North Korea News Podcast by NK News - Ambassador recall, remote work scams and the lives of North Korea’s elites

Episode Date: June 23, 2026

This week’s episode of the NK News Podcast looks at North Korea’s decision to recall its ambassador to the U.K. just weeks after his appointment, in protest over British sanctions on the Songdowon International Children’s Camp.  NK News Lead Correspondent Shreyas Reddy discusses why the camp holds symbolic importance for Pyongyang, its links to Russia […]

Hello, listeners, welcome back to the NK News podcast. I'm Alana Hill and I'm joined today in this studio, June 23rd, by NK News lead correspondent Shreyas Reddy. Hi, Shrae. Hello, thank you for having me. Now, you graced us with your presence just a couple of weeks ago, but I wanted to have you back today to discuss Pyongyang's decision to recall its ambassador to the UK just weeks after his appointment. Later in the show, we'll take that conversation a step further with Gianbeck, author of Privileged but Powerless. Her book looks at the people inside North Korea's elite system, diplomats, officials and others who may enjoy status and access, but often lack real security or control over their own lives. And Traas, we're also going to delve into a new investigation into North Korean IT workers.

But let's start with the recall of Pyongyang's ambassador to the UK. What do we know about Mun Myung Shin and was his appointment to London notable before the recall? Well, to be honest, I think it was mostly at that stage it seemed more like a routine reshuffle. He was appointed in late April, or at least that's when North Korea and announced it and it had seemingly been on the cards for a while because the last ambassador had been there for many years, I think even through the pandemic. And over the last few years, we've seen North Korea essentially carrying out diplomatic reshuffles in various parts of the world, some cases shutting down embassies, but in others just cycling out diplomatic staff.

And so this perhaps wasn't all that unusual at the time. But what did stand out was, essentially, he was appointed in late April. I don't believe he even got a chance to present his credential, so he might not have had a chance to formally take up the post. But within weeks of his appointment, he had already been recalled. This is what we learned from the North Korean Embassy itself, which told NK News that it had recalled him amid grievances over the UK sanctioning of a children's camp. Well, speaking of those grievances, as you just said, Treyas, North Korea says the recall was a response to UK sanctions on Sondawan International Children's Camp. What do we know about this camp and why did it come under scrutiny over-links to Russia and Ukrainian children?

Yeah, so this camp has pretty much been around for decades. It was established in 1960 and it's located near Wonsan, one of North Korea's east coast, where Kim Jong-un has also made a big deal about building it up as a tourist resort. but Songdo once importance periods that by decades. And over the years, it has hosted children from many parts of the world, many states that are friendly to North Korea across Asia, Europe, Latin America. And in, but before the pandemic, it, it was quite active during the pandemic, seeming shut down just like the rest of North Korea.

And then it resumed in 2024, but only for Russian children. And so Russia started to start. sending children there and from what it was essentially leisure activities it was like from the way North Korea would bill it it certainly seems more like a regular summer camp

now there is obviously a propaganda value to it but that's the way they've traditionally presented it and even the stories we heard coming out of the camp in terms of the attendees it was mostly that seemed to be the focus but

there was also a lot of controversy because it wasn't just children from Russia as the rest of the world recognize it. It was also Russia for children from Russian held territories, Russian control territories, that ended up traveling there. And so much of the, there has been increasing controversy over the last couple of years, where people, human rights activists have alleged that Russia essentially sent Ukrainian children for brainwashing and indoctrination in the deep. And, Trace, am I correct in saying that this is the same summer camp where children of Russian

soldiers were sent? Yes, so in pretty much soon after that first, after the resumption of Sondon in 2024, Vladmir Putin met Kim Jong-un in Pyongyang and thanked him for organizing to us to Sondon for the children of Russian soldiers who died in the war in Ukraine. So there was very much that war connection even at the top level in terms of the political message. Now, Pyongyang, of course, has criticised sanctions before UK sanctions, but this time it downgraded diplomatic relations to the charged affairs level. What makes this case different? I think a big part of it is just the significance of Songduan. I think, like you said, in the UK, other countries have imposed sanctions on North Korea in the past. And North Korea typically just either doesn't respond or it simply condemns sanctions with statements. So this time, though, it seems that essentially they took aim at a children's camp that North Korea takes a lot of pride in and it holds particularly significant. Now, as much as people might say it's about the Russia connection, it goes beyond that. It's Sondon has been quite significant for the North Korean regime for decades.

And essentially, it is part of, it is in some ways a more. positive aspect of their outreach in terms of the way they frame it. That is how they wanted to be viewed. So for it to be essentially sanctioned and linked to the war is something that felt and like an insult to North Korea. And also more than that, they are very particular about that DPRK-Russia friendship at this point. And they see this action as demeaning both North Korea's activities on its own as well as its friendship with Russia. Let's zoom in a little bit on what this recall of the ambassador actually means. What does the ambassador's absence mean in practical terms for DPRK-UK diplomacy,

especially as London has been trying to reopen its embassy in Pyongyang? Yeah, it has definitely been quite tricky for the British government over the last few years. It has, for many decades, the UK and North Korea didn't really have relations as such. and it was a huge step forward when I think it was around 25 plus years ago when North Korea established this embassy in London. And since then, it has been a great channel of communication with the West, with the British government. And for the UK, it was certainly important to at least restore that connection to North Korea

in the first place because their embassy in Pyongyang shut down because of the pandemic. They haven't been able to resume it since. They've tried on multiple occasions. They've been trying for years now to go back into the DPRK and it just hasn't worked out. So it doesn't seem that North Korea is quite ready to engage with the UK, at least in North Korea. But this embassy was still there.

It was still active. It was an invaluable resource. It was an invaluable channel. But now, essentially, it does leave North Korea without an ambassador there. The embassy hasn't shut down. there is still a Sharjad affair, but essentially it does leave the UK with a serious question, which is how do you deal with North Korea as long as it believes the relationship, as North Korea itself said, should be downgraded because of the sanctions.

And it goes beyond just not having that person at the top pyramid to deal with. It also lays down questions about whether, how the UK can genuinely restore dialogue with North Korea to be able to push forward relations. What also perhaps doesn't really help in terms of uncertainty at this stages, the UK itself is currently going through its own political shifts with Prime Minister Kea Stama stepping down. So for North Korea, they'll also want to wait and watch to see what the next government looks like, whether it's Stama again, whether it's or someone in his camp or whether it'll be someone else and who else comes in and what their approach to North Korea relations would be.

And as far as we know, Starmer's resignation is not related to sanctions or North Korea. Indeed. As far as we know. Well, zooming back out, Trace, you know, what should we be watching for next? Whether this, you know, to know if this is a temporary protest or a deeper deterioration in relations, like, are they going to reappoint a new ambassador? Could the former ambassador go back? How does this work?

Well, I think it is, as of now, from what we understand, it is a temporary withdrawal. It's most likely that it's, and it's not the sort of relationship that I think either country completely wants to abandon for different reasons. I think for the UK, it gets to position itself as an important stakeholder in world peace, in the global peace process, by engaging with North Korea because the US certainly can't. And at the same time, for North Korea, it is one of its few remaining channels to the rest of the world, particularly to the West. So one would assume that this isn't something that is irreversible, but it certainly does leave questions about when and where, like what will really prompt either side to really shift its perspective. Will the UK undo a sanctions designation that's saying, okay, this isn't what we thought it was, or at least not entirely? it certainly would be unusual for a government to do that when it comes to North Korea and it would be seeing us backing down.

Whereas for North Korea as well, it has now firmly drawn the line in the sand. As long as that, until that designation is reversed, it has no interest in having an ambassador in the UK and it will downgrade its relations. So it is pretty much a game of diplomatic chicken at this stage and we have to just see who really is willing to compromise. Perhaps there will still be some dealings like back-channel communications, but for now at least it does seem that it'll take a while before both sides can figure out where they're really going with this next.

In terms of the other part of the big picture will be just this simple precedent of North Korea responding to sanctions like this, I don't believe I recall North Korea withdrawing an ambassador over a sanctions announcement. the past, not just with UK, but with anyone else. So there are very few countries that are both willing to sanction North Korea and have designations and have diplomatic relations with it. So there may not be too many other cases where this will apply, but certainly there will be other places where there will be law enforcement actions or maybe contributions to the multilateral sanctions monitoring team. And then the question is, will North Korea object to, let's say,

Germany, German law enforcement, taking down a North Korean worker cell or something, or would it object to other members of the multilateral sanction monitoring team flagging sanctions operations and then say where we're drawing our ambassador from there? So that is right now still a very remote possibility. It seems that this is more about it being Song the one specifically rather about it just being sanctions, but it certainly does set an unusual and possibly dangerous precedent for diplomacy. It's definitely, as you said, Shrew,

setting an interesting precedent. And of course, you know, this is just one case that we're seeing. Is it related in particular to that summer account? We don't know. But of course, we will continue to watch how this diplomatic game of chicken does play out. But let's shift now from diplomacy to

another way North Korea operates overseas and that's remote IT workers. You also reported on the NISO's investigation that uncovered a North Korean IT worker cell targeting US companies with nearly 170,000 applications and more than 21,000 interviews, dozens of job offers.

You know cyber stories are my favourite, so let's get right into it. Shares, what is the main takeaway from the NISO's investigation? And why does this report stand out from earlier reporting on these North Korean IT workers schemes. So I think the biggest thing that really stood out was the scale. You did mention the numbers, so 170,000 job applications in just nine months or so,

leading to lots of job opportunities. And I think what the way, essentially what kind of stands out is, it's not just an ad hoc operation where they just go and toss their efforts at a wall, toss something at a wall and see what sticks. they have clear what this investigation revealed was a very coordinated cell that has administrators, managers and team leads, as well as as many as 22 operators just for this one cell. So, and the way they manage that as well, they've implemented a lot of processes to make sure everything is going on smoothly. No one's really getting in each other's way. They're able to coordinate not just with each other, but also with their network.

of facilitators in the US who are helping essentially achieve a lot of these results. So this, I think it perhaps shouldn't come as a surprise that this scheme, which North Korea has essentially perfected over the last few years, is being done on an industrial scale. But it certainly was an interesting look at just how they managed it and how they keep these systems running. Right. That's definitely what stood out as the most interesting thing to me. because firstly, when you first read those figures, it kind of sounds like, oh, they just were bombarding companies with thousands of job applications. And of course, some are going to slip

through the net. But that wasn't really the case. This was, as you said, shares, like highly coordinated. What kinds of new tools and processes did Nesos observe that helped power this IT worker scheme? So I think they made sure that their setup was built for efficiency. So they had a productivity dashboard. They had essentially a leaderboard style performance tracking system, as well as a lot of complex reference systems just to defeat background checks. So they went and had even backup websites built in just to, in case anyone wanted to check something on their resume, they would be able to reach that. Now, to be honest, we don't, the investigation suggested they hadn't necessarily, this website hadn't been used, but just the fact that they had it

in reserve was quite remarkable. And I think, What we've seen from that is also they've leveraged a lot of these custom tools, a lot of these dashboards essentially to manage their calendars, manage different identities because they have a lot of fake identities which they use to secure these jobs and coordinate across different companies. They've also, of course, and this is more later in the actual application stage as well as in carrying out the work. They've also leveraged AI tools,

something that has been observed for a while, that North Korean IT workers use AI tools for everything from helping generate material for their fabricated resumes to researching targets, as well as, of course, even we've seen deep fake interviews, which just to make sure that they can get through. And perhaps something even more concerning at times is in some ways, is they're increasingly leveraging these AI tools also to help with coding assessments or to pass interviews where they're challenged on technical questions. So some of them certainly seem to have the skills to be able to do it and feed answers even to others, whereas others seem to rely more on these AI generated answers, which they see

are overlays on their computer screen. And what that essentially does is it greatly expands the potential field. You don't need to be a highly skilled programmer to be able to work in this. You can just be a relatively decent programmer supplementing your abilities with wipe coding. And that's enough to be able to get jobs in some of these companies. It's definitely concerning the expansion of these schemes with these new tools. And as you mentioned, Trace, this was going on for a period of about nine months. How did NICOS first detect the suspicious applications? And how did that lead to the broader infiltration of the network?

Well, it was an interesting incident for Nisos, because it stemmed from a hiring process at the company itself. So June last year, the company identified what it flagged as suspicious activity from an applicant who went by whom they've referred to as Joe in this report, who was applying for a remote lead AI architect. position. And so what Nisos kind of observed was they used personal information for someone else, a newly created email account as well as an AI-generated resume. But at that stage, they were still a little uncertain. But rather than really rejecting the applicant immediately, they consulted law enforcement and instead set up essentially a sting control operation to try and get into his network and try and understand more about what he was doing. And so they led him to believe he had

been selected for an entirely made-up role, shipped a laptop to his address in Florida, which was essentially the address of one of the facilitators. And then based on what they'd gleaned from that laptop as well as other open source research, they were able to put together a picture of his entire network, which wasn't just him and his facility. but also a whole bunch of other operatives and administrators, including administrators based in North Korea itself. That was something that they figured out based on the chats that they extracted from the IT workers' laptop.

So basically they were tipped off to this because someone applied to their own company. Yeah. Now, Shares, I think another interesting part of this story is that the operatives avoided cybersecurity, government, and defense roles. What does this tell us about their risk? calculation? I think it's, well, it essentially came down to them wanting to avoid roles where they would face particularly heightened screening for jobs, job clearance. That was something that we knew is always going to be an issue. We always say that the best way to weed out these

IT workers is just to follow all the protocols necessary. And these are sectors where you know that they're going to insist on extra background checks, they're going to insist on. biometrics in some cases they're going to ask for other tests and quite frankly these IT workers and their facilities are already going quite far. There are also reports of the facilitators whom the North Korean IT workers refer to as natives undergoing drug tests on behalf of the on behalf of the IT workers so but they can't go as far as let's say giving a biometric test so for them for the North Koreans it was more about saying where can we manage. maximize our reward, maximize our potential, without having to go through a lot of effort and

potentially getting caught. Let's talk a bit more about these natives. So these are people who are based in the US and are facilitating this scheme. Like, for example, Sharis, you mentioned that they had to send a laptop for this applicant. So these facilitators, perhaps one of their things that might be doing is receiving things like laptops. What other role do they play in helping North Korean operatives, you know, get higher, not only get higher, but then keep these jobs. Yeah, so you mentioned the laptops, because it goes beyond just one or two laptops in many cases, and there's something we've seen in past campaigns as well.

They hosted entire laptop farms where they received multiple computers issued by the companies. They also occasionally attended interviews on behalf of the applicants, and like I mentioned, even underwent drug tests. And in return, for their services, they were compensated with cryptocurrency payments. or in some cases they also received a portion of the salary for their effort depending on the level of involvement because some of them essentially served as the face of the applicant. So they would appear on camera while the North Korean operatives would essentially feed them information remotely to help them pass interviews and do work.

In other cases, the operatives would pretty much handle everything. It would just be down to the facilitators to help. essentially do tasks that way they wouldn't have to be seen or heard really or have any direct interaction with the company. And in other cases, they basically would just, the operators were actually hire third party developers to do all the work. And so it would be an even more complex network where you'd have these other programmers from other countries that would be doing the work on behalf of the North Korean agents. More broadly speaking, this might be a bit of a difficult question to answer. But when it comes to these IT workers schemes, is the goal here to infiltrate

certain types of companies to extract information? Is the goal to earn revenue or is it a combination of both? What do we normally see with these kind of schemes? I think the primary objective has for long been get in to infiltrate these companies, but with the goal of earning a steady salary, more than anything else, and then sending that back to Pyongyang. And I think it's an old thing in some ways, because we've also heard in cases that many of these companies find that these workers are actually quite reliable. They're quite affordable as well,

and they get the job done. If it weren't for the fact that they were doing it under fraudulent pretenses and essentially to help North Korea evade sanctions and develop weapons, they would even be seen as the model. employees, except of course they don't really exist and they're deceiving the company. But in the last few years, as more attention has been focused on these IT workers, we've also seen them increasingly leveraging their access for more harmful, for more nefarious purposes, whether it's stealing data and extorting the companies as well in some cases, whether it's setting up malware to

launch future attacks. There's increasingly an overlap between these operations as well as North Korea's more cybercrime-focused operations. And I think that's, as we go forward, we're probably going to see more and more of that because, yes, you can get some steady salaries for North Korea, but you can also leverage that for other access. Now, they won't want to jeopardize their access at first. So initially it's always about earning income.

But when they are let go or when they are, when they feel that they are under threat of being identified, that's when we start seeing them turn to these other goals as well, because at that point, if they see a position or a fabricated persona as already being burned, they will just say, we're going to take whatever we can and get out. Again, going back to the scale of this operation, that really, really struck me because this is 170,000 job applications over just nine months. It just seems massive, Shreyes.

what should companies be taking away from its investigation? You know, in practical terms, if I'm a recruiter, what warning shines should I be looking out for? I mean, fundamentally, it is the same as it ever was, which is that North Korea and IT workers are increasingly focusing on certain sectors, particularly technology and cryptocurrency. In some cases before this, there were also concerns about defense, but I think as we have seen in this campaign, it's more about, earning money and it's where their technical skills can shine without necessarily having to risk their cover being blown. I think the biggest message is to the same thing that you would probably advise any recruiter, which is verify everything. We know that with remote positions, particularly since the pandemic, it's become more increasingly common for companies to

prioritize just getting as many of these remote workers through as possible and they're convenient certainly but it comes with a lot of risk if you're actually following through checking demanding all the entities and trying to check up on their supporting materials you might spot more you might spot some unusual activity as nisource itself did in this case it spotted what is essentially a fabricated resume generated by AI spotted the that some of the identity details had seemingly been stolen from someone else. And if you're doing your due diligence, you'll probably get to spot those. Now, as this campaign does show, they're also getting better at essentially doing this on that

industrial scale and they've got operations to make it more efficient. So there will still be many cases that slip through the cracks. But with much more attention now on the issue, the best thing that can be done is actually going back to the basics. Well, unfortunately, that's all we have time for, but listeners don't go anywhere because next up, I'll be joined by June Beck, whose new book, privileged but powerless,

examines the fears, grievances, and vulnerabilities of North Korean elites. You can find Charis's reporting and more North Korea analysis at NK News and NKPro, and of course, I'll link all the stories we discussed today in the show notes of this episode. Sharias, thanks so much for your time today. Thank you.

Looking to go beyond the headlines on North Korea? Join the West Coast Exchange 2026, a Chatham House rules invitation-style gathering for the global North Korea professional community taking place from September 17th to the 19th. Hosted by NKPro of Career Risk Group, the event brings together analysts, diplomats, former negotiators, military experts and researchers for candid discussions, field visits and real exchange, including a visit to Iggy Bang Observatory on the Inter-Korean border. Confirm speakers include the mole who went undercover for a decade in North Korea, a former US ambassador to South Korea,

a blue house official who was in charge of the Inter-Korean Military Pact, journalists who visited North Korea a dozen times, and a former South Korean special warfare commander. Early-bar tickets are now open, with discount for NK Pro and NK News members. Space is limited to just 80 paying guests, so claim your seat soon. I'm joined now by Gian Beck, author of Privileged but Powerless. Her new book examines North Korea's elites, diplomats, party officials and others who may have status, access and opportunity, but often lack real security or control over their own lives. Her book is based on years of interviews with senior defectors.

Gianne Beck, thank you so much for joining me today. And welcome back to the podcast. Thank you. It's great to be here. So, Jan, your book's title is privileged but powerless. What does that phrase capture about North Korea's elites that maybe outsiders often misunderstand? Yes, so it's great to be back here, though I'm joining from Washington, D.C. And so it's an interesting title in that the book does capture the grievances of the North Korea's top elites,

mostly the top cadres of the party. And so these are individuals who certainly have access to the country's best privileges, access to the best luxuries, creature comforts, and such. So these are the privileges that I refer to. At the same time, these are not people who have actualized power, because at any point, they could be on the chopping block. they could, and this is not a hypothetical. This has been proven under Kim Jong-un, and of course as predecessors,

but it has been very sharply proven under the current leader of North Korea, whether it's with Changsong-Tek or with his half-brother or with the hundreds, if not in the thousands of the North Korean elites that Kim Jong-un has executed and or have purged. And so the title somewhat pithily captures the thesis of the book, that the top elites, yes, they are, it kind of captures this paradox that the paradox of the proximity to power, that yes, they do have access to privileges and luxuries, but they don't have security or any actualized power. Let's talk a little bit more about that paradox because as you mentioned, you know, a lot of these elites would have substantially better lives than, let's say, common North Korean citizens. And I think many people might assume that North Korean elites are maybe a bit protected because they receive better housing and food and education, these foreign postings. But your book suggests that these privileges do not translate into real security or even political agency. based on the interviews that you conducted, how can North Korea's elites be both beneficiaries of the system,

but also deeply vulnerable within it? So I don't mean to elicit any sympathy for the North Korean elites by any means, but they definitely are, because they're certainly enablers, they are the operators of the regime's system on a day-to-day basis. They are there. They are the beneficiaries, as you mentioned, of the, of the, not the benevolence of Kim Jong-un, but the benefits, like you said, of being in these positions. But at the same time, the higher someone rises in the North Korean system, the more scrutiny one is subject to, the more suffocating surveillance one is subject to, one in one's family. And there is just zero margin of error for one in one's family, whether it's in one's conduct or speech or even perceived disloyalty. And so there is that, there's just zero room for error.

And so, I mean, if you're accidentally even caught up in the wrong rumor mill, if someone's out to get you and you're just caught up at the wrong rumor mill, that can really convert into, that can really convert into someone's downfall. And so that's, it is a, it's a very precarious position for the elites, especially the higher one goes to begin. And I know that the listeners of this show will be very familiar with Mr. Te Jong-ho, who I know has been on the show several times. And he has told me, as well as other North Korean senior elite defectors have mentioned as well, He's mentioned this quote that the closer you are to the sun, the more likely you will burn. And it's kind of like this North Korean adage or a North Korean proverb, if you will,

where if you're too far away from the sun, the sun being a metaphor for Kim Jong-un, then you might freeze to death, maybe somewhat literally. If you're too far in the outskirts of Hong Kong, North Hamgeng province, and you don't have any access to resources and you're just really, down and out, then, you know, you're down on your luck, then you, you know, you might actually freeze. But if you're too close to the sun, too close to Kim Jong-un, and you fall out of grace, or you fall asleep in a meeting that he's running, or you doze off, or you laugh at the wrong statement, or you don't laugh at the wrong statement, or you don't cry at the right moment, or, you know,

whatnot, then, then you're out. And so that really captures this harrowing and really, truly terrifying reality that North Korean elites today live in. And those grievances are captured fairly categorically in the book. Gian, I want to go back to that scrutiny that you were just describing. And how, yeah, the higher up you go in this system, how you are maybe more exposed, How central is fear to what we're saying, you know, whether fear of execution or demotion or even banishment from Pyongyang, punishment to family members, or simply being, as you know, as you touched on, being associated with the wrong person at the wrong time? I don't want to mischaracterize the lives of North Korean elites. These are not individuals who are living, trembling, and fear 24-7. especially the senior cadres, the high-ranking Kanbos in the party,

they do have a lot of clout. They are in the North Korean system. They do carry a lot of power when they are secure until they're not, until they're not. They could go into a restaurant. They could walk into a meeting. Of course, when Kim Jong-un is not around. If they're the highest person in that room or in the situation, then others will tremble in fear or others will certainly bow out of reverence and so forth.

So they're not all quivering. They're not living their lives quivering 24-7. But they are certainly living their lives, performing loyalty. And this is another concept that's a through line in the book. that whether or not a North Korean elite member is genuinely loyal to the regime and the system and Kim Jong-un or not. So whether someone is genuinely loyal or not, you have to performatively be loyal. You have to feign, feel to the system out of self-preservation for yourself and your family. And so because if you don't, then your fears will truly be realized that you will be out.

And so the role of fear is a primary factor in driving people's conduct to perform loyalty on a day-to-day basis, to be acting and performing in unison, and to make sure that everyone's acting in the way that the state expects them to act and behave and speak the way you're supposed to. And that's all driven by fear of execution, of purges, of revolutionization, of being sent to forced hard labor before, if you're not being executed, and so forth. So that's, so fear is certainly a primary driver of people's behavior. That's certainly, that's certainly a common theme in, in elites lives. Not just the elite. That's the common fear in every single North Korean people's lives. Well, sticking with the theme of fear, and you've just touched on purges and executions, the execution of Zhang Song-Tek appears to be a pretty major turning point in your account.

Just a bit of quick context for our listener, Zhang Song-Tek was once one of North Korea's most powerful figures. He was Kim Jong-un's uncle by marriage before he was purged and executed in 2013. Ji-un, what did that episode signal to other elites about their own security under Kim Jong-un? Yeah, this is a great question, and it does feature fairly prominently in the book, because his execution, Zhang Song-Teg's execution, ordered by Kim Jong-un, very explicitly ordered by Kim Jong-un himself, it did a couple things. One, it sent out an ice cold chilling effect across the country and especially among the elites.

And the message that was sent out was, nobody is safe from Kim Jong-un's, from the chopping block, including his family members. And Kim Jong-un's aunt, so the aunt who was married to Tang-Zong-Teg, when they were first, when they were first courting. So aunt, she was Kimmer-sung's daughter. She was so in love with Changsong-tech. And these are accounts that are written, these are, this is all very public information.

She was so in love with Chang-Song-Tek, and Kimmer-sung did all sorts of things to separate them. And he ended up acquiescing. And so he ended up blessing the marriage. And obviously the marriage was rife with all sorts of marital strife. and he was a heavy drinker, he was an adulter, all this crazy stuff. But in any case, there was a huge, there's a very colorful story there. But in any case, it was a very, there was just, Kim Jong-un must have known all of these

stories about his uncle. But anyway, so these elites receive a message, oh my goodness, even someone who is so thickly interwoven in the Kim family is not safe. So what does that mean for us? And so, and this is not conjecture. This operation, this kind of chill factor operationalized in a number of preemptive defection by high level, high level elite defectors in, I don't want to say droves, that's kind of overstating it. But in fairly high numbers, by elite defector and their families who are posted abroad. So by elites who are already working and.

posted and assigned abroad in China or elsewhere. And so, and this is all public information. So Mr. Ri Jong-ho and his family, and they talk about this very publicly, they were as an entire family were based in China. And after they heard about the Changsong Tech execution, they as a family decided to defect. And they ended up moving, they ended up escaping to South Korea before coming to the United States. And there were others very senior level escapees who made this preemptive decision because they thought nobody is safe

if an uncle figure could go like that. So clearly that execution of Zhang really, in a sense, struck a lot of fear into especially elite stationed overseas, Gianna, as you just mentioned, who increased their affections then that was seen subsequently. Did grievances among elites appear to expand then under Kim Jong-un compared with earlier periods? Yeah, so that's a really difficult question to answer because I didn't, I wasn't able to capture all the grievances by era, certainly because many of the elites, or all the elites living under Kim Rissin and Kim,

Daniel, I just couldn't talk to in part because they're not with us anymore. But there's an interesting statistic that sort of points, that somewhat answers your question in that the NIS, that South Korea's National Intelligence Service, put out a really interesting statistic back in late 2024. And the statistic is that under Kim Jong-un's short administration, he came into power in 2012. So since 2012, there has been an increase in elite defections, an increase by 250% then compared to all of the elite defections under Kimmer-Sahil's administration combined. So that's a very staggering statistic in my mind because the time period that we're comparing is between 2012 until 26, compared to all of Kim R-sung and Kim Jong-il, Kim Jong-un combined. So 250% increase in elite defections under Kim Jong-un.

And so whether, so I could infer that one of the factors that is a trigger or like a push factor of those of those defections is grievances. Maybe it's more opportunity. Maybe it's access to unprecedented access to information. maybe it's ideological erosion. Maybe it is perhaps a stronger desire for better opportunities for one's children. But all of those things kind of all feed into their grievances, which is that, A, we don't want to go back to North Korea because, and these are some of the, these are the various grievances that are outlined in the book, there are fewer opportunities for our children in North Korea than abroad. because we know based on the information that we have consumed based on the internet and from

unauthorized content that schools are better outside of North Korea. Kids, our children can study whatever they want. They can do whatever they want. They can explore whatever they want. They can travel, et cetera. And so all of these different types of factors, I think, feed into the grievances and perhaps are, they play a large part in why we have seen such a sharp and dramatic increase in the number of elite defections under Kim Jong-un compared to his two predecessors.

And sticking with those grievances and perhaps their broader impact, your book looks at the possibility that these elite grievances could actually weaken the regime from within. What do you think distinguishes private dissatisfaction from politically, meaningful dissent in North Korea? I think that I think your question speaks to the difference between the status quo in North Korea today and a perhaps desirable future. So as a listeners will know, and of course you know all too well, this country, the society has been designed to prevent any organized and meaningful, meaningful and sustained dissent against the regime. So what So a combination of social atomization, a combination of, so plus terror through the political prison camp system, the just the poib, so the internal, the internal police, the politically just terrifying system that people live in, guilt by association, you know, all of these different.

different things that the North Queen Society is built on and everyone is just inculcated in everybody's mind is has been designed and embedded into the country from the early days. And so the idea that people can organize outside of a state of a state sanctioned space to do something against the regime is close to nearly impossible without being caught. It has been tried before like the 1996. Chengjin's Sixth Army Corps coup attempt, and that failed terrifically. And I say that in the most definitional sense. Somebody snitched, and then everybody was just moached down. There are declassified intelligence documents from the CIA and other intelligence agencies, and people, if readers or listeners

are interested, you can check that out. So there have been known acts of dissent, organized attempts at dissent. But in any case, the point being that the system is designed to prevent organized dissent. And so today, we know that people have grievances, whether it's people from the core class or the hostile class. I'm referring to the various songbun, songbun classifications, or the elite class. So we know people have grievances. Now, because it's such an unsafe situation to share those grievances with one another, so let's say I am a North Korean elite. elite in Pyongyang. I'm a, I'm a cadre member, and I really do not like the way that I really don't like these lavish apartments that are being built in the, in the future scientist street district,

because it's just too lavish, and those resources should be going to the less fortunate out in the out in the countryside. Let's say that's what I think, which seems pretty fair, honestly. But I could never voice that, but I think that. And let's say you as a friend of mine, who is also a North Korean elite member, think that. And we share that grievance. It's not even a major grievance. It's a critical view of a policy that's being played out in our city. Let's say we're living in Pyongyang.

I think that, you think that. But you and I can never share that thought because it's too dangerous. to think that because I don't know you think that. I'll never say that to you. Because what if I say that to you, Alana, and you say to me, oh my gosh, you are, you are a traitor. How dare you question the wisdom of the party, which is, which is overseen by Kim Jong-un. You are a traitor. I'm going to report you. I don't know if you're going to respond like that, no matter how close you and I are because even if you are my best friend as a Coke, even though you're my best friend, if I told you that and you harbor that information, you hold that information, and later on it

turns out that even though you don't share that view, let's say it's, it's, it's, it's, you're found out that you held onto that information and you didn't tell on me or you didn't report me, then you would be equally culpable of sharing that view. And so, it's, it's, it is, it behooves you, it is in your best interest to report me, your colleague, and your very good friend. So that is a system in North Korea. So this points to this very well-known concept called preference falsification. And so in this somewhat simple example, even though I and you don't like this policy of these lavish apartments on the future scientist street. We are going to, whenever there's a new apartment complex that's being rolled out in Pyongyang,

and they are continuing to do so. We are going to come out with our company, and we're going to praise, we're going to cheer and praise and applaud in unison with our colleagues and our comrades and our co-codres. and we're going to make sure that the media, the Korean Central News Agency, the KCNA, catches our faces as enthusiastically cheering on whatever policy is being rolled out as possible because we want to be captured in the media

that we are as loyal as possible because this is all out of self-preservation. And so this is kind of an example being kind of stretched out in a very elongated, way. But that is sort of the, that's a very small example, but that is, but think about all the types of grievances that a single North Queen elite might have, and they have to play that out day in and day out all day long. Fear of execution. The, the criticisms that they have of policies, the criticisms that they have of the world around them, the, not just, not necessarily even in a

grandiose way. But just on a day-to-day basis, they have to trumpet the state narrative, because they are an elite. They're a senior ranking cadre. But they know better than anyone how the world works because they have unprecedented access to foreign information. They know how the world works outside of North Korea, and they know how the world inside of North Korea works. And yet, there's cognitive dissonance that North Korean elites carry inside their brain and inside their hearts is so intense. They say one thing, but they know another thing, and they just have to live out two different realities. So there's so many different types of grievances that these individuals have. And then so these individuals have some options. Number one, do nothing. Just maintain the status quo,

because that is the safest thing that one can do for oneself. It's just that of self-preservation for oneself and one's family. The second option is to defect, and we see that. It's a very dramatic, very, very risky decision. And obviously we've seen that with some North Korean elite members. The third thing is to try, and I've seen this through interviews, to really lean in to this performative. loyalty. Like, screw it. If I'm going to stay in this country and I'm not going to defect because

it's just too dangerous for my family and myself, that I'm just going to play this role to the best that I can and just reap the benefits to the best of my ability and just live it, live it out, you know, live it, live it, live it out until the end of my days in this country. It's a, it's certainly a coping mechanism. And then another one is definitely just, figuring out ways to push for, like, just find small spaces for agency. So not necessarily in any meaning, politically meaningful or autonomous ways, but just it's very much for cognitive autonomous spaces. And people have told me this.

They'll create songs in their head. They'll create poetry in their head. Of course, never written down, never outspoken, but they'll just come up with movie scripts in their head. They'll just have some fantasies about being free, things like this, daydreaming, if you will. And then the fifth but most far-fetched idea would be, or far-fetched option would be to push for reform. And that's kind of the path that we think Zhang Song-Tek was somewhat pushing for. And that's what got him on the chopping block.

I also, I just wanted to highlight the point that you just made in because I think it's really interesting. I think especially when we're talking about elites who do have the chance to work overseas or overseas or be stationed overseas, I think sometimes we kind of simplify and say, oh, you know, they have so much freedom, they're already overseas. Why wouldn't they defect or why wouldn't they not go back to North Korea? But you just touched on the fact that these elites are the closest to the leadership and they're they know the system the best. And I think that's really interesting because it goes back to what we were talking about,

about fear. And like with the example that you gave, I can't think of any grievance that I might have that I would be willing to risk to share, even with, as you said, a trusted friend or a close companion or a close comad for fear of the punishment or the repercussions that I might face.

And again, because these elites know so, well how the system works. To me, it totally makes sense why they do live in fear and aren't more open to defecting or not returning to North Korea. There is, there's an anecdote in the book and it, even like talking about it, it just breaks, it's just, it's heart-wrenching because it speaks more about human dignity. And so I'll share it briefly now. now if I may. So it's about, it's of a North Korean prosecutor and it's in the book. And anyway, so he, so long story, I'll give you the truncated version. So he was a very known man. He was powerful in the North Korean situation. And so he told me that when he would walk into a

restaurant or walked down the street, people would cower. And he would walk with his shoulders back and he loved that sense of power and people wouldn't meet his eyes and for those among the listeners who kind of know what I'm talking about like you you know what I'm talking about like people would look down as a sign of reverence or fear or respect and he like that he escapes he comes to the north he comes to South Korea and he goes to a restaurant speaking to a journalist and the table next is a Korean barbecue restaurant somewhere in Seoul it's a Friday and or Saturday night. It's very noisy. Table next door, a bunch of college kids. They're loud, the drinking, nothing out of the ordinary. So he kind of tries to shush them. And he's a very pretty

heavy accent, a North Korean accent. He's a bit older. And they ignore him. So he gets up, walks over, and he tries to kind of put on that older man, the Adushi, Mr. Roll. Like, hey, guys, did you hear what I said? Can you guys kind of quiet down over here? I'm trying to have a conversation with this adult. none of the kids get up none of them even like raise their heads they're there they're there they're no one even like puts their shot glasses down they're like soldier shot glasses one kid like barely looks up and you know how rude that is you know and it's like if you want to have a proper conversation then go to a place that like go to a quiet place not you know what what are you doing having trying to have a conversation at a restaurant

like this. And so this guy gets very embarrassed. He goes back to his seat. And the South Korean journalist kind of oversees his kind of feigns ignorance. And he's trying to help him save face. Tries to help him save face. And he goes, oh, the kids are so rude these days. So then this North Korean prosecutor is retelling the story to me and some of my colleagues I was with. And he goes, how do other North Green elites do it? And he was pretty, he was pretty recent defector at this point. And he goes, how do other North Korean elites do it? And he said, you know, Ms. Beck, I know you've met with a lot of folks from North Korea, especially the elites. How do they find any sense or purpose in South Korea? Because for people who were quote and co-ordinary or like lower class in North Korea, when you come here, you're the same and you go to school and you kind of work your way up and that's fantastic. People who are at the top of society and you come to South Korea, you are second rate or second. class citizen, you are suspected of being a communist or a spy. He's like, I'm older, I have a thick accent, I can't get rid of it. Kids won't listen to me. I'm just some like old school communist

adjacent dude that even college kids won't even listen to. And he got, and like he was like tearing up. His glasses are fogging. Like his face was all getting red. And, and he goes like, sometimes I just wish, he's like, I wonder if I made the right decision coming to South Korea. Not because he missed North Korea the system, obviously. And this was a much longer conversation, but he was just like the sense of being somebody, being recognized, being acknowledged as a man, as a person, as a professional, even though that system was so fantastically messed up and awful. And he's completely aware of that now.

But he's like, still, he's like, I don't know. like, I am so lost in the system in South Korea. I am nobody. And so, and there's a lot of research on this. And so these are like new grievances, new found grievances of North Korean escapees in South Korea. And it's definitely, and there's various, I mean, there's so many grievances of four North Korean escapees in South Korea. But there is a unique, I think, class of grievances among elite grievances. And for those who resettle in South Korea, and there's a lot of studies on this as well. But there's the sense of lack of purpose, lack of self,

and a sense of aimlessness, and lack of mission, I think is something that elites will continue to grapple with in South Korea. It's such an interesting aspect because it's something I'd never even thought about. Oftentimes when we report on the difficulties that defectors face when they come to South Korea and things like integration and finding jobs, I had never thought about for elites what it must be like knowing that you would be given up a certain lifestyle, even if it's the North Korean way. You know, to be giving that up, as you just said, to become an ordinary person in South Korea, it's certainly something really interesting.

And as you said, very tough to grapple with that decision. I do want to connect our discussion and your book, of course, to a current case we discussed earlier in the show. North Korea recently recalled its ambassador to the UK just weeks after his appointment. What does an episode like this tell us about the power or the vulnerability of DPRK diplomats? Yeah, it's, yeah, I'm still, I'm still trying to wrap my head around that particular episode. What we do know is that over the past 12 years or so, a lot of diplomats have escaped. have defected from their posts, whether it was from the UK, from Kuwait, from Cuba, from Italy, and even before Kim Jong-un, it was from their diplomatic posts as well. And even if they don't defect,

we do know that diplomats, North Korean diplomats, do have a lot of difficulties. They have to self-sustain their embassies financially, and they do take advantage, they really do, really do take advantage of a diplomatic immunity and engage in all sorts of illicit activity to generate revenue to not only self-sustain their embassy but also to to send back funds back back home to HQ and so forth so it is somewhat of so it's a double edge sword and that it is a prestigious job in the north korea context or like in you know in most other countries being a diplomat is wonderful. You get to go abroad, especially in the North Korea context. You get to go abroad. Most North Koreans can never dream of going abroad. But it comes with all sorts of burdens.

You have to undergo constant ideological retraining. The HQ will have foreign diplomats and other personnel who go abroad or anyone who goes abroad with the regime's permission to undergo ideological training in order to undo anything that one has, one may have been exposed to. And so, yeah, there's a lot of, there's a lot of, there's a lot of burdens that diplomats have, that diplomats undergo. In terms of this specific case, I'm still, I'm still waiting to see how it unfolds. Pyongyang framed its recall of this ambassador because it was, because of UK science, What should governments like the UK, the US and South Korea understand about elite incentives when they're trying to pressure North Korea without making the system more closed?

So surprisingly, North Korea is not as closed as it likes to project itself to be. I mean, they are very closed off, extremely closed, but they are surprisingly have diplomatic, relations with 160 countries, including the UK. Of course, they do not have normalized relations with the United States, nor South Korea. And so to go back to your question, I think that the balancing act of countries trying to better understand and manage individual elite incentives. In this case, I mean, it would be great to not send back elite diplomats. The best case scenario would be to keep as many diplomats outside of North Korea, expose them to foreign information, and have them engage with as many people as possible, because they are basically

mules for foreign information and foreign ideas and so forth. That would be the best case scenario at the individual level. But this balancing act, I think there are trade-offs. I think the greater good has to do with, in my opinion, in this case, maintaining and or sharpening the implementation of sanctions. Yeah, because even if it's not with this individual UK ambassador, there are other ways that the UK and our allies could better understand and engage and inform North Korean elite incentives. Jean, before I let you go, I want to ask you one final question. What are you watching next as maybe a sign of change or even stress or continuity inside Pyongyang's elite circle?

You ask really good questions, Alana. I do, by the way, as a plug for your readers and I will tell, and your listeners, and I will say, she did not tell me to say this. I really do love this podcast. I listen to every single person. podcast. What am I listening, what am I watching for next as pressures or pain points in Pyongyang or elsewhere? I'm looking at the continued investment that Kim Jong-un and the party is pouring into the elites because, and it really does, this is kind of a good way, I guess, to, to close out this conversation. Because the book is about elite grievances. And the point being that these elites are important because they are the ones that are holding up and supporting the regime. They hold up the regime. They are the operators of the regime.

And to keep the elites happy, Kim Jong-un and the party, and of course they are the party members themselves, Kim Jong-un is pouring and lavishing them with all these privileges and luxuries. And we see more and more luxury malls and puppy pet stores and 200, $150,000 Lexus sedans that NK Pro recently reported on and so forth and more and more luxury apartment buildings and so forth, even though he recently just said, again, published by you guys, that he's now like cracking down on luxury goods or whatnot. But it really does point to the fact that it's no secret that elites have revances now. It's no secret. Now the next question is going to be, when?

are these grievances going to be politically consequential? And that is when these individual grievances are going to become a matter of collective action. And it's going to become a matter of collective action when these elites don't think the benefits of working for the system is worth it anymore. And it's not going to be worth it anymore when they do a cost-benefit analysis. And what What goes into the cost and cost benefit analysis or that risk analysis is a combination of the fear, all the fears that they have about execution and purchase and so forth, with the luxuries that they have. And so and all the benefits and privileges that they have. And so that's why I'm such a advocate of having very sharp targeted sanctions at luxury goods. going into North Korea because when you start straining that supply chain of luxury goods

that are going into the pockets of not only Kim Jong-un, but into the elites, to keep them happy in spite of their grievances, that's when we're going to start seeing different individual calculations of the elites being like, okay, is it really worth it maintaining the system? And so with that little rant, I guess the short story long, I'll say I'll keep an eye out for more and more luxury investment of luxury goods and also sanctions, sanctions targeting luxury goods in North Korea. Well, Jean Beck, thank you so much for joining me today to discuss your new book, privileged but powerless.

And listeners, of course, I will have a link to your fantastic book in our show notes. Jean, thank you so much. Thank you, Alana. Thank you, everybody. And that brings us to the end of today's episode. Our thanks to Brian Betts and David Choi for helping make this podcast happen. For more reporting, analysis and expert insight on North Korea, visit NK News for the latest stories and NKPro for deeper analysis, data and research tools.

You can also watch this episode on YouTube and be sure to follow us on social media for the latest updates, clips and behind the scenes content. I'm Alana Hill. Thank you for listening. And we'll be back next time with more on the stories shaping. North Korea.