North Korea News Podcast by NK News - What’s next for North Korea-Venezuela ties after Maduro’s capture

Episode Date: January 15, 2026

North Korea is closely watching the situation in Venezuela after the U.S. captured President Nicolás Maduro, shaking up one of Pyongyang’s few political friendships in the Western Hemisphere. In this episode, Gabriela Bernal and Camilo Aguirre Torrini delve into what happened in Venezuela, how North Korea has reacted in state media and what lessons Kim […]

Hello, listeners, and welcome to the NK News podcast. I'm your host, Jacko's Wedslude, and today it is Wednesday, the 14th of January, 2026, and I'm recording this episode via Streamyard. We've got two guests, and we're going to be talking about what's happened in Venezuela recently and what North Korea might be learning from that. Both guests have written about Venezuela and North Korea relations in the past, and both are currently in Latin America looking at Venezuela from two different geographical directions. We have Dr. Camilla Aguirre Torini, whose work traces DPRK, Latin America

ties across history and sanctions era politics. He's joining us from Chile, and he wrote a piece for 38 North North back in October 2021 called Can Venezuela and the DPRK wipe the slate clean and make a fresh start? And also joining me is Dr. Gabriela Bernal, who is a North Korea analyst and non-resident fellow at the European Centre for North Korean Studies, who write. on Pyongyang's external relations and information strategy, among other topics. She's joining us from the Netherlands and Tilly's Island of Curacao. Gabriela wrote an analysis just last week for NKPro entitled Where North Korea Venezuela TIE stand after Nicholas Maduro's downfall.

So welcome on the show, both of you, Camilla and Gabriela. Thank you. Thank you for having me. Okay, so, I mean, obviously, anyone who's been watching the news, will be aware that in early January, I think it was the third local time, Venezuela's President Nicholas Maduro, was seized and taken to the U.S. jolting one of Pyongyang's few political friendships. For listeners who are new to this story, what happened and why does it matter to North Korea? And Gabriela, I'll have you start.

Sure. So President Trump decided to take, to pretty much depose the Maduro government, which he has not been a fan of. He's made that clear over the past, I mean, ever since he took office, Trump has taken over actually quite a few oil tankers over the past few months off the coast of Venezuela, signaling that something bigger was coming. So it was not completely unexpected, but still the speed at which the operation took place was very surprising, I think, for a lot of us in the region. And, yeah, why it matters to Pyongyang is because, of course, North Korea is one of the most isolated, countries in the world. They don't have that many allies. Venezuela is one of its very few allies, and having for Kim Jong-un to see one of his very few friends on that global stage be removed from

office in such a swift way without any, you know, kind of following any kind of legal rules, international norms. It just for North Korea really just reaffirms their distrust in the U.S. and they're decades long just perspective on the U.S. being this hostile state, as they call it. So this just reaffirmed what North Korea has already been believing for decades. In that sense, that's how it matters a lot. To North Korea and Kim Jong-un will be watching it closely. And the fact that they launched a missile soon after the operation also shows that it was a way of them expressing their displeasure with what Trump did in Venezuela. Okay, that's a good beginning.

Camilla, do you have anything to add to that? Not really, I think from a historical perspective, it's important to understand that North Korea in past had allies other than Cuba in the region. For instance, the Chilean government of the popular unity in the 70s. So it's not the first time that North Korea has experienced something like this. I don't know. I wish I could engage with a North Korean historian to see they're aware of this kind of diplomatic monsters, but it seems like every time they gain an ally, there is this reaction from the

US and they had to start from from the very beginning again and again and again. So it was Chile, now Venezuela, in the past, if we were even to the 60s, was Euro-wide. So for us Latin Americans, we don't like to think that this is the Americas back yet, but from an accurate perspective and seeing all these hegemonic actions, it seems like it is. Right. Now, what did each of you look for in North Korea's reaction, for example, in state media and diplomatic signaling? What did you look for to sort of gauge your sense of how this activity was being interpreted or seen in North Korea? Cabriana? Yes, so first of all, I looked at, of course, the KCNA, so the North Korea's state media main channel that talks about, you know, reports about foreign. affairs and to see if an official government statement was made, and they did, soon after Trump took over, I mean, deposed Maduro. The North Korean government did send out a statement,

strongly condemning the action, strongly saying that it was a violation of Venezuela sovereignty, which are the key words that North Korea likes to use in the state media. So that was very important to see. Again, the missile launch, that was even before the statement, that was also a a key sign that North Korea is very closely watching it. And not just that, not just after the Maduro incident, but also before that, North Korea has been over the past few months reporting much more about the Venezuela situation. And it's been more in general news reports about what's happening in Venezuela, the U.S. Venezuela situation regarding the oil tankers. But you can see a really big spike in North Korean media's coverage of Venezuela story. So you can see that

Pyongyang has been watching the situation very closely for months now. It is something definitely that is relevant to them. Otherwise, you know, they wouldn't be reporting about it as much. Now, Camilla, can I ask you to zoom out a little bit and to look at the historical context, at least in the last, say, five years? When you wrote an article about Venezuela and North Korea, kind of resetting their relationship by opening embassies in each other. So before this month's event, how substantial were relations between North Korea and Venezuela beyond rhetoric and symbolism? Yeah, that's the thing.

It's very hard to go beyond this rhetoric and symbolism, this brotherhood between two countries that in reality were linked, basically due to U.S. sanctions. So it's this powerful country that's isolating, this kind of rough states brings them together. So I think it's very hard for me as I'm trying to go beyond that, beyond the retire. But yeah, I think that this whole Venezuelan crisis is important for North Korea because it's a confirmation that there's no way they can resign their nuclear. deterrence. It's something that I believe it's clear for them. And when it comes to reporting the Venezuelan crisis in the local newspapers, and again, from a very like historical perspective, coming from the 50s, this constant reporting of U.S. hegemonic actions or actions against

progressive governess. So I think it, you can find like articles in the Nodong or the Jiangni Times from the 2018 forecasting a possible, you know, military action by the US against the Venezuelan government. So I think this gives the New York of Korea leadership and reinforces this ability to kind of, you know, predict the future. What about in terms of bilateral trade or security cooperation? Was there a lot of that between North Korea and Venezuela? Not really, as Gabriella mentioned in her piece for NK News. There was this UN commission that was investigating the trade between Venezuela and North Korea,

but it wasn't really significant. So for me, as I see it from afar, because I mean, to either, right? But it's more symbolic than anything. Gabriela, anything you want to add to that? Sure, yeah, there was not, so like, so it's been mostly a symbolic alliance like we've said. But yes, so in 2021, the UN did investigate, you know, trade between Venezuela and North Korea to check if it was in violation of sanctions. So the report stated that Venezuela had imported textiles, machinery, electrical equipment, all in violation of UN sanctions, while exporting iron, steel and other metals to North Korea. But Venezuela and North Korea have both always denied any reports about military arms sales, arms transfers, or any kind of other trade that violates sanctions.

So it's practically impossible to get any official data about the numbers of trade between the. the two countries, but we can assume that it is relatively small because, again, both countries have been under sanctions for a long time. They don't have the economic capacity to trade at very, you know, on a large scale and also the fact that there are sanctions that still does make it more difficult. So we can say there has been trade, of course, over the past few years, but in terms of significant notable security cooperation, military cooperation, significant arms sales like that, that was not, you know, it's not something that we've seen with concrete proof for evidence, no. Right. So there's no evidence, for example, that there were any

North Korean soldiers in Caracas in the same way that we heard that there were some Cuban security officers who were killed in this recent American raid on Caracas. Right, no, not that we know. I mean, that would be very noteworthy. There would be noteworthy. But we do know that, I mean, North Korea has a track record of sometimes sending units for training or for assistance to, for example, African countries. So it's interesting that in this case, they didn't have anybody in Venezuela. Now, we know that Venezuela opened an embassy in Pyongyang in 2019, and North Korea opened one in Caracas in 2015. A question here, what would the North Korean diplomats in Caracas be reporting back to Pyongyang, well, as of last week?

after the raid there. Camila, what are your thoughts, first of all? Yeah, it's interesting. I thought that North Korea will, you know, withdraw the whole mission and to call them back. But they're staying. As far as we know, Chavispo is still in power. So I think that they have a very privileged point of view, and they can inform Pyongyang for this whole. attempt of not just overthrowing Maduro, but not comes the very difficult part because the U.S. is very good at overthrowing governments. Then it comes national building. So I think that they have a very privileged perspective and my belief is that North Korea will try its best to

keep them in Caracas as long as they can. Gabriella, what are you thinking? Right. Yeah, I think so. Now, of course, the, you know, Pro Madura government is still in place, so we need to see what will happen, of course. Because as long as the Promodore government stays in place, there is no real reason for the embassy to close, in theory, at least, because it's still the same communist, you know, left-wing government that has had relations with North Korea for decades. So as long as the current vice president, so who is now president, Del C. Rodriguez, as long as she remains. the leader of Venezuela, which she might or she might not, we don't know. I think that relations between, at least diplomatic relations, should remain the same. But we never know because, of course, there should be elections.

Elections should be taking place. And, of course, if the elections are, you know, fair, which I doubt they will be. But if they would be fair, of course, then they would probably elect an opposition figure. and that government then would be doubt then it would raise questions about would that government maintain diplomatic ties with North Korea, would they not? I think it would not make much sense for them to do so. I don't see what they would gain from maintaining ties with North Korea. So but that even before, even before there are elections with Donald Trump saying

that America is basically running Venezuela right now through the new president. Is it not possible that or likely that there might be pressure from Washington for Venezuela to distance itself from countries like North Korea, like Cuba? I think, I mean, Cuba, yes, definitely, because Cuba, you know, North Korea, Trump has said a lot about Cuba. Trump definitely sees Cuba as a major issue. So Cuba, definitely. North Korea, at least not right now, not so much. I think Trump doesn't see North Korea right now as a major issue in terms of Venezuela, at least. Because again, his focus with Venezuela is in that context of the Monroe Doctrine, which they're now calling the Donroo doctrine, his intention to focus on the

Western Hemisphere, on the American continent. So Venezuela, I don't think, presents a major threat to Trump. I don't think it's big, like, high on his agenda right now. And also, we know that Trump has expressed interest in holding talks with Kim Jong-un, possibly in the future. So if he would explicitly come out and say, oh, Venezuela, I want you to close the DPRK embassy or, you know, expel the DPRK diplomats, that would be sending yet another. I mean, this whole Maduro thing already sent a terrible message to North Korea. So if Trump comes in and says, oh, you know, get the North Korean diplomats out, it would just really, you know, it would not help at all with his, you know, talk of wanting to, uh,

you know, engage diplomatically with North Korea and the future. So I don't think he would do that right now for those reasons. Yeah. My message is that we want to keep communication channels open as much as possible, and the embassies provide that. So even more important than the DPRK embassy in Caracas, for me is the Venezuelan embassy in Kenya, because imagine if there is a pro-US government in Venezuela or if the U.S. is effectively running

the country as to have. Trump mentioned, then you have a US embassy in Pyongyang. So what role can be the Venezuelan embassy play in communication between the US and North Korea? That's interesting. I know it's a. Yeah, that's not scenario, but you. To continue exploring that possibility there. So if Venezuela does go undergo some kind of.

change and maybe if not closed its embassy, at least transformed its embassy. And with Cuba also under pressure from the United States, how isolated does North Korea risk becoming in the Western hemisphere? And what are the practical costs that could follow for North Korea in North and South America? So I think it's a very hard position from North Korea right now because, of course there is Venezuela, but how we look at it as South Americans or Latin Americans, who's next? And there are very progressive governments such as Mexico and Colombia. They're very concerned with what happened. So I think that there's just further isolation for North Korea because the whole region is turning to the right. There was a pin tide

past years, but now this reaction from the very much. rights and in my country, for instance, Chile, we had elections and we turned from left to right. And there is this huge chance that North Korea will be more and more isolated in the region. But still, I think that North Korea, in the past, has managed some similar situations, like in the 70s, or just anti-comens military dictatorships and they still manage to have some presence, not through like regular missions or official channels, but there is also another way of engaging through public diplomacy, you know, or supporting paramilitary government parties.

So I think that North Korea has managed similar situations in the past. So I think that even if it's isolated, I think it will still have some presence in the Western Hemisphere. I don't know if you're going with me. Go ahead. That's a good point. Now, Gabrielle, in your piece for NK Pro last week, you wrote that if both Caracas and Havana sever ties with North Korea

due to U.S. intervention, Pyongyang's only remaining diplomatic presence in the Western Hemisphere would be in Brazil and Mexico, dramatically reducing North Korea's influence of the Americas. Can you tease out a little bit the implication? of that? Yeah, so again, I think it's more mostly symbolic, but still very important for North Korea, because, of course, in terms of economic trade, in terms of military partnership, we can't compare Latin American partners with, you know, North Korea's big, big friends like China

and Russia. It's just you can't compare the two. But in terms of Latin America, I think North Korea will be losing key if, of course, if Trump intervenes in other countries. North Korea would be losing key allies in terms of its anti-U.S. coalition, its anti-imperialism coalition, which it's always, you know, North Korean media is always talking about, you know, the New World Order and, you know, wanting to paint the U.S. as the, you know, the evil hegemon and, of course, rallying, you know, with North Korea, They're rallying with other like-minded countries that stand against the U.S. So in this sense, of course, they will still have allies in other parts of the world,

and they won't be completely shut out in the Western Hemisphere either, because, of course, they do still have, you know, North Korea still attends like UN General Assembly and New York. There is that communication office in New York. That's not going to just go away either. But in terms of Latin America, yeah, it's more of that symbolic. decades long, you know, those communist allies that will might, that might, might disappear. And it just, yeah, it makes North Korea stand a little bit, I guess, more alone internationally. But at the same time, I personally do not think, even if, let's say, Cuba falls and they

install some democratic regime in Cuba, even if that were to happen, of course, okay, North Korea would lose an embassy. they would lose some footing and influence in the Western Hemisphere, but in the grand scheme of things, you know, will it affect North Korea majorly? Like in the short term, no, because it still has Russia,

which is by far the biggest, the most important partner for North Korea now. So in the short term, I don't think it'll make such a big difference. In the long term, maybe, perhaps, especially if talks with the U.S. remains still needed as they have been over the past years, maybe in the longer term, it would hurt North Korea more, but in the short term, no, because again, the economic ill-tire relations have always been quite limited.

Does either of you expect Pyongyang to reallocate scarce diplomatic resources toward regions where the ties are more resilient? So, for example, parts of Southeast Asia, and what might be some early indicators that we might see that going on? Camillo, your thoughts? Yeah, I think that's a country that has. as limited resources. So there is a chance that they might just give up on the region

from a very official diplomatic perspective, of course, maintaining presence through other channels, such as the Korea Friendship Associations that they play a role. And one thing that I wanted to mention is that it's not just the so-called traditional common allies of North Korea and Latin America, But there are progressive governments in Latin America, which are not a communist, but they still want to engage with North Korea.

There is a sense from a Latin American perspective that we need to open up this isolated country. And there has been from many governments, such as Argentina's in the time of Peron or Chile during Salvador and the administration, that they kind of dreamed of being an understanding. intermediary or a kind of to play a role in inter-Korean, you know, dialogue. So I think that it's important to understand that that it's not just the traditional eyes of North Korea, but there are Latin American countries that want to engage with North Korean in their own terms. So I think that, yeah, they might give up on this region because it's clear from now from the U.S. actions that this is effectively America's backyard.

But yeah, I think that they will focus more on Asia more than anything. And I think that it's, you know, that it's not only North Korea, but I think that China is also making the same adjustment. The only country that we from Latin America kind of, we don't know what will happen is Brazil, because I don't know if China will be ready to give up Brazil. But other than that, I think that everything, major power understands that this is part of U.S. sphere of influence.

We're going back to realism. Yeah. Gabriella, any comments? Yeah, so I think there could be depending on, like Camilo said earlier, that, of course, now we have a trend in Latin America that is moving more to the right. So I think while some previous governments have been more interested in engaging with North Korea, the governments that we'd see now in place, maybe not as much.

So we will have to see maybe in the future if there's new elections in some of these countries and more progressive left-wing leaders get elected. Maybe that would change, definitely, though. So that's possible. But does that mean that North Korea will reallocated resources to other countries? For now, yes.

Yes. So I think in the immediate future, it makes most sense to do that. So especially Southeast Asia, ASEAN, because North Korea already has a presence in ASEAN, They have the contacts there. They have been working with ASEAN for decades as well for a long time. So I think it makes more sense to do that.

Maybe parts of Eastern Europe, like some Russian allies, that's also possible. But I think mostly in Southeast Asia, I think that's where we can expect to see more of North Korea expending its diplomatic resources, in the near future, at least. Now, I want to look a little bit at some lessons that North Korea might be drawing from this, and not just looking at what happened in Venezuela last week, but looking a little bit more broadly at Syria's, in Syria, the collapse of the Bashar al-Assad regime in 2024, 2025, and also the current unrest that we're seeing in multiple cities in Iran, in the Islamic Republic of Iran there.

What are some parallels and some key differences that we should keep in mind when we're assessing what lessons North Korea might draw from all of these tumultuous changes in countries that it has historically had very friendly relations with. Camillo? Yeah, I think that the kind of most important lesson is that is reinforcing what North Korea already, how North Korea understood the fact that they're alone, that they can't rely on their allies. the idea that there's no way they can give up their nuclear deterrence.

So I think that more than teaching new lessons to them is to reaffirm what they already knew. Like, we knew that. It's, you know, and that's the funny thing with the whole Venezuela episode is that it's written in North Korea newspapers like five years ago. You know, it's possible that the US will attempt something. So I think that, yeah, it's more of a confirmation of why. what they already knew. And historically, you know, the way that North Korea has depicted the US government. And now you have a confirmation.

I don't know how much North Korea used this and reported the Venezuelan episode to the domestic audiences, but it's basically showing them. And I think it's a source of legitimacy for the North Korean leadership. You know, it's still dangerous out there. You know, there's still this, this, this, this US imperialist force that we are the only ones to get me kicked in out of the Union of North Korea. Sorry, the northern part of the Korean Peninsula. So I think not like a new lesson, but confirmation of what they already understood.

Confirming, right. Okay. Gabriella? So, yes, I completely agree with what Camila, definitely reconfirming, reaffirming what North Korea has feared for long, what they have been saying for long. It's great propaganda for North Korea. They will be, you know, definitely reporting on it continuously to show, again, like to show that what the U.S. really is, what the U.S. really stands for, and why they need their nuclear weapons, why they shouldn't trust the U.S. In terms of Iran and the other countries, I think in Iran, Iran is the big one now, for sure,

for North Korea. Iran will be watching what happens in Iran very, very closely because multiple reasons, but namely because Trump already made threats and already kind of promising that, you know, telling the protesters to keep going, that help is on the way and that he's, you know, pretty much hinting to multiple times already that he's going to do something in Iran. So and during the press conference when they announced the whole Maduro operation, Rubio said to the world, like, you know, don't play with the U.S. because Trump is not like other presidents. Trump will actually follow through with his threats.

So North Korea will be seeing for sure if Trump follows through this time in Iran, because if he does, it just sends, it's on a whole other level than Venezuela because Iran is much more complex. It's much more, you know, it would be much more difficult to remove the regime there. It would be an operation on a completely different scale. So if North Korea sees that the U.S. actually does something directly to depose the regime in Iran or at least tries to, it would, I I mean, it would be a massive signal to North Korea that, you know, I mean, not only reconfirming, but also just pushing them towards greater hostility, greater defensiveness from the U.S. and closing themselves off even more to potential diplomacy with the U.S., at least under Trump. So I think the implications of a possible U.S. operation in Iran or U.S. involvement in the potential regime change in Iran, I think that would be one of the biggest developments for North Korea in terms of foreign policy and in recent history. So I think that will be very important. Now, North Korea is often pointed to past examples of regime change like Iraq and Libya and Afghanistan when talking about its own need for self-protection.

And I'm just wondering whether after the events in Venezuela last week, are there any, any, narratives or policies that Pyongyang might adjust either domestically or externally when sort of talking, you know, telling its story to its own people and to the world. Well, I think, you know, we already know that North Korea uses a significant amount of propaganda domestically. And I think more than changing, again, like Camilo said before, more than changing anything, it will be just taking this latest story. Because that's what North Korea likes to do is taking stories that are really happening over the world, around the world, news, and showing it to its people and saying, look, this is why we are the way we are, this is why we don't

trust the U.S., this is why we have nuclear weapons, and this is why we need to struggle so much economically to protect ourselves, because otherwise we'll end up like that. So I think we'll see a lot of that in the media, we'll see a lot of that in being told to the North Korean people. And we saw that, for example, when President Yun in South Korea declared martial law. I mean, North Korea, that was such a golden opportunity for North Korea to just totally use that as such great propaganda domestically. So I think that that will definitely be something they'll be doing a lot. So effectively, North Korea has been handed a free propaganda win. Yes, for sure.

Yeah. In the actions of the U.S. in Venezuela. You agree, Camilla? Yeah, I agree. The only thing that I really don't know what will happen. the Chavismo and the US work together because you know, both Trump and Rubio mentioned that they were willing to work with the Chavismo, with the Venezuelan leadership as long as they behave. So I don't know, North Korea can translate this to North Korean audiences.

So if there is some sort of collaboration between the Venezuelan leaders, leadership and the US, how will North Korean translate that to their audience? My guess is that will be just silence? Yeah, yeah, it certainly could be. Now, a day or two after the abduction of Maduro, an unnamed spokesman for the DPRK foreign ministry, quote, strongly denounced the U.S. hegemony-seeking act committed in Venezuela as the most serious form of encroachment of sovereignty and as a wanton violation of the UN Charter and international laws. Now, was this in line with the level and the tone of the response that you had been expecting from Pyongyang, Gabriela,

or were you expecting something different? Maybe a statement given in the name of Kim Jong, for example. Well, yes, I mean, I guess that would have also been very, very, very. definitely very possible. But I think, again, it shows the level, because North Korea, yes, it has few allies, but it does have different levels of allies. And so I think Venezuela was never one of those that was the most important or one of the top. I think if it was an ally of greater significance or greater importance, greater consequence to North Korea,

then maybe even Kim Jong-un would have come out and said something. yes, but because it was Venezuela an ally but not such a consequential ally, I think this statement sure makes sense. And again, if you see it in the context of all the other new stories that they've been reporting about

Venezuela over the past few months, you see that it's not just that one statement. It has been more, so yes. Yeah, it's interesting that here there was a statement by

Kim Jong-un that went viral in which he described Venezuelan leader in Nicolas Maduro as his friend. And he warned the US that oppression against Venezuela could lead to a new world war. And this was fake news. But it was a thing here in South America. It was reported. It was in every newspaper that, you know, Kim Jong-un supported his friend. This was before January 3rd, was it? Yeah, it was before the official statement by the DBR. is a spokesperson. And the thing that I find interesting about this spokesperson, you know, the whole speech was that

dimension to the UN charter. So it's basically North Korea saying, you know, the US is destroying this international order. So in the past, we had, you know, this anti-imperialist approach and, you know, talking the US, this rogue and brutal state. But the fact that the US did the North Korea is, you know, this anti-imperial approach. then North Korea is using the same institutions and the same international order that the US helped building. I guess that means something that I find interesting. And it's also the same United Nations that has sanctions against North Korea and has condemned North Korea for missile launches and nuclear tests and human rights abuses, et cetera, et cetera.

Yeah, so there is some irony in there, perhaps a little bit of hypocrisy. Now, you've already said before, Camilla, that this is really reinforcing Pyongyang's belief that nuclear weapons keeps its leadership safe from external coercion up to and including the rendition of its leader to a foreign country. I'm wondering how might this harden positions in any future dialogue between the United States and North Korea on denuclearization or arms control? Yeah, I think it's impossible to talk about unilateral denuclearization for It's not even on the cards.

I can't imagine a scenario in which North Korea will just give up their nuclear weapons. And there is nothing that the US could actually offer to them. I think not even even saying sanctions will do it. It's just a struggle to see a scenario which North Korea will just give up their nuclear weapons. So this makes any attempt that dialogue even more difficult if the US is committed to pursue this denuclearization strategy. Gabriela, do you agree with one more nail in the coffin of denuclearization of North Korea? Yes, 100% if it wasn't already dead before. Yes, it's definitely something that will become even more, I don't want to say impossible,

but seemingly impossible, at least in the near to middle term. And again, you know, North Korea is looking at Trump's actions compared to his words. He's seeing, of course, what he did to Venezuela, but also with, you know, Iran. North Korea's had quite a few examples under Trump as to why not to trust him. You know, so Trump said last year he expressed interest in negotiations with Iran and diplomacy with Iran and coming to a deal. And then, you know, when the deal didn't materialize, he bombed. Iran, you know. So, same with Venezuela. He's like, oh, offering Venezuela, you know, to, he said before,

like, oh, you know, we, we would offer to talk and to work this out. We're trying to work it out. And then, you know, weeks later, you have, you know, U.S. military taking out Maduro. So for North Korea, it is, it, it, it, it, it, first of all, they've already said that they are not interested in talks with, um, with Trump with the U.S. They've been seeing it all of last year. They've been seeing it pretty much since the Hanoi summit. But now, you know, not only if they didn't have reason to talk to Trump before, they definitely don't have reason to talk to him now, you know, barring an impending, you know, direct threat to their survival, which I don't think is there now. And also as long as they have the support from Russia, that's another key factor. As long as the war in Ukraine continues,

and they have that partnership with Russia and that military, especially military relationship with Russia, I think there are less and less reasons why North Korea should risk it all, really. It's survival, the Kim family, everything to have even a meeting with Trump or even lower-level negotiations. It's going to be difficult. It's not impossible.

So, again, lower-level negotiations could take place, yes, Trump has expressed interest so they could try, but it does seem very difficult. And North Korea will be much more guarded this time around compared to 2018, 2019, when they had hope. You know, there was widely

reported that, yeah, North Korea really did hope for a deal and they really did think they could get there with Trump. They had high hopes, but not only the Hanoi Summit, that whole experience with Trump showed that it's not going to be that easy. And now, since then, in this

gap of, I don't know how many years, eight years, the world has changed so much. Geopolitics has become so much more complex. And Trump's recent actions in multiple countries has just, you know, made the situation much more difficult for Kim Jong-un to say, yes, let's sit down and talk. I think it's going to take a lot more, a lot, a lot more. Yeah. And like Camilo said, I don't think, even if the U.S. says, okay, we'll give you sanctions relief. I don't think that'll be enough. Like, that might have been enough. It would have been enough, I think, in 2019. if they really came with a package for sanctions relief, I think North Korea would have taken that

and they could have gotten some kind of agreement. But I think this time around, even if Trump says, you know, okay, we'll give you a nice package, a sanctions relief package, I don't think that would be enough either, not this time around. It's interesting you say that I just want to point out the shadow carol of NK News and NKPro thinks that it's possible that the recent events might scare Kim Jong-un

or at least motivate him into choosing. to engage with the United States once again, but you obviously don't see that as being very credible or likely? I don't think in the near future. I think he has more to lose and to gain. Again, of course, North Korea's main goal does remain the same. So I do think, of course, they will always want to have that deal with the U.S.

They do want that, you know, those security guarantees. That still will always remain the priority and goal that North Korea wants. They will want a deal. they will always want to deal, but are they willing to risk so much in this context of this, this very complex security geopolitical situation, are they willing to risk it? Especially knowing they still have Russia's backing here. Yeah, it's a bit difficult in the near future, at least.

Yeah. Now, Camilla, do you think there are any realistic conference building steps or measures that the U.S. or its allies could offer North Korea to reduce the risk? Not really. I don't think. I think that North Korea wants, in response to the question about the article, I think that North Korea wants to engage with the US as much as possible,

but I think that the giving up nuclear weapons is not on the cards. But engaging with the US, it's good for them. good for the North Korean leadership because it's proof that they can, you know, you know, engage with with a major power. So they are there, they act really as a big power in the global scenario. But yeah, I don't think there's anything that they can offer North Korea leadership. Okay. Looking internally within North Korea, both of you are very familiar, of course, with Rodong Shimon and North Korean media. So this is a question for both of you.

Inside North Korea, how might the leadership use this recent crisis in Venezuela to rally elites and also the general public? What sort of propaganda frames do you foresee? And what should analysts be watching for in the Rodong Shimon or the KCNA to track whether that's happening? Okay. So when you read the Nordom Shimon or Rodham Simon from a historical perspective you see some links or series of events that everything starts with the Korean War.

So this is just one episode. It's the last, you know, part of the whole chain of events. I think that more than introducing new information, it kind of reinforces everything that the North Korean leadership knew about the world and how it communicates it to the, to the are domestic audiences. So it's still a dangerous place outside. You know, there's still this threat and we are the only ones who you can actually contain or, you know, keep them out of the northern part of the North Korean Peninsula. So I think that's interesting how this episode is not an isolated episode. And I don't know if North Korea is willing to, you know, revisit what happened in the, in the Western Hemisphere in the past. Because

Again, it's not the first time that there is a U.S. intervention in Latin America. There's a whole. So I don't know if they will frame this as, you know, something that a long history of U.S. interventions in the region. Or if they will take this approach of, you know, this part of world history. World history is basically us fighting against the United States. Okay. Gabriel, any comments? Yeah, so I think especially toward the elites, like you mentioned, that will be important because to the general public, it will be again reaffirming that, okay, the U.S. is not to be trusted and all of that.

That will just continue, maybe become even stronger with this whole Venezuela situation. But I think, yeah, to the elites, the message, I think, can be made stronger in the sense that, you know, North Korea's diplomatic presence abroad. how, I guess, in terms of Kim Jong-un's perspective, like the need to really safeguard the remaining diplomatic presences that North Korea has abroad, especially in strategic places. So, especially, like, for example, Latin America, Brazil will be a big one because, you know, that one is, Brazil is a major, major country in Latin America, a major point of entry for North Korea, for any country, really. into Latin America. So that will be very important. I'm sure they're in close communication with their people working in Brazil. That is going to be very important for sure. And then in general in the world to maintain whatever like embassies they have, diplomatic presences that they have, how to engage with new partners as well, partners that may be aligned

ideologically with Pyongyang. I think that will be kind of expanded on maybe this year and moving forward to not to ensure that it does not remain isolated because north korea of course a lot of people look at north korea as this very irrational state but it's actually the opposite it is very rational they have a strategy for for everything that they do so seeing if they see that okay some of their dominoes are falling in south america they will want to reinforce their their presence and and standing on the global stage in other places wherever they can so i think that will be another focus like we said previously and And in terms of Rodong-Shin-moon, what we could see or look out for, any kind of wording related to the need for greater, I think, again, we see this a lot already, of course, like greater military preparedness, readiness, we see that.

But how this might translate in terms of actual changes in North Korea's military maneuvers. perhaps, you know, there have been some articles that say maybe we could see some form of Russia, North Korea military exercises. That would be something that would be a big step up from what we see now. That could, it is possible. It was unthinkable a few years ago, but I think it's becoming increasingly possible. That's something we could definitely look out for. So in the months leading up to something like that or some big military change like that,

North Korea will probably be, you know, putting out. signals in their media calling for pretty much stating the reasons why that would be justified. So I think, yeah, those are some things we should look out for. Okay, last question for both of you. And I'm going to have to ask you to give me a brief answer. We've gone a little bit over time already. Over the next six months, what concrete events would tell you whether North Korea-Venezuela ties are persisting or fading or a...

being rebuilt under new terms. Camillo? Yeah, and look at the embassies. What will happen if Venezuela just, you know, withdraws its presence from North Korea, vice versa. I think that that will signal the future of this bilateral relation. Right. Okay. And Gabriela? Yes, beyond the embassies, also, I think, who's in power in Venezuela? So is it still Delci Rodriguez? Is it somebody else? Is it someone from the opposition. Is it a vacuum? Is the U.S. just running everything?

So that will be very. And is the U.S. still there? Because right now the U.S. is there, but will it be able to maintain its presence there in the medium to long term? That will be, that we don't know that yet. So, yeah. Great. Thank you very much, Dr. and Doctor, for coming on the podcast today.

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