North Korea News Podcast by NK News - North Korea’s new destroyers, China border trade and Seoul’s coexistence dilemma

Episode Date: July 8, 2026

NK News Senior Analytic Correspondent Colin Zwirko joins this week’s podcast to discuss North Korea’s naval modernization push, from Kim Jong Un’s latest cruise missile test from the Kang Kon destroyer to the recent commissioning of the Choe Hyon, the country’s first 5,000-ton warship to formally enter service. He also breaks down his latest NK […]

When North Korea moves, you need more than headlines. NKPro's Intel Suite brings together real-time trackers, expert analysis, primary source databases and KCNA watch, giving professionals a faster, clearer view of developments across the DPRK. From missile launches and maritime activity to leadership movements, sanctions, trade and state media, NKPro helps government, security, finance, research and media teams connect the dots before their next briefing.

NKPro, the intelligence layer for serious North Korea work. Hello listeners, welcome back to the NK News podcast. Today is Tuesday, July 7th, and I'm joined in the studio by NK News senior analytic correspondent, Mr. Collins, Wurko. Hi, Colin. Whoa. Great to have you back with us. This week, we're going to talk some more about North Korea's naval modernization push

as well as an analysis that you just published that suggests, makeshift smuggling routes across the North Korea-China border have restarted after months of inactivity. Later in the episode, I'll speak with Gabriella Bernal about South Korea's shift toward distance with North Korea and whether it's even realistic, given Pyongyang's hardline stance against Seoul. But first, let's start with North Korea's nearest destroyer test. The story broke over the weekend with state media reporting that Kim Jong-un oversaw a cruise missile test from a new 5,000-ton-war. worship on Friday. Colin, let's start with the basics. What did North Korea test from the Kankan destroyer? And why is this evaluation significant? Yeah, so this destroyer is the one on the

East Coast. North Korea has two of these Cheyhan's class 5,000 ton destroyers that they've built in the last couple of years. One of them, they just launched on the West Coast. That was last month. They commissioned it to the Navy. We also saw in satellite imagery, that one isn't moving yet. from the cargo port where it was officially commissioned, where they had that ceremony. But the one that they tested over the weekend is the one on the East Coast. And that one's named the Kangon, and it's very similar to the other one. I haven't done a full comparison of exactly all the guns on board, but it looks very similar.

So it launched cruise missiles, 12 of them in quick succession, from vertical launch systems on the deck of the ship. And this test took place near Shinpo. So that was on Friday and they just reported it on Sunday. Colin, as he just said, in this test, we saw 12 cruise missiles launched in this rapid succession. What does that tell us about the ship's combat capabilities? And, of course, what do we still not know? The big thing that people typically say about this ship is that in a crisis, it could be found and taken out quickly by adversaries.

So that's the main issue with the ship's capabilities. but if it can get off 12 cruise missiles in a couple of minutes, those will fly low and are designed to evade enemy radar and anti-missile capabilities. So that's a significant capability in itself. But I don't know exactly how we'd have to talk to a real missile defense expert to find out exactly how effective that launch of 12 and quick succession would really be. There's an article that was written over the weekend by our colleague Shreyes, and there were some expert comments in that article. And of course, I'll link to that in our show notes.

We've talked about the Cancom before because it had quite a trouble launch last year, to say the least. This was the ship that we saw capsized on its side. How notable is it that North Korea now says this ship could be commissioned within just two months? Yeah, this ship was launched. It was built in Chongjin up the coast on the east coast. then in a parent ceremony that they never showed us, this thing fell on its side and capsized. And then they took a few weeks to pick it up out of the water, took it up to Rassam, where it was repaired for another couple months, I think.

Then they officially launched the thing last year. They said that this is going to go through its trial period now. I think that was in August. And then they sailed it down to back to the factory in Chungjin. And it was there for the last almost a year. Presumably they were fixing it up enough to where it wasn't in a dry dock. It was just on the pier there. Presumably they fixed it up enough for it to sail.

And then all that was left was to probably fix up the electronics, the interiors, anything else that was damaged and then get the missile systems in order. So now this thing has demonstrated its ability to sail long distance. It just went from Chongjin a few hundred kilometers down the coast. to Shimpo for two times recently. Last month for Kim Jong-Lun inspection and then went up to Rasson again, and then now it came back down to Shimpo for this missile test. So it is this video footage in state media. That's pretty believable, I think, in terms of where its location being confirmed. And then we also caught it in satellite imagery. So I think it is sailing understone power. It's launching missiles.

Really, this thing probably just has to go through its own checklist of, of tests, that's part of the Navy's criteria. So navigation tests, command and control, getting the sailors all on the same page, everyone's trained. So it's just a matter of time. And they might be a little bit late, but with the other ship on the West Coast, they were like a month late to that or so, or a couple weeks late. And I think it's just their, Kim is probably satisfied with the timeframe on that, given everything that's happened to it. Let's talk about that other ship on the West Coast, the Cheyhan. On June 23rd, North Korea commissioned the ship, its first, 5,000 ton destroyer.

So I want to talk about how these two ships fit together. The Cheyhan was initially expected to join the East Sea Fleet, which we talked about actually the last time that you were on the podcast. But it has now been assigned to the West Sea Fleet. Why does that change matter? I don't remember what we said last time, but this was kind of a strange one to begin with. They were building it on the West Coast,

and at that launch ceremony last year, they said it will be commissioned to the East Sea Fleet, which we had to take that. at their word, it was very clear in the state media text. There was no misunderstanding there. And I saw some people interpret the later announcement of the East Coast ship to mean that the West Coast one would stay on the West Coast. It ended up being true, but I don't know how we could have interpreted it any different. That East Coast ship was already well under development by the time that they said the West Coast ship would go to the East Coast. So it's hard to understand why they said that in the first place, but it's obviously a logical position for it to be in. launched on the West Coast, stays on the West Coast.

So they'll have one of each of these ships on either coast. And then even though they said that they're building a third one in Nampo on the West Coast of this class of destroyer, Kim at the ceremony last month was talking more about a 10,000 ton, much larger warships that he wants to build now at one or two every year or something. I forget if he said one or two per year, but it leaves the question of whether or not they're still building these, more destroyers or if they're moving on to the much larger ships. Something bigger and better. And as you said, Colin Kim Jong-in and just said North Korea can now build larger surface and underwater combat systems, including, as you just mentioned, these 10,000 tons

strategic vessels. How realistic are those ambitions? They had a really poor shipbuilding industry for a long time. It took them over 10 years to build four corvettes, much smaller ships that are like 77 meters long, and these are 140 meters long, really just to give a sense of the size and how much work it takes. So these are much more modern. They're showing an ability there to build these large ships. I don't think it's anywhere near the capacity of China or South Korea yet, but they're trying.

I think we'll probably see progress on this larger ship in the next year, whether or not it. I think he's ordering it to be done next year. So they're going to have to go fast. He has set the standard. So I guess we'll find out. They're not always successful with following through on his orders. As you've seen with the satellite launch program, good chance, but we'll see. Kim also admitted concern about the lack of naval bases, big enough to support these larger ships.

I thought that was something really interesting. I know it was something you also thought was interesting. Is infrastructure now maybe one of the biggest weaknesses in North Korea's naval modernization push? Perhaps. I think it's something they need regardless. I don't know if we can really judge how, okay, yes, they have aging naval bases, of course. And we have to see what kind of new naval bases they will even build. They only have one partway through construction on the East Coast. And it's very large, but I can't judge what kind of facility. There's only a couple buildings there that are even partway built. I think the thing that matters most is the weaponry on board, having a nuclear-powered submarine that they say that they're building something like that, which is harder to detect by enemies. That matters more than wherever they're docking, probably. They have places where they can put these ships that's just not sufficient in Kim's eyes for the crews and the maintenance needed and loading missiles on board

in a regular quick fashion, stuff like that. Going back to the Kang Kong for a quick second, just because I'm curious, when it came to that capsizing that happened, was that likely an infrastructure issue at the docking facility or something to do with the ship itself? Do we know? That one was on the East Coast at Changjin Shipyard,

and that one was side-launched. And I think that the way they described it in state media was, or I think the way that you can infer what happened based on the position it was in and it's supposed to slide down a bunch of, I don't know what they're called, but I don't know how to describe that, but it's supposed to slide down some rails

along its length, basically, sideways off the pier, and something got caught. And so instead of going down like that, it tumbled over the opposite, like a high side kind of situations. I think it had something to do with the shipyard.

and what they set up for that side launch. So even if they are building these ships on time, it sounds like they're still having issues with infrastructure capabilities. Yeah, and I think that they've started. So inside of that measure, we can see that they've started to build some new, very large, something at the Chungjin shipyard. So after Kim Jong-un purged the manager and some employees there

and said that they committed this criminal act with the failure of that launch. last year. They finally started to build something new there, making it sound like, okay, he still has confidence in this factory. But they started that a couple months ago and then installed now. And it's unclear what kind of facility it'll be. It could be like an enclosed dry dock with some hydraulic systems or some evidence of that kind of in the satellite imagery. But they've stalled on that. Definitely they don't have like modern chip building facilities at Chungjin, but the one at Nampo has been more successful. And they're also going to start building more at that Nampo.

shipyard. And those are the two that have built the ships so far. We've been talking about what North Korea wants to show the world. This is new destroyers, missile tests, its naval modernization. Now I want to pivot to some of your most recent reporting, which looks at something Chiang is not advertising. And that's the apparent restart of smuggling routes along the North Korea-China border. Colin, tell us, what did you see in satellite imagery that suggest these North Korea-China smuggling routes have restarted? Yes. So this was a story that was, I think, broken. by Asia Press last fall. And they had a bunch of on-the-ground photos and testimony talking about how the influx of

Chinese private cars that we were seeing on the streets of Pyongyang were coming across the border on dirt roads that were just, they packed dirt into the river in shallow areas and then drive trucks across with cars, other machinery, who knows what they're trading other than private vehicles, but there were photos of big lots of private vehicles being smuggled over the border, not at official crossing points, no customs, none of that, on the North Korea side, and then they would be shipped inland. And then using satellite imagery, we found more of exactly how widespread this was. There were like 30 places where they had a lot set up, where they had cars gathering and other cargo and then little makeshift dirt bridges across the river.

And so I was trying to check the update on how this was going last month. And I was about to write a story about how it had all stopped. There was no back last summer and fall. You could see these staging lots filling up with cargo and vehicles in medium resolution imagery. So it's not high-res. We can't see exactly what these are, but we can see it's the activity corroborated by the photos. that were published by Asia Press. And they were busy every day changing appearance.

And then starting, once all the snow melted, starting last December, and then once all the snow melted in March, April, May, no activity in any of these places, none of them. So it looked like it had stopped. Maybe because of the public reporting. Maybe someone on the Chinese side wasn't happy about that. Maybe North Korea stopped it because they had too many vehicles coming in.

But then checked it again last week, and yeah, 13 of the locations had new activity once again. it seems to have restarted. An interesting thing is that comes just after Kim Jong-un and Xi Jinping met in Pyongyang earlier last month. How much weight should we put on that timing that this restart comes so close to after that summit between Kim and Xi? You can't make a direct connection unless we had someone from either side with an inside

scoop about what was discussed in the summit and that's not coming out in any media I've seen. So really it's just, yeah. have to consider the timing and the why possibly it could have happened. Maybe it restarted because they did talk about it and the message was sent down that it's, it can continue. Maybe it started because they didn't talk about it. And maybe the people involved thought, okay, this means it's not a big deal. Or maybe it's just a coincidence. And now Kim wants more vehicles to come in because now the car dealerships in Pyongyang are running out or something like that. Let's go back for a second to what you're actually seeing on satellite imagery.

You've described these like makeshift dirt road routes across the Yellow River. How unusual is that, Colin? And what does it tell us about the scale or the informality of this trade? It's really unusual because there are a lot of parts of the river that have been historically shallow, where people can wade across it, certain parts of it, over time, every year, or especially parts that are so narrow where, when it's, frozen in the winter, you can easily walk across it. Before COVID, and maybe a few years before that, prior to that, the border fences on either side weren't that, or they were more porous. And now

North Korea has built up their border fencing a lot, double-layered. China has also built up their border fencing. The only kind of crossing you could see going on was little things here and there, or testimony from defectors being able to cross, like wading across or whatever. So to see clearly in satellite imagery a path across the river being built in these 30 plus places it was quite unusual we have to assume that it's not secret because there's a giant Chinese government-led highway project being construction is going on within meters of these crossings all across the border in this area so it's informal looking but we have to have to assume that authorities on other side, but we don't know what level of authorities. It could just

be local, are well aware of this. And then once it hit the media, I'm sure authorities in both countries got wind of it. And Colin, we've touched on this already, but last year, private vehicles appeared to be a major part of activity. Why would North Korea suddenly need so many cars? And does it give us any clues about changes that are happening inside the country? This was, it might be like a Chicken and egg question, but the cars are coming in because they're allowed to now, because Kim Jong-un changed the law. This was according to Asia Press and I think other reporting, maybe we also confirmed it, that he changed the laws to allow private vehicle ownership. That's a big capitalistic step that he's taking. And the theory is that this is to

satisfy the growing capitalistic tendencies of the middle class in North Korea. they're getting more money, they're getting more into business, they have a lot more to do, they want a car, they have places to go, but to see. So that's why we saw more coming in. And the reason why it's happening across smuggling routes is because North Korea needs a large number of cars. They're going to have to get them mostly from China. And China doesn't want that to be going across border checkpoints because it's absolutely clear violation of sanctions, even though other things go across the border all the time, like tractors and harvesters and machinery metals,

all this is prohibited. China lets it go through anyway. But I guess they drew a line at vehicles. Last question and big picture. What does this tell us about the current state of sanctions enforcement and China's willingness to tolerate Alyssa's trade with North Korea? Yeah, we're at a point here where UN sanctions are being, they still have an influence on what North Korea can get,

because China is still willing to play with them in some way. As we see here, the fact that the vehicles aren't going over the border at the official checkpoints and customs processes suggest to me that China still feels it needs to abide by them to some degree. But then they don't agree with the premise of the sanctions anymore. So that can't really change unless the U.S. somehow agrees to lift sanctions at the U.N. As a permanent security council member, it can't change either way. They can't be lifted and they can't be strengthened because of the impasse between the U.S. on one side and Russia and China

on the other side. So I think we're at this place where Russia will completely ignore sanctions, trading weapons, the nuclear capable weapons with North Korea. And then China will let it slide to a degree. North Korea is not out of the water yet in terms of its ability to get whatever it wants from the outside world. But it's getting, the pictures looking better for them as time goes on. Listeners, you can find all this reporting on NK News and NKPro. And I will link the specific annasas that we've been talking about today in our show notes.

Colin, thanks so much for joining us. Thank you. So President I. Jiamyang has said his government will not pursue unification by absorption and wants to reduce tensions with Pyongyang. But North Korea continues to reject dialogue and now defines the South as a hostile state. To discuss whether peaceful coexistence is a realistic goal and what Seoul might learn from the Balkans, I'm joined today in the studio on Wednesday, July 8th by Gabriella Brnoll. Gabriela is an analyst for NKPro, a non-resident fellow at the European Union.

Center for North Korean Studies and a freelance writer on Korean Affairs. She holds a PhD from the University of North Korean Studies. Gabriela, welcome back to the podcast. Thank you for having me. So, Gabrielle, today we're going to be talking about analysis that you recently published on NKPro and it was titled, What Seoul Can Learn from the Balkans about coexistence with North Korea. It comes at a really interesting moment because the E-administration is trying to lower tensions with North Korea, while also moving away from some of the traditional language, around unification. South Korea's unification ministry recently published a white paper that signalled a shift in how South Korea approaches its relationship with North Korea, reorientating policy

away from unification and toward peaceful coexistence. It may sound like a subtle wording change, but your analysis argues it raises a much bigger question about what Seoul can realistically achieve when Pyongyang rejects dialogue and sees the South as a hostile state. So, to start, is this a real policy change or just maybe a softer way of talking about the same old problem? Well, I think the same old problem is still the same old problem, but I would say it is a significant policy change from Seoul's part because although legally, of course, Seoul and according to their constitution, unification remains the main goal of South Korea by the Lee government It's reframing the issue as one not abandoning unification completely, but at least recognizing,

without saying it out loud, recognizing that, okay, unification is probably not very realistic in the near term or even in the medium term. So we're going to have to do something different, especially after Kim Jong-un declared that he was abandoning the goal of unification in December 2020. I think that really pushed Seoul to change its position at least somewhat. And so I think this is a result, among other factors, a result of that of realizing that, okay, the strategic landscape on the Korean Peninsula has changed a lot in just a few years. North Korea is not, North Korea today is not the same North Korea that it was back in 2018 when President Moon Jae-N was doing all the summitry with Kim Jong-un, all the diplomacy, when inter-Korean relations were at such a high. That, even though the Lee government wanted to go in that direction, I think they recognized that that's realistically going. to be very difficult, especially after what Kim Jong-in said in 2023. So I think this is their way of not giving up on engagement, not giving up on unification completely, but at least saying,

okay, we're not going to pursue such a big, idealistic, lofty goal as our main policy priority, since we know that that's probably not going to happen. We'll focus on coexistence, the issue of coexistence, which is something that I guess has already been going on for the four decades because the two Koreas have been coexisting. But yeah, I think that it's a recognition. It reflects Seoul's recognition that, yeah, things have changed in 2026 compared to when inter-Korean relations were much better. And Garrell, you've just touched on coexistence.

But you argue that even peaceful coexistence, it might be too ambitious right now. Why is that, especially when perhaps to most people it might sound like a pretty modest go. Right. Well, I think if you look at a lot of the literature, academic literature on peace studies and what is peace, you can define it in different ways. And peaceful coexistence, there's no one set definition for how you would define it. But I think we can define current Korean inter-Korean relations as a state of coexistence. But can we really call it peaceful coexistence? Just because there's no war, it's difficult to say that that is peace. It's a negative peace. The absence of conflict, yes. But to call it peaceful coexistence is still a stretch. And so, yes, it makes sense to make that goal because we've not yet achieved that. So it makes sense that the government would say, okay, we are going for peaceful coexistence because that would be in the eyes of soul. And it makes sense a stepping stone toward potential unification or just much better inter-Korean relations in the long run. But yeah, we're still.

a long way from that. One of the most useful concepts in your report and something that was really interesting for me to read was about functional coexistence or FC. And this is the idea that two sides don't necessarily have to solve an entire conflict before they can start managing it. For our listeners who maybe you haven't a chance to read your analysis yet, what does functional coexistence mean in plain English? And how is it different from peace?

Right. So I think, so I'm also pretty new to the functional coexistence concept. I only came across it about six months ago when studying this issue of coexistence and peace. So I thought the reason why I think this is an interesting concept to apply or to study in the context of inter-Korean relations is because functional coexistence doesn't, unlike other peace theories or mediation theories, it doesn't focus on resolution of conflict. It doesn't focus on achieving peace, actually. So on the surface, it may sound a bit depressing. It may sound a bit like, oh, that's even passive, some would say. But at its core, what functional coexistence is trying to do is manage a state of enduring or entrenched non-fighting. So a negative piece, an enduring negative piece, usually across over one or two generations, so many years. And it's characterized by a state of mutual non-recognition between the different side. and like I said, the absence of armed conflict. So it is not necessarily aiming for resolving the dispute between the two states,

especially not related to sovereignty issues, which is at the core of the non-recognition problem. But what it, the novel, I think the novel idea that this theory provides is that it challenges our assumptions regarding peace that, oh, we must achieve peace now and everything we do in terms of policy has to be to achieve peace as the goal, as the more immediate goal. Now, while functional coexistence doesn't argue against peace, of course it does not, it cautions. It calls for caution in rapidly, too rapidly, moving toward a peace settlement, because especially when it comes to entrenched non-conflict, entrenched conflicts like the inter-Korean situation, negative peace that has gone on for decades and decades, it's very difficult and some would say even dangerous to

immediately go from such a long generational state of mutual animosity to suddenly declaring peace overnight that makes it realistically difficult for it to be sustainable. Now, in the studies that I've done with other case studies, not just the Balkans, which I'll just briefly mention that when we look at other countries, other cases, where there has been a state of functional coexistence between the two countries for a long period of time, and then suddenly they either normalize relations or they sign some peace treaty. Usually, it doesn't last. Usually things go back.

They don't go back necessarily to conflict or to war, but they don't really necessarily lead to the peaceful outcome that we would like to see. One example is Cuba, United States, when they normalize relations under Obama. It was an executive order. It was something that the president decided it was, of course, people could say it was a long time coming. But the structural support to the foundation to sustain the normalization of relations, the improvement of Cuba-U.S. relations, it did not, as we see today under Trump, it's not been a sustainable resolution. So that's pretty much functional coexistence is trying to maintain a state of negative peace and prevent pretty much what is trying to prevent the two states. from going to war because coexistence is a fragile thing. That's also one very important point.

It's not something that automatically from coexistence view out of peace. Often from coexistence, you can go back to war. So it's more of a cautionary theory, which I think is important for the Korean context. Let's delve into the Balkans a little bit more because your analysis turns to a case that may not immediately come to mind for the Koreans. And this is, of course, the case of Serbia and Kosovo. They still have a deep, unresolved dispute over-recognition. But They've also managed to negotiate practical issues under international mediation. Gabriela, Serbia and Kosovo are not the first cases I think most people would think of when talking about the Korean Peninsula. But what made that comparison useful in your mind?

Yeah. So when I was looking at the conditions that need to be satisfied for a relationship to be called one under functional coexistence, it needs to have the element of mutual non-recognition and the element of an entrenched negative piece. And I think Kosovo, Serbia has both of those things. Now, of course, the context is different. There's no nuclear dimension, et cetera, et cetera. There's a lot of differences. But if we focus on what are the similarities,

I think there are quite some interesting points that we can take. So for Kosovo, Serbia, I think the most important point related to this case compared to the other case studies that I use is the fact that this relationship still remains in the zone of functional coexistence. because it still remains in the denial slash non-recognition zone of this table of functional coexistence. While other case studies that I looked at were under functional coexistence in the past, but have since moved on to higher levels or more stable levels of coexistence, such as official recognition, such as Cuba and the United States.

But in Kosovo, Serbia that's not been the case. Serbia still does not recognize the legitimacy of Kosovo. So it refuses to. And there's a lot of interesting similarities in terms of the diplomatic processes that have gone on in terms of inter-Korean relations and also Kosovo-Sherbia relations. For example, the EU-facilitated dialogue that has aimed at normalizing relationships, the relationship between Kosovo and Serbia since 2011. That in many ways has provided us with a lot of lessons on how do two countries that fought a war, and still have major sovereignty disputes with one completely denying the other's existence as a sovereign state. How do these two countries that also border countries that were once one country,

how do they manage this state of coexistence? I think it's interesting to study that and to compare to the Korean. And one of your key points in that Serbia and Kosovo comparison was that they still didn't resolve the big political speed, but they do talk about practical issues. Is that the kind of model that Seoul should be thinking about with Pyongyang? And what are some of the practical issues that North and South could bring to the table? Right. So I think in the past, I think Seoul has attempted on many occasions to have dialogue on issues of mutual interest with North Korea.

And such as the environment, climate issues, natural disasters, dam, management, fisheries, things like that are not as glamorous or not as they don't make the headlines, but still very important in terms of keeping those communication channels open. So with Serbia and Kosovo, we can see that they've had, they've signed agreements on many different areas such as policing, the judicial sector, elections, things like that, which again may not sound like really big issues, but they form a foundation for diplomacy. for the improvement of relations and for at least the continuation of engagement, which, again, puts a higher cost on potentially restarting a conflict.

So that's what we're trying to achieve here is to not go back to a state of war. And with Kosovo and Serbia, that is much, the period of their functional coexistence is much shorter than the two Koreas, because the war between Serbia and Kosovo was in the 90s while the Korean War was back in 1950s. So it's much younger, yet the efforts that have been made, thanks in part to the EU, NATO, and the willingness of both parties to sit down and talk about these specific issues has at least prevented conflict. There are still clashes all the time between police and especially in northern Kosovo. There's a strong military presence. There are still barricades, people that do not go over to the other side.

and to even refuse to acknowledge the other side completely. So on the ground, you could say there is still a very strong sentiment of division, just like on the Korean Peninsula, but still that has not prevented dialogue. So again, for Korea, now it has become more difficult in recent years because of North Korea changing its unification policy, but it still doesn't make it impossible because there will always be issues of mutual concern and of mutual benefit to both Koreas that don't have to take place in the context of broader negotiations, especially about the nuclear issue, because that's another thing that functional

coexistence is helpful with, is because it sees these bigger issues such as the nuclear problem, not as an impediment to diplomacy, but as a separate issue, a separate issue. An issue, a very important issue, yes, but it shouldn't be the roadblock that completely stops all kinds, all forms of communication. So of course, much easier said than done in practice, but yes. At the base level, these are two neighboring countries. So there's plenty of issues to discuss on a very practical level. So I feel like ultimately the lesson here is that, yeah, listen, Korea should not copy the Balkans exactly, but that even these deeply divided parties can sometimes build habits of communication around very narrow practical issues. But I do want

ask you, what do you think that functional coexistence in the Korean Peninsula case, what could it look like? What would be the first visible sign that it would potentially be working? First of all, I think an obvious sign would be communication between the two sides. Now, it doesn't necessarily have to be the highest level communication between the two leaders. No, it doesn't have to be that. It can be the lower levels about, again, other issues, maritime issues. other issues that are important to both sides. That's the key thing here is it should be a problem that is important to both sides because otherwise they don't have the incentive to keep talks going. So I think that is one very important thing. And just overall reduction in the military tensions,

reduction in hostilities on both sides. The DMZ is a very good place to look to see how the situation is in terms of military tensions between the two sides. What is the north doing? What is the south doing? Is the relative stability or calm or is, is, is, is, is, is, are there weekly or regular tensions, flare ups, things like that? I think that's very important to look at. But overall, right now, it's, of course, we're in a very difficult position because there is practically no communication. But I think that there is still a role to be played both by, Seoul and also by third actors such as the United States, such as potentially China. Two, because if we look at the Kosovo case, the two countries, it's very unlikely, very

unlike, almost impossible that the two countries would have sat down in the same room and decided to speak about normalization. If it wasn't for the other mediators, especially the EU, these two parties would not have sat down together. So I think with the two Koreas, it's a similar issue. There needs to be a third party that is seen as as neutral as possible by both sides. And I think one thing that I mentioned in the article was about potential role, an expanded role for the UN command or the neutral nation supervisory commission, especially Switzerland, which is going to be reopening its cooperation office in North Korea later this year. I think because North Korea has long condemned the UN command for being like a U.S. controlled mechanism.

and so they've not been wanting to really engage with it. But we did see that, I think it was last year, that Kim Jong-un did notify the UN command about, I forgot what it was about, but he notified them about some. I believe it was building fortifications around the dams. Yes, right, right. So that was quite interesting.

Right, right. Because before they wouldn't have done that. So I think that shows that, okay, of course, the rhetoric coming from North Korea will always be very aggressive and bombastic. But in practice, they have a vested interest in preventing tensions from getting out of control. So I think the UN command, there is something there definitely. There are other members also, we forget, of the UN command, such as Thailand, who has long had pretty stable relations with North Korea.

So those members leveraging their role a bit more in the UN command, I think that could be something to be explored. And again, like I said, Switzerland, which has long been seen as the new. neutral nation of the world, could potentially play a more active role. And again, finding the challenges to finding, starting small, finding those areas of mutual interest where they can cooperate, and not starting off with, okay, what are you going to do about your nuclear weapon? Because if we go in with that kind of, in that kind of framework, as we've done in the past, North Korea has already made it pretty clear that that's not going to work. Right. So of course the main goal is,

nuclear-free peninsula. Of course, the main goal is peace. That is the main goal. But to get there, I think we need to put less ambitious goals, at least for the short and medium term, to set a more durable foundation, a sustainable foundation, so that in the future, when the opportunities for peace do come, and I believe they do come, because these things come in cycles. We've seen on the It's cycles of talks and then of animosity and talks. So when the next cycle does come, that we're better prepared and that we have a stronger chance of making change, maybe not solving the whole thing, no, but at least of making progress that is more difficult to reverse.

I think that should be the goal. I do want to delve more into the role of mediators in this idea of functional coexistence, but I do want to go back for a second to communication between north and south, because you've made the point that it has to be on practical issues that affect both sides to allow for conversations to continue. And that makes total sense. But in my mind, it seems like the obvious roadblock in this is, of course, North Korea's unwillingness to communicate at all with South Korea at this point. Pyongyang has repeatedly shown it won't join talk simply for the sake of dialogue. What do you think North Korea would need to get out of limited

technical talks for them to be worth its time? I think this is a question of patience. I think it's patience because North Korea ultimately does always come back to the negotiating table. I think patience is important. And I think while the other party is unwilling, I think the opposing parties, in this case, Seoul, I think there are things that South Korea can do on its own, regardless of North Korean participation or not, to, again, set a better foundation for success in future

talks. So I think South Korea has been, like, one of the things is a peaceful coexistence example, shifting the policy toward North Korea. Another example is, again, something that may sound really small, but is actually very important, using North Korea's official name. The DPRK instead of North Korea, the Ministry of Unification is now actively looking into that. And just another thing that's very important that functional coexistence talks about, especially when it comes to issues within communities in one state, but it also applies to interstates, especially since the two Koreas were one state, is the issue of domestic consensus. So I think that's another thing that South Korea can focus on working on, despite regardless of whatever North Korea is doing or their unwillingness to talk, because North Korea, for all its issues and

they, we can say they have been more, more clear and more consistent with their policy toward, not just South Korea, but toward the world, than South Korea has been. Because in South Korea, we've seen major fluctuations between whenever liberal, progressive is in power or a conservativeism power. It's like a 180 degree shift completely of the North Korea policy. And that's a problem. That's a very big problem because not only does it signal to North Korea that whatever soul says in five years it can completely flip and that doesn't help in building trust and in building again that sustainable foundation but also it doesn't help in terms of building domestic consensus because there are people and of course you will never have 100%

uniform consensus on oh we need peace with north korea or whatever coexistence no but at least the governments need to i think agree at least on a few which i think i mentioned in the article a few principles related to North Korea policy that will not be reversed. Right. Come the next administration. So again, starting small with things that most people can agree on, like we, most people can agree on. I'm generalizing, but no unification by absorption, right? That's one thing.

For example, calling North Korea by its official name, the DPRK, that's another thing that could be agreed on. Recognizing not, it doesn't mean they have to change the constitution, but recognizing, at least verbally, officially, publicly. North Korea as a state, we recognize its sovereignty. We respect its sovereignty. North Korea, South Korea, they joined the UN separately. The whole world sees them as separate sovereign states, regardless of what their opinions are on North Korea. Things like that, agreeing on these very, very basic principles to at least start to build some domestic understanding of, okay, this is our position on North Korea. There are some things we may disagree on, but the

broader policy is this, and this is what we're going to stick with. Because the only thing that's been consistent across administrations has been the goal of reunification, because it's in the constitution. But even that, the way that the progressives and conservatives have gone about it is completely different, sometimes very contradictory. So I think even if North Korea is refusing to talk, things like this, there are a lot of things that South Korea can do on its own to build a better, a more fertile ground for peace, if that's what it wants. If it wants peaceful coexistence, I think it doesn't only, it's not only about the other side, it's also about making the preparations here, right here at home.

I think that often gets overlooked, but that's very important. But going back to the role of mediators, because a really important point in your analysis is that this coexistent, it doesn't depend only on one career or both careers. As you mentioned, in the Kosovo-S Serbia case, outside institutions helped keep channels open and manage crises. On the Kareen Peninsula, the existing architecture is obviously very different, but there are still some mechanisms that often get overlooked. Are institutions like the UNC, the Neutral Nation Supervisory Commission and the Military Armist Commission, are they underused tools for managing tensions between the two Koreas? I think, yes, it's not in every, of course, it depends on the context, but not in every situation, would they be able to step in and play a mediating role?

But I do think, like I said before, there is room for expansion as to what they could do, especially like the UN command. I think there is more room for a more proactive role by them. And I think, again, depending on who is leading the efforts and with what, message these efforts are being pursued, I think it could potentially be a tool to not only decrease tensions, because that's right now the goal is maintaining as low military tensions as possible, decreasing tensions with North Korea, monitoring the DMZ, the border. That's their main goal now. But like I said, other countries like Thailand and, of course,

the UNC, it's not, its main function is not like a diplomatic tool. and it does not, it's not going to replace the work of diplomats. But again, it could be a supplemental tool, and supplement to, especially right now when things are so stalemated between with the U.S. and North Korea, inter-Korean relations. I think it's something that could be explored more. But still, like I said, ultimately, for those bigger, more ambitious goals, the role of the United States and North Korea, U.S. diplomacy is,

completely vital. Nothing can replace that. Before we wrap up, let's bring things back to the administration because the challenge seems to be this. Soul wants to reduce tensions, avoid unification by absorption, Pyongyang, still rejecting dialogue and defining South Korea as a hostile state. You've touched on things that the administration could do as stepping stones or to lay a foundation for functional coexistence like recognizing North Korea's official name or recognizing North Korea as a sovereign state. If you're advising the administration on things not to do, what would they be? Not present a disunited front. I think that's very important, especially in the first six months or so, and even still now a bit, but especially in the

beginning of the Lee administration, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Unification consistently were making very sometimes contradictory remarks, contradicting the other. I think that's very counterproductive, not just domestically, but just the message that is sending to North Korea is that Seoul is not a reliable partner that they can negotiate with or someone who is trustworthy in the long run because they don't even know what their policy is. At least that's the message. That's how it looks. That's how it looks to the outside world. So I think getting on the same page, I think that's very important. So not to make these contradictory remarks, even if they disagree, And of course they're going to disagree.

Everyone is going to disagree on a lot of issues, especially on something as sensitive as North Korea. But I think for any administration, it's very important to present this united front that we know what we're doing. We are very clear with our goals. This is what they are. And we're going to be consistent about it. That's very important.

Consistency is key. And patience. That was Gabriela Bernal, analyst at NKPro, a non-resident fellow at the European Center for North Korean Studies. Thank you so much for joining us. Thank you. And that brings us to the end of today's episode. Our thanks to Brian Betts and David Choi for helping make this podcast happen. For more reporting, analysis and expert insight on North Korea, visit NK News for the latest stories and NKPro for deeper analysis, data and research tools. You can also watch this episode on YouTube and be sure

to follow us on social media for the latest updates, clips and behind the scenes content. I'm Alana Hill, thank you for listening, and we'll be back next time with more on the stories shaping North Korea.