North Korea News Podcast by NK News - Destroyer deployment, missile tests, drone warfare and North Korea’s near misses

Episode Date: July 1, 2026

This week’s episode of the NK News Podcast looks at North Korea’s military modernization, from Kim Jong Un’s new 5,000-ton Choe Hyon destroyer to recent tactical missile and artillery tests. Korea Risk Group Correspondent Joon Ha Park discusses what the destroyer adds to Pyongyang’s navy, why its assignment to the West Sea Fleet matters and […]

Looking to go beyond the headlines on North Korea? Join the West Coast Exchange 2026, a Chatham House rules invitation-style gathering for the global North Korea professional community taking place from September 17th to the 19th. Hosted by NK Pro of Korea Risk Group, the event brings together analysts, diplomats, former negotiators, military experts and researchers

for candid discussions, field visits and real exchange, including a visit to Iggy Bong, on the Inter-Korean border. Confirm speakers include the mole who went undercover for a decade in North Korea. A former US ambassador to South Korea, a Blue House official who was in charge of the Inter-Korean Military Pact, journalists who visited North Korea a dozen times, and a former South Korean Special Warfare Commander.

Early-Byr tickets are now open with discount for NK Pro and NK News members. Space is limited to just 80 paying guests, so claim your seat. claim your seat soon. Hello listeners, welcome back to the NK News podcast. Today is June 30th. This week, we're looking at North Korea's military modernization from Kim Jong-un's new 5,000-ton destroyer and recent tactical missile tests to South Korea's push to expand drone and counter-drone capabilities.

Then we're going to take a step back from the present and look at the moments when North Korea's history could have gone very differently. Dr. Fyodor Tertitsky joins the podcast to discuss his new book, Pyongyang on the Brink, and what 16 crises reveal about the survival and fragility of the Kim dynasty. But first, let's dive into the latest on the peninsula. And to help me do that, I'm joined by Korea Risk Group correspondent, Junha Park. Hi, Junha. Hi, Alana.

June, it's your first time joining me. I'm excited to get chatting. We'll start off with some naval modernization. state media says North Korea has commissioned the Cho-Hung after 14 months of sea trials and weapons tests. Tell us what do we know about this ship and what it's designed to do. Yeah, so as we said, it's the first operational 5,000-ton destroyer. It is a significant deployment within North Korea's navy, which has quite frankly lacked the capabilities for a blue-water navy. It still does, quite frankly.

But it has been resonating within Cold War strategy. It has cold war level frigates. It has definitely looked towards asymmetrical warfare instead of coastal warfare against the South Korean and US naval capabilities. What's particularly significant is that North Korea spent 14 months actually conducting sea trials, weapon tests, before formally commissioning that ship. North Korea has not released detailed specifications, whether these ships have nuclear capabilities or whatnot. but what we know so far from footage that's been released from these tests, from cruise missile tests, from these, is that they are both equipped with both offensive and defensive weapon systems. So looking forward, it does look like quite a significant deployment for the North Korean Navy.

And, you've just touched on the state of North Korea's Navy. Kim Jong-un said that Cho-Hun marks the end of more than 70 years of stagnation for his country's navy. What specific capabilities does this destroyer add that North Korea's Navy? Navy previously lacked? So a destroyer of Cheyhan's size and structure, it does give North Korea a much great ability to project that naval power beyond its immediate coastline, so the NLL, to be certain, the Northern Limit Line. So it could escort other vessels. It could provide air defense coverage, launch land attack or anti-ship missiles, complementing North Korea's submarine capabilities, but it does still lack the area for a base. So it does look like still still. It does look like still

a long way to go for North Korea to become a blue water navy like South Korea's. It still is much far off as its air force is comparably to its army branch that is having experience in Ukraine. I do want to ask you a little bit more about those naval bases, but before I do that, the ship was originally expected to join the East Sea Fleet. And this was just something that we discussed on the last episode, not the last episode, but a previous episode with our colleague Collins-Wirko, because we were talking about how exactly this warship was going to get to the east coast. Now, state media now says it's actually going to be assigned to the West Sea fleet. Why is that change so notable?

So as you mentioned, the East Sea doctrine, if it was delivered to the EC command, as we've discussed, it would have to go around South Korea to get to the EC. However, for the West Sea, China and also the access to the West Sea is not so hard for the North Korean Navy to make sure. sure that their voice is heard, or in this case, that Navy is heard. It does look like quite a strategic decision on their part. It does look like they're trying to push forward with the anti-access, anti-area denial tactics that we've seen throughout their history at the NL. And it does look like the NLL is focused, especially the West Sea area, as quite a focus against South Korea, especially we've just seen South Korea observe the 24th anniversary of the second

Battle of Yomping, where six sailors were killed from a North Korean attack. It's been the site of multiple inter-Korean skirmishes, naval skirmishes, where North Korea has been the main perpetrator, to be quite frank. So North Korea does look like they're trying to push forward with this naval comeuppance against the South Korean Navy and also the US Navy and looking forward to becoming this Blue Water Navy as they are trying to be ambitious for. Personally, I was a little bit excited to potentially get to track that warship around the peninsula if it was going to be stationed on the east coast. But unfortunately, looks like that's not going to happen. We'll have a couple of other problems. Well, back to those naval bases that you touch on because, Nora, Kim Jong-un also

said North Korea plans to build larger 10,000 ton strategic vessels. But he did acknowledge that the country still lacks these naval bases ready for them. Do you know, what does that gap tell us about the pace of North Korea's naval modernization. It does look like quite a failure on Kim Jong-un's part to match the timing of the infrastructure with the development of its naval capabilities. We've seen the timing of the infrastructure, especially with, I think it was an analysis,

NKPro analysis from Colin from April, I believe, where he was saying that it's still been 12 years since the naval base at Munchon is still under construction. We've still got naval bases that cannot fully, equip or support these 5,000 ton naval destroyers like the Chehon to be commissioned or operationalized for any sort of blue water operation within the NL, let alone the EC. So I think that Kim Jong-un's leveling of play here where he's pushing forward for these destroyer development, but still lacking in the infrastructure that's available for it, it's still something that the North Korean

Navy and the North Korean military leadership will have to decide which one is more important. Of course, there's also the perspective that they're getting help from Russia. Seeing as the war in Ukraine and their experience and their partnership with Russia in Ukraine, they don't know how long that's going to go for. And it does look like some analysts that we've talked to have suggested the fact that North Korea could be receiving something in return. And especially with this destroyer and the development of the destroyer, it does look like with the help of the Russian Navy and also the Russian Defense Agency for Development It does look like there's something that's behind the scenes where Pyongyang has received information.

So it does look like quite a rapid acceleration of that development on par and at the behest of having these bases readily available for accommodating these vessels. Let's just shift now from the sea to the southern border because this was not the only weapons arrayed story out of North Korea over the past week. Kim Jong-un also oversaw tactical missile and artillery tests on June 25th, the anniversary. of the start of the Korean War. June, as state media says, Kim Jong-un oversaw these tests of tactical nuclear-capable missiles on June 25th, as I said, the anniversary of the start of the Korean War. What exactly did North Korea test? Yeah, so they tested a package of weapons, not just a missile.

So the headline system was the Hwasong 11D system, the ballistic missile, a short-range missile believed to be capable of carrying these tactical nuclear warheads, as an North Korea has projected. In addition, North Korea also tested an upgraded 240 millimeter, I think it was multiple launch rocket systems. They feature a modular 24-tube launcher, extended range of about 90 kilometers, as well as also the 155 millimeter self-propelled howitzer. That South Korea also propels in its own army too. These weapons are capable of firing precision rounds to a range of about 65 kilometers. So it is something that Kim Jong-un has pushed forward as a southern-facing firing range.

These are weapons primarily designed to be neutralizing South Korean targets. Let's talk a little bit more about the South Korean target aspects of this missile test, because KC&A did say the missiles are designed to hit airfields, ports, and power facilities. Why are those targets significant, especially for South Korea? Yeah, so the ones that we've listed, ports, power facilities, facilities, airfields, they all are critical formats of South Korea's military and civilian infrastructure. So what we've seen throughout South Korea's military doctrine and also civilian doctrine and also contingency doctrine is that we have seen this sort of cohesion between

the military and civilian infrastructure. We've seen that throughout the civil military drills that happened throughout the summer, also throughout the springtime, but military airfields are quite essential for U.S. and South Korean interference. fighter aircraft to respond to a contingency. It's part of the kill chain structure and part of the three-axis system. Ports, they receive reinforcements and supplies, possibly from regional partners like Japan, and also including U.S. forces during contingency within the region from Guam and Japan, as I've just mentioned, and also power facilities, they also underpin the civilian infrastructure. So all of the communications, digital communications that South Koreans will rely on

in the event of a conflict to get around and also evacuate civilians in the case of an emergency that will also be depleted. So North Korea is effectively targeting that so that South Korea's emergency doctrine within the start of contingency is somewhat neutralized and very much impacted by North Korea's weapon systems that seek to cause a bit of chaos and havoc within the South Korean community. Now, NK News analysis suggests the missile may have been fired southward towards an island target. Really interestingly, South Korea only publicly confirmed attacking the launch days later. Do you know, what makes that unusual? Yeah, so South Korea's military usually provides an alert to journalists and also the South Korean public that a North Korean missile-looking projectile

has been fired or launched. That's something that's always followed in real time. Of course, we've seen that time when that's been delayed in the past, but not so much as what we saw on the delay of alerts, seeing as North Korean state media only reported on it on the day after on June 26, even then South Korea's military had nothing in their bank. The only thing that they had was what we'll mention later was the upgrading of their drone capabilities. And they remained mum on that until, I believe it was yesterday's regular briefing on Monday, where they were publicly confirming that they did detect the launch, and they were observing it, they were still looking through it,

and their usual talk Yada on how the Ironclad Alliance and the U.S. Rock Alliance is still looking towards that defense posture against North Korea's nuclear missile threat. Of course, for observers, that leaves the question of why wasn't this alerted beforehand. Is this just a change in the way that the military is looking forward? Is there still just an extension of how the Lee administration, or the IJayang administration is trying to be going forward on a level of engagement with the North. It does not look for sure as to whether there's a consecutive answer.

But I think that the South Korean military is not doing itself any favors in delaying the announcement for something that it's been doing quite routinely for quite some time. Just to clarify, and again for a bit of context for our listeners, it's not entirely unusual that we don't hear anything from the JCS until perhaps a day later. but what's particularly unusual in this case is that, as you said, Juna, JCS was mum for basically days. So I think that's, again, the unusual factor in this case. So while North Korea is building up missiles and artillery, South Korea is trying to prepare for a battlefield where drones play a much bigger role. Seoul announced a new plan to expand its drone and counter drone capabilities.

Juna, break it down first. What are the main parts of this plan? So we've got three pillars. So first, it's expanding offensive. drone capabilities. So it's looking to rapidly procure more than 20,000 low-cost expendable drones, including reconnaissance drones, small loitering or suicide drones. It also plans the field its own version of the, or what it's been described as the K-Lukus. They seem to put a K in front of everything these days. But basically what the Lucas is, it's a long-range loitering weapons system. It's a drone that's been used by the U.S. Central Military Command, or Central Command, during the operations against Iran that we saw in late February and early March.

We've seen, the Luke has seen quite some success within the US military. That's why the South Korean military is trying to incorporate that within its own system so it can target bases in Pyongyang, for example. Of course, we also see the second pillar, which is the counter-dron strike capabilities. We've seen South Korean anti-drone defenses being quite subpar compared to what we've seen from US capabilities. It does look like South Korea is trying to ramp that up now. We've seen since December 2020,

when the North Korean drone came into South Korean airspace, flying over the Blue House, taking quite a round over Seoul airspace. It does look like South Korea that was a wake-up call. Of course, it's not the same doctrine that we've seen under the UN administration, but it does look like an upgrade from that, where it's much more meticulous, where it's looking for expanding frontline units to rear areas, critical infrastructure, individual soldiers, where they can have these anti-dron defenses and these doctrines

ingrained in them for warfighting capabilities. And then third, it's reforming how the military actually operates with these drones. We've seen talk since months ahead or months ago that the drone operations command will be reformed. This is stemming from their alleged involvement or now confirmed involvement. in the October 2024 drone incident where a South Korean drone was seen in Pyongyang, basically dropping leaflets, anti-regime leaflets across the Pyongyang floorboard. But we've seen that this was actually a pretext for Yunsa Giel's martial law attempt in December 2024. So it does look like that the South Korean military is trying to disperse that now.

They're trying to change it into what's called a national defense drone headquarters now, which is capable of doctrine, capability development, procurement, and also civil and military cooperation. So it does look like they're trying to take the operations format out of the drone operations command and deliver it to these real base and also frontline units. Unsurprisingly, officials have pointed to lessons from Ukraine and the Middle East, as well as North Korea's own drone development.

Juno, you've touched on this a little bit, but why are drones becoming such a major focus for South Korea now? drones are facing or they are changing the face of modern warfare as we note right now even as we speak operations in ukraine and also russia they are incorporating these ai-based drones or even autonomous or controlled man drones for their operations we saw in operation spider web hundreds of drones being used by the ukrainians to neutralize russian air bases we've seen in the middle east too where drones have been used, as we've just mentioned, the U.S. Central Command, also Israeli drones that were targeting Iranian bases and also Iranian missile sites

and also Iranian leadership bunkers. So we can see that drones are being used as a format and a basis for where warfare is being fought on the level of the speed in which someone can push a button the fastest. So we can see that from Seoul's perspective, drones are no longer a question of can we get it or not. It's a question of, or it's a statement of we need to get it fast. And it does look like a reflection of something that the North Koreans have also been experiencing on the Ukrainian battlefield. And fighting against Ukrainian forces actually single-handedly experiencing first-hand how drones are used in warfare. I can't emphasize enough how that will be a plus for them and their warfighting capabilities.

They are the only fighting force on the peninsula right now, bar-finding. barring the US that have modern warfare experience. And the South Koreans don't have that. No matter how much state-of-the-art weaponry that you have, if you don't have a fighting force and a battle-hardened army, you're going to be at a disadvantage. And that's what South Korea understands. I mean, that's what South Korea is trying to look forward to

in incorporating the 500,000 drone warrior doctrine that they've introduced to and trying to make sure that these soldiers are familiarized from the bottom up and not from the top down. Absolutely. I think certainly when we've been looking at modern warfare in the context of Ukraine and the Middle East, I think it's fair to say that drones are at the forefront, if not a key component. So certainly this plan makes sense as to why it's happening now. It does include plan. This plan includes low-cost drones, suicide drones and systems to defend against drones, including lasers, high-power microwaves and interceptor drones. Junet, is so mainly trying to defend against North Korean drones, or can we also say that it's building more offensive options as well? It's both. South Korea is a pragmatic doctrine. It's something that basically allows for offensive and defensive capabilities against North Korea or any contingency situation. So when you have offensive drones like the K-Lukas, or you have

defensive drones like, for example, a stinger that's a counter drone that's being used in Ukraine, that South Korea could acquire in the future or develop themselves in their own sort of terrain fixed away. This is something that targets any adversary. North Korea, of course, is the prime target and is also the prime enemy for the South Korean military. But in any situation, we could be facing in a contingency Chinese military drones. We could be facing Russian military drones. We could be facing Iranian Shahids for that matter. So we can't always rely on our missile interceptors or drone interceptors, these billion-dollar tools, to face against these $200 drones that are coming in from the north. So I think that these counter-dron operations,

these offensive drone operations, are trying to give a little bit more strategic flexibility for the South Green forces. When they, of course, re-obtain Opcon, as the Lee administration puts it, in the future and leads the defense of the Korean Peninsula for the South Green side. And, you know, you mentioned these 500,000 drone warriors. I want to delve into that a little bit just before we wrap up. South Korea also says it wants to train 500,000 drone warriors and reorganize drone units across the military. What does that tell us about how seriously Seoul is taking drone warfare? I think this whole doctrine of 500,000 drone warriors, it's a bit of a, it's a bit of a corny term, of course. But it's based on the doctrine that it wants South Korea's soldiers, and I want South Korea's officers to be familiarized with drone warfare. We've seen conventional warfare. We know that South Korean forces are already quite well equipped with conventional equipment. But when it comes to drone warfare, there's a bit of a lack of understanding on how to operate it,

on how to train with it. So it does look like South Korea is pushing forward with this. As I mentioned before, North Korea's situation is quite different. And their battlefield experience, the way that experience is, being educated and disseminated between the North Korean Army is something that South Korea is seeing as a cause of situational awareness. So South Korea's forces does put drone warfare on the pedestal of prominence, and it does look like South Korean forces and also South Korean military doctrine, especially with the defense budget increasing. They will still increase that

defense budget for 2027, and it does look like drone warfare will be quite a key component for South Korean forces as they delve into the region of op-com transfer. Listeners can find all their reporting and analysis on these stories over at NK News and NKPro. Juna Park, thanks so much for joining us today and walking us through it all. Thank you. So we've been talking about North Korea's military posture today, the ships, missiles and drones shaping the current security environment. But to understand where the country may be headed, it's also worth asking how many times

it's passed could have gone differently. And to do that, I'm joined today by Dr. Fyodor Tertitsky, whose new book, Pyongyang on the Brink, 16 crises that shaped North Korea looks at 16 moments when North Korea's history could have gone in a very different direction. He researches North Korean political, social and military history and has authored several books in English and Korean, including accidental tyrant, The Life of Kim Il-sung and the North Korean Army, and is also a lecturer at Korea University. Fyodor, great to have you with us today. Good morning. It's wonderful to be here.

So, Fyodor, your book, as the title suggests, is built around 16 moments when North Korea's history could have gone in quite a different direction, to say the least. Why did you want to tell the country's history through counterfactuals through these kind of what-if moments? Well, I guess my number one reason is a bit unusual because I wanted this book to be a popular one and to reach a wider audience. And it has been my observation that alternate history, like sort of like thoughts about what is, are very, very popular in these days across the internet, like there are various alternate history settings which sort of stimulated the fans to think about real history, about the characters, about some niche moments, and about some situations which we now consider to be like obvious, but we totally not obvious for the contemporary people.

It makes total sense here at NK News. We have a what-if series ourselves about these kind of improbable situations, you know, what could happen. Fyodor, out of the 16 crises in your book, is there one that you think perhaps came closest to fundamentally changing North Korea's trajectory? Oh, well, I guess the most of how actually it did came closest, but I'd say the most radical would be number one crisis,

because what I say is that initially due to the Stalin had very little interest in the Korean Peninsula and the very event which resulted in creation of North Korea, the Soviet-Japanese War and in the Asian of North Korea, could have gone completely differently. And just like if you imagine the atomic bomb being created one month early, and perhaps Japan surrenders one month earlier, And that means that the whole existence of North Korea is part of flight away.

And actually, like, if you would believe in this timeline, I think to predict the alternate course of events, the existence of North Korea's current shape and form up to 2026 would have been extremely counterintuitive. And I think like maybe if someone would have wrote that as an alternate history, that also may have been accused of being too right in and making an absolute nightmare. North Korean communism. Yeah, so I guess that's the most radical because the change is so subtle, just like you have a Trinity test one month earlier and the whole existence of the state we all study is erased from history. Let's talk a little bit more about the impact of the Soviet Union on North Korea itself and go back to the beginning to 1945 and the division of the Korean Peninsula.

One of your scenarios looks at what might have happened if the Soviet Union had not occupied the North. How different could North Korea's history have been? Well, North Korea wouldn't probably even exist as a concept. It would probably be a part of the unified Republic of Korea, maybe a bit similar to what we are having here and the south, probably somewhat different because North Korean politicians, like say, Jomansik would be participating in politics of this unar career. And I think it will probably far more consequential point

is that in these timeline, Mao Zedun is quite a long. likely to win the civil war in China, which means no People's Republic of China, no, like, Maoism as we know it, and yeah, so probably very, very different earth indeed. In my other book, which is actually here, North Korea before Kimmel, what I argue is that this week, because Soviet-Japanese War lasted literally one week from 8 to 4th to 15th, in 45, was the most consequential week in the history of East Asia like full stop because it altered a trajectory of all countries here. In divided Korea, it basically created a basis from which a communist China was born.

It's through these Taiwan was born as an accidental but independent state. And I guess because the Soviets conquered the most part of Japan, the Kural Islands and the South Sicardin, it also partially shaped the state of Japan. And for our listeners who are not watching the YouTube video, Shiodo just pointed out that his book is actually in our NK News Library, which wasn't staged for a big fan of your work here at the office. Now, Kim Il-sung's rise, it might look quite inevitable in hindsight, but really was it?

Or was he mainly a product of Soviet backing? Or do you think that he had the qualities that made him especially good at consolidating power? I think both are true, actually, because like initially he was, selected by the Soviets and from what we knew by, from testimonies of people who knew him back in the early 40s, he had not have any like ambitions to lead a state at a time. His dream was to be a division commander in the Soviet army, actually, given how good he was at learning Russian, he probably thought that he would be staying in the USSA perhaps for the rest of his life. But when he was selected to leave the country and actually like this is probably,

probably the first book of Mindwaya speculated about the exact date, 17th of December 45, and the decision, I argue, probably happened. Then he proved himself to be spectacular good and consolidating power because he survived destalinization, unlike certain leaders of Eastern Europe, no one apart from history notes like me. Remember, like Matias Rakhushche in Hungary of Volker-Champenkov in Bulgaria. He created the dynasty which still rules North Korea. He survived the collapse of the Soviet Union and its satellite state,

and that's just when we're talking about consolidating power. Another of his major geopolitical success was manipulating the great powers, primarily the Soviet Union and China during the sinus-soviet split because he managed to position in North Korea just in between the famine, and sort of milked both cows. And that's actually like the current extremist skills, North Korean Diplomatic School was born roughly in the 1960s under him. And that's why North Korea is so, so good at manipulating the great powers with minimal resources.

Well, moving to the Korean War, how close did North Korea come to disappearing as a state, especially before China intervened? Well, actually, that was like before China intervened, was the closest moment when it came to disappear in because China was very reluctant to to be. Well, when we are talking about China, we are actually talking about this old man who made the final decision, Mao Zedom. And twice he said no. He officially, like said no to Joseph Stalin, only after a greater grave pressure from Moscow, he very reluctantly sent troops to help North Korea. A comparison of making in the book is about another civil war, which I think is also semi-forgotten, the Greek civil war, because we've also been civil war in Greece, also.

between, say, capitalist and communist forces. Communists were ultimately completely defeated, and the leader Nika Zahariades was living in exile in the Soviet Union, where he ultimately committed suicide after contracting depression. And perhaps that could have been a story of Kermalsohn if he were to be defeated in the Korean War. Another what if? Another what if, 16 of them. So the war devastated North Korea. But what did it do to Kim Il-sung politically? Did it weaken him or did it ultimately help him tighten his grip on power?

Well, so he was very good at dividing conquer, at manipulating his enemies against him. So the biggest set of crisis came in 1996 after Nikita Khrushchev denounced Joseph Stalin. And after this wave of this talonization, I nearly removed him from power. Well, at least there was a conspiracy and at least a substantial number of people in the Central Committee considered it. But he was way, way more skilled in terms of political manipulation on his opponents. He was ready to make one step back when it was absolutely necessary, ultimately to make three step forward when the crisis would have waned. He was very good at point people against each other because anti- Kim Block was only united by the mutual hatred. of Kim Il-soon. And ultimately, he was very good at manipulating the great powers, because

probably even the bigger crisis was not the challenge from the win, but from the world in September 56 when an angry joint Soviet-Chinese delegation comes to Pyongyang, and he manages to convince that he should stay in power. Now, several of the chapters in your book, Fyodor, look at challenges or coup attempts against Kim Il-sung. Why did those efforts fail? Well, the military coup against Kim Ilson, we are talking about 1992, and I think here, like, the ultimate factor was pure luck. Because what way we were planning to do is a very fascinating story of how a group of officers who were educated in Gorbache of Soviet Union and was constructed this perestroika spirit of liberalism, wanted to just shoot the great leader from a tank. But the tank we were planning to use during the parade in April 92 was simply. not deployed Enver Square and ultimately the conspiracy was discovered. So often Kim Ilson survived

by skill and well Kim Junel and Kim Jong-in too, but sometimes it was up to pure luck. What did Kim Il-sung understand about elite politics that his rivals didn't? Well, that you should not say all the things you are thinking right now. I'd say because lots of people there were quite emotional and the moment we felt like saying something, they said something. Like even during this 56 crisis documents have records about some people who are annoyed with Kimmelsohn directly telling him off. It's the face. And Kimmelsoon understand when he had to shut up and he had to pretend to be sorry when he had to pretend to be lenient. So he knew like some basic things about how to manipulate human beings. I guess he learned them in Manchurian partisan units

in the 30s because one of the most traumatic events of his life was a massive purge of partisans in the 30s and at a time if you didn't know how to lie, how to fake remorse, you would have surely be killed. If we step back and look across all these crises, what mattered most for North Korea's survival? Was it repression or ideology, institutions, foreign support, or as you've touched on in some cases, is just luck. Well, I guess we would be several factors, including all the ones you mentioned, because, yes, like leadership's resilience, yes, foreign support. And I think foreign support partially is based on North Korea's geographical location. It's very conveniently located in between Japan and South

Korea and one end and China and former Soviet Union and Russia and others. So it looks very convenient at least like for between as a buffer state. I think if North Korea would have been in Africa, they would have struggled a lot with simply attracting attention of the great powers. The system of dynastic succession is very important because each subsequent ruler has a massive ideological incentive not to criticize his predecessors. Well, Monarch is one of the most stable forms of authoritarian governance. And, And I guess also the sense of Korea being a divided country. Because of the elite, North Korean elite, they sort of understand, or at least well, they understood until very recently that any kind of political change in North Korea, massive, like regime change level, would probably result in the end of North Korea as an annexation of North Korea by the South, sort of like a German-style reunification, which is very, very political dangerous for them, because it means that we can't just. like the complete of the new regime, but we will all be removed from power. Well, yes, what Eastern German story teaches us, these people can only heal if they feel massive existential fear for way of survival, like the East German-Polode Barot did when we reluctantly approved reform,

and then they do not, and as of now, of course, we do not. They have massive incentive to unite around the leader, because, well, if we won't be together, we will all be killed. That's what we think. Fodor, your book goes all the way up to Kim Jong-un's 2020 Health scare. Why did you include that episode and what did it reveal about succession planning in North Korea today? I guess one of the motives was, of course, because I wanted to see something about the third leader. And I think that's the only episode where he could have come closer to having his room.

And that's actually, by the way, what Hunter Fyfeld argued in her book about Kim Junin, that the biggest threat to his leadership comes from a simple health crisis. So theoretically, yes, if he dies without a successor, that alone will spark a massive crisis around the regime. And let's not forget that Kim Jong-in himself was appointed the successor after a massive health crisis of Kim and Kim Jong-in. After his stroke of 2008, which I also discussed in the book,

And Kim Jongny himself started sort of promoting his daughter, I guess as a potential successor because she is not appointed yet, also after 2020. I mean, it did take him some time, but it seems like these health crises do remind the leadership that we're immortal and that something has to be done in case of the untimely demise. Counterfactual history, it can be a little bit controversial because it can easily become speculation in some cases. How do you keep these what-if scenarios grounded in evidence? Well, most of the scenarios there are not just like about what if speculations. We are sort of like what happened, how it came to the point of divergence, and maybe like there's a few paragraphs of like speculated what is. Yes, we are speculative, yes, as you said.

But the way I try to sort of ground them in reality, since they try to find a comparative case in real history, like say the Greek Civil War to the Korean War. Second, I try not to build the whole timeline, but maybe talk about the immediate consequences of what if. Like if Camelsohn is killed during an assassination attempt of 46, my argument is, well, who would be the next leader? I think it would be Bakunian, the leader of South Korean Communists, most likely.

And second, it would change in the immediate future. And I would say in the immediate future, probably not much, because the regime at a time was very dependent on the Soviets. Sort of what I think would we call hard alternate history. In doing my research, one of the things that I thought was really interesting that it came across was that you've mentioned paradox grand strategy games as an inspiration for your book. Oh, yes, I did. For our listeners, maybe who aren't so familiar with these type of games,

these are games where players can explore basically how history might have unfolded differently if I'm describing that correctly. Fjodor, what did that format help you see about history that traditional scholarship sometimes misses? Well, I think it's a way to, like it's a great education tool. Because like I think that there's alternate history modes like Kaiser Reich, like the New Order and many, many others. They provoke especially the younger generations to think about history itself. because I think many, many people would say the Russian civil war or like the United States during the Great Depression simply by playing a paradox which came specifically like Kaiser Reich. It's a moat about the imaginary victory of Germany in World War I.

And after you encounter some fine character like, say, Hugh Lone there, you would be incentivized to look up who Hugh Lone really was in actual history. So, yeah, I just think it's very thought-provoking, and I think what we can use it as an education topic, basically history is fun. And that's, I think, one of the messages of this. Do you think Pyongyang on the brink could be turned into a paradox game? Could that be next? Yeah, I think, well, not all of third, but maybe the 56 crisis, both of them, because you can, yeah, theoretically, you would be making a motorbought world in 1956. Yeah, I think, like, two stories, you could easily. serve as a basis. Well, Fyodor, after studying all these near misses, do you think North Korea's future is more open-ended than maybe a lot of people assume? Short answer, yes.

Long answer, I would say, like the probability of media change now, I think, is lower than most time of history, because now North Korea seems to be quite stable, as it was, say, in the 70s and the 80s in the time, like there is quite a big gap in the book, where no crisis are shown, maybe because we don't know where it happened, or maybe because we don't know a crisis. But ultimately, well, my favorite example here comes from Star Trek,

because it was a Star Trek episode made in 1987, which predicted the existence of the Soviet Union in the 23rd century, and the USSR was dissolved in just four years later. So, yes, theoretically, something could happen. Like, the most logical scenario you could think is a 2020-style health crisis, of Kim Jinan taking his life because that would destabilize the regime. I think it's quite unlikely that we would immediately annoyed his minor daughter as a successor, which means probably power struggle and lots of potential outcomes, lots of these funny scenarios.

But one thing which I would like to say, even if North Korean regime would collapse, it wouldn't mean the end of history like Hugslav and Paradise. And here I would like to explain actually these books dedication, because it might be quite unusual. So I dedicated it to Eliza Dushko, home. Well, listeners probably know, as I initially knew, as an actress, but now after her retirement, she is a mental health practitioner. And as the dedication has done out of my great admiration and respect to her,

but mostly actually because of what she is doing now, because of this work, the work of healing, the work to help people deal with her piteous, they would be of paramount importance when it comes. to North Korea after Kims, because like probably the entire population, maybe, or, well, at least the majority would be enormously traumatized, and people wouldn't lack just skills to live in modern society. People would also lack sufficiently healthy mental states. Once again, even if something is to happen, it will be probably only the start of the

great and a very, very painful process. often with the legacy of the Kims. Speaking of the legacy of the Kins, after all these crises and moments when history might have gone another way, is North Korea ultimately doomed to remain under the Kim dynasty or does perhaps history suggest otherwise? Is there another option?

Well, of course, there are another options. Like state, no country, nothing lasts forever. No regime, no dynasty lasts forever. So one day, yes, one day it will end. The problem is when, because like North Korea ending in 2026 and maybe in the 23rd century, to refer to that Star Trek episode, it would be very, very different to, in terms of consequences. One thing which I would like to say, because some collapse can be truly because it's catastrophic if it would be, if North Korea would be to end in a war, because it as always could have been

catastrophic by definition because North Korea can simply destroy Seoul by conventional weapons. But now we also have missiles and use, as everyone knows. So like if it would be a second Korean war, we could see in a North Korean regime actually using these weapons and the scale of destruction would be absolutely catastrophic. And especially while so matters, because, well, if North Korea is to change, to fall, to reform, South Korea, would be the country which would be expected to contribute to the reconstruction the most. And if South Korea itself is devastated by war, whereas it will hurt not only South Korean people, but North Koreans by proxy.

Fyodor, before we wrap up, I have one final question that I want to ask you. Since you finished writing your book, your latest book, Pyongyang on the Brink, has there been anything that's happened on the peninsula that's given you pause for thought, perhaps, of what could be a 17th what-if scenario that you would add to your book now? Not yet, I would say, because as I said, now North Korea looks like quite a stable country, like it was in the 70s and in the 80s. So from the point of view of today, from the 30th of June, 26, the immediate collapse and the collapse in the near future looks quite unlikely.

But once again, let's remember the lessons of history, about things which feel unlikely to us now, things which even seem impossible to us now can become possible one day. That's a great note to end on, Dr. Fyodor Tertiski. Thank you so much for joining me today. And listeners, I will have Dr. Tartiski's latest bionk on the brink linked in our show notes. Thanks so much, Fyodor. Thank you, Helena.

And that brings us to the end of today's episode. Our thanks to Brian Betts and David Choi for helping make this podcast happen. For more reporting, analysis and expert insight on North Korea, visit NK News for the latest stories and NKPro for deeper analysis, data and research tools. You can also watch this episode on YouTube and be sure to follow us on social media with the latest updates, clips and behind the scenes content. I'm Alana Hill, thank you for listening, and we'll be back next time with more on the stories shaping North Korea.