North Korea News Podcast by NK News - Why North Korea has embraced sustainable development – Ep. 340

Episode Date: May 1, 2024

North Korean trade with its top economic partner China rebounded in March to nearly $160 million, in the latest sign of strength in bilateral exchange. NK News Data Correspondent Anton Sokolin joins the podcast to discuss what we can learn from China’s officials trade data, as well as Moscow’s plan to send some 40 zoo […]

Thank you. Hosts Jongmin Kim and John Lee dissect topics from diplomacy to technology, ensuring you're always informed. Our episodes are a must for professionals in and out of Seoul. Subscribe on your preferred platform and elevate your understanding of Korean affairs. Korea Pro Podcast, where clarity meets depth. Hello listeners and welcome to the NK News Podcast. My name is Jack O's Wetsuit. I'm the host of this here show and today it is Tuesday the 30th of April 2024 and I'm joined in the studio by Anton Sokolin, one of our best reporters here at NK News. Welcome back on the show, Anton. Hi Jacko, thank you very much for inviting. I'm not sure about the best, but thank you. I'm not sure about the best, but thank you. Okay, so we're going to talk about a few of the more recent stories today.

Let's start off with North Korea-China trade. Where are things at the moment? Are they back to pre-pandemic levels? Are they growing? Are they shrinking? What's happening? Well, look, actually, I wanted to talk to you about today's Chinese trade data in general. So when we discuss it, of course, we want to follow certain trends, whether it goes down, whether it goes up, whether it recovers. And it's a rightful question. But at the same time, what I wanted to bring up is

the fact that how we actually analyze this data. Well, given the absence of many sources, we have to go to the Chinese Customs Administration that provides this data. Luckily, they are the only source available right now that shows this data. For example, Russia stopped publishing it. And in the absence of other sources, that becomes basically treasure. It's gold. Hang on. So for China cross-border trade statistics, are they measuring overland trade or also trade by ship or trade by air?

Is that everything? I think everything is included because it doesn't specifically say what's what. But we should assume that it's pretty much everything. At the same time, of course, it doesn't account illicit trades. So obviously supplies of coal that fall under UN sanctions. From North Korea to China? From North Korea to China. And, for example, certain oil shipments that, of course, transshipments from China that take place illicitly, because we need to separate. There is also illicit legal shipments of oil that China needs to report to the UN 1718 Committee. And then, of course, it is counted as legitimate trade. But also, of course, we have illicit trade that also takes place. Now, it's the same oil, but the

difference is because under sanctions, there's a cap, right? There's a maximum which North Korea can receive in one year from China or any country. Absolutely, absolutely. So the cap is at 500 barrels of oil, refined oil, petroleum, refined petroleum. Let's call it precisely. Per? Per year. 500 barrels per year? Yeah, per year.

500,000. 500,000. 500,000 barrels. Half a million. Okay. 500,000. 500,000. 500,000. There you go.

500,000 barrels. Half a million. So it's not that bad, but of course it severely limits North Korea's oil capacity, right? And some of that oil may be used for missiles. Well, of course, whatever fuel you've got in the country must be used for military purposes. Obviously, the military use it. And yeah, getting back to it. So whenever we look at this, of course, we try to find some

maybe prohibited items traded. We try to find some vital items. For example, recently, we've seen a lot of construction projects going on around Pyongyang, right? Like, for example, the Hwaseon district, all these high-rises, beautiful buildings. And of course, we see the reflection of this trend in trade data. For example, we look at it and we see that North Korea has been importing lots of floor tiles, for example, floor coverings, all kinds of chemicals that are needed for construction, bricks, cement even. Where does North Korea get its cement from?

Does it not make cement domestically? I suppose, of course, they have the capacity to produce it domestically. But, of course, it's nice to have something on top, you know, nice bonus. And by looking at these things, for example, like tobacco imports, MSG, you know, famous food additive. Of course, it's one of the key items that North Korea imports from it. And it helps basically the North Korean population to, you know, diversify their food. At the same time, we're seeing that North Korea relies less and less on, for example, rice imports from China. And as experts say, it might be related to the fact that Russia stepped in and started providing wheat shipments to North Korea. And wheat basically just replaced rice deliveries.

Okay, but I imagine in the North Korean population, wheat is not a favored cereal grain, right? They prefer rice when they can get it. Well, it is true. But wheat is extremely important, especially wheat flour. And they have been importing it a lot from China. And also, they have been getting wheat shipments of raw, just literally grain from Russia. And of course, it's one of the key staples that basically help the North Korean government sustain its population and sustain the livelihood of the people. Right. Okay. All right. So that being said, then, now, what are the trends that we've noticed lately? We are also noticing that, for example, compared to the previous year, I've seen a number of illicit goods that China openly shipped to North Korea because…

Why openly and illicit? Yeah, well, because these items, they PRK sanctions regime is very arbitrary and sometimes countries choose whatever they are going to abide with and whatever they are not going to follow through with. And in this case, when we see such shipments, for example, like tractors or some machinery or some turbines or maybe some pumps, and there was even once a nuclear pump needed for some nuclear engineering machine. And it was very interesting to see it because it could be used for dual purposes. So, for example, it could be used for something else. It could be used in civil industries, and it could be also used for military purposes. And when we see these items, it also sort of indicates what North Korean regime is interested in, providing this glimpse. But at the same time, we are seeing that China has become more careful about openly publishing these sort of items.

And for example, when we saw a huge uptick last year, now we are seeing that actually the trend is going down. They are not basically posting those items that could be considered illegal. But last month we saw that a few items that are like digital cameras, computers, and even scales like weighing machines were included in the statistics. And technically they all fall under the category of machinery that is sort of subject to UN sanctions. But I also can see where Chinese come from and they're saying, probably their thinking is that these items are harmless, right? So why not to ship it to North Korea? Well, just to pick on one example,

it's hard to see why a tractor should be forbidden under sanctions. As any vehicles, basically all kinds of vehicles are prohibited. A 17-wheel transporter erector launcher, maybe I could see why that would be a problem, but a tractor maybe less so. You raised a very interesting point and very important one, that indeed when the sanctions were first introduced, they encompassed categories of items, right? They didn't specify specific goods like a tractor or a car or a transport electric launcher. No, they just have very broad categories of vehicles. And everything that falls under it basically is subject to sanctions, which is, of course, wrong because obviously we can find such quote-unquote illicit items

like shovels on the list as well. And a few years ago, there was the famous case of the nail clippers that couldn't be imported. Exactly, exactly. Because they're made of metal. Metal, metal work. All right. Now, what are you expecting to see for the rest of the year in terms of China-North Korea trade? I'm seeing a rebound.

It basically follows this wave pattern. I'm seeing a rebound. It basically follows this wave pattern. So a bit of a weak start at the start of the year. Maybe there is a little bit of a slump. I think my theory is that because they had huge stocks of goods stocked up closer to the end of the year, and that's why they didn't need to import much at the start of the year. And I see a slight rebound in trade this

month. And I'm thinking that there is a good chance that actually this year, this trade with China is going to recover to its pre-pandemic heights, which sort of approached last year, but stayed shy of it, let's say. And yeah, the trend is pretty strong. So I only hope that it gets better because obviously no one is wishing anything bad to North Korea. Yeah, yeah, yeah. Wow. Okay. All right. Let's move on to the next story then. North Korean delegations to Russia. Right. Apart from China, who is one of the biggest and most important neighbors of North Korea, Russia also plays a huge role.

And especially since the last year, we are seeing a lot of exchanges, we are seeing a lot of delegations, we are seeing a lot of military cooperation. And for this past year, I think media have been focusing a lot on specifically this military domain, which I think is important, of course, but at the same time, it's not the whole picture. And recently, we're seeing lots of humanitarian, let's say, exchanges. For example, North Korean delegations visiting Russia and attending meetings with the Russian Minister of Education, dispatching their agricultural delegations, dispatching their health ministry delegations. And what does it tell us about North Korean exchanges with Russia? Is that North Korea is extremely interested in absorbing and applying Russia's experience in many different fields. For example, North Korea is very interested in sending its students to

study in Russia because it's affordable, good quality education. Russia provides it and Russia can accommodate meager amounts like a few hundred students from North Korea. It's not a big deal. Russian dormitories can accommodate that. Plus, they are very interested in the medical field. For me, it's very interesting because the areas of interest are actually quite diverse. For example, they're interested in orthopedics. So it's like, you know know microsurgeries related to feet and

joints and everything and i think it could be related to the fact that in north korea it's unconfirmed but that's what i heard from other people is that doctors on lower levels are not really capable of treating these for example broken arms and joints very efficiently maybe when you say at the lower levels you mean what doctors in provincial, for example, broken arms and joints very efficiently. When you say at the lower levels, you mean what doctors in provincial clinics, for example. Yes, exactly. So maybe they do have this expertise in Pyongyang because it's the capital of the country, of course. But to make it more accessible for everyone, of course, it's better to get some foreign maybe experience and it could be very helpful.

The other area is oncology, for example. So cancer treatment is becoming very interesting and they're paying a lot of attention to it. For example, this last visit of the North Korean Minister of Health to Moscow, they visited multiple centers that treat it and they were very interested, apparently, in learning Russian know-how.

Another area would be... But it's hard to treat cancer without lots of drugs and chemicals, and North Korea doesn't have access to those. So I suppose that's where Russia steps in and can provide its expertise on it. Because another, that's what I actually wanted to mention, another area of their interest is pharmaceuticals. And that could be tied to the oncology treatment procedures. So that combined

with their interest in reproduction. So for example, genome sequencing, and family planning and reproduction. The delegation also visited a couple of centers in Russia that deal specifically with that problem. I'm not sure whether they're going to clone Kim Jong-un or... It's a joke. I'm not sure whether they're going to clone Kim Jong-un or... Wow. It's a joke. For now, yeah. Now, we know that Kim Jong-un on the... When he gave a talk to the Mothers' Federation or the Women's Federation a few months ago,

he was very upset about the low birth rate in North Korea. What's the birth rate like in Russia? Do you have any idea? And is that something that they talked about when the Ministry of Health was in Russia? I don't think it was mentioned. From the top of my head, I think the Russian birth rate is something like 1.6. So it's also below replacement. It's below.

The Russian economy is also growing, and with it, the birth rate is going down, despite the Russian government's attempts to actually boost the fertility. But, well, we are seeing that it's going down. It's pretty much the fate all the countries have to face at some point. Right, right. But as far as you know, that was not a major topic of discussion with the North Koreans, was it? No, no, no.

But at the same time, yeah, we outlined several areas. They're pretty interesting, and it shows that North Korea wants to learn a lot from Russia. Now, what about Russian animals in Pyongyang? Oh, yes. Another area of exchanges. It's very interesting, because when we talk about North Korea, it's always military. It's always about this, you know, high political talks and strong statements. But at the same time, we're also seeing this sort of humanitarian exchanges. For example, Moscow Zoo delegation. So Moscow Zoo, what is it? It's one of the biggest zoos in Europe that hosts multiple, many animals.

And it plays a very important part, I think, in the life of the Russian capital. And Moscow Zoo delegation recently visited Pyongyang. And it was interesting to see this news because the Russian embassy that first announced the visit said that the delegation handed over multiple, over 40 animals to the central zoo in Pyongyang. And it sounded pretty cool. But in reality, it turned out that they provided certificates for these animals. Certificates? Saying that they are gift certificates, let's call it that way.

Okay, so you can hand this certificate in in exchange for a fish or an otter or a mammal or something. I suppose this certificate states that the Moscow Zoo wants to hand over certain animals in the future. We don't know when the transfer is going to happen, whether it didn't happen for sure yet. And we don't know when actually the Russian animals will travel to Pyongyang. And it will be interesting to see. And also, what kind of animals did they want to provide? It's eagles.

Have you ever heard of a fruit bat? Yeah, sure. We have a lot of them in Australia. Nice, of course. So fruit bats and Yeah, sure. We have a lot of them in Australia. Nice, of course. So fruit bats and pythons. So relatively small species, right? It's not like amur tigers or something, anything like that. Not bears or not elephants, clearly. And when I talked to one expert about this situation, why such small animals? Well, of course, it's a speculation, right? We only can

speculate at this point. But the point was raised that North Korea might not be in the position to actually care for the animals very well. And that aligns very well with previous reports about cases of mistreatment of animals at the center of the zoo of Pyongyang. Yeah, yeah, yeah. Well, exactly. I mean, that's one thing that zoos in many developed countries have had to deal with in the last 20 years is the old way of sticking in a large animal in a small cage and letting people look at it is considered passé now. And so zoos are more interested in creating an environment that is comfortable for the animals. And maybe that's not yet the level at which the Pyongyang Central Zoo is at. Absolutely.

Of course, it's a point of concern, right? I'm actually a strong opponent of zoos at all. I do not like to see animals in cages. I think it's outrageous by any standards, and humanity should be past that point. But, of course, like you said, maybe if we create a slightly better environment to accommodate animals, it can help them.

I'm not sure the North Koreans are capable of doing it yet, especially considering those reports when they had a chain-smoking chimpanzee and their zoo smoking in front of the visitors just for the sake of their entertainment. I think it's a bit inhumane, you know. Right, right. Okay, well, let's see what Russia ends up giving in exchange for these certificates.

Now, the last story for a couple of minutes, we have a little time to talk about a Reuters exclusive, about a ship involved in smuggling weapons from North Korea to Russia. That's a constant scene that we've been talking about here on the NK News podcast for some time. So what's the latest? And now we're back to the military domain of Russia-Tiburkey relations. We can't escape it.

We can't. Practically speaking, when my colleague Colin Zvirko and I started investigating these transshipments, we clearly established that there were four ships, the Angara, the Lady R, the Maya 1 and the Maria, that moved certain goods that are alleged to be, of course, arms transfers from the port of Rasson in North Korea to several ports in Russia, in the Russian Far East to be precise. So these four ships, are they believed to be Russian ships or are they traveling under some other kind of Russian? They are all Russian ships. They are all Russia flagged. Oh, okay. And they belong to companies located in Russia. Okay. That's pretty

clear. That's pretty clear. Everything is trackable at this point. But the thing is, when we started investigating, we also started closely following them, right? So sometimes they make minor detours and you see that it probably is nothing. Sometimes you see that certain, tours and you see that it probably is nothing. Sometimes you see that certain, let's say, ports or locations ring certain bells and alarms and you need to take a closer look. And what we have seen is that this particular ship, the Angara, that was first flagged by the US government as the first ship that was involved in this, probably underwent certain maintenance in a Chinese port. And why is it important? Because when the ship is sanctioned by the US, and it's sanctioned by the US,

and it visits a foreign port, basically it's a signal to the country's authorities to take measures, at least to react in a certain way. And, of course, it also can inflict certain reputational damages for other companies cooperating with the port and or the receiving company, for example, operating the dock where the ship was moored. And at this time, we didn't see any reaction from China. We didn't see anything.

But we clearly knew that this ship went there, stayed there, underwent certain maintenance. And we even talked with the shipyard where it was accommodated. And all of this several months before Reuters publishes this exclusive saying, wow, they know the location of the Angara. Well, NK News has been on it for very long. It's not new. We have mentioned this shipyard many times in our stories and when it came out

it kind of puzzled many of us at nk news what was this all about right so reuters if you're listening uh you're following the lead of nk news a few months behind yep that's true wow okay and where's that ship believed to be now huh all right well right. Well, you want me to spill my guts and provide some hints to my frenemies? All right, I'm ready to say. Only if you want to. Let's keep a close eye on the movements of the ship. If you know how to use vessel tracking services,

and I'm sure many people are capable of that, you will see where it is right now. Okay, but this ship, the Angara, many people are capable of that. You will see where it is right now. Okay. But this ship, the Angara, is one of four ships that are believed to have been moving some kind of weaponry or armaments from North Korea to Russia

for its war on Ukraine. That's correct. That's correct. Okay. All right. Well, something to keep an eye on. Thank you very much, Anton Sokolin, for coming on the NK News podcast today.

Thank you, Jacko. Have a good day. You too. Explore the unofficial world of DPRK-inspired apparel at NK News Shop. Dive into a captivating collection of North Korea-themed T-shirts, hoodies and more at the NK News Shop. Collection of North Korea-themed t-shirts, hoodies and more at the NK News shop. From the popular Daedonggang beer t-shirts to the adventurous Air Koryo designs, each piece offers a unique glimpse into aspects of the DPRK you'll be familiar with. Featuring retro travel-inspired prints of Pyongyang's landmarks and brands, our apparel

is 100% handcrafted in the USA. Support independent journalism with every purchase. Explore our range today at shop.nknews.org. That's shop.nknews.org. This interview was recorded using StreamYard on Friday, April 12th, 2024. And today I'll be talking with Dr. Sojin Lim at the University of Central Lancashire about North Korea and sustainable development, as well as memory politics in North Korea. and also the leader of the MA in North Korean Studies course and co-director of the International Institute of Korean Studies at the University of Central Lancashire School of Psychology and Humanities. That's quite a mouthful. You can find her on Twitter at Fugabach, F-U-G-A-B-A-C-H. We'll put a link to that in the show notes. Welcome on the show, Dr. Lim.

Hello. Hi. It's great to see you. and thank you very much for inviting me this morning, well morning here in the UK. Morning your time, that's right, it's almost the end of the week in Seoul. Now looking at your list of publications, which is very, very long, it's very impressive, you have certainly been quite prolific in recent years. In fact, I dare say that you have written more chapters, more books, more academic papers about Korea than I have read in the last decade. So congratulations on your prodigious output. Thank you. Thanks. Now, I know that not all of your research interests intersect with North Korea, but since this podcast is all about North Korea, I wonder if you could summarize your research interests that do intersect with North

Korea. So if I begin with my academic background, I did my PhD in development studies. And that's why most of my research tend to focus on the development area rather than nuclear program or international relations, because most of things we talk about North Korea is you know in that area so my research is kind of a little bit different from most of the academics in the field but at the same time I believe that that is where we really needed to also consider because at the end of the day, you know, the country itself is where the people, ordinary people live. And they also think about their own life development and economic development, political development. It's just unfortunate that they are under this strong regime, which

doesn't allow us to communicate with each other. But once things become better, then at least someone needs to be prepared. So that's why I began to focus my research on North Korea in that area. And many of my PhD students are also working on that aspect. So that's immersive. So they come from a development studies background. Yes. So that's what it is. So I want to start then with a recent book

and also a book chapter that you co-wrote. So the book is International Aid and Sustainable Development in North Korea, a Country Left Behind with Cloaked Society. You wrote this book by yourself and published it last year with Rutledge. And then there's a chapter that you contributed

to another book called Comprehensive Peacebuilding on the Korean Peninsula. And this chapter is called Compliance with Global Norms, a Case Study of North Korea and the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals. And you co-wrote this chapter with two PhD students at the University of Central Lancashire. But they're all about the same topic that both the book and the book chapter. So what's the central thesis of your book? So my book is again in the same line with what I've just talked about. And if you are familiar with UN Sustainable Development Goals, currently we are in the regime so-called sustainable development. So it started from 2016 and the all country, the UN member countries are supposed to implement it until the end of 2030. And the very core value of this so called SDGs is that leaving no one behind. And then my argument is that people in North Korea, they are apparently left behind under this current

UN SDGs because of the UN sanctions. So that is quite contradicting. You know, UN itself imposing the sanctions on this country, but then on the other hand, they are saying that we should not leave anybody behind. So that's really contradicting. And that really occurred to me to think about how then we can work for the ordinary people, not the regime, not Kim's family, but the ordinary people in North Korea who have been left behind. So that was all about the book. Okay, but somebody who is in favor of the United Nations sanctions regime on North Korea would probably argue at this point that the problem is not the United Nations sanctions that caused the North Korean people to be left behind, but rather the choices of the government in Pyongyang that prioritize things like

security, so weapons development, surveillance satellites, and things like that, rather than development of the economy and agriculture, which would help the ordinary people. So is it really fair to say that it's the United Nations sanctions that caused North Korea to fail in its achievement of the UN's sustainable development goals? That is one thing I really thought about for quite a long time before I began to write this book, because I know that some people would point out that maybe I'm too naive. Because having said that the sanctions are not effective in the case of North Korea could sound really naive, because I don't then consider about the security pillar. But if you think about that, when you impose sanctions internationally, the main purpose of the sanctions is the behavior change of the target country or the target person. But we had this sanction on

North Korea for a long period of time. But we have no evidence that Kim family has even shown any evidence to change their behavior. Denuclearization would not be the case. Nuclear weapon is the only bargaining chip for North Korean regime at the moment. And underneath of that, if we are targeting countries like Russia, for example, Russia has a loss of multiple trade partners. Then if we cut their trade partners by the sanctions, then Russia may suffer. But for North Korea, the trade partners, as we know that only China or nowadays the Russia and some of the African countries maybe and some of the Southeast Asian countries. But because of that for North Korea, sanctions do not bring lots of changes for the country. It still sees the way to go around. And also, especially

the countries like China and Russia, they violate the sanctions anyway. They do not cooperate with UN sanctions regime. And because of that for North Korea, the sanction itself is not really functioning in a way that the main purpose it was supposed to be. For countries where we see that the sanctions have been successful, there can be the cases like the trade partners, you know, they could not benefit from them, then they had to change their behavior. But we don't see many of the cases have been successful in terms of the international sanctions. And especially the sanctions regime clearly mentions that it should not affect badly for the ordinary people, ordinary citizens. But in the case of North Korea, because

of the so-called rogue regime, the bad regime, the people are suffering. So my thoughts goes that then what can we do? And I just looked at in history, when we provided aid, international aid to North Korea, even though that was only part of the humanitarian aid during the Arduous March in 1990s and early 20s, there has been some anecdotal evidence from the UN or the international organizations, people who actually went into North Korea, saying that they could meet people. And even though there were still these bureaucrats around, they could communicate with people at the bottom line, in the grassroots. And from my point of view, that may be the way how

we can bring changes. So that's how all began. And in terms of the sanctions, the case of North Korea, I really don't think that would be the efficient way to impose. If we really want to keep the sanctions because of the security reasons, then we really need to think about that in a slightly different angle, because we've been there for a long enough time, and I really see that this is dead end. Okay, let me jump in there and ask about, given that a lot of people at the bottom rungs of society are not doing well, they're doing poorly, they're suffering in North Korea, how interested is the North Korean government in the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals?

Do you see a high degree of interest or willingness from the North Korean government to pursue these goals? So that is the part of the book chapter you mentioned. It is not clear that whether North Korea really genuinely want to implement that. And it's more towards in a way that North Korea use these UN SDGs as a keyword for them to bring international aid. And normally it's not only applying to North Korean case. When you work with the so-called recipient government with UN people, when they produce required documents, normally UN staff members tend to write the documents along with the government officers in that country. By doing that, we do so-called capacity development. So because these people in certain countries, they don't know what are the vocabularies that UN use and what should be there in terms of the accountability. They don't understand what should be the accountability,

what would be the monitoring and evaluation process. So by writing these kind of required documents together between international organisations, staff members and the government members in the recipient countries, they can build up the capacity so that they at least understand what is important because this, at the end of the day aid is a taxpayer's money so both sides needs to be really responsible and accountable so that is the beginning point and north korea was not different north korea was also working with

the undp and also the uanscap staff members when they wrote the so-called voluntary national report to the UN or the SDG implementation. So at least they know that what are the keywords and then how the international level, the so-called civil society work together. But the problem they're bringing is that it just stays there. It doesn't go down to the end beneficiaries. So that is the problem where I wanted to address throughout my research. You mentioned just now voluntary national reports, VNRs. What are voluntary national reports? So the voluntary national reviews, the VNR, is that the countries, the member countries of the UN, they are supposed to voluntarily submit their national reviews of the implementation status of the UN, they are supposed to voluntarily submit their national reviews

of the implementation status of the UN SDGs. Interestingly, the United States has not submitted any yet, especially under the Trump presidency, the administration, as we know that he withdrew from the Paris Declaration and all these kinds of international agreements. So it was not quite surprising to see that the US did not submit that, but North Korea submitted it. So that's one thing I thought, hmm, that's really interesting. And Colombia, a recipient country, submitted for like five times already.

So those are really voluntary. And there can be the peer pressure from the other member states, but there's no legal ground that you should submit that review report. It's not like that, but then North Korea did. But by looking at the VNR of North Korea, interestingly, North Korea tried to synchronize how their ideology, socialism, socialist approach can fit into this UN mechanism. So that was one way the North Korean regime tried to convince that they are the legitimate regime. So that was also another interesting finding from my side to look at. And it was also quite surprising for me to look at that the UN let that

been published in that way, because, you know, people who don't know about the regime that much simply thought that, oh, this country, the socialist approach and digitism could be really good because it goes along with the SDGs. So those kind of purposes also were embedded when North Korean government published the VNR. It seems a little bit ironic that North Korea is a country under international sanctions, but yet it is complying with certain international norms, such as these voluntary national reviews related to the UN Sustainable Development Goals, even while at the same time it's trying to breach and ignore other sets of international norms such as universal human rights accords or non-proliferation treaties? That's always a question and I also have lots of questions, similar questions from my students as well.

Why? Why they are doing this? Is it their real intention, right? As I said, you know, when you see, you can see that there's an international level, there's a national level, there is a gap in between when they implement something. And at the international level, North Korea looks like wants to be a part of the international society. It does not want to be like isolated entirely. And also the existence is very important for the Kim regime. That's why Kim Jong-un always tries to have these talks with Trump as well, not only about the sanctions lift, but also that was another way they play in these international relations. I'm not an expert in international relations, so maybe I am not fully right when I analyze how North Korean government tries to achieve at the international level what they want to achieve but at least in the international development field the way how I see is that anyhow North Korea can't be isolated forever and that it whatever happens whatever is happening inside of North Korea at the moment North Korea will need to be prepared for opening up at least something in the future

like they can bring the tourist game back to the country, or they can have this, even though it's illegal, they can increase their trade with China, because the Russia and Ukraine war will not exist forever. So North Korea needs to find another route, right? In that sense, also the international aid could be the way, but if you think about that, what happened when Kim Jong Il was there, North Korea initially received humanitarian aid, which means medical and food aid mostly during the Elders March. But then at some point, Kim Jong Il asked for the development aid, which means now you need to bring other aid aspects into the country for the economic

development. But then we all know that that could be country for the economic development. But then we all know that that could be utilized for the nuclear development program. So that's why I couldn't happen in that way. But once we think in a slightly different way that, for example, we can try lifting sanctions partially and have a very full monitoring mechanism, because there was the negotiation almost successful in the past in between North Korean government and the UN body that the North Korea let UN officials to have the monitoring of their aid.

That if that could happen in that way, then we may can bring some differences there. But because of this old political and international relations dynamics around the peninsula, that negotiation didn't go any further. And that was a shame from my point of view. But I still believe that there could be the way to have more engagement, because engagement should be the key there. It's not like, you know, isolating and just punishing a country. But we need to think about how we can engage the country more so that people can have more contact from outside of the world and then they can learn by themselves. So that's how I want to see from this discourse. In your book title, you link international aid with sustainable development and also with this concept of a cloaked society.

Why did you link those three concepts together so as you said you know when we when we see no not not many of us are academics so we don't know about theories we don't really know about what really theories say it's more about people are interested in North Korea Kim Jong-un or you know the Trump Kim Jong Un love letter kind of thing. And whenever I see, I meet people, for example, you know, if I'm on a taxi from the airport and the taxi driver learns that I'm from South Korea and then he knows a lot more about Kim Jong Un than the South Korean president, right? So they know about Kim Jong Un and they know that this nuke person, but they don't know

about the people actually in North korea some of the people know about the north korean life throughout the defectors voice but the defectors as some of us already very well know that the defectors who came out from the country in 1990s their first generation they came out of the country because of hunger but then the recent defection, the trend shows that they are defecting because they are not satisfied. Some of them were political elites. Some of them, I call them economic elites, like Don Ju, we all know. They had certain status in society and the bribery works really well, but then all of a sudden they couldn't have what they used to have anymore. So rather than they fight for that, they decided to come out.

And as you know, we have this 70-70 rule. 70% of defectors are women and 70% of defectors are from the borderlines. That told me that, what do we know about them? told me that, what do we know about them? Those people are not in the borderline, in the inland, and people who are in the military or not the elites, no, the people who are in prison camps, not those who's been there in and out, but really was kept there because of their 성분, from the beginning of their life, they had to be lived in small contained place forever, or in mines. What do we know about that? Honestly, I don't know about that. And I looked through the books and articles which used defectors testimonials. Here defectors, I just simply say defectors. But you know, I know that some people say refugees or migrants. I don't want to go beyond that. But I just simply call them defectors, I just simply say defectors. But I know that some people say refugees or migrants. I don't want to go beyond that, but I just simply call them all defectors. And one of the common

things that defectors themselves, they don't know about the other places, apart from where they used to live, because the mobility is very limited in North Korea. And because of that, for me, the society really looked like clogged by this image of defectors and image of the country, the regime. And we really don't know what would it be really like in other places apart from the border lines. And that's why I shaped the majority of the bottom line of the Songbun is cloaked by the bureaucrats, the donju, the middle-income classes, and political elites and economic elites. They are the ones who we tend to meet outside of North Korea. But the

real people, not real people, the people who are not outside of North Korea, we haven't had a chance to meet them. And whenever we go to North Korea as a tourist, well, as a South Korean, I haven't had the chance to go there. But some of my so-called foreign friends, they tend to have their own routes where they can visit. And from the international aid workers where they visited places where the tourists don't go. And what they tell me and what tourists tell me, the storylines are quite different. And that also tells me that we really don't know certain parts of North Korea. So that's how I came up with the cloaked society image. Now, in your book, you present a case that the international aid to North Korea could actually provide social change. Can you say

a little bit more about that? Right. So from my point of view, now many of North Koreans, we can't tell whether that's a majority population or not, but at least those in borderlines and the young generation in Pyongyang, they have access to the South Korean dramas, South Korean movies, South Korean songs.

They know that they have a different world. And that could be the threat for the Kim Jong-un, right? This information influx and the cultural influx is there. But what people don't know is that, okay, there are different worlds there. And I know that what my government tells me is not quite correct. But they never think that I can bring the changes. They don't know what the collective action could bring for their lives. They tend to more or less keep their privileges or they tend to defect. So they try to see the outside of the world. But they don't know that they can bring social changes. The social movement would not be there in North Korea. I keep asking myself whether

we're going to have like something like Arab Spring in North Korea. I really don't see that because North Koreans, either the elites who are supposed to lead these kind of movements in history, they tend to think that, am I going to lose my privileges then? Am I going to still have this status? Am I going to have a good changes or are we going to be destroyed on the other hand? So they're not going to do that. And the ordinary people, they don't know that they can work together and then bring the changes. The only way for me in this case would be the international aid, because if I see the case of the Eastern Bloc, after the Soviet collapse, the so-called Western international aid went into the so-called Eastern European countries.

The civil society concept and how you can work accountably, how you can bring changes in your society by yourselves, all these kinds of concepts were shared in between aid workers and the recipient side. So that's how they learned and then they worked together. So this human to human, people to people engagement could really bring changes from the bottom, from the grassroots. So that's how I thought that if we can bring international aid into North Korea again, now I don't know whether Kim Jong-un wants to receive it or not, because I don't think he's stupid enough to not know that this would happen. But at least if we are lucky enough, then if we bring the international aid and if aid workers can go deep into the grassroots level and then really can communicate with people, then people

can be enlightened in a way. Then slowly, it will be really slow, but gradually we will be able to see the changes. Do you see North Korea as a fragile state or a strong and confident one? That is one thing I still argue always with my colleagues. I define North Korea as a fragile state because of the state dysfunctionality. North Korea as a fragile state because of the state dysfunctionality. North Korea is a strong regime, but as a state, it doesn't function for the people.

That's why I call it fragile. Here, the fragile does not mean that, you know, that's vulnerable or the country will collapse next day, tomorrow, something like that. The concept of fragility is about the state function, whether the state functions for its people or not. North Korea's case is clearly not. North Korea has a very strong regime, but we need to think the regime and the state differently in this case. Because of this strong regime image, the North Korean people are being left behind. And because of that, when we approach the fragile state in international

development discourse, when we provide aid, we think about these country situation, you know, one size does not fill all the cases. So because of that, I try to shape North Korea as a fragile state. So they try to come up with a customized approach, which can work better in the case of North Korea, because that's a unique case. It's not like ordinary case like other developing countries. It needs to come up with something alternative than usual, so that we can address what is the cause of the reason that this country should be locked like this and they have to focus on the nuclear only, then we need to think about from there in a slightly different

way. Now, in your conclusion to your book, you link all of this back to North Korean human rights advocacy. What do you conclude about North Korean human rights activism? What are activists getting wrong and what are they getting right? I don't want to blame or criticize human rights activists in regards to North Korea because I know that they work really hard. But one thing I think is always missing there is that there needs to be clear understanding whether they are working for North Koreans inside of North Korea or whether they are working for the defectors outside of North Korea.

That's really not clear to me. So when you say the human rights advocacy groups for North Korea, most of them, they work with North Korean defectors. But they can't actually deliver what is really going on inside of North Korea. actually deliver what is really going on inside of North Korea. And as I said, the defectors themselves, they don't know about the other regions, unless they used to do the trade like vendors, you know, they had a little chances to go beyond their hometown. But they for me, that the human rights activists really need to focus on the North Koreans inside of North Korea. And if you think about that,

you can't insist that we should keep the sanctions because then we don't have any access inside. If you think about the humanitarian UN report, North Korea has been not included for now about two years already, because there's no data at all. We don't have embassies there anymore. You know, we don't know what really is going on. We just know that there are prisons. But those kinds of things, if you think about that, like, people do not have mobility.

Why we don't think that people do not have mobility? What we need to do? When you think about the human rights, you need to think about that. And just little things. My current research, if I can mention, is about the period of poverty in North Korea. The women, you know, the women in North Korea, apart from Pyongyang or the border lines, you know, they don't have sanitary pads and they still use the cloth. But because you don't have a clean water access, you can't wash clothes well. And, you know, that's really hygienic way.

It's really not hygiene. And it's not really good for your health and well-being. And every month, most of all of the women go through this cycle, but then they can't have their sick leave. It should be tabooed. And also in the middle and high school time, you know, if you don't have the sanitary pads or if you don't have enough clothes to wash them, you show your blood comes out of your clothes and the boys make fun of that.

Mentally, that's also very much traumatized in a way. And then you tend to become really like a shy person in your adulthood. This is also part of the human rights. But we don't think about that kind of things that much. This is also part of the human rights, but we don't think about that kind of things that much. In terms of the pregnancy, in terms of the sexual violence, domestic violence, we don't talk about those kind of issues that much, but tend to focus more on the bigger topics. So that's why I think the human rights really needs to go all the aspects. And that's why I try to address from this angle that we can think differently. If you had five minutes to talk to Kim Jong-un in a neutral space about how to improve things in his country, what advice would you give him? That's tough. I think from what I observed and heard from the people who actually met Kim Jong-un or the former ambassadors who been to in North Korea, Kim Jong-un can be very smart and reasonable, rational person.

If that is the case, if that is really the case, I don't think that Kim Jong-un would lose his power, his privileges, privilege in his government. But then I don't think that he wants to be the poor government leader either, if that is the case. And if you really think that a nuclear program is the only solution for him, I would like to say that it's not. He can open up the borders and he can try the economic development like Vietnam, for example. Vietnam still has, and also China, there are ways he can try and if it doesn't work, maybe he can go back. But at least he can try. He's a very still young leader and why not trying and his children are still

very young and if he wants to give a better future for his people, then he may want to have some take some challenges and try to be brave and try some other ways and be like a normal country rather than just categorized as like a rogue regime. Yeah, so I wonder if there are any easy economic solutions to North Korea's economy that would not require any deep systemic changes. And it sounds like you're saying that Kim Jong-un should simply open the border with China and allow more trade, international trade, more basically market forces, supply and demand, selling and reselling. Is that basically what you're arguing for? No, that's not. So the already the PDS system is, well, it's already collapsed. And you know, North Korea does not have centrally planned system anymore. It's not socialist economy at all.

It already adopted a capitalist economy. And if that is the case, why not trying to open up the trade partners, open up the trade to the multiple partners rather than just rely on China? Kim Jong-un do not want to rely on one source of trade partner. And Russia and China, they are the only ones at the moment. And some of the countries in Africa, maybe. But if Kim Jong-un wants to do that, no, he can see the case of Vietnam. Vietnam is like almost now a fast growing economy. And we expect that Vietnam would be really the next generation of the newly industrialized country.

It could be in that sense. And North Korea also has Korean people, labor, everything like Vietnam. So I believe that that would be the one way. But yeah, I don't, to be honest, I don't expect that Kim Jong-un to take that route, of course. Okay, now we have about a little bit more than 10 minutes left. So I want to finish up by talking about your 2022 paper in the Journal of Peace and Unification, entitled Struggle on Demand, Shaping Contemporary North Korea's Public Sphere Through Memory Politics. Now, this is a paper

about how the North Korean government controls its society. So first of all, what do you mean by struggle? And what is the significance of struggle in North Korea's societal control? So Kim Jong-un, so that paper came out at the 10th year anniversary of Kim Jong-un's leadership. And we tried to see how his control or his style of the information control has changed or not. And at the beginning, he tried to follow his father or grandfather, and then we also saw that he being on this white horse on the back mountain or these things, the image of his grandfather. So this memory politics looked like it worked for him at the beginning because Kim Jong-un didn't have relatively longer period of time to be

exposed to the public members. When Kim Jong Il became the leader, Kim Il Sung made Kim Jong Il to be exposed to the media for a long period of time, but Kim Jong Il died all of a sudden and Kim Jong Un couldn't benefit from that kind of preparation process because Kim Jong Un was not exposed to the media that long period of time. So Kim Jong-un had, as we know, that the power struggle as well. Also, Kim Jong-un had the struggle in society because people would really need to see Kim Jong-un as a leader. And the image-making in a propaganda process

that Kim Jong-un looks more like Kim Il-sung, the founder of North Korea, really worked well at the beginning. So that's why we call it as a memory politics. But now... And tell us a little bit more about what memory politics are, because that concept might not be familiar to our listeners who are perhaps not familiar with the academic term. So if I can try to put it simpler, Kim Jong-un tries to re-image himself, which looks like his grandfather, Kim Il-sung. And people, especially the old generation, they tend to think that Kim Il-sung

was a really good leader. So by making himself look like Kim Il-sung, he used this memory of the people's mind, in the people's mind, that he looked like reflecting the image of Kim Il-sung, his grandfather. So this is what we call memory politics in a simple term. So he's wearing this leather jacket and then riding a white horse and focusing on this Baekdu bloodline. All of these are part of the memory politics, which makes Kim Jong-un looks like his grandfather. So people who had still memory of those old good days, even though they had to go through the Arduous March, and now they are going through the economic difficulties again, they still have this trust in the regime that, oh, yes, we used to have those golden days, golden age, Kim Il-sung. And

then Kim Jong-un looks like his grandfather. And then he can bring these good days again to us. This kind of psychological mental process was what Kim Jong-un tried to do for his first 10 years. Did Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il also use memory politics? And if they did, how was it different from Kim Jong-un's approach? So we call it Kim Il-sungism, Kim Jong-ilism, Kim Jong-unism in a way. But Kim Il-sung really didn't need to use the memory politics because Kim Il-sung himself was the founder.

And Kim Jong-il, in a way, failed to impose a fully effective memory politics because Kim Jong-un's image was a little bit weaker than Kim Il-sung in terms of the charisma and the approach. So Kim Jong-il was not much effective in that sense. But Kim Jong-un, from the appearance and how Kim Jong-un really looks like Kim Il-sung, so the memory politics really worked in favor of Kim Jong-un well. That's how I see from the data which I analyzed with my PhDs for this paper. But as it was said that going towards the end of the 10th anniversary and more and more nowadays, it doesn't look like this memory politics would work efficiently anymore. Because the memory politics can work only when

you have a good number of people in population who can utilize this memory. And this memory of the Kim Il-sung is mostly for the older generation. Young generation, they don't have this memory of Kim Il-sung. And young generation's memory about Kim Jong-il is not good. It is more about the famine, right? So the memory policy in that sense, it does not quite work nowadays, especially with the young generation. And that's why Kim Jong-il now needs to find out another way to control. As far as you can identify, what are the main characteristics of Kim Jong-un-ism? So that's more about, well, at the beginning, it was Byung-jin policy. Before that, it was Sung-gun, but then that became Byung-jin with the military and economy together with, right? So that was... So Byung-jin is this idea of a parallel track of

weapons development and economic development happening at the same time. Yes. So that was at the beginning. Then Kim Jong-un wanted to focus on the propaganda by using the national media. So he tends to bring more focus on young generation. You are the future of the country. You are very important. But at the same time, I'm part of it. So that was what he focused on. If you see the frequency of the keywords which this KCNA used throughout this news about this young, young Korean, that frequency is a lot higher than before during the first 10 years of Kim Jong Un's. But then there was the realization that the young generation anyhow doesn't share these memories anymore than Kim Jong Un now wants to become more like entertaining leader so that's why he tries to bring the in the mobile phone for example there's more cases with mobile phone games which is again part of the propaganda and it's very simple but still it's not he tries to get

things like less boring than before the paper version of newspapers now becoming like a digital screen for targeting for the young generation and also if you i think you did but then if i tell the majority of the readers that this tap gun style kind of tap gun style kind of the the promotional video recording all of these is really like he's trying to fit himself into these young generation styles. Right, make it more fun for the young people. Now, you argue that Kim Jong-un may be moving away from the legacy of his father and grandfather and trying to move towards creating a legacy of his own that's detached from memory. Now, when Kim Jong-un gave a speech at the end of the year Korean Workers' Party plenum in December, he said that he was finished with the idea of peaceful reunification with South Korea.

Now, some people saw this as perhaps trying to create a new legacy where he's clearly taking a different direction from his father and grandfather who were all about unification first. Do you think this is part of what you're talking about, that he's moving away from memory and creating his own legacy? So I think that that's all mixed up. It is part of it, but it's more to do with to control and then take the grasp back from the young generation. So as you know that from the time when we had the Ardus March, the ideology education has been quite loose. And young generation does not Ardors March, the ideology education has been quite loose. And young generation does not have the same amount of the ideology education in schools like before for the older generation. And the young generation tend to be more like capitalists now throughout the Jangmadang.

They know that the money is important rather than the ideology. So they know that the hunger is nothing they want to go for. So because of that, by saying that we don't want to have reunification anymore and putting the South Korea as enemy land, he can have more control over the information from South Korea. Now South Korea is our enemy, like the U.S. is our enemy. So any information or the Korean drama or Korean songs you are enjoying at the moment can be categorized as a really important issue

for the country that because you are adopting and bringing our enemy's materials here. So I more or less interpreted that movement in that sense because Kim Jong-un really looks like a desperate to take the control over the young generation against this cultural influx. I don't think that information influx anymore is more about cultural influx, which will be really difficult to control.

I see. Now let's talk about succession briefly. Kim Il-sung, of course, had a long time to prepare the path for his son, Kim Jong-il. Kim Jong-il, on the other hand, didn't have much time to prepare for Kim Jong-un's succession. Kim Jong-un was revealed to the world at the big parade in late 2010, and Kim Jong-il died a little bit more than one year later in December 2011. So in the last year or two, we've seen Kim Jong-un's daughter in public at weapons launches and other important events, and he may be preparing her for a later succession. Now, of course, we won't know until it happens,

but if that is the case, what kinds of shifts or developments in memory politics would you expect to see? The memory politics in this sense would not work because, number one, the biggest challenge here is that Kim Joo-hye is a woman. She's a figure of a man. So the memory policies do not work at all in this case. So for about that, it's more about to expose her earlier as possible. And this young generation is more adaptable for the new changes. And if you see the sequence of the changes in the North Korean government

system, like the election, the change, recent election changes as well, you know, they used to have only one sole candidate, but now they have two candidates, even though we already know that who's going to be the one they should vote for. But these kinds of changes slightly bring differences and try to satisfy people's mind so that this country is not only rely on the legacy from on rely on the past but we are trying to bring changes like you see from your dramas or other countries and because of that I see that it's not like it's not possible to have female leader in North Korea I see that it is not possible to have female leaders in North Korea. I see that it is possible to have female leaders in North Korea, but only when they can cooperate or

incorporate with young generation. Older generation, of course, they would not like to have young female leader. But because Kim Jong-un is dealing with a young generation here, so that's why I think, either number one, Kim Jong-un's dealing with the young generation here. So that's why I think, I don't number one, Kim Jong-un's health is really problematic, and he's really preparing for it. And number two, then because of that, Kim Joo-hye would be the next option in line, then that's how Kim Jong-un wants to capture like the young generation's minds. Now, Sojin, my last question to you, is there anything that you'd like to add that I haven't asked you about, or that you think is important for our listeners to know? I know that we tend to be more interested in the issues like a nuke or Kim Jong-un Trump, the dynamics or the Kim Jong-un Putin meetings. But I really want people to think about the people inside of North Korea,

not those who are privileged in society, who are enjoying whiskey kind of thing, but the people who live with very small amount of food or with no water a day at all. How it would be like, you know, I really want you to think about those people who are there. Then we can begin to think about those people who are there, then we can begin to think about this country slightly differently. Okay, that's a very good and meaningful way to end our interview today. So thank you very much again, Dr. Sojin Lim from the University of Central Lancashire for coming on the NK News podcast. Thank you very much, Jack, for having me today. Thank you. And listeners, you can find her on Twitter at F-U-G-A-B-A-C-H. We'll add a link in the show notes.

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