North Korea News Podcast by NK News - Ria Roy: The importance of subtle language differences between North and South

Episode Date: January 22, 2026

Dr. Ria Roy, a scholar of modern Korea and East Asian history, joins the podcast to discuss the differences in language between the two Koreas, including contrasts in linguistic and ideological correctness. She examines the Soviet Union’s influence on the Korean language in the DPRK and the importance of conveying information with the right tone. […]

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That's shop.m.knews.org. Hello listeners, welcome to the NK News podcast. I'm your host, Jacko's Wetsuit, and this episode is recorded on Tuesday, the 30th of December 2025, almost the end of the year. And I'm joined here in the studio by Dr. Ria Roy. She is a Kleinhein's fellow at the Hoover Institution, Stanford University, and is a specialist in the history of modern Korea and East Asia. Today we'll be talking about her paper entitled to Sacred Text and the Language of the Leader, Cultured Language and the Rhetorical Turn in North Korea, which was published in the Journal of Korean Studies. Welcome on the show, Ria. Thank you, thank you, thank you, Jack for inviting me. It's such a pleasure to be here. I'm glad to hear that. So let's start with a couple of questions to set the scene for our listeners. If a listener were to turn on North Korean television tonight, what would they hear that instantly tells them, ah, this is North Korean, not South Korean? So when one is listeners to North Korean language, the bits that immediately come across are the bits that are so political. In a way, to our ears, it comes

across even as maybe irrational. You see the reverence for the leader and historic language, very verbose. And you also have the accent and intonation. It also depends on who you speak to, let's say the broadcaster or the elite or people who live in Pyongyang or people who live in the other region. So there are certain kind of markers. but in a way to our ears, like the most striking thing is the kind of propagandistic aspect of it. And would you be able to read one short Korean sentence in two ways, in a South Korean way, and in a North Korean broadcaster style, just so the listeners can hear or see the difference?

Oh, wow, I should have really prepared for the reading, but yes, I think I can do that. Great. So I guess an example I have in mind is that in South Korean, let's say KBS, the Korean broadcast system, they would say, if I say the same sentence, Widean, Kim Jongil Dongik, Kays,

Kiyo, so firstly, in KBS, they wouldn't really use the kind of grandiose kind of descriptions, let's say, the great leader.

But, but you, Korean would, in a way, to North Koreans would sound much more kind of monotonous. So if you read it in kind of the North Korean

announcer way, it would be that, Widean Youngdoza Kese, Kim Jong-il Dongji Keseo something like that. So here you see the Keseo, you have the honorific,

you have the markers referring just the leader, but at the same time you hear this kind of a heroic way, how the readers, the broadcaster reads it out loud. So you can't say things like Kim Jong-il-I, or you can't say justice name without any kind of an honorific. Right. And if you can't say,

kind of focus. I mean, what North Korea tries to do is that they want to also adambrate the correct feeling to it. The feeling that the listener should have. Yeah. Okay, so let's talk about cultured language. In plain English, what is Munwa-a-a, which is the North Korean word for, you know, their standard of Korean, and how is it different from everyday Korean used here in South Korea? Yes. So again, the different bit is the, with South Korean language, you know, when you're judging a South Korean language, even if you're not a linguist, what you would normally judge is based on the grammar, the syntax. There are certain proper ways of doing it. And that's the same

for most languages, right? There's a receipt pronunciation or the like. But in the case of North Korean, you have this kind, not just the linguistic correctness, but you also have this ideological correctness. In other words, there is a correct feeling to be felt. In anything that he said. In anything, for instance, I mean, things that, I mean, things that where this becomes more pronounced is the, let's say, what you say about the leader. And that's very strong, right? The great leader did this, great leader did that. But at the same time, when you watched Korea Central News Agency, the North Korean TV program, you would also hear announcers swearing at the enemy. These human garbages should rattle on knowing what they're talking about or are kind of foul.

language, very colorful swear words they're as if towards their enemies. And that to our ears would be gosh, oh, this is a prime time newscaster is swearing on TV. But in the North Korean perspective, that is perfectly normal and justified because

speaking Bunhao, the cultured language, is not really just about getting the grammar right. It's also about getting the sentiment, getting the ideology right. And so that's where this word Munwa culture is, it's doing some ideological lifting here. Yes. So So Munha-oh, so Munha refers to culture, as you've mentioned, and O refers to the language.

So Munha-oh is the cultured language. But here, culture is not as simple as it sounds. So culture here doesn't mean just anything. The culture here means, Munha actually, official definition would be like the socialist, national, Korean language. And the culture here has a special meaning where it's not just reading a book or anything like that. it's really about inculcating a particular view where there are certain kind of culture, certain kind of cultural norms that are in line with what the party or the state has. So it's not also an thing where it is marked by abstract criteria.

There is a certain kind of a moral and missionary didactic zeal that comes with it. So the goal is to kind of you constantly are trying to perfect and hone the ideological, aesthetic and political use of it. So put it simply, it's not really just about speaking correctly, it's really about having the right attitude. Oh, yeah. Now, in general about North Korean language, one of the claims it's often made

is that North Korea has tried to, or the North Korean leadership has tried to purify the language in North Korea, is tried to take out loan words or words with too much hancha in them, you know, from Sino-Korean roots. So could you, is there an example that perhaps a word or a phrase that you could think of that is pure Korean in North Korea, but more often in South Korea might be from Chinese or from even a borrowed English word? An example that comes to mind, I mean, kind of answers it, but it's a word called Chang Balsong.

Chang Balsong, I read a memoir written in the Korean War about South Korean intellectual. And he says that in the south we use the word Changi Song. But Changbal Song is a word they haven't heard of. It kind of means original kind of way of doing things like originality. But North Korea, one big difference between the North and the South, where you can see why the North thinks that their version of the language is much more pure is because if you just look at the newspaper that was published in the North, say in the 1950s, early.

in 1950s and compare that with the newspaper published in South Korea, you would immediately see that South, North Korean one, they're trying to use fewer Sino-Korean vocabulary and fewer Japanese loan-worse traits. So in a way, trying to eliminate the Japanese imperialism and also some Chinese character. So with North Korean newspapers, it is aimed to have this universality where anyone picking up however educated or less educated you are, you are able to understand. But we can't say the same thing about South Korean newspapers at that time. And although now the South Korean newspapers, they don't use hanjia anymore,

but in the early years, that was like a big difference. Yeah, yeah. When I first came here in the 1990s, some of the, you know, the Jo, Dong, Zhong newspapers, they were still publishing in mixed script, you know, hanscha together with Korean, with hengel. But the example that you cite there, Chang Balsong versus Changi Song, Both of them are from Huncha. Yeah. Yeah, I would think so.

But then at least the Korean intellectual at that time was saying that that's the word that South Koreans didn't use. At least he, him as an intellectual, mentions that North Korea seems to be using Korean-sounding words, but they don't sound like Korean at all. Right. It's kind of ironic that North Korea has definitely kept the use of the word Minjok, which I understand from my reading, was borrowed from a Japanese translation of the German word folk.

So folk became Minzoku, which became Minjog. And that's the word that is so central to North Korean ideology, that ultimately it's a borrowed word from the enemy Japan nonetheless. So I want to talk about the Soviet origins there. So your article shows that North Korea didn't just copy the Soviets in language policy, but developed its own path. But what Soviet ideas about language most shaped North Korean policy, linguistic policy? So I guess one way of answering that question is, what lessons did North Korea

learn from the death of Stalin? And that might be a rather, it might sound like a very abstract answer, but there is actually something to it. Because, I mean, this is a very kind of an obscure side, relatively obscure side of the story from the Soviet side, but one thing that really shaped North Korea is Stalin's intervention with the linguists. And then this is quite striking, because but maybe perhaps readers of Solgenitzen would know that in Solgenitzen's first circle, the novel, there's a scene where Stalin is late at night mulling over a glass of mind, and he's thinking about abstract things like language. Is language the superstructure of the base?

And this is quite striking why would Stalin think about these things. But actually, this was actually based on what had happened in 1950s. there was a very now obscure linguist called Marr, Nicolae Marr, and Marr had this idea that he was one of the first to apply Marxist materialist thought into language. But the whole reason why he was so popular, why he got the Lenin Prize and so on, is that he thought that while there are many languages in the world, eventually they would all merge into one and there will be one world language. And if you're a Marxist, a colleague at that time, you think, gosh, what a revelation. That chimes in so well with communist internationalism. So then these people were debating all the time. But what is so striking is not just about what they said about language.

What is striking is why Stalin felt the need to intervene. So he rejected Mars theory. So when he's rejecting Mars theory, the bit that is important isn't what's Stalin actually said about language. The bit that is in a way salvaged is that we get the status of Stalin, who seems to know everything from obscure linguistic theory to new, whatever, so many things, which is something that we wouldn't expect from presidents or prime minister. So what you get there is that leader as an arbiter of knowledge, in a way, leader as somebody

who seems to know Allah, who's able to stand outside of the discourse and say, this is true and this is not true. But all that comes to an end when Stalin dies. And then you have to push up secret speech in 1956. But similar thing happens to North Korea. So in some ways, the language of the cult that stopped with the death of Stalin, North Korea takes on where the Soviet had kind of left off. So in some ways, the initial hint comes from Stalin. But what North Kim Il-Sang also does is that he also purchased another linguist in Kim Dubon

Who was one of the partisans from way back in the beginning? Yeah, so he was one of the prominent political rivals, and he rejects the North Korean linguist. And then he also tries to kind of consolidate his power based on that. So in some ways, North Korea got the initial hints from Soviet side, but at the same time, they elaborated it further. Kept going, yeah. Who was Kim Suu Kyeong?

and why is he a big deal in this story? Yes, Kim Sugeong was this linguist who eventually went to North Korea. But I guess every time I talk about Kim Sugeong, I have to mention that Kim Sugeon was one of the students, bright students at Kejou Imperial University, which is a modern-day Seoul National University. Right. And I have to add this part where Kim Sugeyang,

much to our profound disappointment, was only able to research in 14 different languages. Only in 14. Only 14. Not 15. Wow. So what happens is that, He was very multilingual and he goes to North Korea.

And in 1946, for ideological reasons, he went to North Korea? Yes. So combined. But so at that time, Kim Il-Song University was, you know, math founded and then salary was good. So he's one of those people who went to North Korea, although he actually didn't tell his wife

that he was going to take a job there in the beginning. So wife was a bit disappointed, but she also leaves to the north eventually. So what Kim Su-Gyong did is that he was one of the... the figures. He's just an example where who translated a lot of the Soviet theories, including that of Stalin's intervention with

the linguists. So figures like Kim Su-Gyong is very important because when you think about North Korea, people think about the Machiavellian politics or the cult. But at the same time, you can't have a cult. One man can't make a cult on his own.

You need to have a system. You need to have the hands behind the scene. So Kim Su-kyung and the other few rhetoricians I mentioned in the article are a few examples that demonstrate that in a way there were people behind the scene who made the cult possible. Working specifically on the language?

Yeah. So then you mentioned rhetoric there. So in the 1960s in your paper, you say that there was this rhetorical turn in North Korea. What changed there? And why was that more consequential than alphabet or dictionary work? Yeah, so I think the alphabet

and the dictionary work, which they did early on, But that's what other places do all the time, right? In a way, that's not new people coming up with writing dictionaries, people, Russian, Korean dictionary or Japanese, Chinese, whatever dictionary. But the point about the rhetorical turn, which is so interesting, is that as you have this development of Munhao, cultured language, when you open the lid on Munawa, it's not really about,

there is an aspect of a language, the grammar and the words, but the bigger byproduct of it is the leader, the primacy of the leader. So what I refer to as the rhetorical turn is when you not only have emphasis, you not only get the grammar right, you also have the moral and affective, performative aspect of it right. So you have that from the 60s, but how do you have the correct kind of attitude or morality? That's from the 70s onwards you have to check Q&A competition or studying the collective works of Kim Il-Sung. So it's not just one thing.

It's really like the entire cultural sphere being permeated with the attempt to inculcate a particular culture that sustains and contributes to the monolithic system. And that's why, unlike in the USSR after Khrushchev's reforms, they had to keep the leader inside language or on top of language rather than separate from it. What do you mean by that? Well, I mean that you were saying that once Stalin was dead

and Khrushchev had these reforms and secret speech, that there was no longer a sense that the leader of the Soviet Union is an arbiter of knowledge and decides the rules of language. But with Kim Il-Song, he's always got to stay in it because the language is part of elevating him. Right. So in a way, it's not just a politics, that's on his side. It's really the entire cultural maneuver and the linguistic and entire

corpus of knowledge really. Because when you think about it in the 70s or 80s, it's not like you can go to Kjobo Mungo and buy Lemurisarabla or Mengshus. In a way, the books that people have exposure to art, the collective work of Kimmel's song. So then people read that. And in a way, they develop the correct way, the correct speech of how to speak in cultured language. And in a way, telling people to speak in a particular correct way also comes with certain kind of societal norms that inevitably kind of contributes to the system. Yeah, you argue that in North Korea they built a formal etiquette for how to speak of and for the leader.

And you've already mentioned at the beginning there that there was the suffix, guess of, what are some of the other features of that etiquette, that formal etiquette of speaking about and for the leader? Yes, so for instance, when you're conveying the statements or the sayings of the great leader. Are these the kioshi, the leader's instructions? Ah, kiosi, yeah, kiosi is the instruction. So when you're conveying that to the people, sometimes you give us, there are certain techniques you can do, poses and intonation, speed, or certain things. Let's say when you are saying something about how generous and loving the leader is to children,

you say it in a very kind of slow way. The dear leader kind of took care of all the children. Or when you're conveying the statements or the instructions or the giosi of Kim Il-sung, you make sure you say it in a very, you give a pause before and after the name. And you also... Just to make sure everyone's listening. Exactly, so that you heighten the focus. Right.

of the thing. So they do various rhetorical means to really make sure that the audience is with you. Yeah, so you've mentioned their tone, pauses, pacing, and we've already talked about some honorific forms. Keseo is not used for anybody else in North Korea, is it? You can use NIM for some things, but Keseo and I guess words like Jido Jiao or Suryong, which is often translated as leader Suryong, but that's specifically referred to Kim and Song. what political work does that kind of ring fencing, you know, that exclusively using honorific forms and certain titles for the leader? What political work does that do? So it's really about it delineates who can do certain things while others cannot.

And in a way, there are certain things only leader can do. And at the same time, it contributes to the political legitimacy of the state. And you also have certain monopoly of certain words. Like an example I want to give is Kiyoshi. Kiyosi, as you know, it means instruction. But if you and I look up the word

Kiyosi in South Korean Dictionary, you would get the definition that you would expect. Like a guidance, teach and show, certain things like that. And if you look it up in North Korea,

in the early 1950s, Russian Korean dictionary, Kiosi would mean the same. But with the advent of Munao, the cultured language, the instruction becomes only something that the leader can issue. So that definitely, it's kind of the statement that the leader says or in a way, a giosi that the leader gives is a lot, it's treated like a sacred text.

I'm not saying that culture language is sacred, but what I'm saying is there's no higher authority that could intervene it. I want to focus on this word, this sacred, because you've said in your paper that, yeah, the DPRK rhetoric, quote, renders the language of and about the leader. as a sacred text. Now, North Korea is a state that famously does not like organized religion. So what makes something sacred if it's not theological? Is Kim elevated to something more than human?

So I think the point, so let's say as we've seen in the Stalin example, Stalin was the one who was able to arbitrate a particular knowledge, corpus of knowledge. So when Kim Il-sung too similarly is able to give certain kind of a or instruction, but they're not giving that in a sacred, in a way, the sacred sense in a religious sense. What I mean sacred here is that there are many ways of defining sacred, but if there's no higher authority that can intervene it,

that also makes it sacred because people are treating it as though, in a way, if you compare the Constitution versus what? what the leader says, Kim Il-Sang Kiyosi. Kiyosi is the highest one, right? You can imagine. So the irony, I think, is that with so many of the Marxists, it stays where, you know, ostensibly you're against religion, at the same time, I think the problem is that

because the monopoly of reason rests with the party, you need the arbiter, the leader. And especially the party center, which is the leader. Exactly. Right. Yeah, so in some ways, I think you wouldn't expect, let's say, President Obama or South Korean president or PM to know everything about nuclear science to linguistics. But in some ways, like as shown in the case of North Korea, North Korea is an extreme case of this, where by default, the system makes, ensures that the leader is able to attain that position. Yeah, and he becomes in a way all-knowing, right?

He's sort of the omniscient genius. He's not God, but no one knows more than him. Exactly. Now, what about this tension between having an idea of egalitarian people's speech on the one hand and a super elevated language for one person, namely Kimmer's song on the other? How does that tension, how does the DPRK resolve that tension? So I think the tension that people feel, people, if we're listening, if you're reading about what great leader this, great leader that in 2025, outside of North Korea, let's say from South Korea, people are going to be very kind of cool towards it. People won't find it so, how'd I say it, exciting or useful. But at the same time, if we think about what 1948, 1950s would have been like for ordinary North. Koreans, when things are really, really bad, so there's a Korean war, there, everybody,

you had the colonial period where language and all that was objugated. There was both north and the south, especially from the elite, there was a strong yearning for a strong leader. So in some ways, when the North Koreans came up with the system, the tension that you and I think about is a bit different. If you were in the 50s or the 60s, in a way, it's. In a way, it's. a bit, I think it fit as playing chess. In the beginning, you don't, you think you're doing all right, but there comes a point where certain moves are very, very critical and you can't undo that. So in the early years, I think both in the north and the south, they yearned for a very strong leader, where they didn't think of that as, was this egalitarian or not. They

kind of yearned more for the enlightened one who could kind of save these people, I think. It's also one of those interesting ironies that in North Korea, I don't know how this is with other languages, but in North Korea, there are two words for comrade, depending on whether it's a comrade on the same level or whether it's a comrade who is someone you look up to, right? You've got the Dongmu and the Dongji. I don't know whether Russian or Chinese has that distinction in words for comrade too, but it is already there we see that breach in egalitarianism. And then, of course, we have the next level, which is, you know, talking about the great leader himself. Now, in 1975, there was this book that was published by Riesang Biok, this manual, Chosun Malhazul. Is it basically a style guide or is that a performance handbook or a political catechism? How would you describe it?

I think it's all of the above. All of it. Okay. Tell us a bit more about it then. So, in a way, we've seen in the 20th century after World War, after World War I and all. that we've seen the rise and fall of all other cultic figures. We know their use of charisma. But what we see in North Korea, in the example that you mentioned,

Riesang Beog's Joseon Malhasa, the rhetoric of Korean, published in 1970s. 50 years ago this year. Yeah. So that goes beyond anything that the Soviet had imagined, meaning North Korea maintains clarity where the Soviet-Stalin era, linguistic really elusive. In other words, they shape the contours of charisma.

They sketch the contours of charisma. So in doing so, you have this kind of a guide on, instruction on how to convey the sayings of the leader. At the same time, they also tell you the style guide, how you should read it. So another word that they kind of mention is this sortipika, sound color, which is not a, it's not a word. word that you use in South Korea.

But that kind of thing is a reference to kind of certain kind of texture, certain kind of, to heighten the ideological awareness, kind of feeling, performativity of it. So those things are all, so Rizheng Beog's Joseommal-Hasul has all that sides to it, and where you tell the readers, if you're reading a poem, you read it in such a place, If you're reading whatever the leader says, you read it in a particular word per syllables for whatever minute. So, yeah. So this is really where, yeah, it's all spelled out.

Here's how you say things. The pauses, the emotional delivery, the sound color, as you said. This might be getting a bit into the psychological weeds and you may not be able to answer. But how do these techniques actually push listeners toward the intended feelings? How does it work? Mm-hmm. So I think, I mean, reception, we all.

All of us have to be kind of cautious when we're talking about reception, let's say, especially of a top-down policy. But at the same time, I would look at this question. I would divide the generations. Let's say, if you're in the 50s and the 60s, if you were born in the colonial period, if you've seen what language being oppressed and culture being oppressed was like, and then North Korea is founded, and then you have the Kim Il-sung, and he's the one who builds schools, He's the one who makes sure everybody can read and write.

And if you're from that perspective, you don't really think the cultured language is an odd thing. In a way, this is something very natural, I would think. Although there were some skeptics, I mean, there were some skeptics in the memoirs that I found, but there would have been a stronger appeal. But at the same time, if you were somebody who was born during the famine

after the economy has collapsed, you wouldn't find these kind of strong embracing of the Munha-en-en-en-er or the culture language. But at the same time, this is what the state is telling them to do. Right. So although the reception question is different, difficult to answer, I think it also depends on what region you're from

and what kind of true-sinseng, what kind of background you have. Yeah. We know that Kim himself came from a Christian background, and a lot of people in Pyongyang did in 1945, right? It was the Jerusalem of the East, it was called. Do you see a crossover, an overlap here between Christian techniques or Christian ways of talking and then Munho? Yeah, I mean, that's a very interesting question.

So directly, I mean, as you mentioned, there was circumstantially, like indirectly, there was a Jerusalem of the East. And in the actual text itself, you don't see any kind of reference to. Christian techniques. But if you look at some of the actors or Kim Il-sung himself came from a very Christian family, but I'm not really sure if we have enough evidence to kind of suggest that the development of Bunha-a-or came from, drew from any kind of Christian context. I think it drew more, parallels are more strong in the case of the Soviet Union. But in terms of reception of it, probably that may have contributed to it.

And then as well as, of course, the elevated ways of talking about the leader, you've also got particular ways in ways of talking about the enemy, right, the imperialist. Is this also sketched out in Riesung-Biog's manual? Yes, absolutely. So when what is encouraged that you need to have the correct psychological representation. So having tremendous hatred for the enemies or using very colorful. And in many cases, very original swear words for the nation's end. enemy.

And also the very repetitive, whereas you would use NIM for a good appendix. You've got norm for a bad appendet suffix. Yeah. And I sometimes think that, especially if you've, you know, experienced a Korean war. And with North Korea, it's not like there is a pluralism. There is like a different exposure to, like a various points of view that you're exposed to. You only have certain kind of very curated access to information. So at that time, I think in some cases when you hear swear words like that to the Americans or American imperialists or things like that, I think some would have even found it cathartic.

Do you think in a way that the language is, the way that the language is used, is sort of trying to put the listener back in the time of the war? I think perpetually they're, in a way, they're trying to go back to that moment where you always have an enemy, right? So it's much better for a system if you have a common enemy. I think Ronald Reagan said that back in the 1980s. Remember he talked about the cold war between the Americans and the Soviet Union? And he said, you know, if space aliens were to come here tomorrow and try to kill all of us, we'd all get together and fight off against them. So having an external enemy has a wonderfully unifying effect.

Yeah, it did in the case of North Korea, definitely. Right, yeah. Now, this manual, this Riesangbog book from 1975, it looks very, It seems to be very self-conscious about charisma, but how unusual is it globally to codify charisma like this? Have you found any sort of examples elsewhere around the world? Not as far as I'm aware of. So I think what North Korea does in terms of this charismatic oratory

is absolutely original. This kind of deep emphasis on performativity of it. I think this is like one of the original contributions that North Korea does, because like you said, I mentioned, there could be like a Christian, like different kind of religious indirect influences or direct influences, but then we don't have enough evidence to suggest that. But in the case of North Korea, what's so odd or interesting is that if it's just, you know,

if it's just brute use of power or Machiaem Valley in politics, why do you bother with all this? Why do you bother to explain to the people that this is the way we're doing it, right? So I think this kind of a drive to kind of enlighten the mass is to explain that this is how we do now because of, from their perspective, based on scholarly reasons, it's very original. And that's what makes the North Korean Munhae case stand out because you not only have platonism of ideas, that's expected. You have platonism of feelings. You have the correct feeling to be felt. I think that's absolutely original. Now, moving into a bit more into the present day here, when we turn on North Korean and we hear star North Korean news announcers like Ri Chon He, some people call the Lady in Pink, which techniques from the Rizangbiok 1935 textbook are we still hearing in the 2020s?

Is it still, is that book, as far as we know, still in use? Is it still important? Is it still used today? I'm not sure if I haven't come across any kind of evidence that suggests that broadcasters in KCNA are using the actual manual that Riesangbeau made, but because there are other manuals, other kind of discussions, because Munao now, the cultured language is a, it has an entire corpus, right? So it's not just one book, it's moved beyond. Yeah, moved beyond. But I mean, having said that, I do think that Rizambeok's work was absolutely pioneering.

And Ritchunhi, the pink lady, the mentioned, she's absolutely kind of skillful in delivering the right delivery. So she has the right sound color. When she's talking about, when she's raising about the enemy, she kind of... She looks disgusted. She's disgusted and angry. But when you look at the funeral reporting that she gave, you also see her kind of shedding tears, very kind of emotional language, right? Yeah, that emotional language, especially the fierce and sometimes the course,

course language that you've referred to, is that just propaganda heat or is part of part of the original goal of closing the gap between written and spoken language? So I think it's definitely an attempt to close the gap between the written and the spoken language part. I mean, that was also like the Marxist's name, like for that ordinary people could understand. But by doing that, it is much more appealing, right? It's kind of very easy to understand. And there's an ideological aspect to it, of course. So it has an agitation effect, right? To move the masses, to move the people.

Yes. Right. Now, in classrooms and in meetings, do ordinary North Korean people actually try to reproduce these features, or is this now mostly reserved for broadcasters? Yeah, so I think whether we have the same intonation or not, whether we read it out loud as skillfully as Richonio or not, when you look at what North Korean writers or award-winning writers,

or when you listen to what high-level defectors say, the big point about culture language is having that, maintaining that culturedness, right? So that aspect is always there. So especially when you talk to high-level defectors. And maybe if you're born somebody, if you're born during the famine or if you were born after the collapse of the economy,

you may not feel that this was really powerful enough, But then I think in education, North Korean education in general, their aim is to heighten a particular kind of level of culturedness. So even if you don't do the whole intonation and the speed and all that as skillfully as richune, that aspect of it is kind of deeply permeated in the cultural fabric. But having said that, cult isn't a gift that keeps on giving. Cult is very difficult to maintain. it's you need to language and all that is very difficult to deal with.

So let's say when the reception of it probably is not as how would I say it maybe as good as it used to be but I don't think I have enough evidence to say that but what's so striking is that Kim Jong-un now, the three laws

that he recently passed in the cultural sphere, the Cultural Language Protection Act and whatnot all that is an attempt to kind of reassessing reassert the Kim Il-Sung-era, Kim Jong-il-era orthodoxy. Yeah, yeah.

So language is still such an important part of maintaining the stability of the system, right? I mean, yes and no. As in yes, partly because with North Korea, I mean, I mentioned it as a rhetorical turn, but what other turns can you have? Meaning North Korea, a lot of the promises that it had for these people,

like a wonderful welfare state, egalitarianism, that all the economy... Rice and meat, Supe three times a day. All that didn't really work out. So at the end of the day, all you have left is the rhetoric. About 10 years ago, going to a very sad moment there, remember the Otto Warmbier trial in which he gave this confession that was filmed by North Korea and used by North Korea government for its own purposes? It seemed to, well, did you think that he was, was he coached in how he spoke when he gave that confession?

because sometimes it felt that he was speaking in a way that an average North American boy of his age probably wouldn't. I thought he looked terribly weak and I can imagine that he must have endured so much. But at the same time, some of the word choices, when I look at the heavens and the earth, or when he uses the arms, a gesture in a very kind of evocative way, I thought I wouldn't be surprised if he was actually kind of coached to kind of, although he's using English, he's kind of speaking in a particular way. Yeah. Yeah. And we even, have you ever seen film footage of young North Korean like kindergartners or elementary school students give a speech in front of their class

about Kim Il-Song or Kim Jong-il or Kim Jong-un? And they have also been trained from a very early age in how to speak with these gestures and with the tone. Yeah, I think a part of that is because a part of the reason why cultured language or the like has to continue one way or the other is that you have Senaengalchunga, right, the reflections. The what do I call it? The self-criticism. It's a self-criticism session. So when you do that, and the books that you're writing.

So you can't say that using slang, you know. So that's why I think there are different ways in which the state is kind of encouraging and forward. forcing people to speak in a particular way. Do you, in your interviews with North Korean defectors, have you learnt whether they, in their self-criticism, would also criticize how they used language, like I spoke inappropriately, or I used the wrong, you know, sound color in referring to the leader, or, you know, I didn't say it right?

You mean when they're reflecting on their life? Yeah, when they're reflecting on themselves, or maybe when they're criticizing somebody else in the Saturday meetings, do they say, you know, I saw him give a speech, and he didn't do the right pauses and he sounded really crap. He sounded like he was talking about, you know, the dustment down at the station, not talking about the leader. I haven't come across that, but I can, I mean, probably if it's like a meeting among people

in a very local level, I think probably not using the pose and all that will be forgivable, I think. But what's not forgivable is when you're being rude about the state, the leader, and the ideology. So the content of it, so I think the linguistic part of it, I think that's, more or less okay. And even the performativity, I think, you do a bit of it, but even if it's wrong, I mean, the more grave issues that you can trouble that you can get into is probably getting the ideology wrong. But I haven't come across any interviews like that. So how difficult is it now for North and South Koreans to communicate with each other,

given these linguistic policies and choices? Yeah, so I think when North and South Koreans speak, they get the language. I mean, it's not like if a South Korean reads the North Korean text, they don't get it. It's more so what's so apparent in the North Korean side is that the ideological, the political side of it is so strong. So if you're an ordinary South Korean, that's a bit kind of a bit odd, right? It's a bit difficult to kind of understand. But I think Kim Kim Il-sung, actually, when he was coming up with this culture language, what he initially said was that the languages of the North and the South can't be too different,

because ultimately at some point, North and the South will unite, so it can't be too bizarre. But right now, after 70, 80 years, you do see clear differences. So then the question is, what is it that one can do? at least I think whether one is on I think one way of dealing with that is you just have to understand how certain utterances

are made in North Korean context and think about why they're saying what they're saying because I guess the key is you want to know when to be offended when not to be offended, right? So you also want to know when this is just the saying

or whether other things are very genuine. So the only way, all the antidote to that is to look at the context where in which certain kind of things were uttered. But you also, you don't want to be using the same words to talk about different things. And I'm going to give a very trivial example here. The word for octopus and squid are opposites in the two careers, right? So muno here is Oginga there and Ogingo here is Muno there. Now, if you say, you know, if you got a restaurant and say, I'd like some Muno, you'll end up

with the wrong thing. Now, that's a very trivial sort of, you know, everyday, quotidian example. But at a certain point when, with these political loadings that all these words, you're words have, that you could be using the same word, but talking completely past each other in terms of intended meaning? Yeah, I mean, that's definitely, definitely the case. Let's say, I think when North Korea said that even when referring to former President Moon, even a boiled head of a cow would laugh at such absurdity. So that's a very kind of a, it sounds horrible in South Korean, but in the North, it's okay. But then if you say that at a, important diplomatic summit.

Or if you said that about the North Korean leader. Oh yes, that's a... That would be a no-no there too, wouldn't it, right? Yeah. I think given the differences, you will just have... I think when the inter-Korean communication takes place, you just have to also go back to the defining different terms. Defining the terms?

Yeah. Did the survival of Munhoa after Kimmel Song's death in 1994 have something to do with the ongoing existence of a rival standard in the South, in South Korea? Rival standard as in... Well, okay, so coming back to the example of Stalin, that once Stalin was dead, that all of his linguistic things were no longer needed. Now, Kimmer-Song died in 1994, but Munwa-O is still a thing in North Korea. And does that survival, is that related to the ongoing existence of South Korean dialect?

So I think it has less to do with the existence of South Korean dialect. I think it has more to do with that, let's say, Kim Il-sung died, but we're still using Munha-oh. But that's really because, and that's actually one of the book that I'm working, because my book is on charisma, politics, and the succession. How do you continue the charisma? Right. How do you continue, in our context, how do you continue munha-a-o, the cultured language?

So in the case of North Korea, you have all these kind of cultural policies, and you have all this kind of linguistic norms. But people still use Munaw. Kim Jong-il still uses Munau, and Kim Jong-un also uses Munau, really because one of the things that happen is that the crown is passed on via the language. Via the language. So I'm not saying that's the only means of political legitimacy, but it's certainly one aspect of it that contributes to the continuity.

So that also kind of, so let's say, what is the language of the leader? That question itself opens doors to the next question, who speaks the language of the successor? So if we think about North Korea in that sense, we can kind of understand why the continuity of Munao, the cultured language is there, and at the same time, the next leader is still using it.

Yeah, that reminds me of an interesting quote that's in your paper about communism that says a communist revolution is a transfer of society from the medium of money to the medium of language. It implements a true linguistic turn on the level of social practice. And I wonder, does North Korea still live in that kind of linguistic economy today where language is the medium? Yes, I think North Korea does, partly because in 2025, unless North Korea makes big changes or open store to reform, it can't really really promise, I can't really have a booming economy. So in a way, all you have is the language, right? All you have is kind of, how else are you going to make people work so hard, right?

How are you going to kind of kind of incentive? How are you going to kind of kind of do things to all the state? So for that, like a very kind of economically viable way of dealing with that is having or inculcating particular cultural mores, right? Right. Where the language plays a pivotal, pivotal role. So in some ways, the more desperate the state gets, there is this kind of emphasis on rhetoric. But having said that, the more extreme those kind of rhetoric get,

and the further away it is from reality, you're going to have people who will be disillusioned, right? So in some ways, there will be the moments of enchantment. At the same time, at some point, you will also have the moments of disenchantment, a certain kind of language, even though if it's used, it no longer works as powerfully as it used to.

And these are some of the stories that we hear, for example, from North Korean refugees who leave North Korea, the spell having been broken or something. But from what you've heard and read in talking to defectors, do you think that does language, do these tools still work in North Korea or are people doing them performatively because that's what you have to do to survive? I think the answer is both. in a way, you don't need to believe in the magic for it to work, right?

In a way, it doesn't matter whether you are a 100% believer or a 20% believer or as long as you, on the one hand, the system doesn't depend on people really feeling it. So to the question of, does it still work? So, why does, looking at this question a different way is, why does the young leader, Kim Jong-un, on the one hand, in past laws, that hearken back to the Kim Il-sung era cultural policies, let's say protecting the Korean language and all that. If it was completely futile, why bother doing it?

Right. So in the past probably it worked better, but now it's working less effectively. But still, he feels the need to do it. But at the same time, if you completely give up on it, you're also depriving people of certain kind of a reason, right? Conviction, right, to continue through. In the 14 years under Kim Jong-un, have we seen any stylistic tweaks in the language compared with his father or his grandfather?

So I think there is definitely a tension. On the one hand, like I mentioned, what Kim Jong-un is trying to do is he passed laws, three laws, Cultural Language Protection Act and the Youth Education Guarantee Act or something like, or the like from 2020 to the 2023. So he is trying to have that push. But at the same time, there was also a report, which I read that a while ago, Kim Jong-un, he himself used a word that was used in South Korean. Oh dear.

South Korean drama. So there is a bit of attention. But my thing was Teong-ho, the high-level defector, he said a few years ago that in North Korea, they're no longer cinematic hits. because people don't want to watch it anymore. But at the same time, recently, North Korea now had a new drama, which slightly is a love story between a prosecutor and an agricultural scientist. And you have the mother-in-law where who is not happy that the son is dating this girl

when the son has a bright future. But that also mimics a bit, that sounds a lot like South Korean drama. Yeah, yeah, yeah. So I do think North Korea is a bit uncertain about it. on the one hand, there's a vicious suppression of South Korean culture and language, but at the same time, I think you see some kind of traces of change. Now, what have South Korean scholars of language missed by focusing mainly on grammar and lexas and not on rhetoric and performativity?

So I guess there is this, you miss out a lot in a way. So you see different kind of tendencies, as you mentioned, this South Korean language. to that focus on the bits that are common to north and the south in a way to restore homogeneity. But if you, I think, and people do do that because if you focus on the cult or the power propaganda or the highly political language, it sounds very ludicrous, right? It doesn't sound like a academically serious thing. But at the same time, my sense is that if you remove that veneer of the cultural fabric of that mona or the cultured language.

Firstly, it's very difficult to remove that because it is part of this cultural fabric. It's in everything. It's in everything. But if you do ignore that, it's a bit like Hamlet without the prince. So you're missing out a substantial aspect of North Korea. So, and historians or other fields,

there are tendencies to, on the one hand, to kind of de-centered a leader, trying to understand North Korea without the propagandistic language. And that's not so useful because we end up missing out on the very important bit. So if you really want to decenter, you have to actually take the cult

and the language of the leader seriously. But at the same time, if you're, if you are more hoaxish and treat North Korea as a cult and there's nothing new that we can, the cult aspect of it is self-evident. There's nothing new we can learn from it. That too is also preventing, from learning more about what's happening.

So in some ways, we have a rather uneven view of the state, right? People always want to focus on certain bits, but not the other bits. So we have to kind of be more balanced. What's your favorite small detail that once you notice that you can't unhear in North Korean media? Gosh. I think there was a certain kind of a swear word North Korean announcer used for, I think, the nation's enemy. so that would be the Americans. And she said something like,

I would like to explode the American nosers or something like that. I thought that was a very strongly worded. Explode their noses, yeah. Yeah. And then another thing was from the funeral of Kim Jong-il. And there was a line where you have this kind of fantastic image, footage of Kim Jong-il,

and he says, the great leader opened the door all by himself and then was sitting on a rock, and he took out a rice bowl and humbly ate that rice bowl. So in a way, you have a particular description of that leader, which is once you hear that kind of thing, you really get to learn the image that the state wants to project. So once you hear that, it's a bit difficult to forget. I can imagine.

Now, is there anything that we haven't mentioned today that you'd like to throw in at the end there as a final comment? I think in a way I would like to add that with North Korea, like if you're a policymaker or an IR specialist or a historian, focusing on language seems to be like the last thing that they're interested in. But actually, if you want to understand what makes the state tick, why the North Korean state does what it does or why they say the way they do, understanding the development of language is so important. important. And the more we know about it, I think it helps us come up with better policy and better ideas of the states. So taking the culture and history and language seriously, I think, I think to me, that would be the most important thing. Well, you've certainly made a good case, a strong case for language being very important here. I recommend our listeners go and have a look at

your paper, the sacred text and the language of the leader, cultured language and the rhetorical turn in North Korea, which was published in the Journal of Korean Studies. Thank you very much for coming on the show today, Dr. Ria Roy. Thank you so much, Jackal. Looking to stay informed about South Korea's fast-evolving political business and cultural landscape, join us on Korea Pro, the go-to resource for in-depth analysis expertly curated by top-tier professionals. And now you can pick the membership level that best suits your needs,

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who cuts out all the extraneous noises, awkward silences, bodily functions and fixes the audio levels. Thank you and listen again next time.