North Korea News Podcast by NK News - What Russia has to gain by killing the UN panel on North Korea – Ep. 341

Episode Date: May 8, 2024

In recent weeks, the mandate of the U.N. Panel of Experts tasked with monitoring the implementation of sanctions against North Korea expired. Evidence emerged that the DPRK is phasing out the use of the term “Day of the Sun” to refer to Kim Il Sung’s birthday. The regime released a new song praising Kim Jong […]

Thank you. and comprehensive reports that keep you ahead on Korean affairs. Plus, enjoy priority invites to our unique events in Seoul that connect you with key leaders and influencers. Elevate your understanding of Korea. Join us today at koreapro.org slash podcast. Hello listeners and welcome to the NK News Podcast. I'm your host Jack O'Swets, and today we are recording the May Roundtable, and it is Tuesday, the 7th of May. I'm joined here around the table by my colleagues Shreyas Reddy and Chad O'Carroll, but we've also got special guest Chris Green, the Assistant Professor of Korean Studies at Leiden University and the Korea Peninsula Analyst at the International Crisis Group. Welcome to all three of you. Thank you for having us. We have a complete mantle going on here, but that's just the way things are.

Theme. We've got themes. Theme one. The end of the POW. The end of the POE. That's wrong. That's an incredible Freudian slipjackle. Yes. Shreyas, why and how did the United Nations panel of experts die at the end of April? Well, the short version is because Russia vetoed a resolution mandating its renewal back at the end of March. So essentially, the POE, which has been in place since 2009, is renewed annually with the Security Council vote. annually with the Security Council vote. And amid increasingly close Russia-DPRK relations, in late March, Russia vetoed the renewal of the panel, essentially calling into question its purpose and its way of doing things. Obviously, a lot of other countries, the US in particular, are saying this is about Russia-DPRK relations, particularly arms cooperation. And so now we've reached a stage

where without the Security Council mandate, there was no way the POE could continue. Okay. So I think you've just said Russia four times in the last three minutes. Chad, is it fair to blame Russia for all this? Well, yes, from the procedural aspect that they did veto the extension of its mandate but at the same time russian and chinese calls for serious conversation on reducing or limiting sanctions have equally gone nowhere and being as far as i can see totally ignored since 2019 so i think I think it's fair to say that there is basically binary positions from the two sides of the parties whose agreement is necessary to continue the panel, but it's broader than just the panel of experts itself.

So Shreyas, coming back to you, does this mean that sanctions are no longer in place on North Korea? No, sanctions are very much still in place. Essentially, the panel of experts was there to oversee sanctions implementation, to monitor and investigate how the sanctions are being implemented, as well as evasion methods. And so now what this does is it drops the 1718 Sanctions Committee, which oversees North Korea sanctions as a whole. It drops them off a valuable monitoring tool. The POE put out reports twice a year detailing essentially information that they received from various sources, countries, as well as open source information and their own research on North Korean sanctions implementation. research on North Korean sanctions implementation. So now those reports are essentially out of the way and leaves the committee not completely blind because there are perhaps other ways they could still receive information, but at least it means one ongoing source of information is out of the

picture. All right, Chris, it's obvious what North Korea gets from this, but given that states do what they do to serve their own interests, what do Russia and China gain from the death of the POE? Well, diplomats have been speculating for a while that Russia could veto the mandate of the panel, partly because, as Chad said, there is a long running discussion about changing the sanctions regime to be more favorable towards North Korea or to give North Korea a way out of the sanctions if it does certain things. But Russia had also been using its veto assertively on other cases like Syria, and especially Mali is a great case. So it says Russia has a bigger strategic goal here. So it wanted to reduce the scrutiny on the DPRK, but also limit monitoring of its own purchases of weapons and things like that from Pyongyang.

So we need to see the bigger picture, but also the specific gains that Russia makes in terms of its more productive and increasingly productive relationship with the DPRK. And is this a reputational win for China because it didn't have to use its veto? It kind of let Russia do it for it? I don't think we should see it that way. I mean, this doesn't come at a particularly great moment for China, which is attempting to ameliorate some of the risks in its relationship with the US. So actually, it's a bit of a fly in the ointment, which is why we saw China demure from taking a strong position rather than supporting Russia when it decided to veto. Right. But does it benefit from this, given that China is the major source of

trade into North Korea? I think it may do in the medium term, but there are clearly also costs for China. Like China is walking a more difficult line. For Russia, obviously, Russia wants to be a spoiler in the international community. That seems to be the role it has adopted in recent years, and it has its Ukraine war to contend with. China is a more active and productive participant in the global economy and has to think across many more vectors. It's a more complicated picture for China. So it's a more multidimensional game of chess for China. It's 56D chess for China. There you go.

Comments? Yeah, Chad? game of chess for china it's 56d chess there you go comments yeah chad just one thing i i'm curious to hear what people think actually is when these really big sanctions in 2017 were imposed the trump administration did manage to succeed to persuade the russian and chinese to sign up to these sanctions and i guess i'm just curious why they agreed to sign up to sanctions that did have no uh expiry date because could it be well surely that the six nuclear test we have we're forgetting how much of a big deal that was the six nuclear test at the time right but these are china and russia especially are countries that have foreign policy that is it's strategic in nature that they don't have the inconvenience of elections they

tend to think in the long term right so i just don't understand like what what led them to to agree to this and it was only two years later, 2019, when they're proposing an alternative. So I'm just baffled. I mean, I know things were tense on the peninsula back then, but they could have included language or proposed language that included a yearly consensus-building vote to continue some of the seafood sanctions? Chris? China has its three no's policy. It doesn't want instability on its northeastern border.

It also has a very strong interest in maintaining a measure of control over North Korea, which is not always accomplished, not by any means, because North Korea does tend to plow its own furrow. is not always accomplished, not by any means, because North Korea does tend to plough its own furrow. But at least that is China's intent. If they had inserted a sunset clause in sanctions back then, now, it might just have been simply a mistake back in 2017. I'm not, I'm not, we can't ever, you can't rule it out. No, you can't rule it out. But if that's not the case, then it may have been that some kind of automatic sunset clause in the sanctions would have been a problem because it would have reduced China's leverage over North Korea. And I think North, in general, sorry, China seeks to maximize that leverage, not reduce it.

I suppose one other thing about that particular time was, obviously, while China and Russia was still the main allies for North Korea in many ways, under Kim Jong Un, they hadn't really had that very direct interaction to the same level that they had before that. It wasn't until 2018 the main allies for North Korea in many ways. Under Kim Jong-un, they hadn't really had that very direct interaction to the same level that they had before that. It wasn't until 2018 that he started, for example, going out and meeting the leaders of China and a year later, Russia. So obviously, the lack of sunset clauses, that doesn't explain it. That still seems like a bit of an oversight on their part, not entirely sure sure why but certainly in that time and place it's quite possible that China and Russia did not quite feel the need to defend North Korea

especially after nuclear tests as much as otherwise they would would have. Yeah 100% but I guess what I'm so surprised at is that for their like top diplomats to not be able to zoom out and have that perspective that things can be fluid just seems to go against the grain of what i understood about chinese and russian foreign policy making yeah also like you said it's long term so it's a it's all that they wouldn't have really thought that part through the so basically they've created this mess for themselves and i guess technically they should be... And now they're blaming everyone else for it.

Is it actually a mess, though? Like, from my perspective, China's pursuit of leverage over North Korea, arguably, one of China's potential problem at the present time is that Russia-DPRK relations are booming. That's a slight overstatement. But you know, they're improving. There's bilateral trade. There's also a sort of a bilateral diplomatic relationship, which actually reduces Chinese leverage. And I think in the medium to long term, China is going to find that a problem. Actually, that's why I've been surprised since late last year that Xi Jinping hasn't invited Kim to come and visit him or done a reverse visit. As we saw China's leverage

decreasing with Russia's ascent, I'm just surprised that there hasn't been more high level diplomacy or symmetry between the... Well, the instability question, that China's desire, strong desire for no instability on its northeastern border is principally served by there being no seventh nuclear test. So from China's perspective, the present situation, much as they may not appreciate missile testing per se, it doesn't degrade the security situation that much because it doesn't incite a response from DPRK antagonists. But a seventh nuclear test would change that dynamic, and then China might have to re-evaluate its position.

Interesting. I suppose another fact, while we haven't seen leader-to-level exchanges, it's not like China's completely out of the picture. It's still North Korea's biggest trade partner. It's still, North Korea's still heavily reliant on it. And we see senior officials from both sides continuing to visit each other, the other country. to visit each other, the other country.

So it's China still got, I think it's still probably fairly self-assured in its influence over North Korea to some extent. But obviously, maybe at some stage, we might see a bigger... China remains indispensable. Russia is dispensable still, but China's not. To use that American term, the optics of it, it looks like China's playing second fiddle

to Russia right now. And that can't be a situation that China likes. Perhaps not. But Xi Jinping is walking around the Alise Palace these days. I don't think this is necessarily something that's immediately concerning. He's got bigger fish to fry. Okay. Now, former British ambassador to North Korea, John Everard, who also once served on the United Nations Panel of Experts on North Korea, wrote an opinion piece for NK News titled, The Panel of Experts on North Korea John Everard, who also once served on the United Nations Panel of Experts on North Korea, wrote an opinion piece for NK News titled, The Panel of Experts on North Korea is Dead. Long live the Panel of Experts. He very much gives the blame to Russia. But he also says that, quote, it may be possible to limit the damage

and even explore new and more effective approaches to sanctions enforcement. What new approaches does he suggest, Traeus? Well, I think one particularly notable mechanism he suggested is similar to what the UN General Assembly adopted in the case of Syria, which is the international, impartial, and independent mechanism. And so that mechanism still operates within the UN. It still has the authority of the UN, which is something that a lot of independent alternatives would not have. Obviously, there's no system that's perfect. You'd still have, even with the UN General Assembly, it has so many considerations, so many interests to balance that it might not work. So a lot of countries are also, or at least there's always a possibility

that they could go for an independent body outside the UN. Okay, hold on a second. Chad, this first option that Trash just mentioned, this is similar to what we talked about when you were on the podcast last, wasn't it? We went through all the different options. Getting a lot of deja vu. Yeah, okay.

And yeah, I think a key question though so last week we had this joint statement 50 countries north korea responded criticizing it i am very interested to see if that that political will from those 50 countries translates into any serious dollar spend on actually practically dealing with this because whatever the mechanism is it's going to require money it's going to require money yeah it's going to require staff and it's going to for for it to be effective it's going to require that group to have as much control as possible in how they investigate and sort of limits to outsized influence from donor countries trying to push it in certain ways.

So yeah, I'll be keen to see if that happens. Chris, has the International Crisis Group put itself forward as an alternative outside independent body? No, no. Would you like it to? I think it's impractical. I think it would require funding flows and significant increases in staffing to be accomplished. And in the end, I think, given that that's true for all of the options, they will eventually choose one that does not include intellectual crisis.

What do you think is the most likely way forward at this point in time? Some kind of non-UN, non-governmental body, probably. But it's very hard to see. And there are internal politics in the UN. There's a group of countries that isn't really motivated by oversight of North Korean sanctions violations, but by bringing a bit more power out of the UN Security Council and into the broader General Assembly, for example. So there's a lot of internecine conflict over what should be the shape of the UN and how does this issue, which requires some kind of solution, feed into or reflect those internal dynamics.

Shreyas, what would be the strengths or weaknesses of a system outside the UN? Well, I mean, it would certainly be much more responsive, much more agile and be able to, in some ways, not be burdened by the internal divisions of the UN itself. But the flip side is it would not have the authority of the UN. Countries could just easily ignore its requests for information. It would not be able to go everywhere. And perhaps the biggest challenge is with the panel of experts, it was a multinational group. It was, at least on paper, impartial. With an outside group, almost certainly there will be questions about its partiality in terms of whoever's backing it.

Right. Yes, Chris, you've got a comment? Yeah. And if you do set up some kind of independent monitoring mechanism outside the UN structures, that can work to get information to the UN bodies, because ultimately this is a problem of information flows, right? Right. That capacity for information to be provided to the people who make decisions has been undercut by the veto and the collapse of the panel of experts. But all countries are not created equal in terms of their violations of sanctions. And if some kind of independent monitoring mechanism were established

by Japan, South Korea, and the United States at the head of such a movement, I think it's obvious that that would be the case. Do you see the Chinese or Russians treating such a body as genuinely autonomous or trustworthy? And do you see the Chinese and the Russians, who are the largest trade partners of the North Koreans, the Chinese by far, do you see them providing information in a reliable and timely way to such an independent monitoring mechanism? I struggle. So a couple of thoughts. One is that I agree the Chinese and Russian response participation is going to be limited. But let's not forget it has been under the panel of experts as well. POE has got very few answers to lines of inquiries involving actors in China and Russia. oftentimes is actually prevented from what I understand from publishing certain evidence because it was considered too close to certain member states.

We know who those are. So I think a lot of the problems people flag about it being in the UN, outside the UN or whatever it may be, I think these are all surmountable problems. these are all surmountable problems but really like there needs to be probably a much bigger discussion about sanctions in general and the need because sanctions are being used at record levels throughout the world by western governments right now but once they are created it's down to banks financial institutions to de-risk by removing those actors. But then to find others who are guilty of association or violating sanctions connected to those people or who are in breach of very large sectoral sanctions does require proactive research. And that's presumably not just the case on North Korea.

require proactive research and that's presumably not just the case on north korea like there are i don't know how many panel of experts there are now but sanctions writ large globally are you know many countries are targeted so i think that like it no one like so far we have think tanks journalists ngos doing this on a like a sort of bit by bit basis in different parts of the world. But there's no like systemic overarching effort to investigate sanctions evasion in one place. And I think probably this could be a good opportunity for those that prioritize sanctions to really look at what sanctions are about and try and create a structure that can do that globally. I don't know what it could be, but I think if there's maybe a risk of finding a quick solution, quick and dirty solution on North Korea for political reasons to show that pressure is not being let up, that the risk is you create something that is imperfect, short-lived, and fundamentally doesn't contribute to a more sustained, coherent

solution to a problem that is probably going to keep growing in the years ahead. Shreyas, how has North Korea reacted to the death of the panel of experts? Well, to be honest, they reacted in their standard fashion, essentially condemned the whole panel as a mechanism for the US and the West to target North Korea and its allies. So they ignored when China and Russia signed on to a lot of those sanctions, did they? Well, I think pretty much. And on that note, they've also taken offense to the US and well, a lot of the Western countries. You mentioned the 15 country joint statement earlier, criticizing Russia for the veto. So you mentioned the 15-country joint statement earlier,

criticizing Russia for the veto. So I think while they've not outright named Russia, they've pretty much talked about a certain Security Council member's veto. And, yeah, so for them, they're turning to that, saying the panel was just there to spread misinformation about North Korea and essentially warning that any attempts to set up alternatives would just lead to self-destruction. Last question on this theme. Last week, our colleague Anton Sokolin reported that three members of the panel of experts

had shared findings on a ballistic missile attack on Ukraine, and they concluded the missile was, in fact, from North Korea. It's not the panel of experts as a whole, but just three of its members. What does this mean? And does this set a precedent, Shreyas? Well, I mean, on one hand, the thing is, there's always going to be that fact. It was reported in many media sources around the world as UN panel or UN experts go and confirm this. But at the end of the day, it was something that there was a lot of divisions within the panel.

And obviously, they could not go as a whole panel, as a whole to investigate this. There was no formal report on behalf of the panel. So it's in a sense, a kind of test case for what we're talking about. These are people who are, who at the time of this were within the UN system. They have that authority. People respect their position.

But are there going to be questions about their partiality? Are there going to be questions about their authority? Certainly. Are there going to be questions about their methodology? Certainly. There were indications that a lot of this was based on second hand information even though they visited rather than necessarily missile experts going in and saying oh yeah this is what we saw first hand

well okay so that's enough for sanctions for right now we're going to move on to our second theme and kicking it off again, Shreyas. The sun has set on the day of the sun and seems to be rising for the grandson. So since 1997, so roughly three years after the death of Kim Il-sung, North Korea has named April the 15th or Kim Il-sung's birthday as the Taeyangjol or the day of the sun. And it looks like this policy or this naming has now ended. Why? So in terms of why, what we mostly know is what we've heard from sources that are involved in these tour agencies, for example, that interact regularly with North Korea. Why would North Korea prioritize tour agencies to let them know over, I don't know, making an official announcement in KCNA or telling the friendship groups to put up on the KFA websites? Why the tour groups? I mean, there could be lots of different reasons. One, I think it's not the sort of thing

that you want to, at the end of the day, Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il are still senior figures in North Korea's hierarchy. You can't just outright deny their importance, their significance in an official statement, particularly if it's something, definitely not through domestic media, through domestic media. But at the same time, it's still kind of about sending a message saying, we want you to reduce your use of this term. We're certainly reducing our use of the term.

Have they got a new term, or has it just used this one less? Well, there was one Korean outlet that did a story on this on the weekend, a South Korean outlet, but their English translation of the article well there was one korean outlet that did a story on this on the weekend uh south korean outlet yeah but their english translation of the article was referring to it as sunday which i think made me think it was maybe a papago translation hiccup but yeah they said sunday is ending in north korea and i was baffled and i realized they meant day of the sun a six day

week yeah it's the most boring day of the week. Get rid of it. But yeah, going back. So essentially, they haven't officially, because this isn't an official announcement, right? What they have done, what we have seen is that this year, there were only a few instances of them using the term Day of the Sun. Okay, so they are still using it, but less. They use it on the day in the top level media. But when it came to all the events being held to celebrate it, they usually use things like the spring holiday in April, just April 15th, or like the April 15th celebration. Essentially,

it's highlighting that it's still a big day. It's still a big month for celebration, certainly. There'll be lots of events around it, but it isn't only about Kim Il-sung anymore. And I understand that one of the tour companies has suggested that, from their sources, that the name for Kim Jong-il's birthday may also have changed. Yeah, that certainly seems to be the case. So the Day of the Shining Star, they've at least been advised not to use it as much. In terms of what will be an official replacement for it, that's something we don't yet know. What about Kim Jong-un's birthday? Does that have a special name yet? It isn't officially even acknowledged yet by North Korea in a sense, as in it's not in their official calendar. It's not an

official holiday. But every year we see these unverified single source reports coming in about things like, oh, the North Korean authorities are making people give rice or other things as tribute. Or I think this week there was a similar unverified story about them having North Koreans pledge loyalty to Kim Jong-un on his birthday. But as of now, there is no official holiday. No. In fact, they've not even said, we know this is his birthday. Wait, are we sure? Because I felt sure that we knew the birthday.

We didn't know the birth year. I thought the birthday had been acknowledged. Outside, it's been acknowledged. Inside the country, not yet. So essentially outside the country, it's always believed it's January 8th. But yeah, from what I know, they haven't officially highlighted the day domestically. I want to know if it's 84 or 83 because he'll be my dongsaeng or my... Dongga?

Yeah, depending. Okay. Dong-Ga. All right. Chris, by demoting or changing the names of April 15th and February 15th, does this somehow elevate Kim Jong-un? No, not by itself. So how do you see this?

What's the framework to look at it? It reduces the salience of the April and February birthdays. It reduces the salience of those leaders in the public imagination to some moderate degree. But as Shreya said, we haven't seen how these terms will be replaced, right? It's not as if they have deleted these two dates from the North Korean calendar. That's not the case. They're just talking about them in a different way. And it doesn't elevate Kim Jong-un in and of itself. It reduces the salience of the previous leaders. To elevate Kim Jong-un is a different process. We've seen it ever since. If we go all the way back to the beginning of the succession process with the emergence of that song, Footsteps, and the way that was sung, and that didn't even mention

Kim Jong-un's name. It used a euphemism surrounding the general. Exactly right. So this is a process and we can see this as another step in that process. I think we can also see it as reflecting some, and I don't want to overplay this, but still some modest movements over recent years towards a more statist version of North Korean politics, like away from this pseudo-monarchical or, as Rajan would say, theological version of North Korean politics, towards something that is a bit more statist and normalized and also probably makes succession a less fraught process. Is it also a move away from charismatic leadership? Yes. To be statist is, to me, it seems the antithesis of charismatic leadership. Am I getting that right? Yes, that's basically correct.

But let's not overplay that because we haven't seen this story end. But still, that statist movement isn't new to this year. It's been going on for some time. Help me out here. Is Kim Il-sung still referred to posthumously as the eternal president of the DPRK? Is that title for him still used? Well, we haven't yet seen anything to suggest otherwise. Whether or not at some stage they have that change, that remains to be seen.

But for now, there hasn't been anything to alter that. If I'm right, it's not super widely used. Exactly. I think we should do a KCNA watch word count to see whether it's going down or whether it fluctuates or something. But yeah, to be honest, like Chad said, it's not very common. I think a few years ago there was also this contentious story about Kim Jong-un becoming president.

But that was more about a mistranslation where it was president of the State Affairs Commission. But essentially for now, that title is still reserved solely for Kim Il-sung. But it's almost never used. Shreyas, was the birthday, which was just a couple of weeks ago, April 15th, was Kim Il-sung's birthday celebrated any differently this year? Did it feel more muted by your looking at North Korean state media? Well, in general, yes. But also, to be honest, that isn't just about perhaps a decreasing focus on Kim Il-sung. North Korea usually has bigger celebrations for major anniversaries. So basically, anniversary years ending in zero or five. So this year for our listeners was the 112th

birthday of Kim Il-sung. So maybe we have to wait 3 or 8 years for his 150th or 120th to really know whether they're demoting Kim Il-sung. They still had events, they still had festivals and cultural performances throughout the country

particularly in Pyongyang of course. And they had visiting delegations, performers coming in from Russia and China. So it's still obviously a big deal. But compared to, let's say, the 110th anniversary, naturally somewhat more muted. Chris, going back to you, whether this is a move to an increase in status

view of North Korean leadership and also the less fraught nature of the succession question. Does that mean then that we could be at some stage looking at a collective leadership of North Korea or a form of leadership that doesn't involve somebody from the Baekdu bloodline? Is that kind of making that possible? That's a big jump from what I said a moment ago. Kim leadership system or a collective leadership system on a permanent basis was ultimately impossible, presumably because of political inertia around the existing system, the way decisions are made. That made it just too difficult, he assessed, to make that kind of change.

That being said, on a contingent basis, you can have collective leadership in North Korea. When Kim Jong-il had a stroke in the summer of 2008, of course, it was famously Jang Song-taek, the late Jang Song-taek, and his wife, Kim Jong-il's sister, Kim Kyung-hee, who led the country for that period of time while Kim Jong-il was incapacitated. Also, when Kim Jong-un came to power, there was a collective leadership. Hang on, Chad's making a quick exit. See you, Chad. Bye-bye. See you next time. Yeah. There was a collective leadership put in place to guide the succession process in 2011, 2012. That was led by Jang Song

Taek again. His neck was way too high above the parapet by the end of it, and someone had to chop it off. But we can see that collective leadership on a contingent basis is possible. That is not the same as a dramatic political shift towards some other form of leadership in the long run. as a dramatic political shift towards some other form of leadership in the long run. Even though we're going towards a more statist system? Well, North Korea has institutions and it has its symbols. And I think the statist orientation that I'm describing is a symbolic one as much as anything else. More use of the flag, more use of the anthem,

less use of specific symbols related to members of the Kim family, Kim Il-sung, Kim Jong-il in particular. So that's what I really mean by that. That doesn't necessarily get reflected in the institutional structure of the state at this point. Shreyas, we recently on this podcast talked a little bit about the new song debuted in North Korea that praises Kim Jong-un as a friendly father or friendly parent. My wife and I watched the video last night, or at least the snippet of it, the one-minute piece that's on the NK News website, and we found it aesthetically an interesting fusion of traditional North Korean imagery, so portraits of Kim Jong-un, flags, Mount Paektu, people surrounding the leader and showing great emotion, combined with something resembling South Korean imagery. So people looking happy and carefree and enthusiastic,

but not in a weeping way, lots of jumping and lots of thumbs up, but also people dressed in hazardous material suits. Give us your analysis of it. Well, I mean, it was definitely quite the video. So I think it's a bit of a change from how North Korea usually celebrates these things. Yes, they do celebrate their leaders with over the top videos. But this was, as you said, perhaps a little more, I'm not going to say modern, but at least it felt like it was more about celebrating the leader in a different style, one that was different how they used and much more exuberant. But in terms of the actual focus of the video, I think essentially it was like it was called Friendly Father. And in some ways, that's a little reminiscent of how in the past year or two, we've seen a big focus on Kim Jong-un every now and then, or at least a subtle focus on Kim Jong-un as kind of the father to the people in how state media portrays him. public appearance, there was a phase where basically we had articles talking about Kim

Jong-un emphasizing the role of the youth, the future, and essentially how a lot of these visuals seem to emphasize his role as a family figure rather than just this untouchable leader who is above all, in a way sort of humanizing him a little. Chris, I see you've got your hand up. But even before you give your comment, I want to bring in, in 2004, Brian Myers wrote a piece for The Atlantic about Kim Jong-il being the oboe, the parent of the nation. And I wonder if you could bring this into your comment as well, whether it's of a piece with what we've seen before with Kim Jong-il. It's regrettable that today is not Oboye Nal, that's tomorrow, isn't it?

I know. We're on the brink. It will be released on Parent Day, Oboye Nal. Oh, there you are then. Welcome to Parents Day, everybody. That's nice. I wanted to say initially that that video is a reflection to me of some trends in North Korean media production and technical changes that's been going on for some time. And it also has a political component. So if you look at the way North Korea has changed the way it films and broadcasts military parades, these have taken on

a more advanced and yes, you said modern, maybe that's not quite the right term, but I can't think of anything more appropriate. It does seem to be recognition of global social media trends. Social media trends, TikTok ability. I don't know. You know, you put it how you will, but it's been a significant change in the way they've gone about that kind of product, technically speaking. At the same time, on the political side, we've seen I mean, it's a bit of a kitsch video from our perspective, but it fits in with established East Asian norms of media production, right? It doesn't look out of place. K-pop itself has a strong kitsch element.

And I'm not saying that the North Koreans were simply attempting to reflect South Korean media norms. It's a broader, it's Chinese, it's also Taiwanese. It's a style which fits in in that part of the world. So they want to reflect the way things have changed in the media production space in that part of the world, I'm sure. They don't want to be left behind. At the same time, they've pivoted to a strong anti-South Korea policy at the beginning of this year. That did not come out of the blue. Antipathy towards South Korea obviously has a very, very long history. But at the same time, as you're telling your people,

you can no longer adopt any kind of South Korean cultural norms. You can no longer watch South Korean... I mean, it was always forbidden, but it's even more forbidden now than it was before. At the same time, you have to provide people with an alternative. So there's carrots and sticks here. And so North Korean media has to at least try to answer to what is being taken away as well. So that requires more dynamism, more interesting products that at least attempt to meet the audience where it is rather than enforce aging aging, out-of-touch, boring, conservative styles in the media space. On that note, Chris, have you seen any preliminary studies on what kinds of videos North Koreans share amongst themselves within North Korea? I haven't, but it would be very interesting. It would, of course.

I mean, I'm assuming that their intranet and their smartphones have that capacity to share videos. Do we know? The state has been trying successfully in some areas to limit that, such as by removing the ability to share files through Bluetooth and so forth. Like it's a very it's a private dynamism, public stasis thing. The government is always trying to catch up with the way that young people in particular are attempting to circumvent the surveillance state that they're erecting. And also, pretty much the apps that they're allowed to install in North Korea, they're pretty much, typically they're installed physically in a store. So that's something that

the state has essentially decided what can go on their phone, what can't, and that makes it very hard. That said, there are certainly instances, there have been reports suggesting some North Koreans have found ways to effectively jailbreak their phone, so to speak. Is there a North Korean version of YouTube? Not that I know of, but it wouldn't surprise me if there's at least some sort of. Then it makes me wonder, this video that we've seen, that we're watching on YouTube because some pro-North Korean channel named Mayari has put it on YouTube for the rest of the world,

within North Korea, can they only see it on television? I don't know the answer to that question. But what I was going to say was that, riffing off what Shreyas was saying a second ago, if North Korea wishes to continue running criminal enterprises centered on cyber crime, that requires a certain kind of education of North Korean citizens to be technically competent and able to deal with modern technological forms, computer programming, all the things that you require to be a competent cyber criminal. That will create a big class of North Korean citizens with the competence to do things which the state does not want them to do on a technical basis.

A big class? How big? Well, it will run into the tens of thousands over time, I'm sure. And at any rate, it's enough. Yeah. Right? So they're running a significant risk, because that seems to be at odds with the desire to control what people are able to see, download, do on their devices. Now, what about my earlier question, Chris, about Kim Jong-il as the earlier iteration of parent of the nation, as Brian Myers famously wrote in his 2004 piece for The Atlantic? Is this a continuation of that? Well, yes, I think it is. At the risk of sounding dismissive,

I think it's new wine. No, hold wine in new bottles, rather. Is the use of oboe for the male parent weird? Because oboe now, it's parents' day, so it does include mother and father. Is the use of calling Kim Jong-un or Kim Jong-il the chingunhan oboe, the friendly father or friendly parent. Does that include both male and female roles in this case?

I think in this case it doesn't sound particularly strange. Okay. Do you disagree, Jack? I'm not sure. That's why I'm asking the question. I don't know. And I suppose fundamentally in some ways he's bigger than that. The leader is much bigger than just that term.

So I don't think it particularly matters as much in that sense. The significance is still there. The meaning is still there. I find that in the video, I think it's the North Koreans put in the English title, Friendly Father, and I thought it's interesting they went for that rather than Friendly Parent.

Anyway, that's a nuanced question for another day. Our third and final theme, journeys of North Korean refugees. Now, we start off with a sensitive topic. We recently, I interviewed Sumi Terry, producer on the film Beyond Utopia. Listeners can go back and find it on episode 316. And since then, some allegations have come to light that the pastor shown in the video asks North Korean refugees, whom he helps before and maybe during and after this movie was made, to sign an agreement to consent to filming and having their face used in media and also attend a three-month class on religion.

Now this, as far as I understand, does not implicate the producers or the directors or the documentarians who made the film, but that the pastor is accused of some funny dealings there. Shreyas, why is this a problem? Well, I mean, obviously there are ethical questions about it when you're talking about people who are desperate to leave the country and to leave North Korea. Obviously they know that they're incredibly reliant on this Christian organization and its network of brokers to get them to safety.

So there's obviously an ethical question. Is it okay to, when they're in that situation, to effectively pressure them into signing an agreement that means if they don't sign it, they risk heading back to captivity or even worse? it, they risk heading back to captivity or even worse. Or obviously in any such case, people will sign it. I should perhaps also clarify a little bit in terms of the story.

So it was a story that was broken by Radio Free Asia originally. And they essentially shared what they claimed were the contracts, the agreements that the mission in question had the defectors sign. So NK News reached out to the mission and they said that while they do have defectors sign these sorts of agreements, essentially from their part trying to spread the message, the Christianity, like the messages, they said that those contracts that RFA showed were not what they use. But they also at the same time, they said, we do kind of, we do promote Christianity in this way. Chris, have you seen this before? You've been watching the North Korean refugee

movements for a long time, over 10 years. Is this unprecedented? It's rather an unusual situation. this is unprecedented? It's rather an unusual situation. And I haven't seen many examples of such a thing in the past. But my question is, okay, if people in North Korea who wish to leave or those related to them in South Korea, because as we know, a lot of defections are chain defections. So those related to them in South Korea are given the choice whether to sign such an agreement, whether they choose to sign the agreement or not is determinative in whether the religious group facilitates the defection. If all of these things can be satisfactorily answered, then we have a case of a slightly curious and a bit uncomfortable situation, but one that ultimately leaves the agency with the defector to choose whether or not they sign an agreement and assuming it's not determinative

in the decision whether assistance will be rendered for the process of defection. Do we know, Shreyas, whether they're still helped even if they don't sign? Well, so I think it's a good idea also Because we also reached out to Sumi Terry about this. And she essentially told NK News that in the case of the escapees who appeared in the film, to question, they were talking about their general practices rather than specifically related to the movie. Okay. So. All right. But that doesn't completely answer whether the question that Chris raises, is it determinative of whether they're helped or not? And that's key.

Yeah. Of course, that is a good question there. Yeah. That's key. Of course, that is a good question there. So Pastor Kim, who's the pastor of the Eastern documentary, did say that those in critical need, even if they do not sign the contract, they will help at least. So that is what he explained. And certainly we hope that is the case because it would be wrong to turn away people in that situation.

That would be – or that uncomfortable would seem to be highly unethical, particularly given the power imbalance there, right? The leverage or the asymmetry that's going on. Okay, Shreyas, now, as our colleague Alana Hill reported on April 30th, there were 43 North Korean refugees who made it to South Korea in the first quarter of this year. That's up on last year's figures, but still down on pre-pandemic numbers. Are these almost all people who have been in China since before COVID-19? I think that has largely been the case for most of the defectors who made it here in the past couple of years. We've seen that because both North Korea and China really tightened border controls during the pandemic. Of course, we talk about North Korea completely

shutting its borders, making it almost impossible. But China was just as difficult. And life in China became quite difficult for many of these defectors. So we're seeing not just people who defected in the last three, four years. We've seen people who've come in after spending 10, 15, 20 years in China because they essentially did not have the identification. They did not have the identification, they did not have the documents needed. And during the pandemic, China introduced so many measures that made it almost impossible to live, to get jobs, to get rations, to get your basic necessities that they felt we need to leave. And so, yes, essentially many of these people are coming in from China and many of them since before COVID-19.

Right. Now, we know it's now much, much more difficult to cross the border into China. It's also very hard to move through China. Is this likely to be the way of the future with very few defectors arriving here from North Korea? Or will they find another way? Will they perhaps risk the sea journey or crossing the demilitarized zone? I think that is something that we'll still have to see. Certainly, the recent trends have suggested it's not going to be easy. The numbers will, even if they rise, they may not necessarily go back to pre-pandemic levels. Like you said, they may have to look for

other options. I'm sure that there are a lot of people working on alternatives. Of course, we talked about Caleb Mission just before this's certainly other organizations as well that will be looking into ways to get these defectors out, get them to safety. But even the Unification Ministry, so last year I had the opportunity to go to Hanawon, which is the resettlement center for defectors who have just arrived in North Korea. And I think they were also kind of prepping for this new reality where they were no longer dealing with hundreds of defectors at a time whom they were training for life in South Korea. They were looking and saying, maybe now it's time to say, OK, we may not have as many defectors arriving. use our resources, use our capabilities to boost after, like post-Hanawan training, post-Hanawan adaptation and other facilities and support.

So I think that's something that is certainly something that people would hope that numbers will not completely diminish. But at the same time, people are preparing for the possibility that they may not go back. Quick point of information here. but at the same time people are preparing for the possibility that they may not go back. Quick point of information here. Caleb Missions, as far as I know, well, as far as you know, do they help people who are still within North Korea right now to get out or have they mainly been helping people who are already out of North Korea in China? So to be honest, I would say I'm not the greatest expert on their operations but I think what has typically been the cases.

So, for example, in Beyond Utopia, we saw a couple of different cases. One was a family that had already made its way over to China. But the other case was of someone who was in North Korea. That's the mother with an adult child who may or may not be in a camp now. Yeah. So the mother helped reach out to him through a broker, facilitated or at least tried to facilitate his escape to China. And from there, ensured that he would be able to come across. Because they can't, obviously, these brokers, these who help make the journey, they can't operate within North Korea, but they have their own network of contacts there. But the broker's not Caleb Mission, is

my understanding. Yeah, they have their own network of brokers. And I think even Caleb Mission, so the pastor came in the documentary. He said, look, they're not always trustworthy, but they know that they need us as much as we need them.

So essentially, we're going as far as possible. We will continue that relationship and so get the job done. Now, meanwhile, repatriations by China erupt. Last month, at least 260 North Korean people were sent back to North Korea. Shreyas, very briefly, are these people who were recalled by North Korea after the pandemic lockdown ended and they're now slowly making their way back to North Korea? Or are they people who have been caught in China by the PRC government and are being sent back against their will? Well, I think in general, this is something that

we've been seeing a lot from China in the past year or so. They've been tracking down North Koreans who are living in China, detaining them. And then at various points, certainly there have been multiple reports of their repatriation. A lot of this seems to be coming from the Chinese side. One would assume it's based on agreements with North Korea. But at the same time, we must bear in mind these sorts of repatriations were also happening before the pandemic. It's just that now, after many years of border closures from both sides, we're seeing that it's happening at a bigger scale because many of them are being sent back all at once. But this is also kind of consistent with China's

policy that it does not want these North Korean escapees in its territory. Where in China have they been found and caught? Are they all in northeast China in the provinces of Jilin and Yaoning? Is that the other one? Well, in this case, most of them were sent back. About 200 of them were sent back from Jilin. and the other 61 were sent from the cities of the regions of Tumen, Hunchun and Dandong, which are very much in that region near North Korea.

But there are certainly plenty of North Korean escapees who make it to other parts of China as well. So I think there isn't necessarily any safety in other regions as well. But obviously, for many of them, it is easiest, most convenient to settle as close to the border ones have made their escape, because that's where they first have a chance to build a life. What's being done in international circles by the South Korean government or by the United Nations to try to help these people? A lot of it has basically been about trying to raise awareness about it and call for the Chinese government not to repatriate them. But it's very much a top level approach. I think there hasn't been any concrete alternative that would really help. At the end of the day, it's something that South Korea can ask China not to send them back to North Korea, but they also know that it's going to be up to China to decide whether or not to send them across to South Korea or other countries or just let them be.

Chris, give us the long view here. Is this just something that is unlikely to change? I mean, there is an international, what's the principle? Non-refulment? Is that the word I'm thinking of here? Yeah, that exists in international law. I don't know if it's binding. But anyway, China chooses to send these people back saying that they're simply economic migrants. It's had a consistent policy for over two decades. Is this just how it's going to be? I think it's how it's going to be for the time being. If we look at the bigger picture, we talked about whether defector numbers would rebound, whether new routes out of North Korea would be found. Structurally speaking, I think the circumstances geopolitically and in terms of border security mitigate against that. We shouldn't underestimate human ingenuity.

that we shouldn't underestimate human ingenuity. The pandemic has made life harder in North Korea. Back in 2011-12, when defector numbers started to decline from their historic peak of about 2,950, 2009-2010 time, they started to decline partly because of increasing investments in border security on the part of the North Koreans, But also because there were some people in North Korea who felt like there was a possibility of change and improvements in their lives. And most people who leave North Korea... You mean if they stayed back? If they stayed in North Korea. And most people who leave North Korea

don't actually really want to go. They would prefer to stay if their lives could be of a standard that they would be comfortable. That simply, people felt at that time that maybe that could be the case because simply people felt at that time that maybe that could be the case because of all the things that we've heard so much of about Kim Jong-un, young man, Western educated, might be a reformer, blah, blah, blah. Now, pandemic has made life very hard for a lot of people. There's not that much optimism in North Korea as we understand it.

And there's probably a buildup of people who would, all else being equal, leave because they don't feel like they have a future in North Korea as it currently is constituted. Therefore, there should be a demand that will drive ingenuity, and people will find ways to circumvent the border security and the increasing security on the Chinese side of the border as well. But at the same time, geopolitics and the dramatic increases in investments in border security on both the Chinese and North Korean side during and after the pandemic mean that that is difficult. And if people pivot to a maritime mode of escape- Stealing boats or buying boats.

We've seen on the English channel between France and the UK that people die in large numbers when their method of escape from wherever it is they're coming from to wherever they wish to go to becomes more dangerous. So I think although there may well be a demand, the risk of doing it, if it were based on crossing some area of dangerous sea, would mitigate against that. crossing some area of dangerous sea would mitigate against that. And then there are the difficulties posed by the fact that North Korea and China and Russia, to a lesser extent, are collaborating more than before on preventing this from happening. Okay. Well, that's where we're going to have to leave it for today. Thank you very much, Shreyas Reddy and Chris Green, and also to Chad O'Carroll, who joined us here earlier.

Yeah. Thank you, both of you. Thank you. Explore the unofficial world of DPRK-inspired apparel at NK News Shop. Dive into a captivating collection of North Korea-themed T-shirts, hoodies and more at the NK News Shop. From the popular Daedonggang beer t-shirts to the adventurous Air Koryo designs, each piece offers a unique glimpse into aspects of the DPRK you'll be familiar with. Featuring retro travel-inspired prints of Pyongyang's landmarks and brands, our apparel is 100% handcrafted in the USA. Support independent journalism with every purchase. Explore our range today at shop.nknews.org. That's shop.nknews.org. episode for today. Our thanks go to Brian Betts and Alana Hill for facilitating this episode, and to our post-recording producer genius Gabby Magnusson, who cuts out all the extraneous noises,

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