North Korea News Podcast by NK News - John Everard: Deciphering rumors about return of more diplomats to North Korea

Episode Date: September 19, 2024

With Swedish diplomats returning to work at the country’s embassy in North Korea this week, former British ambassador to the DPRK John Everard joins the podcast to discuss the process for others to make their return and rumors of North Korean diplomats being allowed to rotate into Western countries.  He also talks about North Korea’s […]

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of NK News. And I'm joined in the studio by Ambassador John Everard who was formerly the United Kingdom's ambassador to Belarus, the United Kingdom's ambassador to Uruguay and to North Korea from 2006 to 2008. Welcome back on the show Ambassador Everard. Thank you. You were last on the show in late 2019 for our listeners reference you can go back to episode 107 so it's nice to have you back on again, almost five years after the first time.

Yes, also much older in the meantime. Well, and hopefully we're all a bit wiser. I hope. So you're retired, but you're still active. You have a lot of contacts in the North Korea space. Great Britain is one of many countries waiting to reopen its embassy in Pyongyang. That was of course closed down at the start of COVID.

Why do you think this process is taking so long? It's difficult to be sure, but my own hunch is that up until February, March, the process was being controlled by the North Korean foreign ministry, who actually wanted the embassies to reopen, partly because it's good for them to have diplomats in Pyongyang, partly too because the Europeans had made clear that North Korean diplomats overseas were not going to get rotated until the Western diplomats came back to Pyongyang. So they had a staff motivation to move the process forward. Wait, so it's a little bit of a tit-for-tat thing?

Yes, that's right. Reciprocity. Was this made known in a formal way or kind of informally, do you think? I'm not sure. I wasn't part of that process, but I'm told that it was made known in a formal way or kind of informally do you think? I'm not sure. I wasn't part of that process but I told that it was made known. And that would be standard diplomatic process. That is what you'd expect countries to do in that situation. Would that be true for both the UK as well as Europe? The Western embassies or lack of them you like, but they're foreign ministers, work together in a consultative group in Pyongyang. So everybody compares notes and everybody tries as far as possible to maintain a common line.

And they seem to have succeeded to a large extent. But to come back to the question you asked, Draco, I think the foreign ministry controlled the process up until probably February or March, at which point things changed. Now, my hunch is only a hunch, is that what happened was that the process was hijacked by one or more of

the security agencies who have no interest whatever in foreign diplomats coming back to Pyongyang and who simply block the process. It's possible too that more recently the DPRK's new warm relationship with Russia has played a role. I hear rumors, the Arda's rumors, that the Russians have been dripping poison into the ears of the DPRK authorities trying to stop Western I simply note the rumors. Do you hear any rumors that there may be movement on either North Korean diplomats being allowed to rotate into Western countries or vice versa? Rumors, rumors and more rumors, yes. But we've been knee-deep in rumors ever since the Western embassies withdrew their staff in the COVID pandemic.

How much substance there is to any of these is very, very doubtful. You hear rumors that some embassies might reopen fairly soon, but we've heard those before. I believe on the other side that the Romanians have accepted a North Korean ambassador but are refusing to allow him to present credentials, which leaves the poor ambassador in something of a kind of protocol limbo. You can't actually have official calls until you recognize the ambassador. But that is about the only solid evidence of movement that I've seen.

Now meanwhile we've had Russian tourists going to North Korea multiple times and even a Russian kid summer camp that was sent to Songdo-won. Apparently the security officials aren't too worried about that? No, the Russians or the Chinese. The Chinese Embassy now appears to be able to rotate staff normally. I have less evidence, but I believe the same applies to other quote friendly unquote countries. The Cubans can move stuff in and out.

The Nicaraguan ambassador appeared to be able to present credentials normally. We don't know about, for example, the Iranians, though I suspect that they too are able to carry out normal diplomatic functions. No, the security people are clearly much more worried about some embassies than others. Now what are you hearing about foreign students going into North Korea to study in Pyongyang? There appear to be a small

number of students who might be able to take up studies in Pyongyang perhaps next academic year. And so far- The North Korean academic year, does that begin in the spring? No, that begins in the autumn, I believe, yes. So that if you are processing your applications now, then you might well get in before the end of this year.

Now, there's many a slip, as they say, but so far, that process appears to be advancing normally and I think we're all keeping our fingers crossed that these young people are actually able to go to Pyongyang to study. So these are students from just friendly countries or from a slew of countries? No, a couple of people from Western countries also. The ban is not complete. The ban appears to be on Western tick and match specifically, not on Western as a whole.

So for example, back in April, there was an environmental conference in Pyongyang where there were Western environmental experts and the North Koreans didn't seem to have a problem with that. Right, and of course there was also various career friendship associations of also Western countries that went there earlier this year. Indeed. Including one from Great Britain.

Including one from Great Britain. Dermot Hudson, the leader of that delegation, posted a number of photographs proudly showing himself in the very place in Pyongyang. He did, he did. He also gave some media interviews. He will not talk to us at NK News, however. I can't think why. Now what about North Korean students studying outside?

Have you heard about that happening now as well? No, I like to think that that would move in parallel with going to Pyongyang, but I haven't actually seen evidence of that occurring. Generally speaking, do you think that this kind of student movement, both in and out of North Korea, is a good thing? Yes, I do. I think any expansion of contacts between North Koreans and the outside world in any form helps North Koreans, enlightens them, empowers them to an extent.

So I'm all for it. Do you think it's an unalloyed good? No good is unalloyed, is it? Is that true? Well, that's a philosophical question. Yes, we're disproving the theology there. But I mean, there are downsides. You might find that North Koreans simply learn skills overseas

that they can apply to nefarious ends. But on balance, no, I think it's good. Now, after some time of non-isolation with the world except for Russia and China and some friendly countries, as you've mentioned, North Korea seems to be sending Foreign Minister Choe Son-hee and a high-level delegation to the United Nations General Assembly later this month. Is that an encouraging sign? Yes, it is.

Once again, on the same principle that any engagement by the North Koreans with the North Koreans is in general a good thing. I suspect that they are going because Chae Sont-hee wants to make a thunderous speech. Of course it's the one occasion where any foreign minister's got the world for an audience and the North Koreans didn't want to pass this up. Is she known for giving thunderous speeches? She's not forgiven for thunderous everything. She's definitely a thunderous woman.

Well I've heard that, have you ever had a sit-down negotiation or chat with her? No, when I was there she just didn't hold that position. Right. But I know people who have and they're unanimous that you know that Jason He is spiky, very articulate and quite acid. I've heard that she came to that in conversation, I don't know if she's done speeches before, that would be perhaps a new thing. She has done speeches. She's done way back. Her remarks were recorded in a large party meeting. I'd have to go and check my files to remember what it was.

But she does make speeches. And I suspect, as I say, that the one to the Ion General Assembly will be quite thunderous. Hopefully it won't be like those Wamai Gaddafi when he gave his speech to the General Assembly and it went on so long that his interpretive fainted at the end of it? Yes, that's right.

Fidel Castro did the same, I recall, four hours, which actually, for Fidel's terms, it wasn't that long, but that wasn't the way the UN General Assembly thought. When that happens, it's counterproductive because you've got these delegates who are sitting there in front of you in the Assembly Hall, and they'll listen politely for the first, what, half hour, hour, maybe. After that that people simply get up and go out. And it's not unknown

for the UN to turn the sound system off as a gentle hint. Gee. Now you were quoted by NK News as saying this week, I doubt that this is about reaching out to the US, though it is possible that she'd accept a US invitation to talk. Can you expand on that a little? Yes, as I say, I think her main objective in going to New York is to communicate the DPIK view of the world through a speech. We see nothing to suggest that the DPIK has invited the United States to talks in the margin, though we probably

wouldn't hear that anyway. I doubt if the DPIK is going to want to talk to the United States until they know the results of the election. So the timing is all wrong. Were this to take place after November the 5th, they might be more open, but we'll never know. Do you imagine there would be some preconditions on talks, even informal talks, on sideline talks on either side? Not on the US side. I mean the DPRK hasn't imposed conditions on previous occasions so probably not on their side either. No, it should be a clear run.

Now how can we coax North Korea to engage more with the world? Now that is a tough question. Of course in their terms they are engaging, it's just that it's their world rather than ours. I mean the DPRK and Russia engaging on all fronts. We've seen a number of delegations going in and out. I was told just the other day that the Russian ambassador to Pyongyang is constantly whizzing between Pyongyang and Moscow. People want to talk to him, set out more stuff,

different areas of cooperation. And recently, we've even seen DPRK close for sale in a special sale in Russia, in gross contravention of sanctions, of course. So there's clearly quite a lot going on. And the DPRK maintains relations of a sort with China. They're rather chilled at the moment. I don't think the Chinese are that thrilled

by what is going on between the DPRK and Russia. And that appears to satisfy their social needs for the time being. I mean, remember that for a very long time, those are the only real relationships that the DPRK had. They're used to this, and they don't feel particularly lonely. To engage more widely with the Western world, I think if you put that question to the DPRK leadership they'd say well why should we? No, what's in it for us? You know look at the way that our attempt to build a relationship with the United States

collapsed embarrassingly, humiliatingly at Hanoi. You think we're going through that again? They have a point. Now how can retired diplomats and government officials from various countries, people like yourself, help when North Korea doesn't seem interested in track 1.5 or track 2 dialogues right now? We are as constrained as everybody else. He's not just a retired diplomat. I think if North Koreans are not going to talk, there's not a great deal you can do about it. And the North Koreans right now are not talking. Without giving any names or giving too many details away,

when was the last time you spoke with a North Korean person who was not a defector or refugee? Not a defector, okay. Shortly, no, actually during the pandemic, so a couple of years ago. Oh wow, okay. So my contacts have also gone into the hibernation since then. So I don't claim most immediate contacts.

Now you recently went to Ulaanbaatar, Mongolia, where at least before pandemic, it was often a place where North Koreans and South Koreans would come together in a multilateral situation and rub shoulders with each other. Did you not see any North Koreans there in Mongolia at this time? No, this wasn't the Ulembatao dialogue. This was a separate process where there were various Russians and a smattering of Chinese, but no North Koreans. So no, I didn't. Was it a topic of conversation?

Of course, yes. I mean, we talked about North Korea all the time. The Mongolians weren't sure whether or not the North Koreans would be coming. The main dialogue is next month. And you only find out whether North Koreans will attend at the very last minute. They still didn't know. Let's keep our fingers crossed. Now this week at the Global Korea Forum, you suggested that China and Russia might oppose Korean unification. Why so? Simply because there's nothing in it for

them for different reasons. I mean, if Korea were to unify, then both countries lose their extensive influence over the DPRK. The influence over United Korea would be much reduced. In Russian terms also, you lose an important supply of munitions, which is vital to their war effort in Ukraine. It's very difficult to believe that a unified Korea would play ball that way, the way that the DPRK has. China tends to regard North Korea as not quite a buffer state, but as part of its sort of informal empire. And it would lose that if Korea unified. So I think it's possible to envisage a different arrangement on the North, on the Korean Peninsula, which China could live with. But it would take some negotiation with Beijing and Beijing would

be unlikely to be entirely enthusiastic. Now we know that North Korea's leadership seems to have given up on unification, at least for now, at least they say so. But how do you think that North Korean citizens themselves feel about unification with South Korea? The ones that I talked to were all strongly in favor for all the wrong reasons I mean they the wrong reasons the wrong reasons they they they were all busily consuming illegal South Korean soap operas and somehow formed the idea that these were documentary rather than drama so that everybody in South Korea lived in these rather smart apartments, drove fast cars, and spent their time eating in the very best restaurants.

Hey, if only. And they wanted a piece of that action. What the senior leadership think about this, of course, we will never know for certain, but they are much less likely to be enthusiastic. Why would you want to surrender all your privilege, all your power to join with a country in which you are only ever going to be a backwater? As, after all, East Germany is still now so many decades after unification with the West.

So you're saying that the North Korean people have an unrealistic expectation of what their lives in a united Korea might look like. Yes, and that's going to be a very big problem if and when the two Koreas ever do unite. You're going to be facing massive big problem if and when the two Koreas ever do unite. You're going to be facing massive unfulfillable expectations. Well, okay, that is a grim picture. What do you make of the recent announcements by DPRK embassies to cancel planned events for September 9th, National Foundation Day? I suspect that this is simply because the DPRK is short of money. It does need to do flood relief. It's refused international aid and telling embassies to council parties and to submit the funds that they would otherwise

have spent on those parties is a relatively pain-free way of doing this. It'll be interesting to see whether the celebrations in Pyongyang are likewise turned down or possibly even cancelled. We'll learn in a few days. Ed, look, I talked with Chand earlier this week for one of the short episodes and it looks like they've got something planned because they've built the dais or the rostrum there next to the Mansoor de Assembly Hall in Pyongyang and they've been doing some exercises, you know, sort of practicing elsewhere. So it looks like something is planned.

Yes, I suspect that, I don't think you can get through the day without speeches. North Korea just can't survive without speeches, can it? And we may well get a flag show. And a flag show, and possibly a parade. But whether it goes beyond that or anything more expensive, we'll see. We will, yeah. Now, the last time I saw you in person,

that was here in Seoul in May at the Asan Plenum, where you talked about what you believe is a dangerous situation on the Korean Peninsula right now. Do you feel that South Korea might be in danger of an attack from North Korea? whether that be a big one or a small one? Yes, I think that danger is very real. I really don't know what the probabilities are and I think that other academics who have said that North Korea has made the decision for war may have overstated their case, but I do think

that Pyongyang is scoping options right now. And you can see in the mess that North Korea is in that chillingly, an attempt to grab the South might not be their worst option, things might get desperate. Whether that happens depends on a whole bunch of unknowns. The United States, South Korea, Japan too, have spent considerable resources and time signaling strongly to North Korea that if it so much as thinks of doing that, it's going United States, South Korea, Japan too, have spent considerable resources and time signaling strongly to North Korea that if it's so much as things are doing that, it's going to get

very heavily hit. Do the North Koreans believe this? Do they believe that the United States has got the stomach for an attack and possibly prolonged war? Would they calculate that they could survive that and in any case take over the South regardless? These things we just don't know. One of the things about this situation that does worry me is a propensity amongst the analysts to talk as if North Korean decision-making was cool-headed and rational. Anybody who's read Tae Yong-ho, Councillor

Tae Yong-ho's book about what goes on inside the North Korean government will know that that is simply not the case. That North Korea quite often makes decisions on the fly for the wrong reasons on based on misinformation. And in the kind of situation that we are talking about, a mistake could of course be fatal. Okay, but at the same time, it's important to point out that the other side of the spectrum is that North Korea is irrational and makes decisions based on having a leader who's not mentally well. Now that's also missing the mark too, isn't it?

Yes, I'm not suggesting that Kim Jong-un is mentally unwell. I don't think there's any evidence for that. But that he's vindictive, that is well documented. And he clearly blames South Korea for attempting to penetrate his society and diminish loyalty to him. So South Korea, well he said, is number one enemy right now. Would that vindictiveness inform his decision-making? I think it's quite possible.

Well what do you make of his announcement at the end of last year at the party plenum about about Korea's unification? Do you take it at face value? Yes, I think that I've seen a lot of comments suggesting that this is just yet another ploy by the North Koreans to put pressure on South Korea and that eventually they will backtrack from that and go back to dialogue. I'd love to be able to believe that,

but no, this has to bring a truth to me. I think they made a strategic decision that they're going to finally abandon peaceful reunification. Remember that the, according again to Taehyung Ho, the North Korean attempts to reach some kind of deal with the South over a peaceful unification were genuine up until roughly the mid 1980s,

at which point apparently Kim Jong-il decided this was simply not going to work, that the deal on offer from the south, which this North has since tagged unification by absorption, just was not acceptable. And then followed from that the decision to build up the North's armory to put pressure on the south. And I think that what we saw there was the latest manifestation of that long-term policy. Do you really think that it was a strategic decision to renounce unification? It felt to me like the fallout that came afterwards showed that it might have been made quite quickly or announced quite perhaps prematurely.

No, I don't think that's the case at all. I think that was very carefully thought through and I think that the build-up to the decision was suggested that this was carefully considered and yes, strategic. Well, what I've heard from, for example, the Japanese pro North Korean, sorry, the community in Japan of pro North Korean ethnic Koreans was that they were in total chaos because they didn't get any kind of a, you know, for months they didn't get like a new order of business like how to react, how to talk about unification, how to not talk about unification, whether to avoid South Koreans or not. Similarly, we had all the North Korean websites that suddenly went dark in January and February of this year.

It felt to me like it, you know, that Kim Jong-un made the announcement and that the fallout is taking some time to work its way. Yeah, the fallout is taking some time to work its way, that's certainly true. But I think it's important not to confuse two things. That the fact that the Jong-un, that the pro-North Koreans in Japan were caught on the hop and I suspect... Four months. Yeah, four months. And that the, I suspect the North Korean embassy is worldwide the same. Does not mean that careful thought didn't go into this decision. It's the kind of consultation,

teleconsultation that would be kept under very close wraps right at the top of the leadership. So it's not at all surprising that other people didn't know it. The fact that there were no plans for what you actually do operationally having made the decision is entirely North Korean. I mean North Korea doesn't have a great track record on focusing on detail when it makes decision decisions. Do you expect there to be a lot of second and third order changes in things like for example, you know, North Korea's got the document, the 10 great principles of establishing a monolithic leadership ideology. There in the preamble it mentions the Jogoktong, the unification of the fatherland a few times.

Now, if that's no longer on the cards, then you'd probably want to remove that. No you don't. There are different kinds of reunification. And I want, we were talking just now about a possible attack on South Korea. One of my anxieties is that Kim Jong Un may feel impelled, as he would put it, to complete the revolution, to unify the fatherland, never mind peaceful. So this rejection of unification may in the long run make it... It's not rejection of unification, it's rejection of peaceful unification.

This rejection of peaceful unification, thank you, that's an important point, may in the long run make it more likely that Kim would decide to take some kinetic military action against South Korea? It opens the door bureaucratically. A bit of background here, it's important to understand that North Korea is not a kind of Gaddafi-style dictatorship. It's not that Kim Jong-un can simply issue diktats and things happen. It's a heavily rules-based society and to enable any kind of action you have to clear the way legally. It's incredibly bureaucratic. And so North Korea, before it takes any kind of action, has to clear its own

rule book. And declaring South Korea to be a separate and hostile state would be a necessary precondition for a determined attack on the South. Now, that's not a sufficient condition. Other things have to happen first, and as I've said, I'm not saying that they have actually taken the decision for war. But in terms of developing options, clearing obstacles, that would make sense. Isn't it also possible that it could go the other way and we could see in five years some sort of peaceful mutual recognition of the two Koreas as two states?

Yes, it would be, I'd love to be able to believe that. And there was quite a lot of discussion of that in the Global Korea Forum just over the last couple of days. I think from the southern side, you might be able to move towards that position. The trouble is that the North having declared the South not just a separate state but hostile and continuing to build up its armory and continuing to make all these fiery statements about liberation, it would be very difficult to achieve peaceful coexistence with the North. And for the North to abandon that rhetoric would be quite a strategic shift.

So I'm not optimistic, to be honest. Now, as a former ambassador in North Korea and a long-time observer of North Korea, you've seen cycles of tension and release over the decades. Does this time that we're in now feel different to you in some way, either quantitatively or qualitatively? Yes, it does. I think in the analytic community, I think there's probably too great a willingness

to see what's going on now as just part of a repeating cycle, and which is comforting, because we know that at the end of the cycle, everybody hugs and makes up, more or less. I would love to believe that is the case, but I think the, I've just said that the decision to describe the South as a separate and hostile state is probably a significant, a strategic decision. This isn't

part of a cycle. This is a long-term shift. Moreover, North Korea's deteriorating internal position and its current dependence on Russian aid, which is time-limited when the war in Ukraine ends. I doubt that Russia will continue this, these supplies, would leave Kim Jong-un hanging and in really quite a difficult position. What he might do with that situation isn't clear, but it could be quite dangerous. You've just brought up Ukraine. How has the war in Ukraine changed or affected the situation on the Korean Peninsula or perhaps influenced the calculus of North Korea's leadership? I think the big change has been the new war relationship with Russia, brought about by

a Russian need for North Korean munitions. And we've seen lots and lots of delegations going to and fro. We're talking about that just a moment ago. But what started will stop. I don't know any more than anybody else about how long war will last, but it's unlikely to drag on indefinitely. And when it stops and Russia no longer needs North Korean missions, I suspect that Russia will simply

jolt North Korea. There's certainly something to be said for a sort of situationalist understanding of what's happening. But North Korea and Russia also did sign, what, was it a treaty, an agreement? I mean, something. I mean, that kind of institutionalizes or documents that it makes it sound like something a bit more long term,

doesn't it? It does. But I don't think you need to get too excited about that. Long-term friendship strategic cooperation yes talking yes all these things actual exchange of money and goods or technology into the future I'm not so sure. I mean as a worked example way back was it 2019 or 2018 I forget was the official year of Russia-North Korea friendship where the two signed all kinds of agreements and you know, one thing could

happen. In fact, nothing transpired and I think we go back to that. In May, we at NK News published an op-ed by you called The Panel of Experts on North Korea's Dead, Long Live the Panel of Experts. What do you think about the panel in hindsight? Was it a flawed but necessary vehicle? Yes, it was. I think the panel did very useful work in terms of analyzing how North Korea was attempting to avoid sanctions. I continue to think that the focus of the panel was wrong, that producing all these

reports while of great interest to the analytic community, was perhaps not the best way of going about things, that instead of putting all their energy into producing reports, working behind the scenes with countries to stop them cooperating with North Korea, warning them of the dangers, perhaps submitting cases to international judicial agencies, might have been a more effective use of panel resources.

But it was an important body and its loss is keenly felt. I could only sort of channel my imaginary member of the panel. They might argue that the reports had to be written in order to persuade countries behind the scenes to take action. How do you, you know, work behind the scenes to get consensus to take action without showing them the evidence first? You can show countries the evidence in private and threaten them with legal action. Naming and shaming is quite effective but it's not the most effective way of getting countries to fall in line.

Have there been any significant updates in the situation in the three and a half months since you wrote your piece? No, sadly no. When the panel was dissolved there were all kinds of initiatives for a replacement body. Some of them, some quite creative ideas. Chad and I talked about seven, nine of them replacement body. Some of them quite creative ideas. Chet and I talked about seven, nine, quite a lot of them. Yes, indeed. Sadly, nothing's happened. So yeah, the subtitle of your op-ed at the time read, the end of UN group monitoring

DPIK sanctions is a major loss, but it's possible to limit damage and explore new approaches. Tell us more. Yes, I mean, there are other examples. You could set up a body under the General Assembly which, paradoxically, would have greater freedoms than the bodies set up by the Security Council for complicated UN reasons. I want more listeners with you right now, but that would have worked. You can also set up a purely independent body funded by whoever to at least monitor the sanctions. There were different approaches, but as I say, nothing has actually happened.

Do you have any thoughts on the indictment made against Sumi Terry, who was also at the Assam Plenum where we met in May, and who has been accused by the FBI of acting as a foreign agent for the South Korean National Intelligence Service without registering herself as a foreign agent? No, I wish I could offer a comment on that. I know no more than you and other agents have published. It all is really quite messy. I'm sorry for the woman.

And what about on Craig, the Canadian now under investigation and detention in Switzerland for allegedly passing on secrets to the Chinese military intelligence services? That is a court of intriguing case. I mean, we don't know what it is exactly he passed on. And none of the court documents have yet been made public. If eventually, no, if this does become a full court case,

then the Swiss will practice open justice and will know more. yet be made public. If eventually, you know, if this does become a full court case, then the Swiss will practice open justice and will know more. But right now, I was intrigued and bewildered as everybody else. We are on the 5th of September now, and I think he was arrested in the middle of March. So he would be coming up to the end of his, or the Swiss authorities, I should say, are coming up to the end of their second period of three months, what, pre-trial detention or investigative detention, and then probably in the middle of this month,

maybe next week, we'll find out whether they're going to keep him another three months or actually lay some charges or let him go without any charges. That's right. And I don't know Swiss law, but getting a second extension of three months might be more difficult. You certainly need a third, yes. Yes, no. You get the first three months, the second extension.

That's right, but third period of three months. How are we going to get past it? They might well not get it, so I think the pressure is on them. And if they do actually lay charges, then we finally get to see what the charges are. Right. It is unusual for the Swiss to do this. So, this so well a it's unusual for them to accuse people of spying but be also to be so non-transparent. Well no that's actually not the case. In the banking sector there's been some famous cases on transparency there but just in in this case it seems a bit unusual. It's unusual because it is a spying case so there's not a lot of precedent.

Why the Swiss have taken action in this case particularly we don't know again if It's unusual because it is a spying case, so there's not a lot of precedent. Why the Swiss have taken action in this case particularly, we don't know. Again, if charges are laid we might find out. Non-transparent, I mean the Swiss prosecuting authorities are not obliged to release any documents until they actually charge, so they're paying things exactly by the book. Okay, all right. I just feel like in other countries when they pick somebody up for alleged spying that there's usually a release of some sort.

No. I mean I can think a lot of counter examples. Now this week you're in Seoul for the Global Korea Forum, organized by the Ministry of Unification, if I'm not mistaken. Now that attracted some negative attention in mainstream and social media for the fact that its line-up was almost exclusively male and older people. The current UK ambassador to Seoul withdrew from this, from his speaking slot. What did you make of that? It's one of those arguments to which there's no good answer. The women who put this program together were clearly trying to get a good lineup of speakers and I think originally they only had one woman on the lineup.

Was it put together by women? Yes. The organizing committee or whatever the group was, the task force team? Women. All women. Yeah. Boy. Right. And I've no idea whether they contacted other women originally who were unable to attend or how they ended up where they were. But there was a great deal of pressure on them at the end from senior men in the misdemeanification to get more women on board. With the result, there was a mad scramble.

And the last 48, 72 hours before the forum started, they were contacting all kinds of women to bring them in. Now this brings its own problems because of course if you bring anybody, it might not be a woman, a 72 hours notice, you don't really have time to prepare the thoughtful interventions that you like to hope for in the Global Career Forum. A lot of them involved actually quitting themselves

very well indeed, considering the time constraints, but a few of them you could see they hadn't had time to prepare properly, and that showed rather than presentations. When speakers drop out of an event after having said yes initially, does that add a sort of pressure to maybe in the long term to change the planning, or do these things get quickly forgotten and you're back to the same old thing the next time? I think if you drop out of something at short notice, that is a black mark against you. You're most likely to be invited back.

And of course, it puts pressure on the organizers, which also is not going to get forgotten. How many speakers dropped out at the last minute, I'm not sure. I get the sense that they simply expanded the panels rather than replacing existing speakers. How do you think, you know, long term, this situation can be improved? I get the sense that they simply expand to the panels rather than replace existing speakers. How do you think long term this situation can be improved? This is not the first time that there's been a conference on North Korea in Korea which has been almost entirely composed of men over the age of 50. How do we change that trajectory?

I think that you bring in new blood. It's not just men and women. There's a generational question here as well. I mean, a lot of the participants, men and women, on the panels were well over 50. And I think there's a case for asking for younger commentators to come forward and offer their views. Is there a LGBT issue here as well?

I mean, and how far do you try to strike an ethnic balance? The question is multi-dimensional. But I think there is a strong case for not simply cutting and pasting last year's speaker list, which quite often happens. It feels like it happens. Yeah. Because you do see the usual suspects again and again. You do. But simply ripping it up and telling your organizing committee to find new people this time and see what happens. Were there a lot of North Korean voices at the forum this time? As you'll see from the program, the recent effect of Ryu Il-gyu spoke and there were

a couple of other, should we say longer established effectors who weren't actually on the list who spoke, but a couple of voices, not many. No Russians and no Chinese. Well, that may be because they were invited but didn't say... How do you know? The tough thing about this is that at the end of the day you only see the line up as it is of agreed speakers. You don't know who was invited and who said no, and who was invited didn't respond to the email or the email went to spam.

You don't see any of these things. No, that's right, you don't. And the organizers are understandably not going to cook public on this. Right, right. Is it a problem of incentives? I mean, I've heard from some people the criticism that these conferences are sometimes arranged by senior men within the ministry who want to in turn be invited to other conferences in other cities like London, New York and Washington DC? No, I mean the conferences are, the GKF is not actually organized by the Ministry of Unification, they outsource that to different universities. Are the academics involved hoping for invitations back? Unlikely because their names don't appear on the program. So no, I don't think that's the case. Okay, and overall did you feel it was a good event? Were you happy with how it was run?

It was well run. I mean, the organization was smooth, everything went along. Was it a good event? This is an annual event, and you talk about the same issues, which is what it's there for, but inevitably, you tend to hear echoes

of remarks from previous years. After you've talked about North Korea for a few years, you start to run out of remarks from previous years. After you've talked about North Korea for a few years, you start to run out of new things to say. Well, and what was the best new idea you heard this time? Now they put me on the spot. There were quite a lot of discussion inevitably about President Yun's August 15th invitation to broader dialogue with North Korea.

And there were a few sort of ideas there on how you might pursue this, technically how you try to engage the North Koreans, which were sort of quite interesting. But beyond that, new ideas, to be honest, weren't that thick on the ground. Coming back to President Yoon Sung-yol and the question of whether we're in a dangerous spot right now on the Korean peninsula, I forgot to ask. To what extent do you think that the South Korean government and its new rules of engagement might be making the situation more dangerous?

I'm not sure that they do. I don't get the sense that the DPRK is actually responding to South Korean moves. They've got their own agenda, which they've been pursuing vigorously and determinedly for some time, and are likely to continue in that course. It's noticeable that they haven't responded to the President News 15th August. I think they'll just ignore it and carry on. The sending of balloons, the trash balloons,

does seem to be at least partly responsive to other balloons going the northern direction. Yes, explicitly so. I mean, Kim Jong-un's sister made clear that that was why they were sending these balloons. That clearly irritated them. It's an interesting example, again, of failed DPRK analysis. If the objective was to stop the activists sending balloons north of the border. Then it failed, I mean the activists

continued to send the balloons and you end up looking foolish. Moreover, that outcome was entirely predictable. The North Koreans had simply not thought this through before they launched that balloons. And now having started to launch them, they're caught. They have to keep launching them in protest because to stop launching them looks like they're backing down. It was a big mistake.

And it also led to the reestablishment of the loudspeaker batteries. I have been surprised that North Korea hasn't been more exercised about the loudspeakers. I almost thought that by now we'd be into threats of shooting or shelling of loudspeakers. Yes, I thought so too, but no, they haven't been. Why that is, I can only guess. I suspect that they have decided that having made one 4-power, they are just going to cool it for a bit before they get even deeper in. This week marks the seventh anniversary since North Korea's last nuclear test. That was number six in September 2017.

It does seem to be a long time to not test a nuclear device. What do you put that down to? It's, at various stages over that time, they appear to have readied their nuclear test site for a further test but not actually carried one out. The Chinese tell me that they are responsible, that they have been telling the North Koreans, you test and you're on your own. They're taking credit for this? They are taking credit for this. Oh wow credit for this oh wow which not publicly though I think right not

publicly but not until now the which is entirely creative first folks that's right which is entirely credible I mean it's difficult to see why the North Koreans otherwise would would act in this way and who else would persuade them from testing I don't think that the Russians have carefully not taken a position on further North Korean tests and given the new warm relationship I doubt that they'd want to sour it by telling the North Koreans not to test. So it's probably not them which my personal donation does leave the Chinese which backs up what they're saying.

And it's also been a long time since North Korea, well, for example, since the sinking of the Cheonan, the shelling of Yeonpyeongdo, and the putting of those mines that blew the legs of those two men back in, I think, 2015. Been a while since anything like that's happened. Do you also put that down to Chinese pressure to sort of just kind of cool it? No, I don't think...

Or at least the Chinese haven't said anything like that to me, so I can't actually point to a Chinese statement as private or public in that sense. I suspect that the reason that the North Koreans have desisted from that is because it didn't work for them. I mean, you think the Jong-Un immediate outrage and the South Koreans go and become hostile. The world tells against you. What actually have you gained? You know, why do that again? And blowing the legs off those two unfortunate soldiers caused a worldwide revulsion against North Korea, which they took a

while to live down and they're probably rather regretting having done it. What keeps you interested in your retirement years? It's, well apart from North Korea, you mean? Specifically in North Korea, why do you stay involved? It's a horrible fascination. I mean, I keep trying to give it up in the same way that people try to give up smoking and alcohol and fail miserably. You keep coming back to it. It excites a strange obsessive power over those who once imbibed. Wow, okay. An interesting note to leave on. Thank you once again for coming on the podcast

today, Ambassador John Everard. You're very welcome. Welcome to a new realm of insights into the Korean Peninsula. At Korea Risk Group, we delve deep into the complexities of North and South Korea, offering bespoke analyses that empower decision makers. Whether you're in government, business or academia, our tailored solutions provide clarity in an opaque region. Let our team guide your strategy with data-driven insights and on-the-ground intelligence.

Step into a world of informed decision making and and visit careerriskgroup.com today. Ladies and gentlemen, that brings us to the end of our podcast episode for today. Our thanks go to Brian Betts and Alana Hill for facilitating this episode and to our post-recording producer genius, Gabby Magnuson, who cuts out all the extraneous noises, awkward silences, bodily functions, and fixes the audio levels. Thank you and listen again next time. you