Odd Lots - Dan Ivascyn Is Excited About a New Era in Fixed Income
Episode Date: December 8, 2025In the years since the financial crisis, bond investors didn't get much return for taking on risk. With low interest rates and little sign of inflation, investors had to accept lower-quality assets to... get any semblance of yield. Now that's changing according to Dan Ivascyn, the chief investment officer of Pimco, one of the biggest bond fund managers around. In this special 10-year anniversary episode, Dan reflects on longer-term trends in the bond market, as well as more immediate issues like independence at the Federal Reserve, concerns around data center financing, and worries of "dangerous" and inflated credit ratings. Read more:French Budget Endgame Means Stress Test for Stocks and BondsPinebridge Sees Emerging-Markets Rally Tilting Toward Bonds Only Bloomberg - Business News, Stock Markets, Finance, Breaking & World News subscribers can get the Odd Lots newsletter in their inbox each week, plus unlimited access to the site and app. Subscribe at bloomberg.com/subscriptions/oddlots Subscribe to the Odd Lots NewsletterJoin the conversation: discord.gg/oddlotsSee omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.
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Hello and welcome to another episode of the Odd Lods podcast.
I'm Jill Wisenthal.
And I'm Tracy Allaway.
Tracy, you know, we've been doing this podcast for 10 years.
I am aware, yes, a whole decade.
And we've been doing episodes, talking about big picture things and things that have changed
and what's different now in 2025 or 2015 when we started.
And some things are the same and some things are different, et cetera.
But I think, and we've mentioned this before, I think the one thing that could not be
more different is the rates environment. We were right in the middle of like the ZERP decade or the
ZERP era or maybe in 2015. Maybe at that point the Fed had tried to hike one time already and then
the market sort of slapped it down and said, oh, no, no, no, no, we're not ready for more
rate hikes, et cetera. The rate environment could not be more different than when we first started
this podcast. Absolutely. Can I say one thing about the anniversary? Yeah. So we started the podcast
in November 2015.
Yeah. We were going to celebrate for the month of November, but we're now in December.
So are we going to make this a two-month celebration?
Well, you know, we're having our 10-year anniversary party in December, so I think it's allowed to believe.
We'll just keep going.
You know, it's allowed to bleed the 10 years into both months, given that we're formally celebrating in December.
I think this is how I'm rationalizing this framing for this conversation since, yes, we're no longer, we're technically no longer in
anniversary month. I guess it's our party and we can celebrate as long as we want to.
However we want. But you're absolutely right about the rates environment. And you know, you could
see that if you go back and look at some of the old episodes. The other thing that strikes me
looking back at the old podcast episodes is how many of them were about shadow banking,
which of course nowadays we call private credit. And that's another thing that's changed
enormously. So the private credit market now basically rivals the public credit market in terms of
size, and there's obviously a lot of concern about what that means, the outlook.
So lots of differences.
Lots of differences.
Yeah, completely dramatic.
And setting aside the big picture questions, there are also some small picture questions,
maybe how you put it.
Immediate questions.
At the time we were recording this, it looks like the December meeting is basically a lock,
that there's going to be a cut, but up until recently, there was a lot of market uncertainty.
If we recorded this two weeks ago, it would have looked very different.
It would have looked very different.
And, you know, what happens after December, highly uncertain.
on many dimensions, the follow-through for the rate cutting cycle.
There have been increases in various credit concerns of various source.
We've had a few small blow-ups, but nothing that big, but like what Jamie Diamond called
the cockroaches.
We mentioned it on the show that suddenly people are talking about credit default swaps
on certain high-tech companies, which is very unusual.
That's that Star Wars meme.
I haven't heard that word in a long time.
That's right.
But with the AI buildout and how.
much that's getting financed by various forms of credit. Suddenly people are talking about the fact
that big tech companies are credits, which we don't really think about very much. And so there are
some big picture things, but also some things happening right here and right now that warrant
further understanding and further explanation from the people who really understand it. Absolutely.
Well, I'm very excited to say we really do have the perfect guest, someone who we've had on the show
before, but someone we love speaking to. We are going to be speaking with Dan Iveson. He's the CIO over at
Pimco, which of course everybody should know about. So, Dan, thank you so much for coming back on
the Oblod's podcast. Thanks for having me. And congratulations on the big 10-year anniversary.
It's an honor to be invited back during this series of podcasts. So thanks.
Yeah, very kind of you to say. Let's start small picture. I think this episode will be out
before the Fed meeting. The market is saying it's going to be a lock. They're definitely going
going to cut rates. But beyond that, when you look into 2026, there are sort of two different questions.
There's the ongoing uncertainty about who is going to be the next Fed share.
And then there's just the questions about how much appetite this existing committee has to continue a rate cutting cycle.
So I'd love to get, you know, what are you thinking about for the 2026 and what we could be expecting?
Sure.
So, you know, we do think the Fed's likely to cut rates at the upcoming meeting.
We also think that this is a Fed that would like to get rates a bit lower into 2026.
The challenge, of course, is that we expect to see a little bit of reacceleration in the economy during the first half of the year, and we also expect inflation to remain comfortably above the central bank targets.
So, you know, we believe this Fed, when they say they're going to continue to focus on the data.
We do think the data is going to be a bit confusing.
The general view, you know, today at PIMCO, with, you know, significant uncertainty is that they probably do get rates down another half a percent or so next year, which is close to what's being.
you know, prices into the market today. But again, if you see meaningful reacceleration in the growth
data, and more importantly, if you see even a modest uptick in inflation, this Fed, you know,
even with a new chair, will likely, you know, be willing to remain on hold. And then I think the other
point, and this came up with, you know, one of your recent guests is that there's the front-ed
policy rate, and then there's the reaction out in longer maturities. We do think there's a chance if this
Fed cuts aggressively into strengthening data, higher inflation, you may actually get a sell-off
in the long end of the curve. So that could be a bit self-defeating. And I think something that will
be a topic into next year if we do get that re-acceleration that we expect. There's a lot you said
there that I want to follow up on just in that one answer. But just very quickly, what is the idea
the gist behind why you expect that Q1 re-acceleration? Yeah, a lot of it's related to significant
momentum, you know, in terms of capital investment, you know, associated with AI, as well as the
delayed positive growth impact of the so-called big, beautiful bill. A lot of the corporate tax
extensions happen retroactively. For the consumer of the household, in many instances, you're going to
begin to see, you know, the direct impact in terms of positive, you know, refunds coming into
the new year. So again, you know, plenty of uncertainty, you know, a lot of cross-currents in this
economy, but we do think there's the chance that you'll get some moderate reacceleration in the
first half of the year. We're looking at a growth environment for next year in the United States,
at least, somewhere in the one and a half to two percent type range. So again, that's an environment
where from a traditional tailor rule perspective, we don't think that the Fed needs to cut a lot more
from here, although we do think that this Fed, particularly with new membership and a new chair,
would like to get rates lower. Since you mentioned the new chair, this is more of a
long-term, thoughtful question, but obviously for the majority of your career as a bond manager,
I don't think Fed independence has really been much of a concern, right? We certainly haven't seen
the degree of headlines that we are seeing lately with Kevin Hassett emerging as the frontrunner
for the new Fed chair position. How do you as a bond manager view that particular issue? And do you
have to start handicapping the way you invest because of this? I think to an important.
agree. I think if you go back several decades, you know, you can question the concept of Fed independence
a little bit. And I think even from the perspective of this Fed's expanded mandate in recent years,
what the market's really focused on is independence related to the setting of policy rates,
which, you know, of course, have a direct impact. So from that perspective, we are monitoring the
situation like other investors. You know, we do think less independent Fed has implications,
particularly in longer maturities, where you may need a bit more risk premium when you're dealing
with uncertainty around Fed independence. But generally speaking, when we think about, you know,
who's being considered for the Fed role, including Kevin Hassard, you know, we do think that there'll be
a general spirit of independence there. We still think, you know, the chair is one vote, so to speak,
and we have a committee that will continue to focus on the dual mandate. So, yes, it's a consideration.
It's an input into our decisions.
It's not a major concern.
We do think that the group that's being considered are certainly highly qualified and will likely continue to take a sufficiently independent view regarding monetary policy.
Let me ask you kind of the same question, but with a slightly different framing.
It's December 2025 right now.
So we've had like over four years now, I think over four years now of the Fed missing on its inflation.
on getting inflation durably back to 2%.
And if the Fed is going to continue cutting,
as it looks like it's going to do in December,
that signals a further willingness to ease policy
even with inflation over its ostensible target.
Setting aside the strict question of independence,
do you think the Fed, regardless,
even the current composition and the likely composition
going to be forward,
is just not going to take 2% seriously?
as perhaps it might have in the past.
Yes, that's a great question.
And I think that in a general sense, the 2% target matters.
But not so much the current inflation rate.
You're absolutely right.
We've been operating and living with an inflation rate meaningfully above their target for
quite some time.
But when you look at inflationary expectations, and I think when you talk to central
bankers, you know, here in the United States as well as outside this country,
the inflationary expectations piece is what's critically important.
So when you look at longer-term break-even inflation rates, they've continued to be very, very well-behaved.
You saw a bit of an uptick at the outbreak of the war in Ukraine, and then you saw an uptick around
the tariff announcements earlier this year.
But when you look at a 10-year tip break-even rate, just to use one of several proxies,
no one measure is perfect, you're down around 2.5% on CPI inflation.
So to the extent that inflationary expectations remain well contained, we do think that the central
bank's willing to look through some of the more higher frequency data.
To the extent that you see those longer term expectations become unanchored, we do think that's a
risk for a Fed that's too aggressive in cutting rates here.
We do think that the mindset will change, not only the mindset of the Fed, but we think the market
reaction could be counterproductive, not only in terms of higher long-term interest rates,
but an impact on risk assets as well. So, you know, the markets have let the Fed get away with
running fairly accommodated policy cutting into a 3% type inflation world because, again,
there are a lot of other forces at work that very well could be disinflationary over the long
term. And there still is significant confidence in global central banks and being able to
generally keep inflation, you know, close to the target on a longer term basis. So, you know, again,
so far so good. But, you know, this is all going to be a,
a key source of uncertainty, you know, into 26 and beyond. I feel like uncertainty is constantly
the key word on our podcast nowadays. Since longer dated expectations and yields keeps coming up
in this conversation, I got to ask, do you believe in the term premium? Or rather, is the term
premium a useful concept to you as a big bond investor? It is. And, you know, when we look at,
you know, where we're to invest, you know, we like to get paid for, you know, taking more risk. We do,
you know, see an elevated term premium, certainly relative to where we were five or ten years ago,
and that's made longer maturity investments a bit more attractive. With that said, there's lots of
reasons why the term premium should be higher. Inflation is one of them. Global debt levels,
U.S. debt and deficit levels are another. And we probably live in a world today, given what's
going on in terms of focusing on tariffs and bringing back supply chains, you know, to domestic markets,
the need for, you know, higher risk premium. So, you know, as a firm today, we, we like longer
maturity bonds more, but we're still, you know, tend to keep our positions concentrated in shorter
maturities, and we would expect over the next few years a little bit of additional underperformance
in the very, very long end of the yield curve. So we do think it's important. It's interesting.
People focus a lot on, you know, the deficit situation in the United States. As an investor,
you know, you don't want to lend to a perfect high-quality credit.
You don't get paid so much to do so.
So in some sense, we want, you know, just enough fiscal irresponsibility where we and our end
investors get paid more to lend, but not so much where it becomes a concern in terms of the
overall viability of the system.
So we think we're in the midst of that type of market environment today.
But things can go a bit too far if we don't get, you know, the deficit or the inflation
situation under control over the next, you know, couple to few years.
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Can you talk about the role of bonds in a portfolio?
Again, this is something that in 2015, bonds fit beautifully into a diversified portfolio
because they were paying something, but also they had that nice inverse correlation,
and so you got that natural hedge, et cetera.
We haven't had that very, like, that beautiful inverse correlation between risk assets
and bonds for a long time, which undermines one of the cases for the diversified investor
of having like a big slug of perhaps longer duration assets.
How do you think in 2025, how do you sell the case that diversified investors should still keep
some allocation to duration or fixed income?
Yeah.
So, you know, it's interesting.
I know this is a 10-year anniversary show.
So, you know, went back and looked at the performance of bonds versus other things, you know,
over the last 10 years.
And the divergence in performance over the last decade has been remarkable.
And it explains a lot.
If you look at the S&P 500 over the last 10 years, in absolute terms, you generated a return of
about 15% a year.
Adjusted for inflation, I think it's up close to 12% or so.
I'm rounding a little bit.
When you look at the performance of the Bloomberg aggregate index over that 10-year period,
the return annually has been below 2% in absolute terms.
When you subtract inflation, you ended up with negative returns in bonds for 10 years.
So not only has the correlation broken down, but you didn't make it.
make any money in owning bonds. When you look at the starting valuations today under any type of
reasonable longer-term valuation framework, none of which have to mean revert quickly, but you know,
you look at a, you know, a Schiller-P-type arrangement or an equity risk premium type argument,
you don't need a great correlation on bonds versus equities. What the relative valuations would
suggest is that there's a good chance that bonds outperforms stocks over the next five or ten
years, or at least have returns on a risk-adjusted basis very, very close to stocks. So you don't
have to rest on a correlation argument. You know, you don't have to focus on, well, bonds do well
during periods where, you know, people are losing their jobs or, you know, income growth is
negative. You can just from a pure valuation perspective, find the asset class quite attractive,
absolute and relative. I think the second point around correlations is that correlations between
stocks and bonds will tend to break down when inflation is the primary risk factor. Today, yes,
inflation is above central bank targets, but there's a lot of uncertainty on the economic side.
You do have this complex economy where tremendous value within the tech sector, tremendous capital
and investment, yet lower income households are feeling considerable pain. If AI is very,
very successful in increasing productivity, that can mean significant job loss across key segments of the
economy. So the bottom line is that risks are more balanced. We don't think correlations are going to
ever come back to the really, really neat, clean levels, you know, a decade or so ago when
inflation simply wasn't a problem at all, you know, across the global economy. But we have
seen correlations improve a bit, and we would expect on a go-forward basis, correlations to improve
further. I think it's important, again, to look at a global opportunity set. I think that
the correlation arguments are stronger in areas of the world that have the best
fiscal position, but in general, you know, not only do we think that the valuations are quite
attractive, you know, we do think the correlations will be a bit better, certainly that we experience
coming out of the COVID area.
So, Tracy, 2015, bonds were an easy sell.
It turns out they weren't the best investment.
2025 may be a harder sell, but the math says that now is actually the time to expand
your exposure.
Well, I guess in 10 years when we do the 20-year anniversary, we'll be able to judge.
But, Dan, you know, since we're talking about why people should buy a policy.
bonds. One of the surprising things that happened this year was we had the big tariff drama and we saw
markets go down and we saw bond yield spike. Everyone was talking about the sell America trade.
So this idea that you didn't want to hold on to U.S. assets because of all that policy uncertainty.
And now, you know, in December 2025, yields have come down quite a lot, although I have to say the
dollar is still fairly weak. You were always, you.
kind of resistant to the sell America idea and you pushed back on it. What did you see that
perhaps others didn't? Well, again, I think a lot has to do with starting valuations.
After a significant period of underperformance across U.S. fixed income or global fixed income,
you ended up with a decent valuation cushion. So I think that's always important in markets.
Yes, there was news that in a narrow sense was negative for bonds and negative for U.S. bonds or U.S. assets
in particular, you started with a decent yield cushion. We began the year with yields 10-year
treasuries up near 5%, a 5% yield even in a 3% inflation world, not that bad. I think the second
point, though, we weren't overly convicted in just owning the United States. And I think if I could,
you know, the most important thing I can say today is that global bond investing is back.
For so many years, capital is poured into the U.S. markets. It's poured into the U.S. markets focusing on
private credit, which has grown the most here in this country. But very very quietly, you've
seen underperformance across the global fixed income opportunity set, where today, even from a
U.S. dollar-based investors' perspective, there's great yield, great sources of diversification.
So it's not that we were insistent on just owning U.S. assets. In fact, we've gradually diversified
into other areas of the market, we just thought that there was good value and good yield in the
U.S. a sufficient cushion. And then by extending into these other markets, a great way to generate
incremental return by good old-fashioned relative value trading in markets today that are less
correlated than they were during those years coming out of the global financial crisis and where
you just have a really, really exciting time to troll, you do old-fashioned training across yield curves,
across markets, and avoid having to-
What changed? Because it seemed like,
Like, you know, it felt like international investing across any asset class was like a real suckers thing.
It's like, oh, this is going to be the year that we're going to diversify internationally.
You didn't get paid at all for it.
What switch flipped such that actually both stocks too, because international equity markets have done very well and have outperformed the U.S., which is kind of surprising in many respects.
But what switch such that now there's been real opportunities to make money looking abroad?
Yeah, again, valuations have improved.
You know, we talked about, you know, the real poor performance of the U.S. bond market over the last decade.
As we all know, yields were outright negative in many areas of the world.
So we talk about low yields, you subtract that low inflation rate, you end up with a negative number.
And big portions of the global fixed income opportunity set, you didn't have to subtract anything.
You started with a negative number.
So a lot of this has just been the repricing of markets that started not only at low levels, but negative yield levels.
Then the second piece relates to policy. Coming out of the global financial crisis, not only
where yields low, but you've had such incredible policy activism where on any signs of economic
weakness, you had a massive fiscal response, a massive monetary policy response. COVID, you know,
the ultimate example of that. And today, you know, with debt levels and deficit levels where
they are, policymakers don't have that flexibility. So you're back to an environment where
markets increasingly have to stand on their own based on fundamentals. And that's just an exciting time.
It means more risk premium in markets, more term premium, higher yields with significant valuation cushion,
absolute and relative to what looked to be quite expensive equity markets. And then just less
correlation. You have situations even over the course of the last couple of months where a political
surprise in Japan or France creates lots of local volatility in those markets. Uncertainty in French
politics impacts UK politics because they have similar challenges in terms of getting their
deficit situation under control and economic productivity higher. So it reminds us a lot more like
the mid-90s, you know, back before you had this massive volatility suffocation from policymakers.
And again, with deficits where they are, with inflation where it is today versus central bank
targets, it's likely that over the next several years, you know, you're going to continue to
be in this type of environment, good value, good relative value, and then much less correlated markets,
which lead to some good opportunity to generate incremental return above starting yield levels.
Well, we wanted to talk about private credit as well, because as we said in the intro,
this is one thing that has changed quite a lot since 2015. People obviously have different
characterizations of private credit, but I'm curious how you think about that space and how you
would define or how you would measure things like transparency and opakness and customization in the
credit waterfall and things like that. Because again, one person's extremely transparent market can
be another person's opaque morass of potential defaults. Yeah. So I talk for the rest of the show here
in this topic. That's fine. First of all, I'm surprised it took this long to get to the private credit
topic. But look, you know, not much of this is new.
You know, when I joined PIMCO back in the late 1990s, I spent the good portion of my initial time at the firm focusing on the underwriting of private assets.
You know, we call them pure privates, but these were, you know, 4A2 privates that were created as part of the Securities Act of 1933.
144A privates, which were quite popular, I think the first one was issued back in 1990.
The technology that's being utilized to fund AI infrastructure today, some of these off-balance,
contingent or make-whole guarantee-type frameworks were around in the mid to late 1990s.
The difference today is that you have this massive capital investment need, so the deals are
larger, but a lot of the technology has just been, you know, dusted off, so to speak,
for the new era.
I think the other point that's important, and when we're talking about historical returns,
I think this explains a lot, is that what's been so unique in terms of credit asset performance
in general has been the post-global financial crisis.
period, where we haven't had a sustained period of economic weakness. In fact, one of my favorite
data series is looking at how lower quality lending performed since way back during the Michael
Milken days, you know, when he helped to create that market. If you go back to the early
1980s, all the way up to the global financial crisis, if you had just blindly bought the lowest
quality credit that's out there, proxied by high yield, senior secured loans, direct lending,
you know, blend the index, you would have ended up with only about a half a percentage point
of incremental performance versus high-quality bonds over that entire period.
And the way it worked was that you made a lot of money, a lot of money, a lot of money, a lot of money,
then you gave it all back.
Yeah.
Then you made a lot, a lot, a lot, a lot, gave it all back.
And we'd go back to the late 80s when you had, you know, that period, initial period
of aggressive underwriting.
You had the savings and loan crisis of the early 90s.
You had the LTCM or the Asian financial crisis in the late 90s.
then the internet bubble and the telecom issues of the early 2000s, then of course the global financial
crisis. That was a more normal credit environment. Since the GFC just blindly buying the lowest quality
credit on the board, whether it's private credit or lower quality public credit, you generated
7% a year more than high quality bonds. Wow. And that explains a lot. Not surprisingly,
you've seen massive growth in that area of the market. Now, you know, weaker credit tends to perform
well when stocks go up 15% a year. But again, you know, that's where we are today. I hear all the
discussion about, God, you know, underwriting is worse than the public side versus the private side.
The reality is when you've grown this much, when you've lent so much money to weaker quality borrowers,
when covenants have weakened, when spreads are tight, when equities have gone up consistently as much
as they have, you're going to have challenges in these markets. So when we think about credit,
We look at it under sort of two continuums.
One, liquidity.
Certain assets are completely illiquid.
The only decision you get to make is the purchase decision, so you better be right.
And then at the other end of the extreme, you have very, very liquid assets where you can
change your mind on a regular basis.
And then you have economic sensitivity.
You have assets that are very insensitive to the economy that are very, very high quality.
Then at the other extreme, you have assets with a tremendous amount of economic sensitivity.
a tremendous amount of sensitivity to AI-related disruption, other forms of economic weakness,
an anticipated competition. And you just want to make sure you get paid enough. And with stocks near
all-time highs, with spreads tight, with Covenants Week, there are going to be problems.
And I think as an investor, you just need to acknowledge that you're not getting paid what
you got to take that risk five or 10 years ago. And you just want to be defensive. You want to be
skeptical, but it's not so much private versus public. I think it's just thoughtful underwriting and
just understanding that we're at a time where, given the strong historical performance,
given the fact that we haven't had a sustained period of economic slowing for a long time,
some complacency has worked their way into these higher risk areas of the market.
Well, talk a little bit more about competition in private credit, because I imagine it's good to be
PIMCO when it comes to sourcing deals and maybe negotiating the terms. But does even someone like
you, a truly big bond manager, have to deal with competitive pressures where if you don't agree
to one bond term, someone else will swoop in and agree to it and take it away from you?
Absolutely. And again, I think the other point about public and private markets is that they're well
integrated. You know, we could talk about convergence, you know, a bit later have some views there.
But when an issuer looks at their options, they're going to test the public option.
They'll test the private option.
And there is a lot of competition.
A lot of competition for market share.
When you look at a lot of the managers, particularly in the private credit space, they announce very, very aggressive growth assumptions.
You know, as an investor sometimes, you know, I wish in certain quarters people would talk about, you know, if we can find value for the end investor, we will grow this much.
All too often, you know, after a pretty bullish environment for credit.
it's, we're simply going to grow a lot. So, you know, we do see time and time again situations where
you start the underwriting process, you get down to the point where it's time to get into a final
round and you don't get the terms that we feel we need as extenders of credit in this marketplace.
And that's just, again, symptomatic of the fact that there's a lot of demand for these assets
and there's a lot of demand relative to the supply across many segments.
to the market. And that's true not only of the low investment grade risk, but it's very, very true
of certain transactions with an investment grade rating, at least from a rating agency. So,
given tight spreads, given the competition, you just have to say no. And I'll go back to my earlier
point. What's so exciting about this market today is that you do not need to take on aggressively
underwritten credit to generate return. The high quality area of the market, especially if you
expand globally if you take advantage of liquidity, which typically means flexibility for end investors,
you can have a high-quality portfolio where you don't have to sacrifice return. Very different than
where we were 10 years ago. But again, pretty exciting now. We can go up in quality without, again,
giving up return. In some cases, ironically, picking up expected return. I'm Francine Lacqua,
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I want to go back to something you said and I didn't quite get it, but I think it's important.
Of course, it's very interesting to our audience.
You were talking about the AI financing, and I think you said something, contingent make-whole guarantees.
I don't tell us about these financing as you see them.
And what is the history?
How novel are they relative to past financing or how much is it that these are structures that were very much in place for something else are now being reproposed into this new exciting area?
Yes, I'll start with what's new, which is lending to support the growth in AI and
related infrastructure. There, you're talking about several trillion dollars of investment need.
So that's what's new. But, you know, what's not so new is this idea that companies would like to
keep a good portion of their debt off their balance sheet or come up with structures that
limit their overall financial liability or give them some flexibility to manage that liability
over time. And as an end investor, you know, looking to lend to those companies, you know,
it's important to acknowledge that lending against tech firms, lending against AI infrastructure,
lending against AI chips is risky. That could be a real good investment if you own the equity.
It may not be a great investment if you own the bonds, where at most you get your coupon and you
hope to get par back at the end of the day. So a lot of the underwriting of these transactions,
and there have been a lot and we expect a lot more to come over the course of the next few years,
is to understand the form of that guarantee and understand the entity that's providing that guarantee,
whether it's in the form of lease payments or other type of make-hole type arrangements.
And these types of structures are what have been around for many, many years.
You know, back in the mid in late 1990s, you know, a lot of times these would be done by Wall Street financial institutions,
sometimes across a segment of their business, where they would use a corporate guarantee to arbitrage a business.
of the rating agency frameworks.
And other times, these deals were backed by, you know, large ships, equipment, other areas
of the market.
So it was the same type of analysis, the same type of underwriting of checklist, which involves
a lot of lawyers to ensure that you understand the guarantee, how you have to realize
on that guarantee.
And that's not so different today.
And just to be clear, the guarantee we're talking about here is, okay, here is a hypothetical
SPV that owns a data center and it borrows money and it finances and et cetera. And the guarantee
question is how much will the tenant of that data center, which didn't want to have all that debt
on their books, maybe like a Facebook or one of the hyperscalers, how much are they actually
committed to being a tenant for the long term there, basically? That's what we're talking about.
Absolutely correct. And why it matters here is you're typically talking about investment grade
rated counterparties on these transactions where the infrastructure itself, the assets that are
partially backing the deal on a standalone basis would achieve a very, very low rating. So how do you
create a structure where you improve the credit quality while meeting the needs of those that
are looking to borrow within this market? So again, the whole key is to make sure that
something that the rating agencies may assign investment grade rating to is in fact investment grade
from a fundamental credit quality perspective.
And I think that's another theme.
You know, in talking about private credit, you know,
there are more economically sensitive, lower quality loans,
and then there's been a lot of growth on the investment grade side.
It is very, very dangerous to assume something has an investment grade rating
just because the rating agencies assign a rating to it.
It's critically important that you do your own credit work.
Today, all too frequently, you'll have an investment grade rating from one entity.
And again, market participants for years have always done.
joked, if you can only find one investment grade rating, it's pretty fair to assume everyone else is
below investment grade. So, you know, the bottom line is that there's been a lot of aggressive
underwriting going on, even with instruments that carry an investment grade rating, at least from
one entity. And again, when spreads are tight, when documentation is relatively weak, it's just
critically important that you do your own fundamental credit work. I do think PIMCO has some
advantages in that area, both in terms of experience and resources, but it's super important because
you're not always getting the terms that you want. When you do, you can unlock tremendous value for your clients, but
this is an environment where we have to be really, really selective as a bond investor at least.
Yeah. When I think back to the 2015 environment, I remember a lot of people were writing stories about the triple B bubble in investment grade. So triple B is the lowest tier of investment grade. And that had been absolutely exploding post-financial crisis.
And everyone, not everyone, a lot of people expected that to end in tears.
And instead, it ended with all those like triple Bs getting upgraded and a lot of junk getting
upgraded as well and having a bunch of rising stars, which I don't think a lot of people were
necessarily expecting.
But talk a little bit more about the rating agencies.
What are the pressures that you think are perhaps driving them to rate some of these structures
higher than they otherwise might be?
Well, again, there are multiple rating agencies
that have different philosophies
to how they arrive at a rating,
and there's going to be understandable disagreement
within markets, but issuers are quite shrewd.
They're going to go to where they get
the most favorable ratings treatment.
This has always been the case,
and I think the important point to note is that
when stocks are going up 15% a year,
when the economy's growing,
when you don't have a sustained period of economic weakness,
even poorly underwritten credit will mature. We experienced that in an extreme sense, you know,
during the 2000s. What we try to do as active investors is to underwrite to weaker economic
environments, environments where, you know, those underlying entities or the infrastructure, you know,
that you're lending against go into a period of weakness. And I think that's where, you know,
good fundamental credit work in this type of environment that we're in today that's very much driven
by rating arbitrage, you know, seeking out investment grade ratings, you know, for an insurance
balance sheet or a reinsurance balance sheet as an example, you know, can lead at times to
aggressive decisions. So I think it's just the nature of the fact that you have multiple agencies
and some will be more optimistic in certain areas than others. But, you know, that's great.
You know, if we didn't have those sources of disagreement, there wouldn't be opportunities
to generate incremental return, you know, versus passive alternatives.
While we're here on credit, actually, you know, there's probably about a month ago or a month and a half ago.
That's when we were getting all those headlines about tree color.
And that was when Jamie Diamond made this sort of famous crickets thing.
I was getting really...
Cockroaches.
Cockroaches.
I hate cockroaches and I like crickets, so I want to make that clear.
Crickets are lovely.
You're right.
I should not associate them with credit blowups.
That's completely unfair to crickets.
It's fair to cockroaches.
Jamie Diamond made those cockroaches.
I was getting worried.
I saw all these heads like, oh, another entity took a hit on this.
Another entity.
I was like, oh, this is very familiar.
I don't like how many times the same company appears in the headlines.
But we haven't gotten that much, actually.
Since then, it's not like there have been five more of those.
I'm just sort of curing.
It's setting aside some of the data center, the sexy private credit stuff that everyone's focused on.
Do you think over the last several years, was there some systematically bad underwriting going on,
especially over the last few years?
Or were there isolated cockroaches?
the first cockroach before they had a chance to lay eggs and make babies.
The lonely cockroach.
Yeah.
Yeah.
So, look, again, because there's been so much growth in lending to lower quality, you know,
companies, and again, the last major cycle was lending to lower quality households.
Yeah, right.
You know, there's going to be areas of excess.
And I think people are focused on these areas.
But again, when you look at the cumulative, you know, delinquencies and in law.
losses. Yes, they've increased a bit over the last few years, but these situations have been
relatively isolated. But again, anytime you've had this much credit expansion, you're going to
have challenges. And these challenges are happening in a relatively strong economy. So we don't
think this will be a catastrophe. The word I've used is that there's likely going to be
disappointment in certain areas of the credit markets that have performed exceptionally well
over the last 10 to 15 years. But that shouldn't be viewed as an overly controversial
statement. That's how markets work. You know, credit was very cheap 10 or 15 years ago. High
quality bonds were very, very expensive. Today, credit spreads are near all-time tights.
Equities are near all-time highs. And value in high-quality bonds looks reasonable relative to their
history. So, you know, starting valuations tend to be pretty big drivers of future returns.
If the economy continues to grow, if stocks keep going up 15% a year, yes, these will be,
you know, relatively isolated situations. But if you get into a period of economic week,
losses will go up, and they'll likely be some disappointment. I think that's the best way to
categorize it. And then I think the second important point when you look at markets in a longer-term
historical context is that regulators hate bailing out the same sectors twice. Back during the GFC,
it was lending to the consumer. It was excessive lending from the banks that caused all of the
problems. I almost took down the financial system, and not surprisingly, the regulations
towards the banks and towards consumer lending was massive.
And today, when you look at the world, the household balance sheets,
certainly middle income and above cohort groups,
hasn't been this strong in several decades.
There's record amounts of borrower equity in these areas of the market
have been very, very strong from an underwriting perspective.
The areas that escape the scrutiny the last time,
a lot of lending to non-financial corporates,
a lot of, you know, this mid-market private lending,
that came out of that period relatively unscathed from regulatory perspective has grown a lot.
So I think a lot of this just relates to longer-term cycles.
PIPCO is talking in a much different way back in 2005 and 2006,
where we were screaming from the rooftop saying that, you know,
what was going on was so irrational that there were major problems ahead.
That's not where we are.
And that's why I sometimes sound a bit more negative than we are.
I think that the idea of disappointment is the way people should think about
some of these areas of the credit markets. And the good news is you don't have to accept
disappointment. You can simply accept the fact that you had a great performance run and that by going
up in quality, expanding into a global opportunity set that hasn't been sufficiently embraced just
yet, perhaps only a little bit of non-dollar exposure, get you to the same place with much more
resiliency, much more downside protection, and a lot more liquidity or flexibility to change your mind
in the future as well.
Since you brought up household balance sheets, can you talk to us a little bit about your housing outlook? Because I believe Pimco has been pretty bullish on mortgages recently. But at the same time, we've seen a slight slowdown in the housing market. But then again, we still have long-term structural tailwinds, such as a massive undersupply of homes in the U.S. Where do you see that going in the coming years? Particularly, you know, if we were to see inflationary prices,
pressure start to pick up and those longer end yields start to rise.
Yeah, so we are very bullish on housing-related investments in the United States as well as in
other areas around the world. Agency guaranteed mortgages still traded very widespread
relative to corporates, even in an absolute sense. We think it's a very high-quality,
liquid area of the market that, again, makes a lot of sense to own across a variety of
different mandates. We also like lending in the non-guaranteed area,
against the house simply because borrowers have record amounts of equity.
So when you lend against collateral.
Yeah.
That's what it sounds like.
You love collateral.
Yeah, we like good documentation and good, good collateral, you know, at least all else equal.
But, you know, it's not a major bet on the directionality of homes when you're lending against a household that has 70 percentage points of borrower equity.
Your home can go down quite a bit and you're very well.
protected. That same dynamic exists, you know, over in the UK, across Europe, you know,
and even in other parts of the world. So, you know, again, regulators don't like billing out
the same sectors twice. That's pretty good asset allocation advice. It's quite straightforward.
But also, you know, you have much better fundamentals across households. But to your specific
question around housing, it's a tough situation. We do think that homes are going to remain
elevated from a valuation perspective and affordability is going to remain quite constrained because there's
no easy answer. You know, you bring the mortgage rate down, the home price goes up, you know,
affordability doesn't change in a meaningful sense. What we really need in this country and other parts
of the world are more homes, more housing units. And again, because of a lot of the post-global
financial crisis regulation, it's been real hard to build new homes. So our base case view is that
home price is going to moderate here on a national level. You could see, at least in real terms,
you know, some steady declines over the course of the next several years in certain markets that are
a bit overextended, you know, a bit more volatility. But we do think that, you know, home prices are
going to remain elevated from a historical perspective just because of the fact that people have
locked in very, very low mortgage rates, 30 years, you know, not just five or 10 years, you know,
which were mortgage durations, you know, popular pre-GFC.
So, you know, you're not going to see, you know, too much turnover.
And unfortunately, that means that homes for, you know, a lot of younger Americans are going to remain out of reach.
But again, maybe some incremental benefit.
Maybe, you know, this administration get mortgage rates down a bit through some creative policy the next couple of years.
By the way, we'd like that given Pimco's current positioning.
But again, without building new homes, which are going to take, you know, many,
years, you know, there's no easy solution.
I want to go back. You mentioned this idea. There's, there's an optimal amount of fiscal
profligacy from the perspective of the bond investor. Maybe you want them to push it a little
bit because then you get paid a little bit for taking it on, but obviously you don't want
them to push so forth where you get some fiscal dominance spiral leading to higher and
higher inflation. You want to find that sweet spot. You know, I mentioned we were talking a little
bit about politics earlier, about whether an independent central bank can be sustained. But when
you look abroad, you know, it seems like in a lot of pretty major, we're not the only country
that's having political volatility these days. People are concerned about the approach that the new
Japanese PM is going to take it. So we know that rates are higher in Japan. France, very indebted
country, they seem to have like a new government every two weeks. I like lose track of all the
times their government collapses and so forth. The UK very indebted country, the moment anyone
takes office, their approval ratings plunged to negative 30 or whatever.
whatever. There's a lot going on on the political front, and that sort of determines whether
countries are even, it's even possible to run what might be more responsible fiscal policies.
Is that something that, I don't know, keeps you up at night as the right term, but is that
something that's a big part of your work is trying to understand, especially when you think
abroad, understand the political dynamics in all these countries that are happening right now?
Yeah, absolutely. And, you know, we get together once a year, you know, talk about the outlook for
economies and markets over a, you know, five-year type timeframe. And, you know, one of our advisors,
I think, put it well was that, you know, we used to live in a world where, you know,
economic outcomes would drive politics. If economies were strong, you know, politicians usually
ended up in a good situation. They'd stay in office. Today it feels like it's a bit reversed
where political priorities, geopolitical tensions are driving economics. And I think you see that to a
degree with tariff policy. You see it, you know, to a degree with various forms of reshoring. You see it
in terms of these populist tendencies across markets. So they're all very, very important and a lot more
important than they were in the past. And I think it takes a lot of humility from someone like myself
and others that grew up, you know, doing, you know, discounted cash flow analysis and, you know,
derivative pricing as opposed to understanding the political economy. So, you know, we think that
that's important both from the perspective of gaining an edge in markets, but also understanding
that sometimes we'll be wrong. And when you're running the debt levels that countries are running
or deficits in overall debt levels, there's going to be some unpredictability. And that's
why this idea of looking to exploit a global opportunity set, prudent diversification,
targeting some countries outside the U.S. that aren't running, you know, six, seven percent
deficits. And there are high-quality countries out there,
Australia being an example, Germany being another example, even the United Kingdom, although they
have a lot less policy flexibility than we do, given that there are a smaller open economy with their
own currency, offer attractive yields. So this is less about picking your favorite country from our
perspective. It's more looking to take advantage of attractive opportunities around the globe
with some tilt towards those countries that are balancing their budget and that do have a better
overall fiscal picture. And we haven't talked about emerging markets, but
There are a few emerging markets that, you know, this cycle got ahead of inflation that have been, in some sense, more fiscally prudent than their developed market counterparties, and that have very, very high yields even adjusted for inflation rates.
So even some diversification in some of the higher quality areas of the emerging markets, you know, from our perspective, represents real good value or real good sources of diversification in return versus some of these assets, you know, here in the United States.
that have performed real well historically, but where when you look at, you know, the likelihood
for forward performance, just just look a little bit less interesting.
Actually, this reminds me, thinking back to 2015, 2015 was actually a big year for Pimco,
because it was your first full year without Bill Gross, right, who left in late 2014.
Oh, yeah, that's right.
Can you talk to us, perhaps, how the culture of Pimco has changed over the past 10 years
and how you would describe that evolution, because I imagine it's been a long time.
It must have shifted a little bit.
Yeah, look, the way Bill left the firm was an ideal, to say the least.
But, you know, Bill left us in an incredibly strong position.
You know, he created a lot of the frameworks that we still use today to make decisions.
You know, Bill was a strong personality, but he believed in teamwork and believe that investing was a team sport, you know, so to speak.
So from that perspective, there didn't need to be a lot.
lot of change or certainly not radical change. But over this period, you know, markets have become,
you know, so much more specialized. Client needs have evolved, you know, over time. The introduction of
a more sizable private opportunity set has been important. Technology, big data, using, you know,
trading techniques, portfolio trading and in other automated, you know, type, you know,
trading strategies are all critically important. So, you know, we're a much more specialized.
firm today, which is a function of, again, evolving client needs, but also just the realities of
of this world that we live in today where data is abundant, much less expensive to access.
So from that perspective, we've needed to adapt. We've become even more global. So we tend to
utilize regional committees and regional decision-making structures. But a lot stayed the same,
at least in terms of mindset. And we try to really leverage the history and the
experience the firm has had managing and navigating through more challenging markets.
22 is rough, you know, for both stocks and bonds. But, you know, in general, you know, the environment's
been reasonably forgiving. But you can always get into these, you know, tougher periods.
And again, we try to use these structures that, you know, Bill put in place and Bill deserves
a tremendous amount of credit for. It's funny. In your last answer there, there were like five
things you said that could merit full follow-ups or even full follow-up episodes, like about
changing client needs over time or what happens when the cost of data goes from costly to
fairly affordable, et cetera, all those sort of interesting things. But just my last question,
and it sort of relates to technology. You know, when it comes to AI in investing, we've talked
a little bit more on the short-term, like, high-frequency side. And the sort of models that
they use and the signals that they use and how that sort of relates to AI and their application.
But for a firm like PIMCO and when you're thinking about longer term holding periods and
you want to have a good collateral and good documentation, et cetera, currently today, have you
found ways to apply cutting edge AI technology to the process of good security selection?
We have and we're finding ways to utilize the technology at an accelerating rate.
We do some of this and some of our, you know, more quant-focused strategies, you know, where we look to use AI to actually drive alpha.
But just AI as a tool to drive efficiency has been, will be critically important to managing an investment platform.
Just the ease in which you can access data that you can use AI to help support overall analysis,
both at the, you know, company level, the individual investment level,
but even, you know, coming through economic history and understanding some of these geopolitical
trends and themes that are hard, you know, at least intuitively to grasp, are going to be critically important.
In fact, before our discussion today spent considerable time, you know, with our head of technology
and our head of implementation, talking about various firm-wide initiatives. And I think the only other
point is, you know, my own use of AI, both at home and at the office, has gone up almost exponentially
over the last year or two. And I'm the last person you want to, you know, rely on to understand this
technology. It's the younger folks that we hired over the last year that are helping us with a lot of
this perspective. So this is going to be quite disruptive, probably productivity enhancing,
you know, at the economy-wide level, but it's also going to lead to considerable disruption.
And it's important that we don't get disrupted and that we use this technology to drive
client returns. But, you know, it's going to be important in so many ways. And we're really,
really embracing it here at Pimco.
Dan Ivesant, thank you so much for coming on OVLOTS.
That was a fantastic conversation.
Really appreciate you taking the time.
And we're going to check back in with you in 2035 and see how well one got paid for taking
a little bit of duration here.
Great, Joe, Tracy.
Thanks again.
And congratulations on the big milestone.
Thank you so much.
Thank you so much, Dan.
Really appreciate it.
Thank you, guys.
Tracy, I thought that was great.
I really enjoyed talking to Dan.
Fantastic overview.
Yeah. So a couple things stood out to me. So number one, the idea of no more free lunch in credit. Although people have been talking about that for a while now. And obviously with the rate environment changing, you can see that argument. The other thing that I really liked was his description of policymakers don't want to bail out the same thing twice. Yeah. That's interesting framework or way to think about it.
Yeah, absolutely. And it kind of reminded me of there's another person in credit who used to tell me a line about how he invest, which is follow the bad guys, right? So like the guys that blew up in one part of the market usually, you know, start doing something new.
They're going to get their act together. Wait, are you saying they're going to get their act together or they're going to do something new bad?
No, I'm saying they move to the new thing and then that blows up. And so if you can just identify the bad guys and just follow the.
their career trajectories, just short everything the bad guys do. I love that. I love that
take. You know, it was really, I had not realized that stat, he said, about how little you got
paid for taking, for buying poor credits up until the GFC. Yeah. And then post-GFC is just totally
flipped. That you just got, you should just go as far out on the credit risk curve as you possibly
can. And you've just walloped anything safe. And I knew that, I guess, on some level, but the extreme of that
statistical divergence. But, you know, you have to think we had that, well, it was more than a hiccup in
2020, but we did bounce back very fast from it. So really what we were looking at is, you know,
well over 15 years now of the lines just going up. And you have to think about what are the things
that accumulate over that time or the patterns that accumulate or the habits, et cetera, and this
idea that there's a lot of safety at the far end of the risk curve and that people don't care. And that
Maybe now some of the perception that there's safety at the far end of the risk curve and how much that's been burnished into people is very interesting.
Absolutely. The other thing he said that I thought was very poignant was the idea of you have all these private credit firms starting up, right, and promising these astonishing returns for investors.
And he made the point that like, you can't just say you're going to make all this money in private credit because like those deals might not be out there and available to you.
You have to do it on a risk or value-adjusted basis.
And as I say that, I see a headline in Bloomberg about Capital Group getting into private credit as well.
So this is the thing.
Like it's a booming market.
There are a lot of competitive pressures both on the lender side and also on the credit rating side.
And you can see people really scrambling to get into the market and accumulate as much as they can.
And so the temptation, of course, is to, you know, accept lower.
terms except lower quality. Totally.
All right. Shall we leave it there? Let's leave it there.
All right. This has been another episode of the Oddlots podcast. I'm Tracy Allaway.
You can follow me at Tracy Allaway. And I'm Jill Wisenthall. You can follow me at the stalwart.
Follow our producers, Carmen Rodriguez at Carmen Armand Dashob Bennett at Dashbot and
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