North Korea News Podcast by NK News - Kim Jaechun: Why unification is only possible with North Korean people’s support

Episode Date: July 18, 2024

Kim Jong Un’s announcement of a new policy rejecting reunification has sparked considerable debate among North Korea watchers. This week, Kim Jaechun, a professor of international relations at the Graduate School of International Studies at Sogang University, joins the podcast to talk about a discussion he recently moderated at the unification ministry about the future […]

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most closely watched regions in the world. Don't wait, spaces are filling fast. Hello listeners and welcome to the NK News podcast. I'm your host, Jaco's Wedge Suit, and this interview was recorded on Monday, the 15th of July, 2024. And joining me here in the studio is Professor Kim Jae-chun. He is Professor of International Relations at the Graduate School of International Studies at Sogang University and is currently also the Dean for Sogang GSIS.

He's a political scientist trained at Yale University and has served as a member of the Presidential Committee for Unification Preparation. His research interests include international security, US foreign policy, Northeast Asia regional affairs and inter-Korean relations. And he's also currently the chair of the Subcommittee for International Cooperation of the Unified Future Planning Committee. Welcome on the show, for international cooperation of the unified future planning committee. Welcome on the show, Professor Kim. It's great to be here.

Thank you for the kind introduction, Jaco. Thank you. Yeah, thanks for making time for us. You recently, and when I say recently, I mean about a month ago, you moderated a discussion at the Ministry of Unification with some international North Korea watchers. Broadly speaking, what did you ask of them? Well, basically I asked them what they thought about Korean unification, because Korean unification

is not that popular topic domestically. In South Korea, not many people are interested in talking about unification, particularly younger generations. They are saying, what's really in it for us? I mean, economy is going through very difficult times. We are not properly getting employed. And then unification sounds unrealistic. Why would we have to care for unification?

On top of that, internationally, it's not a popular topic anymore. I'm thinking, was it ever ever popular unification? I was thinking, but particularly this new Cold War thing, earlier in the early 1990s, when the Cold War came to an end, there was an air of optimism. If you keep using, applying these engagement policies to former communist countries, East European countries, you can somehow assimilate them. You can somehow convert them into like-minded countries. If you turn these countries into market economy, then eventually these countries will become adopt some form of a political,

democratic political institutions, but that didn't really happen. And it's new Cold War, which basically means these countries are fighting against each other. I mean, one block, we see these liberal countries that want to maintain existing international order dubbed as liberal, rules-based liberal international order. On the other hand, we have bloc of countries that want to change the status quo and revise

the international order to their liking. So in this order of blockization, we try to use this some kind of a sunshine policy, engagement policy toward North Korea and eventually we will accomplish our goal of unification. That sounds a bit hollow. So we are losing international audience for our unification policy. So that was the objective of that get together, having chats with the international experts. And what kind of answers did they give you? They were actually, I don't know, I don't know, it's because of the venue, but they were very enthusiastic. I mean, they were throwing support for Korean

unification. Right, now you mentioned the venue. This is because the conversation was sponsored by the Ministry of Unification and the ministry itself was present. Yes, and I guess they were paid. Yeah, but they were very serious. No one in the room was critical of South Korea's, you know, soon to be a new initiative on unification, Korean unification. So it was very productive and I liked the session as the moderator of the session. Were there any interesting new ideas or proposals that came out of that discussion? As far as I remember, you know, some participants were saying that, were saying that there's no other way but to talk to North Korean regime leaders to get to the final destination, and that is Korean unification. But I guess the overwhelming majority of the participants were saying, no matter how hard we try to placate the fear of

North Korean leaders, it's of no use. And no matter how we write this new unification initiative or vision so that it can be palatable to North Korean leaders taste, they would reject them flatly. So now the objective should be to how we can mobilize support from North Korean people. I mean if there is a target in North Korea for our new Unification vision, it has to be North Korean regular people, not North Korean leaders. Is that you saying that, or is that the international observers? Yeah, observers. Yeah, yeah.

I'm of that opinion as well. What is the new initiative of the South Korean government about unification? It's basically vision, because last time, South Korean government announced new unification plan, it was some 30 years ago. So that's outdated. So we need to do a bit of updating and upgrading given many changes that have transpired between two Koreas

and internationally and domestically as well. My understanding of the 30 year old plan of unification was that it there was I guess what you could say North Korea and South Korea had in common was some kind of Federal or Confederal system that involved two states existing under one umbrella in some kind of thing like the European Union perhaps. Is that a correct understanding of the old vision of unification? I guess so. I mean, somehow we'll have to keep talking to each other and we'll have to acknowledge that two systems of two Koreas are very different in which case we will have to settle with what you have just referred to as as federalist you know to Korea but that's I mean it's not workable. Well that was the old vision so what's the new vision?

The new vision isn't really about the plan it's a heavier on vision, light on roadmap. The details? Details. Okay. Does it still involve, I don't want to say recognition because we, the two states can't recognize each other because the two constitutions claim sovereignty over the entire Korean Peninsula as territory. So mutual recognition at this stage is still probably a difficult thing, but they have

to mutually talk to each other. Is that still part of the new vision? Talking to the regime in North Korea? I doubt it because there was a dramatic change in North Korea's policy. They adopted this, should I say, vision. I mean, policy of two, I mean, you know, inter-Korean relations is not, is basically a relationship between two hostile sovereign states. So they are removing concepts of the same, you know, nation. Unification is our national goal. They are being removed and they are in the process of amending constitution so that they can reflect these changes in their new constitution. So as I said, this new initiative or vision, which is still a work in progress, but we are laying out these visions so that it could be more appealing to North Korean people

and South Korean people as well. I mean, it's our constitutional duty as South Koreans, as South Korean government, South Korean president. I mean, your constitutional duty is to keep pursuing unification of the Korean Peninsula. And if we keep pursuing that unification policy, what would be the end outcome of that policy? What kind of country are you envisioning? That's the question that we are asking ourselves and we are trying to give some answers to that may be people who say that's not realistic I mean given the reality of inter-Korean relations and international environment and there is no popular support for the unification in South Korea as well but as I said I mean it's it's in our constitutional duty to talk

about unification and what kind of unification we want to accomplish. But in a way, perhaps Kim Jong-un's new vision as he described it last December, in a way that's perhaps more realistic than this current South Korean policy. It's a recognition that yes, we are two states and we are fundamentally opposed to each other. I mean, yeah, many foreign countries do recognize two Koreas as two independent sovereign states. That's the reality. But I mean, the intention of North Korean policy is to, I guess, maybe you can say that their intention was being defensive when they came up with that plan,

I don't know, the policy of two Koreas as two hostile countries. But on the other hand, they are being very aggressive. They keep developing nuclear weapons and missiles. And if you are the same nation, and if South Korea is part of your country, is another Korea that has to be unified, you have no right to threaten the use of nuclear weapons and missiles to your brother. So many Korean experts are saying that the intention of North Korean policy, the change of policy,

was very offensive, in which case it just doesn't reflect the reality. I mean, it reflects their intention to aggress toward North Korea. I mean, think about it. North Korean leaders, they want survival. And we keep saying that if we give some kind of security assurances, then they would give up nuclear weapons and missiles. I doubt it very seriously. I mean, the ultimate fear they have is, as long as there is South Korea that is more prosperous,

stronger, freer, then there is this force that is being generated here because no matter how we say about unification, it's not the unification by absorption, but North Korean regular people aspire to become a part of South Korea. So there is that force intact. So to North Korean leaders, South Korea will have to go. That is the ultimate security guarantee.

South Korea would not go away, but South Korea will have to go down in the drains. I mean, I can't really come up with the proper English expression here, but so that is the reality. There is, I mean, two Koreas live peacefully and happily ever after. No, that's not going to happen. I mean, to Koreas live peacefully and happily ever after. No, that's not going to happen.

North Korean leaders, South Korea will have to go. That is what they want. So it's not just realistic, but I know that part of the reality is that two Koreas are functioning as two independent sovereign states, international. That's true. Both members of the United Nations. Yeah. independent sovereign states, international, that's true. Both members of the United Nations. Yeah, but I mean, think about it, if that is the case, I mean, what if there are some contingent situations

that arise in North Korea? We have no right to intervene if North Korea is a different country. So we got to keep, you know, retain these parts where we can say that, well, two Koreas are actually one Korea. Is there a possibility of an intermediate stage of peaceful coexistence of two separate systems and two states on the Korean Peninsula at the same time? Is that a realistic proposal?

No, that's not realistic. That's idealistic. I mean, that has been tried out previously by some progressive governments in South Korea. I mean, they put unification behind. Let's get along with each other. Yeah. And we can move step by step, you know, taking, you know, baby step, one step after another. And in the interim, on the interim stage, we can function as two, you know, independent states, but under one federal umbrella. That didn't work. Yeah. No, but look, as you say, North Korea at this stage right now is probably preparing to change its constitution. And we don't know yet what that will look like, but that may involve a recognition that the demilitarized zone is in fact a national border.

Now we've seen some hints of that. We've seen that in North Korean maps, they've stopped showing one color Korea on the Korean peninsula. They've showed a division there. So if the North Korean government does change its constitution and recognizes that its territorial border only goes up to the demilitarized zone. It's in fact putting into law a situation that has been a fact on the ground since 1953. I wonder if that's something that could perhaps make peaceful coexistence a realistic option. If the South Korean government also did the same thing and changed its constitution to recognize that the demilitarized zone is actually a de facto national border, that may actually help the situation. What do you think? My guess is, my educated guess is that they will keep launching provocations, testing

the nerves of South Korean government, keep trying to provoke that national border, supposed to be national border, you know, that those Yangpyeong Island areas keep testing South Korean government's nerve. I mean, the important thing is that I think they made a strategic decision to be with Chinese and particularly with Russians in this new era of the Cold War. So, you know, engagement policies, I mean, toward North Korea, it's a thing of the past. I mean, particularly any initiatives coming from South Korean government, that's, you know, I mean, that is basically our posture, policy stance toward North Korea. Let's just get together. The door to diplomacy is wide open. Let's just get together. We can to diplomacy is wide open. Let's just get together.

We can talk about anything, anything. But if you keep provoking, we will have to augment our deterrent and defense capability. There's no other way around. But still, we can talk in the middle of war. But they are not responding. I mean, that is, let's just get together

and let's start diplomacy. That's just the policy of and let's start diplomacy. That's the policy of the Biden administration as well. It fell on deaf ears. Why? Because North Korea, they made a strategic decision to be a vanguard state for the block of revisionist countries represented by Russia and China. So no matter how hard we try to show this peace

gesture to North Korea, it's not going to work. So they have their plan, but that doesn't necessarily mean that we'll have to come along with that, go along with their initiative. We got to have our own plan and our own initiative or vision do not really apply to North Korean leaders because the vision is to establish a better Korea. The vision that we like to realize in unified new Korea is all the people, not these leaders, but not just South Korean people but North Korean people will leave very free, prosperous and peaceful lives where human rights are respected and so on and so forth. So this new vision, this new initiative that you talk about, you've mentioned a couple of times that it's not really directed at the leadership of North Korea but at the ordinary people, the 22 approximately million people in North Korea.

How do you imagine that this vision can be communicated to the ordinary people of North Korea given that there really is no practical means of communication possible at the moment to those North Korean people? I mean, you know, we can't speak on the North Korean media, the South Korean government can't send letters to the North Korean media. The South Korean government can't send letters to the North Korean people. The South Korean government stopped sending leaflets in 2000, and it's now, you know, there are civilian civic groups that send leaflets. But how do you imagine that this vision can be communicated

to the ordinary people? I guess I'm in no position to talk about all these operations that are going on. But I guess many North Korean people have access to these radios and cell phones, smart phones, to be more precise. So they are number of them, a growing number of North Koreans now know what really is happening in their own country

and how ruthless their political leader is, how pathetic that leader is. And they are aware of the concept of human rights as well. So I guess the international community, basically the United States and South Korean like-minded countries are putting in good faith efforts. I mean, real efforts to sort of, I don't know, I can't really come up with the proper English word here, but vocabulary, but infiltrate North Korean society and giving this information to North Korean people. So then maybe, I don't know. I'm not saying that there's going to, North Korean regime will collapse, but maybe there would come a time when North Korean people would stand up and then revert against the regime.

I don't know. We can't really rule out that possibility. So, I mean, yeah. Free, peaceful, and prosperous, unified Korea. That's the goal, that's the vision, but from here to get there, I mean, there is a big swamp. There is no denying that, right? But how to navigate that nasty swamp,

I mean, no matter how hard you try to come up with these detailed plans or roadmaps with which we can get there, it's not going to happen. I mean, we cannot, as a social scientist, we have no capability to predict what's going to happen in the future. Be honest with ourselves.

So it's just, as I said, it's our new initiative or vision, heavier on these visions and very light on these plans. Would it be accurate to say that you probably don't expect there to be any serious substantive talks between the governments of North and South Korea on unification within the next five years? No, no, because that's, as I said, I mean, it's basically a North Korea's strategic decision. Let's give a chance to this new Cold War. When the Cold War international order came

to a rather abrupt end in early 1990s, Korean vocabulary, we have membum, they were mentally collapsed when they lost their key allies to South Korea, when Russia and China normalized diplomatic relations with South Korea. They succeeded in two years in a row. They were really mentally collapsed.

That's when they began developing nuclear weapons in earnest, but that didn't really work. So they became basically a pariah state, a failed state, a real backward state. But now they want to seize this opportunity. The Cold War came as a big opportunity for North Koreans, so they want to capitalize on this. And they are smart. I mean, in my sense, they know that their strategic values loom larger than before to Chinese and Russians. And then to Chinese and Russians, when the Cold War, I mean, the competition between the US and China wasn't that tough. I mean, there were times when China and Russia did care about North Korea's

denuclearization so that they agreed to impose sanctions on North Koreans. Right? But now they don't even pretend. They don't even pretend. They want to cover up actually for North Korea's missiles and nuclear weapons provocations and cover up for North Koreans when they violate sanctions and human rights. So that's the reality.

I mean, that's the backdrop. So I don't think North Korean leaders would change their minds. No matter how hard we try to accommodate their fears and strategic concerns, I don't think they will come to the negotiation table. It's more of a structural thing to me as an international Asian scholar. But if the international circumstances change, that could all change, right? I mean, the war on Ukraine could reach a negotiated conclusion and relations between the United States and China might improve and then North Korea would be faced with a different situation

again. Yeah, but I guess US and then China, they are in it for this strategy competition for long haul, I guess. It's going to sustain at least for next 30 years. So maybe in that sense, Trump could come as an opportunity to Russians and North Koreans because the first thing that he wants to do

if he gets elected, as he said during the last presidential debate, even before he becomes inaugurated, he would call Salman Zelensky and then put him to this negotiation table and work on this peace deal. So I mean, I don't think it's going to work to the advantage of Ukrainians.

So basically, he'll say to Zelensky, Trump will say to Zelensky, forget about Crimean Peninsula, this Donbas area, the Eastern part, and maybe half and half, that's it. So if the war in Ukraine ends that way, it's a huge loss, I guess, for the bloc of liberal countries. I guess it's a big win for Russia, not just to Russians, but to countries in that bloc of revisionism.

But I guess, I don't know. I don't know whether that's going to happen. Well, let me bring it back to Korea. What is the unified future planning committee under the ministry of unification and what does it seek to do? As I said, I mean, that national community based unification plan that came out 30 years ago

is outdated. And it's basically saying that Korea is one nation. Okay? Korean nation. Okay? But unfortunately because of geopolitical events, we were divided. So it's our, I mean it's natural for two Koreas as the same nation to be unified. True to a great extent, but now we have some, I don't know how many, but 200,000 foreign families, by foreign families, I mean these foreigners who are naturalized in South Korea.

So it's not really realistic. I mean, it sounds a bit more, a bit myopic. I mean, if you just stick with the concept of Korean nations when South Korea, we have some 200,000 foreign born families. You're talking about the ethno-nationalist view of the nation. Yeah, yeah, yeah. So that nationalism has to be more open-minded. Yeah, so that nationalism has to be more open-minded.

Yeah, it has to be more open-minded, it has to be more cosmopolitan, who espouse more of a cosmopolitan values or outlook, if you will. So there is that part that needs to be updated. So that would be the end of the idea or the concept of the Uri Minjokiri, which has been repeated. No, it's not the end. I mean, if we are not really the same nation, there is no reason for us to talk about unification. So that's there.

But it has to be more forward-looking nationalism instead of closed, just Korean nation. You know, Korean nation, sometimes we can be very myopic, you know? So we have to be more open-minded and there's got to be more to it, to the unification. Yeah, I mean, human rights should be there or all these values now, you know, all these values, human rights, freedom, you know, peace, prosperity,

they are universal values. Maybe those values came from Western world, but they have become universal values. And then we'll have to realize those values on unified Korea. So that is basically the centerpiece of this new unification vision, I guess. And under that Unified Future Planning Committee, there is the subcommittee for international cooperation.

That's in charge of running that. Yes. And is that about what, sort of getting international support for South Korea's vision? Basically, yes. Is there a role for non-Korean state actors to be involved in, you know, bringing lasting peace to the Korean Peninsula? I guess that venue that was prepared by the Ministry of Unification, that was the one idea behind that get-together. Let's try to engage foreign experts who are based in South Korea. Basically, we are trying to mobilize support from the international community

for our new unification vision. And maybe we can bring them to the unification planning committee here so that they can assume the role of unification ambassadors for South Korea. I guess that's a very good idea, I guess. But that sounds like a one by one sort of person to person approach.

I'm wondering, is it something that- As far as I know, as I said, I'm in no position to talk about all these, but we were reaching out to these, some of the more famous Korean experts in the US and in Europe. And these scholars who are working for these think tanks, they are not allowed to participate

in foreign governments committee on unification, committee like this. So there is a conflict of interest issue that is at stake. So there was a limit to which we can reach out to the foreign experts or foreigners. But I guess there could be some other avenues through which we can engage, not these experts, maybe just ordinary citizens in foreign countries.

And one plan that we have is to do some survey on the support of international community or maybe as a Europe, how they think about South Korea's unification with their Europeans' support. They are interested in unification in the first place and maybe they are supportive of that unification. Why is that important to the Korean government? I guess it's a better with the international community to keep this momentum going. Actually, we kind of lost the momentum. Last time the previous president of South Korea, former president, Park Geun-hye came up with this unification bonanza theory, the Debaek theory, sort of created that momentum for Korean unification. But since then, it lost the momentum. And if you lose the momentum, it's really difficult for you to restore the momentum

and keep it going. But that's what we try to accomplish, I guess. Now, looking back over the last 71 years since the Korean War armistice was signed, relations and tensions between the two Koreas seem to go in cycles. Would you say that since Kim Jong-un announced that he was giving up on the process of, on the prospect of peaceful unification with South Korea, and now that for North Korea, South Korea is no longer a worthy dialogue partner, do you feel like this is a new situation or is this simply a

repeat of the old cycle? I don't think the repetition of the old cycle. This is the new phase of inter-Korean relations because you know Kim Jong-un will stay there for next, I don't know, he doesn't look too healthy, but he's relatively young, so he will leave at least 30 years. So I don't think his policy posture will change. And as I mentioned before, there is this new Cold War thing, the structural change that took place internationally. So that has to change to me,

as an international Asian scholar, structure matters a great deal. So I guess unless there is this structural change, North Korean policy, that's why I said, they made a strategic decision to be with the bloc of revisionist country, to be a vengored country for the blo block of revisionist country, to be a vengored country for the block of revisionist countries. So I guess Cold War

international order will have to change so that North Korean policy could change. This current cycle of aggressive talk and provocations from North Korea, what signal do you think North Korea is sending? Do you think that it's, is it actually bringing us closer to a potential conflict? I mean, there are experts who are saying that, but I guess if war breaks out on the Korean Peninsula, it's the end of their regime as we know it. I mean, if it is a measured conflict

between the two Koreas, but the thing is they have nuclear weapons. It could always escalate. By provocation, if they want to test the nerves of South Korean government, I mean, it can be manageable to a certain extent, but this government of South Korea, and the government is very adamant about just retaliating. manageable to a certain extent, but this government of South Korea, the North Korean government,

is very adamant about just retaliating. More than we receive. And that kind of tit for tat cycle could lead us into a very dark place. Exactly, so. How do we get out of that cycle? I guess, I mean, I don't think our proposal to have some talks, I mean, I don't think these proposals

would be reciprocated by North Korean leaders. However, we got to keep sending those messages, I guess. First of all, so that we can occupy more high ground. We want to talk. I mean, we can show to the world that we are the party who wants to talk. It's they who are denying diplomacy or talking. And second of all, I mean, I guess there is a, if we keep sending this message, I guess, you know, they would say, yeah, why not? Just let's meet. I mean,

let's we can take some measures with which we can restore hotlines between two militaries. I mean, I guess we gotta put in some sort of efforts to scale down the tension over the Korean Peninsula, although I believe that our efforts would not be reciprocated by North Korean leaders, but we gotta put in those efforts as well. So instead of sending drones back over to North Korea. Yeah, instead of a T-40, but I'm not saying that we shouldn't be augmenting our defense

or deterrent capabilities. But while we are doing that, I guess we'll have to keep imparting this message that there is a room for diplomacy. I guess, I don't know. Do you remember in 2010 when Lee Myung-bak was president and North Korea shelled Yeonpyeong Island? It seemed like we were quite close to a retaliatory strike by the South Korean Air Force. Accounts vary, but it sounds like the planes were close to going and bombing those artillery tubes in North Korea. And the US stepped in.

The US stepped in and said, hey, let's not do that. I don't know where we would be if that had happened, but the way that President Yun Son Yeol is talking here, it sounds like that if the same thing were to happen again, that a retaliatory strike would be more likely than it was in 2010. Do you think that's the case? I guess the US would step in. Again. Again. And sort of try to dissuade.

It's my guess, but I guess it's not just the China, but the US that want to avoid major conflicts on the Korean Peninsula. To be honest with you, I guess, primary concern of the US as well as China is to maintain status quo on the Korean Peninsula. So it's the reason why, I don't know whether I should say this on this podcast,

but I guess, sure, the US throwing its weight behind our unification plan, but deep down in their hearts, I guess they, I mean, if unification happens right away without any side effects, okay? So now like tomorrow we have this unified Korea here in the Korean Peninsula, and it's like an expanded version of South Korea. And the US-

That's the dream scenario. That's the US would like very much, but because of the uncertainties or unpredictability of unification, progress, process, and outcome, it's uncertain. So it's the reason I guess most of American experts or policymakers prefer a status quo. I mean, that's what I'm thinking.

I'm not saying that. I shouldn't say that. We're speaking here on Monday. This is just after the weekend in which Donald Trump, presidential candidate, narrowly escaped an assassination attempt. Do you think that it's likely to, I mean that's not the intention of course, but do you think it is likely to help

his presidential campaign? I guess he's in better condition now because I mean, he's not seriously injured. Yeah, he's in good health. And now he's got this image as a, I don't know, national hero. Yeah, to fight. Did you see that picture that is going viral on the internet?

The picture where... He's raising his fist with blood on his face and he's wearing a flag behind him. Yeah. That's just a very iconic moment. It's an iconic moment. Yeah, so I guess it's a billion dollar advice, you know, advertisement. So let's, let's, um, for a moment there, imagine that he does get re-elected. Uh, a second Trump

presidency, would that be, uh, an opportunity to South Korea or a threat? What do you think? It really depends on from which angle you will be looking into his second presidency, I guess. Well, let's think about the alliance first of all, because we're looking at maintaining the status quo in the Green Peninsula. Do you see a danger for the ROK-US alliance? Yeah, because he doesn't really value alliance very highly. That's true, I guess.

And he sent message previously when he was negotiating with Kim Jong-un. He could, I mean, he actually stopped one of the major military drills between the US and Iraq. And he continuously threatened, you know, pulling out these USFK here. So, I mean, there's going to be a more danger to the integrity of ROK-US alliance. But then again, I mean, when you analyze the future of ROK-US alliance, I guess we'll have to take into account structural variable as well. By

structural variable, I mean, the US Congress, although there is a saying that the US foreign policy is what the president says it is, but the Congress still retains a great deal of foreign policy making power, I mean, as long as a veto power is concerned. And over the 70 years of alliance, there are very strong constituencies in both countries for the alliance in policymaking circle, in think tanks,

in military circle, in Congress, in both countries. So I guess there is a limit to which even Trump could do damage to the alliance. So I guess major structure of the alliance will survive. However, I mean, it's just an unpredictability factor that comes with Mr. Donald Trump. It's just unpredictable. And I meet a lot of American experts

who are saying that they're close to Donald Trump. I don't know whether they are true, because now Trump has a better chance of getting elected. But they are now trying to placate fears harbored by many South Koreans. Alliance will stay. Maybe Trump will talk to Kim Jong-un again, but with a consultation, he will seek consultation with South Koreans and Japanese first. Do you think that Kim Jong-un is kind of waiting to see what the presidential election outcome is and that's why he's not talking to either America or South Korea? I think he has certain interests in how this

presidential election of the United States will turn out. However, I know if I were Kim Jong-un, I wouldn't have too much, too many interests in having another summit with Mr. Trump because that big disgrace coming out of that Hanoi no-deal negotiation summit empty-handed when he came to Hanoi all the way from Pyongyang on train, like three days and four,

I mean three nights and four days, and going back to Pyongyang empty, it was a big disgrace. So there is a saying that he confided to his key confidant is that I would never, never talk to American presidents. So there's that issue, second you know that strategy decision I don't think when Kim Jong-un thinks that there won't be too too much that he can gain from

talking to American president but if Trump was saying there were as long as you freeze your programs you nukes or missiles then I can lift all these sanctions all these sanctions, all these sanctions. That's a, then why not? Then why not? But I don't think Trump has that idea, but I guess he's, even his key advisors, I don't know who they will be, the foreign policy and national security advisors would oppose that idea. That's just, I guess, I mean, I can, that's unfathomable to me. Looking again at the Ukraine situation, what would change if South Korea were to start supporting Ukraine with lethal weapons? Do you think that Russia would make good on its

threat to help North Korea or to somehow threaten South Korea? I guess, I mean, we all know that South Korea's 155 millimeters are going to Ukraine, actually. But by- 55 millimeter shells? Yeah, 155 millimeter shells are going to Ukraine by way of the United States, you know, via- Indirectly, yeah.

Indirectly. So we are actually supporting Ukrainians, you know, with these lethal weapons, but it's the matter of doing it just a... The long way. Long way or just anybody cannot. I mean, at least when we provide these shells by way of the United States,

we can maintain some sort of plausible deniability. Yeah. Now, if we just send these lethal weapons directly to Ukrainians, there's no plausible deniability. And all these wild cards, they are effective when you hold them. So if South Korea use this wild card, it's no longer effective. So I don't think we got to, It's no longer effective. So I don't think we got to, we are not, we didn't really get to that point where we really have no option but to use this wild card.

So I don't think South Korean government will just dangle this option. We have this option, so you guys take caution. You guys being Russians? Yeah, you guys. But President Yun has this knack of saying this just very directly. I mean, you choose, you make a right decision here.

It should be either North Korea or South Korea. You choose, you make the right decision. Right, that's very, very bluntly. Yeah, yeah. That's his style. But I guess you asked that question. I mean, that's going to be the threshold that South Korea shouldn't be crossing

at this stage. I personally believe that there is still room to wiggle as far as the relationship between Russians and South Koreans is concerned. So we will have to retain that wiggle room as of now. I've got one last question for you. This is a vision question or an imagination question. So maybe a thought experiment.

So looking at the East Asian region more broadly, South Korea has more in common with countries like Japan, Taiwan, and many of the Southeast Asian nation states. And South Korea, of course, wants to be a global pivotal state. That's how it's marketing itself. And what about the experiment? Think about this thought experiment. If South Korea, perhaps, pushed a vision for some kind of a block or a community of free market, liberal, democratic states in East Asia and announced to leave it open to both North Korea and China under the Communist

Party that when you're ready you'll be welcome to come and join us when conditions are right but right now we're going to focus on countries that act in similar ways and that trade in similar ways and that have governments that you know vote democratically in similar ways. That's a great suggestion actually. I like that very much. I guess wittingly or unwittingly, the current South Korean government is doing exactly that. But it's just a matter of messaging management, I guess.

I don't think that message is not being properly imparted to North Koreans and Chinese. So as far as that big strategy is concerned, we should be very clear about our strategy, strategy of being with a group of like-minded countries, US, Japan, and American key allies in Europe. But then again, we gotta keep sending these messages to North Koreans and then also Chinese as well. There is a room. I mean, we can certainly, if this very tough stage

of US-China competition subsides to a certain extent, we can reengage each other US-China competition subsides to a certain extent, we can reengage each other so that we can have this economic relations in earnest. That goes to North Korea as well. I mean, this is a tough time. And I mean, I guess both Koreas do understand that there isn't really no other way around here at this stage of Cold War. But if things subside to a certain extent, there is a room to

maneuver. There are avenues through which we can cultivate our relationship as we did in 1990s and early 2000s. Well thank you very much Dr. Kim Jae-chun for coming on the NK News podcast. It's been very interesting talking to you. Where can people find out more about you? Are you on Twitter or do you have a website people should look at? I'm not much of a social media guy, but I guess my contact information is available on Sogang University website.

So if you have any further questions or comments, please do not hesitate to contact me. That's great. Okay, we'll put a link to your Sogang University page in the show notes for this episode. Once again, thank you very much for coming on this show and good luck with your subcommittee for international cooperation at the unified future planning committee. Enjoy being here. Thank you very much. Thank you. Join the Korea Pro Community and unlock a world of exclusive insights on Korea. As a Korea Pro member, you gain access to articles, expert analyses, and comprehensive reports that keep you ahead on Korean affairs.

Plus, enjoy priority invites to our unique events in Seoul that connect you with key leaders and influences. Elevate your understanding of Korea. Join us today at koreapro.org slash podcast. Ladies and gentlemen, that brings us to the end of our podcast episode for today. Our thanks go to Brian Betts and Alana Hill for facilitating this episode and to our post-recording producer genius, Gabby Magnuson, who cuts out all the extraneous noises, awkward silences, bodily functions and fixes the audio levels.

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