North Korea News Podcast by NK News - Xi Jinping’s return to Pyongyang and the future of China-North Korea relations

Episode Date: June 10, 2026

On this week’s episode, NK News Lead Correspondent Shreyas Reddy unpacks Chinese President Xi Jinping’s first visit to North Korea in seven years and what it reveals about the future of China-DPRK relations. The conversation examines the symbolism and strategic messaging behind the two-day summit, including Xi’s meetings with Kim Jong Un, visits to the […]

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Early-Byr tickets are now open with discount for NK Pro and NK News members. Space is limited to just 80 paying guests, so claim your seat. claim your seat soon. Hello listeners, welcome back to the NK News podcast. My name is Alana Hill, and today I'm joined by NK News lead correspondent, Shreyas, in the studio in Seoul on Wednesday, June 10th. Hi, Shreyas. Hi, Al-A.

Shariaz, today we're talking all things, Xi Jinping. The Chinese president wrapped up his first visit to North Korean seven years, departing Pyongyang yesterday after a two-day state visit, marked by military honors, mass celebrations, extensive talks with leader Kim Jong-un. The visit featured a lavish welcome ceremony in Kim Il-sung Square, a summit at the Kumsu-San state guesthouse, a banquet, cultural performances and a joint visit to the Sino-DPRK Friendship Tower commemorating Chinese soldiers who fought in the Korean War. But beyond the symbolism, the summit offered new clues about the future of China-North Korea relations, and perhaps just as importantly, highlighted what Beijing and Pyongyang chose not to discuss publicly. we're going to break it all down now today or do our best. Okay, Shrews, let's start with the big picture.

She's visit generated months of speculation. As I said, it was his first trip to North Korea since 2019. Now that it's over, what would you say is your biggest takeaway? I think in some ways it is a continuation of their last meeting in Beijing in September, where the focus is more on essentially trying to rebuild a relationship after years of essentially reduced engagement due to pandemic and North Korea's growing closeness to Russia, it seems that these summits have offered China,

as well as North Korea, a chance to essentially reconnect, but for China to also make sure that it retains influence over North Korea, that it still shows that it is the big brother. It is the one that has perhaps it is North Korea's longest serving ally, It is its biggest economic partner. It is still crucial for North Korea. And I think for both countries, that top-level leader-to-leader interaction is something that they value. And so it was a chance to show, as they kept putting it, their invincible friendship, their fraternal bonds,

trying to show that that friendship has not gone away despite the relative silence of the previous years. At the same time, as with many China and North Korea summit, these things tend to be very vague, very fuzzy. China-Northquare summits don't usually end in joint declarations or agreements unlike, let's say, Russia-Northcure summits, where there's usually something concrete coming out of it. So it's more about that fuzzy wording about trying to emphasize a friendship between two neighbours rather than necessarily coming out with something concrete.

Well, you've highlighted how much of an emphasis was on this friendship between the two countries. And that's really what this summit seemed to focus on. I don't want to say entirely, but for a huge part. It was about friendship. It was about shared history, socialist solidarity. We saw welcome ceremonies, concert banquets, even this kind of tree planting ceremony.

How much of this visit was just about symbolism and how much was it about concrete policy? I mean, when it comes to China and North Korea, neither of them is all that forthcoming with details. we know, there may have been a lot discussed, there may have been a lot covered, but certainly not something we'll know. But what they choose to present is largely about symbolism. It is largely about showing that they are still firmly aligned with each other. And particularly in the last few years, as global geopolitics has shifted, that is something that both countries,

but particularly China have looked to do. China, Russia, and increasingly North Korea, they all advocate a multipolar world order, something to challenge the U.S.-led global system. And they may not always see eye to eye on everything, but for now it is quite very convenient for them to actually be aligned with each other to show that they are working together, much as they did when Kim traveled to Beijing in September. So that is something that we definitely, that has. has been an important part of the focus when it comes to this relationship. Well, speaking of what was shown and what was not shown,

the sleet perfectly into my next question, because I think one of maybe perhaps the most striking things that wasn't mentioned was, of course, denuclearization, sanctions, South Korea, even the United States. Yeah. What does this tell us about where China-North Korea relations stand today? Well, so I think the denuclearization part, let's perhaps tackle that first. That is something that has been a sticking point for North Korea in all its engagement in the last few years. It has very much said it will refuse to talk to the United States as long as denuclear is on the table.

But fine, the U.S. is North Korea's enemy in its own words. But for China, there is also this awareness that. The situation now is different than it was before 2020. So in 2018 and 2019, the two leaders held five summits, and quite consistently, Xi Jinping brought up, or at least the Chinese readouts, said that Xi Jinping brought up denuclearization each time. In fact, on one occasion, even the North Korean readout mentioned it,

because that was when North Korea was at least looking to engage with the wider world and was willing to mention it, even if they didn't like the idea. whereas since in the last few years in 2022, North Korea firmly enshrined its nuclear status in law. It has devised its constitution to emphasize that, and that is something that now that China is quite aware of, that if anyone even tries to bring up denuclearization, North Korea will just not talk to them.

So for China, if it's trying to strengthen that relationship with North Korea again, make sure that it has influence where to either that's, greater than Russia's or at the way least something similar to what China had before the pandemic, then for them now the time is to say, well, for them now the focus to say, we're not going to talk about denuclearization immediately. It's still definitely a concern. China has never liked having nuclear armed neighbors on its doorstep, but they know that the more important thing from right now strategically is to show that they and North Korea can work together. Again, the US being a factor. So they're willing to keep denuclearization out of the talks for now.

So let me take that one step further because, you know, as you said, it appears North Korea is at least willing not to talk about denuclearization. So probably we can say it's fair that China is maybe increasingly willing to live with this nuclear armed North Korea. Is it fair to say then that Beijing has effectively abandoned kind of expectations that Pyongyang will denuclearize? I think realistically they know that the nuclear gene is already out of the bottle. So North Korea for many reasons, one, it already has nukes. It has also seen what happens to countries that either give up their nukes, the nuclear program like Libya or temporarily halt or slow it down like Iran. To them, they've always framed this as warning signs and justifications for their own continued nuclear development.

So China is quite aware of that as well And they don't see North Korea giving up the nukegeneer. So for now, the purpose is less about actually denuclearizing North Korea, but more about making sure it doesn't really have a reason to use it or go further with it, which I think, again, coming into the summit, North Korea also sent that reminder to China very strongly. In the days leading up to Xi's arrival, Kim Jong-un visited a uranium.

He visited a nuclear capable warship, and he also visited a missile factory, while his sister released a statement criticizing the U.S. for saying that they are working with China toward the denuclearization of North Korea. So all this came right before she's arrival. So if there was any doubt in China's mind about where North Korea stood, they made it abundantly clear. Right. So we've touched on what wasn't talked about. let's talk a little bit about what was talked about. And one thing, one topic that was extensively discussed was expanding economic ties,

transportation links and people-to-people exchanges. What kind of practical outcomes could emerge from those discussions? Are we likely now to see things like increased trade, tourism or infrastructure cooperation? Well, I think that is certainly what at least China would be hoping for, but at the same time, how much it happens will have to see. Trade is something that's convenient for North Korea too. So if there is going to be some relaxation, more Chinese visitors coming into North Korea, more essentially activity at the border, it'll probably be on that front.

And Xi Jinping, or at least the Chinese read out again, they very clearly emphasize that that is one of the outcomes she wants. He wants essentially in the wake of recent border relaxation, more transport between the two countries. He wants to see more economic exchanges and more people-to-people exchanges. As you mentioned, tourism was also on the list, but there's still questions about how much that will really happen.

I think over the last years, we've heard stories of opposition from both sides in different ways to resuming full-fledged tourism. Right, because tourism still isn't open to Chinese nationals, right? No, only Russians at this point can do it. And so I think can perhaps say there's room for cautious optimism for those who want to, for Chinese people who want to travel, but at this stage, there still is nothing. And it certainly didn't help that while she laid out some very clear talking points about

what he wants to do, what his agenda items are, the North Korean readout did not mention any them, except in very broad terms, just essentially talked about them having mutual areas of alignment when it comes to these exchanges, particularly the economic ones. So for the moment, it seems that China is pushing for some sort of shift, but still seems to be in vague terms. It's something that perhaps they're working toward or they want to work toward with North Korea. North Korea, whether it's reluctant or whether it just wants to play its cards closer to chest, it does not seem to want to commit to that at the moment.

And going forward, especially when it comes particularly to tourism, what are things like that we can be looking out for that would perhaps indicate that realistically? Because as you said, Trace, this is something that we've been following now for years since the borders, very slowly sort of reopen after COVID to Russian tourists and the likes, well, just Russian tourists, I should say. You know, what are some concrete things that we should, that we could see that would indicate, okay, this really could be real. North Korea could be reopening to Chinese tourists. I mean, honestly, over the last years, we've seen North Korea have quite a few stops and starts when it comes to tourism announcements.

And for the most part, it seems like they've settled on the idea that they don't need tourism. That doesn't bring in much money. Now, with Chinese tourists, maybe they say that does bring in extra numbers. But for the moment, that's not something that they seem all that well set for. Now, there could be other things, for example, increased quarantine controls. we've seen them developing new facilities. That is certainly, if they want to do more of that, bear in mind this is a country that, to the best of our knowledge,

has not been fully vaccinated against COVID yet. They probably still do have concerns about that and other diseases. So if they want to let more people in, they need to be able to open up. They need to have the facilities to be able to check that everything is going to be safe. But beyond that, there are other facilities. For example, the new bridge across the Yalu River, which is Lohong being.

essentially in the works and but hasn't really opened yet. So it's not really active at this point. So if they open that up, that is going to certainly boost a lot of cross-border travel by road. So definitely opens the door for more trade and potentially tourism. Obviously with tourism, there will be other fact as well. Are they going to be more keen on essentially getting, offering visas to these people who are coming in?

Those processes do exist in China, but there's a question of capacity after years without actually letting people in. And it sounds like North Korea is still really weighing up the risk versus benefit. Does it really benefit them to allow tourists back into the country? Yeah, and it's very strange because they have invested heavily in tourism facilities, like the Wonsan Kalma seaside resort. They've occasionally talked about resuming tourism, but mostly it seems that it's aimed at domestic tourism, maybe Russian tourists every now and then at most. And there were those tours very briefly to Rassan, right?

Was it one or two? Well, more than that, but it lasted like two weeks. And as a result of that, it does seem that they did get a sense then that it wasn't the right time to open. Now, that may have also been down to the choice to open up in Rasson where there's practically nothing. And certainly a lot of the visitors who went into Rasson came out and openly told everyone, the media or posted on social media that there was nothing there. They seemed to have had a slightly more positive experience when it came to the Pyongyang Marathon a few months later, well, last year's Pyongyang Marathon, when a lot of people

came in and were blown away by the shiny new streets and buildings in Pyongyang, but then they canceled the event this year. They clearly don't feel well equipped to let people in entirely at this point. It's definitely one area that's super interesting and will continue to watch closely. Shea Dingwing also called for greater cooperation in areas like agriculture, technology, healthcare and transportation, which you briefly touched on. Do we know how receptive North Korea is to those kind of proposals? I think North Korea certainly wouldn't oppose it. A lot of it is just going to be about does it come with no strings attached?

I think there might be more challenges from China side in some ways. because China, even though it has certainly allowed a lot of North Korean sanctions evasion, it still wants to maintain some appearance of respecting sanctions. And also within the Chinese system, from what we've heard, there can be differences between how the federal government administer sanctions and how provincial governments do. And so I think there will be some questions there about where they're going to have objections with dealing with North Korea on certain things.

from North Korea's perspective probably comes down to can they get what they want without having to open up too much or let too many outsiders in, even allies like China. So I think with North Korea, it's a case of readiness in some ways for opening up, whether it's capacity or whether it's willingness. With China, there might be other concerns at play. Well, looking at the broader geopolitical picture, this visit comes after North Korea's, of course, growing partnership with. Russia, which we've discussed at length on previous episodes of the podcast, on the websites. And, of course, amid increasing tensions between China and the United States, Shreis, how should we interpret the strategic messaging behind this summit? So the two countries, very notably, tried not to mention any other states while they're there.

So Russia, at this point, it is working with both countries in different ways anyway. And so we can expect that to continue. but perhaps it was more about emphasizing the China and North Korea friendship. And I think there was a Chinese state media readout that kind of said Kim would, he considered China the most priority, the highest priority partner. And so I think that is a message. And that was only in Chinese state media. Yeah.

I think in general, the North Korean readout of the talks was a bit more vague anyway. Okay. But certainly it was something. that China wanted to emphasize that it is still number one. That is, of course, when it comes to the Russia factor. But U.S., obviously it wasn't mentioned, but it was the biggest factor in some ways. It was the elephant in the room. When they talked about changing international circumstances, wanting to pull together, wanting to be strategically aligned, it's inevitably a reference to the U.S. and it is where the two...

countries have the most in common when it comes to foreign policy, it is their shared opposition to the U.S. And that is something that perhaps we will see a lot of going forward as well. Even if they don't always mention the U.S., that is perhaps going to be a driving factor. Just like we, for example, saw Kim Jong's statement the day before she's arrival, even though it was sending an indirect message to China, it was aimed at the U.S. It was aimed at U.S.-China cooperation, which for Xi Jinping, right now he's trying to deal with the tricky balance. How do you deal with Trump while also engaging with all these countries that fundamentally are opposed to Trump? And I think for China and North Korea, at least in this region, it is about trying to oppose U.S. influence over the region, particularly when it comes to military activities.

But at the same time, with China, there's a bit of a tightro because they don't want to completely. disrupt the prospects for economic relations while maintaining economic competition in their own way. Right. And I want to ask you a little bit more about that dynamic between China and Russia and North Korea because we've heard observers suggest that, you know, Beijing could be a bit concerned about losing its influence in Pyongyang as Russia is becoming this really important partner for North Korea. Apart from that state media read it that you just mentioned, Treyas, that highlighted how North Korea's prioritizing China as its number one partner. Was there anything else from this visit that suggested China is trying to reassert its role? I think it is just in general a continuation of everything

since their previous summit in September. That was essentially China welcoming North Korea back into the fold. Since then, we've seen a lot of high-level exchanges, a lot of emphasis on where they're aligned, including, for example, in the summit, Chinese media talked about, North Korea support for its One China policy and for she's four global initiatives, which for once even North Korea mentioned its support for the One China policy. Was that a first trace? I don't think it was a first. It wasn't a first, but it's certainly something that in a summit readout, it's a little less common. It's more that North Korea has long backed the policy

in some ways, but they're more likely to do it by repeating the Chinese. foreign ministry's statements or occasionally pushing back against other country's claims when it comes to these things. Whereas in the summit, it was more explicit. So for China, at least, I think it's been a steady move since September to say, we are going to continue working with North Korea. It sends a message to the world, but it also sends a message to North Korea that China is there and also that it expects North Korea to be there. with it. When they emphasize, for example, this year that it is the 65th anniversary, the military alliance between the two countries, which essentially that's next month. So that kind of sends a reminder

to North Korea as well. Look, we are your longest serving ally. We're also your biggest trade partner. So I think it's about a lot of it does tell North Korea that China still has the most influence, even if it doesn't always say it. With Russia, it has been about emphasizing that they personal connection between Xi Jinping and, sorry, between Kim Jong-un and Vladimir Putin in particular, and how that has since transformed into a different relationship, as they would say, forged in blood on the battlefields of Ukraine or battlefields of the Ukraine war. So what we're seeing with China is different. They're not going to emphasize that's our relationship, but they did mention the Korean War. They mentioned that particular bond. So it's

about the history. It's about the connection and it's about maintaining continuity with that. And just coming back briefly to this explicit support for China's one principle policy, you know, Kim publicly reaffirmed that support. Xi appeared willing, as we've touched on, kind of overlook North Korea's continued nuclear development. Can we say that this was like effectively a political trade taking place between the two leaders? I think the one China thing was never really something that, North Korea opposed. So it wasn't, whereas the denuclearization matter was something that China was one of those countries that were voted for sanctions against North Korea and

kept bringing up denuclearization earlier. I think the trade perhaps is more in just the fact that they are, the increased visibility of these exchanges. What we could see with the trade is perhaps in the future a greater opening up, more room for China to exert influence directly in North Korea. But for now, Xi Jinping's first priority is just being sure that they're all aligned on, and particularly when it comes to this region, as well as on the global front in terms of the U.S. and the West. With China, it's often about the long-term goal, whether it's their belt-and-road initiative around the world, whether it's or other economic projects, whether it's the influence they wield in media operations everywhere, which in North Korea as well. It's

about showing there's a friendship that it is continuing. Even as North Korea grew closer to Russia, China was still there. It was still the biggest trade partner. It was still there behind the scenes. And now it's just about making sure that it is at the top of the gender, which at least perhaps may not necessarily be as stronger case at the moment, but it's certainly getting there. One nitty-gritty aspect of the trip I wanted to ask you about

was we saw Jee visit. at the Sino DPRK Friendship Tower and North Korea's Central Cadre School on his final day of the show yesterday, right? Yes. Why were those particular stop significant? Well, the friendship tower is pretty sad. In fact, almost all of she's agenda was the same as last time. It would be awkward if you didn't go. Yeah.

So, like last, like in 2019, the first day was, well, motorcade through the city, welcome ceremony in the city center, talks at Kempstrand Gatehouse, then a banquet. And this time there was a cultural performance. Last time there was major mass games, artistic and gymnastic performance scale down this time, but fundamentally the same goal. And then the second day began with the trip to the Friendship Tower. So that's where it's about paying respect not just to fallen Chinese soldiers, but about, again, bringing up that historic bond, just reminding everyone, North Korea in particular,

but also just in general pointing out, that there is that connection dating all the way back to the Korean War. So that is both symbolic and also practical way of trying to force that connection, trying to show how much they have in common. Again, we talk about the shared history. That's where it really comes from. And now the Cardiff School, that was something that was new because it wasn't really a thing when she last visited.

But in some ways, it had its own purpose, which is when you have two leaders who keep trying to emphasize a relationship founded in shared socialist ideals and party-to-party relations, it probably makes sense that they visited the party's training school for its own officials. And that is something that sends a message. It's not just about the history. It is about the fact that they still have a lot in common politically. it's about leadership between, about relations between the leaders as well as the parties. And so I think for unlike other world leaders who have visited recently, like Putin or Lukashenko,

for the leader of a country like China, that makes perfect sense. Well, it seems like on the surface at least, the majority of this trip's focus was to highlight the friendship between the two countries, the friendship between the leaders, a lot of symbolism highlighting, as you've mentioned, Trey, the salon, selling. history between the two countries. And going forward, only time will tell in terms of people to people exchanges and tourism and trade, you know, whether anything concrete will come from those. But going forward, what kinds of things should we be watching it for? Are there specific indicators that will tell us whether this visit leads to any kind of, I suppose, substantial changes

in this relationship or whether it just was ultimately largely symbolic? I think there will be signs more from the border re-opening's. And I mean, they've already begun to an extent, but will they increase? Will trade increase? And of course, we mentioned tourism. Essentially, non-trade exchanges, will they go up at some stage? We'll probably see continued high-level visits from both sides. I think that's something that they're already pledged in September. And so there's seem that that is where they're going forward now, not just backroom dealings to keep the relationship going, but also actually having visible meetings and summits. So we may see more of that. I mean, at one point, Xi Jinping was, before the pandemic, he had met Kim more than anyone else.

I mean, still, historically, Kim has held more summits with Xi Jinping than any other war leader. So perhaps we could see that frequency go up. Now, the balance has perhaps shifted a little bit in some ways compared to then when she would call, Kim would head to Beijing immediately. Now, I think they'd both perhaps be a little more reciprocal in their visits. I think Kim's a bit more confident in his own power and is standing as a world leader. He's certainly tried to project that in the past year quite a lot. So we'll probably see more of that. And again, I think going back to, you talk about the close friendship between the leaders or how they want to project it, we see that there's a difference between how China and North Korea, how these leaders deal with each other,

then, for example, Kim's dealings with any other leader. And it isn't just about the shared values. It is also about that personal touch when it comes to, for example, how they interact. So every time, almost every time, it has been Xi Jinping and his wife, beating Kim Jong-un and his wife. And that is something that we saw this time,

even though Kim Jong-un's wife is perhaps her problem, permanence has decreased a little bit in recent years as the daughter has stepped into the limelight. But they're saying that what once was before the pandemic is still there. It is there is a certain symbolism that also comes from that interaction, that there's a certain family approach in some ways there. Well, Sher, speaking of Kim Jong-Land's daughter, she's believed to be called Kim Jouye, we don't know that for certain. But she did make the trip with her dad to Beijing last September. We didn't see her in this summit. Who did we see?

And why is it important or symbolic or maybe not important that we didn't see Kim Jueh. Yeah. So as mentioned, of course, when it came to the leader-to-leader interactions, we saw the wife. So we saw Kim's wife, Rieselju, and she's wife, Peng Liyayan. But that was certainly when they were emphasizing the more personal aspects. When it came to the professional aspects or like the policy aspects, it was quite interesting seeing China essentially came with a very strong pact delegation. Now, often does travel with big delegations accompanying him, but it still tends to be a little focused on certain areas. Obviously, Foreign Minister Wang Yi is a standard feature, but this time he also brought his right-hand man, Chai Chi, with him.

That's someone who has a lot of influence within the Circle at the moment. He is someone the Chinese president trusts clearly, very strongly. He's willing to share sensitive details with him that he probably isn't with others. at least that's what we've heard. And apart from that, another notable face was China's new defense minister. So he just took over a few months ago, and he visited in North Korea. Now, why is this significant? Well, from what we understand, no Chinese defense minister has been to North Korea since 2009.

So it does send a message. When they talk about cooperation, there were some bare minimum mentions of military cooperation as well. Now, they didn't spell that out, but taking a defense minister to North Korea, I think China has long kind of opposed that military interaction with the DPRK, particularly since North Korea's nuclear program became active. So now this at least says, just as there's keeping the nuclear issue aside, they are still, they're trying to bring in more aspects of other security cooperation, which, as mentioned, all of them have. certain concerns, particularly with regarding U.S. activities in the region. At the same time, they also didn't bring in China's special envoy for the, for Korean Peninsula issues. Leo Jiaming, who has one would think this is essentially one of the two countries, his brief actually covers. So he'd be there. He's dealt with North Korea before. He, they know him well.

But perhaps whether it was scheduling issues or prioritization, he was not present on this occasion. So whom they brought and whom they didn't bring says a lot about where the level of importance, China is attaching to this. They do want it to be a big deal. They do want to focus on cooperation in certain areas. So there were a lot of economic officials as well, including the Commerce Minister. So we're seeing that. And from North Korea side, quite often they go into summits with world leaders with just Kim and a translator, maybe one other official by the side. this time they had the defense minister, they had the foreign minister, they had Kim Jong-nam,

who is essentially the ruling party's international affairs, but particularly China point person. So on the whole, it does seem like both sides wanted to at least come into this, showing a certain degree of commitment, trying to focus on certain areas, which, again, from the readouts, we don't know if anything concrete came out of it, but you don't bring in delegations like that if you don't actually plan to get something out of it. Right. Certainly a super interesting facet of this summit. And as you said, Trace, you don't bring someone that high level, a defense official

that high level. And, well, I don't want to speculate. But as we've touched on, just because it's not in the read, it doesn't mean that something wasn't discussed. We don't know if we're certain. That's what we're going to have to leave it for today. But you can find all the reporting and analysis we discussed today on NC News at NCPro. And I'm going to link all your fantastic articles in our show notes.

Many thanks to NK News lead correspondent, Trace, ready for joining us today. Trice, thanks so much for insights. Thanks for having me. And that brings us to the end of today's episode. Our thanks to Brian Betts and David Choi for helping make this podcast happen. For more reporting, analysis and expert insight on North Korea,

visit NK News for the latest stories and NKPro for deeper analysis, data and research tools. You can also watch this episode on YouTube and be sure to follow us on social. social media for the latest updates, clips and behind the scenes content. I'm Alana Hill. Thank you for listening and we'll be back next time with more on the stories shaping North Korea.