North Korea News Podcast by NK News - Bo Ram Kwon: How cooperation with Russia has emboldened North Korea

Episode Date: September 5, 2024

Cooperation between North Korea and Russia across various sectors has gone from strength to strength in recent years, with major implications for the Korean Peninsula and beyond. This week, scholar Bo Ram Kwon joins the podcast to talk about how Moscow’s war in Ukraine has shifted the security dynamics for South Korea, particularly strategic planning […]

In the intricate world of Korean affairs, tailored intelligence makes all the difference. Korea Risk Group's consulting services offer specialized, actionable intelligence designed to guide your career-related decisions. We provide bespoke consulting services that cater to your unique challenges and goals. From policy analysis to market entry strategies, we bring clarity to complexity. Transform uncertainty into opportunity and visit careerpro.com solutions today. Hello listeners and welcome to the NK News Podcast. I'm your host, Jaco Zwetsloot, and this episode was recorded on Monday, the 2nd of September

2024. Joining me here in the studio is Dr. Boram Gwon, who is a research fellow in the Global Strategy Division in the Center for Security and Strategy at the Korea Institute for Defense Analysis. That's a long title. Her research expertise includes US security and defense strategy, US-ROK alliance issues, the nexus between US foreign policy and domestic policy politics and economic sanctions. And today we're going to be talking mainly about

the impact of the Russo-Ukraine war on the security of the Korean Peninsula, as well as South Korea-NATO cooperation. Welcome on the show, Dr. Gwon. Hello, nice to be here. Thank you for choosing us. I understand that we are your first podcast ever. Yes. But you've probably been on the radio and television before right? Not much. Okay, but it's the same thing effectively. Okay, so let's start by talking about the impact of the Russo-Ukraine war on the security of the Korean Peninsula. You wrote

a piece called The War in Ukraine's Impact on the US National Defense Strategy and the Security of the Korean Peninsula, which was published by the Korea Research Institute for National Security Strategy. First of all, how has the war in Ukraine shifted the security dynamics on the Korean Peninsula here, particularly in terms of US and South Korean strategic planning? Right, that's a really big question. It is, isn't it? We start with the big ones. I know. And the war in Ukraine not affected us, but practically everything. So when this was when this seminar or this presentation was planned, I guess, by Koreans, they want to get the big picture out there first.

So the first part of it was they wanted to know how the war affected the US defense strategy and then how that affected the Korean Peninsula But I think it's in your question Named on the peninsula is more pertinent to our conversation today Yes, and so when it was I wrote this a couple months ago, but I still think it works now So I think I put down five impacts and let me go through them real shortly So I guess the war in Ukraine generated a lot of discussions about how South Korea would respond to a Taiwan contingency. That was the first one.

The second is it mobilized critical thinking about US security commitment to Asia. Then it also made us realize that we have restrained options to condemn and rein in North Korea's nuclear missile provocations. And that was partly because North Korea and Russia had become very chummy, and now they have a partnership. And the fifth point is it drew South Korea and NATO closer. So those are really, they're all very big topics.

I'm just gonna put them all on the table right now. And I've got some more in-depth questions about some of those topics. So let's talk about North Korea's strategic calculations. You mentioned in your presentation, your paper for Crens, that North Korea might coordinate with China in the event of a Taiwan contingency. Now how likely is this scenario and what could it mean for regional stability? I can't put a number on how likely it is but I think now I think North Korea has earned the most from this war

compared to China and Russia, period. So that was what I was going to go through. And so what the US planners are very worried about now is having two wars happening at the same time. They're not ready for it, right? In Europe, a land war and in Asia, perhaps a sea or air war. Even if it's in the same theater, having two wars,

they just can't fight it. And they've learned it through the war in Ukraine, that they're not ready. The defense industrial base is just, they can't take it. And so I think, in terms of that, I think North Korea has been emboldened. And that's the point I wanted to make, that it's in a hard place. And that's why it has this partnership with Russia.

But I think Russia has given it some relief from all that sanctions pressure. And so it's getting a lot of aid. It's giving military aid in return. And I think that emboldenedness may, may incentivize it to coordinate more with China. But then China is sort of like a triangle right now about the war. It's not absolutely pleased with how the war is going on

because they have longer term plans about their own leadership in the world, but perhaps the war in Ukraine disturbed that plan. So it's a bit of a triangle. In Korea we call it a semo, right? So I can't really say how high the probability is But I would say that North Korea is more emboldened than before now You've said that North Korea is more emboldened and yet North Korea hasn't done a seventh nuclear test and it hasn't

Repeated say the shelling of Yeonpyeongdo. So how can we see that? It's emboldened? How do we what are the signs that it feels emboldened? Okay. I'm not a North Korea expert So I can only say what I know But I've heard that that Kim Jong-un the the reason why he's not doing more exercises or condemning our exercises Even more this year is that he's having some problems with internal Control that he wants that he is sensing that it's not just external powers that's making his, that is challenging his leadership, but actually there's a lot of disgruntlement. Within his population.

Yes, yes. So he may be, so North Korea as a country may be emboldened on the global stage, but internally Kim Jong-un is under a lot of stress. That's what I've learned. So it's a bit paradoxical. Okay. So coming back to this question about North Korea possibly coordinating with China

in the event of a China contingency, I wonder if this works both ways. And I have to explain what I mean. What I mean is, if North Korea were to make a move first, do you think that China would be likely to move on Taiwan? And also if China made a move first, do you think that North Korea would be likely to move against South Korea?

Is that the sort of scenarios that we're talking about or is it just one of those two? I think it would be one of those two, but I can't say which is more likely and I can't say both are very likely at all. Because we're all, the system is under stress right now. Which system? The global system is under stress because of the war in Ukraine and because it's getting longer. We don't know when it will end. And I think the biggest factor there is US presidential elections. Everybody's very careful. Two months from now?

Yes. So I can't really put a number on the likelihood. But the two scenarios that you put on the table are likely. They're the ones that people talk most about. Right. But at this point, I don't think they're that likely. They're just one of those scenarios that are most talked about. So do you have a gut instinct as to which of those two is more likely? Do you think that China would move first and then North Korea would would follow or vice versa? I don't think North Korea will move first. That's my answer. Perhaps something would happen in Taiwan or the Taiwan Straits and then North Korea might say here's a good chance Let's do something but with that is that

Coordinated or is that just opportunistic? You know, that's a very good point I was at a capstone meeting in Singapore in June this year was at June or earlier It was it was funded by I think tank in DC and it was like a three-day discussion of simultaneous strategic I think Tankin, DC, and it was like a three-day discussion of strategic simultaneity, getting at your question. The word is a new term, and we were trying to put more meat on the bone. And what you just said was discussed.

It could be opportunistic, it could be even coincidental, this coordination. Even among the closest of allies, ROK and the US, we have to practice so many times to get things right coordinated perfectly. China and North Korea don't practice as much and their relationship isn't about values. So there's a lot of gaps. So it could be totally coincidental. It could be intended.

But I think if it's unintended, that's the more dangerous scenario. Because of the risk of miscalculation or getting something wrong? Yes. Okay. All right, let's talk about Russia-North Korea relations. What are the strategic implications of the growing military cooperation between Russia and North Korea and how might this affect the ROK-US alliance? Well, it doesn't look good, let's put it that way. So, now that North Korea has more of a relief because of Russia.

You mean economic relief? Economic relief, I think, first. Okay. It wasn't looking for any military relief. Maybe the tech transfer would help them in the long term, but I doubt that Russia would give anything so sensitive to North Korea that easily because it's not actually exactly winning the war right now. So getting back to your question how does it strategically affect the alliance? It's putting a lot of pressure on it. It's actually making the ROK-US-Japan trilateral relations work

better against North Korea. That's something that sort of backfiring I guess. And I think the direction that the ROK-US alliance is going is more deterrents, stronger deterrents, more coordination, more institutionalization of coordination. So I see a lot of tension building up on the peninsula. We're not going to see any war anytime soon, but it's a lot of tension and there's very little space

for talks between with North Korea. And another point, South Korea-Russia relations at a very low point right now, which is also very concerning. Right. Now, this institutionalization that you were talking about before in terms of the ROK-US alliance, is that something to make the alliance independent or less affected by personalities, leaders? Sure. Leaders both ways. The US leader and the Korean leader. Right. Okay. So that the alliance can continue to function regardless of who is president of any country. Okay. Now this relationship, this partnership between Russia and North Korea. Do you see that as a values-based partnership or is it something more short-term and based

on our interest align right now, so let's work together for the meantime, but it's not necessarily a long-term thing? When you sign a document like they did, that doesn't lend one to think, oh, maybe this is more permanent, maybe this is more long-term. What do you think about that? I think if we were dealing with two democratic countries, we would assume that their partnership would last longer because they have different audiences they have to talk to and there's more responsibility.

But we're not dealing with two democracies, it's two authoritarian states, right? And so I don't think their relationship is based on values. I guess it's more interest-based in terms of how long they see their... I don't think they're going for the short term because actually signing onto a document means something even for them. Because research shows that even auto credit leaders

pay audience costs. So it matters, they still have audiences. Kim Jong-un has an audience also. But mainly domestic. Yes, yes, yes. So it matters. But so I'm going back to the US presidential elections. It's two months away. We don't know how quickly we'll know the results though, because it may take longer to count and rectify the results. But I think that would be the first goalpost that they need to get past and then we can say for sure whether it fits for a

more longer term or not. Do you think it's that kind of an agreement is something that would last beyond the term of either President Putin or Chairman Kim? They have very long terms. Well, they're open-ended. Yes, okay. Now you write in your paper that China would only permit a certain level of Russia-North Korea cooperation that does not pull Pyongyang too close to Moscow. That's an interesting statement. I have heard similar ideas from people before, but how do you imagine China might intervene to prevent Pyongyang going too close to Moscow? Well, we know for sure that although Russia is giving economic aid to North Korea, it's

always been China that's had, like, keeping the Kim Jong-un regime alive economically. So I think it can do a lot of things on that end. Like, it can deport workers. I mean, things like that that could all add to pressure. And I think North Korea would get the message, and they will moderate how close they get to pressure. And I think North Korea would get the message and they will moderate how close they get to Moscow. But there's a risk there for China, isn't there? I mean, if you, for example, the example you cited, deporting workers, that's not something you can reverse quickly. So those economic effects would be felt for quite a while in North Korea

if China were to do that. Yes. And I'm pretty sure China thinks long term, much more long term than North Korea. So it will take the steps that it needs. Okay. Now let's look for a moment at sanctions and diplomatic challenges. With the weakening enforcement of sanctions against North Korea, how can the international community effectively respond to North Korea's nuclear and missile, well, provocations or acts or tests? That's a very tricky question. Sanctions, going back to resource sanctions, are more likely to

work when it's either backed by military coercion or threats of military options. So I'm not suggesting that we go down that route, but I think sanctions alone will not be that useful because there's a big hole in it. It's not just China. It's also Russia now. Yeah. And that's something that has changed, I think, really during the Russo-Ukraine war, isn't it? That both Russia and China have shown that they're not particularly interested in enforcing

the existing sanctions, let alone levying any new sanctions. Yes. Okay. Now, what about the impact of nuclear weapons on security calculus? Given the lessons that North Korea might be drawing from Russia's use of nuclear threats, so far it's just threats,

how should South Korea and its allies adjust their security strategies to address an emboldened North Korea? Yes, well certainly, even I think I saw this morning that since Ukraine actually hit Russia past their border and they're really concerned right now, Russia is talking about changing their nuclear doctrine, which is going way beyond what we thought. But from the very beginning Putin was very smart to saber-rattle with the use of tactical nuclear weapons.

Tactical, yeah, or battlefield nuclear weapons in Ukraine. He hasn't yet. No, he hasn't yet. Hope he doesn't. And North Korea has been using the same cards against us. So now, their nukes are not just for the US, but the tactical ones are against us. And more concerning is that they've changed their constitution. Um, they're saying unification doesn't matter anymore.

So those hostile changes are giving very negative science to us. So how South Korea and the ROK US can respond is by upping deterrence and spending more on defense. So, uh, I read that next year we're going to spend a whole lot more in defense. Um, actually spending more than the actual national budget. So the increased rate actually. Wait, so say that again? So our government's gonna spend more next year,

about 3.2%, but in defense expenditure, we're gonna spend more, like 3.6%, so the increased rate is higher. Right, right, okay. So how then, how is South Korea now preparing itself for the end of the Ukraine war, whenever that might be? What are some of the debates and discussions going in, ongoing in Korea around that?

Mm-hmm, I thought about this, and at the very beginning I asked, I talked about how the war in Ukraine has impacted the Korean Peninsula. And among the five, four of them were kind of problems. But when you think about the war ending in Ukraine, it doesn't relieve us from those four problems. Those are continuing problems for us. And that's something I want to talk about.

And when we think about preparing for the end of the war, I think it has to come in different parts. So first, South Korea is actually helping the war, I think it has to come in different parts. So first, South Korea is actually helping the war end. The war hasn't ended yet. So the war can end on terms accepted by Ukraine. We engage in diplomatic efforts, global efforts, NATO IP4 efforts, even bilateral efforts. That's one. The second thing is we have concrete assistance programs ready for them to use when they reconstruct. OK, so aid packages, sending people skills, those kind of things.

And also, we have to prepare for the changes that the war changed. So Russia, North Korea relations, how would that change should the war end? We have to think about those things. And so we've talked about this already, but we have to think about why they entered into a partnership in the first place. Okay. And then I think this hasn't come up yet, but the defense industry. So because of the war in Ukraine, there has been a lot of media attention

about how South Korea's defense firms exported a lot of weapons to Europe. And that's a good thing in terms of making money. But what the media picks up are the orders that were put in place. The actual deliveries take time, and they come in phases, so that needs to be maintained. But when the war ends, then the demand for weapons will decrease, so we have to prepare

for not just the reduction of orders, but we have to make for not just the reduction of orders, but we have to make the Korean defense industry has to make very good decisions about who are you going to market, how are we going to improve our weapons, the quality of it, the cost effectiveness. And also because of all of this, the EU has a defense industrial strategy now. So they want to increase their own defense industrial capacities because they've seen Korean firms coming in export. So it's a very competitive market that we're dealing with.

So that's one thing that hasn't really come up but I think it's important. But what about in terms of the political discussions happening in Korea? Is the Ukraine war something that both the People Power Party and the Democratic Party see more or less eye to eye on or are there large differences of opinion? I don't think any party would actually want the war to be prolonged. But I don't think it's the priority issue right now.

It's not something they talk about every day. Right. Okay. And are they talking about what to do once it's finished? I think on reconstruction they can see eye to eye. Right, okay. All right, now let's talk a little bit about ROK-NATO cooperation. You've also written a piece about that for 38th North a couple of months ago, published in April. So let's start with the question that the title of your piece asks. What does ROK-NATO cooperation mean

for relations on the Korean Peninsula? Right, so I think because we are ways apart, some people might ask, so what can you actually do for each other? And you mean South Korea and NATO? And NATO, right. Actually, why is NATO even interested in the Korean Peninsula all of a sudden?

I don't think it's all of a sudden. I think ever since US put out their Indo-Pacific strategy and saying that the Indo-Pacific is their primary theater. Now a lot of other countries have their own Indo-Pacific strategies, including many European countries. I think that's the actual start. So it's not that new, it's more three or four years. And now South Korea has Indo-Pacific strategy.

So both sides have incentives to do more with each other But in terms of actually what they can do for each other is I think what the US wants Is for them both to talk about what are we going to do about China? And that's something we can talk about but I think for the South Koreans they also if they actually prioritize more What can we do about North Korea because the nuclear North Korea problem is not a regional problem anymore, it's a global problem. Okay. So in terms of inter-Korean relations, ROK-NATO cooperation, is that putting pressure on the

inter-Korean situation? I would say yes, but not much is going on between the two Koreas right now. I think tensions are quite high. Again, going back to now North Korea has an exit option called Russia. So we're kind of in a stuck place. So we'll have to see what happens in the next two months. Now you said that that rock NATO or rather NATO has been interested in Korea more or less since America put out its Indo-Pacific strategy a few years ago.

But what about the Russo-Ukraine war? To what extent is that also pushing NATO to look more at the Indo-Pacific? I think there are many answers to that, but the one thing that I can think about is how the war is being fought in Ukraine. It's the Ukrainians that are fighting. The US has made it very clear that it's not going to put its boots on the ground. I think that's a very strong message to all allies,

European allies and Asian allies. And I think on that point, they share those concerns. They understand that allies need to do more for their own defense. So although they're in different theaters, they have different adversaries, well, primary ones anyway, they have a common understanding that they need to strengthen their own defense and then create more linkages between like-minded states.

And that all works for both NATO and Korea. So I think keeping that dialogue going and now that we have a NATO AP4 or IP4 platform, I think that's very valuable. Right, remind our listeners who are the IP4. So it's Japan, Korea, Australia, and New Zealand. Okay, and so these countries are now in a regular dialogue with NATO. Okay, now, and does that, the strengthening of that dialogue and that relationship, is that seen by Vladimir Putin as an attempt by,

well, basically NATO to surround Russia? Of course. And China isn't very happy with it either. It's saying it's all part of the big containment plan. Okay, so Russia and China are both feeling threatened by this. Mm-hmm, mm-hmm. Now, what is the individually tailored partnership program,

the ITPP, and what does that mean for Korea? That's more of a diplomatic. I do more in defense. I don't know the exact details of that, but I know it's one of the first ever very detailed cooperation plans that has about 11 very important points. But I have to go through looks on my loads on that. OK, sorry. Is that something between Korea and NATO or Korea and the United States? No, Korea and NATO. Oh, okay.

So it's diplomatic, but it is involving NATO. That's interesting. Okay. I'll have to get someone else to come in and talk more about that. Okay, let's talk about strategic balance. And how do you see the evolving ROK-NATO cooperation impacting the delicate strategic balance in Northeast Asia, particularly with respect to North Korea, China and Russia's responses. How does that that cooperative relationship affect the balance here? I think it's it's it's at the very beginning, it's not peaking, so

as long as we keep the trajectory going, it would be a positive influence. I don't think it's big enough to counterbalance or anything. It's more of an effort to bring the two regions or theories together because they're facing a common threat that is called China. But again, I emphasize that for South Korea, the primary adversary is North Korea. But I think it works both ways that they want more, they want more linkages and I think it's good they have more of these linkages that are lattice-like

and networked on very different levels. Not just state level, but going below state. So military to military. Yes, yes. Party to party. Yes, and even industry to industry. And all these different networks matter because there are so many external shocks. External shocks could be wars, but external shocks could also be leadership changes.

And some leadership changes matter more than others. Now, you said just before that for NATO and a lot of states, China is the main issue here, but for South Korea, North Korea is the main issue. But isn't that also the case that it's kind of awkward for South Korea to talk about China as a threat because of the proximity? Yes. That Koreans don't really, you know, some Koreans don't like to talk about China too much knowing the risks that are there, you know, the THAAD dispute, the garlic wars of the early 2000s.

Yes, so in many of our government documents, we don't call out China, but you can certainly tell that we are talking about China. Right, you can read it in. Yeah, but I think that's a big step forward because before we didn't even do that. Now, given these growing ties between NATO and South Korea, how confident should South Korea be in NATO's commitment to support in case of an escalation on the Korean Peninsula?

I mean, clearly Korea is not and is unlikely ever to become a member of NATO, so Article 5 cannot apply to Korea. Right. And yet, should South Korea be confident of some sort of commitment to help? I think we can be, but we are very cognizant of the fact that their major theater is Europe. And the US is also making that very clear. We don't expect NATO forces to come and help us on the peninsula. It's just too far away. And should something happen on the peninsula, Europe becomes more vulnerable to other crises. So they have to be ready. So you can't disperse all of your weaponry and people.

And yet we have to remember that, I haven't done an analysis here of exactly each country, but most of the UN command sending states are also members of NATO and many members of NATO are part of the UN command and recently Germany that wasn't there for a member of UN command but is a member of NATO joined the UN command. So there is a lot of overlap there right? Yeah and I think the momentum to revive

UN command has grown over the couple months. I think there has been diplomatic meetings that South Korea wasn't actually part of, but now it's actually seeking to be part of. Right. And there was that meeting, was it this year or last year that all the defense ministers of the different sending states came here to solve for a meeting convened by President Yun, right? Yes, yes, yes. That's part of this too, isn't it?

Yes, yes. So they're building momentum and they're building, they're making a spot for South Korea to go into. And the UNC has always been a very politically sensitive issue. But now I think I see more momentum. I see group, pockets of people talking more about the UNC, how to revive it. Politically sensitive where? In South Korea or in other countries? In certainly in South Korea.

Okay. Could deepened rock NATO cooperation further complicate diplomatic efforts with North Korea, especially in context of denuclearization talks? Yes, I would say. But talks at this point, we're not going anywhere. So NATO isn't the major problem. I think it's more about, let's see, it's really hard to pinpoint what the major problem is but I don't think it's NATO is the biggest problem right now. Okay, we've already talked about how Russia and China probably perceive this kind of cooperation as as threatening. Does North Korea perceive it as threatening? Sure. Have they said so? I can't quote but I would think that they

did. Okay, now a bit more about China here. How might China's perception of rock NATO cooperation influence China's policy towards South Korea? And what economic or diplomatic repercussions could Seoul face in this time? Well, I think I mentioned that China isn't too happy about ROK building more ties with NATO because it thinks it's part of the big US plan to contain China. And because US, China are engaged in strategic competition which is intensifying.

And so even the little thing, small things can become very big problems quite easily. And I think in terms of if China thinks ROK is going too far, we went through the third economic sanctions period that they know how to make Our businesses suffer. Mm-hmm. They know how to do that I don't know how far they will go, but they certainly know how where to push to make South Koreans hurt Yes, and it does seem over the long term that you know

China tends to go after the weaker of the two parties in a situation So China can't really hit out at NATO, but China can certainly put some repercussions in place for South Korea. And you write in your article that member states with strong economic ties with China have been reluctant to take a firm stance against China's coercive behavior. That's not new. This has been true for a long time. But do you ever see it changing?

Changing? true for a long time, but do you ever see it changing? Changing. I guess some of the language can change over time, but you can't really do away with the economic and technological interdependence that a lot of these countries have with China. Even if the Biden administration or the next administration says, you have to de-risk, it may go up to decoupling again, depending who wins in the next election.

It's really hard to make your allies and partners do away with their relationship with China because economic security matters for their audiences too. Right. Now, let's move on from China and talk about the future of how might the ROK-NATO partnership affect the dynamics within South Korea-U.S.-Japan trilateral relationship? I think the interactions between those two relationships are quite positive, that they can reinforce each other.

Because Japan has very good relations with NATO also. It's also one of the four IP portals. This is a very good example of what lattice-like networked partnerships looks like, right? You have countries in threes and fours and what have you, networked and put on each other. So whatever external shock comes, you still have, some of the networks can be cut,

but the others will stick. So in the end, it's okay. It's more resilient. I think the point is more resilience than effectiveness. Do you see that both South Korea and Japan want a similar relationship or a similar level of cooperation with NATO? I can't put a number on it, but I would see because they're like-minded states and they're very strong allies of the US that they have similar values and similar understandings, yes.

And they both have limitations too, because they're Asian powers and they can't be in Europe. Right. Although South Korea was involved in Afghanistan, was that working with NATO in Afghanistan? They sent some medical assistance, right? I don't recall if it was actually, I think that it was related to NATO, yes. Okay, so that goes back quite a way then, that corporation. Yes, yes, yes, yes. Now, which of the three countries, South Korea, United States, Japan,

which of the three countries under new leadership, whether that be Japan under a new prime minister this month or the United States under perhaps a new revitalized President Trump in two months time or even South Korea under a Minju Democrat Party president in 2027 when the next presidential election happens. Which one of those do you see is potentially the weakest link in maintaining that trilateral relationship? That's a very tricky question. It is, isn't it? I think if we think about what change comes first.

Okay, you mean chronologically speaking? Yes, let's be fair, so it's Japan first. But then if we take out the time factor, perhaps it could be Korea. And why is that? Because the two parties have very different perceptions of Japan. Okay, do you wanna drill down a little bit is that? Because the two parties have very different perceptions of Japan. Okay. Do you want to drill down a little bit on that?

What's the the Minja Democrat Party's perception of Japan? I mean, yes, there are a lot of history issues. We've talked about that before. But as you've said a few times in this interview, that South Korea and Japan in today's world are like-minded states with similar interests and values, you know, liberal democratic order, capitalist economy, that kind of thing. So why would that not continue that sort of cooperation under a different president? I would think the Minju Party has a different footing on perceiving Japan as a partner.

So they think they go back to the colonial times, that they haven't forgiven Japan. But then another point is because domestic policy in Korea is so polarized, it's not just to Japan that's the problem, it's because the two sides just don't like each other. It's just anything but. I see. Okay, now if President Trump becomes re-elected in November in America, he's quite sort of a transaction, he's more transactional than ideological. So I don't see him easily having an ideological, what's the word, revulsion or dislike

of trilateral cooperation. But he may be looking for a better deal. Is trilateral cooperation between South Korea, Japan, and the U.S. something that could be sold to Trump as, hey, this is win-win, you're getting something for nothing out of this? I think you're on the right track. It could be sold as a win-win, but I've been working with DOD on a similar issue. That's the U.S. Department of Defense for our listeners? Yeah, MND, so that's our Department of Defense in Korea. I misspoke.

And their list of what we need to prepare for in terms of the alliance and the next president, is there are 20 more so issues and the trilateral partnership is only one of those. It's a very, very long list. But like you said, the trilateral partnership is only one of those. It's a very, very long list. But like you said, the trilateral cooperation part, they don't think it's particularly vulnerable to Trump 2.0. Okay, so there are 20 issues that the Ministry of National Defense in South Korea has on its mind to prepare just in case Trump gets re-elected. That's a lot of issues. I guess-

But I think it's the same for all countries right now. Right, okay. Apart from within the Ministry of National Defense, how is South Korea preparing itself for the possibility of a Trump re-election? Let me backtrack a little bit. So if you asked me that question last month, I would give you a more straight answer.

But because I've seen the Republican National Convention, and I've seen the Democratic National Convention, and the dynamics have changed so strongly. What used to be a double-hater, so low enthusiasm U.S. presidential campaign to now is the revived Harris and Rawls campaign. I think now that we're on equal footing, so you should be asking me what is South Korea preparing for both administrations, not just one. Oh, okay. Let's do that then. How is South Korea preparing for both of those potential outcomes? And now that I have a question that I want, I want to point out that although we're worried about a Trump 2.0 because we know that there are fewer guardrails, we don't have adults in the room like the first term.

And there was a lot of chaos in the first term. But I want to say that the challenges that the alliance will face is not pertained to Trump itself. It's how America is evolving. So if we look at the Harris campaign and Trump campaign, of course their language is very different, but I think they have three very common points. And those include, let me see my notes here.

I don't wanna forget. Okay, so number one is America first. Although Harris does not use the words, it's American middle class first, okay? And the Democratic Party will be more diplomatic about how they go, how they deal with allies. Trump is not very polite with allies, but the point is there, it's America first.

America has never been second. That's not going to change. And that means allies have to do more of the heavy lifting. The second is military. They both want a stronger military. Even during the first Trump administration, their grand strategy didn't change because of Trump and his actions.

It's still primacy. They want to be the strongest military power. That's not going to change. But how they use power, how they use it to intervene in other wars, that will change. Again, the message is allies need to do more. The third is, it's China.

They both think China is the biggest threat. They both want to out-compete China, and they want help from allies, because they both know that they can't win without the help of allies. So, I'm trying to stress that they're not that different in terms of allies' viewpoint. Right, now I also noticed that if I'm not mistaken,

neither the Republican nor the Democrats have denuclearization of North Korea on their policy platforms for the presidential candidates. No. Did that surprise you? No, it didn't surprise me because I spent some time thinking about what's happening in both parties the Democratic Party and the Republican Party Yeah, and they're very inward and they're very they're very focused on domestic internal issues right now And it's very concerning that North Korea period is not a priority issue

For both can for both parties Although I mean president Obama on his last day of office when he was handing over to President Trump said, this should be a priority issue for you. But I don't think that President Biden would say the same thing to the next. I'm not sure because we have two hot wars right now. Period. America is very busy. And so I think what we really need to think about is what is America's priority issue. I don't think it's North Korea

period. And even if Trump, I don't think Harris will be more likely to start a discussion with with Kim Jong-un anytime soon. But even if Trump comes into power and decides to talk and engage with Kim Jong-un, the talks may not be about denuclearization. It could just be talks. Okay, so that's a big difference there because he went through it once. I'm sure he has his own lessons learned. Do you have an instinctual feeling about which of the two US presidential candidates would have a better personal rapport

with President Yun Sang-yeol? Well, President- We all know that, for example, President Trump in his first term in the White House had a particularly strong relationship with the then Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe. Did a lot of golfing together, socialized together, got on well together. Do you think that that would be the same with President Yun? I think it would be easier for me to respond if Harris were a man,

but because she's a woman, I think the dynamics are very different. I think on a professional level, she can get along with anybody, but if you tell me to compare her with Trump, it's hard. Because she's a woman. Yeah, and I'm not favoring one over another, it's just different. And Kamala has actually made it very clear

that she's a very strong and lawful person. She doesn't like to do business the like what's the word backdoor way. So she's less pragmatic and more bound by laws. Yes, she's more principled. She doesn't like to do the big gentleman thing like how they talk over cigars. I don't see that with her. So I think the dynamics will be very different. But at the same time we also know that President Trump doesn't drink and President Yun does like a tipple from time to time and so they wouldn't be negotiating over over whiskeys in a back room either. No, but perhaps golf. I don't know. Okay, last

question to leave you with. What do you, as a research fellow in the global strategy division in the Center for Security and Strategy at the Korea Institute for Defense Analysis, what do you propose? What are the top three things that South Korea should do in the next 12 months? Okay, so it's September now. So I'm thinking 2025 September. So what South Korea should do? Well, regardless of who wins in the US election, I think we have to spend a lot of time thinking about what we can do more as an ally,

not just for the peninsula, but I think also more for the region. Now there's more discussion happening about unification, how we have to have our own consensus and our own understandings and plans about it before we ask about global consensus. And I think that's a big homework for us too. It's a long-term homework

because unification is a long-term project. Right, but it's also tough in a polarized South Korean political environment right now. Yes, but I think ever since, I think we've lost the dialogue itself. I think reviving that dialogue, it needs to start now because there's a lot of change pending. And I worry that these changes may not be positive

towards unification because there's so much competition, big major power competition, strategic competition, strategic simultaneity, all these negative aspects, it just cannot help. So in terms of growing more interest, I think that's something we need to really focus on, having a more internal discussion, and even discussions about what to do

with our nuclear trajectory. I mean, small discussions about South Korea developing their own nuclear weapons. It's very small. They're only small pockets, but foreign media somehow catches it and makes it really big. But it just shows that our internal discussion isn't mature enough, and perhaps it's something we need to talk about. So we have a lot of internal homeworks that I need what I would put on the list.

So Stronger Alliance, number one. But then we need more discussions about unification and about what are we going to do about nuclear options. Are there enough? Okay. Can people find you online? Are you on Twitter or any of those other platforms? I do have a Facebook account, but I rarely do anything on it.

Okay. So people should look at the website of the Korea Institute for Defense Analysis occasionally for your insights. Yes. All right. Well, thank you very much, Dr. Boram Gwon for coming on the Korea NK News podcast today. Thank you for having me. Score more for less with our NK News Shop discount campaign. Score more for less with our NK News Shop discount campaign. Ready to upgrade your wardrobe with some unique flair? At the NK News Shop, podcast listeners buying any two items from our t-shirt or hoodie collections

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Thank you, and listen again next time.