 to 15 years out of date now. One topic before we get going. I can ask you to wear your cybersecurity hat. And that is because a company called ByteDance, which owns TikTok, big in the news, hot in the streets in D.C., where legislators are considering a ban on the social media platform. I want to talk about the solution that they've laid out, which is that to make it a separate entity

that the Chinese government cannot spy on Americans' information, is that the company Oracle is going to house all the data in Texas. And that way, if you can hear my sarcasm, the Chinese government can't touch it and mess with it, all that good stuff. I don't buy that explanation, but do you? No, not at all. The fact is the Chinese, the PRC government, and I always say PRC because I don't want people to think that they get to call themselves China. There's a second country that has the same name. That also has China in its name. The People's Republic of China is strategically focused on gathering up as much data on every American as possible for long-term utilization.

And this proposed, this proposed, air quote, solution is just a pile of bite dance. I'll say it like that. You know, and interesting, taking it back to, tying this back to the finance conversation, you know, there are data centers in Asia that have bite dance data sitting on the server that's right next to, right next to each other. So, Alibaba, Tencent, Binance, Bynance, Bight Dance, these companies are all sharing hardware with data sitting co-resident across all of them in a variety of different environments. There is no way that I would trust BightDance or anything else owned by the PRC, which, you know, just as a reminder, there's no such thing as a private company instead of the PRC, right? The government always owns a piece of it, right? That is always part of the discussion. In order to launch companies or a scale company, you have to be a member of the Communist Party.

So am I going to trust a communist? backed by a communist government in the protection of American data? No, not at all. Now, is breaking up TikTok a thing? It's just removing it. There are a million ways we can solve this. From a cybersecurity perspective, I think it is a nightmare currently, and the proposed solution only makes it worse. But the data's in Texas. How are they grabbing it? There's a thing called the internet, Ricky. I'm not sure if you've heard of it. The ability for Oracle to lock that out is impossible, whether it's at the hardware layer, whether it's at the network layer, whether it's at the virtual machine or database layer, there are an almost infinite number of ways that the Chinese could get access to that data, even if all they do is own the land the data center is on,

which, by the way, the amount of land in Texas owned by the PRC directly or indirectly is a relevant one here. How much of the Oracle shareholder base is PRC? You know, these are all very important questions. I think people should really ask, you know, the more, the, the most, the, the long, longitudinally relevant questions. You know, the Chinese don't care about next year. They care about the next century. And so are we going to play at that level or are we going to argue about what sounds good on CNN? That's Sultan Megji. He is the former chief innovation officer at the Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. You may know it as the FDIC. It's also a professor in the

Pratt School of Engineering at Duke University. Appreciate you joining us, Fools on Motley Fool Money. Thanks for having me, Rite. As always, people on the program may have interest in the stocks they talk about and the Motley Fool may a formal recommendations for or against. So, don't buy yourself stocks based solely on what you hear. I'm Chris Hill. Thanks for listening. We'll see you tomorrow.