North Korea News Podcast by NK News - Minjung Kim: The Ten Principles that govern the lives of North Koreans

Episode Date: November 14, 2024

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Subscribe now to stay fully informed and support our mission to raise the bar in North Korea reporting. Until the end of November, podcast listeners can sign up for just a dollar for their first are our daily update and week ahead newsletters, plus get exclusive invites to online webinars and occasional in-person events. Join our community today and help to the NK News podcast. My name is Jacko Zwetsut. I'm your host and this episode was recorded on Thursday the 10th of October 2024 in the NK News studio and joining me here today for the very first time on this podcast is Dr. Kim Min-jung, who is Deputy Director of Unification Human Rights Studies at the Institute for National Security Strategy, the INSS in Seoul. And she's also at the same time, President of SAVE NK. And today she's here to talk with us about the 10 principles of North Korea. Dr. Kim, thank you for joining me.

Thank you for having me here. So this document is called the 10 principles for short. The long title is the 10 principles for the establishment of a monolithic leadership system in Korean, the 10th principle of the 10th principle of the 10th principle of the 10th principle of the 10th principle for short in Korean. It's not a very long document, it's quite short. It's only five A4 pages with 10 main principles and 60 numbered sub-principles and a preamble of about one page and a short conclusion at the end. The English translation is a bit longer. It's about nine full A4 pages and 4,000 words approximately. So first of all, how would you describe this document? What is it and what are its contents and how important is it to average North

Korean citizens? To begin with, the 10 principles are a set of rules used to exploit North Korean people's labor and also to unify them under the leader's dictatorship, making them one of the most important tools of the regime. The original version was introduced in 1974, aiming to make Kim Il-sung an absolute figure, insisting that the whole world should be unified under Kim Il-sung's Juche ideology. If you're in North Korea, you might not know the Constitution or the Workers' Party Charter, but you can still survive. But if you can't survive without following these 10 principles, many believe that around 80 or 90 percent of political prisoners are in prison for violating these 10 principles,

showing how much higher they rank over the Constitution. Okay, so it's a very important foundational document in the lives of every adult North Korean. Now, when you go to North Korea, you can buy a lot of copies of many different texts. You can buy the complete works of Kim Il-sung, the works of Kim Jong-il. You can buy speeches by Kim Jong-un about North Korea. You can buy lots of books about Juche. But North Korea does not sell copies of this small booklet in Korean or in any other language, nor does it quote from this booklet in any of its texts that are available to the outside

world. I've only ever found copies of the text, in fact, on South Korean websites such as the National Intelligence Service website where I found the full text in Korean of the 2021 edition. In searching through the English and Korean text of the complete works of Kim Il-sung, I only found one very brief reference in passing to the 10 major principles of establishing the monolithic ideological system that was the original title of this document from a speech that Kim Il-sung gave back in 1973, I think. Now I recently corresponded with one member of a Korea Friendship Association, that's

a group of foreigners who are very pro-North Korean, and that person claimed that the document is completely fake, made up by South Korean intelligence services. So the question is, why is the North Korean government so secretive about a document that is so foundational in the lives of every North Korean? I don't have a clear answer why they don't publicly talk about this 10th principle. But I would say why it's not effective or whether it is effective in North Korea, people, or whether the 10 principles is working well. I mean, politically, negative perceptions of Kim Jong-un has been growing in North Korean

people and defectors. I mean, in North Korea, North Korean defectors who lived under the rule, under his rule after 2022 tend to have a more critical view of the regime compared to all your defectors, I would say. Under Kim Jong-un, the burden of taxes of the people has increased and dissatisfaction with the party's leadership has grown. For instance, tax collections, which used to be on an yearly or quarterly basis, it is now open demanded weekly or even daily. The range of people subjected to these taxes has also expanded.

So this aggressive cash collection strategy, it seems to be linked to international sanctions. And I don't think personally, Kim Jong-un would have any motivation to publicize this 10th principle, given this background. I mean, even more significant issues in social factors. Yeah, well, I want to get to those social factors a bit later on. But first of all, how do we know that this book exists at all? Have copies been smuggled out of North Korea? I haven't seen the physical copy of the 10 principles, but in our institution, we have several high ranking, former high ranking North Korean officers.

And one of them who defected last year, I just wanted to confirm if it really exists. And I asked him, and he asked me back, can I see the copy, the most current copy you have? And then I sent him the link from the NIS. Right, the same link that I looked at. Yeah, the same one. And then he was very surprised. Like, wow, how come in South Korean intelligence community has the whole entire context, the contents. And then he even

the whole entire context, the contents. And then he even, like, he even pinpointed what has changed since 2020. So that means, you know, it exists in North Korea, and it is real. And they did revise in 2021, which we will be talking about. Yeah, now at this point, I can say that I have actually seen a copy of that book, the physical red paperback book when I was on a trip to North Korea. I saw it somewhere and when I asked my guide if I could obtain a copy of the book, he told me no. Oh my, oh my, no way. And the reason, when I asked him the reason he came back the next day and he said because,

well, he said, Jaco, if you were Korean Korean like us and if you believed the same things that we believed Then you could have a copy of this book But since you are not Korean and you don't believe the same things that we believe you can't have this book Mm-hmm, and so I didn't get a copy except for the the the one on the website now going back in 2012 multiple podcast guest dr Christopher Green at Leiden University and the International Crisis Group, he wrote in a piece for Sino NK that quote, upon his arrival in Seoul, Hwang Jung-yop, this is back in 1997 when Hwang Jung-yop defected, Hwang Jung-yop commented

that he was very impressed with the quantity of books on North Korea that were available. However, he was less impressed when he started to read some of them and he found it particularly disturbing that nobody seemed to know anything about the 10 principles. This was because he said nothing could be more important. So presumably the National Intelligence Service and maybe even the Institute for National Security Strategy, where you work, had a copy of this document in 1997 when Hwang came down here, since it's been around in North Korea since the early 1970s. Why do you think it's so little known even amongst people who write about North Korea here in South Korea? To begin with, I've known these 10 principles ever since 1998

when we were preparing to establish our organization, the NGO 7K. And we have all the connections inside North Korea at that time. So for me, it's not unfamiliar in the documents, but this is not the typical, it's not the case for the 10 principles per se. This is the general problem about North Korean issues as a whole. The lack of information from inside North Korea and the lack of trustworthy information. That would be the basic, the main problem, I guess. Now what status do these 10 principles have? Are they laws? It is, as I said, like, you know, it is,

it has higher rank, defective higher rank over constitution. Okay, so it kind of sits above the laws, does it? Yeah, yeah. So when we talk about, you already mentioned earlier, the charter of the Korean Workers' Party and the Socialist Constitution of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, but this document, the 10 principles, if you look at it in a hierarchy, it's above those two, is it?

I mean, in terms of punishment, like in the daily life of the ordinary people, this is the important thing to follow. Right, okay. Now in the preamble to the document, which is about one page long, it mentions a couple of sentences in that preamble talk about national unification. Now that unification is off the table, I wonder what might happen to statements like, and here I'm going to read from my translation, the great comrades Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il are the lodestar of unification of the fatherland and outstanding leaders of the world revolution, having dedicated their entire lives to the cause of Korean unification and that of human independence.

The great leader and the great general opened a bright future for the unification of the fatherland through their tireless efforts and made immortal contributions to the realization of the global cause of independence. So with that, with, you know, unification off the table, do you expect to see a new revision of the 10 principles since the last revision was issued only in 2021? A short personal answer would be yes, because it's been more than 10 years since the last major revision in 2013. I mean, you know, there are two minor changes in 2019.

The title has changed. The title changed in 2021. There are some minor changes. But you know, based on the past, the 10 principles haven't fully achieved their original goal of solidifying Kim Jong-un's dictatorship, you know, from my personal opinion. Given North Korea's recent emphasis on the two, and as you say, you know, the two-state theory or getting rid of the term unification. It's possible that the principles could be revised again sooner or later. If so, I see two potential directions.

The first one would be Kim Jong-un's title and Kim Jong-un ideology, Kim Jong-un's title and Kim Jong-un ideology, Kim Jong-un-jui. The revision could focus on officially securing Kim Jong-un's title as supreme leader, Suryong, and reframe the principles around a new national identity based on Kim Jong-un-jui. The second, alternatively, the 10th principle could be revised in line with North Korea's hostile two-state theory. This would mean removing any references to unification and clearly defining South Korea as the enemy, the only enemy. It might emphasize national sovereignty, territory, and defense, making South Korea the main enemy. Additionally, we could see

the principles shift from promoting ethnic unity or nationalism or unification to highlighting state-centered ideologue. Now, you just mentioned there that there were some, the changes made in the 2021 edition were not very great, but I looked, I compared the differences between the 2013 and 2021 editions. Apart from removing mentions of Kim Jong-il's songgun revolution and bringing language used to refer to Kim Jong-il into line with language used to Kim Il-sung, there were not many changes. As you said, there were quite sort of surface level changes. And Kim Jong-un himself is not mentioned by name in the 2021 text.

What do you make of that? Sure, as for the 2021 version, which is the most recent version, it focused on four main changes. The first one is strengthening the Kim Jong-un regime, as you pointed out. And the second is further legitimizing the power succession of Kim Jong-un. And third, as you said, reducing the importance of the Sun-Kun or military first ideology, while adding more emphasis on nuclear power. I need to emphasize this. And the first one is removing the terms, you know, proletarian dictatorship or communism. Also the number of provisions was reduced from 65 to 60. Okay.

Now, although Kim Jong-un is not mentioned by name, since he's now given the title Sooryoungnim, he can be inferred logically whenever loyalty to the Sooryoungnim, the leader, the great leader, in a general sense is mentioned, can't we? Yeah, yeah, definitely. I mean, I, you know, from my point of view, there will be some, there was some background about the recent revision in 2021. And as you said, most of the changes were about strengthening internal ideological unity and referencing Kim Jong-un's regime. I think this is driven by four factors. The first, the regime was facing challenges from both inside and outside. Internally, the state was struggling with economic difficulties

and growing dissatisfaction among the people, leading to continuous crisis. And externally, international sanctions and pressure were worsening the situation. So Kim Jong-un needed to solidify the regime and ensure loyalty to himself. The second one is the legitimacy of Kim Jong-un's power succession, as I mentioned. And the third, removal of the terms, you know, proletarian dictatorship and communism. That shows that at least initially, Kim Jong-un is focusing on practical economic development while also indicating his intent to strengthen the military. The first factor, the last factor is justification of nuclear power, which I emphasized. The emphasis on nuclear power was aimed at giving North Korea an upper hand in negotiations

internationally, while internally using military strengths to secure Kim Jong-il regime. Now, I want to talk a little bit about the language that's used in the document, the 10 principles about Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il. The 10 principles describe them as the eternal sun, S-U-N of Juche. It describes the Kum-Susan mausoleum as the sacred shrine of the eternal sun And it exhorts the people of North Korea that we must venerate or we must exalt them It uses a Korean phrase Nop-pi-pat-du-ryo-mo-sho-ya-handa. So does this sound like religious language to you?

I mean as an ordinary South Korean person It sounds very awkward. Awkward, okay. It doesn't sound like church language. It sounds just kind of strange. I'm personally, as a Christian, I believe the ten principle is based on the ten commitment from Christianity. But yeah, I get your point, but it's not like, you know, directly related, I would say.

Well, because I have read in several places that Kim Il-sung's younger brother, Kim Yong-ju, who was raised as a Christian, wrote the Ten Principles in the late 1960s, modeled after the Ten Commandments of the Old Testament, as you hinted at, but that Kim Jong-il revised and rewrote these 10 principles, making them public to North Koreans in the early 1970s as part of his struggle to cement himself, that is Kim Jong-il, as the successor to the leadership of North Korea. Does that accord with what you've learned? Yeah, I mean, me, like as a Christian, I learned in a trinity, like God, Spirit, and Jesus. The 10th principle is not quite the same. This is my personal opinion.

But yeah, it's been revised three times, including the title. And during the process of the revisions, I think it's been changed. And in the original version in 1974, the main motivation for Kim Il-sung, Kim Jong-un, was not to copy the 10th commitment, but to make him a legitimate leader after Kim Il-sung. So I think the motivation is not the same. It's quite the same as the Ten Principles, I mean, Ten Commitments. Right, no, sure, of course, it's a different,

yeah, but do you believe that that's true, that Kim Yong-ju, the younger brother of Kim Il-sung, wrote the original text that Kim Jong-il later on changed? Yeah, I believe so as a Christian, and not only the Ten 10 principles per se, like the whole entire theory, ideology in North Korean people, and including Juche ideology. I believe everything is based on Kim Il-sung's background,

like his family background, you know, his mother, her name was like Peter in Korean, and know, his mother, her name was Peter in Korean. And his uncle was pastor and the entire family was very dedicated Christian. And he, I believe, you know, as a, I mean, I got a master degree in modern Korean history because I really wanted to know a little more about the roots and ideology of the North Korean regime. So that's what I learned. So you would see the North Korea's ideology as a kind of a perversion of Christianity, is that right?

Yeah. Have you talked to North Korean defectors and refugees about how their lives were impacted by the 10 principles? Oh my god. Yeah, they even talk about like how tough how hard to be a real Christian after they defected to South Korea because they've been they've been struggling with those like 10 principles and the life review or self-criticism. Yeah.

Which like all of them are very related or very similar to the daily life as a Christian in Korea. We have prayer meetings and Friday night and they have meetings after meetings on Sunday and like, you know, dumb prayer meetings. It's very similar to what they've been practicing in North Korea. Yeah. Yeah. So I guess that brings me back to the religion theme again.

I have a question here about that. So we've talked about, on this podcast, I've talked with some other North Korean refugees about those self-criticism sessions, the weekly self-criticism, and how they use those 10 principles as a yardstick against which they measure their lives. So does this feel, these meetings and the way that it's used,

does it feel to you like a sort of a confession of sin and a repentance and a forgiveness like in Christianity? Lacking Christianity? Liking, so similar to... Liking Christianity. That's not my opinion. It's their opinion. The defectors in general, their opinion is very same, is very similar to the Christian, the daily life. Is everybody in North Korea expected to remember all the principles? I don't think they remember, like they memorize, they're obligated to memorize like line by line, but they know the 10 principles and they know what kind of behavior will be against those principles. I'm going to put you mean the contents, every single line seems to be very unusual and very like awkward, I would say.

You know the whole document. I've translated the whole document into English. So I've got one that really stands out to me. So I'll read it out and I'll get your reaction, your opinion. This is principle number nine. We must establish strong organizational regulations so that the entire party, nation, and military

move as one under the monolithic leadership of the party center. So that's principle number nine. But the interesting part for me is under that principle nine, sub principle number five, we must not permit disorganized phenomena such as individual cadres arbitrarily convening organizational meetings of the party, government agencies and workers groups reaching conclusions in scare quotes that do not align with the party's intentions during meetings,

altering or creating party slogans without proper organizational approval or establishing organizations for social movements. So that's principle five. Now as a friend pointed out to me, this seems to leave no scope for the kind of liberalization of ideology moving away from dogmatism that was seen, for example, in the People's Republic of China after Deng Xiaoping's speech in 1978 called, Emancipate the Mind, Seek Truth from Facts, and Unite as One, Looking to the Future. What do you think? Yeah, that's the whole point of the Ten Principles and the problem of the Ten Principles.

The individualism in North Korea, which has been expanding, it clashes with the monolithic ideology or ten principle. That's the point. And this ideology, the ten principle, inherently promotes totalitarianism, as you pointed out. But since Kim Jong-un came to power, the spread of individualism among the people has been very obvious for the last 10 years. To elaborate a little more, what's really noteworthy is from 2020 to 2010, the importance of personal matters was on decline.

But after Kim Jong-un took power in 2011, this trend reversed. So by 2016 to 2020, over half of the population believed their personal affairs are more important than their work. So this growing individualism naturally leads to a decline in trust, not just in party's leadership, but also in law enforcement and the judicial system, not to mention the mobilization of the people. Okay, so you're saying that there is a growing individualism, sort of a trend within North Korea, that people are moving away from this monolithic trust in the party.

But the document, the Ten Principles, is all about bringing people back to the party. But I also find it interesting, kind of contradictory, that there are also admonitions to adopt a creative and forward-thinking approach to our work and to thoroughly eliminate outdated work methods and practices, including authoritarianism and bureaucratism. So how are we to understand such contradictions? Do your North Korean informants ever say that they were confused or didn't

understand how to interpret these things? I mean the entire, the North Korean society as a whole is full of contradictions. You know, what they proclaim is different from what, you know, their daily life is. The ordinary people's daily life is. Getting rid of those dictatorships, authoritarianism in written documents, I don't think it really means that. It's the same. same like, you know, we, we, the people, the people centered, you know, ideology, whatever. They claimed they're like family oriented states. And then North Korea is family oriented

states where everyone likes each other. And everyone is sacrificing themselves to for the sake of the nation. And as a whole, why the real life is exactly the opposite. I think this is the same. They claim what they claim, you don't need to focus on what they claim. We just need to focus on what their daily life is and how this 10 principle is utilized in their daily life. I don't think the people get confused

about this, what they claim, because the North Korean community, I mean, the society is full of the same contradictions. A reminder that starting from November 20th, our full-length episodes with special guests will be exclusively available to NK News subscribers. This shift will allow us to invest more in bringing you top quality interviews, cutting-edge analysis and a more comprehensive NK News experience across our website and podcast platforms. So don't miss out. Subscribe now to stay fully informed and support our mission to raise the bar in

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So I want to get a better picture of how these principles are actually studied and applied. Is the focus on the headline 10 principles or do they regularly dive deeper into the 60 sub-points? I don't think that ordinary people know about the 60 points. I mean, it was formerly 65 points back before Kim Jong-un era. So, I mean, it doesn't matter. You know, there's the minor, the detailed, the contents. It doesn't matter. What matter is like how those 10 principles would affect in case the people are not following directly, I mean, accurately the 10 principles.

I don't think they memorize. I mean, I'll give you an example. Please, yeah. There's a lady who defected a couple of years ago and she was asked, when she met the NIS guy in China, in Chinese border, she was asked to answer the 10 principles, exact wording.

And then she was like, how come I would, why should I remember every single line by line 10 principles? Why should I do that? So then she is from the Han-kyung area. So those ordinary people who just live their daily life in border area, they are not still into, I mean, it's not obligated, they are not obligated to memorize this 10 principle. But they know it's in their life. But when they do the life review, the Sengho Chongha, the self-criticism, don't they start

off with principle one, subpoint two says blah blah blah, but this week I was very lazy, I didn't do the in-min ban cleaning properly so therefore I disobeyed principle one, subpoint two and I'm a very bad follower of Kim Il-sungism. Isn't that level of specificity included in the self-review sessions? I believe, I mean, here in South Korea, not in North Korea. So I mean, I might be like, you know, the information I have might not be so updated,

but from my point of view, I mean, to begin it, it depends where you live. Like if you live in Hamgyong area or border area, or if you live in Pyongyang, like the center of the regime, it all depends on like where you live and what your social status is. So if you are one of the elites, maybe you could, you would be obligated to follow strictly, very strictly what the regime asks you to do, like, you know, strictly following the Saengwalchongha. But as you may know, in Han-kyong province, like, you know, all the suburb area, rural area, the Saengwalchonga is not the same as 10 years ago.

So you don't need to follow, you don't need to memorize like 60 points. And like, you don't need to follow Saengwalchonga. To begin with, Saengwalchonga is not that strict recently in rural area. So it really depends on where you live and what your social status is. When you speak to elite-level defectors who have come from overseas, so maybe these diplomats or traders or business people or students overseas, do they tell you that they also had to read and study and follow those 10 principles?

Oh, I didn't specifically ask them, but the person I asked about the existence of the 10 principles still, he could pinpoint it. He was able to pinpoint the very subtle, very minor changes in 2021, not to mention the title change in 2019. He was in foreign countries for a long time, but still he had old updates. So he had an updated version, yeah. Yeah, and when you've talked to defectors,

can you, I know you said that the Sengwal Chungha, the self-criticism is not as strict as it used to be, especially in the countryside, but what does it look or feel like in a study session? Can you walk us through the process? What is it like when they get together and they're there with the books and the notebooks? And how does that session go? Yeah, frankly speaking, I haven't done a life session. So everything I would say is from my personal experience from, you know,

with network with defectors, my friends defectors. But, you know, more than 70% of the defectors are female to begin with. And majority of them are from the northern province instead of the Pyongyang or the central part of North Korea. So you don't need to, I mean, I can't generalize what I heard, but that said, the saengalchonga or all the regulations from the regime is not as strict as before Kim Jong-un era compared to in the Kim Il-sung era is that the control of the regime, I think it's been not the same. Do you think that's a deliberate strategy by Pyongyang?

I don't think... Is that a liberalization? No, it's not intentional. I don't think they have any single intention to liberalize, per se, liberalize the people or in any single extent. This is, I think, based on lack of their control over the people, thanks to, I would say thanks to the outside information. Yeah.

Okay. So people smuggling or buying videos and DVDs and USB sticks and things like that, you're saying that's eroding the control of the North Korean state, is it? Yeah. I think there's only the sole vision and background, and which I've been working very hardly for the last 20 something years. I'm as an NGO, as an NGO person.

I mean, I'm a deputy director at INSS, but at the same time, I've been running an NGO for ever since 1999. And now every single day, the content has been smuggled and aired inside North Korea. Is that the main work of your NGO, to bring information into North Korea? As an NGO person, as a chairman of SaveNK, that's my main job, but I'm a full-time employee at INSS. My position in NGO is outside of my position at INSS. Right, no, I understand, but of course, it's relevant to what we're talking about.

So tell us a little bit more about SaveNK, because many people may not have heard of it before. You said you started it in 1999. What was the main mission in 1999? Oh, so Save NK, the former name was CNKR. Save NK was established back in 1999. At the time, we as a Christian organization, we established and the main purpose of the organization at the time back in 1999, like 25 years ago, was to give the North Korean defectors the refugee status from UN. The defectors in Chinese borders. So we started a signature campaign. We ended

up gathering 1.8 million signatures here in South Korea, in South Korea and US. You could imagine like it was not back in 1999, everything was done manually, like nothing digital. One network. Yeah, so I have to get the signatures on paper and digitalize and put in cities. And we brought all of the cities, I think it was 20 something cities to UN. And we met the UN, HCR head Ogata Sadako at the time. Was that in Geneva or in New York?

In Geneva. In Geneva. And Mel Robbins later on and we delivered the cities to UN, I mean, US Senate senators and US House of Representatives, and then to EU. And that was 2002. After we delivered the cities, there's the first ever defector who got the refugee status.

Like two or three months later, we submitted this to UN. So that is a big success. And I didn't expect to work for North Korean people for more than two decades. But ever since that, we've been helping North Korean people, more than 1,000 people, escape from North Korea and settle down in South Korea or in the US. And still we've been working these things. And actually, South Korea was established by my father, who was a former mayor of Seoul, and he was judge in Seoul Supreme Court,

and he's from North Korea. Ah, obviously, okay. Yeah, he came right before the Korean War. Right. And as a very dedicated Christian, he just established this organization, and he got struck in 2008. So ever since that I've been with my husband, we've been working and we've been running

this organization. Now it must be difficult these days to help people get out of North Korea because of the fences and you know on the Chinese side and the North side, and all the CCTV cameras and the increased security. So has that changed your organization's work? Even before the difficulty, before COVID-19, because of lack of funds, we could not continue the rescue efforts. When my father was running this organization as a lawyer, he had enough personal funds

to support these activities. But after he'd been hospitalized in 2008, like for four years, more than four years, we have to shift our strategy and more focus on the defectors in North Korea at the same time sending information inside North Korea. So that's where when we started some other method and we've been airing mid-wave radio broadcasts in North Korea, You know, still now, like every single day. And... OK, medium wave, that's like AM, isn't it? Yeah.

OK. Yeah. And thankfully, we are the only NGO who has been able to... Really? Yeah. I thought there were other groups that broadcast radio into North Korea. Oh, there are... I mean, yeah, there are shortwave radio.

Ah, okay, so you're not doing shortwave, you're doing it on medium wave. Yeah. Okay, and does that have a, what's the benefit of medium wave? Does that have a longer reach? Shorter reach, but enough to cover the Chinese border, even to Russia, what it was took.

Like, we've been checking the quality of our radio broadcasts very frequently, like, you know, quality-based. Yeah, what it was took. Like we've been checking the quality of our radio broadcasts very frequently, like quality base. Are you able to say where your transmitter is, approximately, is it in South Korea? I mean, I'm not supposed to, sorry. All right, okay, I understand for security reasons.

Okay, do you also use other methods? Do you send balloons or anything? Back in late 90s, we've been sending balloons, you know with not The guy who've been in a pack some huh? Yeah, not the guy. I mean, I like him. I love him But there's another guy the original Email called who is his name is Eaming book. Okay. Yeah, he was the Person who started doing the balloon launching and efforts. So you tried that too?

Yeah, but not, not, not anymore. And I'm more focusing on new technology, like, sorry to, I, I cannot, you know, uh, specify what method I've been trying to do, but I would say those are high tech. Okay. Yeah. Sometime like partly utilizing network and partly utilizing very high end technology and including some like satellite like service. And how are you raising funds for that these days?

That's tough question. The previous, you know, during the previous administration in Korea, under Moon Jae-in. Yeah. I never submit any single fund application for five years, can you imagine? So that was a tough time. Was that because it was politically

difficult to get funding? It's not a matter of politics. It's a matter of how they are not so supporting, I would say. Supporting our activities. It's not a matter of supporting, you know, you know the background, but I don't want to criticize the Korean government. Although they are not quite in line with what we've been doing. So we just decided not to get any funds from the Korean government. Instead, we are lucky to secure some funds outside of Korea, like internationally, including the US and the Congress. So we've been successfully, thankfully,

continuing these efforts. And now I have all the connections in US and in Europe who have been working for the sake of Iranian people for the last five years. So I've been trying to utilize their technology to South Korea I mean to North Korea. Yeah. Yeah now bringing it back to where we were earlier when we started this conversation with the ten principles In your content your radio content or in your other Information content that you're bringing into North Korea. Do you target the these ten principles?

Do you do you talk about them? Does this become part of the content that you put out there? I didn't have any motivation to talk about the 10 principles because I don't think that that's what the North Korean people want to hear. But it is something that they, as you said, it's a very important document. It affects their lives in many ways. I thought it might be something you could try to counteract or explain the background of it or something like that.

Yeah, I would think about it. One of the things we really deeply dig into was Jewishuche ideology because Juche ideology was the one I think that Christianity was based on. You mean Juche ideology was based on Christianity? Yeah. Okay. So as a Christian, I really wanted to cover every single sentence which Hwang Jang-yeop emphasized and every single problem it has. So we've been covering the topic Juche ideology for a long time.

What really is Juche ideology? How would you summarize Juche ideology in a couple of sentences? Juche, as everyone knows, is like self-reliance. But self-reliance doesn't necessarily mean relying on North Korean people per se. It's more likely in a Chinese regime center or Kim Jong-un centered ideology, better than for the people as you know. So yeah, it's the main method, main weapon for the regime to control over those people. Yeah. Is there anything else that you wanted to say about the 10 principles that we haven't

talked about that you think is important to know? Oh, I think we've been, I mean, there are some points about the revisions, you know, back in like 2013 or... Right, the beginning years of Kim Jong-un's time. Yeah, but I think it's outdated. I just wanted to point out one thing, like yesterday, you know, the Constitution, the revision of Constitution, the Constitution amendment, which was released like yesterday. By the Supreme People's Assembly, the North Korean parliament. Yeah, so everyone is expecting, you know, it will cover

between Parliament. Yes. So everyone is expecting, you know, it will cover what Kim Jong-un asked to amend. Right, we're expecting to see something about maybe a revision of the borders. Yeah. So what did you find? So as you know, you know, Kim Jong-un stated at the end of last year that he wanted to define North and South Korea relations as hostile between two separate states. Yes. And he even mentioned that South Korea should be declared North Korea's top enemy. Right. But however, yesterday they did not include these hostile theory nor they removed the term like unification. Did that surprise you? Yeah, it was a surprise.

But everyone is wondering why they did not cover this. And I think there are like three possibilities. Like, I mean, these are in Kim Jong-un's order. Who would dare ignore them? Okay. So there may be only three possibilities. What are they? The first would be simple. Kim Jong- there may be only three possibilities. What are they? The first would be simple. Kim Jong-un will do these plans. So he changes mind basically.

Yeah. And second, the changes are still in preparation. But that's 10 months after he announced them. It's a long time to prepare, right? Yeah. And the third one is the announcement has been omitted and or delayed for strategic reasons. Strategic reasons? Yes, I don't know, but for the first scenario, I don't think it doesn't seem to be very persuasive. Kim Jong-un doesn't seem to have changed his mind. Yesterday, North Korea's military also announced the regime is committed to the two-state theory.

North Korea claims there are defensive measures for national security, but it could be interpreted as a move toward solidifying physical separation or even preparing for military conflicts. That is, it was the second scenario. If it was the second scenario... Which says still preparing, Kim Jong-un could be aiming to secure legal justification through gradual actions to cut off South Korea. He might be escalating tensions step by step,aming the US and or South Korean government for the situation. And then later, manding this constitution once it's politically advantageous.

Okay. And the third one will be... Strategic delay. Yeah. If that's the case, it will be to avoid international backlash, or possibly, Kim Jong-un would wait for the US election before making it public. So there are several reasons. I don't think he has changed his mind. Which one do you think is most likely? No one knows. Maybe he's hiding or he's just delaying that announcement. I don't know. Could there be a

fourth scenario, which is different from the first three that you've mentioned, that there may be some internal disagreement or chaos or friction within the North Korean system? No one would know exactly, but I'm not that positive about the internal conflict and the impact of like elites, given the character and Kim Jong-un's characteristics. But it's my personal opinion. Now, I want to finish off just a last couple of questions. So you're at the Institute for National Security Strategy. Maybe some of our listeners don't know much about it. So what is the INSS?

How does it work? What does it do? It was established back in Park Jung-hee administration under NIS. I mean, at the time, the title, I mean, the name is NIS. KCIA back then. Yeah, KCIA. But I don't know exactly when, but INSS became independent from NINIS. But we're still, you know, technically in control of NINIS. Okay. Does it mean everyone who works there is an agent?

Not me. So you're not. Alright. Okay, and what kind of things do you research there? I'm a Deputy Director at NISS working for Freedom of North Korea, or North Korean people's human rights

and unification related issues. Although my academic background is on nuclear proliferation, which is one of the main points, main area of INSS. And INSS is Institute for National Security Strategy. So security is the focal point of our institution. security is the focal point of our institution. But we have a new center, I mean, new department on North Korean human rights,

meaning the Korean government has been more focusing on the North Korean human rights and for the North Korean people, instead of just simply focusing on and emphasizing the importance of the regime and emphasizing the importance of the regime, the regime and the all the problems of the regime. We've been shifting our main area of focus to the people per se. So one of the things I've been doing is developing new technologies and creating network internationally because we don't have enough

human resources inside South Korea in this area. There's new technology including AI and satellites and internet services. So those are the things I've been mainly focusing on. So it sounds like there's a natural fit between the work that you do for INSS and the work that you do at your NGO. Would that be fair to say? Yeah, that's why I finally decided to join this institution. I had some other opportunities, like several other opportunities to join the Korean government for during my 25 years of NGO works.

But none of the positions I got offered, I was not interested in any of these positions because my main point is North Korean people. And if I join the Korean government, coin is North Korean people. And if I join the Korean government, no matter whether it is a unification ministry or whatever, my capacity would be minimized because as a Korean government official, I cannot send radio to North Korea. So this is the only opportunity I have. I mean, INSS is independent right now from government, like technically, although we've been very closely collaborating with the NIS and the Korean government, we are technically independent.

So I'm not a South Korean government employee. So I have all the freedom. Wow, there you go. That's probably an interesting position to be in. Yeah. Yeah. All right. Well, I'd like to thank you once again, Dr. Kim Min-jung from the INSS, from coming on

to the podcast and talking to us about some of your research and about the 10 principles. Thank you. Thank you for having me today. Thank you. Ladies and gentlemen, that brings us to the end of our podcast episode for today. Our thanks go to Brian Betts and Alana Hill for facilitating this episode and to our post-recording producer genius, Gabby Magnuson, who cuts out all the extraneous noises, awkward silences, bodily functions, and fixes the audio levels. Thank you and listen again next time.