North Korea News Podcast by NK News - Yoon’s prison sentence, Xi’s North Korea visit and shifting peninsula dynamics

Episode Date: June 16, 2026

This week, NK News CEO Chad O’Carroll and Chris Green of International Crisis Group join the podcast to discuss a Seoul court’s decision to sentence former South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol to 30 years in prison, finding that he orchestrated a drone operation that sought to provoke a North Korean response and create a pretext […]

Looking to go beyond the headlines on North Korea? Join the West Coast Exchange, 2026, a Chatham House rules invitation-style gathering for the global North Korea professional community taking place from September 17th to the 19th. Hosted by NK Pro of Career Risk Group, the event brings together analysts, diplomats, former negotiators, military experts and researchers

for candid discussions, field visits and real exchange, including a visit to Iggy Bong, on the inter-Korean border. Confirm speakers include the mole who went undercover for a decade in North Korea. A former US ambassador to South Korea, a Blue House official who was in charge of the Inter-Korean Military Pact, journalists who visited North Korea a dozen times,

and a former South Korean Special Warfare Commander. Early-Byr tickets are now open with discount for NK Pro and NK News members. Space is limited to just 80 paying guests, so claim your seat. claim your seat soon. Hello listeners, welcome back to the NK News podcast. I'm your host, Alana Hill, and today, Monday, June 15th, I'm joined in the studio by two guests to break down a couple of topics. First, we have Chad O'Carroll, founder and CEO of Korea Risk Group.

Hi, hi, Chad. And Chris Green, assistant professor at the University of Leiden and a senior consultant for the Green Peninsula at the International Crisis Group. Thanks so much for joining us, Chris. My pleasure. Lots to cover today, but we're going to start with the ruling, from a sole court last week sentencing former President Ian Seyield to 30 years in prison after finding that he orchestrated a drone operation aimed at provoking a response from North Korea

in order to create a justification for declaring martial law. The ruling is expected to be appealed, but the court's findings, they've already sparked some significant conversations about the lessons policymakers should take away from the episode. Child, I think it's fair to say that this ruling is one of the most serious ever made against a former South Korean president. That actions toward North Korea were allegedly used to try and create a domestic political pretext. What was your reaction when you read through the court's findings? Well, I wasn't surprised it was a big sentence. The probability that he served this is extremely low.

You look at former presidents who've gone to prison, Puckun He, Ayen Yongbach, they all came out well. Basically all of them, right? well before yeah it all came out well before the sentence was due to be finished for the health reasons or there was some you know new government in position that decided to show clemency towards the former president so i i very much doubt he'll serve anywhere close to that you know it was funny i you probably remember i was the journalist that asked him a question in korean i was a last foreign journalist to ever ask him a question and i did ask him specifically about this and at the

time that question went viral because... What's the question again, Chab? I asked, I planned it very carefully so that it wouldn't be an easy yes, no for him or a no comment. I think it was something like, how do you feel South Korea's international position has changed? Is it got better or worse for this drone incursion? Something along those lines.

And he claimed not to understand the Korean. My Korean is not amazing. I try my best. But now in hindsight, again. Given that we now know that he was, of course, the person that green lit this decision, was he pretending not to understand to buy some more time to think about what to say? Well, wasn't that one of the reasons why your question clip went so viral? Because a lot of comments were your Korean was great.

You know, a lot of comments that we saw were from Korean saying, I understood what the question was. Well, no comment in my Korean was not great. You're being humble. I was very nervous asking that question. But the topic, I mean, yeah, it seemed that like that was, you know, it was a really actually a very important issue. And the response, he just, he just, I can't remember what he said. I think he refused to confirm or deny that South Korea had been involved.

It was the standard talking point at the time, which was not to confirm or deny that South Korea was involved, which the MND had started with. But, yeah, I know. I don't know about you, Chris, but I have kind of mixed feelings on it because there was part of me at the time that thought, well, what's wrong with South Korea doing this? They've tolerated so much in terms of these trash balloons. Those balloons have caused fires on some rooftops. They've been a huge nuisance. They've come even into Kwongaman. What's wrong with sending some leaflets into North Korea, even by drone?

And I feel like a penalty of this severity. even though it was done for seemingly for domestic political purposes. I do think there could be valid situations in which it's appropriate for South Korea to use drones to send propaganda into North Korea, especially if the North Koreans are doing it sustained for an extended period. What do you think? Well, just a quick reminder for our listeners, a bit of context. This was at that time when the North was sending literally thousands of balloons filled with trash

over into South Korea. And as you said, Chad, causing a huge amount of damage monetarily for, you know, these cleanup crews that had to go and collect all the rubbish, basically, that was strewn all over, all over. But yeah, Chris, as someone who obviously follows these issues closely, what struck out to you most about it, I would say, the court's conclusions in this case? Well, first of all, I think focusing on the fact that you probably won't serve this full sentence, while true, is a bit of a side issue. I mean, that's a domestic. political decision in a sense, right, whether he is released early. Unless the ruling is quashed, this was an extraordinarily reckless act. Now, I agree with Chad that both sides conduct reconnaissance

activities and they conduct what from our side we call a freedom of information activities fairly frequently into North Korea. But as you say, this was ultimately for a domestic political purpose, right? And I think the South Korean people would be right. And I think the South Korean people would be right, to be frustrated and angry if there is an effort made to incite North Korea to conduct some kind of provocative reaction in order to declare martial law. Like that is a fairly reckless way to behave in the context of a fairly tense, highly militarized peninsula. So it's deeply problematic, although I do understand the point you're making about continuous activities of a different sort that do go on across this border all.

the time and often for perfectly good reasons. Personally, I was more surprised that there wasn't more outrage in South Korea because if this had gone the opposite way and Pyongyang had reacted and, you know, killed some soldiers along the border or done something, I mean, this would have been insane. It doesn't seem to be garnering the response that I thought it would from the public. Yeah. I mean, maybe if it had worked, we'd be all living under martial law now. You know, that's the other thing.

We might not know that this was deliberate on the South Korean side, had the plan or gone to schedule and triggered the angry North Korean response that would then be used upon, seized upon by the South Korean government under UNSocchio to implement martial law. But yeah, you're right. I don't know. I don't think people maybe realize in the general public how close we came and how actually North Korean restraint was a key factor in this. becoming a much bigger problem.

I think there's, yeah, I think you're right. I think there's two things to say here. I think a lot of the general public, when they hear the words North Korea, they switch off because they're not interested in North Korea in general. But also, President Yun did go on to declare martial law anyway, and it was a complete farce. So people see these events through that lens, and it gives them a sense of less concern, less danger, less recklessness, because the whole thing was a complete debacle from start to finish. So that puts a different colour upon these events that is probably not warranted.

I think it was extraordinarily reckless. Chad, looking back at that 2024 drone incident, do you think that analysts and journalists were asking the right questions at the time? Or has this ruling kind of changed now how we're all viewing this episode? Yeah, I hope that it's going to give journalists, especially local South Korean journalists, make them a bit more skeptical about what the government says. I think one should be very skeptical in any national security related incident like this. I remember at the time there were a few journalists and North Korea experts who were of the opinion that the South Korean government would never deliberately do something like this and there must be some kind of sophisticated NGO

group. People, there were some in the community. extremely skeptical about this and when we contacted them were very you know like almost laughing like how the succoring government would never do something like there were some to their credit who I had lunch with were like this is definitely the south Korean government here are the reasons why so I think yeah the lesson is just be open-minded about these kind of things and sometimes having a kind of conspiracy theory mind might be valid in situations like this yeah I'm sorry, Chris. Yeah.

But the South Korean government, quite understandably, spends most of its time portraying itself as the good guy among the two careers and the North Koreans as the bad guy. I mean, that changes depending on the political regime a little bit. But still, ultimately, it's premised on the fact that we are the good guys and they are the bad guys. So it's not surprising when an event like this happens, when people search valiantly for alternative explanations other than, oh, we were actually the bad guys here.

or we did something which actually wasn't in the name of peace and security on the Korean peninsula. So we shouldn't be surprised if when an event like this happens, this is the response. I agree. Journalists need to approach it with a certain mindset. That's a subset of the population. But as a general principle, it's not so surprising. I remember being surprised by how black and white people's views were. I thought there'd be a lot more kind of gray area, some ambiguity, well, maybe.

But I remember the team talking to experts at the time. And like you say, Chad, there were so many people who so clearly said, absolutely not. There was no way this was the government. And then, yeah, a couple of people did say, well, maybe it was. But I remember, yeah, thinking like, wow, people are really staunch in their views about this. Chris, what lessons should the broader career watching community take away from this case when evaluating, you know, potential future incidents and periods of heightened tension between the two careers? I think the career watching community is generally quite open to alternative perspectives beyond the one being pushed by the major power holders at any given time.

I think we need to recognize that both sides, I mean, North Korea is clearly the more problematic of the two careers, but both sides are doing things that we don't always have full visibility. of. I mean, that's inevitable. And so we should continue to approach our analysis of the Korean Peninsula with an open mind to these possibilities. Well, one of the themes, we're going to discuss this way more later in the show, the upcoming fabulous West Coast exchange trip. One of the themes of this year's trip is challenging assumptions. And what assumption about North Korea, South Korea, or inter-Korean tensions, does this case kind of forced us to reconsider? Chris, I'll start with you. It forces us to reconsider the assumption that, say, Korea is always the quote unquote good guy on the Korean Peninsula. And it forces us to reconsider

the assumption that both parties, for whatever reasons, are working to avoid a second conflict between the two. Chat, any more? Yeah, I think it also for me is a demonstration of why we should be skeptical about about sudden optics in South Korean support for things like human rights in North Korea. I think it's clear now that there can be ulterior motives for that. And the Yun-Sukyal government and the Pakkonghe government, both of them had huge spotlight on North Korean human rights. And I feel now we know what the South Korean government under Yun was doing and how it was

sort of using North Korea to afford its own domestic policy. I think I would be skeptical about the reasons for future spotlight on certain things relating to North Korea if they sort of abnormally come out of nowhere. That's kind of one conclusion I would have. And I think there, yeah, you can, to put the big picture over what you just said as well, we look at inter-Korean relations as a foreign policy issue. Like it approaches us, it seems to us to be a foreign policy issue. And I'm not saying we are confused about this, but I think it's worth remembering that

inter-Korean relations has domestic political backdrops in North and South Korea. And we need to try and be aware of what those domestic political backdrops are. And if you can't understand the domestic politics of the two countries, now I understand it's rather difficult in the case of North Korea. But if you can't understand the domestic politics, it's very hard to understand the inter-Korean politics too. It's super important context and of course we'll see how long Yun does stay behind bars. Now we did cover Chinese present, Xi Jinping's recent visit to Pyongyang, his first trip to North Korea seven years extensively on last week's episode. But Chad, I know that you wrote a great analysis

about his trip. So I do want to get both your thoughts on this diplomacy between the two neighbors. One of the most striking aspects of the summit was that was what wasn't discussed publicly. No mention of de-nuclearization, very little focus on the traditional. on North Korean nuclear issue. Chad, what does this tell us about how China's approach to Pyongyang has changed? Well, yeah, I mean, denuclearization was the top of the sort of Chinese readout back in 2019 when Xi Jinping went. This time it was totally absent.

But to be fair, I don't think it's not any sudden change. It was absent when Kim Jong-in visited Beijing in September last year and was pictured alongside Putin. It was also clearly absent when China's high-level delegation. went in October last year to observe the military parade and we had Hwasong 20 ICBMs just rolling past the Chinese delegation. So that wasn't really a surprise, but I figure that it implies that China is really focused on practical, pragmatic approach to North Korea, which probably rightly recognizes Deenicroization is just a waste of time to raise or discuss,

especially in any public readout. But we know. know that it hasn't been dropped completely because the Trump administration and their readout of the Trump Xi summit in Beijing said that Beijing had agreed that it still supports the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. And while the Chinese readout didn't mention that, China didn't take umbrage publicly with the US side about that coming into the public domain, which does imply that there, that it at least was an actual discussion. It wasn't just fiction on the US side or they might have disagreed.

agreed publicly on that. For me, the more interesting thing was the other topics that Xi Jinping, he made this four-point proposal to Kim Jong-un in Pyongyang, and there was a lot in the Chinese readout about the people-to-people exchange, the tourism, even Chinese experts going to help at this cemetery of martyrs lost in the war. And the North Korean readout has absolutely nothing on these topics, which to me suggests that North Korea just isn't ready for people to people exchanges with China. And my read on that is that that's relating to their intense fear and paranoia about outside contact, foreigners coming in, foreign information flows, information going outside the country.

And if you have very large numbers of Chinese people coming in suddenly as a result of that summer, it's going to be very chaotic for North Korea Ministry of State Security to maintain the information controls that they've perfected since COVID started in 2020. So do you think specifically that the North Korean government isn't ready or the North Korean government isn't ready to let the North Korean public know that they're open to these kind of exchanges? Good question. So I really thought we might see that both sides agreeing to some form of tourism at this summit.

You can, there was the air China flights have started again, the passenger train services have started. Chinese tour companies have started offering tours or promoting the fact that they might be able to do tours but at the end of the day, the North Koreans just didn't agree to it. Or maybe they did, but I would have thought that would be something that we could see something come out. At least Kim Jong-un mentioning the word tourism,

let alone all the other forms of people to people exchange that were mooted by Xi Jinping. And if you look at the Chinese statements, it's all like we stand ready, we're prepared to, but it's not like he's announcing that there's agreement or consensus on these issues. So I'm starting to wonder, you know, maybe again, even with the Chinese, we're not going to see any major resumption of tourism. And then you look at that air China flight after it restart.

I did one flight and then it halted service for a couple of months. And it's back on now. But I've heard the train as well. There's very few people going on it into North Korea. So these may have just been pre-summit. measures by the Chinese to give momentum to what she was about to announce, but still on the Korean side, maybe no interest. Or like those Rassan trips, you know, when they first came back on, there was a couple of

these tourist trips to Rassan, and then I think it seemed like North Korea thought this isn't actually worth it. So maybe something similar there. Yeah. I mean, look at the tourism question is one thing, but we are also seeing a certain number of people going into North Korea from various nationalities. They're not tourists. They're there on business trips or for other reasons besides tourism.

But it's not surprising that in 2020, the police state of North Korea, which constitutes a large part of the state apparatus, had a perfect opportunity to slam the door to stop a bunch of things that they previously didn't have particularly good reasons to stop. So it was contested. For a while, there was no contest, right? It was obvious that there was a public health rationale for doing all these things. on the border, closing the border, keeping people out and so on and so forth. Over time, that is going to go away to some extent. And you're bound to end up with. I mean, I hesitate to use the word debate,

because I don't think you have debate in the ruling circles in North Korea. But there will be people who are going, you know, shouldn't we be doing this? Can't we be doing that? There's going to be more space for slightly divergent policy opinions within the state apparatus. So we ought to be looking out for those signs because North Korea isn't always the same. We need to be constantly looking for signs to see whether things are just changing in the margins, because these are always marginal changes. What are some signs that we could expect to see?

Well, for example, they may let the UN back in to do some. I mean, that's a rather big thing. I don't think that's the best example I could give you. But we do all know that there are people in our circles who have been to North Korea in the last three to six months, right? And so the North Korean state in some areas is looking for assistance. That much is clear. Do they want business?

I don't know. Do they want NGO-style humanitarian or developmental assistance? We don't know the details very well, but we do know that there are areas of North Korea. They're looking for a little bit of help of some kind. So that's a good example. And we need to keep our ears to the ground and find out who's going in and coming out

because it's going to be those kind of trips that carry on for a long time before we expect any large numbers of tourists. country, right? And Chris, looking at the summit from a broader geopolitical perspective, what would you say was the single most important takeaway for you? I want to return to the denuclearization point, right, to put it in context a bit. Okay, so China can't afford to accept North Korea officially as a nuclear state. That would cause more instability and a greater risk that its adversaries, Japan, South Korea,

would ultimately be forced to follow a similar path, right? So from China's geopolitical perspective, it doesn't make sense to accept North Korea officially as a nuclear state. So that's one part of it. We shouldn't expect that to happen, right? And so they are sort of quietly, tacitly acquiescent to the situation as it is. But of course, denuclearisation remains one of their policy goals, unrealisable as it may be in any kind of reasonably foreseeable timeframe.

That's why it appears on the Xi Trump Summit readout, right? But at the same time, North Korea hasn't conducted a nuclear test since 2017. It's been a long time. So I think China's priority for no instability, let's not bring any US assets into the waters around China and the Korean Peninsula by fermenting instability through provocative actions. As long as North Korea adheres to that, then they can benefit from Chinese business connections, trade and so on and so forth. Whether the North Koreans value that is a different question, but that's kind of the deal that's on the table here, right? Denuclearization is going to be quietly retained as a policy objective, and at the same time, they are going to try and proceed to, as always, cause North Korea to open up and normalize their trade relations with China, right? That's their objective for the time being, because that's the best way to avoid instability in the absence of nuclear testing and stuff like that.

One thing that was explicitly mentioned by Xi was expanding military cooperation with North Korea. But analysts, we've seen some division on whether this was mostly symbolic, which a lot of people I think have said about this trip was just very symbolic. Or is this potentially the start of something more substantive? Chad, what's your read on that? There was the part about one China, which was new from the, we're not new, but the Kim Jong-un was issuing full support for one China policy on Taiwan, which to me raised a question, would they support China in the event of a contingency in Taiwan

because this was all framed within the 65th anniversary of the mutual defense treaty. But there wasn't, well, there wasn't, I didn't see any new language about that treaty changing in terms of obligations for either side. There was no updated text that was publicly issued. But the key question for me really is, why did Xi Jinping go to Pyongyang at this time? Why was it seemingly a big priority for the Chinese to make this visit? Because it does look, I mean, if she was going to Pyongyang, either he was invited or he said he'd like to go. And it comes in the wake of a lot of high-level diplomacy since September 2025 when Kim went to Beijing.

And again, like, Xi Jinping would be hosted well. by any country in the world, right? He has limited bandwidth. But to go to North Korea first for his first foreign overseas trip of 2026 is really interesting. And the only thing that came to mind that maybe is different is that he wanted to get some informal or background support from Kim Jong-un that if we have a problem in Taiwan, I'll support you in the same way I supported Putin.

Rest assured, we'll be able to send troops, munitions, whatever you need. it's pretty wild if that was the case. I kind of feel it probably is a low probability that that was the case. But that to me is the only thing that might add urgency in Xi, going to see Kim Jong. I mean, even just the optics of that being a possibility might be enough for she, like to make the US and Japan and South Korea think there could be more to this than me.

It might make their response different in the event that there is a, issue in Taiwan. But on the other hand, I mean, if there if there is support, it could be devastating for USFK if DPRK suddenly gets involved and makes it clear that US assets in ROK are acceptable targets due to the mutual defense treaty. Yeah. So the language was quite vague. You called for improving ties in the fields of diplomacy law enforcement and the military. But one thing that we discussed on last week's podcast was the fact that part of his delegation was the Chinese defense minister, who's obviously the top official when it comes to defense. And it was his first visit to North Korea in I think 17 years. So I know that a lot of analysts were looking at, you know,

why was he there? That seems like a big deal. Chris, do you think that that's something potentially substantive could come from, come from that? I think we naturally jump to the most extreme conclusion because it's the most worrying, right? The possibility that the China and North Korea are colluding in advance of a future Taiwan contingency that the Chinese might incite, right? But if we think about what greater cooperation in those three fields actually means, the bar is set very low, right? It doesn't take much. Since Kim Jong-un came to power, China has assisted North Korea with improving its propaganda and media techniques and apparatus. They've helped with law enforcement, border security in terms of providing equipment for those

activities. So there is a history here, but I think the level of cooperation between the Chinese and North Korean militaries over the past decades has actually been exceedingly low. So it doesn't take much to improve on functionally zero. Yeah. And back in 2018, when there were the five summits between Xi Jinping and Kim Jong-un, there was actually a lot of working level delegation exchange between DPRK armed forces and Chinese armed forces. There were a lot of photos that came out of Roundtable. We never knew what they were discussing, but there was a good handful of meetings that were featured in the state media of both countries.

So I agree with Chris that the bar is low, but I also can't. But couldn't we say that in the same case with Russia and North Korea? I mean, their military cooperation would have been pretty low prior to the war in Ukraine, right? And we've seen what's happened there. Yeah. If there were to be a contingency in Taiwan, to me it doesn't seem that far fetch, given what we've seen with North Korea and Russia cooperation. Yeah. And also there's the way that treaty is written, it's very similar, if I remember correctly, in wording to how the Russia-DPRK-Mutual Defense Treaty is written.

So, for example, if China, let's say, did a blockade of Taiwan and then the US or another country, let's say the US did some kind of kinetic engagement to diffuse that blockade and was therefore seen potentially as China as the military aggressor, I don't know if that would actually trigger the mutual defense treaty because it's, from my understanding, it's if China or Russia are attacked, by a third party, that automatically triggers it. And likewise, for North Korea, if they are attacked, that should trigger the China and entire Russia one. I need to reread those documents.

But that was my initial impression on why North Korea was involved only in Kursk, because that was Ukraine entering Russian territory and breaching its territorial sovereignty, although we later found out that Kim Jong and allegedly volunteered to send those guys. Well, and their treaty was signed after the agreement on assistance was reached. In addition, though, I agree that in principle these treaties only apply in the event of a conflict that North Korea or China or Russia don't start. But the South Koreans have to consider the possibility that it will be enforced differently because North Korean troops went to Russia to assist with the Ukraine conflict. Yes, they remained on the Russian side of the border as far as we know, fighting. to expel the Ukrainian forces from the Kersk area.

But you cannot conclude that this isn't ultimately, initially a war of aggression on the part of Russia. So the way these mutual defense clauses will be implemented in practice, we can't actually be sure. And therefore, it has to be taken into account the possibility that it won't be implemented in response to aggression from a third party, but actually in response to aggression from the principles themselves. Well, before we wrap up, I want to spend a few minutes talking about the West Coast Exchange. This is a three-day gathering in Incheon this September that brings together members of the North Creek Community for off-the-record discussions, field visits, networking. The event builds on the East Coast Exchange held in 2022. Chad, of course, you helped create the format,

organize the whole event. Chris, you attended the previous gathering and can speak to the experience from a participant's perspective. So let's talk about what the exchange is, why it exists, and what attendees can't expect. Chad, the West Coast Exchange is described. And, is described. as not another conference. What was missing from existing Korea-focused events that led you to create this exchange format? Well, I went to a multi-day event in Hawaii years ago. I forget who the organizer was. Amazing scenery. And yet we spent three days in a windowless air-conditioned room in a hotel. I think there was one evening reception. And to me, it just seemed like it's such a huge missed opportunity for from the organizers perspective to convene all these really interesting people

and just overpack the day with panels and workshops and have zero to little time for networking and to actually enjoy the surroundings like we could have just done it on zoom so that was a there was a frustration there and i'd worked on i've worked in a past life on a couple of big multi-day conferences brussels forum and halifax security forum so i had seen some of the like advantages of bringing these large groups together. And of course, we've done a lot of community North Korea Watcher events in the past, like rooftop networking sessions, where it's very low on speeches and programming,

but very high on just giving people a place to mingle. So that's kind of the goal. It's really to provide people from across the spectrum within the North Korea community. So from pro-engagement to pro-sanctions and pressure to like military, humanitarian to the North Koreans themselves. We believe it or not have actually invited the North Koreans to attend. I very much doubt they will. But if you're listening, you're more than welcome. We'd love to have you there. Haven't got the RSVP yet. Likewise with the Chinese, the Russians, we want to build a platform for everyone to come together and freely talk, debate, North Korea.

The other reason that we decided to do it was, so this year there was the Shangri-Lah dialogue in Singapore. And the second year in a row we've attended, and there's a second year in a row we've attended, and has been next to no official coverage of Korea, no like session on. So he thought, why don't we try and create our own Shangri-Lar-like event, but just for career watchers? And so this is the first year since 2023 that we've done it. We did it in the past with the support of a large grant, which made it effectively free for everyone. This year, we have to charge people the hotel costs and their food costs. It's basically the ticket price is just the costs,

there is a strategic pass for mainly for the corporate security sector, which has a few extras. NK Pro members can get a light pass, which means you can just attend for free, but you don't get the lodging included. So we've tried to make it as accessible as possible, but yeah, that's the gist of it, and we hope it will be a great opportunity for everyone in the world of North Korea to come together. And we have hopefully an amazing VIP speaker for the keynote that we'll release the next few days as well. Well, as I said, the West Coast Exchange is the successor to the East Coast Exchange in 2022. Chad, what worked especially well at that first event, do you think?

For me, it was the fact that we were remote on a beach in this resort near the North Korean border. Great weather, it was May. This is September. So it'll be the same. Lots of fun. And again, at least half of each day was without sitting in a conference. him listening to someone talk. We had some great sessions, but we went to the border.

We looked into, from Kosson, Special Military Border Checkpoint, we looked into North Korea and had some sessions about what we were seeing, some explanation from the 22nd Division. And there were like rooftop networking events, beach walks. It was, for me, it was just like a combination of my geeky interest in going to the border, some of vacation vibes with sandy beaches past North Korea. and some late night drinks. It was everything all in one.

I mean, I'm going to sound totally biased here, but I personally think that that's where career risk groups excel is these networking opportunities. And that's where I've learned the most in the last couple of years working here is at these events where it's not this formal sit down you're listening to someone giving a speech for 45 minutes an hour. It's literally, like you say, having a coffee or having a drink

or going for a walk on the beach with people who are firsthand in this industry. and having those conversations where you just, I mean, you learn so much. You really cannot beat it. Speaking of the East Coast Exchange, Chris, what motivated you to attend that in the first place? Free Jolly. It was an accident of timing. I was in South Korea for most of that year doing some research. So I had the opportunity to be around at the right time of year, which is obviously important.

I think I can echo what Chad said because there are sessions at these events. but if you ask me now what do I remember most about it, it's not the sessions. In fact, I honestly, with no disrespect to anyone who spoke there, I can't remember too much about those sessions. But there was some very useful networking events. I'm not a huge fan of beaches, to be brutally honest with you, but it was a lovely setting. And the opportunity, yeah, to have some really meaty debates and discussions outside of the conference room. That was the real value ad. Networking plus serious debates with serious people over.

delicious drinks. Well, the West Coast Exchange, I want to touch a bit more on the setting. It includes visits to places that most people or some people wouldn't maybe have access to. It's just similar for the East Coast Exchange. Chad, how does that field component affect the conversations? Oh, well, again, this is a pet peeve of mine. I won't name the various South Korean organized conferences in question, but I think a lot of people, experts that are flying from DC for conferences in Korea, multi-day, plenums, etc. They tend to fly business class paid for by the organizer or the government of Korea. They touch down and go in a taxi to a five-star hotel. They stay in the confines of that hotel where the conference is usually organized. Grand Hyatt,

being an example, four seasons can be another one, great hotels, but you are not really experiencing South Korea. You're in a tiny bubble. And then most people will spend, and then the two, three days there and then fly back. And with that, you don't really get the practical impression of just how close you are to North Korea. And so, you know, a lot of people haven't even been to the border. And let alone Eggie Bong, where we're going to be going to, where you just take a bus for an hour. And it's just interesting from a geeky career watcher perspective

to see the security, the border changing. And then you get to this location where you have this weird Starbucks and people, drinking their lattes overlooking this tiny village in North Korea which feels a bit weird to be honest kind of like you're looking into a zoo to be honest it's a bit weird but I think it's

really good to make the effort to go to the border just so you're reminded this is not a virtual issue we are adjacent to North Korea and I think it can just leave you a bit more of a profound understanding of the issue and also a reminder that when you're talking about deterrence and these kind

vague concepts within international relations. It actually has a real effect on people that live in the area. Yeah, when you're debating North Korea in the corridors of power in D.C. or Tokyo or whatever, yeah, you think about it in the context of IR. You talked about a Starbucks there. Why is there a Starbucks there looking to the background? You mean, how is South Korea and North Korea dealing with the reality of long-run inter-Korean division? Like these are domestic issues, they are emotional issues.

They are not just IR issues. So, yeah, that's a very valuable part of these events too. Chris, was there a moment during the previous exchange that made you see an issue on North Korea differently? There was a very, very productive late-night discussion about whether we were really very close to going to war with North Korea in 2017. That discussion didn't take place in one of the sessions. It took place outside.

And I think a lot of people took a lot of people took a lot. away from that discussion because it brought different perspectives on the issue of how 2017 played out and why it played out as it did. And I think a lot of people, not just me, would have got a very valuable insight into some thinking from that. Well, speaking of those valuable insights, Chad, what are you hoping that participants leave with after this three-day exchange that they wouldn't just get from even reading our website or attending webinars or other conferences? Ideally, I mean, it's a pretty lofty goal, but ideally we will help reboot this as a priority

for countries who are sending personnel there, just trying to bring together as many movers and shakers within the field as possible. And the hope is it just moves the ball a bit in terms of getting this as something we can have some hope for practical progress on policymaking. I want to reiterate, well, the guest list, it's incredible. There's diplomats, there's people in military backgrounds. It's an incredible list. But maybe might feel a little bit intimidating to some people who maybe just North Korea

watchers or aren't super into the field or I don't know. Chad, if someone was a bit of on the sense about attending or I thought maybe this isn't the right space for them, who would benefit most from being in the room? Okay, so I think if you were a young research, or academic or you're just finishing your master's program and you're interested in maybe dipping your toe into Korean studies, I would definitely attend, even though it might seem. When I was 28, I got invited to a dinner with Mahmoud Ahmadinejah, the president of Iran,

and I paid to fly to New York to attend without any real agenda. I was very interested in Iran at the time. And it was just, it was fascinating to be, within that proximity of the leader of that country at a very sensitive time. And so I think with something like this, it's similar. You can, you'll make some great contacts if you're proactive and don't just sit in the corner. And you'll learn a lot, I think, like Chris said, in the background. Also, if you're a diplomat or military official or business leader who's just been posted to

career or is about to be posted, definitely attend. This will really set you up with a lot of good. contacts for the next three, four years, however long your posting is. And if you're a host country official, South Korea or North Korea, if you guys come, yeah, again, lots of great petri dish to meet new officials and figures that are working on this issue that could be valuable for your future. Likewise, if you're a journalist, obviously, even though it's not on the record, you'll meet loads of great sources. And I'm sure you can do interviews on the sidelines. Okay, last question before we wrap up. Chris, what advice would you give to

someone who's going to be attending the West Coast Exchange and it's their first time attending something like this. Don't go there with a, I'm going to sit in the background and listen attitude, although that's useful too. And listening is often more important than talking. You do also need to gather those all important contacts. And it's a pretty rare opportunity to intersect with a whole bunch of people that you don't often meet. So you have to go there with a proactive attitude towards the networking component of it too. Well, listeners, if you are interested in attending the West Coast Exchange in September,

I'm going to include a link with more information in the show notes. And as you mentioned, Chad gets updated all the time. And if you'd like to read more analyses and the stories that you've discussed today and follow developments on the Korean Pinsula, be sure to check out NK News and NKPro. Chad of Carl, thanks so much for joining me today. Thank you. And Chris Green, great to have you with us. And thanks so much for your insights.

Always a pleasure, never a chore. And that brings us to the end of the end of the. today's episode. Our thanks to Brian Betts and David Choi for helping make this podcast happen. For more reporting, analysis and expert insight on North Korea, visit NK News for the latest stories and NKPro for deeper analysis, data and research tools. You can also watch this episode on YouTube and be sure to follow us on social media for the latest updates, clips and behind the scenes content. I'm Alana Hill. Thank you for listening. And we'll be back next time with more on the stories shaping North Korea.