North Korea News Podcast by NK News - Carlo Masala on why a Russian victory matters for Korea: North Korea Unpacked

Episode Date: October 22, 2026

Editor’s note: This interview was recorded in July 2026. Some references to recent events and political developments reflect the situation at the time of recording and may differ from subsequent developments. German political scientist Carlo Masala joins North Korea Unpacked with Jacco Zwetsloot to discuss his book “If Russia Wins: A Scenario,” why a Korean-style […]

Hello, listeners, and welcome to North Korea Unpacked with Jacko Zwitzut. That's me, Jacko, and I'm here today with Professor Carlo Massala, who is a German political scientist and lecturer at the University of Munich and at Bundesweir University of Munich. Last year, Professor Massala published the international bestseller if Russia wins a scenario, which has now been released in Korean as well. Welcome, Professor Massala. Thank you, Jacko, for having me on your show. So your book, which we're going to be using as the basis for a discussion today,

if Russia wins a scenario, imagines a Russian victory in Ukraine leading not to peace, but to a wider challenge to the European security order. What motivated you to write that? Well, actually, what motivated me to write the book was the discussion and the debates we had all over Europe in, let's say, spring 24, when the German minister of defense and the German shot, the chief of the German army, went public. saying that by 2029, Russia might have armed, no, Russia will have armed forces,

that if there is any intention by Russian politics to attack a NATO country, are able to attack a NATO country. And then a debate started all over Europe. People were questioning this assessment, were asking why Russia should basically be so stupid to attack NATO because they know that conventionally NATO is much stronger than Russia.

Others were making the point that given the problems, Russia has in Ukraine and advancing there, it's quite unimaginable that Russia would even think about attacking NATO. And my point was that we're probably looking at this scenario in the wrong way, that it's not about a full-fledged attack, you know, the traditional six tank divisions breaking through a border, trying to conquer Poland. But that probably it's just a, you know, a kind of limited attack that will put NATO on a test to see if NATO will involve article 5 or not. Because if NATO doesn't invoke Article 5 in such a scenario where there is a limited attack on NATO's territory, then basically NATO is dead. NATO is done. Now, here on NK News,

both the podcast and the news service, we think all the time about an unresolved war, and that is, of course, the Korean War, which has been in the state of temporary ceasefire for the last 73 years, longer than you and I have been alive. Did Korea enter your thinking, why? writing this book? No, Korea didn't enter my thinking because I was involved in all the debates we had a couple of years ago, whether the Korean model could be a solution for Ukraine. And I personally do think that the Korean model doesn't serve as a solution for Ukraine because the Korean model, according to me, from a security perspective, just from a security perspective, worked and still works because of the massive US presence here. And since it's very clear that the US under the current

administration doesn't even think about putting any U.S. soldiers, any U.S. boot on Ukrainian ground after the end of the war. You know, this kind of deterrence for Russia will not be in Ukraine, which is here on the peninsula. That's obviously a distinct difference between the Ukraine scenario and the Korea scenario. But there must be some reason why that analogy became so popular and really took hold in 2024. Are there some parallels or any parallels between the Korean and Europe that made it to become a popular idea? Well, I think it became a popular idea because, I mean, first of all, of course, a lot of people are looking into the issue how to basically bring this war to an end.

And then secondly, since there is a kind of stalemate, of course, people had in mind, you know, the 38 parallel line here in Korea where basically nothing moved forward, nothing moved backward at a certain moment in time. So basically everyone agreed to freeze it on this line. this line, and that led people to think or to take a closer look at the Korean model and to think whether the Korean model should serve as, could serve as a kind of blueprint for the end of the Ukrainian conflict, the war of Russia against Ukraine. I think there is another issue why it will not serve for the time being as a kind of blueprint for Ukraine, because Russia is very

clear in its ambitions and even said by Putin yesterday that Russia still thinks it can win this war militarily. So there is there are no signs from Russia basically which we could interpret as that Russia is ready and willing to negotiate about an end to this, to the host of this. Since you mentioned President Putin's statement yesterday, I should mention to our readers that we're recording this on Wednesday, the 1st of July, although it will be released a bit later. you've already stated very clearly that the thing that people most misunderstand about the Korean armistice and why that may not be an analogy for the Russia-Ukraine ceasefire if one comes is the absence of American presence here and the absence of American will to put a presence here. But is that not oversimplifying a little bit because the United Nations command structure is, although led by the United States and the largest contingency is from the United States and underwritten by the United States, it is an international body. I mean, West Germany, sorry, Germany, I beg your pardon, I'm three decades behind now. Germany recently joined the United Nations command just in the last couple of years, probably around the time you're writing the book. Currently, the United Nations Deputy Commander is an Australian. General, hello to Lieutenant General. Scott Winter, AM, if you're listening. So it is an international body.

It was given a new lease on life, I think a few years ago, under former now-imprison Junson-Yol here in Korea to really bring in the international, all the other contingents. And anyway, is that not an over-simplification to say that the absence of America, American presence and will in Europe means that this kind of model can't work? Could there not be a... I mean, no offense against the UN presence here, no offense against the Australians and the New Zealand, which are here and I admire both of their armed forces, have been there and talked to their officers.

But who do you think the North Koreans are afraid of in case they think about attacking the South? Do you think they are afraid of of the Australian reaction of the 17 New Zealanders who are here or of the roughly 30,000 Americans who are stationed here? Who do you think they are afraid of when it comes to nuclear threats against North Korea? They're afraid of the US.

So the US provides the deterrence for this whole construct which came into being after the end of the Korean War. And I think the US is instrumental for keeping the peace or used to be instrumental for keeping the peace on the Korean Peninsula and not the UN presence. The UN presence could be over anytime soon once one of the members of the Security Council changes its interest in keeping the UN presence here. It's based on the mandate. It has to be agreed by the Chinese and the Russians. I mean, I don't say that they are thinking now differently about the presence of the UN here, but there is a theoretical, hypothetical possibility

that the Chinese, the Russians might change their mind and then the presence of the UN is over. It's not the presence of the US won't be over at that moment. And I think that you, I mean, this is what we always talked about, you know, the extended deterrence model in Asia and the extended deterrence model in Europe. And I think if you look at political science literature, there are endless studies about both models,

but they all basically do agree that the deterrence provided by the US was one of the incremental factors that kept the peace in Europe as well as in Asia for a long time. So is the lesson then that a frozen conflict can only remain stable with outside input from the US? Yes, as long as the Europeans don't acquire enough power to keep the peace by themselves, which is not the issue right now at the moment, you need a U.S. involvement.

And this is actually exactly what is debated in Europe. I mean, there are talks among Europeans, what they could offer in terms of security guarantees once this war is over. But all of the Europeans are very clear that without a U.S. backstop, they're not going to go into Ukraine. Ukraine. And you look at the Russian debate, the Russians really are not afraid of a European presence in Ukraine. I mean, they say no presence at all in Ukraine. But what they are afraid of is that the US will provide a backstop for Ukraine as well as the European troops in the Ukraine because this is what

deters Russia. So if that war in Ukraine ended with a Korea-style armistice, a ceasefire, would the the thing that we should most worry about be that Russia will simply when it's ready and wants to resume the attacks. Absolutely. I mean, that's also, you know, if you look at the President Zelensky and how he is basically behaving,

he's very clear that he's ready to give up Ukraine territory, but he needs an exchange hard security guarantees. A hard security guarantee. From the US, you said. Yeah, from the US and from the Europeans. And he knows that only the US can provide this kind of hard security guarantees.

Because what they're all afraid of, I mean, we have a situation where actually right now as we speak, there are no negotiations between the US, the Russians and the Ukrainians any longer. The US basically withdrew from the negotiations. But when they were in, they were demanding and asking the Ukrainians to withdraw from those parts of the Donbust, the Ukrainians are still holding.

And if you look at these parts of the dawnburst, from a military perspective, these are parts of the Donbass where there are large fortifications. So once the Russians are in control of that, it's quite easy in vertical commerce for them to start a second attack with the direction Kiev. And that's the reason why Zelensky says, I'm willing to give it up. I mean, he has to undergo a referendum then and so on and so forth, but I need hard security guarantees because otherwise, you know, it's a matter of time when the Russians will attack the second time. because Russia's intention is to destroy Ukraine,

and therefore they would be in a very, militarily speaking, in a very favorable position to do. And in a sense, we have seen this movie before after the Minsk Accords of, when was that, 2014? Yeah, yeah, exactly. That was all a prelude to where we are today. Yeah. But let's return to the theme of deterrence.

We've mentioned that already in today's discussion. So one thing that runs through your book is deterrence. What is the single biggest misconception that ordinary citizens with no military experience have about how deterrence works? Well, that's a good question. I don't have an answer to that. I think what people usually misunderstand or basically underestimate when we talk about deterrence, deterrence is much more than having, let's say, the military platforms.

Most people look at deterrence like if you have enough tanks, if you have enough fighter planes or frigates, depending you know where you're not. This will deter an enemy from attacking. Right, that it's about numerics, numbers, metrics of military strengths. Exactly. And I think, you know, as important, and I would say even more important, is the psychological factor, is the factor that through signaling, which means rhetoric, which means maneuvers, you need to let the other belief that in case something happens, you will use what you basically purchase in terms of weapons systems.

Because you can have the most advanced army in the world. If the signal you send out is that you're not willing to use them, you open a window of opportunity for everyone else to attack you. And I think this psychological dimension of deterrence is quite often underestimated in the debate we have. So it's really an expression of political will to use Milton. Yes, exactly. And so to come back to your earlier point there where you spoke perhaps a little disdain, about the small numbers of New Zealand,

there's Australians, Germans, ties, etc. It's not about the small numbers of those soldiers that are here. You're questioning whether those countries would have the political will to strike back against North Korea if North Korea made a move across the democracy. That's the point.

You know, I mean, if you translate it to the Korean peninsula, of course, I mean, deterrence means that the North Koreans have to believe that they get punished very hard once they do something against the South. If they don't believe that there will be punishment, you open a window of opportunity for them. If it suits them, you know, to attack the South. Well, part of that discussion now for decades

and has become much more salient since North Korea has developed nuclear weapons and long-distance missiles. And part of that discussion has been, will America be willing to swap San Francisco for Seoul or New York for Seoul or Washington for Seoul? That's the old extended to Torrance, problem. Right. What would be the European equivalent of that? The European equivalent right now, I mean, it used to be 50 years ago. I mean, let me put it differently. When Charles de Gaulle, the French

president, met Ludwig Ehart, the German Bundeskanzler in 63 for the first time, 63. And they had to talk about transatlantic relations and Ludwig Erhardt was praising the U.S. and how great the U.S. is. and that the U.S. is protecting Germany. And then Ludwig, Charles de Gaulle, asked Ludwig Earhart, Chancellor, Mr. Chancellor, are you really convinced that the Americans would risk the destruction of New York

for the liberation of Hamburg? And that's the old deterrence, extended deterrence problem. Nowadays, the extended deterrent problem is do we really believe that the U.S. would risk the destruction of New York for the liberation of Tallinn-Origa in the Baltic,

in the Baltic countries. Cities that most Americans probably haven't heard of or couldn't find it on a map, we assume. Absolutely. And in order to minimize this dilemma, I mean, it's impossible to solve. But to minimize this dilemma, we developed in Europe a kind of escalation ladder, which meant you had a huge conventional presence of U.S. forces on the ground. You have nuclear sharing, that means tactical nukes, which are stationed in Europe. And then, of course, you have the strategic arsenal, which is in the U.S.

So that there is an escalation letter. An attack which probably starts conventionally can be answered by conventional forces, can be answered with tactical nuclear weapons. And therefore, you tie the strategic arsenal in the U.S., you tie it very closely to what is in Europe. This was basically the issue on how we tried to minimize the dilemma which is inherent in extended deterrence. And nowadays it's back, the dilemma.

So in your scenario, in your book, Russia is probing NATO because it doubts NATO's willingness to react. Is that realistic? I mean, do you think that NATO does have a willingness to react, or lack of willingness to react? And if so, is that because of America's lack of involvement in the world today? No, I mean, the U.S. is a part of the problem, but it's not the entire problem. There is disagreement in Europe as well. And as a sum rule, you could say the further away countries are from Russia, geographically speaking, the less inclined they're probably to defend the Baltic countries.

Because allow me a historical analogy, let's go back to the 60s or the 70s. Let's assume that the Warsaw Pact, I mean, you know, the alliance system of the Soviet Union, would have attacked Germany. I'm pretty sure that the Portuguese would have come to Germany to defend Germany, because at that time we knew that the aim of the Soviet Union was at the end of the day to be in Lisbon. Communization of all of Europe. Yeah. So you defend Germany in order to prevent the Russians from coming to Lisbon.

Right. That's not the point today. Right. Yeah. It's very clear that if Russia would attack a Baltic state, they would stop there. They wouldn't, I mean, their aim is not to go through Europe and to end up in Lisbon. So the question is, why should Porte's? risk the lives of their men and women

for the liberation of a tiny Baltic state. It doesn't make, at first sight, it doesn't make sense. So there is this kind of uncertainty whether even Europe would react united. And then, of course, we have all the indications coming from the US that the US definitely will not take the lead in defending Europe conventionally. This is what the US told us.

I mean, Pete Hex said last year at the NATO meeting, Ed Rich Colby this year at the NATO meeting. No, sorry, we have 2026. No, this year, exactly, 2026. At a NATO meeting that basically the conventional defense of Europe has to be done by the Europeans. The US will support it, and we don't know exactly what it means, support it, but they're not going to take the leave.

Well, now bringing it back to Korea, one topic that's come up time and again, both in Donald Trump's first term and in the second term, is this idea of the United States withdrawing most of its forces from Korea, either back to the United States or to other theaters where they may be needed. Now, if that were to happen, either in a phase withdrawal or all at once, what kind of signal would that send? Well, this would be exactly the signal that Trump administration is sending out right now in Europe.

It's basically that the U.S. is no longer willing to defend actively South Korea in case of an armed attack against the country. Yeah. And then, of course, I mean, you know, in Europe, we have no debate coming from the US about the nuclear umbrella. But the point is, if the U.S. is no longer willing to defend Europe in conventional terms, then it's quite unrealistic to think that they will use strategic nuclear weapons. So, and here we have the same situation.

You know, if there are no U.S. forces on the peninsula, you are attacked, I think you can't rely on the fact that the U.S. still provides the nuclear umbrella for South Korea because then what I called, you know, the extended deterrence problem arises. Why should there risk a destruction of Washington or New York for the liberation of Seoul? And that would be a message sent not just to North Korea, but also to other countries, right? No, I mean, it's a message you're sent to Japan, it's a message you sent to China, is a message you sent to Russia, as well as to North Korea. Right, that basically anything goes now.

Yeah, exactly. So in Europe, Russia is often described as a revisionist power. Yeah. Seeking to alter the post-Cold War order. Would you describe North Korea similarly or is it a different kind of challenge? No, I think North Korea is a different kind of challenge. North Korea is a state as quo power. The revisionist power here in the region is China.

It's not North Korea. I mean, if I look at North Korea and even the recent moves of North Korea, I mean, abandoning the goal of reunification from their constitution. I mean, I've been to the demilitarized zone recently, and I learned that, you know, this direct political and military talks are not taking place any longer right now at the moment. So all indicates that the North Koreans, they basically want to fix and establish their status as a known country.

And correct me if I'm wrong, but I don't see any revisionist policies with regard to the South-North issue. What would that look like? Well, it would look like what the North Koreans did in the past, you know, provoking, poking the South Koreans. I wouldn't rule out, and that's the point,

I wouldn't rule out that at the end of the day, the North Koreans are willing to be used as a proxy in case countries like Russia and China needs them, you know, to deviate attention from other theaters. in the world. You know, if the Russians start something, let's say, against part of Europe, or if the Chinese do want to do something here in Asia, if they ask the North Koreans to do something limited,

in a demilitarized area and so on, because then, of course, I mean, attention will be diverted, directed to the issue between South and North, and China or Russia might get a free hand in what they actually want to do. Well, let's not forget that Kim Jong-un only gave up the dream of peaceful unification. that that doesn't rule out any other things. And one of the striking features of North Korea over the last seven decades

is its willingness to engage in limited provocations without triggering all out war. And often it will provoke, but then it pulls back if it is challenged or threatened. How does this compare with the dynamics in Russia's behavior? I think it's different because the Russians usually do exploit a strategic vacuum and they go all in them.

They see a strategic vacuum. And that's the point. I mean, I'm not saying that the Russians are going to attack, parts of NATO, but if they see the opportunity, they will exploit the opportunity. And I think that's different from North Korea. I mean, honestly, as a foreigner, and you might laugh about it, and people probably don't like to hear that. But quite often, I look at North Korea's provocation, and don't get me wrong,

I don't mean it positively, as a cry, you know, something like, listen, we're still here, don't forget us. Yeah, we are still dangerous, we are still here, don't forget us. And I think that's different from Russia. Are there lessons that North Korea could learn from a Russian victory that might threaten or harm South Korea's interests? Yes, absolutely. I mean, there are a couple of military lessons the North Koreans can learn. And I think this is one of the reasons why North Korea basically sent soldiers to Russia to fight there in Kyrgyz.

But that's mostly learnings on a tactical level, though. Yeah, that's on a tactical level, but don't underestimate it. Don't underestimate it, because what the Russians are doing, and this could be applied to actually North Korea as well. Yes, North Korea is a nuclear power, but take the nuclear issue aside. The North Korean army relies on mass. The South Korean army relies on, let's say, quality systems. But what we see in Ukraine is that mass at a certain moment becomes a quality in itself. Who said?

There was Stalin. There was Stalin who said quantity is the quality of the time. Exactly. And this is what we see. You know, I mean, people look at the Russian way of war and think how stupid they are. You know, they're working with waves. I mean, nowadays they change. But half a year, three quarters of a year ago, they're working with human waves.

They let the people slaughter. But they underestimate the effect of these kind of waves. Because at a certain moment, if you have an enemy or someone on the other side who, in terms of personnel and numbers, is inferior to you. Of course, I mean, at a certain moment, these waves are overwhelming the other side. And that's what North Korea can learn. They can learn, I think, a lot.

And I'm not sure what basically the deal is. I haven't talked, I mean, I haven't talked to anyone who could tell me this. I mean, there must be a deal between the Russians and the North Koreans. So Russia sends soldiers to the south. Russian provides artillery shelves for the Russians, most North Korea. Yes. And I don't know what they get in exchange.

Yeah, we're still waiting for those details to come out, whether it's satellite technology or re-entry vehicles or what. Exactly. When it's, for instance, in the realm of electronic warfare, this might help the North Korean immensely if they think about, you know, attacking the South. Because that's what we see. The Russians are pretty good in electronic warfare.

Always have been. South Korean forces are relying heavily on technology. Find a way to jam certain things, then this plays to the disadvantage of the South Korean forces. I think the South Korean forces are trained with the idea that once a conflict breaks out, you know, South Korea tries to basically strike a decisive victory by being faster, quicker and harder than the North Koreans, striking deep inside North and deep inside North Korea. So if you find a way to disturb this, then of course your whole concept of defense crumbles. Are you concerned that North Korea might follow Russia's playbook in the sense of find a vacuum or a weakness and then go all in rather than probe and then pull back and probe and pull back or provoke and draw down?

I would say this depends on the circumstances. I think that it served quite well for the North Koreans to provoke, to poke and provoke. But let's assume, let's just assume, that there is a development where in a year from now, a US president will tell the South Korean government, listen, we're going to pull out all the 30,000 troops from South Korea because we need them somewhere else. So this might open a window for opportunity. And it's about perception.

So if the North Koreans do perceive that, you know, then the defense of the South is weak and that they might, have a real opportunity to strike, if they strike hard, win very quickly and limit their own casualties, this might tempt them to do certain things they are not ready to do right now. If they get the support and the backing by the Russians and probably by the Chinese, then this increases, of course, the chances that they will do so. So at the end of the day, it's about how they perceive the situation here. Remember, Putin thought that within three weeks he can conquer Ukraine.

It's a matter of perception. Well, in Putin's calculus, was he thinking about ruling all of the Ukrainian people, or was he hoping that many of them would leave somehow? No, he was hoping that many of them would welcome the Russians as a liberator. Okay, well, in the Korean case, we know that the North Koreans thought this in 1950. Yeah. We know that they cannot be thinking this now, and they must be, I mean, there must be a concern in North Korea of if we do win and somehow take over South Korea, what do we do with all the remaining 50 million South Korean people who we have? haven't killed during the war, they clearly are not waiting to become North Koreans. It's a totalitarian society.

South Korea is a loud, vibrant, sometimes chaotic democracy. If I were Kim Jong-un, I wouldn't want South Korea. It would be a poison pill. That's a good point, because this is one of the factors which basically might lead to the perception that it's better not to attack South Korea full-flage because if you win, you have bigger problems than you want. So they might continue with this kind of. of provocations as they did over the past.

70 years? Yeah, 70 years, but then even now with their missiles, basically, you know, on a monthly basis, so to speak, this might be a better strategy for them. Tell us a little bit more about your trip to the demilitarized zone. What did you see there? And did you speak to any military officers there? Did they give you a sense of what's going on? Well, actually, we went there.

We had a trip through the zone, and we speak to, couple of officers. And they were all pointing to the fact that North Korea now is trying to basically, you know, I mean, not withdraw, but what I mean is to consolidate themselves as in terms of, I mean, an original quote, well, we don't want to have anything to do with this kind of unification stuff anymore. Right. Yeah.

So in this day, see in the demilitarized zone. Well, that's right. They've put the guard posts back in. Exactly. They've got to remilitarize. I talk to people and ask whether they are still, you know, these kind of meetings between military people and political forces and they told me no, they haven't taken place. Still, there are these twice a day calls, you know, between the army on both sides, just to check

that everything is okay and everything is calm. But the impression was right now, it's very calm. I asked deliberately if this could also mean, you know, this is the calmness before the storm, but everyone was saying that they have more. occasions for that. Is there something that Europeans should be learning from 70 years of deterrence on the Korean Peninsula? I was asked, in one of the talks I had, I was asked by a Korean student, whether the South

should give up also, you know, this kind of vision of unification. And I strongly said, I mean, coming from Germany, don't do this. Although even if it sounds not realistic today, we Germans saw that basically overnight, things can change dramatically. And I remember that in summer 89, there were some German politicians who said, and I could understand this at that time, we said, listen, let's give up this clause in our constitution, the German constitution, that we aim for reunification because it's never taking place. Two months later, people went out on the street, two and a half months later, the whole regime collapsed.

But at the same time, in the German situation, my limited understanding is that the unification issue was put sufficiently on the back burner that some degree, of state-to-state relations were possible. There were the liaison office of West Germany in East Berlin. And these things became possible because unification was from the backburner. And in South Korea or in the Korean situation, we don't even have that. Yeah, absolutely. But I think you're dealing also with a different regime.

Because the regime in Eastern Germany was eager to be recognized. That's not my feeling with the North Korean regime. So what can you learn from? What can we learn from the Terrans on the Korean Peninsula? I think, I mean, we had similar lessons at the end of the day because we had similar deterrence models. I mean, just with the difference that we had tactical nukes in Europe and the Asians, let's put it this way, don't have tactical U.S. nukes.

So I think these are basically the two models. There is not much, I think, we can take us a lesson from the deterrence game here in Asia and especially. Okay. Has then the war on Ukraine changed or ended the idea that the European and Asian securities theaters can be treated as completely separate military theaters? Well, that's my major point. And this is why, I mean, partly why I'm here. Because I think South Korea, Japan as well, I would say as the Europeans, they look wrongly on Russia and China in military terms. because we are very much focused on regions.

You know, I mean, here also, I mean, if I talk to the South Korea, if I talk to the official, if I talk to ordinary people who have knowledge about security policy, they're very much focused on Asia. And the argument is always, why should we take, I mean, why should we be interested in Russia's aggression against Ukraine? Because it's far away from you. Yeah. So, and if you are in Europe, the Europeans are looking at the eastern flank,

they're looking at the northern flank, looking at the Indo-Pacific, and they're planning for different regions with different needs. If I look at the Russians, if I look at the Chinese, they consider the world as one theater. In their thinking, a conflict, and in the book I try to allude to that, the book is about a conflict which takes place in Estonia. But it starts in sub-Saharan Africa as well as in the South China Sea to distract the Europeans. as well as the Americans, from, always used the term as a German,

help you're going to say strong, from the major direction of what you want to achieve. And I think we should get used to look at, you know, the world and our security, much more through the lens of our enemies, which are looking at the world at Guantzietam. And thereby, I don't like the idea to say, you know, there is in the Pacific, there is Europe,

and they are more or less disconnected. No, I think if Russia wins in Europe, it has consequences for the Indo-Pacific. Because if Russia wins against Ukraine, the impression is that the U.S., before Trump came into office and the Europeans, I mean, their wealthy states' powers, we're not able and willing to provide Ukraine

with all the stuff Ukraine needed to have a realistic chance of beating the Russians on their own. And so on. Why should they do this if China attacks Taiwan? Why should they do this if North Korea attacks South Korea? And I think this is basically, you know, one of the messages which will spread around the globe to say you can do certain things which violate international law.

And the chances that basically the rich Europeans and the rich Americans are putting everything in to restore international law again, you know. are quite slim. This is one of the messages which will be sent across the globe. In your conversations here in Korea with Koreans, have you found

there to be a receptiveness to your message that this is one theater if Russia wins is going to have consequences in Asia too? I get the feeling here that in South Korea, the political leaders are like, well, it sucks to be Ukraine right now, but we have to find a way to continue to work with Russia

in the future. The point is what I found here is with the new government, I always compared this to Turkey 15 years ago because there was a foreign minister who developed the policy of zero problems. And my feeling here is

with the new government, they want to get closer to China, they want to have some kind of relations with North Korea and they want to have normal relations for Russia. And therefore, basically, with regard to Russia, the point is always, you know, know, look, we will suffer economically if we play hardball with the Russians, therefore we don't do it.

But it's a kind of, you know, with all the three main, I would say, potential threats, and the North Korean is an actual threat this country have. They want to normalize relations. So, and therefore, they were not very receptive for saying, listen, if the Russians are winning in Ukraine, your problems here will get worse, probably. Have you heard or seen any hints that the South Korean government, is trying to approach the Russian government about a sea route that would go north of the coast of Russia between the Arctic ice cap into Europe to avoid the Straits of Ormores, for example.

Is that something? I heard that. I heard that. But I'm not quite sure whether to what extent it already is some kind of official policy or not, but I heard this kind of rumors about this, you know, cooperation. Should Europe be concerned about that? Yes, of course, Europe should be concerned about that. Whatever strengthens Russia is of concern for Europe.

Whatever gets Russia out of hardly the isolation, which was a kind of policy after the war started, is a concern for Europe. Do you imagine that after? And let me put this this way. I mean, what I've found a bit striking is that in a couple of talks I had, officials didn't see how basically the war against Ukraine offered for South Korean industry a huge opportunity. I mean, before the war, I mean, we all knew that the South Korean armaments industry is quite good. But it wasn't really a player in Europe, full stop. Now, this is one of the big players in Europe. I mean, look at the polls, look at others, how many, you know, tanks and armored vehicles we are buying from South Korea.

So in a way, they profit from the war, the part of the industry here. And this somehow is neglected, has been neglected in my talks. Looking back, has anything in Russia's war in Ukraine forced you to revise your own previous assumptions about military deterrence or military power? Yes. I mean, actually, I had to revise a couple of my thoughts about strategy on a tactical level. As I said, you know, I didn't expect that mass still matters to that extent like it matters in Ukraine.

This is one of the things. I found it quite surprising how good the Russians. are in taking the right lessons out of their problems on the battlefield and adapting during an ongoing operation. I didn't expect that. So, yeah, a couple of lessons. Have Western governments learned the right lessons from this current war or are they still preparing for the last war rather than the next one?

The point is that there's still, I mean, the situation has changed in Europe because as I said, you know, that the U.S. told us that they're no longer going to be the primary security guarantor of conventional security. Yeah. And whatever we do and how we think about warfighting right now in Europe is very much along the U.S. concept. But if the U.S. is no longer there, we have to revise this concept. Because certain things, which are also part of NATO strategy, like you're going to have,

you know, quick decisive operations, air superiority, deep precision strikes, and you aim for a quick win without the US, that's impossible in Europe. So we have to rethink our European way of war fighting, and we're still at the beginning with that. Let's imagine now that we're 10 years in the future in 2036. What do you find more realistic, a renewed Russian challenge to Europe or a crisis on the Korean Peninsula? Why not both?

As I said, you know, if you look at the world as one theater, I wouldn't rule out that the Russians, if they believe that they should basically do something, rather either in Ukraine or against a NATO country, will ask the North Koreans to basically start a crisis here on the peninsula so that the U.S. is going to be distracted. Yeah, I'm reminded of one of the podcasts that years ago with American historian Catherine Weathersby,

who found evidence that showed, that although the Korean War wasn't started for that reason, the reason it went on so long, the reason it went on for three years rather than ending in one, despite Kimo Song's desire to finish the war early, was Stalin told Kimmer Song, I need you to keep the Americans busy here because I'm doing things in Europe and elsewhere,

and so we see history repeating itself. And that's exactly my point, you know. I mean, sounds ridiculous, but connect the dots. Yeah. Don't look at regions. I mean, like the question, what is more likely, a crisis in Europe or a crisis in Korea? So why not have both? Yeah, my point is why not have both?

Because, you know, that's exactly the point. The Russians might ask the North Korean for some help, not in terms of, you know, sending soldiers to Russia to fight the Baltics, but to create havoc here so that the U.S., probably China, no one knows how this triangle will play out in 10 years from now between Russia and North Korea and China. So, but that, you know, major power, are distracted by the crisis taking place on the Korean Peninsula so that the Russian have some

kind of, you know, more room of maneuver in Europe. In such a scenario, do you find some tactical use of nuclear weapons to be likely? It is likely and it might be successful if you do it right at the beginning. Because that would really be a game changer in terms of warfare and just how we live on this planet. Yeah, but if you look, for instance, if you look at the Russian military doctrine, they lowered the threshold for using tactical weapons. I mean, so to such an extent that in their thinking, and the Americans are going along with that, the use of tactical nuclear weapons becomes a war-fighting tool again.

Yeah. So, and let's imagine you have it. I mean, let's go back to the, go back to the Korean. I was thinking about that when Douglas MacArthur said, if I just lay a strip of radioactive cobalt across the north and part of the Korean peninsula, it'll keep the true. Chinese out. Exactly. And try to think now that you have a kind of military conflict here.

And that the South gets deep into the North, why shouldn't the North not use nuclear weapons in order basically to stop the advance of the South? If that's everything they have left. So the actual use becomes more likely in future warfare. With the lowering of the threshold. Yeah, exactly. Well, if you were to have a quick meeting with President E.J. Myeong

before leaving Korea, if you were or advising any policy makers here and Sol, what is the single most important lesson from the Russia's war on Ukraine that they should never forget? Mass matters. Take care of mass. Increase the size of the South Korean Army? Yes, this is what I mean by mass. I mean, mass and personnel matters. But then we're saying that mass on both sides matters, right? Yes, of course.

If your enemy has mass, you need to have mass to. Yeah, exactly. That's my point. And if you look at the numbers, you know, I mean, the South Korean army, as I said, you know, qualitatively speaking is much better equipped than the North Korean army. But in terms of numbers, they're inferior. So increase the numbers. Exactly.

There's no other way around that, but to increase the numbers. Yeah. Yeah, but we, I mean, we've gone here in South Korea from a mostly conscript army where, you know, when I first came there 30 years ago, people were still in the army for more than two, two plus years. Yeah, I know. And now they're down to about a year and six months. You have to increase it.

That's basically what we are all doing in Europe because we realize mass matters. That's one thing. Second thing is, I always tell highly sophisticated armed forces which are depending on technology. Never forget the old way of war fighting because this might be extremely important.

I give you an example. I mean, the Russians have to, the technology to disturb satellites. So if the North Koreans attack and the Russian want to give them a helping hand, they might basically, you know, kill all the satellites. Your army uses for ISR. ISR being intelligent surveillance and reconnaissance. Okay.

So that means probably, you know, the armed forces here are pretty blind about what the enemy is doing, where his positions are. Where do you get the targeting data? So rely more on aerial reconnaissance and land reconnaissance, old systems. Analog methods never go out of style, is what you're saying, right? That's my point. Your book, essentially, it's a warning. Is there a development that would convince you that Europe at least has learned the right lessons

and that your scenario is becoming less likely? Well, yeah, I mean, the whole point of re-arming Europe and the coalition of European countries, which I believe is very determined to, to deter Russia is something which, I mean, wasn't there when I wrote the book, which has developed right now and is very promising. The biggest danger, however, lies in the end of the war, not at the end of the war in itself is a danger. Don't get me wrong.

But then in Russia, which is clever enough for a year or so to do nothing, not threatening neighbors, you know, not doing any stupid things on the border tornado. This will lead, of course, to a debate in most of the European countries, public debate, whether this whole spending on defense is really necessary, because at the same time we are cutting back on welfare. And whether we shouldn't use the money we spend for defense to fill the gaps for education, health, pension, and so on and so forth. This is the biggest danger which lies ahead of us. And so I hope we have courageous leaders who are talking to the public

and not trying to convince the public that we still need to do both. And in South Korea, would the sign that they've learned the lesson here be that a sudden increase in the size of the South Korean army? Yeah, I would say a sudden increase in the size of the South Korean army. I mean, your defense spending is already increasing. This would be a sign that you take the right lessons

from the situation here. I think, I mean, I'm not a Korean expert, therefore I'm reluctant to give any advice. And I think, you know, trying to have some kind of normalization with the North is, of course, I mean, it's something I can understand. But I would always say do it like the Europeans did in the 60s and the 70s, where they reach out to the Soviet Union and its satellites, but we're quite sure that they had to do it from a position of strength, military strength.

Because if the policy fails, you know, they have. of an option, a plan B. Having a plan B, and that's what the deterrents is about. Having a plan B and showing the will to use it if necessary. Exactly, exactly. All right, well, that's where we'll leave it today. Thank you very much, Professor Carlo Masala for coming on the show,

and we recommend to our listeners your book. If Russia wins a scenario. Thanks for coming on. Thanks a lot. Ladies and gentlemen, that brings us to the end of today's episode of North Korea Unpacked with me, Jacko's Wetslute. Thanks go to Brian Betts and David Choi for facilitating this episode. and to our post-recording producer genius Alana Hill.

Thank you and listen again next time.