North Korea News Podcast by NK News - Roundtable: What we learned from North Korea’s Ninth Party Congress

Episode Date: February 27, 2026

In this special roundtable edition of the NK News podcast, the team sits down to discuss the results of North Korea’s Ninth Party Congress, the messaging behind the latest parade in Pyongyang and what leadership reshuffles may signal for the country’s domestic and foreign policy direction.  The panel explores why this congress focused less on […]

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slash solutions today. Hello listeners and welcome to the NK News podcast. I'm your host, Jacko's Wetsuit. And today it is Thursday, the 26th of February, 26, one day ahead of the 7th anniversary of the failure of the Hanoi Summit. But we're here to talk about the 9th Party Congress just finished and parade. and I'm joined here in the studio by Jong-min Kim, Colin Tuirko and Shreyes Ready. Welcome.

Hello, thanks for having us. We are keeping one eye on the parade KCTV footage right now. It's airing right now. Now the parade happened last night at around 11 p.m., but they're just showing the footage now. Is that correct? But no weapons, just marches. And a bunch of really fancy ones like breakdancing and the saxophone.

There's no breakdance. Whoa, whoa, whoa. Is there popping and locking? Popping and locking I saw once. There were a bunch of different types of very musical artistic stuff going on. Let's not get the listeners excited. There was no breakdancing. No, I did see like one second of a breakdancing from the naval officer. Wow. Okay. Let's start off with just some big framing questions. What kind of Congress was this?

If you had to describe this Congress in one sentence, was it about consolidation, correction, or course setting? Colin, why don't you start first? One sentence. Super short. It was about consolidation. It's framed as a very successful event compared specifically to the last Congress in 2021, five years ago. During COVID. Right. So this one was all about saying we are on the right path right now. We just need to keep it going. That's, you know, ideologically and militarily. And we're not really changing much in terms of what, you know, this bad relationship with South Korea and the U.S. But I'll let the others talk about that. I'm sure that's a long sentence. Zhangmin, go. Can I do two sentence?

You can do a run on. You can link them together with a semicolon. Okay. When it comes to foreign relations, all else, they are sort of open to external factors changing, hence not much detail that they released aside from Peninsula-related. They are basically saying South Korea and North Korea relations is a done deal. We are not interested. Just really drop it, guys, is what Kim is trying to say.

And overall, when it comes to party-related stuff, I think the core keyword, were absolute obedience and elite control, it seems. Okay, Shreyes? Yeah, a lot of it was very much about consolidation and continuity because as far as North Korea is concerned, or the way it's portraying it, the whole situation, it has been doing a great job over the last five years, especially compared to the problems that Kim Jong-un complained about a lot at the last Congress.

And so this was more a chance to just pat himself on the back and say, look how well my leadership is going. and let's keep following my lead on this. Okay, so in terms of sort of three keywords, three metrics, if you will, sort of ideology, managerial, and securitization, or just security issues, how did this year's Congress compare to 2021 and 2016? Is it more ideological, more managerial, more about security stuff? I mean, there's ideology all throughout the things about loyalty and about obedience. It's quite clear that the main thing Kim is concerned.

about is that people, you know, he has these ideas. If he can get everyone to just follow his orders, then all of his ideas will come true. And he's boosted by seeing all the successes over the last five years. He orders 50,000 homes built across, you know, 300 skyscrapers. And boom, they're built out of concrete, you know, the people are mobilized. And he's quite confident. He gets his weapons built. I think, you know, he's on a high right now. So the question is, do people get the motivation and the incentives to really sustain that going forward? And you want to add anything to that? Yeah, I mean, I think essentially, like as Colin said, a lot of judgment as well,

a lot of it is very much about the ideological element about trying to say that there's a certain, he has a certain vision for the party and for the country, and people need to get in line because, well, he's a leader, but also as far as he's concerned, what he's proposed, what he's done over the last few years, has, at least borne out, it's born fruit. Foreign relations-wise, they've strengthened relations with their old allies and distance themselves from their enemies, which compared to a few years earlier.

On the economy, they've had a lot of regional development initiatives, a lot of other housing construction along the way, and Colin, I'm sure, will be able to tell you more about how true that the success is, how true the achievements are on that front, but certainly the way they're presenting it, it has been going well. But the one thing that he says is, look, we're doing a great job, we're on the right track, but not everyone has gotten in line. Not everyone's living up to the ideals we have.

So that's where they've tried to kind of bake his own ideologies now into the party rules, into how the country operates to say the way Kim operates, what he wants is where the party is going forward, and that is what will take the country to the next level. Sorry, for a moment then I was confused about whether we were talking about the Korean Workers' Party Congress or the State of Union address in Washington. Just some of those lines felt a bit similar. Now, on paper, there's a significant turnover in leadership. Does this really represent change, or is this just Kim tightening the same circle,

Zhongmin? A couple things. One is we see that many of the reshuffle is not really demotion to punish. It's a generation change and just to align with broader strategic changes that Kim Jong-un is envisioning. For instance, there are names that we are very, much used to so far in past decade, you know, Chetongha, Bach Zhang Chen, whatever they are,

the roles that they used to hold, we are seeing that younger generation. When I say younger, it's like 50s, but they are rising in the Politburo rank. I saw that a lot of international media headlines focus just on Kim Jo-jong getting promoted. Sure, that's interesting. It does not, I don't think that it sort of means

that her actual power changes or anything because she was already quite powerful. But it will be interesting to keep on eye on what kind of departments, these unspecified department directors will be leading because, like, you know, if Kim Yo-Jung is leading, for instance, OGD,

organization and guidance department, or, you know, PAD, the propaganda agitation department, it will mean different things, right? And so reshuffles generation change and also just aligning younger generation leaders, potential leader, you know, folks into the departments that, you know,

suits them. Was there anything that genuinely surprised any of you? Maybe the lack of detail. The economic sort of policy detail. Is that what you mean? Economic was quite, it was relatively more detailed than other. They always, at every Congress or New Year's address or Supreme People's Assembly, they always list the economic sectors one by one with just saying something very vague about it. So I mean more of just the secrecy around the weapons development plans are it's more vague this time and does that also explain why no weapons or well nothing larger than guns was used in the parade uh we're not exactly sure why they i think that's just about cost and they also they already ran a military parade in october last

year actually this was their ninth i think ninth military parade including paramilitary parades just in the last six years so yeah it would have been an opportunity to show off their weapons But that goes back to this comfort thing. Kim Jong-un feels really comfortable with his nuclear weapons serving their deterrent purpose. And it doesn't necessarily need – no one needs convincing at this point that he has ICBMs and short-range missiles and new drone systems. I think what he's more focused on is operational testing of these things. So, yeah, I mean, we say it all the time, but probably in the next year we'll see more. I mean, he said in the Congress report today, or the report said that there will be more, missile testing, more operational testing of weapons systems. So we should just expect that to keep

going. Could that include nuclear testing? Well, I mean, it doesn't specify or anything. It just says that he needs to, it really mostly is, it seems like it's clearly pointing to him saying he needs to work out command and control. Not when he talks about testing and being essential to his nuclear weapons systems, it sounds like it's, I mean, it reads like it's about command and control more than saying we're going to do a nuclear test. Okay. Anything that surprised you, Jungman? Not really surprising, surprising, but related to your question, what changed compared to 2021? I think nuclear actually is one of the, I mean, we are so used to it now because we have seen every year at Plenum, you know, gradual increase of the tone of the rhetoric and the doctrine and, you know, all that.

And of course, how they see South Korea, that's the biggest change compared to five years ago, right? Right. But on that note, the lack of detail, it's actually Kim Jong-in explains a little bit with what was released this morning in Rodong. He said something along the lines of, you know, like going forward, the external relations of the state, it has to be very, it has to be through very direct involvement of the party central. Everything related to foreign relations has to be like very, very hands-on going forward. That's a code for him, isn't it? Yes, and I guess like some people around him, but him. And I think this was an important line.

He was like, our enemies do not know what we are envisioning, what we're calculating. They can't know and they shouldn't know. And it gives them the anxiety and the fear. It seems like it's their game plan now, not to release too much to show what their plan is. And he sort of links this to overall change security environment compared to five years ago, which is what America means. internationally, it's like, of course, they always mentioned Czech-Jewy imperialism, you know, U.S. is a bad actor, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah. But fundamentally, the language changed a little bit this time

because it sort of frames America as, you know, you know, now it's proven that they are willing to go after other country's sovereign territory if it follows their national interest. And the lesson for us is don't give them nuclear weapons because, you know, if you don't have power, you will be stripped up your sovereignty. and now it proves. So that's why they are doing all these, you know, rhetorical

and also like backing up military plans this time around, saying that, you know, like with the U.S. as well, like half a page, it's like U.S. is bad. And then at the end it goes, well, but if they are willing to recognize our constitutional status, which means nuclear, you know, nuclear power status, maybe like, why not, you know, maintain a good relations with them? So it's like it's considered a absolute premise that they won't change at all,

which is, I think, a subtle change compared to five years old. Colin? Yeah, well, I just made me think of something if the secret, this thing you said that is in the report about how the enemy must not know what we're doing, we have to increase secrecy. That reminds me of that line that Brian Myers likes to quote. I think it's from Kim Jong-il, which said that Chaucon must be wrapped in a fog from decades ago. Right, yeah, he's bringing that back. Well, you know, so he's saying, okay, let's talk if you accept us as a nuclear state, Trump or whatever.

But this means there's no such thing as a chance or there's no chance for arms control. North Korea will not talk about things which invite scrutiny or invite inspections or anything like that. So, I mean, he's saying we can be friends if you accept us, but then like nothing beyond that. So it has to be a purely, a pure capitulation from the U.S., like pure. Right. Like you don't get any insight into how many, ever happening. How many weapons we have, right? Yeah, and also he's up the game a lot.

Again, we might be jaded because we have seen so many statements in the past five years about how North Korea, South Korea, it's a separate state, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah. But the rhetorical, the intensity was it actually surprised me a little bit because Kim Jong-un went on to say something like, not, just we're not compatriots anymore and that's permanent. It will hurt Cheng Dongyang Unification Minister's heart so much. What, sorry, this is you saying this or Kim Jong-un saying this? I'm reading into Kim Jong-un's mind.

But also the part where Kim Jong-un is like, if you provoke us, we can do absolutely any sort of response, including preemptive strikes. And, you know, any response usually is a code word for nuclear or any asymmetric, you know, attack system. And then when we look at the military plan as well, others are like quite lack of detail, but then only the part where they mention like assets targeting South Korea, like 600 and 600 millimeter MLRS and others, they do detail them. And so he's upping the game when it comes to threatening a voucher preemptive nuclear use against South Korea. And he went on to say stuff like actually South Korean regime might collapse one day if they continue provoking.

us. Wow. Now, a question for Shreyes here. From Martin Wise's very detailed analysis, which our NKPro subscribers will be able to read, I learned that all 11 secretaries of the Central Committee were appointed as department directors and full members of the Politburo. Some double and sometimes triple-hating there. Does this suggest tighter vertical control over policy execution, or is this completely normal? I mean, it is, in some ways, quite normal for a lot of the top officials to be wearing multiple hats anyway, that is not all that uncommon, but certainly there's been a certain amount of clustering and on this occasion. And I think we talked earlier about how they've pushed

out, how some of the older people have essentially been pushed out, more because of age than anything else. Right. But, and some of the new people have come in, they were already kind of in or around Kim Jong-un's inner circle. So they're not all that surprising. But he seems to be concentrating power among a few people who are closer to him. And I think that's partly why we didn't really see that many surprising new faces when it came to the topmost officials are coming through. We know whom they are because they've been in and around for a while, as opposed to like the last Congress, I think sure, long-term North Korea Watchers would still look at and saying most of them, we know who's coming through. But there would still be some people who we'd have to look at

say we don't actually know what this person's bringing to the table. This time though, for the most part, you can say it partly adds a signals a certain degree of continuity in terms of the policy priorities, but to some extent also just Kim Jong-un concentrating power around him. And like he has a certain circle that he is comfortable with. And we're seeing them increasingly likely to play a bigger role going forward. I also learned that compared to the ministry reshuffle, turnover within the military appeared rather limited. Does this suggest that the military is somehow more stable, more loyal? Well, I think they've had their own military shuffles on and off over the last few years.

There's a few senior officials who keep coming and going. I don't think that's necessarily says, okay, if not now, maybe it could happen later or it has happened in the last few years. We see Kim Jong-un has been periodically cycling officials in and out. Some reappear after all. while. But I think this is more of a long-term project that has kind of been changing the leadership structure around him, making sure that there are people who are very much on his side. And by on the side, I mean, in terms of likely to align with his objectives. But I think when

it comes to the military side of things, I mean, this time there were changes. There were obviously elections for the Central Military Commission as well. It wouldn't surprise me, though, if next time we have a more dedicated, focused military-related meeting, they could push through more changes all over again. Now, we did have a little bit of provenance of figures tied to inspection, discipline, and Carter oversight. Is this about anti-corruption? Is it sort of about fighting bureaucratic paralysis or just enforcement of loyalty or anything else? Going back to the, yeah, the main things Kim is always talking about. I don't know specifically about these officials because, I mean, nobody knows who these people are, really, and what they stand for.

But, yeah, it does signal. The main problem is Kim was always talking about formalism and, yeah, corruption is a thing, for sure, people who try to use their position for personal benefits. But the way he always talks about formalism or people, it really points to, like, laziness or people do who just try to do the bare minimum and just get through, you know, you get a good position, you just try to, you know, do, get by and go unknowingly. noticed and not bring any innovations to the table. And this is what Kim wants to solve across. He wants everyone to be super proactive and altruistic and brings great ideas and solve problems for him. But it's like, you know, think about yourself.

Why do you think about you? Like everyone should think about it. Why do you do anything proactive at work? It's because incentives pay. Incentives, right. So this is, seriously, this is a problem for Kim Jong-un. But, yeah, just to add to that in terms of what you're saying, I think, I think we did earlier about how there has been an overarching theme of ideology and discipline and reshaping the

party essentially according to what Kim wants the party to be, what Kim wants a country to be. And we saw that in terms of the statements, in terms of state propaganda, in terms of how they incorporated his party building line into the party rule book. That was a big part of being that happened. But also, since we're talking about the officials, there were a few who stood out in terms of the connection to that. Now, again, as Colin point out, it doesn't necessarily mean that it's about those individuals specifically, but some of them come with certain experience,

certain recent experience, particularly related to these matters. For example, Kim Jeryang, who is former Premier, so he also has economic expertise, but the last few years he's been more focused on, he's been heading the party discipline department. So he was very much prominent through the country, Congress and the appointments that were made earlier this week. Others who seem to be in the limelight

included the Carter Department head, Ri Heung, and some others who have more focused on propaganda. So that message is coming from Kim Jong-un, but he's also supplementing it with his appointments, with his choice of personnel whom he's keeping around him. Now, the next five-year plan, am I right in understanding that we don't have a lot of real detail on the new five-year strategy? We have some hints. Like when it comes to military Fiverr Plan, probably Colin can explain better, but they did mention a couple of new developments like anti-satellite system to attack the reconnaissance system of the enemy, you know, AI-related, AI-on-man system of sorts, but not really much detail what exactly that means because anything is AI unmanned these days. And to be fair, they were already at least building AI-powered, unmanned aerial vehicles.

So at least that, so they have been saying for a while. Yeah, there was a five-point weapons list that's vague, but only one of them is brand new, the satellites. The other four are ICBMs, electronic warfare weapons, which they mention all the time, which is still kind of vague. We don't know exactly what they're talking about. Is that for jamming maybe? Yeah.

Or the electromagnetic pulse weapon also to shut down electronic. But it feels like in 2021, they were more explicit about goals and failures. Why the vagueness this time? Well, that's what I'm saying. It goes back to the secrecy thing, saying we don't want the enemy to know what we're planning. So this really is a theme through all of the... He'd be starting with the last parade. Last time as well, they had a five-point, like, strat military...

Five-point munitions development strategy, something like that. Which they never actually told us what the five points were. Instead, they told us about like 12-plus missile systems, very detailed that they wanted to develop. That's what they did last time in 2021. This time, they told us the five points, yeah, which are anti-salous. satellite, reconnais and satellites of their own, which they're going to revive this program, which they've stalled since 2023. Because there were some launches that did not succeed.

24? Yeah, failed launch in 2024 was the last one. That's two. And then electronic weapons, ICBMs, and, oh, and the AI systems, right? Yeah, of course. AI systems, okay. AI unmanned weapons. But, yeah, I think the secrecy was one factor, but also, I think they've also seen that they don't have to tell the world everything.

course of the last few years. They did elaborate on their weapons plan in a fair bit of detail in the last Congress, which allowed some people, like Colin here, to monitor those very closely and say, this is what they've managed to do, this is what they're still failing to achieve. They're always augmenting, too. They have weapons expos almost every year now, and that's where we can dig into the photos and see what they're still prioritizing or not. That's true. And we've also seen, like, the last few parades, they didn't actually bother trotting out their real high-profile systems. They instead kept them. for the weapons expos where they can actually try and sell them to prospective customers,

where they can try and see what they've got running. And I think the other aspect, they've also seen what happens if you make a bold promise or a bold plan, and then, as in the case of the satellite, it goes up in flames, literally. Yeah, you don't ever do that. You just don't talk about what you're going to do because then you don't have to be accountable. Exactly. Right. So we know that musicians in defense and weapons systems were elevated or prioritized.

Is there also a focus on heavy industry, agriculture, and regional revitalization in this next five-year plan? Of course, but those are all boilerplate kind of statements. So that could be copied, pasted from the previous congress. Yeah, I mean, it's clear that they're developing in these areas. They're building tons of rural housing all the time. They're doing this 20 times 10 project to build little factory, like, well, not little, but like a small-scale factories, light industry factories, a hospital and a leisure complex. They're doing this in every county in the country.

They're doing it, right? But it didn't get like a lot of play in the report. I mean, it got discussed just as much as you would expect it. So this focus then on the weapons industry, is it going too far to say that this is a wartime economy pivot? Or is it simply rhetorical alignment with Russia cooperation? Well, Kim said a couple days ago, I think it was either during the Congress or before the Congress where he said, we no longer need to decide on economy or

the military. We're doing both together. So this is like Pyongjin from the past. I'm feeling Pyongin a deja vu here. Yeah, it's simultaneous military and economic development. That's the line right now. But they contradict themselves all the time. You'll see, I can pull up some examples from the last year of Kim Jong-un or state media saying very clearly that

military spending is the priority in this country. Okay, but just coming back to the the importance of the weapons exports to Russia. Does this Congress sort of show that it's now structurally embedded in the North Korean economy, or is it just kind of an bonus or an add-on? Well, still going. I mean, there's still containers lined up at the port awaiting Russian ships today. So is it interwoven with the North Korean economy, you know, wholesale, or is it sort of an addition? I mean, I'm sure it's a large part of driving the mass production capabilities.

The money, the influx, the upgrading the factories, this is all going to continue. continue. Yeah, I think questions remain on, you know, exactly what happens when they stop purchasing weapons, but I don't see why North Korea can't just become an arms exporter like South Korea and go to other types of countries. I don't think anything's stopping them at this point in terms of reputation or consequences. There's no such thing really as for the S word. Sanctions enforcement anymore. So, yeah. Sward as in shipping? No, sanctions. I was. The only thing. The only enforcement that can happen on sanctions is if the U.S. or interdiction. A different country, I entered on the high seaship, and that's all that you can do.

Zhongwin, anything to add to that? Right. Something I also found sort of interesting is that the, you know, the conclusion speech, it did not really touch on China or Russia or any other foreign relations. It's only mentioned U.S., just enemies in general in South Korea, right? Am I wrong? Yeah. Right?

That was interesting. It didn't even talk in vague terms, did it? It didn't even say, like, we got a... The relations go in or something like that. They did mention, like, the whole thing about, like, our close, maintain close relations with our neighbor, with our close neighbors. Sure. And anti-imperialist allies, or anti-imperialist nations, which is, in some ways,

similar to what they kind of emphasize at the end Congress. Well, but in the eighth Congress, they directly mentioned China and Russia. There was more detail there. And so this time, it feels like they just decided. we don't actually need to do this. We're already working with them. Or we don't need to talk about it. Whereas there's no need to signal to them externally

when you can communicate with them directly. Whereas with the US and South Korea, there's a purpose to sending that a particular message that we are done talking to, except in the US case, we are done talking to you unless you completely change your approach to our nuclear program. Speaking of external signaling,

remind me again what Kim Yo-Jong's new role or title is. So the title itself is department director, unspecified department. She was listed back. She was dropped before, but she's back to Fubo, iwan, Chung, Juk, Politburo, alternate member. And she's listed among the director list. So there are a couple of possibilities based on former other directors removed from the list. Risenguan is off that list, which means it could be UFD, the United Front Department.

Does that still exist? Well, the Unification Minister. East East South Korea, it says it's changed to Bureau 10 or something. But if it still exists, that is a possibility. I personally think that's not really that likely because North Korea really does not really care about that department anymore. And wouldn't that also mean that if she were in that department, that should be less visibly tied to foreign policy sector?

Right. And she also makes statements about, not just South Korea, but like U.S. as well in China, too. So it makes... Kim says that they reorganized departments that were dealing with South Korea. So if he uses the word reorganized, it makes it sound like the structure was re- Right. So it could be a new department that sort of touches on like separate, like different stuff at once. Or PAD, like I mentioned, because she was there before and she's good in writing FITI statements.

The propaganda and education department. Good is an interesting way to describe her statements. Yes. And like I mentioned, it could be OGD because she was there before as well. and Jo Yongwan moving to higher places now, he was also missing from the director list. He used to lead that department. It's for the cadre and elite discipline. And unfortunately, so when they had these sectoral meetings in the last couple of days of the Congress,

we didn't really see Kim Jong-at any of them, which makes it a little harder to figure out exactly where she's supposed to, what her specialization is going to be. Right, but this morning's role doing it included a photo of a meeting held separately, which mentioned something like there were officials from the PAD and the OGD that attended, but Ilkun officials, it usually means like working levels, right?

So it's not really a clear, but she was there. Yeah. So it seems like this Congress is sort of locked in a long-term, no-engagement strategy towards South Korea. If you're sitting in Sol Dene, if you're Jong-dong-yong, what's the key takeaway from this Congress?

He needs so-ju. That North Korea likes us and wants to talk to us. Oh, that's what I'm seeing from the stage. That's sarcasm. At least they mention it. At least they mentioned us, so they still remember us all. But honestly, today, he and the Unification Ministry expressed regret and sounds like we'll still keep trying, but this is very disheartening. But honestly, that is the most realistic response they've had to any of these.

Because earlier this month or last month, when Kimmer-jong came out with threatening statements about drone incursions, they kept coming back with, this shows that they want to talk to us. Like, no. Like, this is the first time we're actually seeing them say, oh, well, maybe it's not working out. They're saying, oh, well. Now, in terms of for the US, we saw that earlier, I think you've mentioned there, that if America's willing to accept us as nuclear power, we, you know, we see no reason not to talk to them. And I think Marco Rubio said that kind of said it made a response, or at least said in a comment that the US is willing to talk to North Korea any time.

I think it was more an offhand remark, though, because he was just talking about nations in general. And he said, like, you know, if any country out there wants to talk to us, we're ready to talk any time. And so North Korea was among those listed. Right. But we should point out that during the state of the union address, President Trump did not mention North Korea. Does anyone see anything on the horizon for the rest of this year? Jong-man shaken ahead, no. Well, but Trump is visiting Beijing in April.

So I know that there's a lot of media headlines speculating that there might be something going on there, or at least Trump will want to do something because it's nearby. But looking at what Kim is saying today, I feel like if the State Department folks are reading this, I think they would try to persuade Trump against any of those. Yeah. And honestly, a lot of people often talk about, oh, well, if Trump wants to do this, he'll go for it. But that always ignores the other side of the equation. And Kim Jong-un has been very consistent over the last few years saying, we will not talk to the U.S. until and unless denuclearization is off the table. And if he backs down now and. Just changes in mind. Sure, Trump is realistically the best chance any North Korean leader has of having a U.S. president who will buck the trend when it comes to Washington, who will just do his own thing. But it's also not going to be a great look for Kim Jong-un if he suddenly goes and backs down on what they've been saying consistently that as long as the U.S. follows this policy, we will not talk to them. So personal friendship or not, it doesn't matter. If there were to be renewed U.S. North Korea diplomacy, either under the Trump administration or even under a future one, does this current, the lineup and the setup coming out of this Congress? Does it make it any easier because authorities concentrated or does it make it any harder because you've got ideological hardliners and disciplinarians who are empowered?

I mean, it's just the main point that Echreis just said is that there has to be a demonstration from the U.S. that it's no longer hostile towards North Korea. And you know how North Korea defines that. That's the U.S. base. basically getting out of South Korea. And then they'll still have bases in Japan. They have to get out of Japan too. And Guamma, apparently. They have to relieve all these bases. This is my opinion. But this is what it sounds like to me is the only way that the U.S. can truly demonstrate

that they're no longer have a hostile policy towards North Korea. So, I mean, yeah, I think talking is one thing that can be construed in a certain way. They could maybe, he could maybe meet without all of this happening. But all this stuff is what has to happen for them to have good relations with the U.S. And if you're asking about the officials and how they were set up to do it, sure, after the Hanoi summit in 2019, they did remove some U.S. officials, but it's not like they've gotten rid of anyone who has, I mean, Chesoni herself. She has spent time in the U.S. she has focused on U.S. relations in the past.

So as foreign minister, if anything happens, she can genuinely be the one to be part of that whole discussion. But at the same time, that's not what her role currently involves. That's not what North Korea's priority currently involves. So it doesn't immediately seem like it'll be in the future, even if they want, they can pivot to it. I can just sort of just looking way back. Do you remember that time when North Korea in 2019, when it was warning of Christmas gift?

It kept talking about, you know, drop your hostile policy. And it still says that. But I remember at the time that the U.S. side officials were so confused behind closed stores, what does this mean? What is hostile policy exactly? And so I think compared to like 2019 and 20, it's logically easier to process what's needed for the negotiation. It's just practically much more difficult. But I'm saying that's all out there. Yeah. There are, I'd have to dig them up, but they're very clear about it. They not just like saying, okay, we're not hostile to you anymore. Or not just saying, oh, we, we accept you as a nuclear state. There's all kinds of other stuff that they've,

delineated as their requirements now, although they could back, that could all be negotiation strategies, sure, but it shouldn't be vague to, I mean, it's not that vague anymore. No. In our last minutes, let's talk about the parade that I finished the Congress with. Did this parade reinforce the themes that we saw inside the hall? This was a party parade in the party, party down sense of the word. Parade party. Small P Party parade.

Yes, small P party. I mean, we just watched the video of this thing. I mean, so first of all, no weapons, just... Now, wouldn't you say no weapon? Because I did see men with guns, but you mean no rolling stock, no missiles on giant 16-wheel trucks. No, right, right, right. So... No, drones?

No, just some flyovers doing little, like, forming a nine. Drones for like artistic reasons, maybe. Right. Any soldiers with the radiation symbol on a backboard? pack or a chest pack? I don't know that I saw. I mean, there was the Russian, the soldiers who participated in the, in the Russian war against Ukraine. They marched, but they also did that back in October. They did. They spent a lot more time on this. I mean, again, this was just like a celebration. It was like a, like a let's have fun and get motivated and feel good about ourselves

type of parade and not necessarily like look at our military power. So 49 groups of soldiers marched plus some horses and a lot of time in the broadcast spent on color guard dances and paratroopers and Kim Jong-un came into the parade and down the main street this time. What? Wow, so exciting. You came down from the podium. No, no, no, he like drove his limo down the main street instead of the backstage. I mean, this is the kind of stuff that we're talking.

It was very disappointing if you're looking for clues about North Korea's weapons development. So it sounds like it's more about internal unity than external deterrence. Oh, absolutely, absolutely. Okay. Hmm. If we look back at this Congress five years from now in 2013, what might we say was its most important decision, even if we don't fully see it, you know, materialize just yet? Good question. Well, there's, there are things to grade them on, all of this rural development that's going to have to come to fruition.

This is the 20 by 10. Yeah, that in the rural housing. I mean, he, you know, Kim wants to avoid any kind of opposition in places that aren't as well developed as the capital. And so this is going to have to continue. He's going to have to find a way to find the resources and a way to motivate people. Otherwise, it could fizzle out this, this huge optimism that he has right now. So, yeah, I'd definitely be watching to grade them on this economic stuff. And he's talked recently about changing, like, giving. giving people new cultural service sectors, you know, things might be changing soon that weren't

talked about at this Congress in terms of he gave people the ability to buy cars now. What if there's other kind of little bit of opening up economically as long as he feels safe? Domestic travel without travel passes. Things like this, you know, so I think there's a lot of stuff, you know, maybe the report wasn't full of detail, but you can see clues about this kind of stuff lately. Interesting. Shraez. Honestly, I'm torn between a couple of things. But I think if it comes on to one overarching team that I think will continue, even if the way it continues will change,

is essentially the way Kim is in control of the party and shaping it in his image. And we obviously, the Supreme later reigns supreme in North Korea. That is something that's always been the case. But for most of his career, Kim Jong-un has been outranked by two dead men. still the case. But, well, at least we can say that in the last few years, he has risen to a level where he is about sort of on par with them. And I think he's now at least set the ball motion to be able to keep leaving his imprint on the way North Korea functions. He's already done in the last three years. This time, it was more about solidifying that and further entrenching the way

things are, his way of doing things. So I think that's, That's probably where five years from now will still see some impact, although which direction that goes in could still shift. And for you, Zhang Min? I'd say two things. One, Will Kim's, this whole nuclear status gambit would have worked after Trump, looking back, after Trump and after five years. That would be interesting to see, like, if this moves any needle in the State Department

or the Department of War, that this is something they just have to live with. Would that be the new reality that we're living in 2030, or will it be exactly the same in them, like North Korea arguing exactly the same thing in five years? And another thing, a bit more minor, is I know that many people say that, you know, under dictatorship, you know,

like which official does what does not really matter all that much, but still, when we look at authoritarian regimes that sort of crumbled into, you know, not really well-functioning sort of regime, it's usually after like mass mass reshuffle, sort of moving away from the guru figures who knows how to do things, right? So I'm just interested to see how this all pans out,

especially with, you know, if Chayong He is replaced by Cho Yonan at the SPA, you know, he will probably serve that position until he's 80 or something if so. How will this work out? Like, did he find the right guys or gals to lead the right department? last question, a very, very short one, or at least the answer should be short.

In the short term, what's the major thing that you'll be watching coming out of this Congress, maybe a metric or a change or a policy or an action? Not North Korea, because they actually are very consistent. I would watch for how others respond to them, particularly the US, because that's where we see more variation outside North Korea than in North Korea in terms of positions. Very good. Okay, Colin. Well, he kind of stole my answer.

Oh. Why do you think I jumped in full? We got Trump going to China in April, right? Right, right. That's very short. I mean, I think most of our listenership will be watching for that event. Otherwise, I don't know, I'm just thinking quickly here. I'll just be watching for the weapons stuff.

I think given the lack of weapons at the parade, you know, heavy weapons, but he's continued to focus on it recently. Then I'm watching for more testing. You know, Hussang 20 ICBM still haven't tested it. But, you know, people don't care much anymore. You know, he'll test it. won't get a reaction. I mean, in terms of like the adversaries.

Yeah. And Zhongmin? Whether South Korean progressives, traditional progressives, take a hint and start discussing the possibility of accepting the hostile two states or peaceful two states sort of framework that Kim Jong-un keeps talking about. Very good. And a reminder to our listeners that you can find all the excellent stories. and the analysis at NK News. And if you're already an NK News subscriber, think about upgrading to NKPro

because there's even more analysis and in-depth stuff there. Right, guys? Yep. Yep, indeed. Thanks very much for coming on the podcast. We'll see you again soon. Thanks, Jack. Thank you. Bestsellers unveiled at NK News Shop.

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Again, that's shop.nknews.org. Ladies and gentlemen, that brings us to the end of our podcast episode for today. our thanks go to Brian Betts and David Choi for facilitating this episode and to our post-recording producer Alana Hill, who cuts out all the extraneous noises, awkward silences, bodily functions and fixes the audio levels. Thank you for listening and listen again next time.