North Korea News Podcast by NK News - Peter Ward: Inside North Korea’s expanding crackdown on ‘unsocialist’ behavior

Episode Date: March 17, 2026

This week, NK News Data Correspondent Anton Sokolin opens the episode with a roundup of recent developments on the Korean Peninsula, including the resumption of China-North Korea passenger rail service and plans to restart flights. He also touches on the DPRK’s weekend test of multiple launch rocket systems, as well as how Russian media is […]

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That's shop.nknews.org. Hello, listeners, and welcome to the NK News podcast. I'm your host, Jacko's Wedsoot, and this episode is recorded on Tuesday, the 17th of March, 2026. Happy St. Patrick's Day. Anton, welcome back on the show. Hey, Jacko, happy St. Patrick's Day, everyone. Indeed.

Now, let's talk about the news from North Korea in the last week. Is it fair to say that North Korea is now more connected with the world in a couple of different ways? Well, that's an interesting turn of phrase. Sure. Well, it's been a business. week, right? It's always busy. It's always busy on the Korean Peninsula. We know that North Korea conducted a few missile tests. It also, well, President Trump also expressed his desire to meet Kim Jong-in soon. Although we don't know the fixed time frame right now, but

well, he at least said that he could meet him like within a month or something to, but at the same time we're hearing signals that he's not so keen on visiting China that he planned to go to or delaying it at least and well we'll see how will that impact his further itinerary plans. Well, at the same time, we have seen lots of developments on the Russia front. Yes. So we can start with whichever you like. Well, let's start with China. I understand that rail and train journeys between Beijing and Pyongyang have restarted.

This is the first time since COVID. Is that right? Right. So for many years, about six years, North Korea was sort of cut off from China. Of course, there was cargo traffic. There was trade. Commercial exchanges never went away. And even Chinese businessman, entrepreneurs, always visited North Korea, at least in certain places,

like Rasson, present there's on special economic zone because they are allowed a more simplified entry process into the place. And of course, for six years, everyone's been waiting. Russia was the first one that North Korea allowed open its doors for. And just recently, it was China. So what happened is that first they resumed rail traffic. We spotted on Chinese social media the first in six years, the first Chinese train crossing the Yellow River into North Korea from Dandong, from Dandong into Sinejou.

And, well, that marked the first trip in many years, effectively the resumption of passenger rail traffic. What's interesting here is that after this train crossed, eventually also China resumed its... regular train service from Beijing to Pyongyang. So first we saw how this train goes into Sinejou, and in a few hours, about five hours it comes back. So I assume it was like a test run or something, something like that,

because it's just the two cities connecting on the border. But then later we saw that there were also trains going all the way to Pyongyang, and the Chinese media reported that the train arrived, and then train went back, and everyone made a big deal out. Of course. It's a big deal. Yes, it's not the only development. As you mentioned, there is also pending a resumption of air traffic.

So what we know for now is that Chinese state carrier Air China didn't announce but placed, so you can actually go on their website and book tickets for March 30th. And for now, as of what Tuesday, right, we know that the Chinese government has confirmed that it's going to happen. That they always have this interesting way of saying it. Related authorities have already made certain announcements and it's all in the works. So they have announced that and we're expecting it, yeah, this month and that will, it's actually not going to be the first Air China flight in years because Air China, since it's a state area,

it had carried many Chinese high-level officials to and from North Korea for delegation visits, right? And of course, we also saw a few at least one of confirmed cargo flight that flew from Shanghai to Kenya last year, I think. So this would be the first time that we've got regular scheduled passenger flights for civilians. Right. So probably, well, at first, probably North Koreans themselves could use that. Maybe students, we know that Chinese exchange students are about to enter the country. Some of them have already obtained visas according to social media accounts. and probably that will facilitate this sort of exchanges. And yeah, all around it's a pretty positive development.

But what it indicates is that, well, at least it somehow raises hopes that there will be an eventual resumption of Chinese tourism and maybe international tourism. But as we know, North Korea has recently canceled its international marathon. And, well, that kind of casts doubt on whether North Korea is really willing to open to the outside world. Maybe for Chinese, maybe for the Russians. Yes, but we will have to see how it pans out. If Chinese tourism does resume or any sort of short visits by business people, the exchange students from China to North Korea, if that does resume, then it'll be very interesting looking at their social media accounts

to see what images they're able to bring out from North Korea, just everyday life, just walking around the city and shopping and eating in restaurants and talking to North Korean people. There's already no shortage of this kind of content on Chinese social media. Whenever they can, they post a lot. But if we are talking about hundreds of people visiting every week, because the flights are supposed to be weekly each Monday. So let's say like 250 people, if it's fully booked, right?

Flying in, well, imagine how many of them are going to post, at least after they come back to China. Yeah, so that will be a real growth in firsthand primary source of materials from North Korea. Indeed. Well, we'll also have to keep our eye on how North Korea is going to react to that and whether they're going to place certain restrictions or maybe somehow cautioned the Chinese tours not to film things or keep it down the download, you know. Now let's talk about some missiles that North Korea launched over the weekend. Right. So to put it in the context, North Korea has tested lots of missiles.

And for example, last week I did its second cruise missile test by using a warship. So it's a big deal. And, well, it only further indicates that North Korea is working on. But to put it in a wider context, it's basically just another brick in the big wall of North Korea's missile program. And the follow-up that happened over the weekend was North Korea's launch of a salvo of basically a dozen nuclear-capable rockets. Right. This is a multiple launch rocket system, MLRS. Right.

Multiple launch rocket system, 600-millimeter system. also known in the West as KN25. What's interesting about the thing is, of course, it's long range, and it's a nuclear capable, so you can actually mount a nuclear warhead on top of that thing. And what's also interesting is that it's supposed to be, it's suspected to be GPS guided, so it has guidance. So precision.

It's a precision weapon, and that's what exactly they were testing, according to Kim Jong-in. It is a high-precision weapon that hit a target on an island with 100% accuracy rates. So, well, of course, we don't know if we can trust them, but well, that's something. And Kim Jong-in looked pretty satisfied with the test. At the same time, speaking of accuracy, actually, when we saw the first detection of the test, first, the South Koreans and Japan, they announced that it was a ballistic missile test.

So it was first, the announcement was that it's one ballistic missile that they launched. Then there was like multiple ballistic missiles. And the South Koreans said that it was 10, around 10 ballistic missiles. Why does this matter? What is this about? It matters because, well, there's a bit of a discrepancy, right? The North Korea announced it. It showed at least 12 MLRS standing in a row.

It forming two batteries. Yeah, there, of course, they have transfer electric launchers, right? So it's like trucks and two batteries in one row. and each fire in at least one rocket, right? So it means 12. And South Koreans detected only roughly 10, so about accuracy, it kind of raises questions how accurately we can determine this.

And ballistic missiles are a totally different type, right? At the same time, they are not completely wrong because these MLRS has a ballistic component or can have ballistic component to it. This is for our listeners at home, what is a ballistic component? I'm not an expert, but we know that ballistic, The warhead actually can't be mounted on top of the CMLRS, and that's what improves its efficiency. And again, with the guidance system and its long range,

it's a pretty formidable weapon. I'm not an expert on missiles per se, but given the information that I know, that that's what it is. In North Korean reporting on this salvo launch, it mentioned kind of made some oblique threats towards South Korea, talking about the range. You're probably about 400 and something kilometers. I'm glad that you brought it up because range,

Yes, the range is very important. So it's a long-range weapon. And, yeah, actually, probably we should have mentioned that it consists of five tubes. So if fired simultaneously, it can produce that battery of 12 can produce simultaneously. But I don't think they can fire simultaneously all five, maybe. But in quick succession, that's pretty heavy firepower there. And, yeah, speaking about range. So Kim Jong-in basically made unveiled threats to South Korea that this particular distance,

that these rockets can reach exactly matches the South Korean territory, and according to one expert, US and South Korean military bases based in the South. So it means that this weapon is pretty much targeting. It's no secret. And of course, they said that Kim Jong-in said that it's going to be used as a deterrent weapon. It's for deterrence. But if North Korea sovereignty is somehow threatened,

they won't hesitate to use the weapon. And yeah, it's an interest in developing because also we know that North Korea cooperates militarily with Russia. And, well, there's no better training ground right now in the world, probably, other than probably Iran than Ukraine. And North Korea has made lots of use of the Ukraine war to test its weapons in real combat conditions. We don't know whether they're going to supply those. Probably they need them themselves. But nothing stops them from sending at least a few. few of those and seeing them perform in actual combat.

We'll have to keep an eye on that. Now, Kim Jong-un brought a VIP guest along to look at the salvos of MLRS rockets. Right. I hardly read it as a news anymore because he does bring his daughter on these trips quite often. And, well, there is lots of talk, right, why that happens. And probably because my own personal guess is because it's a, very militaristic country. And the military component is very important. And it's very important to make sure that those commanders, officers, military brass, they are familiar with her face.

They know who she is. And when the father is not in the picture anymore, they will actually be loyal to her. But again, we don't know the whole story. Who knows? Maybe he has a son. Maybe he doesn't. Maybe she is the heir. Maybe she's not. Who knows? You have to wonder, as a 12 or 13-year-old, is this something good? 15, probably now. Oh, is she? Yeah, okay, good. As a teenager, would this be the sort of thing that she would find interesting, or would she go,

oh, dad, do I have to come and look at rockets again? Well, if I was here, I would be excited. The firing range, the other visit that they made to the pistol factory, that was pretty amazing. Someone took me to a fire in range. I would go. And it did bring some very memeable photographs of Kim Jong-un sitting in a chair holding a rifle and standing with a leather jacket holding a pistol.

Right. It's a very bit meme worthy photos. Right, right, right. In Russia, it created a whole bunch of memes, too. There is a famous one associated with mafia people and how mafia is striving to get power. And there's that meme and the Russian listeners probably will quickly link those things together. Guys standing like this aiming and it's kind of associated with mafia style look. Generally speaking, how?

How does the Russian social media worldview North Korea and its leadership? Is it favorably or kind of comically? Good that you ask, because we indeed covered a few things about that. And right now, I cannot speak for the whole government or for authorities. North Korea has generally been a meme throughout its history. Even in the Soviet Union, Professor Lankov would tell you the same thing. Their Korea magazine, their everything, the way they phrase things, the way they did things, was all laughable. But at the same time, now it's a bit shifting because of their participation in the Ukraine war.

And at least a certain part of the population, especially somewhat older people, they treat the country with respect because of their contribution, right? So they died for Russia. At the same time, Russia, Russian authorities themselves, they do not really hesitate to play up this sort of nobility, this sort of noble image of North Korea as noble fighters with their valor who defended. basically a Russian region as if it was their own motherland, you know, something like that. And now they're producing a whole bunch of like there were galleries, there were exhibitions, loading, hailing North Korean soldiers. And most recently Russia released a documentary about North Korean Special Forces, Special Operation Forces in Korsk, how they train. It's basically a bunch of half-naked men running around training around. Yeah, you should check it out.

And training for combat. are preparing for drawn combat, how they're, I don't know, fist fighting, and yeah, how they leave their quarters, their barracks. So in the kind of like the red line that like the red thread that runs through the whole narrative is that Russia will never forget the sacrifice and how we interpret this message, right, because that is what's important is, well, look at the situation in the Middle East, right? Russia doesn't have any... obligations, formal obligations before Iran. And when the situation went down, of course,

now unexpected that Russia would actually step in. Russia does supply certain things to Iran. There were GPS coordination with China. We know about those things. But there was no actual military involvement, right? Probably there won't be. But at the same time, it probably raises certain alarms. What's going to happen after the war ends, the Ukraine war ends,

and where are we going to do? So far, it's been a windfall of gains for North Korea. But what if the war ends and it somehow slows down or somehow just goes away, fades away? And, well, that's Moscow's way that at least on a certain level, at least in a certain level of rhetoric, maybe we won't forget you. We will keep mentioning that, oh, yeah, you guys did you. We can pet you on the back and maybe occasionally provide some support. There's going to be some collaborations. There's some cooperation on maybe some humanitarian levels, et cetera.

but we got to see, of course, we got to see how it's going to go. Wow, well, that's fascinating. Thank you very much, Anton. Now, listeners, stick around because right after this, we'll have my recent interview with Dr. Peter Ward about some of his most recent research. Thanks again, Anton, and see you again soon. Cheers. Hello, listeners, and welcome to the NK News podcast. I'm your host, Jacko's Wetslute, and today it is Tuesday, the third of the third of March, 2026,

and a welcome back on the show, one of our most popular. and often asked for guests, and that is Dr. Peter Ward, research fellow at the Sejong Institute. Peter, welcome back on the show. Dr. Ward, welcome back on the show. Just call me Peter Jacko. Thanks for having me. Who asked for me to be here apart from you? Lots of anonymous people. Lots of them. Now, we're here to talk about you. You're a man, I think I said this the last time on the show, possibly one of the hardest working people in North Korean studying, in terms of just the prolificness, if that's the right noun form of your output. You're putting a lot of stuff out there. and so you've been kind enough to share some of your recent papers with me.

I've gone through and picked the three that are most interesting, and we're going to talk about them today. How does that sound? Sounds great. Great. So the first one, last October, you published a 99-page report. You were trying not to break 100 at Sejong entitled The Legal Regulation of Unsocialist Activities in North Korea, over-criminalization, political control, and human rights.

Congratulations. Thank you. Now, in it, you argue that unsocialist activities, quote-unquote, evolved from a marketization concern in the 1990s to a broader ideological category. What does the term actually mean today in practical lived terms? So in the paper I unpacked two kinds of unsocialist activities, one set in the economic realm, the second and the social realm. The economic realm, it's all non-prescribed illegal activities usually involving markets, corruption, embezzlement to state property, misuse of resources that are supposed to be within the

purview and control of the state, its companies, institutions, etc. Would that include, for example, smuggling goods across the border from China and selling them in a marketplace? Absolutely. Would that include selling off bits of a broken factory that is no longer in use? Absolutely. Okay, so those are just two real-life examples. But it would also involve entrepreneurship inside the state involving private actors engaging

in de facto private activities, i.e., on paper it looks like a state enterprise or a team within a state-owned organization, stroke enterprise or farm, or inside the party. But in practice, it's run by an individual who brings their own property or their own cash or makes use of state property to make money for themselves and for their business partners and for some of their workers, maybe. Holden, I thought that was okay now. Some of these activities sort of are okay. They have this thing called the agreed system, Habijé restaurants, Shikang, which are

were, you know, at least when I was, when I was last in North Korea, described as legal. What year was that? 2018. Okay. They were described as legal to me, but it's not really clear. I'm not sure whether they still are. And generally speaking, these kinds of private activity are generally, I would say, presumed illegal.

Hmm. Okay. So entrepreneurship still illegal outside the confines of a state-owned or. So a state-owned enterprise engaging in its own activities on its own behalf, the authorization from the government, it is, yes, conducting potentially legal economic activities and what people do in their own households using their own equipment and the inputs that they are able to source legally through markets or inside, you know, from their own cabbage patches, you know, and other resources, domestic resources are legal. But most forms of private activity that occur out.

side of the household, probably you should presume are illegal. Wow. Okay, that must be tough then for North Koreans to sort of thread that needle then, right? So possibly, if I understand correctly, potentially buying X and selling it at a margin, whatever that is, that could be illegal. Wholesale, large-scale wholesale trade is called brokerage under North Korean law, Kogan, Kogan. And brokerage in South Korea or in the Anglosphere is not illegal per se, but In the North Korean context, it is per se illegal, yes. Wow. Okay.

Gosh. So is the term unsocialist, is that a legal category? Is it a political slogan? Or is it a flexible instrument that the regime uses depending on circumstances? I mean, I think it's all three. Yeah. It's used in the law. It's used as a slogan.

And the regime, you know, invokes it in various different contexts at different times. Okay. With different meanings or is it always? I think the meaning has expanded over time to, you know, encompass more and more activities the state is trying to clamp down on. Those activities may have never been legal. It never have been legal. The production of narcotics, I don't think has ever been legal in North Korea. But it became classified as unsocialist or antisocialist activity latterly. So how much of this is about genuine social control and how much is about signaling to

elites that ideological vigilance remains paramount? You can be both, right? I would suggest it's primarily about trying to control both elites and society through a variety of different mechanisms, not necessarily just repression. That's the thing we talk about the most, I think, when we talk about North Korea, because most of our discourse regarding political control in North Korea is about the worst human rights abuses, which obviously deserve the most coverage and most attention. But there are other ways the government seeks to control its people as well. Okay.

Now, in the context of what we've been talking about, who are the donju and how do they fit into into this? So from other work I've done previously, there are Donjuwa Money Masters, i.e. the people with the cash, I would say three distinct groups. There's like intermarriage between them and then there's potentially there's ways for people to cross over between these three groups, not just three marriage, but marriage is one of them. And they are people who acquire money through overseas connections. So if you have family in say Japan, but you more often, it was China, you could use that money to start

businesses, some of which might be legal, some of which might be not, but your source of funding is your family overseas. And much of these people don't have good social status in North Korea. Living on the border or having connections and or having connections overseas is usually, you know, not associated with high class or high caste status, high Songben status in North Korea. The second group are so... So just to interrupt there. Would there, are there fewer don'tju in Pyongyang then, given what you've just said? So I would say there are fewer donju in Pyongyang of the group. who acquire their funds from overseas.

Got it. Okay. Okay. So, the first of the three groups you mentioned. Yeah. And just to confuse things a bit further, acquire funds from overseas in the sense of from your family overseas, not through trade and investment and travel overseas as a higher level, as an official in the party state bureaucracy.

Right. With the sanction or the blessing of the state. Right. Okay. The second group are self-made. So these are people who won't have external sources of funding or sources of funding they acquire from inside the government or through access to power. These are people who, for whatever reason, are very talented in a particular form of business

and are able to, you know, you make the best cookies in your town, or you make the best tofu in your town, or, you know, you start by making tofu and cookies at home, and then you develop that into a business that you may expand into into sort of pseudo-state enterprise, an enterprise that looks like it's owned by the government, looks like it's operated by a state enterprise, but is actually a de facto private enterprise. But either way, you start without that money from overseas and without that access to political power. The third group are people who either directly, because they are literally carders, or, you know, party officials, or else because they are married to or have some kind of familial relationship with them, are people who acquire wealth

through access to power. So these can be managers of specific resources like, you know, say a coal mine, or they can be party officials who or police officials who enforce the law, who are police access to resources who can either embezzle those resources, use them for their own businesses or else sell access to them for a bribe, or maybe extract bribes through law enforcement and then use that money to finance their own businesses or the businesses of other people. So it's three groups that are distinct, but not entirely. Obviously, you have intermarriage between them, and then you might have, you know, someone who's self-made, might marry someone who has party carders in the family. or someone who's bought, you know, you get the idea. So it sounds like a large proportion of these three groups are people who would be involved in activities that are classified as unsocialist, according to what we're talking about.

Absolutely. So these are people who are defined by the North Korean state by what they do or by how they got their money as criminals. Criminals are a strong word. Outside the law. Outside the law. They can be defined as criminals, but remember, there's, I guess we need to introduce a sort of a category that exists under North Korean law

and also exists under laws elsewhere, which is the difference between a crime and a misdemeanor. Okay. Does that category distinction exist in North Korea? Yeah, they would use misdemeanor, but they often just use the, yeah, they often say illegal activities that do not rise to the level of a crime. So you can break the, so for instance, Jack, if you speed, you're not a criminal. You would pay a fine, right? Or if you say you park in the wrong place, you get a ticket and you have to pay the fine. If you don't pay the fine, you've got a court.

You don't usually get classified as a criminal. Right. You're someone who's broken the law. You've committed a civil offence or an illegal act. Under some legal systems, it would be considered an administrative offense, whereas under others it might be called a civil violation. Now, you argue in your paper that North Korea's legal system is characterized by over-criminalization. Sure. What are the clearest examples of this? I mean, I think we discussed them quite a lot just a moment ago.

Basically, all forms of private economic activity outside the household are illegal, per se. That, to me, is dramatically over-criminalization relative to almost anywhere else in the world. So in practical terms, if ordinary survival activity is technically illegal or outside the law, doesn't that make almost everyone trying to get ahead in the world a criminal or something or a misdemeanor, if that's the right one? Someone making, breaking the law. And malfeasant? So they're criminal or, yeah, yeah, they're either committing illegal acts or they're

criminals here. Okay, so you suggest that the regime has adopted a two-pronged strategy, repression in the social sphere and conditional toleration in the economic sphere. Sure. Why would the government of North Korea split the strategy like that? I think it's a matter of prioritizing law enforcement resources. So what is the bigger threat? Is every official in the country taking small or medium-sized bribes going to lead to the potential destruction of the system?

Is someone cutting into their local mountain to start a small corn plot or someone selling a large number of, you know, a large amount of pork from, you know, from a local refrigeration facility they've been renting on the side or running a small, a small haulage business out of a local transport company more of a threat? Or is people consuming and distributing at scale foreign media and foreign content that undermines the regime's information and ideological monopoly on the minds of North Korea more of a threat? Yeah. And I think they've just decided to prioritize the latter over the former because they see information as far more dangerous to their long-term survival than petty corruption and low-level or semi-low-level

private illegal economic activities. As a social scientist, do you think they're right in this? Broadly speaking, absolutely, yeah. That broadly speaking, information coming in from outside could be more of a threat to regime stability than economic activity. It's not state sanctioned. Yeah, yeah. So as a teenager, I was a Marxist, so I used to think money was the only thing was important or resources was the only thing that was important or the material base of society and the broader social system was most important. But I don't feel that way anymore. I would say

that ideas are really important for, you know, I would say what's probably most important for the survival of the North Korean regime is the ideas of officials and people in the elite. But the problem is it's quite, it's very difficult to distinguish. You know, if this information and content circulates freely in society, then elites are going to be consuming it. Now, this shift to this two-prong strategy, repression in the one hand and toleration in the economics fear, do you see this as evidence of pragmatism or is it simply a better calibrated form of authoritarianism or are the two the same? Yeah, I would say the two are the same. Yeah, no, that's a fair way of describing it. Both of those are a very fair word to describe. I think they are being pragmatic and I think they are also being very ideological, you know, as in almost all foreign content now, unless it's pre-approved by the state is suspicious.

per se. That is a dramatic intrusion into the lives of North Koreans. No other authoritarian regime in the world basically says this content is foreign. It is assumed to be bad and you will get into trouble just for possessing it. Now, coming back to this idea of what's criminal and what's not, one of your most interesting arguments is that administrative punishments may represent partial depenalization rather than simply more repression. Can you unpack that a little bit for us? Yeah, so depenalization is the idea that you get rid of things like custodial sentences, or punitive fines, and you move towards warnings, moral suasion, you know, finger-wagging, public criticism sessions, you know, social stigma as opposed to the use of custodial sentences,

you know, locking people up in other words. And it's only partial, it's not full, but, you know, it is, you are, we do see it in the laws. It sounds a bit like back in sort of merry old England putting someone in the stock instead of putting someone in the jail. Sure, yeah, absolutely. And, you know, as in the modern form of... Stocks, I mean. Yeah, the modern form of the stocks in North Korea is criticism.

some sessions, having the fear before you go to the party committee and the party committee issues your warning or a severe warning, you know, potentially having your, your work, you know, having your position suspended and being forced to go off to the countryside and work on a farm with, you know, on a farm rather than working in an ice air-conditioned office for a couple of months. I mean, I'm not sure if your office was air-conditioned, but anyway, at least you get to sit behind a desk rather than working on a farm. These kinds of things seem to seem to have some effect on people's behavior and the North Korean government presents them as being real, you know, as being punishments in their own propaganda and being alternative punishments

as well to, so, locking people up in concentration camps. So to extend what this means in real world terms, what would that difference that, well, depenalization look like for an ordinary market trader who's trading something that they shouldn't be? Well, they would, instead of getting a, instead of getting arrested and having to go to court and being sentenced to prison or sent off to a concentration camp, they might be issued a fine on the spot or else they might be required to do self-criticism in front of their, you know, their fellow members of their local people's association. Or they might, if they're a party member, they might receive a warning from their local party committee. You know, the warning can then become a

severe warning and then you potentially can lose your parties. And it's, there's a graded scale. But it's like, instead of immediately going, oh, well, you know, you're selling, you're selling on a day when you're selling outside the market or outside of operating hours or you're selling a product, which is now banned for sale in the market. You know, instead of saying, well, you know, you're now going to prison, it's, you know, it's a lesser punishment. Right. Would you also expect their goods to be confiscated and maybe they be to be banned from

returning to that marketplace for a period of time? They could be. I don't know, but that's certainly something that could happen. Okay. And, yeah, based on your readings, is there any concrete example of an activity that might now receive a warning rather than a prison sentence over and above the one we just talked about? I mean, there are many forms of economic activity, which are now, you know, classified under the Administrative Punishment Act, if they don't rise beyond the level of a misdemeanor that could, you know, receive just a slap on the wrist, you know, for anything from buying foreign currency to dealing, you know, providing access to state-owned property. If it's not too extreme to rise the level of a criminal offense, you could, you know, you might just receive a, you might just receive a warning, you know.

Now, where does police discretion enter the picture? And is this flexibility? Is there arbitrary power there, I guess? Well, I mean, so I think there's two forms of discretion. One is reporting discretion. So police can just not report what actually happened and make it sound worse or better than it was. And then the second kind of discretion is, yeah, it's going to be prescribed under the regulations associated with the Minister to Punishment Act and the Criminal Code. I don't have access to the modern regulations. The last references to regulations I saw in the late 2000s where they were literally prescribing how many times you would have to listen to quote unquote hostile foreign broadcasts, say, from South Korea,

before it rises beyond an administrative penalty or a misdemeanor to an actual criminal offense. But I don't have modern version. I don't have anything beyond 2009 for that. And in terms of discretion about sort of what level of fine to give or how many times there to go to a meeting or something, is that also something held by police? I think it's probably police and then also party officials. They probably have some discretion around that. I'm not absolutely sure. Now, given the difficulty always with statistics in North Korea, you may not have any idea about this. Are we seeing a reduced rate of people being sent to prison or a camp? No, I think the numbers have expanded since COVID. At least that's what Delhi NK indicates. Right. And of course, Colin and other journalists here at NK News have talked about seeing camps being rebuilt or expanded.

So how do we account for that in terms of dep penalization? Well, you can have deep penalization in one sphere and then aggressive, aggressive over-criminalization in another. Right. So, like, with deep penalization, it gives officials potentially a suite of options that they can use in lieu of prison for lower-level offenses. But, you know, the consumption of foreign media is now more criminalized than it's ever been. The length of sentences, the aggressiveness of apparent aggressiveness of enforcement, you know, potential use of death penalty as well. It's nothing like what we saw before COVID. Would you say that the net of state control has been widened?

Under Kim Jong-un, I would say that the government seems to becoming more effective in enforcing regulations or laws related to the consumption of foreign content, yes. In other areas, yeah, I mean, we are seeing like with markets as well, you know, reporting from inside the country indicates that there's been at least more aggressive, although sporadic enforcement of market-related control measures, you know, repressions and that kind of thing than before COVID. On to the consumption of foreign media, let's make this concrete. If someone has caught selling imported South Korean dramas on a USB stick today,

what might realistically happen to them? They could get a very long prison sentence potentially for life, or they could be executed. And is that down to the judge to determine which are those two sets? Because that's a pretty... I don't know. I would say that discretion exists at various different levels of the North Korean system, but I don't know for this particular offence and how it is now, I'm afraid. I don't think much discretion exists around this kind of stuff.

stuff. I think this stuff is probably signed off at a very senior level now because they are very aggressively enforcing and they don't want to leave much to chance or much to bribery as it were. And it's particularly selling or distributing the dramas that could lead to a potential death sentence rather than simply looking at something, right? We've seen those headlines sometimes I watched or someone watched a drama and got killed for it. So I don't have all this stuff memorized but it is in my report and they have very specific regulations surrounding where the content is from, what the content, what kind of content it is. So video is more punished than say I think photos, for instance. And then, yes, there's a, there's a, there's a big line between

mere consumption and distribution. Right. Now, if someone is, say, bribing an official to operate a small, informal business, how would that be treated differently? Well, I mean, it could be as simple as a warning or a fine. Even for bribing? Bribery, yeah, even that there are, the Administrative Punishment Act, I have to double check. But I believe that, yes, a small scale bribery can still be, so the official, both sides could just get warnings. It depends how big the cases, you know. Money, you know, the amounts matter. Yeah, right, right. Now, on public executions, which we've mentioned already a couple of times, what's happening on the ground in terms of, is there a wider suite of things that are, that people

could be executed for? Yes, they've increased in both criminal code and other laws. They've increased the number of offenses that can potentially lead to the death penalty. And are we seeing more executions based on testimony of defectors coming out? I get that impression. And are they often held in public, so as a lesson to or a warning to others? Yes, I don't know right now, but in the recent past, I think they were being, I don't think more so than before, but you know, public executions is a fact of life at North Korea. Now, you argue in your paper that economic rights may have marginally improved while cultural and information rights have sharply deteriorated, am I right? Under, yes, yes, absolutely, under the law. Is there a tension there that you can talk more about?

Well, in the sense that, you know, information and social rights are facilitated through markets, right? So access to foreign media, broadening access involves commercial, you know, commercial connections, right? Like strangers selling things to eat, it's a trading but amongst themselves, potentially a key means by which more people would get access to information and get access to, you know, alternative foreign sources of culture. And if you're seeking to clamp down on that, then that has implications for economic rights. but I would say more outside of that particular sphere, the law is pointing in a less negative direction. It sounds like essentially the regime is tolerating markets because it must, but drawing a red line around ideology or anything that touches or impinges upon ideology. Yeah, I would say so. At least that's what the law says. And that would suggest then that ultimately in the long run, North Korea is becoming economically more flexible but socially more repressive.

Yes. Yes, I think that's fair. I mean, the problem is we do have some counterindications. You know, as in my report primarily analyzes the law, but, you know, if you look at, say, a reporting from Daily NK, you get a more mixed impression. You know, you see the use of things like warnings and you see a more tolerant attitude towards, you know, some market economic activities. But then you also see these reports about a general crackdown on the use of foreign currency and attempts to sort of renationalize control. over, you know, the procurement and distribution of grain, for instance. So it's a mixed picture. But the law indicates that things are becoming less repressive in the economic sphere, absolutely. But it does sound like, based on what you just said, that there's more discretionary power than the law might actually give. The law does allow for lots of different forms of punishment that are much less draconian so long as certain thresholds are not met.

The people who enforce the law, so people who have the right to inflict administrative punishment, to have some discretion about what they do, and that could give them potentially the opportunity to extract bribes, but it also gives them the opportunity to be lenient. I would imagine their decisions have to be reported up, at least I've seen evidence in the past these things are being reported up. But the government seems to like some leniency under some circumstances because it sees overly aggressive enforcement as a waste of time and resources in some context. Peter, is all this sustainable in the long run? I guess the sustainability concern really is not around the economy.

It's about information control, isn't it, really? I'm afraid I'm quite pessimistic. I think it might be. I, you know, North Korea's have become much more close since COVID. You know, Chad O'Carroll, you know, wrote back in 2019 about the securitization of North Korean external relations. And, you know, North Korea is not allowing tourists back even from China. You know, has these limited Russian tourists mainly who go to places like once on come are out of the way and stuff. I don't see that much interest and enthusiasm to really significantly improve relations with, you know,

rather open, become more open to foreigners. And, you know, I think their information control system, I mean, Martin Williams is obviously the expert here, and you had him on the podcast recently, but I think they've become very sophisticated in controlling their information and their information ecosystem. And I'm concerned that those controls may be sustainable over the long run. Okay, all right, let's leave that scene there. We'll turn now to the looking back after the ninth party Congress. Before the Congress, you predicted elite reshuffling and possible ideological elevation of Kim Jong-un's thought. Now that the Congress has been held, how accurate was your forecast?

Well, we saw elite reshuffling. I mean, it was kind of an obvious thing to predict, wasn't it? It was kind of an elite, wasn't it? Yeah, you know, as in Kim Jong-un, every Congress that's happened previously has had a big reshuffle. So it's no surprise that he's done it again. Kim Jong-un Sa-Hang, like this idea of just Kim Jong-Yung-Yang Sa-Sang was not put into the party bylaws from what I can see. But these five construction lines, or what are they called five party construction points? Something along those lines.

They, it looks like they were. And, yeah, I mean, you know, we didn't see many surprises, to be honest. Well, that was, you've preempted my next question. What surprised you most about what actually happened? Perhaps what surprised you most that you weren't that surprised? Well, I was, like everyone else, I was hoping to see Kim Juea make an appearance of the party Congress, and, you know, it was very disappointing. It made the Congress less photogenic as a result, because she wasn't there to excite everyone with the emergence of this sort of, you know, girl amongst a lot of middle-aged and elderly men, which would have been very amusing to watch. I was mildly surprised to see Treyang He lose his job.

Maybe I shouldn't have been. He's quite old now, but he's just been such an important fixture in the Kim Jong-an era. There was a South Korean think tanker who basically said that Tring here was the number two in charge. That was last year. So it was rather amusing to see him lose his job. I wonder if he still is number two. You know, I shouldn't be too cruel, really. Elite politics in North Korea shrouded in mystery and people who have the courage of their convictions to come out and say something quite so bold.

I suppose should deserve our respect, but it was, you know, nonetheless, interesting to see. I mean, Yibyeong-Chur and Pak Chong-Tun both, you know, losing their jobs and being. being replaced was interesting. I mean, they both got in in the neck during the last five years for various things. I would have to look it up the specific details. But a lot of other officials have also been told off by Kim Jong-un, so it's interesting those two disappeared. I suppose younger blood was, Kim Jong-un wanted some younger blood, and that probably explains that. Do you still expect to see some formal institutional consolidation around Kim Jong-un thought? Maybe they won't use that term, but they are, you know, they're formally consolidating around

other things he said, right? He's five. What do they call it? I'm going to have to look this up, honestly. I shouldn't get this wrong. Yes, this is a five-point line they said out, right? Shreis did some really good reporting on it last week. So the political, organizational, ideological, discipline, and work style, you know, these five points, this basically reflects a lot of what Kim Jong-un wants and has been trying to do in the party for the last, you know, last 10 years or so, you know, this very strong emphasis on trying to improve people's ideological study, this strong, this interest, this obsessive interest in discipline, this obsessive interest in trying to improve the quality of the work of officials, which includes things like, you know,

their attitude towards the public and then also, you know, their non-interest in taking bribes. I mean, so although it's not literally Kim Jong-un-Hung-Hung-Mong-Sasang, it's like, these are things that, you know, have been coming out of his mouth a lot. True. And they just sort of turn them into general principles. Now, we didn't see Kim Joanne, as you said, but did the Congress clarify the succession question at all? I mean, not really, but, you know, she was very prominent at the parade. It's still not clear what she's...

I mean, yeah, the NIS thinks she's the successor, and, you know, the NIS is, obviously has a bit of a checkered track record. But nonetheless, I take their judgment seriously on these kinds of things. And there are a lot of analysts who think that she's a successor. You know, she doesn't seem to be just playing the role of, you know, his... You know, as in like not meaning to be rude about Kim Yo-Jong, but, you know, she was kind of like his personal assistant. She came across as his PA. She did other things too. You know, she was deputy head of the agitation propaganda department. And she, you know, she issued these statements, you know, related to inter-Korean relations. But when she was around Kim Jong-un, and she kind of came across as his assistant. You know, she occasionally acted as an independent actor in real life, too, when she came here in 2018 during the Pyongchang Olympics. But generally she was as assistant, whereas Kim Jueh doesn't give off that vibe. Do you feel that North Korea is moving towards dynastic normalization? Does look like it, yeah.

We don't know, but that's what it looks like. It looks like, yeah. Did the Congress confirm continued prioritization of military development? Yeah, but of a different kind, right? So Anket talked about this with you recently. This, I would say that they, you know, so Kim Jong-un kind of previewed this last year. He talked about the need to head towards a new dual development,

Pyong Jin line for both the development of conventional and nuclear forces. So, say, move away from nuclear force. So the last Biongjin line, the last dual development line was, let's develop the economy and nuclear forces. This one is now, let's develop conventional forces alongside nuclear forces. And what that says to me is that they're more interested in closing the conventional forces gap because they feel like they've gotten to a point with nuclear development where they're going to need to continue to develop the systems they already have and also

get the military used to using those systems and get them ready and drilled and build up organizational habits and norms surrounding the use of nuclear weapons. But at the same time, they now need to build up their conventional forces because this is where their major weakness is vis-a-vis South Korea in the United States. Do they have the money to do both? The money will be found if the great leader demands it. I don't know. Some of their systems, I imagine even their nuclear systems are not complete and not necessarily in a great state, but they're going to try. And some of these conventional forces are not very expensive.

Like drones, for instance, like small drone, kamikaze drones, they're much cheaper to build than nuclear warheads, at least as far as I know. Now, the two hostile states doctrine of North and South Korea, that seems to have hardened further, doesn't it? Yeah, no, I mean, it's further confirmed. And, yeah. But, I mean, Kim Jong-has been pretty blunt about it for the last few years, hasn't he? We still seem to be waiting. And I've talked about this with some of my colleagues that in Kenya. We still seem to be waiting for, I don't know, further institutionalization of that.

The change in the Constitution that we all talked about last year didn't end up happening. So it does seem to be a little bit like, I don't know, are the hedging? Yeah, I struggle. My feeling is they don't want to give too much detail about it, even to their own people. And a lot of this is signaling for the domestic audience, but they don't want to go into too much detail, because when you start trying to one-pick 70 years of consistent ideological messaging, you're going to open up a can of worms of contradictions and other problems. They were so quick to change the name of Tongil Station, Tongil Market, demolishing the arch, etc.

These are things that your average person who may not even bother reading a Rodung Shuman, and they're going to see this. Absolutely. And they are symbolic, they're important symbolic acts and they're costly signals. They're very difficult to undo. You know, as in some people say, well, you know, Kim Jong-un wants to change the relationship back. It can be done. I don't think it can be done.

I think inter-Korean reconciliation will be very difficult to explain. And for Kim Jong-un, you know, I don't think you can bring back unification having abandoned it. But I feel like there's several issues they have, right? One of them is how do you define the border without starting, without potentially creating a tinder box in the West Sea. You know, back in February 2024, they wanted us to believe they were about to do that, and they wanted to dare South Korea in a game of chicken to call them as they continue to raise the stakes.

You know, as in Kim Jong-un was talking about using anti-ship missiles in the West Sea. This was very serious and dangerous rhetoric. But then they calmed down and they stopped. And it looks to me like they don't really want to create that tinderbox. And more generally, the principles and the boundaries of the future relationship, if you're If they're set out in the Constitution and they're set out of laws, it kind of doesn't necessarily tie their hands, but it makes, it gives them less room for a maneuver, you know, and then when you set out too much, when you, when you're trying to explain your, you know, there's that expression

in, you know, political, in democracies, right, when you're explaining you're losing. And if you try and go into too much detail about something which is just under the old ideological system, a serious heresy, you know, remember the Korean War was a war of unification, right? Kim Jong-il was committed to unification, both his, you know, is a declet, his, you know, his His declaratory policy was committed to unification. Both his meetings were the, both the summit meetings were these great symbols of national reconciliation. And it was a really important part of him in North Korean ideology. You know, the way I like to explain it was it's like the Pope suddenly saying Jesus isn't coming.

You know, and that's about as heretical as it gets in Catholic. One of the most heretical things the Pope could possibly say in Catholicism. And it's, it's, it was part of North Korea's millenarian story. You know, the ultimate salvation of the Korean people was unification. And now Kim Jong-un's just sort of taken that away from his people. And going into too much detail will probably make people more angry and upset. And even Kim Jong-un faces audience costs. I mean, it's not quite on the level of, it's not a democracy, right?

North Korea is a very, very personalist authoritarian system. We were talking about information control earlier. And, you know, it's more brutal and more effective than Iran. And, you know, the Iranians obviously recently, apparently machine-gunned thousands, maybe tens of thousands of their own people. The North Korean government, if it faced a similar, set of protest would probably respond as, if not more, brutally. But he doesn't want to have to deal with the social discontent that would be associated with codification and discussion surrounding

this issue. Better to just sort of leave it at the level of a slogan and at the level of a finger-wagging exercise in some speeches. Don't center it. Don't make it, don't make it a primary focus of people. Just make it something that people are, you know, told from time to time. And don't make it the center of discussions in the country. Now, on Iran, how do you think North Korea is looking at what happened in Iran over the weekend? Is Kim Jong-un likely to go into hiding for a few weeks? Like his father, the late Kim Jong-il did back in 2003 after the US invaded Iraq? No, I don't think it's that likely.

Never say never, but I think he's more confident than his father was back in 2003. He does have nuclear weapons. He's got that deterrent. He's got that deterrent. And I think that does make a real difference. The facts is also the Americans are very, very, very, very, very, very, distracted and occupied by the middle of what's going on on the Middle East right now. I can't remember the last time Donald Trump or anyone in his inner circle mentioned North Korea.

Can you? It's been a long time. It's been a while, yeah. It's probably APEC or a little bit after. I mean, there are obviously people, there are, you know, people who talk to Yon have from time to time in the administration. But they're probably not, you know, cabinet members or, you know, part of Trump's inner circle. Now, in a last five minutes or so, I want to talk about one of your recent papers for Sejong on tactical nuclear and maritime nuclear command and control of North Korea. What is North Korea doing with its nuclear forces?

How is it making it more systematized? So North Koreans are building. So obviously I stand on the shoulders of giants, people like Hankat Panda and Joseph Bermudez. And this is an area that I'm exploring more in my work now, but as a rank amateur by comparison to such grades. But what I argue in this paper is that North Korea is seeking to expand, you know, as other analysts have already argued, seeking to build up its sea-based nuclear weapons as part of a credible second and potentially first strike capability, which is very, very difficult to knock out through a disabling first strike. So basically South Korean counter-force strategy, so how they seek to counter-Korean nuclear

forces and the potential for North Korean nuclear use is through a disabling strike. You know, North Korean missiles can be knocked out left of launch so before they're in the air or else they can be knocked out once they're in the air through interceptor missiles. And that's very difficult to do against sea-based nuclear forces. The other thing that the North Koreans are trying to do is develop tactical nuclear weapons for use on the battlefield. And here the rationale, I mean, there's plenty of rationales, but the rationale I focus on is that they are useful against South Korea's superior conventional force capabilities. South Korea has much better air force. South Korea has much better missile, it has many more missiles. South Korea has a much better armed army, Navy, and air force,

but what North Korea can do to counter that is what NATO sought to do during the Cold War to counter the Warsaw Pax's superior numbers with nuclear forces. So you use low-yield nuclear weapons against oncoming conventional armies. Do you see North Korea moving towards something resembling a mature nuclear doctrine, or do you feel like it's still improvising? I mean, the issue is not so much the doctrine from where I'm sitting. I mean, obviously, other analysts will take a different view. The issue, I think, is more the command and control system itself, right? You know, so they have this doctrine they set out in their 2022 law,

And it's scary, you know, because there's a lot of, there's some quite a lot of automaticity built into it, which a lot of observers noted at the time, you know, so if we think that our, you know, our state is under threat or a threat to our state is impending, we, you know, we will potentially automatically use nuclear weapon. But the, I wouldn't say the doctrine itself is immature per se, but the issue is the command of control system. So just for those who are not military specialists, what does that mean command control? So the extent to which orders, so the extent to which orders can be conveyed to. to the people with the weapons, the commanders in the field. And how centralized is that, is nuclear launch authority in North Korea today? Well, that's the question I'm grappling with in the paper, right? Because if you do deploy tactical nuclear weapons, you do deploy sea-based nuclear forces,

then you will have to, to some extent, either decentralize control. Delegate it down to somebody of low authority. Right. Or else do so under specific contingent circumstances. Otherwise, those nuclear weapons would be useless in the event of a decapitation strike. Right, because they may not be able to get a war. word back to head office, to Pyongyang, to Kim Jong-un, to say, can we launch this yes or no? Right. And the same basically goes with land-based forces, but land-based force command and

control is a little bit more difficult for, say, South Korea or other countries to disable, because a lot of these cables are deep underground and connected to units, but they could also be underground. So they're more difficult to, it'd be more difficult to knock out the communication channels than it would be for nuclear forces in theater, on the battlefield, or else at sea. So if North Korea seeks a survivable second strike capability at sea, what does that mean for regional security? Well, it's quite destabilizing in one sense because commanders at sea in the field, but actually in water, could potentially have de facto control over the launch of nuclear weapons, which North Korea would not be the only country where this is the case, right? So Britain has the captains of nuclear ballistic missile submarines have the capability to launch.

if they want to. Now, they don't have the right to do so. They only have the right to do who saw under specific delineated circumstances when they believe the United Kingdom has been destroyed. But theoretically, you know, de facto, they could launch whenever they like. Fortunately, they don't. But that, it would be destabilizing under those circumstances because, you know, if, in those, sorry, in that sense, it would be destabilizing because North Korean submariners could potentially launch nuclear weapons, even, you know, if they have, if they, if they, if they are under the impression, potentially incorrect impression, that their Supreme Commander has been killed or, you know, the regime has been destroyed.

But in another sense, the North Koreans having this capability, make them feel more confident, may make them feel less worried about exercises involving, you know, USROK exercises, less worried. You know, they may feel secure in their deterrent and therefore less likely to feel that they face a lose it or use it or lose it or, sorry, yes, lose it or use it dilemma. Lose it will use it. But is North Korea's naval nuclear ambition credible yet? It just seems like there's a lot of ifs there, or rather sort of, you know, question marks. Like, is there, do they have

nuclear-powered submarines that would work? Do they have submarine launched ballistic missiles that will reliably launch on demand? So North Korea doesn't have a nuclear-powered submarine yet. They're building one. They've shown off photos in the last year or so. It's over a year now since they've been showing them off. It has been a while. Can't remember the precise dates. It's all in the report. But they've been showing this off. They also launched a tactical nuclear weapon submarine back in 2023, which is, yes, according to a rival website, is still not really on. It's not on patrol and it's still in Dry Dock. But they do have their older Romeo-class diesel-powered submarines, some of which may be nuclear capable.

We don't know. This is a long-term future threat that we need to get to be prepared for. Remember, I'm writing for the South Korean government in mind here, and I'm writing for South Korean policy circles in mind. You don't start responding to a threat. Once it is proven. Right. You know, defense acquisition and strategic and conceptual concerns have to start, have to, discussions have to begin earlier, right?

You argue in your paper that there's a tension between survivability on the one hand and regime control on the other. What is that trade off? So with sea-based, with sea-based and tactical forces, any communication with headquarters risks revealing the position of those forces and makes it much easier for them to target. We see this, we see this right now with Iran. Apparently, a lot of commanders in the field are freelancing now because they're too

scared to talk to headquarters. They also don't know who's in charge which further complicates matters. But so if you're a ballistic missile submarine and you come up to a, you come up to a point where you can be in bi-directional communications with headquarters, potentially giving off signals which allow third parties to find your location. The same goes for tactical nuclear forces, right, in the field. So survivability, survivability implies being in radio silence and potentially freelancing, or at least acting according to preset orders, or when those preset orders don't apply, trying to figure out what an alternative acceptable pathway

is for nuclear use. There's so much to think about there. Across these three areas that we've talked about today, so law, domestic politics and nuclear control, do you see a coherent governing strategy emerging under Kim Jong-un? Yeah, well, if my boss and esteemed senior colleague were here, he probably, so we have unsocialist activities, we have the move towards institutionalization in law, we have delegation in nuclear command and control. I guess we would say delegation is the key word. You know, Kim Jong-un seems to be more interested in delegating authority to technocrats and people with expertise to have them make the decisions. He'll hold them accountable after the fact if they make the wrong decision, obviously.

If you're a nuclear submarine captain, then maybe that wouldn't actually happen. But under most circumstances, the idea is to delegate to people and to allow them to make some decisions within a framework that is set centrally. and then if they do a good job, then they get promotions, they get medals, they get applause, and if they don't do well, you know, they lose their job or worse. Wow, well, that's a lot to think about and unpacked there. Peter Ward, once again, research fellow at the Sejong Institute. Thank you so much for coming on our show. And, of course, people can go onto the Sejong Institute's website and download your papers.

The first one on unsocialist activities, that's available in English, but the other papers are in Korean, right? That's right. The nuclear papers I actually translated it today, so it'll be on the English side soon. Okay. Thank you very much again. And we look forward to having you again in the future. Well, thank you for having me, and I look forward to being back soon. Looking to stay informed about South Korea's fast-evolving political business and cultural landscape? Join us on Korea Pro, the go-to resource for in-depth analysis expertly curated by top-tier professionals.

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Our thanks go to Brian Betts and David Choi for facilitating this episode and to our post-recording producer Alana Hill, who cuts out all the extraneous noises, awkward silences, bodily functions, and fixes the audio levels. Thank you for listening and listen again next time.