NBC Nightly News with Tom Llamas - Former top U.S. commander in South Korea on Trump-Kim Summit (Extended)

Episode Date: February 27, 2019

General Vincent Brooks, the former top U.S. commander in South Korea, speaks with Lester Holt about President Trump, Kim Jong Un and America's relationship with North Korea.

We're about to see a second summit between President Trump and Kim Jong-un. Does that make you feel better about the future in the region? It does. It's good that it's coming, and we look forward to that occurring and being successful. Dialogue is better than not having it, as we saw throughout 2017. Did it feel like we were getting close to war before the first summit? I'd say yes. There was certainly a boundary between falling into war and deliberately driving into war. And the big concern was what happens when we don't have communication with one another. The potential of miscalculating one's actions as observed by the other was very high. And that kind of thing can trigger war when you don't even want it. I don't think any of the

parties wanted war at that point in time, but it required us to be in a very heightened posture, as you saw when you came over to visit, that we had to always be ready. So it felt like a misunderstanding would be all it would take to bring it to blows. Yes. I don't think it would have been a conscious decision to go to war at that point in time, because that's not what was desired. We certainly wanted, from the U.S. and South Korean alliance perspective, to create the right kind of pressure that

would bring about traction for the diplomatic efforts that were underway at that point in time. And indeed that happened. But you don't know how far you have to go before that's going to occur, or how North Korea particularly would react to that, as well as others in the region. So there is diplomacy going forward, at the same time even the U.S. intelligence apparatus acknowledges that North Korea has not given up anything and retains a capability and retains a desire to go forward with its

weapons program. How do you reconcile the two? There is going to always be debate about what the intentions of any human being will be if they have not expressly disclosed it and demonstrated that they're going to pursue that. And that's where we are really with Kim Jong-un. But I think we have to use a bit of empathy here. Why should they give them up? This is something we shouldn't assume away.

Why should they give them up? Well, first, because they said they would. Secondly, because Kim Jong-un and the North Korean economy cannot begin to develop, much less flourish, until they do. And so he has very good reasons to do that. But does he have sufficient trust in what the U.S. is going to do, what the South Koreans are going to do, what the Japanese are going to do, what the Russians are going to do, what the Chinese are going to do, the five countries around North Korea?

Is there sufficient trust for him to just give it all up at once? And the answer is no, there is not. And there has to be a journey then to build the trust that is necessary to take the steps that ultimately lead to a final, fully verified denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. During the summit, the president agreed to suspend joint exercises between the U.S. and South Korea. Did that take you off guard? It did. We always knew there was a possibility and that several countries,

particularly China, were calling for that. But it wasn't something that North Korea had emphasized. And so whether that came as a result of the discussions between Kim Jong-un and President Trump, or if President Trump just wanted to demonstrate a higher degree of commitment and demonstrate that he was serious about moving forward, which is really important. There has to be something that signals to North Korea that a new relationship is emerging. Then that's probably where it came from. But the answer is yes. We didn't know that that decision was going to be made then. We don't have to know. It's not the first time I found orders from the president through a broadcast. And it's not just this president.

So that's sometimes the way it happens in senior command. You have to be ready and postured for whatever decision is made. Are there lines that you would hope the president doesn't cross in terms of what he's willing to do when he meets with Kim Jong-un again? This is a very interesting dynamic also. Because of the way North Korea will decide, and it means Kim Jong-un himself will make any decisions on the direction North Korea goes, it has to begin at the top. And this is unusual in our traditional approach to diplomacy where there's an agreement to meet, staffs do the work, positions are taken, negotiation occurs before the big meeting, products are created to be signed at the big meeting. And then the big meeting occurs. In this case, it has to actually be the opposite. So first I would say, President of the United States,

just like President Moon Jae-in also, who is very importantly meeting with North Korea as well, each of these leaders must have room to maneuver. It's their responsibility to determine which way we're going to go. And some of this has to come by way of the development of a relationship with the North Korean leader, person to person relationship. And that will determine where President Trump goes. I think he'll sense that himself as to where he wants to go with this, what will make it better,

and how he gets to the deal that he's looking for that ultimately leads to a final fully verified? denuclearization the Korean Peninsula when the bellicose language was going back and forth the bigger nuclear button fire and fury Did you lose sleep as the commander the guy that was in charge over there? Not about that You know any commanders losing sleep over am I as ready as I need to be have I done everything that I can to make sure that my subordinates who are under my command, and that in case would be 650,000 troops that would have been under my command at that point in time from South Korea and the United States and some United Nations sending states, have I done everything that I can do to make sure that they have the

best possible chance of success? And no commander worth his or her assault will say yes to that question. So there's always the anxiety of what have I left undone? How do I get to it as quickly as possible while I still have time before something begins? All the while being what I described during that period of time, steady and ready. We had to be both of those in order to ensure we didn't provoke a war that no one was seeking and that we were in fact finding ways to enable the diplomacy that is unfolding even now. How would you assess the threat of war in this current environment? One meeting held,

another about to be held? I think it's low. Now, if you're doing this purely off of mechanical measurement, how many weapon systems are not there that were there in 2017? Very few. There would be very little difference in a mechanical and physical sense. The intentions clearly are different now. And this is what always makes the difference between whether there will or will not be war.

There's dialogue now. There's an expressed intention to carry on that dialogue and to move toward denuclearization. There are successful actions to lower tension along the demilitarized zone. I was part of that as the United Nations commander working with the South Korean side as all three, including North Korea, engaged in discussions about ways to lower the potential of some incident like the November DMZ crossing in the Joint Security Area turning into a firefight that then escalates into an artillery exchange or into a destruction of facilities and

resources, that destruction of lives. It can change so quickly, but right now that tension is lower based on some of the measures that have been taken in the joint security area itself, the reestablishment of communications in the eastern and western communication zones, the creation of a route that goes from the southern side of the demilitarized zone into the middle, and from the northern side into the middle to meet at a spot where significant battle occurred. The North Koreans are regarded as being masters at concealment, everything from artillery emplacements to their nuclear program. How much do you think we know, we really know about their capabilities? Well, again, this is a commander's trait to never accept that you know everything

that you need to know. So I'd probably call it an 80 to 90 percent. Now, there's a lot that's missing there. Ten to 20 percent is unknown. That may be generous in assuming that it's that much more to learn. We may be more accurate than we think we are. But it's better to err on the side of we don't know. And we should anticipate that there will still be denial and deception,

hiding and not disclosing as part of the dynamics that move forward. Again, why should North Korea move forward with us? Do they trust us enough? Do they trust that the direction things are going enough to take the degree of risk that they must undertake? And I think the answer is no, again, and they will take steps toward that over time. And what we need to do is not recoil from that and say, see, I told you they were going to lie, and then walk away. We should expect that they're going to lie or at least not fully disclose everything that there is to be disclosed until a higher level of trust emerges.

And that could be several years before that occurs. That should be expected. So you think this dance is going to take a long time? I do. I think we'll see some steps here in the very near term that say, yes, North Korea, we really are serious about doing this, will be the image that North Korea projects. And they will be serious. But it won't be gratifying in terms of completely solving the problem and getting to a fully, a final fully verified

denuclearization. That will take time, steps, and some relationship among trust, denuclearization, and a new relationship with among the countries that are there. Explain to me the importance of the American presence in South Korea. And I'm curious, not only from a standpoint of protecting and honoring commitment to South Korea, but in terms of strategic placement and power projection in that part of the world. This is a very important consideration. So as I describe it, physical presence in a country like this makes a difference.

This is an expression of commitment. This is not just an expression of interest where we come and we go, but we're there. And so we can honor our commitments as an ally to South Korea. We demonstrate to anyone who would engage in threatening behavior to our ally that we're present. We, of course, have a second alliance there in that region with Japan. Those are two distinct alliances,

but both of them are reflective of the same degree of interest and commitment. And so it's very important to have that presence there. The number is not so much the critical part. That should be determined by what the military necessity is, but always having a sufficient presence to make it very clear that we're really here and we're staying here. Now, this has endured since before the Korean War. That's important to the South Korean people and it's important to the region. You brought up the point about power projection

and the geopolitical posture that comes from that. That's very important as well. And that has to be thought through. What is our interest? Where should we be? What kind of message do we send, especially to China, if we're present still on the Korean Peninsula when all this is done?

I would submit to you that China probably has a greater interest in seeing the U.S. presence diminished or eliminated than does North Korea. North Korea may be more interested in having a bit of a security guarantee themselves, including economic security, physical security from external threat, the security that comes from just being part of a set of relationships in the region, not entirely dependent on China. And this is a very important factor that I think has to be thought through as well. And our presence can impact the considerations that all the countries around there have.

If you were briefing the president ahead of this meeting, is there any wisdom or anything you would want to share with him that you would want him to know? I would say, first, keep going on the relationship basis. And the relationship is based on respect. That goes a long way by itself in keeping the door open for dialogue. Know that we have to deliver, and so do they. It's a two-way dance. Hear the voice of the South Koreans who have found ways to lower the tension and still maintain pressure on North Korea. And that can be instructive for all of us as we go forward.

And good luck. Make a difference. And that's interesting. You mentioned President Moon has really managed a way to do both, keep the pressure on and create, in many ways, the atmosphere for this dialogue, hasn't he? I believe he has. I think he deserves a great deal of credit on being able to sense what is necessary to cause the dynamic to change. This is what we were hunting for in 2017. What can cause Kim Jong Un to change his calculus, his thinking about the way to pursue a future for North Korea? And he tried to pursue a future for North Korea.

And he tried to have a two-pronged approach that was inclusive of weapons, including nuclear weapons, and an economic development program, and neither one of those worked. And so by pursuing the nuclear weapons angle, he lost the ability to develop economically. That's what the sanctions regime looks like, the extraordinary set of international sanctions that were very important here. But at the same time, President Moon recognized that that could not endure forever, that there would have to be some way out of this.

And he made offerings and overtures to North Korea in the summer of 2017 that seemed rather untimely when they came out. But it's the very things that were picked up in the early spring of 2018 after Kim Jong-un indeed had changed his calculus and turned in a different direction. Communications being reestablished, lowering tension in the demilitarized zone, joint recovery remains. All these things have happened.