Odd Lots - CFTC Chair Rostin Behnam on the Fight to Regulate Crypto
Episode Date: May 18, 2023We're still in the middle of a "crypto winter" with the price of coins well off their highs from back in 2021. But debates over how to regulate them are heating up, with significant disagreements amon...g US politicians and agency chiefs. At the recent ISDA Annual General Meeting, we sat down with CFTC Chief Rostin Behnam to talk about his view on crypto rules and more. Among the things we discussed are what constitutes a security or a commodity, market structure questions, new types of betting markets, and other matters currently facing the CFTC. See omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.
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distributor. Hello and welcome to an episode of the Odd Lots podcast. I'm Tracy Allaway. And I'm Joe
We're very happy to be recording a live episode in Chicago at the ISDA AGM. There are a lot of talking
points. You hear a lot of things like leverage, liquidity risk, how to properly regulate and
handle trillions of dollars worth of derivatives. But there's another thing that you hear quite a bit about
as well, Joe. Right. Of course, nonstop talk about crypto. Obviously, crypto itself wanes and ebbs in terms of
how much people are interested or paying attention. Maybe we're still in a winter right now. But I feel like
the next time there's a summer, a lot of how that market looks is going to be based on decisions and
choices that are happening today by industry participants and regulators. Perhaps ironically, but not necessarily
unexpectedly, when the lines on the chart go down in crypto, there does seem to be some extra
regulatory attention paid to the market. So I am very pleased to say that we have the perfect guest
to discuss all of this. We are going to be speaking with CFTC Chairman Russ Benham. Russ,
thank you so much for coming on all thoughts. Thanks, Tracy. Thanks, Joe. It's good to be here.
I want to start out with a very simple question that I think everyone agrees on. Who should regulate
crypto? Well, you know, we have a very unique system of financial regulators in the U.S. I don't think
new or something novel to either of you or the audience or the listeners as well.
And I think it's been built up over decades.
It's been built up as a result of crises in different instances or sort of inflection points
in the financial history of the U.S., both monetary system and financial markets.
But because of that, we have over time developed a pretty comprehensive regulatory system
where each agency, whether it's the market regulators or the prudential regulators,
has a unique responsibility.
And it really falls on what type of asset are they regulating.
Is it a banking asset?
Is it a market sort of financial asset
or trading markets and whatnot?
And we have the SEC and the CFTC as a market regulators
and the banking regulators, which include the Fed, OCC, FDIC.
So as much as the crypto conversation presents new
and novel issues and questions about the underlying asset,
how to regulate it, whether to regulate it,
I do think, and I've said this many times before, we have to sort of use the same playbook
that we've used in the past as we think about policy that we construct for crypto.
So you mentioned that people are aware of, you know, the unique nature of the U.S. regulatory
regime.
But as much as we sort of know that, like I still have very, you know, I'm not a Washington person.
I don't know how it works.
Like, do you and your counterparts of the other agencies, you know, we see these headlines, right?
We'll talk about that as like, the CFTC has one view and this SEC is.
another view on these things. Do you guys call each other up and chat? Like, how does that work?
That sort of, yeah, do you guys just talk? Gensler is here later. Yeah, like, can we get them on
throwing that out there? Do you guys, yeah, do you just talk about these things? We, we absolutely
do talk. We talk within the context of a lot of the interagency working groups, which you're
familiar with the FSOC or the president's working group, but we also do have one-on-one
conversations. And a lot of these conversations that we have, and this is my perspective, of course,
I can't speak for the others is high level, sort of 30,000 feet about what we're thinking,
what we're seeing, who the registrant pool is that we're starting to observe within our markets
and how we need to approach this. A lot of the work gets done at the staff level, a lot of the
technical, legal work, economic work. But we are shaping policy and we're shaping decisions as
we see risks emerge as we see new markets emerge. But communication is frequent. It's very
transparent. And I will say this. I've said this many, many times before, we have common interests
across the U.S. government in terms of what we want to accomplish and how we want to accomplish it.
Can you maybe clarify that last bit? Because there is this ongoing debate about whether or not
crypto should be regulated in a meaningful way at all. I guess the argument against regulating it would be
that that way you kind of keep it out of the walled financial system. You get less contagion.
So what exactly are you thinking in terms of regulating the space?
What is the end goal?
Yeah, you know, this is a question that I think about a lot, but it really comes down to me thinking about my position and my current role and how that intersects with the markets as they're developing.
And I know, and I can appreciate that others, including yourselves, might have a different perspective about crypto, how if it should be regulated and the experiences we had most notably last year in 2022.
and how those repercussions affected traditional markets, if at all.
And there's a strong argument that they didn't impact the traditional markets.
But as I think about my role, and let's just break down that, you know, that puzzle of financial regulators in the U.S.
as one of two chairs of the two market regulators in the U.S., it's very difficult for me to sit back and say,
you know what, this will just fizzle over time, or this is not in the best interest of the United States
or economy, national security, or whatnot. Or we don't have to necessarily worry about this because
there's no contagion risk to other parts of traditional markets. I think we've all read or heard or maybe
know individuals who were hurt from last year's turmoil in the crypto markets. It is a largely
unregulated market, notwithstanding some state-level requirements. And I do think my responsibility
within the context of the mission of the CFDC is to protect investors. And when it comes to
commodity financial assets, which many of these tokens are, I have to do everything I can with the
power I have as chair of the CFDC to ensure that U.S. customers are protected. And we use every
tool we have within our toolbox, whether it's regulatory, whether it's putting out,
notices and advisories, or most notably and importantly, is using our law enforcement tool
through enforcement. So we continue to use these tools, but I don't see, given the way the market's
developing and evolving, and the CFTC does have a unique role and has had a unique relationship
with crypto. Our relationship with crypto at the CFTC certainly precedes me. It goes back to 2014
is, I think, when we brought our first enforcement case. And we've seen the development.
of derivatives products on crypto. Over many years, we have listed futures contracts on both
Bitcoin and Ether going back several years now. So we do have a very vested interest in the protection
and the monitoring and the surveillance of this underlying cash market, which, as I said,
remains largely unregulated. So I will continue advocating. I think there's a lot of
individuals in Congress and around Washington who agree with me, and certainly some who
disagree, but I do always sort of fall back to that home base for myself as chair of this agency
that I have to focus on protecting U.S. customers. And as long as this market exists,
potentially grows, ebbs and flows in terms of size and market cap, we need to do whatever we can
to protect those investors. All right. So we've been talking a little bit high level here. So I want
to like jump into just a specific question. And you mentioned the existence of Bitcoin and
ether futures that are traded. My understanding is that on the matter of ether specifically,
there is a different perspective at the CFTC and the SEC. Is it a commodity? Is it a security?
And I have kind of a two-part question, which is, you know, how do you arrive at the view that say
ether is a commodity and therefore should be regulated as such? And then more, I guess more importantly,
you know, there are other coins out there. And so there are other Ethereum competitors,
level one blockchain platforms like a Solana or something,
would the logic that leads you to sort of make the case
that Ethereum should be seen as a commodity
apply to other coins potentially as well?
Well, it's less logic as opposed to legal analysis.
And maybe, you know, those are within the same Venn diagram, right?
Sure.
Legal analysis, hopefully is logical.
My husband's a lawyer, and I would debate that statement.
Yeah.
But, you know, we, as I said, and Joe, you pointed this out.
We have two listed futures contracts, one on Bitcoin and one on ETH.
And this is not because we, the CFTC, sought out market participants or exchanges and
said, you should do this.
Nor is it because we have a list on our website that says these tokens are commodities
and these tokens are securities.
This was a market-driven effort by exchanges, probably driven by client demand, to list
to particular tokens.
And the process that sort of transpires
when you list a contract,
and this is not unique to crypto,
this happens in that.
The ag complex, the energy complex,
the metals complex, and others is,
you know, there's legal analysis done
by the exchange.
They have to conform with the laws
and the regulations of the CFDC.
There's open dialogue over sometimes many months
to make sure that the contract conforms
with our legal requirements.
And then at some point, there's two avenues to go down.
You can something called self-certify a contract
or you can seek approval from the commission.
So this is what happened with both the Bitcoin
and the ether contract, Bitcoin in 2017, Ether and about 2020.
And that is what we've done historically and consistently.
And in the context of your question about,
is it a security or is it a commodity,
there's no doubt, you know, we within the agency
and at the staff level, examine the characteristics of a financial asset to ensure that it complies
with the law and that it falls within the definition of a commodity, and more importantly,
is not a security.
If you look up at the definition of a commodity under the Commodity Exchange Act,
nearly everything is a commodity, including a security.
It's just securities are exempt from the CEA.
So we do have dialogue with the SEC and other agencies, and we go through this sort of
legal analysis to ensure that we feel confident that when an exchange or registrant lists a contract,
it does in fact comply with the law. Now, I'll add very quickly, and many in this room know this,
and I'm sure many of your listeners know this as well, we have to drive our legal analysis from
legal precedent, which your husband will know, right, in this how we test, which talks about,
you know, four factors about an investment of money and a common enterprise with an expectation of
profit from the work of others. And that, for better or for work,
is this sort of driving force that sits as the foundation of our legal analysis to this day
for digital assets when we think about that question about securities versus commodities.
And I know Congress is contemplating this. We've raised this question. There are many characteristics
about the digital financial assets, which are common to traditional financial assets,
but there are certainly many characteristics which are unique and I think demand a unique set of
thoughts and policy-driven ideas about how and whether we should regulate it.
So just on that note, could you have a situation where someone creates a coin or a token
and they're raising money and it is a security as defined by legal precedent and, you know,
the how we test and things like that? But then technology enables it to become decentralized
enough that it could be a commodity. Yeah, I mean, there's no doubt about that. And this is certainly
a question that we've been grappling with, and I know Congress is thinking about it as well,
that initially, Tracy, as you point out, there's going to be a pooling of capital from investors
to start a protocol or to start a project, and at some point there would be a milestone or
an inflection point where that asset flips from being a security because of those characteristics
and then ends up being a commodity. We've never had to deal with this, I think, in the context
of traditional non-digital assets. But again, these are the types of questions that I
think force policymakers, elected officials to think about which regime do these financial assets
properly fit into. And the policy case that I've made as the chair of the CFTC is, you know,
we have to think about how these assets exist within the financial ecosystem and what
requirements we should layer on to each of the financial assets as it relates to customers.
and investors, right? And if you think about the SEC and the 33 Act and the 34 Act and how and why
that those laws were built, it is in fact, this term is thrown around a lot, but to bridge an
information gap between an issuer of a security and an investor, right, to provide as much
information between that centralized body of individuals that's running a company or running
an organization or running a common enterprise so that investor, whether retail or institution,
can make the most informed decision. Fine. Commodity markets are completely different in the sense that you
have decentralized financial assets, whether it's weak, whether it's crude, whether it's palladium,
and you want to create a resilient, transparent market environment so that the individual investor,
whether retail, but more commonly institutional, understands the risks associated with investing in
commodity markets, but more importantly can understand and know with confidence that the infrastructure
around those trading markets, whether it's the intermediary, the exchange, the clearinghouse,
the custodian are well regulated and sort of resilient in their ability to manage that trading
and that execution.
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So you mentioned when any new commodity or when any new future is launched,
the entity can either self-certify or go to you for approval.
There is one type of entity that I'm pretty sure does not do any of that,
and that is defy exchanges.
If I were to launch a defy exchange, I come up with some new code that's like,
oh, this could be a novel way of trading.
futures for some of these digital assets. What do I have to do to be in your good graces?
What would constitute, are any defy exchanges doing that? What would get me in trouble?
And are the laws clear for someone interested in the space such that they could like create a code,
manage the code, manage a Dow perhaps that runs the code such that they can stay on your good side?
Yeah, Joe, you wouldn't be the first who would do that. So you're a little bit behind the
the ball there. But, you know, this does raise questions about whether or not you have individuals
involved in programming and what the code is and how it's set. But ultimately, and I do think,
you know, this raises this question about regulation by enforcement. And I very vigorously oppose,
at least from a CFTC perspective, and that's the only agency I can speak for, is that we have
done everything in our power, while I've been changed.
and including my predecessors,
to remain transparent and to engage with market participants
in this digital asset, defy space,
to ensure they know as much as they can
about what the Commodity Exchange Act requires
and what is required of them
if they're going to offer futures, options, or swaps to U.S. customers.
And I think it's easy to suggest,
oh, there's no institution, there's no individual,
it's just code, you can't regulate that.
It's sort of self-effectuated,
But that's really the wrong set of questions.
It's really about what are U.S. customers being offered and exposed to
and who is either individual or the group of individuals who set up that entity, that code,
to offer those products.
So we are not legal counsel.
We don't provide legal advice per se, and I know that's a challenge.
There are barriers to entry, as many people in this audience knows,
to participate in regulated markets.
But regulated markets are why we have the best markets in the U.S. and in the world.
And it really is incumbent on individuals to understand and appreciate that if you're going to offer derivatives to U.S. customers, there is a very well-developed and mature legal base and requirements for complying with the law.
Speaking of exchanges, this wasn't necessarily a defy exchange, but a centralized one. I want to personally thank you for producing one of the most entertaining legal documents of all time in the form of the lawsuit against Binance.
And for those of you in the audience who haven't read it, I highly recommend that you do.
It is a good reminder to pick up the phone every once in a while and don't write everything down in emails.
But was there any-
Is that legal advice?
That is not legal advice.
But was there anything in there that surprised you or that said something about the nature of the crypto ecosystem itself and the way that it's being run?
I mean, you had people openly talking about, you know, this might be money-lawful.
but it's only $800. You can't even buy an AK-47 for that.
Well, I'm going to be careful about what I say and what I don't say,
given that it's active litigation. I certainly can say that it was not our intent to entertain,
but, you know, it is certainly a well-developed complaint and credit to staff at the CFDC
for doing the really hard work to put that together. I think at this point, and I've been at the
commission remarkably almost.
six years, nothing surprises me anymore. So we do our work, we do it hard, we know that there's
a lot of individuals out there who either don't want to comply with the law, choose to evade the law,
or don't know about the law. And, you know, sometimes they will do things that are surprising,
including writing things down. But we are focused on making sure we're applying the law,
protecting investors, U.S. investors. And, yeah, that case,
it's ongoing and we're going to keep vigorously bringing bad actors to account here,
and we'll see what happens is that at this point is still active,
and those are only allegations.
Does it feel like the digital nature of this space,
the fact that the participants are so online,
so much of the activity takes place online,
does that make enforcement actions easier or harder from your perspective?
Yeah, it's a good question.
And I think it actually kind of goes to,
I'm going to just pivot a little bit,
but I think within the same context or theme,
you know, there's a lot of individuals
who question the use case for digital assets, right?
And so often we hear about bad actors, elicit finance,
utilizing this vehicle digital assets
to sort of conduct their business,
which is unfortunately nefarious
and sort of contravention to law and good practice.
But what I've observed from a regulatory perspective
and recognizing the sort of counter to that is using traditional paper-backed fiat.
What I've recognized over the past couple years, working with my colleagues at the Treasury Department,
FBI, other law enforcement agencies, other regulators, is we're really developing a lot of
very sophisticated tools to trace the use of digital assets as a means to conduct illegal activity.
So I think from my perspective, it's still a little bit the jury is out.
on whether or not as these technologies develop and as the surveillance tools continue to mature,
whether or not, I think, from a law enforcement perspective,
we're going to be able to root out fraud and manipulation and elicit activity,
in fact, easier than we do under traditional forms of illegal activity.
So a year ago at this time, FTX was still a big thing,
and they were in the process of attempting to sort of restructure how,
or pushing to restructure how futures were traded in the U.S., even beyond crypto,
like a fundamental rethink of how futures are traded with potentially direct access to the exchange,
proposals for 24-7 algorithmic automated margining, things like that.
And at the time, I think you were like somewhat open to this idea.
Then, of course, FTX collapsed a few months later, and I think for now that's dead.
But the core ideas, like, would you still be open to some of these ideas,
and just in terms of like rethinking how we trade,
obviously they're still currently in people's minds
probably associated with FTX,
but the ideas themselves in terms of like
what futures trading could look like in the future,
could you see that conversation revisited at some point?
Yeah, you know, I think if you, as I reflect on 2022
and that FTX sequence of events,
which goes back to 2021 when they bought the entities
sort of that they had purchased was led,
which recently just got auctioned off to a bidder.
I think it's my responsibility
and any chair's responsibility
to always be open to new ideas, right?
We have these very clear milestone moments
in market structure and market technology
over the past hundred years
that clearly have put markets
on a different path and a different course, right?
Whether that was, and in this city,
you can appreciate it better than anything else,
going from pit trading to electronic trading some 20 years ago, right?
That I often would use that example to sort of demonstrate and illustrate how we have to be
open to technological disruptions in market execution.
It's just, if we don't do it, we're going to potentially be behind from an, you know,
U.S. perspective, and I think it's incumbent we think about it.
The other point is, with respect to FTX and ledger X, that was not the first entity to come to the
CFTC and requests an approval for.
non-intermediation, which essentially wasn't what it was. And I said this as well, if you think,
you know, over the course of 2022, as we were reviewing that application, which was a legal requirement
for us to do, this wasn't some sort of arbitrary choice I made of, oh, okay, we have an application,
let's look at it, or I couldn't as easily dismiss it. We have a legal obligation to review and to
respond to applications. And if we don't, then we're actually sort of at legal risk of being sued by
the applicant for not being responsive to them. But we did have two public engagement activities,
we'll call them that. We had a request for information or a consultation document in March of last
year, and then we had a public roundtable around non-intermediation. And that was driven around just
making sure that we were getting as much input from the public, whoever wanted to provide it,
but also to have a larger discussion about market structure and non-intermediation. Because
as we see this digital asset market mature and develop with traditional financial players
wanting a piece and wanting to participate, whether through offering services or assets
to their customers or potentially using the blockchain technology as a foundation for, you know,
banking processes, we have this responsibility, I think, from a regulatory perspective,
to really think through these things.
So despite what happened to FTX, you know, the application was still ongoing.
We weren't close to a decision.
And there were certainly a lot of legal issues, risk issues, and policy questions that we were diving through.
But I certainly think, as I said this before, that proposal wasn't the first of its kind, and it's not going to be the last of its kind.
Speaking of new ideas, I'm going to pivot slightly from crypto, although I think this is actually related to it, because it feels like,
one of the lasting legacies of crypto, no matter what happens now, is it's sort of normalized
gambling behavior by investors. So bets purely on, you know, token go up, token go down,
line on the chart go up or down. And recently we have seen new prediction markets and entities
forming things like Kalshi and Predict it that are offering all different types of bets.
And I'm curious how you are viewing those through the lens of a regulator.
Yeah, you know, I have had conversations with both of those entities,
and there are certainly other entities that are trying or doing similar activities.
And, you know, binary options, these prediction markets are not necessarily novel.
But I think from a policy perspective and from my role, you know, on the one hand,
we have to think about what the law requires.
and the law is very clear when it comes to these types of contracts
that it is illegal to list a contract that has to do with war, assassination,
terrorism, and illegal activity, gaming,
or something that's not in the public interest, right?
So of that five or six items that I just listed off,
most are pretty clear, war, terrorism, assassination,
gaming becomes a trick or a tricky issue that we have dealt with,
and we're dealing with right now, something against the public interest also becomes tricky,
right? And that's where, as we see this emergence of products, and this is a combination or a
confluence of events driven by technology, market disruption, barriers to entry essentially lowering
or being eliminated, and that really is a sort of byproduct of phones and access to markets.
Clearly a shifting in consumer and investor demand, retail investor demand, around products and access
to markets, and then an expansion of the type of products we list, right?
Where historically just down the road, you'd have ag products, you'd have energy products,
you'd have metals products, then you had the emergence of financial futures, you know, 40, 50 years
ago, and now we're sort of entering this next paradigm, and it's been going on for the better
part of a decade, where with this confluence of events, technology, investor behavior,
and barriers to entry, folks are saying, why should we be limited
in the types of products that we can trade or have access to
with this sort of legacy group of products.
Why does it just have to be these few risk management tools?
We have so many risks in the economy.
So many risks are businesses, whether small, mid-sized or large.
So many risks individually.
And we've seen them in the past couple of years,
whether it's Russia invading the Ukraine
and what impact that has on consumer prices and inflation,
whether it's a pandemic, a once-in-a-century pandemic,
that affects every one.
one in a very unique but substantial way, why should we not be able to manage these risks?
So I think from my perspective, I have to always start the baseline as the law, what it allows,
what it doesn't allow, engaging with Congress and seeing whether or not they want to expand or
limit those provisions or keep them the same, and whether within those two provisions I mentioned,
gaming and the public interest, we as a commission and me by proxy as chair can sort of lead a
discussion about what road do we want to go down and what potential products could we start to list
or allow stakeholders registrants to list that would stay within the confines of that legal framework
and also allow markets to evolve, grow, and sort of shift with this consumer sentiment, right?
But there are a lot of risks associated with, you know, potentially listing contracts around
political elections or other types of events. And this is where the community.
mission really has to dig in, get, you know, stakeholder input, but hopefully make decisions in a very
concerted, cautious and balanced way. What is the concern around political contracts? Because just as
the consumer of news, I love them. I love being able to say, oh, you know, so and so is 75. Joe wants to
bet on 2024. No, I don't even want to bet. I just want to see the line. And I actually, you know,
I find it useful to see where consensus is to be able to put a price on that. There are definitely,
there are definitely times where I watch the news. We don't know what's going on. And I look,
and like the markets at like 90%, like the insider,
the people who follow this stuff do know and there's useful information.
They're like, I wanted to exist in 2024.
Why won't it?
So look, I'm unbiased, but I like that.
I believe in markets.
I believe in efficient markets and price discovery, obviously,
and the importance of the intersection between efficient well-run markets
and how they can price risk for capital allocators or decision makers.
I would say, and this is often,
not thought of, and it doesn't surprise me, but just walk you through a hypothetical, and I'm
going to take a quick step back to the crypto conversation. We don't have, and this should be
clear to everyone, I've said this, we've discussed this, I don't have legal authority to police cash
crypto markets. We do have this very limited authority within the CFTC to police cash markets
if there's fraud or manipulation. And the policy idea behind this authority that Congress provided to
us is that if you're going to have potentially fraud or manipulation in an underlying contract
or an underlying cash market that could impact CFTC regulated markets, the CFTC should
be able to police those markets, right? We wouldn't want manipulated cash markets to impact
the markets we regulate. So now let's pivot back to this conversation around election contracts.
In theory, if, and just taking into the context, what we see in the news, what we listen in the news, and
and how news and its impact on elections
and how we behave has changed and evolved
over the past decade,
imagine a situation where we have alleged fraud
or alleged manipulation of an election
and someone coming to the CFDC and say,
you know, you have a contract listed on an election
in X district and Y state, and we,
believe there was fraud because of hardware, software, news, you name it, right? You need to
police that fraud. So without being too indirect, what I'm trying to say is the CFTC could end up being
an election cop. And I don't think that's what Congress meant or intended for us to do. And I think that
raises for me personally, and I can't speak for the commission or my colleagues, a lot of legal
questions and policy questions about whether or not you would want a financial regulator policing
elections. That's super interesting. And I'm now imagining in my head like a headline in the year
2030 about CFTC issues, enforcement action against Russia for election meddling, the sparking
World War III, which I'm sure no one wants. I can't bet on that. I can't bet on it. But actually,
a related question on prediction markets, you talked about people pitching.
these as a hedging strategy. So we have a business risk that might be related to this thing.
And if we had a betting contract, we could mitigate that risk. At what point does that kind of
overlap with insurance? Yeah, I mean, in many respects, derivatives markets have, there is
natural overlaps between insurance markets and derivatives markets. They're unique products,
obviously in the way they're structured and the cost, whether it's the premium on the insurance
side or the margin on the futures or the derivative side, the duration of the contract itself
and this aspect of delivery if you're talking about physical commodities. So there are
many different components or characteristics that differentiate the two, but it's certainly
not a unique, they're both risk management products, right? And it's a question.
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So I want to go back to sort of something that Tracy brought up, which is this sort of like
this gambling on everything mentality. And people are just placing bets on all kinds of things.
And, you know, I was reading some of the public comments to the FTX proposal.
And one of the criticisms of it in terms of restructuring is, oh, this is just going to bring more
retail people into futures trading. It's de facto gambling. People are going to lose a lot of money.
It's very risky. Do you have a position essentially on the question of
like what is the right level of sort of retail participation in these markets? Do you,
do you factor into your thinking like these are sophisticated markets and there should be some
curbs on the degree to which mom and pop is playing in sophisticated financial markets?
Or are you sort of like neutral on this question? And as long as the trading is done with
integrity and not manipulated, that is sort of up for the market to decide how much public
participation there is. Yeah, I mean, it becomes very difficult for me to tell an individual investor
how they can either invest or allocate their capital. I think as chair, you know, my number one
responsibility, and this kind of goes to your point, Joe, is that we do everything we can to ensure
that the markets are transparent, fair, well regulated. As much information is flowing from the
regulated entity to the customer in terms of disclosures about risks associating with, you know,
investing in leverage markets, the risk of loss around any investment at all. And then I think
it puts a burden, and I say that not necessarily in a negative way, on the agency as markets
evolve. And we've seen this, and I'll use a quick example, we all remember the GameStop
Reddit trading in the equity markets back in 2020. We had actually seen quite a sharp move
in some of our markets in the metals complex at the same period.
And it was driven a lot by social media.
Silver.
Right.
And it's hard to move those markets.
Those are very deep markets, very entrenched institutionally.
And to be able to move those markets through some sort of externality.
In this case, social media is not easy.
But point being is we have and we continue to see an influx of retail participation.
of retail interest in our markets.
And this goes to what I was saying earlier
about barriers to entry being lowered
because of technology disruption,
retail behavior shifting
and wanting more access to markets and new products.
And I think that just puts the onus or burden,
however you want to frame it,
on us, including my successors,
to make sure that we're really upping the ante
in terms of how we're sharing information
to investors and the general public
about the risks,
associated with derivatives markets and what it means to invest in these markets and what the
risks are. But going back to your original point, I think it becomes very difficult for any chair
or any commission to say, you can't do this. Now, obviously, we have tests on the equity side.
It's the accredited investor test. With us, we have this eligible contract participant or
ECP, kind of a wonky term, to participate, most notably in swaps markets.
But, you know, we do have some framing about certain markets and who can participate in them.
But if you're thinking about just pure futures and options on futures, in my view,
it's all about disclosures, information flow, and availability and knowledge about risk of loss.
Since we're talking about risk in general, I wanted to ask you about cybersecurity in the aftermath of the ion hack,
which unsettled the derivatives market and probably unsettled some of the,
weekends and work days of some people in this room. You talked about the potential need for additional
rules around cybersecurity. What would those look like and how are you thinking about them?
Yeah, we don't, as a market regulator, and I know the SEC is in the same camp, we don't have
a legal authority to register, to police, to supervise third-party vendors, right? So we have a
registrant who then outsources some back office processing or settlement services.
or cyber services, you name it, I'm sure a lot of these services are outsourced, we cannot
peek into register, regulate, supervise that entity. And I think by and large, this is another
situation which is not uncommon in the regulated space where naturally our registrants have vested
interest in ensuring the viability of their entity and the health of the markets and the ecosystem,
so they're going to do their due diligence. We do have guidance and advisory. We do have guidance and
advisories within the CFTC to say, you know, this is what we expect from you as you engage
and contract with vendor and vendor services. But, you know, Tracy, to your point, the policy
question, especially with what we dealt with with Ion, is should the CFTC have new legal
authority to either, and I'll sort of talk about the spectrum of options is keep things status quo
and just continue to issue either advisories or guidance and best practices of what we expect from
our registrants as they engage with vendors. Or is it to shift to a regulated structure where we then have,
we, the CFTC, have authority to regulate and register in some way, shape, or form the vendor,
the third-party provider, or somewhere in between, and this is not inconsistent with what prudential
regulators currently do. It's called the Bank Supervisory Act, I believe.
is they can supervise vendors or third parties
if that vendor is providing a,
essentially a regulated service to the bank,
to the regulated entity.
And, you know, I propose these ideas to Congress.
I think the conversation is active.
And each has its own benefit and risk.
Each has its own benefit and responsibility.
But I do think it's something that we have to think about
because in the context of cyber risk, regardless of size of the registered entity, this is,
you know, single point of failure issue that, as we saw with ION, which really was not a huge
provider of back office services to U.S. entities, more specifically, this had a pretty significant
impact on our ability to do our job, most notably issue this commitment of traders report,
which, you know, we heard a lot about, but, you know, a serious risk in.
something that I think demands a new policy conversation.
So right before we got on stage, we watched this video about the rise of voluntary carbon markets
and how this is going to be a big market and companies using financial products to offset some of
their carbon consumption.
You know, one of the questions that comes up in carbon markets or offset markets is the
quality of the asset itself.
If I'm buying an offset, did this really reduce some sort of carbon emissions or is it some
sort of, is it a gimmick? Will the CFTC, as these markets develop, mostly just focus on the
trading of these offsets or also the quality of these offsets, the projects that generate these
offsets, whether they're genuinely sort of doing what they claim? Yeah, this goes back again to a
consistent theme of our conversation is what interest do we, the CFTC, have in the regulated market
and then naturally the unregulated market, or the underlying market, excuse me.
So in this case with the VCM market, the voluntary carbon market,
there are at least two listed futures contracts on registered exchanges, CFTC registered exchanges.
And just by virtue of that reality that we have regulated futures contracts,
I then have a vested interest in the underlying market, right?
And if there is, in fact, as you raise Joe, questions about the integrity of the registries and the actual offsets, whether or not they're really meeting their goals of sequestering X tons of carbon, whether the project really exists, you know, is there additional carbon being sequestered or is it just, oh, I have a thousand acres of trees, let me just generate some credits that have been sitting there for 30 years.
We're not an environmental regulator.
I say that often. I understand that there are limitations to what we can and cannot do,
but as was said earlier, there are a number of private sector market-driven initiatives,
the Integrity Council on voluntary carbon markets and others,
trying to create standards and best practices around the voluntary carbon market.
So we are looking at all aspects of the market and all aspects of what the private sector is doing
and thinking about what role we can play in ensuring that the underlying market has integrity and credibility
so that, and most importantly, the markets that I regulate have the same credibility,
because that price dislocation that might occur between the underlying and the cash and the derivatives
is obviously something that's very important to us.
And we need to make sure, as the law very clearly states,
that our contracts are not readily susceptible to fraud or manipulation.
And if there are issues in the underlying market that raise questions about fraud or manipulation,
that naturally is going to have an impact on our markets and something that I would care deeply about and want to address.
Speaking of credibility, Congress currently hashing it out over the debt ceiling.
I don't want to ask you about that directly, but maybe we could talk about it through the lens of the treasury market,
because I know this is something you've considered.
You gave a really good speech on this matter.
I think it was November of last year.
How confident are you that the Treasury market
can withstand some sort of unexpected disruption
along the lines of what we saw in March 2020
when the market was roiled partially
because of Treasury futures?
Well, two very different situations, right?
The issues that we dealt with in 2020
were certainly generational at best,
in terms of how markets reacted, as we all remember in this room, the huge move downward because of
demand destruction and that very odd correlation between, you know, Treasury markets moving
in the same direction as equity markets.
What's happening right now in the debt ceiling debate is very different, and I don't want to even begin to predict
how that might impact Treasury markets
because they're just very different.
And I think, you know, I'll probably leave it there
and hopefully that things will get hashed out
and figured out and I have confidence
in the president to be able to do that.
What we experienced in 2020
and as I think about that and those few months
and some of the dislocations we saw
between futures and cash,
you know, I always pull myself back
and have to, you know,
we have to, you know, we have to,
to remind ourselves of what we went through and how the economy and markets were reacting to that
situation, which was unprecedented sort of historically. And I do think by and large, and, you know,
can't forget about the fact that we had intervention from the Federal Reserve and through these
multiple facilities, but markets did perform quite well. And the infrastructure and the market
structure, I think, was in place. But we did see dislocations. And, you know, this was the repo market
dried up. We had huge volatility, which created huge shifts and demands for initial margin
and variation margin. So it should not come as a surprise given the volatility and the unknowns
that were occurring at that moment. All right, well, we're going to have to leave it there,
but Chairman Benham, thank you so much for coming on Oddlots, giving us some insight into how
you're thinking about a lot of these thorny and new and complicated issues. So thanks so much.
Thank you.
Thank you for joining you.
Well, that was our conversation with CFTC Chairman Russ Benham at the ISDA Annual General
Meeting.
Thank you so much to ISDA for inviting us to record live on stage.
I'm Tracy Alloway.
You can follow me on Twitter at Tracy Allaway.
And I'm Joe Wisenthall.
You can follow me on Twitter at the stalwart.
Follow our guest, Russ Benham.
He's at CFTC Benham.
Follow our producers, Carmen Rodriguez at Carmen Armin, and Dash Bennett at dash.
And follow all of the Bloomberg podcasts under the handle at podcasts.
And for more Oddlots content, go to Bloomberg.com slash oddlots where Tracy and I blog, we post the transcripts, and we have a newsletter that comes out every Friday.
And check out our new Discord. Discord.g.g. slash oddlots.
Listeners are in there chatting 24-7 about all of the things we talk about on the show in more, water, energy, futures, crypto, real estate, you name it.
It's a really fun place to hang out.
I've been there more and more.
Come check it up.
And thanks for listening.
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