North Korea News Podcast by NK News - Lee Sang-sin: Why most South Koreans no longer see unification as necessary

Episode Date: February 5, 2026

Lee Sang-sin of the Korea Institute for National Unification (KINU) returns to the podcast to discuss the results of the think tank’s annual survey, which found for the first time ever that less than half of South Korean adults think that unification with North Korea is necessary. The expert discusses how Seoul’s broad unification framework […]

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That's shop.nknews.org. Hello listeners and welcome to the NK News podcast. I'm your host, Jack O's Wet Slu, and today it is Thursday, the 15th of January, 2026, and I'm joined here in the studio by, well, somebody who's back for the first time in a long time. It's Dr. Seng Shin Lee, who's a senior research fellow and polling expert at the Korea Institute for National Unification, or Kino. Dr. Lee was last on this podcast on episode 74 in June 2019, so that's six and a half. years ago. Welcome back, Dr. Lee. Thank you. I didn't realize it was that long time ago. We really should have you on more often. I know we've run into each other a few times and I've said, you've got to come back on the podcast. So it's finally happened. Now, Dr. Lee, when we last spoke in

mid-2019, you noted the waning interest in unification amongst youngest South Koreans. But when I asked you about this, you said that unification was an ambition that could not be abandoned, that the government of South Korea should reawaken the desire for unification among the young people. So six and a half years on, how is that work progressing? Has the desire been reawakened? Thank you for the question. And six and a half years ago, it was before the failure of Hanoi summit between Kim Jong and Donald Trump. It was actually a few months after. June 2019, we spoke to the failure in February. Yes, sorry, long time ago. I'm getting old.

Not Sinai, but I'm getting old. Yes, yes, it is a few months after the summit. I do not exactly what word I have used, but probably I was referring to people's losing hope after the failure of Hanoy summit. And I'm afraid to say that the trend continues. Last year in 2025, the Kino conduct our annual survey, and for the first time in our city,

series of survey, the less than half of Korean population says that they want, they think the unification is necessary. Less than half of, and that's the whole population, all age groups? Yes, yes. We survey the Korean adult above 18 years old. And there are two major surveys asking the same questions, Seoul National Survey and the Kino survey. The wording is the same.

But we are using the different scale, Seoul National. They use a five-point scale. We use a little simpler four-point scale. So the result is a little bit different. But when you say a four-point scale, you mean something like, it's very necessary, it's very unnecessary, and then two in the middle. Yeah, exactly, yes.

So there are two positive answers, two negative answers. In Seoul National, they have the middle ground. A neutral. Yeah, in case of Seoul-Lational, Sub-A, if people don't want to say it, and they don't, I'm not interested, they tend to go put a neutral answer. Okay, so your survey forces people to take a position.

Yes, yes. So comparing with the Seoul National Survey, our survey tend to have more positive answers. More people who are taking our survey tend to say that unification is necessary. But in Seoul National Survey, about five, six years ago, I think, already less than half of the, there is,

respondents says that unification is necessary. But with our survey, even with the four-point scale, now it's less than half of the respondent's that unification that's a big change. And that's the first time ever in all the decades that Kino has been doing this survey. Yeah, okay. So do you see that as a trend that is likely to continue?

Yes. And I want to show the graphs I'm using in my report, but the line is almost linear, constant. falling. Year by year. Yes. There are some fluctuations when we have the summit between North and South Korea in 2018. People were very hoping for the unification.

At that time, there was a peak, a sudden change is for the people who think that the unification is necessary. But after that, it's falling constantly very slow and steady and decreasing. I have a question about that. You mentioned the word hope, but also we've talked about, We've talked about what the survey asked about, is it necessary or unnecessary? Does your survey make a distinction between the respondent's level of hope and the respondents thought about the necessity of unification? Yes, our survey contains over 200 items.

So it's very extensive survey. We have like 40 questions regarding their attitude toward unification. So every single one of them. But if I'm allowed to say, my overall impression from my survey, I think the failure of Hanoi Summit is a kind of turning point for the Korean public

when we got to the attitude for the unification. Before that, we have a little bit of hope. We knew that unification would be very hard, and it is necessary. But after that, I think the Korean public realized

maybe it's not possible. Maybe you have to rethink the necessity of the unification. Do we have to spend all of our resources and energies for the oncoming freedom of unification? I think that's what changes and that's what drives down the attitude toward unification. Now, under the I Jem Yong administration, how does Kinyu interpret the mandate from President Lee to redefine into Korean relations through reconciliation and cooperation and to institutionalize peaceful coexistence? What does that mean in practice for your research priorities and public diplomacy outputs? Actually, I Jemeyong government, the unification policy and the North Korea policy is not new at all.

Even the Kim Dejung, President Kim Dejong in 2000, when he gave an address in Berlin, that's one of the most important presidential address regarding North Korean problem. And he says that unification is necessary and important. but it will be very hard, and we don't think it will come in a few decades. So, first step, we have to focus our energy on reconciliation and coexistence. And in Izaymyeong and Munzein, even Yun-Sung-Yel, did not deny, they all inherited the North Korean policy from the Kim Daegsum's inside. I recently reread the Kim Dejun's address, and it's remarkable.

And people think that Korean conservative government and progressive government have totally different the unification policies. I do not agree. So you see a straight line from Kim De Jong's Berlin speech in 2000 to where we are now. Yes. Are there some bumps in that straight line, perhaps during Imi Yong Bak or Pakun He? Yes, when it comes to the details. But the big picture of this is hard, it's going to take a long time, we'll do it step by step,

it's not going to happen overnight, we don't want to. a collapse unification by absorption. You see that has been consistent through all the last, gosh, what, six, seven presidents. Yes, the outline for the unification policy was designed by the No Tehu and Kim Jong-Sam in 1989 and 1994.

The Kim Jong-Sam was the current Korean government official position for the unification is called Minzochung-Tongtze Tongil-Bangan. What's the English translation? Wow. Min-jog being sort of the essence. community of Koreans and then Gongdong Che being sort of a community.

Yes, that's the English official translation. It's awkward. I don't know. It was the Kim Jong-Zam was the first architect of the unification plan in 1994. And it has three parts. First part, peace and coexistence. Let's have some economic cooperation and some kind of peacely exchange in North Korea. Let's get along. Let's do not fight. And after that, we go to the next phase of the Confederation. Yes. North Korea and South Korea form kind of the European Union style, the political community between two Koreas. Some people call it a low-level federation.

Yes. Or a confederation. There's not much difference. There is a difference. Oh, is it? Yes. Federal government is the high level of government. Federal government represents North and South Korea.

In foreign relations, they have the military, they have the foreign powers. But in confederation level, South Korea and North Korea have their own autonomy and sovereignty. They have, just like European Union, Congress is not above the individual nations. The Confederation of Korea is not above South Korea and North Korea. It's when in small number of issues we discuss with the Confederation government. But North Korea and South Korea wills, still have maintained the sovereignty. That's the Confederation.

After that, we aim for the complete unification. That was the three phases. Three phases. From 1994. 1994. And Kim Dejung merely elaborate the 1994 plan. Even after the Imeng Bakunabank, Bakunay, Yunsegiel, they are all conservative president.

They have kind of hostile attitude towards North Korea, but they didn't deny this, the, the Minutescoctuary Okay, that's interesting to know that. Now, let's look at North Korea for decades of course from 19, let's say 1950s more or less that North Korea had this

policy that unification is the ultimate goal of the North Korean government. As of late 2023, we see an end to that. Kim Jong-un, Pyongyang has publicly ruled out dialogue, even low level, and economic cooperation and unification. So in that environment, what specific roles should Kynu, your organization, prioritized this year in 2026, both at home and abroad? And also, what indicators would count as success?

That's a very hard question because it's still controversial in South Korea. But when it's South Korean public, long time ago already decided that North and South Korea are going for the separate ways. Constitutionally, we cannot allow that. South Korean Constitution says that North Korea is part of the South Korea. And in 1990, when North and South Korea signed basic agreement, it says that we, the North and South Korea agreed not to recognize each other as a sovereign nation. They agreed. Yes, we signed.

We have the document. Okay. Because in 1990, you know that the Soviet, the whole Soviet blood was collapsing. and everyone was expecting North Korea will collapse in a couple of years. So they kind of signed everything South Korea as for. So the reason why North and South Korea agreed not to recognize each other is that we think that to accomplish unification, two sovereign nations cannot be unified.

To accomplish unification, it should be treated as internal matters of ethnic nations. So the North Korea view South Korea. So at the same time we joined the UN as a sovereign nation, but we treat each other not as

an independent. So it's kind of ambiguous. It's very ambiguous. It's like there are two careers, but we say there's only one Korea. Yes. For other countries like Japan and United States, they recognize South and North Korea as an independent nation, but North Korea and South Korea are

that we would not recognize to each other as a sovereign nation because that was at the time we thought that that was the only way to achieve unification in the long run. But interestingly, this is happening at the exact same time as the two Germans were on the way towards unification. And those two Germans had mutually recognized each other for many years before that final step to unification. So this is getting away.

from what I really wanted to ask you in the beginning, but I am curious. Do you know why that decision was made to go the opposite way of the German, the two Germany's recognizing each other? Because at that time, both South and North Korea wanted to join the UN. Okay. Yeah, that was the... And that had been a sticking point for many years, right? Yes, yes, yes. Half of the world did not recognize South Korea as a sovereign, the communist part. And the American part of the world did not recognize North Korea as a nation. So we exchanged, we concession that part.

So we will join UN as a sovereign nation, but still we want unification. And how to achieve unification? And without the ethnic ethnicity, the nation as a same ethnic ethnicity, North and South Korea agreed that we need to maintain that part. So let's continue to do that. Let's continue both North and South Korea

exceptionally nationalist country, very conservative in 1990. So that was the agreement. And Kim Jong-un just broke that agreement, made by his grandfather, the father of the North Korea. That's a big step, very bold step for the Kim Jong-un. We've talked about that on this podcast before, that there are certain risks associated with taking a step like that. But coming back to my original question there,

so given that current situation, the antithesis of North Korea to unification, right now. How does that affect what tasks and roles you as Kino, the Institute for National Unification, prioritize? Yes. We simply cannot give up the goal of education. I imagine at Kino there are people who look at North Korean materials, right? They read the road. Yes, yes. Is there, I'm just wondering, is there a team within Kino that's been trying to delve in into those materials and work out, is Kim Jong-un seriously giving up on unification or is this a smoke screen? Oh, yeah, it's fierce.

Okay, so the conclusion of your colleagues is this is real. Yes. Kim Jong-un really has given up on unification. Yes, of course. And you guys are saying, but we're going to continue planning for unification. Yes. Okay, so that's a little bit of a mismatch there. Now you've got the current minister of unification, John Dong Yongi, he's been ministered before 20 years ago under President Norme-Hon.

He's an interesting gentleman. He's saying things that sometimes seem a little bit out of step with other members of the current administration like the security side, the national security advisor or even sometimes a foreign minister. How closely does Keenu coordinate with the Ministry of Unification or is Keenu sort of an independent act like we'll just do the research and you guys carry out the policy? How do you do that? Okay, I don't know if it is important for your audience, but Kynu is not the sub-brancher of the ministry identification. We belong to the office to the prime minister.

Okay. So we, of course, we work very closely with the Minister of Unification. We do the research for the Minister of Unification, but we do not take orders from the Minister of Unification. This is interesting, okay. So he can tell you, he can say, I think they should do this, but you say, well,

we take our orders from the Prime Minister, so we'll do whatever the Prime Minister says. Yes, yes. And there's a reason why we are separated from the Minister of Unification. Kinou was founded in 1991. Under No Teu? Yes, right, right after the German unification. That's when we truly started to believe that possibility of unification,

we thought we need to start unification. So that's why we found Kinau in 1991. At that time, Kynu was a sub-branch of ministerial unification. But in 1999, under Kim Dejong? Yeah, under the Kim Dejum, not only the Kynu, Kino, all the government ministry has their own, the institutions

like Kino. All those ministry institutions were separate from their mother institutions. And they formed a group, we call that Gyeonginsan, and under the Prime Minister's office. So there is a reason

why we separate the think tank from the ministry. So our role is to work with our the ministry, in case of Kenya, is the ministry unification. But our job is not only the orders from, follow the directions from the ministry, we must be able to criticize when the Minister of Unification makes mistakes. Internally, I'm guessing, right?

Yes, of course. Probably not publicly. Yes, publicly, I will lose my job. I wouldn't do that. Okay, I want to ask you to criticize John Gong Yong today, then. But there is healthy tension, creative, constructive tension between ministry and Kino. Right. So I think that's a very good thing. So the ministry, not just in South Korea, all the government is, they have hierarchy. They value efficiency.

But as a think of time, we need to figure out the best way. the efficiency is the important goal, but it's not our first priority. You're sort of more focus on independence of thought. Yes. Is there a tension within Kinoe between those who are a little bit more security-oriented and those who are more engagement-oriented? I don't think there's attention. Yes, in Kino we have about 40 researchers,

or the majority of them are the political science major, some economies and sociologies, even the literature major, the North Korean culture. There are various lines of thought, but we have consensus. The unification is important. We cannot abandon the goal. Sometimes the security is important,

but we have to find a way to persuade North Korea to maintain our goal for the unification. Okay, now let's talk in detail about your 2025 global survey on concrete unification carried out in August last year around the time of Liberation Day and also the foundation of the Republic Day. And you were the principal investigator for this survey conducted last year. Has Kino always conducted a global multi-nation survey on unification? There's a lot of interesting stories, backstories about this global survey for the sake of the phone of your audience. Let me tell you just one story. The survey started in 2024 by the suggestion of the Dan Minister of Unification, Kim Jong-ho.

He was a very conservative guy, but he wanted to know how the foreign nations, like the United States, the UK, Franks, how they feel about North Korea and South Korea and what is happening in Korean Peninsula. So that's how it got started. And I was not the PI of that survey in the first year. There's a story which I cannot reveal. But anyway, the survey finished in the December of 2004. So we have the public conference to present our survey findings on the afternoon of December 3rd.

Oh, that was the martial law day. But hang on, on December 3rd, it hadn't happened in the day. It hadn't happened in the afternoon, right? After that happened at 10.30 in the evening. Yes. It was, yes, as I told you, the survey was suggested by the minister himself. So, minister was there, Kim Jong-ho. About five hours before the martial law was declared by the Yun-Sung-Gel.

He was sitting in front of me. Where was this held? Where did this press conference? I did the Sang-Gonguei-Hesa, I don't know. Oh, yeah, down there near Numbdom, the Korean Chamber of Commerce and Industry. 10 minutes on foot from here. Yes. We have very nice public conference.

The minister Kim Jong-ho gave a very nice opening remarks. And after five hours, he went to the Yongsan and declared martial. Oh, he was part of that group. He was in the inner circle. Yes, yes. So our research got buried. Right. Yeah, nobody got notice of the global survey.

Yeah, no headlines for you the next day. Oh, my goodness. Wow. So, yeah, that was the first survey in 2024. I see. So the most recent survey is the second iteration. Yeah, second, yeah. The 2025 survey was second way with survey.

And now this time, I was the principal investigator of the survey. So I changed a lot of the survey questions. It's a brand new survey anyway. Now, was there any major change in which countries were surveyed, year or any methodological cautions that we should keep in mind when we look at that? We survey eight countries in 2004 and another eight countries in 2025. So there are some countries that surveyed two times, the US, Japan, and Poland was because Poland is influenced by Russian-Ukid and we want to know how Poland opinion

was opening a tour, North Korea has changed after the Russian. And also the Germany was surveyed twice because of the unification. But I wanted to cover all G7 countries by the survey. So all the G7 members surveyed the countries were surveyed at least once. In 2024, we also surveyed Australia and Vietnam. And last year we surveyed Mongolia and Canada. and Sweden. Wow.

So which country results surprised you most and are there any where the country was surveyed twice in 2024 and 2025 where the patent was quite steady? Yes, the most interesting one is Japan. Okay. Simply put, Japan has both South and North Korea. Equally.

Yes, of course, Japan likes South Korea a little bit better, but overall, very negative tone. So the other countries, especially the Western countries, the European and the North American countries, for them, South and North Korea is a mirror image. South Korea is a good Korea. North Korea is evil Korea. That's understandable.

The European and the Americans tend to have no knowledge of the Korean matters. That doesn't mean that they cannot make decisions. They don't have the attitude. because they don't know much about the Korean issues, they use this kind of mirror image to make decisions. So they know that North Korea is a human right abusing, very evil country, Kim Jong-un has very bad health or something like that. Everything, South Korea is everything opposite of North Korea.

So North Korea is bad at this point, then South Korea must be good at this point, something like that. So even with the lack of knowledge, they can make decisions and judgment like that. But Asian countries, Japan knows a lot of things about South and North Korea. They were directly threatened by the North Korea and the missile tests and the nuclear weapons. So they know a lot. Actually, we tested the level of knowledge on each country,

but Japanese are most knowledgeable people. When we ask the national image of South and North Korea for Japan, South Korea national image is a little bit better than North Korea for the Japanese people. But even with South Korea, it's negative. South Korea is better than North Korea, but still bad. Interesting. Yes. Other Asian countries like Vietnam and Mongolia, they both like South and North Korea.

So they're positive towards both Korea. Yes, yes. Because Mongolia and Vietnam, they still have very good relations with North Korea. North Korea help Vietnam for the day of war against the U.S. And Mongolia still have a very good relationship. And their economy, Mongolia and Vietnam depend on South Korea. So they also have very good relationships with South Korea. So they like both Koreas, which is very different from Western attitude.

So the Asian people, And the European and the American people have the very different attitude, different way of interpreting things from the Korean methods. Did you survey China too? We will survey China this year. Okay. Because I want to see what that, I would like to hear next year, what the Chinese are. I have a feeling that the Chinese people will be,

some Chinese people will be negative towards both and some Chinese people. Anyway, I'm very fascinated. What about Poland? You mentioned Poland as a, a... a European country that on the one hand, it's next to Germany, which is a reunified country. And we know that in the early 1990s, Poland was quite concerned about what a unified Germany might mean for it. But Poland is also on the other side, you know, it's close to Russia and it's been directly

affected by Russia's war against Ukraine. So I read in the executive summary that you said me that Polish people uniquely, they read South Korea as being ambitious. Possibly this is influenced by the big Korean defense deals. Korea is now sent near the defense industry, selling a little bit more about Poland, how Poland sees Korea. Yes, that's very interesting part of the survey. One of the our survey question is how to view South and North Korea as in terms of the ambition to dominate other countries. And South Korea tends to be looked at as a peaceful, not ambitious country, while the North Korea's ambitious country. But in terms of Poland,

they tend to be a sort of aggressive and ambitious country. So not only ambitious but also aggressive. Interesting. I have to talk to Polish people. But one of the hypotheses I can present now is that we're selling a massive amount of weapons around Poland. And we are basically re-arming Poland against Russia. And I think that kind of relationship currently we are having with Poland is,

maybe they affect the Polish people and their attitude to South Korea. Interesting. Now, generally, in your global survey, I understand that most countries say that unification is desirable, but unlikely. So how do you communicate that gap between ideals and feasibility when you're explaining this survey to Korean or even foreign audiences? It's not easy to say that unification is not desirable. People are nice.

People are nice. So then you think. So when many ask you things like, do you think the unification is desirable or necessary for the Koreans? They tend to say yes. But is it possible, probable? But again, this time they will give you more honest answers. They don't think it will happen again. I think that's why that explains a gap between the reality and the possibility.

Does that fall in line with how South Koreans, See it now or are South Koreans even lower on the desirability scale than foreign countries? The Ministry of Education was formed in 1968. And as I understand it, wasn't the ministry at first. Yeah, yeah, the name was different. It was called Gupto Tongil One. Like an institute, really? Yes.

One of the first project they did in 1969 was public opinion survey. Okay. Which was very, I... Within Korea? Within Korea. I discovered just recently because I was very surprised that, to my knowledge, the real public survey only started in 1980s. Because in military dictatorship... Well, who's going to speak openly about their opinions?

They don't want to know their opinion. Okay, yes. But the Minister of Unification, the original body of Minister of Unification, they conducted a survey. It was very well designed, surprisingly well designed. And I think it was conducted by the professors of the Southern University. At that time, people, over 90% of people said that unification was necessary. But even then, people have doubt about the possibility or probability of the education, even in 1960s and 70s.

Well, I mean, 69, of course, was just one year after, that tumultuous year of 1968 in which many things happened, the Blue House raid, the Pueblo, and lots of inter-Korean skirmishes along the border. At that time, South Korea was not necessarily the stronger or the richer than North Korea. It's understandable. But my point is that there is always a gap between people's desire for the unification and people's understanding of the possibility of an unification. So I think currently people are losing up the unification,

People really don't think that unification is possible, at least in near future, but it's not new at all. Right. Yeah, that's interesting. Now, looking at North Korea's nuclear weapons in your survey, threat perceptions seem to be strongest in Japan, understandable, and in the U.S., also understandable, weaker in Europe, but Mongolia stands out for believing that North Korea has nuclear weapons, mainly for self-defense. How does Kino think that Seoul should tailor outreach on the nuclear issue to different countries, different audiences? I think Mongolian people are very nice. They never say any negative things, both to South and North Korea.

And I really don't think Mongolia people feel any threatened from the North Korea, and that's partially explained what they feel safe from the North Korean nuclear threat. In 2024, we served with Vietnam, and they tended to find They were okay with North Korean nuclear powers and weapons too. So the Vietnam and Mongolia still their socialist country, they don't care about North Korean nuclear weapons. One more thing, they are okay with South Korean possibility of going nuclear. When you say they, you mean Vietnam or Mongolia or both?

Both. Both. Yes. One, I cannot recall if I included this survey question and in the executive summary. But one of the question is that how they think of the South Korean's possibility of the

developing nuclear weapons. And mostly all the countries are negative, but Vietnam and Mongolia and Poland relatively okay with South Korea developing our nuclear weapons.

Overall, it's negative. But comparative, compared with other nations, they are relatively okay. My guess is that they want their own nuclear weapons, especially Poland and Vietnam. Vietnam too, interesting. Does Kino have a stance on whether South Korea should develop its own nuclear weapons or not?

Is there a policy position? Our policy position is our government policy position, and the police system is we are not going nuclear. Okay, all right, that's very clear. Now, when you have survey respondents ranking the different tools that can be used to reach denuclearization, diplomacy comes first, followed by sanctions and then military options. What concrete diplomatic moves still have traction given today's frozen channel between the two careers and also no conversation between America and North Korea?

Well, the question is that we ask the people from the foreign country, that do they think that their own government should have South Korea? Applied diplomatic pressure? Yes, to deal with North Korean nuclear threat, militarily, diplomatically, or financially, yes. And we have a bunch of the co-writers, and my part was to analyze Italy. And I found a very interesting thing about Italy. The younger generation of Italians, very helpful with South Korea and our cause. And it's statistically meaningful differences between Italian younger generation and older generations.

Italian younger generations are very positive with South Korea, and they are more willing to help South Korea to deal with North Korea. I cannot give you the exact reason why they do that, why the Italian younger... Shenzhou? Probably, that's my first guess. But there could be other explanations. Maybe the, not just Italian young generation, but young generation, younger ones, because they are stupid. They are not optimistic. They are very optimistic. They have very positive worldview. Maybe that's because they are young.

Right. Because they think that. Naive, perhaps? Yes, I'm also. I'm cynical. You're cynical. Yeah, I'm cynical. Okay. Yes. But, yes, but soft power could be other hypotheses because the, the, the, the, They are the main consumer of Korean cultural product. They listen to K-pops and K-drama. So they know a little bit more about South Korea. So maybe they are more sympathetic for the South Korean cause to deal with North Korea.

And I think the same pattern could find in other countries. I'm still analyzing other countries, it's massive data. Yeah, there's a lot of work there. Now, with a high percentage of respondents, expecting relations between the U.S. and China to worsen or to stagnate. How does that macro frame shape foreign public's appetite to support Korean peace initiatives? One of the reasons I include this question is to test if our survey is in line with other surveys. So this is new survey. We are not sure how survey would do well. So we need some kind of indication that survey is to measuring people's

attitude correctly. And there are other international surveys that ask the same question how they expect the U.S.-China relationship with goal in five years to like the few research surveys. And I think our finding with the people's expectation with world politics is almost identical with the other surveys. That's the first reason why we measure the people's attitude.

And my overall estimate of that question is that people are losing hope. People are past mistake. The U.S. used to be a benign leader of the world politics. And I don't think people still look U.S. as the same light. And China, many people still have doubt. China cannot simply replace U.S. as a benign leader of a world policy. China still need to develop new ways to persuade the foreign countries. Now, if peaceful coexistence of open-ended, you know, not peaceful coexistence,

not as the first stage towards unification, but just kind of a forever, you know, continuing status, if that's now the most realistic thing that young South Koreans are hopeful for, how should the Korean government talk about purpose and payoff of unification to South Koreans who are under 40? In Kino unification survey, I designed that question about 10 years ago. The question is if South and North Korea can peacefully coexist, the unification is not really necessary. And we ask the people if they agree or disagree with the settlement. And one of the reasons I love this question is that the steadiness of the answers. It's not influenced by the external factors, like the Hanon.

summit or the Korean summit. Even in 2018, when all other variables were influenced by the ongoing summit between South and North Korea, still this question continues its trend is ever decreasing. More people want peaceful coexistence over the unification. As an end state. Yes. The graph is almost straight line. More and more people believe that instead of unification, maybe the peaceful coexistence is the more preferable goal between the more realistic goal. And there is no really generational differences in this regard. Younger generations, it is right, the younger generation

that tend to be more skeptical and more pessimistic about the prospect of unification. but older generation is not that different. And older generations, they may be more hypocritical. Do you find, are there any narratives or messengers or civic education tools that are effective to turn that around to get younger people interested in unification? We are trying that. I can only give you some suggestions, but the education for civic education,

especially civic education for unification is the important medicine. especially for the Minister of Unification. They have special branches for the education. Under the conservative administration, they tend to focus on anti-communist education. They teach people how bad system North Korea is. Under the progressive and liberal administration, they tend to focus on the necessity and the good prospect of unification. but we have to find the new narratives of unification.

We have to abandon the ethnic dimension of unification because the South Korea is now multicultural relation. It's heading that way. Yes. We are already there. More than 5% of South Korean population is from the foreign countries. That's 5% of South Korea is more than 50 million population. So 5% is not small number.

And it's increasing. If you go to the rural area and if you go to the elementary school, sometimes within half of the class was filled with the children whose parents was not ethnically Korean. Right. So you think it may be removing the idea of Minchuk

from this conversation about community and unification might be the way to go? Eventually we have to. Imagine you are a teacher in elementary. school in rural area. Half of the U.S. student is their skin color is not Korean skin color. And you have to say that we have to achieve unification because North and South Korea are the same Min-Joc, same ethnicity. I don't think that can continue. Yeah, well, those classes, the attention will not be there. Yes, yes. So still,

the ethnicity in both Korea is very important thing. But not, for long, it should be changed. Last question here, making it a bit more, bringing it down to the personal level, in your own inner circle, the next generation, your children, your nieces, your nephews, how do they see unification?

They don't care. Do you have conversations? Are you trying to convince them? Yes. They know that I walk for the canoe. Yes, I can messily put this stuff. of unification in North Korea. I think they kind of be cautious in front of me.

But overall, the younger generations, for them, North Korea is just another country. Just another country. Annoing neighbor. Right. Yes. Still, if there is some incident, especially between North Korea and Japan, maybe the nationalistic instincts would kick up, but I don't know, what the younger generation of South Korea,

North Korea is not that special. Wow, well that's what we'll have to leave it today. Thank you very much, Dr. Sankshan Lee, for coming on the show. And we hope to see you again before six years have passed. Thank you. See you again. Bye. Looking to stay informed about South Korea's fast-evolving political business and cultural landscape,

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