North Korea News Podcast by NK News - North Korean troops for Russia, a new Seoul strategy and the ‘Hero of Panmunjom’

Episode Date: July 29, 2026

NK News Correspondent Joon Ha Park joins this week’s podcast to discuss Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky’s claim that Russia has requested another 30,000 North Korean troops for its war against Ukraine. He explains how realistic a deployment of that size would be, why Russia may be preparing facilities in the Voronezh region and whether DPRK […]

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Hello listeners, welcome back to the NK News podcast. This week, we're looking at reports that Russia may receive tens of thousands more North Korean troops, Seoul's new peace-first approach to Pyongyang, and the story of a South Korean armististice representative, who later became a celebrated figure in North Korea. And to help me unpack these stories, I'm joined today, Tuesday, July 28th, in the studio by NK News correspondent, Junha Park. Hi, Junha.

Hi, Alana. Junha, let's write in. President Vladimir Zelensky. He says that Russia has requested another 30,000 North Korean troops to help fight its offensive in Ukraine. What exactly did Zelensky say? And what do we know so far? Yeah, so it came from an address on Saturday. So he's saying that Vladimir Putin has requested the additional troops from North Korea,

of 30,000 to the Varanegh region to receive, it was a newest batch of North Korea since June. And so obviously, North Korea's already reportedly sent about 16,000 soldiers, military engineers. We've heard previous predictions of much larger deployments. They haven't materialized. Just how realistic is a deployment of this science? Well, experts have said it does look quite realistic as of now. Keeves' intelligence are the only reports that we can refer to. We haven't seen anything come out from the announcement from Moscow or Pyongyang,

depending on how many troops are being transferred or are preparing to be transferred to that region. South Korean intelligence, as you mentioned, they estimated that 16,000 North Korean troops would go. This also coincided well with UK estimates as well from the UK defense minister that said 17,000. So it is something that looks to be on course, just dependent on how they actually get to the region, will be the telling question. Let's go back to something you've already touched on briefly, Junho. Zelensky says Russia has been preparing to receive these troops in Voronej, near Luhansk and Kharkiv. What does the location tell us about where they might be sent and what they might do?

So what we've seen since the war started is that the Varanage region is known as sort of cradle of Russia's Navy. So it is the birthplace of also the Moscow's airborne forces in the 1930. More recently, the region has also been known for hosting North Korean missiles at its depots, which have also become targets to Ukrainian strikes, these drone strikes. So similarly, Kiev, they've also struck military-related facilities in the region, including electronics production sites for Russian-ascanda missiles, operational complexes hosting this intelligence equipment for the aerospace forces of Moscow,

and warehouses belonging to a Russian Amazon-esque company. So given this region's location, it is possible that the DPRK involvement or the DPRK reinforcements of 30,000, will be involved in sort of auxiliary functions. So the Kim Jong-un regime looks probably favoring going against sending these forces straight to the front lines, but more in this region where they can help with logistics. Right. So ultimately it looks like that these possible deployment, they won't be going to the front lines. what other kind of roles could they be carrying out? Like, is it going to be things like reconstruction, rear-end defense, logistics, or as we've talked about before, drone operations? So it's unlikely that they will commit this large number of troops to deep offensive operations inside Ukraine. But I think they'll expect them to carry out reconstruction, as you've just

mentioned, in occupied territories, rear area security logistics. Of course, we could see the possibility of these troops ending up on the front lines. We could see that deployment could help Russia go deep into these drone heavy battlefields, well, they need to break through in order to gain some land. So we could see North Korean troops going forward, the 30,000 strong, but we still need to see as to how they'll actually get there in the first place. And of course, zooming out for a second, we're hearing all this just from Ukraine. What should we actually be watching for next, to determine whether this deployment is actually even moving forward? Yeah, so we do need supplementary evidence.

So this is not something that we can just solely conclude and say, look, we're going to trust Zelensky's report or Zelensky's intelligence 100%. You know, we still need to receive intelligence from the South Koreans, especially the South Korean National Intelligence Service that holds every briefings every so once in a while to the National Assembly, depending on their findings, especially considering North Korean troop deployment and North Korean troop movement. and North Korean troop movement within the Far East. Of course, at the same time,

we also need to look at supplementary investigations and intelligence from Keeve itself and also other European partners within NATO. But at the same time, it will also be interesting if we get something from Moscow or from Pyongyang. North Korean state media, they only admitted to the deployment in April of 2025, and that was right after Russia also announced it too,

at the same month. So we won't see an immediate announcement, but we could see something come out from Moscow's foreign ministry or defense ministry in the future days. So he still needs some supplementary evidence. It will definitely be interesting, as you said, Junan now, given the fact that North Korea has admitted to having sent troops to aid Russia to see whether if this deployment goes ahead, if we will see anything in state media sooner. Well, North Korea is expanding military relationship with Russia. It also helps to explain why Seoul is potentially reassessing how it approaches. is Pyongyang. With sanctions losing leverage and the North continuing to show little interest in

talks, it looks like the EJ Meng administration is placing greater emphasis on creating the conditions for dialogue. At a press conference on July 23rd, marking his first year as unification minister, Cheng Dongyang said the government had shifted from a denuclearization first approach to a peace first strategy. Chung also spoke of pursuing a nuclear-free Korean-prin-punuching. Chung also spoke of pursuing a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula rather than the complete neutralization of North Korea. Juna, you wrote a really interesting analysis about this. So first, I want to ask you, it does appear quite striking on the surface, this kind of language. Is this a major change in policy, or is this mainly a change kind of in the order in which

Seoul hopes to pursue its goal? Yeah, so I think it's the latter. So it's more of a sequencing change than a fundamental shift in the way that South Korea looks towards or the currently administrative looks towards implementing its North Korea policy forefront. So it effectively means that Seoul is trying to lower the bar for engagement with North Korea, rather than insisting on denuclearization from the forefront, as previous administrations have done, especially the UN administration, the Amun administration and administrations prior, they're looking as a starting point for negotiations,

where, of course, as a caveat, Pyongyang has also very much rejected any level of talks with the South Koreans, but the Lee administration, they do want sort of this reduction of tensions and their main idea is that if tensions are reduced, there may be eventually some room to have a suitable stature for negotiations going forward, freeze on North Korea's nuclear program, a moratorium before moving towards a difficult goal of denuclearization. Whether that will resonate with the North Koreans, that's something that's evidently not so true at this point. Yeah, well, I mean, ultimately, as you've just touched on, you know, the crux of this issue seems to be that North Korea just continues to reject any kinds of talks with Seoul. It's

defined South Korea as its hostile state. It's strengthened its relations with Russia, with China. Does Pyongyang currently have any kind of reason to respond to Seoul? Quite frankly, no. I think North Korea is in a much stronger strategic position on the international standpoint from its POV or point of view regarding, for example, military cooperation with Russia, closer definitary talks with Beijing, for example, that we saw just a month ago. It's still, you know, North Korea doesn't really have an incentive to bring South Korea to accommodate South Korea at the negotiation table and talk through a possible freeze and nuclear capability. Of course, we can't really rule out completely future opportunities, whether South Korea is a

player in that, that's a different issue. So we've seen the perspective of Kim Jong-un saying that if you drop denuclearization as an objective, then we could probably talk with the US. But for South Korea, he's flat out declined, saying in both occasions from the Ninth Party Congress, the Supreme People's Assembly back in March and February, we've seen that Kim Jong-un and his establishment have no interest in providing South Korea with a seat at a negotiation table or even for dining. So I think that we do need to understand that South Korea's current standpoint is pretty pragmatic. They understand and they're taking note of Kim Jong-un's position that denuclearization is a non-negotiable component of any talk. And they're just trying to set that aside for now and create some

conditions in order to allay concern from the international community. But at the end of the day, it is still a reality that poses as a dead end to Seoul's officials and moving for it's just, it'll be interesting to see how they maneuver that. Well, you know, you also spoke to a number of experts for your analysis. What did they make of this apparent policy shift or at least reordering of priorities? Right. So the experts or all of the experts that I talked to about this sort of apparent shift, the reason why we're describing it as an apparent shift was because Minister Zhang Dongyong, the Unification Minister who eventually gave out this statement, he said that it was a recent.

And that's quote-unquote reset. So some outlets, they interpret it a fundamental change in the way that South Korea approaches it. Of course, we're retaining, or South Korea is retaining denuclearization as an end goal, but still reformatting the structure in which you'll get to it. So most experts agreed with that. Most experts say that, as I said before, it's not a fundamental shift. It's just a sequencing change where the South Korean establishment or the government has

recognize that North Korea is not going to give up its nuclear weapons anytime soon. So instead of making denuclearization a prerequisite for these talks, you would present itself or South Korea as the eventual destination where North Korea can open up and say, look, we're compatriots. Let's sit down and talk. Whether Mr. Kim and his officials are coinciding with that and obligating to South Korea's hopes, that's a different issue. you. Well, even if Seoul does succeed in reopening any kind of dialogue, as you said, you know, with Mr. Kim, any broader peace process would eventually return to a much older question, and that is how to replace the agreement that halted the Korean War without formally ending it. That brings us to the

Korean War Armistice Agreement and to the unusual story of the South Korean General who represented Seoul during the negotiations before later defecting to North Korea. you wrote an absolutely fascinating feature, taking a look back at this story, because, of course, the Korean War Armist Disagrement was actually signed on July 27, 1953, so Monday marked the anniversary. But South Korea was not one of the signatories, which was news to me. It was one of the most interesting parts of your feature that you wrote. Why not? Yeah, so the talk started in July 1951. South Korea was party to them. So it spent two years at the table. but never really became party to the central agreement.

So the central sort of talk that surrounded between U.S. forces, Chinese forces, and also the North Korean forces, that were the ultimate key players in that conversation or that extended conversation over two years. So across, it was more than 150 plenary sessions at the first location of the talks in Kheong, all the way to the end in Panmunjom, South Korea only took part in the UNC,

delegation. They held no vote. They only relied on U.S. briefings or U.S. military briefings of the talks that came in. A liaison officer was included just as a translator. You know, these, this sort of armistice talks that went on in the process, of course, you had a South Korean representative, which was appointed by a UNC official. As talks of a ceasefire were consolidating, and the UNC was suggesting a ceasefire across the board, where a DMZ would separate the two Korea's and Korea would remain a separated country still evidently in war, but not firing against each other as per the three years. The South Korean administration at the time led by President Singh-Munri, they opposed any settlement that would leave the peninsula invited. They were demanding

that the war continue until reunification by force, refusing any armist without a mutual defense treaty with the United States. Many South Koreans at the time came out on the streets and protests, sharing his fear that a truce would only let communist forces led by North Korea and China to regroup and attack again and eventually swallow up the entire peninsula in their words. Of course, Singh-Munri ultimately won the treaty commitment, but still refused to sign considering his original goal in reunification by force and not accepting a divided peninsula. Well, another really interesting detail was the fact that this agreement was signed first at Panmunjum,

And then it was confirmed three hours later at the UN command headquarters in Munsan. So, do you know, who attended those two ceremonies? And what was the purpose of the second one? So as you mentioned, at 10 a.m. on July 27, 1953, we saw the North Korean general Namil, North Korean delegate to the conversation or their armistice talks, the CPVA or the Chinese People's Volunteers Army Representative, and the UNC commander at the time, General Mark W. Clark, who were all present to sign the agreement. South Korea, as we mentioned in the previous segment,

that they were not a party to the agreement, so they refused to sign and they did not send a representative. We saw quite an interesting segment from one of the South Korean journalists or one of the two South Korean journalists that were present at the armistist signing at Panmunjum at 10 a.m. where they were just sort of going over the sting of feeling the lack South Korean presence within the Panmenjum Hall, as it was signed. They were saying that Korea, once again, the fate of South Koreans is being

decided without South Korean hands. That was still a very symbolic moment for them. But of course, we saw a single military delegate from the Republic of Korea, a rock army major general, who was the sole South Korean representative to the armistice talks before they broke off in June 1953, a month before the agreement was signed. And his name was Chedokshin, who was a sole South Korean who was a career army official. He was present there on the order of Singhman Rhee, the president. President Singhman Ree basically called him up in the morning of July 27th saying that I think you should go to one of these ceremonies.

And he eventually went to the ceremony that confirmed it instead of the ceremony that actually officially ended it. And Che went on to reportedly become known as the hero of Panlundjum for defending Seoul's opposition to the ceasefire. Juna, how did that reputation help establish him within South Korea's military and political elite? Yeah, so Chez's military career comes way before him being labeled the hero of Panmenjum or Panmunjum a Yongez by Singhman Rhee after the armist disagreement. He was quite well established. His father was a prominent figure in Korea's independence movement in China against the imperial Japanese. He joined the Rock Army straight after liberation.

During the war, he was quite a controversial figure in leading one of the divisions that committed crimes against humanity, a massacre in a region in South Korea that claimed the lives of hundreds of innocent civilians, sort of allegations that they were linked to communist guerrillas. But, of course, after the armistice being, having made a name there, he was named ambassador to South Vietnam. under Rhee, after Park Jong-his military coup in 1961, where he took power the military junta that was in charge at the time named an foreign minister in 1961 through to 1963,

where he sort of built this diplomatic stature as a top envoy for his country to others. Also, at the same time, he became an ambassador to West Germany, which is where the sort of climax started for him as he moved forward to an eventual defection into the north. Well, before we go to that defection, Let's talk a little bit more about where he started, maybe his position started to unravel a little bit. And as you mentioned, that was during his posting to West Germany when he became entangled in the 1967 East Berlin Affair.

Do you know what happened? And how did this scandal contribute to his eventual break with Pachungi? Yeah, so the 1967 East Berlin Affair, I don't know if I'm doing the description any justice at the moment with this short explanation. but it was where, in short, the Korean Central Intelligence Agency at the time, well, they did abduct dozens of South Korean students, artists and expatriates within West Germany, with allegations for spying for North Korea. This triggered quite a diplomatic crisis. West Germany's capital bond and the president, or at the time of that capital, they were accusing Seoul of violating sovereignty, threatening to sever ties. It looked like the chair was being

put as a scapegoat. So he was since being the ambassador to West Germany at the time for the South Koreans, he was placed as a sole responsible for a diplomatic instance such as this where South Korean students' artists were abducted. It was later found in South Korean court rulings, post-Humasleas, in some cases that this was wrongly done. By the K-CIA, it was fabricated. This led to his departure from West Germany. And he came back to South Korea in shame, where the park administration effectively called them back. And then he took over as head of a religious group called the Chanduist Church. It's a small, very indigenous South Korean or Korean religion that blends Confucian, Buddhists and Taoist influences and traditions, and historically played quite a

prominent role in South Korea's history, especially considering their 19th century movements and their 20th century independence movement. So his leadership of the church itself was also quite controversial. So he had quite an internal dispute that went on over embezzlement. He was treating the role as a sideline. He ruled quite autocratically, and he mismanaged quite a church's personal finances or its church's finances. So that led to a reckoning for the park administration, and the park administration effectively shunned him out. And that's where the sort of rifts between the park administration and Che, and Che effectively moved into exile in the United States. So this is now, we're in the late 1970s,

Che has left South Korea, he's campaigning against Pax government from the United States. How did such a prominent anti-communist official become a dissident in exile? Yeah, I mean, you know, Che was one of the experts that I talked to are dear Andre Lancoff. He was saying that it was for revenge. He felt very shunned out. He was a very proud individual. But at the same time, you know, being shunned out by someone who he advised on foreign policy and domestic policy, someone in Park Jonghi who he trusted to be shunned out like that from an establishment that swallowed him whole. It was something that really did affect his personal stature and his personal influence over being embedded in that elite for quite some time. He spent his entire political career being embedded in South Korea's echelons. But, At the same time, he's now been shunned. And effectively, he built a sort of ecosystem or a tiny ecosystem for himself in the United States and the 70s. And then he moved to start accommodating North Korean officials, where he was a liaison with a lot more North Koreans and developing ideas and sort of linking his heritage and his identity to the North Korean regime.

So then moving on to his defection to North Korean. Korea. This was in 1986. Che and his wife announced they were going to settle in North Korea. Of course, this came off the back of, as you just said, Junha, a lot of liaising with North Korean officials. I mean, for Pyongyang, Che was an extraordinary propaganda prize. He was a former South Korean general. He was a foreign minister.

He was an armistice representative. Tell us how did Pyongyang use him after his arrival to North Korea. Yeah. Well, as you said, he was quite a prominent figure. South Korea, one of the key figures. if not the most key figure within South Korea's establishment in the 1960s, in terms of diplomacy coming to North Korea in the 1980s, decades later, saying that I'm a North Korean now is something that's quite a spectacle for Kimmel-sung's regime at the time.

His pull on to North Korea, it ran quite deep. So his father, Chedongu, he was quite prominent in young Kim Il-sung's education, or reportedly education. He also visited several times, as we mentioned before, But immediately after he defected, he was named vice chairman of the Committee for Peaceful Reunification of the Fartherland. Try saying that three times. Later, chairman of the Chondoischengu Party, which is basically alternative party to the Workers' Party or the ruling Workers' Party, and a deputy to the Supreme People's Assembly that we just saw happen last March.

They also put him quite a number of honors, including the Order of Kim Il-Sang in 1986 on the year of his defection. So he was effectively used as a sort of propaganda tool saying that, look, he's coming to the embrace of the North Korean regime after being shunned from the South Korean establishment. And sticking on the topic of propaganda for a second, his life was actually later dramatized in a film series called Nation and Destiny. And this was ultimately basically what made him a household name in North Korea. What kind of message did his story convey to North Korean audiences? Yeah, so the show was called Nation and Destiny. So it dramatized his life, as you just said, casting him as a man who was abandoned by his homeland in the South, only to return to Kimmel-sung's embrace. You know, it was a very, you know, flashy propaganda tool where it was talking about his life in the South as an army official to a diplomat, career diplomat, and then eventually being involved in a political incident.

and then coming into the north and becoming effectively hugged by Kim Jong-un's grandfather. So I think that when you look at his legacy and how it was remembered in the north, it's something that Pyongyang, it was a gift on a plate to them. Absolutely. I want to take a step back for a second because the reason that you wrote this historical feature was because, of course, July 27th fell on Monday, it was the anniversary of the Armist Agreement signing. July 27th, it's celebrated as Victory Day in North Korea.

South Korea observes it as UN Forces Participation Day. June, how did those different commemorations reveal about how the two Koreas remember the war? Yeah, so South Korea and North Korea, they have, as you said, very different interpretations of how the war played out and also how the armist disagreement was signed and what it actually means. So Pyongyang, they've always cast the conflicts ending or, what they deem as the conflict's ending as a triumph over the United States and South Korea, and also the 16 other nations, United Nations, countries that came. So in 1973, they designated July 27th as effectively Victory Day in their mind and made it a national holiday decades later. It does

carry quite different meaning in South Korea. South Korea wants to remember the veterans that served, especially the veterans that came to their aid from countries that didn't even know how to place Korea on the map at the time. So they, named it as a UN forces participation day, as you've mentioned, to honour their sacrifices and still remember that this war is still very prevalent in South Korea's national memory and national psyche. And finally, June, does South Korea's absence from the 1953 agreement that it still affects diplomacy today? And if the armistice was ever replaced by a peace agreement, which parties would actually need to sign it? Yeah. So in, I think it was early June when

President Lee was having his press conference, and I effectively said that the North Koreans have no interest in talking with the South Koreans. But at the same time gave the reasoning that, look, even in the armist disagreement, South Korea is not a signatory, and the UN forces at the time which had operational wartime or wartime operational control over all of the forces, they signed in South Korea's debt. So effectively, the U.S.-led UN forces at the time means that Pyongyang only wants Washington on the table instead of South Korea. So it still has a resonance of effect. South Korea is from that 1953 document that was signed still matters. It provides North Korea with a recurring legal, diplomatic argument over who should negotiate the end of the war. We've seen efforts in 2018, 2019, where the previous Moon administration wanted to end the Korean War with the North Koreans. Even then the document or the

prospective document had the debate whether South Korea should even be a signatory in the first place. Of course, South Korea is the sovereign state. It's most directly affected, and it would have to implement any military arrangements that come to the fore if Korean War Agreement is reached, or end of Korean War Agreement is reached. The parties that would be involved would be, well, it's quite evident that the four-party peace regime is something that a lot of professors and experts have suggested between the United States, China, the DPRK, and the Republic of Korea, where all are coming together in a seat. Of course, China's role is very much debated.

China probably should sign from one stature where because the Chinese people volunteers army were an original armistice signatory, and effectively they still have the legal standpoint. And then there's also the other argument where China does not need to be a formal signatory. Because the Chinese people's volunteers army no longer exists and it's effectively confuddled into the Chinese people's liberations,

Army that we see now. So it's still a recurring debate over how this war will actually end, but the effect of South Korea's absence in an armist disagreement from 1953 still very much is resonant within South Korean society. Junha Park, thank you so much for joining me today. Thank you. That was NK News correspondent, Junha Park, and you can read more about these stories at NK News and NKPro, and that brings us to the end of today's episode. Our thanks to Brian Betts and David Choi for helping make this podcast happen. For more reporting, analysis and expert insight on North Korea, visit NK News for the latest stories and NKPro for deeper analysis, data and research tools.

You can also watch this episode on YouTube and be sure to follow us on social media for the latest updates, clips and behind the scenes content. I'm Alana Hill. Thank you for listening and we'll be back next time with more on the stories shaping North Korea.