Nuanced. - 270. What Is DRIPA—and Should B.C. Repeal It?

Episode Date: September 14, 2026

Aaron Pete examines B.C.’s DRIPA and UNDRIP framework, explaining how Aboriginal title, private property, Indigenous consent and investment uncertainty shape the debate over repeal and reconciliation.Send us Fan MailSupport the shownuancedmedia.ca

DRIPA may be the most consequential law in British Columbia that most people know only as four angry capital letters. When the BC legislature passed it in 2019, the vote was unanimous. The NDP supported it, B.C. Green supported it, the official opposition even supported it. It was celebrated as a historic framework that would advance indigenous rights, reduce conflicts, and create greater economic certainty. Seven years later, the BC Conservatives won it repealed. An initiative petition has been approved to try and force the issue. Before the legislature, the NDP government, the champion Dripa considered amending it, then suspending key provisions before backing away.

First Nations leaders accused Premier David E.B. of betrayal. A 2026 Ingus Reed survey found that 47% of British Columbians supported repeal. 33% opposed it and 21% percent. for unsure. This is quite the political journey from a unanimous group hug to a constitutional knife fight in less than a decade. Nothing says clarity and predictability quite like a government proposing to pause its signature law and then pausing the pause. But before we defend DRIPA or launch it into the legislative recycling bin, we should probably understand what it is. DRIPA is not Undrip. Undrip is the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous People adopted internationally.

In 2007, Drippa is the provincial law that provides a legal framework to British Columbia. Today, we're going to talk about the unfinished land question beneath this debate, where Undrip came from, what every section of Drippa actually says, what changed after the Gatsala Mineral Rights case, what role Drippa did, what role Drippa did. and did not play in the couch and title decision, the best arguments for keeping it and repealing it, and what a legitimate path forward should look like. I'll admit, I come to this conversation as a First Nations chief, a law graduate, and a British Columbian, but neither my identity nor my education settles any of this debate.

Aboriginal and treaty rights are constitutional realities. Reconciliation is a political project. Political projects do not receive unlimited trust, unlimited taxpayer funding or an exemption from scrutiny. DRIPA is legislation. It should not be, nor should it ever be, a loyalty test. Worrying about private property does not automatically make someone a racist. Defending Aboriginal title does not make someone, mean someone is secretly planning to steal your house, criticizing DRIPA did not, does not erase the constitutional rights that existed before it, and invoking reconciliation does not answer every legitimate question.

about how public authority should be exercised. The question is not whether DRIPA makes us feel reconciled. The question is what the law does, what problem it solves, what problems it may create, and what repealing it would actually change. The unfinished question beneath DRIPA. Before DRIPA, before undrip, and before the current political fight, there was a more basic question. what happened to the land in British Columbia? Was it conquered or was it surrendered? Did First Nations accept the reserves they received or was the broader land question never properly settled?

One side says most of British Columbia is unseeded territory as though that proves indigenous ownership of every acre now being claimed. The other says First Nations were conquered, Canada became sovereign and whatever rights existed, were overtaken by history. Unfortunately, neither statement is complete. There is no serious question that the Crown asserted sovereignty

and established effective control. British and Canadian governments created the dominant legal order, granted land, built institutions, and regulated resources. British Columbia is a legitimate province within Canada. Its existence is not reopened whenever a title claim is filed.

But Canadian courts have also concluded that Crown sovereignty did not automatically eliminate every pre-existing indigenous right. The Supreme Court rejected the idea that nobody legally occupied this land before Europeans arrived. Canadian law, therefore, holds two ideas together. The Crown is sovereign, and Aboriginal rights and title may have survived within that sovereignty. Most of British Columbia is not covered by the historic land surrender treaties found across much of Canada. Outside the Douglas treaties on Vancouver Island, Treaty 8 in the Northeast, and later modern treaties, the broader land question was often left unresolved. But unseated only tells us a surrender did not occur. It does not establish which nations held which land or resolve overlapping claims.

likewise, accepting a reserve was not necessarily a surrender of every interest outside it. The history must be examined nation by nation. And a traditional territory map is not a judgment. A claim may be strongly opposed, weakly opposed, or overlapping with several others. Repeating it in acknowledgments does not transform asserted territory into proven title. Under Canadian law, a nation claiming Aboriginal authority, title must prove occupation when the crown asserted sovereignty, continuity where present occupation is replied upon an exclusivity, including possible shared exclusivity. Title is not confined to

permanent villages, but hunting or fishing is in an area does not automatically establish ownership of everything surrounding it. And those distinctions matter because present-day British Columbians also have legitimate interests. Families bought homes through the illegal system, government told them that was valid, municipalities built infrastructure, businesses invested on the strength of permits, and registered title. If governments made historic mistakes, ordinary families, should not arbitrarily carry the cost of correcting them. The most defensible conclusion sits between the two absolutes. British Columbia is legitimate, but some Aboriginal title questions remain unresolved. Most of the province was not

surrendered by historic treaty, but that does not prove every modern claim. Title can extend beyond villages, but it must be established with evidence. Overlapping claims are real, and reconciliation must consider constitutional rights, private property, security, democratic government, and economic stability together. DRIPA did not create this unfinished history, and repealing it would not make the history disappear. From Undrip to the BC legislature. Indigenous rights were not invented in 2019. Section 35 of the Constitution Act of 1982 recognizes and affirms existing Aboriginal

treaty rights. Decisions, such as Calder, Delgamy, Haida Nation, and Tishol Colton, developed the law of Aboriginal title and the Crown's duty to consult. Those constitutional protections remain whether Dripa is kept amended or repealed. Andrip came from a different process. Indigenous representatives and the United Nations member states worked for more than two decades on the Declaration. The UN General Assembly adopted it on September 13, 2007. Canada was one of the four countries that voted against it, later describing it as aspiration on 2010 and endorsing it without qualification in 2016.

The Declaration contains 46 articles. They address equality, self-determination, culture, language, education, health, treaties, lands, and resources, participating in public decisions, redress for dispossession, and free, prior, and informed consent. Its opening language describes it as a standard of achievement to be pursued through partnership and mutual respect. Article 46 is equally important. It protects the territorial integrity and political unity of sovereign states, requires respect for the rights and freedom. of everyone and permits limits established by law when strictly necessary to meet the most compelling requirements of a democratic society. In other words, Undrup is significant, but even Undrip does not say indigenous rights exist in a universe without other people, other rights, or democratic governments. The Truth and Reconciliation Commission's call to Action 43

urged federal, provincial, territorial, and municipal governments to adopt and implement undripped as the framework for reconciliation. In British Columbia, implementing undrip became part of the 2017 NDP Green Agreement. Bill 41 was co-developed with the First Nations Leadership Council. The government said it would reduce conflict, make decisions more predictable, and build more stable economic relationships. On November 28, 2019, every MLA present supported it. That history matters. was not slipped through by one party over the objections of another party. The legislature was in fact united. But that consensus among politicians is not the same as informed consent from the public. If legislators did not understand the law or failed to explain it, its possible consequences,

that responsibility belongs in Victoria, not with United Nations. DRIPA was sold not only as moral recognition, but is a path to certainty. Seven years later, that promise deserves to be measured against the results. What DRIPA actually says. I'm going to warn you, this may be the driest part of the conversation. Nothing makes the YouTube algorithm quietly leave the room quite like the phrase statutory power of decision. But this is the most important part.

If we are going to repeal a law, we should know, what we are repealing, and if we're going to defend it, we should know what the heck we're defending. Think of this as eating our legal vegetables. If we skip them, the rest of the debate becomes political dessert, slogans, outrage, and people shouting, Vito! Without explaining what it means. And luckily for us, Drippa is pretty short. It contains 10 sections, followed by a schedule reproducing all 46 sections of Undripp. So we'll go through it. Section 1 is interpretation. It defines the declaration as undrip, reproduced in the schedule. Indigenous peoples has the same meaning as Aboriginal peoples in the Section 35 of the Constitution,

and Indigenous governing body is an entity authorized to act on behalf of Indigenous peoples who hold Section 35 rights. The word authorized matters. The law does not say any organization can simply declare itself the government of a rights-holding people. But DRIPA does not provide a detailed test for authorization. It does not tell us exactly what happens when elected and hereditary chiefs disagree, when competing bodies claim authority, or when neighboring nations assert rights over the same territory. Section 1 also requires government to consider the diversity of indigenous peoples, their language, cultures, legal traditions, institutions, governance structures, and relations. to territory. It says nothing in DRIPA diminishes rights protected by Section 35, and subsection

1-4 adds that nothing in the act should be interpreted as delaying the application of Undrip to BC laws. Section 2.2 identifies three purposes, affirming Undripp's application to BC laws, contributing to its implementation, and supporting relationships with indigenous governing bodies. Section 3 contains the most consequential sentence in the Act, and I want to read it exactly and precisely. In consultation and cooperation with indigenous peoples in British Columbia, the government must take all measures necessary to ensure the laws of British Columbia are consistent with the declaration. That is, the entire section. One sentence, which sounds wonderfully straightforward,

until it produces opposing judicial decisions and a trip to the Supreme Court of Canada. The section says must, not may, it must do this, but it does not define consistent all measures necessary or what happens when the province and indigenous representatives disagree. Most importantly, it does not clearly answer whether Section 3 directs governments to undertake a gradual legislative process or gives courts an immediate role in declaring existing provincial laws inconsistent with UNRIP. And that is the heart of the Gatsala appeal. Section 4 requires government to prepare and implement an action plan to achieve UNRIP's objectives in consultation and cooperation with indigenous peoples. The plan must include a review date and be laid

before the legislature. The first action plan reviewed in 2022 contains eight 89 actions. It is not itself 89 new laws. Some measures require legislation while others proceed through policy, negotiation, or spending. GRIPA requires the plan to be tabled, but not a legislative vote on each commitment. Section 5 requires an annual report on progress under section 3 and the action plan. It must be prepared in consultation and cooperation with indigenous peoples and presented to the legislature by June 30th. That requires transparency, but, But these are government reports, not independent audits of economic outcomes, public costs, or unintended consequences. Section 6 permits a cabinet minister acting for the province to enter an agreement with an indigenous governing body.

Section 7 deals with decision-making agreements. This is the other section everyone should understand. Cabinet may authorize a minister to negotiate an agreement for the joint exercise of a statutory decision, making power, or, in the law's exact words, the consent of the indigenous governing body before the exercise of a statutory power of decision. That is consent language. But it is not an automatic province-wide veto for every first nation over every government decision. Section 7 creates a mechanism for a specific agreement, with a specific indigenous government.

governing body concerning a specific statutory decision. Under a joint agreement, the parties exercise the power together. Under a consent agreement, the indigenous governing body's approval is required before the covered power can be exercised. Within that defined agreement, withholding consent can stop the decision. Section 7 also requires the minister within 15 days after cabinet authorizes negotiations to publish a summary of those intended to be consulted. The final agreement must appear in the BC Gazette before taking effect, but DRIPA does not require a referendum or a separate legislative vote. Section 8 says the general offense provision in the Offense Act does not apply. In ordinary language, DRIPA does not create a provincial offense simply because someone

contravenes it. Section 9 gives cabinet regulation-making power. And Section 10 says the act came into force on Royal Ascent, which occurred on November 28, 2019. Then comes the schedule containing Undrip itself. And there's one more piece outside of DRIPA. In 2021, the legislature amended the Section 8.1 of the Interpretation Act. It says, Every provincial enactment must be interpreted as upholding Section 35 rights, and that every act and regulation must be construed as being consistent with Andrip. And that matters because simply repealing DRIPA would not necessarily remove Undrip's interpretive role. A government's serious about doing that would also have to address the Interpretation Act. reading the law lets us reject exaggerations from both sides.

DREPA does not declare the First Nations own every acre of British Columbia, it is not extinguished, crown sovereignty, cancel fee simple title, or automatically hand every First Nation a veto over every provincial decision. But it's also not symbolic. It directs government to take all measures necessary to make BC laws consistent with all 46 articles of under it says application should not be delayed it supports a province wide action plan it influences statutory interpretation it authorizes joint decision making and it expressly permits agreements requiring indigenous consent before defined provincial powers are exercised so who's their serious

legal commitments the uncertainty lives in the questions the statute does not answer clearly Who on earth decides consistency? How is authorization established? How are overlapping claims handled? What happens to third parties? And how much authority should cabinet be able to share through negotiated agreements without returning to the legislature? And those questions became urgent through the Gatsala litigation. Under British Columbia's mineral claim system, a registered free miner could record a claim online over crowd. land, receiving a legally significant mineral interest without prior consultation. Gitsalination and another challenged that system. In 2023, the BC Supreme Court concluded that registering mineral claims triggered that constitutional duty to consult and that the automated system breached that duty. But the judge rejected the broader argument that DRIPA independently empowered courts to decide whether provincial laws were consistent with UNRIP.

That point is really important. The nations won meaningful relief under Section 35, even though they initially lost the larger DRIPA argument. In 2025, a 2 to 1 majority of the BC Court of Appeal went even further. It concluded that DRIPA incorporated Undrip into the positive law of British Columbia as an interpretative instrument with immediate legal effect. The majority held. the courts could determine whether provincial laws were inconsistent with Undrip and declared the mineral claim regime inconsistent because it provided no consultation.

The court did not say every inconsistency automatically invalidates a statute. A declaration of inconsistency is not the same thing as striking a law down under the Constitution. But the implications reach far beyond mineral claims. How many BC laws may be challenged. against 46 broadly framed international articles. Who draws the line between rights, minimum standard, and aspirations? Does the elected legislature control the pace of alignment, or can judges assess existing laws before the political work is complete?

The province appealed. In May 26, the Supreme Court of Canada agreed to hear the case, until it rules the Court of Appeal judgment stands. The legal uncertainty now is real, but so was the original injustice. The province was allowing mineral claims to be acquired in claimed indigenous territories without even speaking to the people asserting rights there. So fair analysis has to hold both facts at once. Then there was your favorite topic, the Cowichin decision.

The Cowichin title case began in 2014. Five years before Drippa, the claim. was grounded in Section 35 and decades of Aboriginal title law. In 2025, the BC Supreme Court recognized Aboriginal title over lands connected to the historic village of Tlucktanus in Richmond and found certain government held fee simple interests, defective and invalid. DRIPA did not create the title claim, the legal test, or the remedy. The judge did refer to the Interpretation Act requirement that legislation be construed consistently with UNRIP as additional support in interpreting the Land Title Act, that means the framework associated with DRIPA was not entirely

absent, but it was supporting reasoning not the constitutional foundation of the decision. So here's like a clean summary. DRIPA did not cause Cowchin, but saying it had absolutely no relevance goes too far. and repealing Dripa would not erase the couch in decision. It would not repeal Section 35, eliminate Aboriginal title, reverse earlier Supreme Court decisions, or make pending claims disappear. Those issues must be addressed through appeals, constitutional legislation, negotiation, compensation, or some combination of all of them. Has DRIPA delivered what government promised? British Columbia did something significant when it adopted DRIPA.

It became the first province in Canada to enact legislation implementing under it. Government presented that as a new approach that would strengthen relationships with First Nations, reduce conflict, and create and produce greater certainty for investment. At the time, nobody could point to another province and demonstrate exactly how the experiment would go. British Columbia was really that test case. We are no longer limited to debating its intentions now, though. We can now begin examining the results, the outcomes, and their impacts. Has DRIPA reduced conflict or created additional grounds for litigation?

Has it made project approvals more predictable or introduced additional decision makers and legal tests? have consent agreements produced durable certainty or certainty only after a particular indigenous government supports a project? And when courts began treating the language as legally enforceable, why exactly did the government seem so surprised? In my interview with Aboriginal law expert Thomas Isaac, you reduced the legal problem to a few words. must means must

his criticism was that the British Columbia enacted a mandatory obligation before establishing what complete consistency with underwood would require or whether complete consistency was even possible within Canada's constitution, division of powers, and existing rights. The government's response to the Gatsala decision makes that criticism difficult to dismiss. Premier David Eby warned that the Court of Appeals' interpretation created enormous uncertainty

and risked putting courts in the driver's seat. His government considered amending or temporarily suspending central provisions before retreating after intense opposition from First Nations leaders. But E.B. was Attorney General when the Interpretation Act was amended to say every provincial act and regulation must be construed as consistent with undrep. Government cannot use sweeping language, celebrate legislation as transformative, and then act astonished when judges conclude that it transforms something.

The Supreme Court may ultimately narrow or reject the Court of Appeals' interpretation, but businesses, communities, and citizens must make decisions before the appeal is ultimately resolved. and that brings us to the economic concern. Major projects require enormous investments long before they produce revenue. A mine, a mill, a pipeline, a transmission line, a forestry operation or housing development may require hundreds of millions, if not billions of dollars.

Investors need to know which government processes have authority, which approvals are required, what criteria will be applied, how long the process will take and whether an approval will remain valid. Crazy, right? They do not need a guarantee that every project will be approved. They need confidence that the rules are knowable and that a final decision will eventually be final. If every provincial law may be challenged for inconsistency with a 46 Article International Declaration,

that risk must be priced into their investment decisions. If consent may be required, businesses need to know whose consent and at what stage and according to which criteria. If several nations claim the same territory, they need to know whether an agreement with one protects them from the challenge of another. When those questions cannot be answered, financing becomes more expensive, timelines become harder to predict, and some projects go elsewhere. Capital does not wait patiently for Canadian courts to spend 10 years explaining what government meant. They just leave. A 2026 Business Council of British Columbia member survey found that 74% of respondents were reducing investment plans in the province. 73% reported increased time, cost, complexity, or uncertainty in permitting.

41% reported greater difficulty obtaining outside financing. 98% said Drippa was not providing the investment certainty originally promised. That is a survey of one business organization, not a scientific consensus of every company in British Columbia. It does not prove that every DRIPA caused every investment decision. Taxes, commodity prices, energy costs, permitting delays, and the wider Canadian economy also still matter, but dismissing the results would be reckless. Business leaders do not need to prove causation in courts before choosing to invest somewhere more predictable. The Supreme Court's hide a nation decision established that the Crown may have a duty to consult before Aboriginal

title or rights are proven. That prevents governments from permanently damaging a claimed right while a nation spends decades establishing it. But the duty operates on a sliding scale. The required consultation depends on the apparent strength of the claim and the seriousness of the potential impact. That flexibility allows courts to account for different circumstances. It also makes it harder to know precisely when enough consultation is actually enough. Heideonation did not give First Nations a veto. The Supreme Court expressed expressly said, consultation does not require agreement. DRIPA did not create that uncertainty. and the concern is that it placed another uncertain standard on top of it.

And the Tall Ten agreements show both the promise and the limits of consent-based decision-making. In 2022, the province and Tall Tan Central Government signed British Columbia's first Section 7 consent agreement for the proposed reopening of the Etzke Creek Gold and Silver Mine. A second agreement followed in 2023 concerning major changes to the Red Criss Mine. These agreements do more than require the government to listen to the Taltan before making its own decision. The Taltan conduct their own assessment, their decision makers consider technical reports, environmental effects, potential benefits and engagement with Talton members and elders. The provincial environmental assessment office conducts a separate assessment. If the Taltan consent and the province approves, the project may proceed subject to conditions.

If the Taltan withhold consent, the province may request reconsideration, but if the answer remains no, the project cannot proceed. Governments resist calling this a veto. It argues that a veto suggests arbitrarily an unlimited power, whereas these agreements apply to a specific project, establish defined processes, and permit reconsideration. That distinction matters legally, but from the proponent's perspective, the practical result is also clear,

Without Tal-Tan's consent, these projects cannot proceed. In January 2020-6, both governments approved the Etzke Creek project with 38 legally binding conditions. Supporters can reasonably point that as evidence that indigenous consent does not automatically stop development. The process produced an approved mine under conditions accepted by the Taltan that may strengthen community support and reduce the risk of. protests or litigation. It may also be more efficient than approving a mine first and fighting about First Nations rights afterward. But one successful project does not prove the model will create certainty everywhere. The Tultan have an established central government, significant technical capacity and decades of experience with the mining industry. Mining is also important to the

Tall Ten community themselves. Not every region has those same conditions. Not every nation can conduct a separate environmental assessment. Not every territory has one governing body accepted by all rights holders. Not every boundary is agreed upon. Not every indigenous community supports resource development. The Tall Ten model may provide strong certainty after consent is secured. The harder questions arise before that point. How much must a proponent invest before learning whether the answer is yes? What criteria will determine consent? What happens if the project or indigenous leadership changes? What happens when elected leaders, hereditary leaders, or neighboring nations, disagree? Can an agreement with one nation protect a company from litigation by another? Those questions will determine

whether the Tallinn Agreement becomes a broadly workable model or a model that functions only under favourable circumstances. The Haida Title Agreement raises a different set of issues. In 2024, British Columbia recognized Haida Aboriginal title over the provincial crown lands throughout Haida Gwai through negotiation rather than waiting for a court to decide the title case. The agreement expressly protects private property, local government jurisdiction, and public infrastructure. Provincial laws continue to apply during the transition, and existing permits and releases remain in effect. Those protections are really important. It would be inaccurate to tell homeowners the agreement simply confiscated their houses.

But acknowledging those protections does not answer every legitimate question. The province recognized title across an enormous area without requiring high donation to prove occupation and exclusivity through a public trial. government believed the Haida possessed an exceptionally strong case and that negotiation would be faster, cheaper, and more predictable than decades of litigation. And that may be true. If the Heide Nation had established title in court, the resulting disruption might have been greater than the negotiated agreement. But negotiation also meant that the historical evidence, boundaries, and possible competing interests were not tested through the ordinary trial process before the agreement was. reached. That raises democratic questions. How much authority should cabinet possess to

recognize title over vast areas of public land through bilateral negotiations? What evidence exactly did it consider? What alternatives were considered? How were residents, businesses, and the wider provincial public represented? Existing permits and leases continued during the transition, but your permit remains valid today is not the same as knowing whether it can be renewed, expanded, or transferred, or financed 20 years from now. If forestry, tourism, mining, or another industry depends on crown land, the destination of the transition matters enormously. A transition creates certainty only when people understand both the destination and the rules of getting there. The fair conclusion is not that every DRIPA agreement is

hostile to development. S.K. Creek demonstrates that consent-based decision-making can produce a yes. The HIDA agreement may ultimately prove more stable than decades of litigation, but neither example establishes that the wider uncertainty has been resolved. Drupal was sold partly as a mechanism for economic certainty, the Gittsalah litigation, government's attempted amendments and suspension, disagreements over the word must, and concern over business community suggests the law may instead be chilling investment. That does not prove the answer is to eliminate indigenous participation. It means government must define the rules before asking citizens, communities and investors

to rely on them. Keep it, repeal it, or fix it. First, let's start with the defense of DRIPA. It begins with the fact that uncertainty doesn't. predate DRIPA. Government authorized development where indigenous rights and title were unresolved. Consultation often came late and litigation became the way to define basic relationships. From this perspective, DRIPA does not create the conflict. It offers negotiation as the way out. Supporters point to agreements with the Taltan as evidence that consent and resource development can coexist.

A project may be more secure than when an affected nation participates in the decision shares in the benefits and agrees with the result. They also argue that unilateral repeal would destroy trust. First Nations helped develop Trippa and understood it as a durable commitment, not a promise government could abandon when implementation became difficult. There is a force to that argument. Governments should not make historic promises, encourage reliance on them, then quietly withdraw them when the courts begin enforcing the words they agreed to. But defending DRIPA cannot mean pretending its operation is perfectly clear. The province itself said the Court of Appeals interpretation created serious and legal certainty.

It considered amendments, then a temporary suspension, then abandoned both under political pressure. It is difficult to tell citizens and investors that the law is obvious when the government that wrote it is asking the Supreme Court to explain it. The strongest case for repeal is that Section 35 already exists, and it is domestic constitutional framework developed over decades. DRIPA placed a broad international declaration over it without defining how conflict would be resolved. It did not define when free, prior, and informed consent is legally required. It did not create a province-wide process for identifying the governing body that represents the rights holders. It did not resolve territorial overlaps, clearly protect existing approvals, or explain what happens when undripped interest conflicts with another right or a compelling public interest. Repeal could remove the ambiguous layer and return disputes to the constitutional treaties, specific statutes, and Canadian Aboriginal law.

The weakest argument for repeal is that it would make reconciliation unnecessary. It would not. The duty to consult would remain. Aboriginal title would remain treaty rights would remain. Projects on established title end would generally need consent unless an infringement could be justified under the constitutional test. Government and businesses would still need relationships with First Nations. A government that repealed DRIPA and tried to ignore these realities would be back in court before the ink was dry. repeal also raises practical questions. What happens to existing Section 7 agreements? Do they continue, expire, or move under another statute? What happens to projects already using them? And because the Interpretation Act separately invokes UNRIP, a one-liner repeal bill would not even complete the stated job.

So I do not believe keeping DRIPA unchanged is a credible argument, but I also do not believe repealing one statute solves the underlying issue. British Columbia should substantially amend or repeal and replace it with clearer domestic law. That law should explain exactly how undrip influences provincial legislation. It should establish transparent rules for consultation, accommodation, and consent. It should define how an indigenous body is authorized and how overlapping claims are addressed. It should protect private property, valid permits, and investments made in good faith. And it should preserve the legislature's responsible.

to balance indigenous rights with the economic environmental and social interests of the province, subject always to the Constitution and independent courts. That will not satisfy everyone, and I know people are starting to type on their keyboards right now in response to that. Some supporters will call it retreat, some opponents will say it preserves too much. But a consequential law cannot be judged by which political tribe cheers the loudest. It should be judged by whether citizens can understand it, governments can administer it, courts can interpret it, and communities and businesses can rely on it. Conclusion. The only durable path is a public one. After reading the law, considering the history, and listening to the arguments, I believe there is only one durable path forward.

British Columbia needs a province-wide public conversation about Aboriginal. rights, title, and reconciliation. Not another private working group, not another agreement negotiated first and explained afterward. Not another announcement. Assuring people everything is clear while the province asks the Supreme Court for clarity. The government should establish an independent public commission. It should include First Nations rights holders, constitutional experts, who disagree with one another, municipalities, industry, labor, property. owners and citizens from across the province. Its first task should be education. Explain Section 35. Explain Aboriginal title and the duty to consult. Explain the difference between established

title, treaty rights, asserted claims, and traditional territory maps. Explain free and prior informed consent, Section 7, consent agreements, and territorial overlap. Publish the legal and economic evidence behind available choices. Then hold hearings throughout British Columbia, not just Vancouver and Victoria, listen to four street towns, mining communities, municipalities, and First Nations, let homeowners, workers, entrepreneurs, indigenous citizens, and chiefs speak, let experts challenge one another in public. People should be expected to be respectful, but respect cannot mean permitting only approved opinions. A homeowner worried about property is not

automatically an enemy of indigenous people. A First Nation citizen describing generations of dispossession is not an enemy of Canada. A worker whose job depends on resource project is not morally inferior for caring about employment. The purpose is not to make everyone comfortable. It is to make every legitimate interest visible. I know people on the political left and other First Nation leaders will disagree with me. They may say, constitutional rights should never be on the public to vote on. And on that narrow point, I understand. British Clemians cannot vote Aboriginal title out of the Constitution. A referendum cannot extinguish title, cancel treaties, or abolish the duty to consult. But the Constitution does not answer every question of implementation.

When should consent be required? Which governing body may exercise authority? How are overlapping claims resolved? What protects private property and existing permits? When should a agreements transferring public power require legislative approval. What accountability follows the exercise of that authority, and how should Undrip influence every other provincial law? Those are public policy decisions involving crown land, legislation, democratic power, investment, and taxpayer money. British Columbians have both a right and a responsibility to participate in those.

And I say that is a chief in my community. I do not simply announce that I have the right vision and demand that my members accept it. Our laws require votes on major questions. Leadership must explain the proposal. Answer criticisms and accept that people may reject the idea. That is not something to fear. It is where legitimacy comes from. So why is it frightening for the province to do the same?

Why should a framework capable of a fact that? affecting every provincial act and regulation require less public ownership. The answer cannot be that ordinary citizens are incapable of understanding. Democracy asks people to weigh difficult questions all the time. Government's job is to provide honest information in a fair process, not to avoid participation because the result is uncertain. And First Nation governments also have responsibilities here. We cannot demand a government-to-government relationship when agreements are negotiated,

then treat the concerns of our partners' citizens as somebody else's problem. Many nations and leadership organizations have communications teams, legal counsel, and policy experts. We, ourselves, can hold town halls. We can explain what authority we seek, what consent means to us, and how our decisions will consider our neighbors, workers, and businesses. We can answer hard questions instead of demonizing citizens for asking them. If we say we are governments, we must accept the duties of government. Partners do not leave the table when the conversation becomes difficult.

They help one another address the concerns of the people each represents. Public trust is a shared responsibility. That does not mean First Nations surrender rights when somebody objects. Constitutional rights are not opinion polls. It means the exercise of governmental authority should carry transparency, reasons for decisions, conflict of interest rules, reasonable timelines, and independent review. Rights and responsibilities must travel together. For provincial, municipal, and indigenous governments alike.

After the hearings, the commission should present complete options, not slogans, substantial amendment or repeal and replacement. With the consequence for consent, existing agreements overlaps, property, investments, and accountability clearly stated. Then, publish the actual draft law in plain language. Let British Columbians read it before politicians vote on it. let First Nations assess whether it respects their constitutional rights, let businesses tested against real projects, like municipalities and property owners,

see precisely how they are affected. Once that work is complete, I believe the implementation framework should be put to British Columbians in a referendum. Again, the question would not be whether indigenous people possess rights. They do. The question would be whether voters approve the proposed provincial framework for implementing those rights and guiding reconciliation. A successful vote would not eliminate disagreement. It would create a democratically legitimate foundation. A failed vote would

not extinguish constitutional rights. It would tell leaders that the proposal had not earned public confidence and needed improvement. People can swallow a difficult decision when they know they were heard, had access to the evidence, and were allowed to contribute. What people struggle to accept is being told that a fundamental change was negotiated behind closed doors, that the consequences are too complicated to explain and that questioning it makes them part of the problem. Any replacement should be measured by outcomes. Has litigation declined? Our decisions faster and more reliable.

Is investment growing? Our First Nation communities seeing greater prosperity. Our overlaps being resolved. private property secure, has trust improved. Annual reports should measure those results, not merely count meetings and announcements. The law should require an independent review after five years and change if it is failing. As a First Nations chief, I want our people to prosper. I want legitimate rights recognized, historic claims resolved and First Nation governments equipped to build

housing, protect culture, and create opportunity for everyone. But leadership cannot mean seeing only the people on one side of the table. It also means seeing the homeowner who followed every rule, the worker whose livelihood depends on a project, the entrepreneur, risking personal savings, the taxpayer funding public services and agreements, and the neighboring community living with decisions it did not make. Those people are not obstacles to reconciliation. They are participants in it. Our ancestors fought for us to have a voice.

We honor them by using that voice judiciously and justly, not by treating every criticism as an attack, avoiding accountability or blaming others whenever trust breaks down. British Columbia can turn this into its greatest weakness. We can remain trapped between court decisions, emergency amendments, abandon suspensions and political accusations. Homeowners can question whether their property is secure. Businesses can question whether approvals will last. Other provinces, countries, and investors can look at us and wonder whether we still know how to make a decision.

Or this can become one of our greatest strengths. We can prove that indigenous rights, democratic legitimacy, and economic prosperity are not enemies of each other. First Nations can lead projects that create jobs and public revenue while protecting the lands our communities depend on. Businesses can know the rules. Homeowners can know their property is secure. Indigenous governments can exercise meaningful authority with meaningful accountability, and the public can see reconciliation is something built with them, not imposed upon them. them. British Columbia was right to recognize that the old approach was failing. It was right to pursue negotiation instead of endless litigation. But being first does not make a law immune

from criticism. Leadership means examining the results. Admitting where the design failed and correcting it before uncertainty does lasting damage. We are stronger together. But the, the, But those words mean nothing unless we are willing to hear from one another, explain ourselves, and share responsibility for the future we create. The province attempted to lead by adopting DRIPA, and it can lead again by opening the doors, trusting its citizens, and building a framework that respects indigenous rights, protects the wider public, and urns legitimacy required to endure. That is how we reconcile a dark history. while creating the brightest possible future.