North Korea News Podcast by NK News - Andrei Lankov on DPRK’s new doctrine – North Korea Unpacked with Jacco Zwetsloot

Episode Date: May 21, 2026

In the first episode of North Korea Unpacked with Jacco Zwetsloot, Jacco sits down with Professor Andrei Lankov of Kookmin University and a director of Korea Risk Group — the first-ever guest on the original NK News Podcast back in 2018 — to discuss North Korea’s newly revealed constitutional changes and what they mean for […]

Hello, listeners, this is Jacko's Wedslute, and before we dive into this first episode of North Korea Unpacked, I just want to remind you all of the new format. I'll be recording these longer interviews with experts and specialists monthly, and they'll be published in the third week of each month, while my colleague Alana Hill will be bringing you the latest on the news cycle on a weekly basis on the normally scheduled NK News podcast. For my first episode in this news series, I wanted to go back to interview my very first guest from early 2018. While other episodes will focus more on unpacking North Korea, in this episode, I asked Professor Andre Lankoff his thoughts on the recently revealed amendments to its constitution. Alana covered this topic when the news first broke recently, so you can check out that episode if you want to hear the basics.

Coming up, Andre and I will dive in depth into the implications of these amendments to North Korea's constitution, as well as other related things such as North Korea's relationship with Russia. And what happened to Andre Lankoff when he went to Latvia recently to give a talk about events in North Korea. So stay tuned. Hello listeners and welcome to the first episode of special series within the NK News podcast. It's called North Korea Unpacked with Jacko Zwezl. That's me. And our first guest on this monthly series is the same as the first guest on the very, very first NK News podcast way back in February 2018. It is, of course, Professor Andre Lankoff from Gungman University. Welcome back up. Welcome on my new series. We'll be talking together on North Korea-Russian relations and the new North Korean Constitution.

Yes, yes, happily. Okay, so North Korea, as I've already hinted, has unveiled a number of important constitution. revisions very recently, including changes related to reunification of Korea, sovereignty, and the formal definition of South Korea. For listeners who have not followed this closely, what are the most important changes in the newest constitution compared to the previous version? Well, first of all, they essentially changed the definition of their state. Because in the past, North Korea, well, starting from its foundation, has all the first,

always considered itself a part of a divided country. There was sort of contradiction, to be honest, because on one hand, the official North Korean line has always been that the government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea is the only lawful government on the entire territory of the Korean peninsula. Yes, they considered South Korea what we normally call. South Korea, a part of their territory, which is for some time likely to remain under an American military occupation.

The South Korean government, from this point of view, was not seen as a government of sovereign country, but was merely a bunch of the traitors on the payroll of the Washington, D.C. And there was a bit of contradiction, as I have said. said, while they described them in such, well, unfavorable light, at the same time, they were talking that in the long run, or maybe not so long run, they were going to negotiate a peaceful unification with South Korea. You can ask, how can you negotiate with people who, according to your own constitution, are just paid agents of a hostile power, but, well,

And North Korea is not a place where you tend to ask questions about contradictions in the official documents, otherwise it will be the last questions you are likely to ask in your life. Having said that, it was the official line. Interestingly enough, South Korean life was a line was essentially a mirror image. They said that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea does not exist. that it's an illegal anti-state entity and that basically, well, the North Korean military is just a bunch of gangsters and terrorists officially.

And in the due time, soon or later, Republic of Korea, the South Korea also was going to unify the country again, I'd agree with peaceful negotiations on paper. Frankly speaking, it has always been nothing but a pipe dream or maybe a smoke screen. I believe you had to be quite insane, an insane or stupid politician in any of two Korean states to take it seriously. But it was selling well with the Korean nationalist public and nationalism is very powerful in both Korean states. and it was a part of an established tradition. Of course, once again,

peaceful negotiated unification was completely impossible. Has never been possible. If you look at the history of the 20th century, there have been five attempts of unifying two states, three of which were peaceful, all ended in failure, and two were essentially, well, if you like a sort of conquest, but anyway, I'm talking.

about unification of Germany. And I'm talking about a bit more complicated situation. Yemen, where it began as peaceful, but very often developed into a civil war, which does its sense continue until now. And if you look at the differences between two states and everything, I will not go. I can go for our way.

I'll explain why it has been nothing but a pie dream, a propaganda lie on both sides. But the first step is that starting from December 2020, Kim Jong-in began to change his tune. He began to say that unification, the idea of unification was a mistake. It was pretty much revolutionary. Because it's undercutting some of his own legitimacy

from his father and grandfather by saying their mission was failure was wrong. Basically, he basically said that what they believed had believed was wrong. It's a bit like, you know, say Pope, telling that, well, the church faithful should not wait for the second coming. Because for a long time, this unification was presented as a happy event which will solve all the problems of the country. It's the end of history. Yes, for Korea.

Triumph, at least in North Korea. In South Korea, too, but to less extent, nonetheless, South Korean left. They admired this idea. They even created a theory of the divided system, system of division, which basically implied that all problems of the South Korean society are essentially by products of the division. It was selling very well 30 years ago,

and the aging professors are still believing this type. Yes, and therefore, I don't want to go too far down the Zabwe, but therefore, by extension, those problems are the fault of America because America is the cause of the division. for those leftists in some of the region. Yes, yes, yeah, yeah, it's true. But the major idea was we should change the system of the major idea of the South Korean left

used to be that they should change the system and that they should get the country unified. And suddenly in December 2023, Tim John said that it was not going to happen, that it was a mistake, and it's a bit like, again, as like to say that Christians should not expect the second coming.

It took a long time to go from that announcement to the actual unveiling of the new constitution now, didn't it? Yes, surprisingly long. But they have not spent two and a half years in vain. They were changing everything. They really decided to blow up

to demolish all monuments to the unification idea. And change the name of everything from the tunnel station, the Tongueoos Chichang, Unification Station on the subway for a long while, for quite a long time, was an interesting place. Probably the world's only subway station, which had no name whatsoever.

Just station. Yes, and on. But, and this is a final step. So it's not very surprising. And it's interesting they began to use the official name of the Republic of Korea, which for 80 years has been a taboo. Right, Dejan Ming-Guk in Korea. Some explanation is necessary, because from the time of the Mongol conquest, roughly eight centuries ago,

in all non-East Asian languages, Korea is called something like Korea. So we don't quite realize that Koreans themselves have two different names in the north and the south. They have different names, not official name of their state, but even the official names of their countries are different. South Koreans call their country Hanuk North Koreans are calling their country Choson Choson and Hanuk doesn't sound similar I will not lecture your history

yes it's not university history class why it doesn't come from but you have to keep it in mind so and now they begin to use this South Korean word Hanuk which has deep implication because it's not just they're calling other country received from

English Translation Republic of Korea. In Korean, it's much deeper. They're implying that it's not just another state, sovereign state. They imply that it's probably another nation. They got rid of all references to the unification

with South Korea. They also define their territory, not as entire Korean Peninsula as it used to be, but it's another part. and it's a big change. And probably in the long run, the most significant change. We have other changes. We can talk about it a bit later.

But this is the single most important changes. North Koreans decided to break, to discard the politically useful, well, not anymore. Well, a fiction of unification which for decades has been seen as politically useful, well, smokescreen, duplicity by both sides. Now, since I think in the everyday lives of the average North Koreans, the Constitution is not a document that they would read very often or come up against. It's probably not that meaningful in everyday life. Much more important in everyday life is this document that I've discussed on the podcast

a few times before the 10 great principles for establishing a monolithic leadership system. That small book, which every North Korean adult has in studies, measures their life again. That does also mention unification a couple of times as being sort of the ultimate goal of the Korean nation. Do you think that they would be changing that text and issuing a new version of that too? Have we seen any sign of that? I have not seen it, but I have not known any doubt it will happen or probably it has happened already. Because they last year they had a major revision of their websites, official websites, and they were deleting articles and obligations is devoted to the idea of unification.

In some cases, they even deleted writings of their Kim family leaders. The dead ones? Yes, yeah. Not only, Kim Jong-un's writings on notification was also partially removed from the websites because, you know, it's not scary and they revise their history and they basically delete the old publications which don't conform to the current line. So, Andre, what's the goal of North Korea now, where it used to be unification, national uniforms?

Never. What is the grand Kim Jong-un is now putting in the minds of North Koreans? First of all, I would strongly disagree that unification, at least peaceful negotiating unification has ever been a goal, ever. It's a bit like... Would you say it was a smokescreen, and in that sense it was always in the minds of North Koreans? Common people, if they were naive enough, probably.

But it was quite clear that it was not going to do. And I will be very surprised if I learned that any of the top North Korean leaders of the real decision makers has ever taken as anything but propaganda, blah, blah, blah. Having said that, having said that, what is the goal, as usual? Survival and if possible, development. Survival comes first. But what's the vision given to the ordinary people, the non-elites? We are building our proud nation, and South Koreans belong to a different nation. and this is the reason why they did it.

Because the major destabilizing factor, the North Korean leaders, the North Korean decision makers have to deal with, is a really massive gap in income and per capita GDP between two Korean states. North Korea has per capita GDP roughly around 1,400 US dollars, or a bit less. South Korea has,

about $34,000 U.S. dollars, which is roughly nearly 30 times, actually 27 times difference, by far the largest gap worldwide between two countries which share a land border. Yes. And in Germany, the gap, which eventually led to the collapse

of the East German government, this gap was between 1 to 2 and 1 to 3. here is between 1 to 25 and March 30. So this alarm is hugely destabilizing. And it's a problem. If they want to keep the country going, they should basically persuade their own people that the average North Korean should not be South Koreans

as another part of the same nation. Because if in such a case, if they are seen as a same nation, everybody might ask. Why they are so dirty rich and they are not? Doesn't it mean that there are some problems in our system or maybe God forbid with the ruling family? And so to make sure that North Koreans would not ask such questions,

they introduce this policy. By the way, East Germans try to do it too. For the first 20 years of roughly, of East German history actually a bit more for 25 years. they tried, they insisted that Germany was a divided country, populated by the same nation and so on. But from the early 1970s, they changed their tune and they began to say exactly what North Koreans are saying now, that West Germany is a different state and a different nation. Well, on that note, back to the German example, that opened the door to the exchange of offices in each other's capitals

and some kind of state-to-state relations, even state-to-state trade. Does this new constitution in North Korea, this revision or this giving up of the dream of unification, does that open the door to some kind of state-to-state relations? You know, we have two countries that land border. There's no trade going on. There's no movement of anything.

Could this now happen? Of course, it cannot happen because of the UN Security Council resolutions, which explicitly ban pretty much every conceivable form. of the economic interaction between North Korea and the outside world. However, in the long run, yes, this decision is making exchanges a bit easier. I would not always estimate it. Generally, I would say Kim Jong-in and his advisors decided to discard the old lie, not because they want to be honest, but because this lie is becoming a political burden.

However, generally speaking, it's always good to have less lies. And the new policy is basically will probably make interaction, normal interaction between two Korean states a bit easier and will reduce chances of conflict just a bit, just a bit. It doesn't mean that there will be a war between the two Korean state. No, war is still possible. but the probability is going a bit down. So it's generally a good developed.

And we may be seeing an example of that healthy state-to-state relations in that tomorrow a North Korean women's football or soccer team is coming to South Korea to play against a South Korean women's soccer team in Sioux. This is, I think, the first time since 2018 or 2019. Yes. Do you see that as a good sign? Mild. Problem is that once again, from the North Korean point of view,

South Korea now is under the, is run by the administration belonging to the left camp. And the South Korean left, they like to call themselves liberals or progressives. The South Korean left is sort of sympathetic towards North Korea, sometimes really sympathetic,

sometimes sort of significantly less hostile than the average South Korean. And these people would like to develop economic exchanges and trade and cultural exchanges is not scary. But those same people in the South Korean progressive left have always held unification as a high goal and talked about it. They even tried to march north in the 1980s to unite with their comrades in North Korea. Yes.

How have they been affected ideologically, politically, by this dropping of the idea of unification? Strange way. In a strange way. Personally, I expect some of them to be show-thought. but more politically savvy people on the left who, as you remember, began their political advancement from, you know, these dreams about marching across the border and embracing their brethren in the north

and telling that North Korea is a wonderful place and blah, blah, blah. The same people suddenly began to embrace the new North Korean life, which their critics usually say, they have always been following what they have been always running talks of Pyongyang, which is definitely not the case, even though they are influenced, definitely influenced by what is said in Pyongyang.

And when I see some people who has made their entire political career by trying to heal long with unification as loudly as humanly possible, the same people are suddenly making a U-turn in a matter of weeks. and I begin to talk that it's time for long-term peaceful coexistence. Personally, well, it reminds me that you should never take things said by a politician at face value. Right or left doesn't matter. You're cynic? No, I'm realistic.

Okay. I'm not cynical. I'm realistic. And many people got themselves in trouble by believing too much in what politicians of their choice are saying. And judging by the speed, they change their ideological dress. It's impressive. Not all of them, but many. And at the same time, it tells me also that in the depths of their heart,

even the left were gradually learned, that gradually came to realize that the official ideal of the peaceful unification has very little to do with the harsh reality. They could not say it because they really, want. It's probably where they are sincere, even in spite of being politicians, they are sincere in this regard. They really want to have better relations

with North Korea. And this is why I'm generally supportive of the left on issues related to North Korea. Even I have always believed that the estimates of North Korea, understanding of North Korea and society is shallow and naive at best.

Having said that, yes. Because as long as the unification was an official battle cry of the North, they did not dare to challenge it. But now when it's okay, they're probably beginning to say which A, will be taken favorably by the North Koreans and they want to have better relations. B, agree with what they have long secretly thought. Andrea, we have to move on to the next topic.

We're going to talk about Russia, Putin and the DIPC-Russia relationship. We've seen an extraordinary deepening of relations. between Pyongyang and Moscow over the last few years. From your perspective, how real and durable is this partnership? Is it a temporary wartime convergence? Or are we looking at a real genuine new strategic alignment? I'm very skeptical about strategic alignment. A bit less skeptical than, say, I go.

Because I see many signs of that, which seemingly indicates that relations probably are getting deeper and more lasting than I sort of expect. nonetheless on balance, I still believe that it's a wartime alliance, if you like, a marriage of convenience, because the Russians used to need a great deal of shells. Shells were extremely useful. At this, well, it's usually artillery shells, right? No, to be more precise, heavy artillery shells.

Okay. Because at some stages, 2003, 2004, maybe until early. 2020 2025, heavy artillery played a major role as a battlefield in Ukraine. Not anymore. No. Not anymore. Now it has been largely substituted by the drones and the long-range drones have made the use, intense use of heavy artillery almost impossible because artillery positions can now easily be attacked by the drones. Sure. In the past, they are far away, but now drones can fly far away. Thousands of kilometers. No, thousands no, of course.

They can. But for this case, we are talking dozens. But having said that, back then there was a great demand for ammunition. And of course, soldiers, even though the number of the North Korean soldiers who were sent to Russia was quite small. It was between 11 and 14,000 people, which is not much. And at any rate, there was a number of the North Korean soldiers who were sent to Russia. they demand and the Russian side was willing to pay. And the Russian economy, until recently at least, used to do quite well now.

There are growing problems, but not of disastrous nature, used to be quite good. So it means that Russia had money and was not only willing but able to pay this great generosity and the North Koreans were happy to take it. But in the long run, still there is one problem. What's that? Russian and North Korean economies are not mutative. compatible. You mean that there's not a high level of...

I would say with one exception. A few items, North Koreans can sell with profits as the international markets. Not many items, but there are such things like, say, coal, some mineral resources, seafood, sometimes

some light industry products and so on. These items, well, they're not selling well in Russia. There are easy, very little, if any, demand for such items in Russia. Like coal, you understand. Russia is not interested in minerals.

Russia is not interested in seafood. The only export item is labor. So now there is a great demand for labor. Especially in those areas damaged by war. Not only. Not only. As far as I understand,

North Koreans are not very frequently seen in the areas damaged by war. I see. Most of them are walking far away from, nearly all of them. In Siberia, mostly. Not anymore. Used to be Siberia, but now probably big cities, Moscow, Petersburg,

Black Sea area, and so on. Why? First of all, there is a shortage of labor in Russia, which was very acute over last three or four years. If you're fighting a worm, you're sending a noticeable, a small, in this case, it was reasonably small, but still noticeable proportion of your males to the military. And at the same time, your economy is booming.

And Russian economy was booming in 203 and 24, not anymore, but it used to. So it means that you have essentially near zero unemployment rate and you need workers, especially to do jobs which are described in South Korea as 3D jobs, dirty, dangerous, difficult. In the past, people from the former Soviet, Mazadim Soviet republics of Central Asia, like Tajikistan or Uzbekistan, not Kazakhstan, which is quite rich. Kazakhstan is quite rich. But Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, poorer places. They were doing the job. But there was a growing dissatisfaction about these people, largely because of their involvement.

Some of them are definitely involved. these Muslim fundamentalists. So the North Koreans look like ideal replacement. They are dacile. They don't agonize. They never get in arguments with police and authorities. They try to keep distance from the local population. You know, they don't sleep with the local women and so on.

Did I speak Russian? Some of them do. Some of them do. And people in Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, younger generations, their Russians are far from perfect, let's say it. Yes, it's a new generation. They grew up. They were born after the collapse of the Soviet.

Having said that, these people are welcomed, and now I would estimate between 40 and 45,000 North Koreans are present in Russia as workers. And this number can double, easily double within a year or two. We recently saw North Korean soldiers marching in Moscow during the Victory Day parade that commemorates the end of World War II. How is North Korea currently viewed inside Russia itself?

What do Russian people say about North Korea? Is Kim Jong-un regarded seriously by Russian elites, Nord-nortemary Russians, or is the relationship still seen largely through a pragmatic geopolitical lens? Basically, for decades, North Korea has had very bad press in Russia, starting from the Soviet era, from the early 1960s. To some extent, it was an unintended result, unintended byproduct of their own propaganda. because when they were showering Russia

and the Soviet Union with all these glossy magazines telling in broken Russia about the greatness and superhuman wisdom of the current leader, it looked for me. And they became essentially

an embodiment of some kind of extreme dictatorship and everything. Then the relations began to change, attitude began to change because of many factors. And right now, I would be probably I would be less certain.

First of all, there is a great deal of gratitude because they are seen as allies and they are the only Russian ally which actually did send troops to fight. And of course, it's noticed. And because majority of the population is supporting their warfare, the war in Ukraine, so they basically seen as well people to be grateful about

and so on. But generally, I would say, so image has improved, but it's still not very good. It's still not very good. And again, they're still damaging it by, you know, when they invite Russian tourists, their Russian tourists came there.

And some of them say, oh, it's okay. It's much better than I expected. But many more say, wow, you cannot even get out of hotel without being followed by plane-clothes agents and everything. And they don't even give you walk about 50 meters from the hotel entrance.

and everything is controlled, everything is banned, verboten, forbidden, forbidden everywhere. So anyway, so still there is a problem. Have you spoken with or corresponded with any of these Russian tourists who have been most recently? Quite a lot. Okay. And that's the general impression is, as you say,

there's two groups, some who say, eh, it's not that bad. Some who say, actually it's not a great place to visit. Yes, yeah. I would say that people who say that it's not that bad, is because people who associate North Korea not so much with a perfect police state, but with a poor place.

Poverty, yeah. Yes, and they see that Pyongyang is not poor. They don't, yes. Pyongyang is not a rich place, but it basically looks like, you know, a normal city in a poor, but not very poor third world country, and it's quite clean,

it's well organized, it's well maintained, and it's the reason why they say, oh, it's not that bad. But the number of restrictions, well, it makes many people actually seemingly majority sort of. Most of them expected it to be like that. So they're not completely surprised. But still, it reinforces their pretty negative views of North Korea. Do you think that the number of Russian tourists might tail off considerably when they hear that it's very restrictive and not much fun?

It's still minimal. Because with the Russian tourism, we have the situation of this much ado about nothing. Because we had these talks about, yes, technically the Russians are the only nationality, which is allowed to visit North Korea's tourists right now. They were in the marathon last month, the Pyongyang Marathon. Yeah, everywhere. However, if you look at the actual statistics, last year, there were slightly more than 5,000 visitors. That's all.

It's all. 5,000. Yeah, it's nothing. Ten years ago, when North Korea still was not under heavy sanctions, they had some sanctions, but they were pretty much marginal, and they could do tourist activities. They had about 300, some estimates were even 400, but let's say 300,000 visitors. Last year, they had 5,000.

It's basically 60-fold decrease, 60-fold decrease. And back then, the vast majority, 95% at least, maybe more. Of that visitors were Chinese. Because I keep saying the only country which can provide North Korean tourist industry with a steady and influx of the clients, of the visitors, is China. For the Russians, North Korea is not attractive. Do you 5,000 do you understand how many Russians went to Turkey last year? No.

Six and a half million. Six and a half million, which is basically thousand times more. How many Russians went to Egypt last year? I don't know. One and a half million. How many came to South Korea last year? I don't know. It's a good idea.

I have not checked. Few hundred thousands, definitely. Right. Definitely. Yeah. Okay. Now, the last topic I want to ask you about today is I want to ask you about your recent trip to Europe controversy surrounding your removal from

Latvia. There's been a lot of speculation and confusion online about what actually happened. Briefly, from your perspective, what happened? From my perspective is what's happened. Latvian government is seriously suspicious about everything Russian. And... Just quickly, what is the percentage of the Latvian population that would be part of the Russian minority? About one third. I don't exactly... It's quite a large number. It's quite large number.

And they are very suspicious. And the situation, they are afraid of conflict and possible war, at least some tensions with Russia. And they are deeply suspicious of everything related to Russia. Right. And you, as a Russian speaker, were visiting Latvia. With a lecture in Russian on the North Korean. On the North Korea.

And they basically, obviously, my idea is that they did not even bother to consult the content. They said, oh, Russian is talking about North Korea. He's glorifying Kempel. And now I see a lot of talks that I'm probably, you know, a North Korean spy or delivering stories about greatness of North Korean prosperity and blah, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah, which is a bit funny because, you know, I believe we just mentioned their prosperity. Actually, as a matter of fact, I would say that the economy has a proof significant over the last years. And thanks largely to the war, right? I think it's a major reason, but there is another reason the diplomacy with China.

But it's a different story. Anyway, so they had this a near-jerk reaction. And now it seems I'm getting company because it did not attract that much attention. But recently they banned a lecture. The Latvian government treated the same way, a visitor also with Russian past, but also, if I understand correctly, not my field. largely living outside Russia, he was delivering a lecture on a highly subversive topic

of modern urban planning. So it seems to be the kind of their policy to prevent any kind of events, of this kind, Russian-speaking events. I used to say with any possible political color, but I don't see political color with this urban lecture, which was suddenly canceled. Maybe because this person dared to say that Moscow has invested much time into urban development

or something equally subversive and dangerous, or maybe not even not. More broadly, are you concerned about the shrinking space for nuance in discussions about Russia, North Korea, and geopolitics generally? Depends. In popular discussion that you have heated, such a heated situation, it might be a problem, but I don't see much change in professional discussions unless you are talking about country where censorship is getting more and more tough.

Like, say, the best example is China. I see how careful Chinese are in their semi-open talk now. But if you are talking behind the closed doors with the Chinese, I don't see any change. So basically, yes, public discussion is becoming much more limited. Yes, propagandist on all sides. I wouldn't say both sides because there are many.

There are more sides than two. They have advantages. They do a lot of noise, I see it. But talking about professionals, I believe, they are talking. Yeah. Still, basically, we can talk quite with very little restrictions, but only between themselves. So not in a public setting like a conference or a...

No, no, conference is okay. Conference is okay. You don't have outsiders. But the media probably will be a bit more sensitive. And again, let's not overestimated, especially in democratic countries. But there are some minor pressures I see it. Were you rattled by what happened to you in Latvia? No, it's what I expected in this current situation.

I think that's something a few months earlier I was, so to say, attacked by the Russian government. Yeah, I remember that. Yes, so it's, for me, it's another. In this case in Latvia, probably not a confirmation because they probably didn't bother to check facts. They had sort of resumed assumptions. But it's sort of confirmation if you are attacked from both sides that you are probably telling the truth. I was about to say the same thing. Have you been to Russia recently?

No, no, no. I think I will go later this year, but I haven't been for two years. Okay. Well, we wish you a safe return from that. I think it's quite safe, so far at least. Now, back to North Korea, if you look at North Korea today compared to, and you've been watching it for decades, of course, having studied at Kimosong University 40 years ago, 40 years.

If you look at North Korea today compared with just as recently as 10 or 15 years ago, what developments do you think that outside observers still misunderstand, overestimate or underestimate the most? First of all, they made a serious move back to the old model. model I would solve call Kimmelsohn system their variety of the command economy and state

socialists. They are reviving public distribution system and something within one third and half of the foodstaff is seemingly now not sold but delivered to the customers through the government-run

distribution system, which means subsidized prices but also a strict control over quarters and rations. They have squeezed out private capital from some areas, even though still, say, service industry, you know, restaurant industry, large part of transportation, everything,

still are privately owned. Officially it's not recognized, but it's privately owned, and so on. And there was a significant decline in the living standards between, say, 2019, 2022, then revival, not complete but noticeable revival, because, as you have mentioned, sales of ammunition to Russia

and also Chinese strategic decision to keep North Korea afloat as a highly useful buffer zone because of the current Sina-U.S. rivalry. So Chinese don't like North Koreans, and these feelings are fully reciprocated. Absolutely. But at the same time, they need no longer to be stable.

They want North Korea to be alive and functioning and be there. But back to your statement that the economy is going back to the old system, the old ways of Kimmel. Moving that direction. I will never go back fully. They sort of made few steps back. But is that sitting alongside with the developments that when I speak to your protege, Dr. Peter Ward, we talk about businesses and contracts and market forces happening to. Korean economy. Are those two things happening at the same time?

Trends? Yes. Yeah. And for the record, he's not my proteger. It's me who is his protager now because he over the over did mean all serious stuff and he's absolutely brilliant researcher. I'm learning for him now. Having said that, having said that, so. Yeah, it's not a complete revival. And there are some laws which basically can be described as market-oriented, new laws, regulations, but generally they are moving back and it's easy to understand why.

First of all, their model initially was a sort of emulation of the Chinese model minus political liberalization. And they cannot do it now because they are banned from trading to their outside wall. Number two, their major sources are coming through the central government. It's, as you guess, heavy artillery shells are not sold by private, merchants. And as you guess, the Chinese aid is not usually sent to small private companies. So it means that government has an increasing share of resources. And you know, resources mean power. It's well-known fact that countries which heavily rely on the sales of their

resources, especially oil, but not only oil, on the world markets, they are much more likely to be authoritarian. They are much more likely to have powerful, maybe way too powerful governments. And North Korea is not an exception because government is getting money, private sector, which used to be quite big,

and it's still sufficiently large, but they are not getting money. They are getting less money. And government is getting more powerful because the major concern for the North Korean decision makers is control. Their major goal is to stay control which they believe, perhaps correctly, means staying alive.

And they will use all resources to increase their control. And the corollary of that is, correct me if I'm wrong, that the North Korean leaders believe that loss of control or liberalization or letting go of the reins of power will mean the end of the regime. And yes, and the bad part of the story is they are probably right. At least they don't want to run a risky experiment. I think that's what they saw when they look at Eastern Europe back in the 1980s. And they would add something else.

Go on. Because in Eastern Europe, when the old system collapsed, in many East European countries, the old leadership survived. They changed their political colors. But remember, we already mentioned that you should never take too seriously ideological statement by any professional politician. So they change their political colors. They redeem themselves from a convaluble.

communist parrachics, communist bureaucrats, into their, you know, supporters of the free market capitalism and liberal democracy, and many of them are still doing well. In North Korea, if the system goes down, especially if it ends with unification, not peaceful unification, always a pipe dream, but a German-style unification.

Chaotic. Chaotic, partially revolution, I would say a cross between a revolution and conquest. So if it ends in such a way, the North Korean elite will have no future. And many of them probably will be held responsible for the real and alleged human rights abuses of the past. So the people believe that they are not only fighting for their system, not even fighting for their power and privilege, but fighting for their survival and for their families' physical survival. And it makes a big difference.

Last question, Andre. When you look ahead, let's say five to ten years from now, what do you think is the single most important trend that's happening inside North Korea right now that people should be watching? Well, I think I have just mentioned. Increasing power of the central government, which to a very large extent is fueled by the changes

in the international political situation. Because now, now, they have had actually two strokes of luck, that is, sign a Chinese conflict, sorry, Sina-American conflict, which is likely to last for long time is spite of all this recent summit, everything.

China will be suspicious of the Americans and hence willing to keep them afloat as a buffer zone. And on top of that, the Ukrainian conflict. And even if, when hostilities in Ukraine ends, which personally, I don't expect to happen any time soon, but who knows? But even after that, and even if the Russian government will not provide them with a sort of, you know, as a sign of gratitude, with additional assistance, even in this case, they still can send a large number of workers.

They can make some money from Russia, but China is the key players. And all this money go large into the central budget. So it will strengthen the state. And if you ask me about what I would expect, I would expect that no 10, 15 years of the same, unless there are some serious problems with Kim Jong-in's health, I would expect North Korea to remain essentially unchanged or just mightly changed in years, if not decades to come.

It's a grim way to end, but thank you very much for being our first guest on the new series North Korea Unpacked with Jacko's wedslip. Thank you. Thank you for inviting me. Ladies and gentlemen, that brings us to the end of today's episode of North Korea Unpacked with me, Jacko's Wedslute. Our thanks go to Brian Betts and David Choi for facilitating this episode and to our post-recording producer genius Alana Hill. Thank you and listen again next time.