North Korea News Podcast by NK News - Joseph Kim on why North Korea is changing beyond Kim Jong Un

Episode Date: September 23, 2026

North Korean defector and George W. Bush Institute program manager Joseph Kim joins the podcast to discuss his recent NK News opinion column arguing that analysts and policymakers focus too heavily on Kim Jong Un while overlooking the role ordinary North Koreans could play in shaping the country’s future.  He explains why he believes North […]

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NKPro, the intelligence layer for serious North Korea work. Hello and welcome to the NK News podcast. I'm your host, Alana Hill, and today is September 17th. This week, we're asking a deceptively simple question. When we talk about North Korea, do we focus too much on Kim Jong-un and not enough on the people living under him? Joining me is Joseph Kim, a North Korean defector and program manager for global policy at the George W. Bush Institute.

Joseph left North Korea in 2006 and went on to study at Bard College and Harvard Kennedy School. Joseph, welcome to the NK News podcast. Thank you for having me, Alana. So Joseph, you recently wrote an opinion piece for NK News, and it opens with a very direct argument that just simply states, Kim Jong-un is not North Korea. What do you think that policymakers and analysts miss when they treat North Korea primarily as a problem of nuclear weapons and deterrence and negotiations with the leadership? Thank you. Let me begin by saying that usually when I make public engagement or any conversations that I'm having, whether that's in class setting or with friends, I usually ask myself three questions.

that is, is what I'm saying, relevant to the conversation that is going on? Second, is this important and is this right? I didn't have enough time for myself to prepare all these questions, so I didn't have the luxury of asking all those questions in preparation to this interview, my way of asking my audience to be generous and be patient with my responses. Having said that, answer to your question directly, There are three things that policymakers are inevitable to miss when they treat North Korea as same as Kim Jong-un. Number one is that they would fail to recognize that North Korea is still home to some people.

Two, it's also a bad optic, a free country such as United States negotiating with a dictator. does not look too good. Three, I think when policymakers fail to recognize that North Korea and Kim Jong-un is a separate entities, we fail to acknowledge that North Korea is a land with darkness, not a land of darkness. And I wanted to stress on my last point a little bit more because it featured North Korea as a land of darkness. darkness, there is no hope. What is the point of trying anyways? That leads to hopelessness. But I believe that North Korea, while I recognize there is, there's many darkness, it's not a hopelessness place. Long time ago, I had a chance to visit South Africa and there

I saw a message. It says, they call it Africa, but we call it home. And I think about that. often when I think about North Korea. Yes, it is a dark place, but let's not forget that there are 26 million North Korean people living there. For some of them, many of them, it's as broken as it is, it is home to men. Joseph, you wrote that some recent assessments of North Korea, they're grim, but they still leave out what you see as a crucial variable, which is, of course, the North Korean people themselves. What makes you think ordinary North Koreans should be treated as a meaningful political factor when maybe some listeners or some people feel like still, so little visible, organized resistance? It's so hard for us to see that within the country itself.

Three reasons. That is number one. Belief is a personal. It's a personal choice. And I believe this is my personally believe that while it is a situation is bad, I still choose to believe in the power of North Korean people. Second is the evidence. North Korea is not the same North Korea in 1990. It's just simple fact. Three is history. I have seen and read history again and again, seemingly powerless people tasked with seemingly impossible obstacles. yet again, these ordinary people always found a way to overcome those challenges. So to reiterate my point, it's personal belief. It's an active choice that I made to believe that North Korean people have the power.

Second evidence, again, North Korea is not the same North Korea 20 years ago. And his story suggests that these powerless people do indeed have. immense power when it's organized and when they act collectively. Well, expanding from your third point on history, it leads perfectly into my next question, because you make a really interesting comparison in your op-ed between North Korea and South Korea. And, you know, South Korea has endured dictatorship. It was eventually democratized. While North Korea did not, and you argue that collective punishment alone doesn't fully explain the difference between the two Koreas.

what do you think does explain that difference? Two things. I would say, number one, let's not diminish what fear does to people. So I'm not entirely and completely diminish or dismiss the effect of our collective punishment. My simple point was that it can be an explanation but not the explanation. And also I would like to say that often we as individuals, we overestimate what we can accomplish in a day. Very often we underestimate what we can accomplish in 10, 20 years. And I think those accumulate habits, actions do make a difference. And one of my favorite saying is how I spend my time today,

influence why become tomorrow. That principle is applicable to anyone and everyone and it's not exceptional to North Korean people. But also, very quickly, I wanted to acknowledge, say that I am fully aware of how much sacrifice, pains that these South Koreans had to overcome in order to achieve democracy. So it's not me just simply saying,

that it was an easy accomplishment. It was rather an explanation again. The collective punishment is not, cannot be the explanation for lack of protest. And you also suggest that many North Koreans historically, they didn't understand themselves as living under oppression in the same way that South Koreans eventually did come to understand. How much do you think that that has changed today? Obviously, it's hard to quantify in the sense I can't say in 1990 percent of North Koreans believe what they were told versus 2026, 70 percent of people, only 70 percent of people are believing. So I can't say, I can't quantify it, but I think with reasonable suggestions, we can say that North Koreans have changed in the sense that they have.

now access to two different version of truth. And I think that's a good thing for North Koreans because now they can compare what they have been taught versus what they see in their own eyes. I think this is a good spot to ask you a little bit about your own experience. As I mentioned in the intro, you grew up in North Korea and you lost your family during the period of severe economic hardship. And you survived on the streets before eventually leaving the country. When did you personally begin to question what you had been taught about North Korea and also about the outside world? So answer to your question directly, I think I can say with some confidence, never. A few things played into a factor that is one, I was 16 when I left North Korea by Korean age.

two, I was uneducated. I had less than four years elementary school education. So my personal experience was really focused on surviving the next few hours, next few days, not really asking grand questions.

I didn't have the luxury of access to or ability to even ask those questions. Well, Joseph, you share your story in much more detail and a really fascinating and poignant TED Talk that I'll make sure to link for our listeners in the show notes so they can fully listen and understand to that part of your journey. But coming back to that op-ed that you wrote for us, a major part of your argument, it centers on the Jiangwadan, which of course are these

informal markets that expanded during the famine of the 1990s. And you describe marketization as one of the most important socioeconomic transformations that happened in North Korea. What do you think changed once people began to depend on these markets rather than on the states to survive? I think the biggest change was that it was the awakening moment that despite the regime claims that North Korea is a place nothing to envy. when compared with their living reality, I think they started questioning that in a small way. So exchange of information within North Koreans amongst themselves, in of itself, I think was a big change.

And I think that plays a role because traditionally speaking, even among North Korean citizens, because of a strict control of movement, that also meant that not only were they physically isolated from each other, but they were also separated from each other's thoughts. So I think the markets not only allowed for them to bartering their goods and selling their goods and service to survive, but it also first time for North Korean to have a place and space to exchange their own ideas.

And I think that's a big change that often underlooked. And this is actually interesting because I spend most of my survival time. I mean, I spend a lot of time in these markets to survive. While I was there, it was hard for me to see that transformation. When you live in the moment, it's hard to gauge that. transformation, but when you look at it from the outside, I think the transformation is much more visible. And I came to appreciate this change after I did my internship, two summer internships at CSIS Korea chair, where I focused on doing research on the development of markets, the

marketization in North Korea. And also I wrote my undergraduate thesis on the marketization. So it was really interesting moment for me because essentially I was studying the place that I lived on, survived in, and what I walked away from living in the markets versus studying it was different conclusion. You touched on a really interesting point about what marketization has done for a lot of North Korean psychologically. And so I want to ask you, when it does come to this marketization, do you think that the most important change was ultimately economic? You know, these markets let people earn their own income, or do you think that it was more importantly psychological in the sense that people realized they could survive without the government? Or maybe it's a combination of both?

I'd lean toward combination of both because in order for me to say that psychological impact was greater, I have to have a qualifier or to quantify which I don't have it. The reason why I say it's thought, but leaning toward more psychological, is because I think this notion of cognitive dissonance, which is the ability to ask questions. It was developed in North Korea by nature of the indoctrination, brainwash, and education. But I think this markets really gave North Korean people to have a lot of. a place to activate their ability to questioning the questions. North Korea has repeatedly tried to bring these markets under tighter control,

and you point in particular to the 2009 currency reform. Why do you see that episode as so important? I think this connects with my previous point, which was the questioning the questions, ability to activate that cognitive dissonance. And I think this 2009 currency reform is a perfect example of it in the sense that when these merchants or North Korean people could not exchange their old currency with new, they knew the right question to ask, but they were not able to or they were afraid of asking that question publicly. So instead of asking in words, they ask that question in action, which is going to. out on the street and burning those old currencies was their way of asking the questions for the reason. Do you think that that distrust created by what happened in 2009, do you think that it can endure

across generations even as the state increases repression and tries to regain economic control? I don't know, to be honest, but I would like to believe that you can't. can't suppress curiosity forever. And yeah, I'd like to think that it would be almost impossible for regime to be able to erase what North Korean people have seen and heard and learned. I think it's just in human nature once we have questions until that question is answered. One way or another, it's in our nature to pursue. those curiosity.

I definitely want to ask you a little bit more about that importance of curiosity, but I have one last question on marketization because I think there is a bit of a counter argument. You know, the state has now lived with markets for decades and it taxes them, it regulates them in ways and it has incorporated them into the system. Do you think that marketization could actually make the regime in a way more durable by helping people survive and reducing pressure on the state to provide for them. Absolutely.

This is something that I asked myself during my, in my undergraduate thesis. My question was simple. Is marketization an opportunity or a threat to the regime? And I think it can be both. The perfect example is not a perfect in the sense that we do not appreciate what's happening in China, But China, I mean, China has been able to grow and advance its markets while still be able to maintain its political control, right? I mean, that also questions this, the modernization theory in a very simple terms. The theory suggests that more economic prosperity will eventually.

lead to greater political liberties. It happened in South Korea and happened in Taiwan, it did not happen in China, right? So I think, going back to my point, it can be both an opportunity and a threat. And the sad news is that North Korean regime is good at what they do. While I do not appreciate, they know how to calculate. They know how they're not making decisions out of vacuum. Coming back to the topic of curiosity and asking questions, you also argue that this exposure to outside information has created something

that the government just can't erase. North Korea has dramatically strengthened punishments for citizens who consume South Korean media and other foreign content in recent years. What do you think the severity of this crackdown tells us? Indirectly and ironically, it actually reveals what regime feels the most. Therefore, we can also infer that these outside information is actually working against the regime. Therefore, we could also make an argument.

it would be in our best interest to increase sending more outside information in North Korea. So that's one thing. And yeah, to me it reveals that the outside information actually undermines and supports the state's state propaganda, which for a long time North Korean regime has to rely on. It's state propaganda to gain authority. When you were living in North Korea, did you ever have any access to foreign media or encounter any kind of outside information? No. If you count former Soviet Union movies as outside movies, foreign movies, then yes, but nothing like South from South Korea or America or elsewhere. Again, my circumstance, my early childhood upbringing and circumstance, was just such in a place where desire to

recognition, desire for human dignity, desire for information outside of the regime was not there. The priority, yeah. Right. Joseph, your article draws on Vatslav Havel's idea that authoritarian systems depend not only on coercion, but on ordinary people participating in the system and essentially living within its lies. What does quietly withdrawing that participation actually look like in North Korea? Wearing jeans that is not allowed to wear in North Korea. That is one form of withdrawing that participation. Watching South Korean movies or dramas is another form

of withdrawing that participation. Watching American movies in spite of the consequences, I think in my opinion, is a simple example, simple yet powerful examples of what withdrawing patient looks like. And Joseph, your article, it ends on a delivery deliberately optimistic note. It says North Korean people are winning. Kim Jong-un isn't. It's also the title of your op-ed. I think it's a really striking conclusion at a time when Kim has expanded his nuclear arsenal. He's tightened border controls, strengthened depression. And of course, the country has deepened its ties with Russia and with China. What does winning mean in this context?

I think what winning looks like in this context is that showcasing and illustrating to the North Korean people and the rest of the world, a simple truth. That is, fate of a nation ultimately depends on its people, not a dictator. to me, if we can somehow, when we can, I think that to me would be a perfect definition of what winning is like. As much as the fate of North Korea depends on its people. I think, of course, foreign policy has a role to play. And you argue that Washington has focused too narrowly on negotiating with Kim Jong-un and that any long-term strategy, it has to account for this social change we've been discussing inside North Korea. What do you think that that would look like in practice? It would include invest in

organizations that is sending reliable and credit outside information in North Korea that maximize can never guarantee but maximize consumer safety. And I think to me that would be, one example of what a practice, what policymakers can practice. And what about, you know, South Korea? What should South Korea be doing differently? We've seen successive governments in Seoul approach North Korean people very differently, particularly in terms of information campaigns which we've discussed and human rights and engagement. Where do you think that Seoul has the greatest opportunity to influence long-term change in North Korea? I think the greatest opportunity can be realized and materialized

when the South Korean government actually reminds itself how they have achieved its own democracy and its own freedom. Denying that truth is also disgrace to what South Korean people have accomplished. So opportunity is a funny thing. If we seek for it, we can find it and realize it. But if we don't, even if the real opportunity exists, it can never be fully appreciated. Well, before we wrap up today,

you've been so generous with your time. I do want to finish with something a little bit more personal. you write in your op-ed for NK News about being a child on the streets in North Korea and being told essentially that you had no choice but just to accept the reality that was in front of you. And then your life went in a direction that neither you nor the person giving you that advice could ever imagine. How much does that experience shape your own refusal to accept arguments that political change in North Korea is impossible? I think you're essentially asking the question of or tension between probability and possibility. Again, I am relatively a well-educated individual, so this is not me being just idealistic for the sake of being idealistic.

But I'd like to believe that this is true anywhere, that is, as we get older, our language of probability becomes so much. more sophisticated for a number of reasons. We have better ability to make judgment. We have more data. We have more experience. That leads to sophistication of the probability. But while it is essential for us to strengthening our language of probability for survival and et cetera, At the same time, let's also not forget, world's biggest accomplishments did not come from thinking in the lens of probabilities. It's only when we dare to ask questions that seemingly impossible, that is, the language of possibility.

While it is against in our nature sometimes or instinct to believe and invest in the language of possibilities, I think we should give more credit and live toward what is possible. I think that's a perfect note to end our conversation today. Joseph Kim, thank you so much for joining me. Thank you for having me. Thank you for your time. And that brings us to the end of today's episode.

Our thanks to Brian Betts and David Choi for helping make this podcast happen. For more reporting, analysis and expert insight on North Korea, visit NK News for the latest stories and NKPro for deeper analysis, data and research tools. You can also watch this episode on YouTube and be sure to follow us on social media with the latest updates, clips and behind the scenes content.

I'm Alana Hill, thank you for listening and we'll be back next time with more on the stories shaping North Korea.