Odd Lots - FTC Chief Andrew Ferguson on the Trump Vision for Antitrust

Episode Date: March 17, 2025

When Donald Trump won in November, one of the things that Wall Street was excited about was an expected liberalization of merger rules. There was a popular view that under Chair Lina Khan, the Biden FTC was overly stringent about what deals it would let go through, and that the new administration would give the greenlight more often. But at least so far, reality hasn't proven to be so simple. There hasn't been a big merger wave yet. And, in fact, the FTC under new Chair Andrew Ferguson has decided to keep the merger guidelines that Khan put in place. So does this mean continuity? At a live episode of the podcast taped in Washington DC, we spoke with Ferguson about the Trump administration's vision for antitrust. He talked about his philosophy of keeping corporate power in check and the tests he's using to preserve a competitive environment. He also walked us through the long history of the FTC and the notion of consumer welfare, plus why he thinks a more expansive interpretation of the term (beyond just lower prices) is in keeping with the history of conservative legal thought. Read More: New DOJ Antitrust Chief Builds Team From Prior AdministrationsTrump’s FTC Moves Ahead With Broad Microsoft Antitrust ProbeOnly Bloomberg.com subscribers can get the Odd Lots newsletter in their inbox — now delivered every weekday — plus unlimited access to the site and app. Subscribe at bloomberg.com/subscriptions/oddlotsSee omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.

Bloomberg Audio Studios. Podcasts Radio News. Hello and welcome to another episode of the Odd Lots podcast. I'm Joe Wisenthall. And I'm Tracy Allaway. We got a special episode for listeners today. We do. A very special episode.

We had a live event over in Washington, D.C. It was a very cool event, Joe. It's really fun. It's been a while. You know, we do live events. We do live recordings from time to time. It'd been a while since we put out a full. evening of programming, a full show, if you will.

Well, also our first show in D.C. And our first live public show in D.C. We'd been wanting to do one for a while. We had a bunch of great guests. I actually really like going down to D.C. Yeah, and it was a great crowd as well. I think we have the only audience that would devote two and a half hours on a Wednesday night to listening about the Jones Act and antitrust policy.

Yes, that's right. It was sort of a late night, too. It was sort of awkward timing because it was, of dinner, so people had to skip. But there was popcorn included with the tickets. It was popcorn. Anyway, so we're going to release all of the conversations that we had on that evening as episodes.

But to start, we had a conversation about antitrust. We spoke to Andrew Ferguson. He's the new chair of the FTC for the Trump administration. Obviously, there's a lot of curiosity about how much continuity there may or may not be between antitrust under the Biden administration, under Lena Kahn, who we've also spoken to on the podcast and what this new era might look like. So it was really interesting to sit down with him and get a better sense of it. That's right. And it's got pretty interesting implications, really for multiple reasons. I mean, if you recall, one of the themes, sort of when

the election happened was a lot of excitement on Wall Street because of a perception that there would be a lot of mergers and deals would get a green light, that they would be going forward, the new era of dealmaking activity. Incidentally, the new era of dealmaking activity. Incidentally, the new chair, Andrew Ferguson, kept the merger guidelines that were put in place under his predecessor, but they're clearly going to be differences. There are areas of alignment. There are areas of differences. And so we talked to Andrew about sort of what a conservative or what a MAGA vision of antitrust might look like. Maga MNA was my suggestion, I think, and he took it. So, all right, here it is, our live conversation with the new FTC chief, Andrew Ferguson. Thank you so

much for coming in. I'm really annoyed, actually, because one of your lawyers gave me, like, the perfect first question for the podcast today. I was like, oh, this is amazing. And then you sort of walked it back. I don't exactly know what happened, so that dulled it a little bit. But anyway, apparently in court today, one of your lawyers said, we need a pause for this case against Amazon because we don't have the resources and we can't pay for transcripts. like, oh, this is an amazing first question for Andrew. And then you walked up like, is there a constraint, though, between this impulse, and we'll get into it, you know,

in terms of headcount, and your desire for what, you know, is, looks like going to be a sort of vigorous new antitrust enforcement approach. Thank you for having me. A lot to unwrap there. Yeah. First on constraints, no. Okay. I've got the people I need to protect Americans from monopolies to protect them from fraud.

And, you know, no, I don't think anyone in Washington has taken sort of the threat that big tech poses to American consumers more seriously than I have. When President Trump announced my appointment, this is one of the things he said he really cared about was taking the threats that big tech posed to American consumers very seriously. There, I will throw every resource the agency has at prosecuting cases against big tech that we've got going. so unequivocally no, there are no resource constraints on protecting Americans from monopolies and fraud. Can you explain what happened today? I think a lawyer had a bad day in court. He was wrong. He filed a letter almost immediately after saying I was wrong. We don't have resource constraints. And we are ready to prosecute this case on whatever timeline the court wants for us. So we're ready to go. Okay. But presumably there is this broader drive to streamline some agencies, yours included.

At the same time that you have these really lofty targets that you're trying to reach, I just saw the very good Bloomberg story out today about the Microsoft probe. This is a huge company. That's going to take a lot of effort, a lot of resources. Again, presumably you're doing this with less resources than you had, say, a year ago at the FTC. I would not presume that. Look, the Americans voted for major reform. President Trump ran on major reform, and he's giving it to him.

And government should not be bigger than is necessary to deliver the services that Americans need, to protect Americans from the problems that Americans have. The FTC, we are engaged in this streamlining process. The goal is to maximize Americans' returns on their taxpayer dollars. When they send their money off to Washington, they expect their government to do a lot with that money, and that the government shouldn't be any bigger than is necessary to do those tasks. And so at the FTC, we've got the resources we need to protect Americans from fraud and monopoly. And look, you know, no government official in history has ever said, no, I want fewer resources, which is why the president's efficiency agenda is so important because government will

always keep sucking up resources. The goal here is to maximize the return on investment for American taxpayers, and that's what we're doing at the FTC. Okay, so what does Trump actually think about antitrust? Because he has a lot of opinions. Sometimes it's hard to get a handle on what exactly those opinions are. Sometimes he seems to contradict himself. A lot of people think he's pro-business, but at the same time, he has talked about antitrust and competition. and the power of the big tech platforms, as you just mentioned. What does he tell you about how he thinks of all of this? I think President Trump is pro-innovation, pro-growth,

and in that sense, he is pro-business. But I'm going to push back a little bit on the way you frame the question. I don't think that there's any inconsistency with being pro-business and favoring vigorous antitrust enforcement. Those two have to go hand-in-hand. Look, I, like most Republicans, and I think like most Americans, and pro-free markets. Antitrust is how we keep our markets free.

Markets that are infected with monopoly, that are infected with collusion, that are infected with foreclosure, these are not free. They move value from consumers, from innovative businesses to giant monopolies who then are focused mostly on protecting those monopolies rather than innovating, rather than growing,

rather than coming up with the next great idea that changes Americans' lives. So I think President Trump is pro-American markets, He's pro-business, but that is easily reconcilable with favoring vigorous antitrust enforcement. And President Trump, you know, he's been president for four years before this. He sort of have seen what President Trump's antitrust agenda looks like, and he favors vigorous enforcement. He favors following the law, and he favors clarity and certainty for people who have to participate in these markets. No, no, no, no, no, no.

There's a live recording, so that's a, hold on, hold on. No, there's a live recording. It's a live record. President Trump spent four years as the victim of endless lawfare. He's president of the United States. Yeah, all right. It's DC audience. I get it.

He has spent the last several months picking people in his cabinet or in agencies like mine who are focused on enforcing the laws as they are written and carrying out this agenda. All right, let me ask you, all right. You mentioned streamlining the FTC. one way that you could imagine streamlining from a government's perspective is that we don't need an FTC and obviously you have your counterparts

at the Department of Justice. You yourself have talked about the sort of philosophy of disputing the premise of sort of these independent agencies. Why do we need two separate antitrust enforcement agencies? So I think we can get to independence in a minute But I think the FTC sort of adds value to the enforcement regime because it combines the consumer protection and the antitrust enforcement program in a single agency. Okay.

And those two can cross-pollinate, and they protect consumers more fully than, you know, just a singular antitrust enforcement necessarily would. And, you know, the two missions sort of like learn from each other. The antitrust people, when they're doing investigations, they can find problems that violate the consumer protection laws. and then the FTC can continue those investigations with the other side of the house. So I think there's some benefit to that. But there's also, I think, some benefits in certain circumstances to having

multi-member agencies with people from both parties. I mean, look, if you have an agency that is exceeding the law, abusing the companies that it purports to regulate, it's helpful for markets, for courts, for litigants, for government transparency to have people in the other party

pointing this out. and saying it in dissents, like, you know, I wrote 400 plus pages of dissents during my time as a minority commissioner. I think that that adds value. But I think that the FTC's particular value add is you combine the two missions, consumer protection and antitrust in a single house, and they both sort of like help reinforce the other. I know it's early days, but one of the things you've done so far is you said you were going to maintain the merger guidelines from the Biden administration. And some people were really surprised about that. You said that you thought stability is good for enforcement agencies. I think maybe some people are confused because this doesn't necessarily seem to be an administration that is obsessed with stability or continuity.

Walk us through the thinking there. Why did you commit to those particular guidelines, especially given that, you know, they got a lot of criticism from multiple sides of the aisle? Yeah, so we've had various iterations of the merger guidelines dating back to the 60s, and then when the FTC and DOJ started doing it together. in the 1980s, you know, we tend to have guidelines for pretty long periods of time. Sometimes there are sort of iterative changes made to those guidelines over the course of time, but a complete rewrite of the guidelines relatively rare. And it happens, you know, we had the guidelines rewritten in 2010,

but the general principle has been presidents of one party maintain the guidelines from the previous. They may add here and there. They provide commentaries on those guidelines to sort of explain to business how, you know, that current administration understands the guidelines, but a complete revamp is rare. And if we get into this process where every single time a new administration comes in, they jettison the guidelines. Two things happen. First, the agencies spend all their time writing the guidelines.

I mean, the previous administration jettisoned the 2010 guidelines and spent like two years having to write this one. They were only effective for barely a year of the last administration. If we get into this process where every four years we're yanking and rewriting, it's all the agencies you're going to do. Number one. Number two, the guidelines will become basically meaningless if they just are like one party's statement of its view of antitrust policy. Courts won't follow them anymore if they think that they're just openly partisan. Regulated entities won't rely on them to plan. You know, businesses can't just plan in two-year cycles. They have to plan longer than that. And if you're of the view that every election runs the risk of the guidelines being yanked, the guidelines just become meaningless. And third, you know, there definitely were parts of the guidelines that were, you know, departures from the 2010 guidelines, but they generally are relatively well aligned. They're built on case law. They preserve a lot of the principles from previous guidelines.

And I think just throwing them all out all at once means, A, the agencies are going to devote tremendous resources to rewriting them. And B, everyone will remain very uncertain about how the agencies feel about it. And finally, you know, a lot has been written about the sort of effects of the guidelines. They're guidelines at the end of the day. They aren't law. They're supposed to be explanations to the public about how the agencies generally understand the merger program going forward. But the most important feature of antitrust enforcement in the United States isn't the guidelines. It's the commitment of particular antitrust enforcers to following the laws as written, providing certainty and clarity about how they

understand the law. And then when you go to court, bringing the cases that you think that you can win, and when you can't win the cases, get the hell out of the way and let the mergers close. So one of the things that obviously came up under the last FTC chair, this idea of like, okay, there's more than the consumer welfare standard that should be evaluated. One nice thing about conceiving of consumer welfare narrowly in terms of price, A, well, people like cheap things, but also, you know, it creates a certain,

it eliminates a certain subjectivity. You can plug, okay, this is what's going to happen to market share of companies, you can plug them into some economist model. I don't know if those models actually work or not, but theoretically spit out some answer. sort of we get lower prices and then it's like, okay, this is good or bad. When you start broadly defining consumer welfare rethinking that, like, first of all,

what is that term, when you hear the consumer welfare standard, what does it mean to you? Does it mean more than prices, for one thing? In order to talk about this, I want to get a little bit into history of being a trust laws. We like history. Yeah, so you said. So Congress passes its first competition law in 1890, the Sherman Act. I don't know how many of you read the Sherman Act, but the operative provisions of the Sherman Act, Sections 1 and Sections 2, it's like 50 words.

Like the most important provisions of American Antitrust Law are 50 words adopted in 1890. The Congress has not changed effectively since then. Then in 1914, they passed the FTC Act, which both creates my agency and also creates a new antitrust provision that prohibits unfair methods of competition. And then a couple months later, it passes the Clayton Act. and the Clayton Act is really important because that's the law that prohibits mergers that tend to create a monopoly or injure competition. So by 1914, with an important amendment called the Robinson-Patman Act in 1930s,

our antigeness laws are basically set. Like the operative provisions for merger purposes of Section 7 of the Clayton Act and Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act are basically unchanged since they were originally adopted. For decades, courts kind of cast about for... a theory about how to apply the antitrust laws. So we know that the antitrust laws are about competition and protecting competition, but that doesn't tell you a whole lot.

Does that mean like making sure that there are a particular number of competitors in the marketplace? Does it mean competitors have to do particular things and we don't care how many there are? Does it mean that we care about the economic effects of monopoly? Does it mean we care about the political effects of monopoly? And this can matter,

because you can imagine, you know, the existence of some monopoly somewhere that ends up keeping prices low, or of a duopoly, but wield unbelievable economic power. Or you can imagine businesses that aren't true monopolists, but they have tons of economic power, or of political power, I'm sorry. And so courts up through the 1950s and 60s

were just sort of casting about looking for some standard they could articulate about when the antitrust laws are violated. And by the 50s or 60s, it was very difficult for anyone to predict what any given court was going to say about any given transaction or conduct. But you could have premised it on what the judges were having for breakfast when they were deciding the cases, and that was as likely a predictor of outcomes as anything else. Then this guy, a lot of people in this audience, it's as sort of wonky as you guys say it is, have probably heard of for other reasons.

He was a professor at Yale's name was Robert Bork, and he writes a book called The Antitrust Paradox. And the subheading of the book is a policy at war with itself. And the position he articulates is the courts are using antitrust to accomplish all sorts of things that don't have anything to do with economic injuries. Politics, labor unions, all sorts of stuff that just don't have anything to do with it. It's basically a choose-your-own-adventure, legal regime. It makes no sense, and it's actually injuring economic growth. The only thing the antitrust laws should care about, Judge Bork said, is the welfare of consumers. So he articulates this view and this.

70s and by 1975 in this famous case called writer, the Supreme Court is citing Judge Bork and saying the antitrust laws are a prescription for consumer welfare. Okay. When Judge Bork writes about consumer welfare, he says, look, low prices, that's important for consumer welfare. High output, that's important. Other things are important too, like the promotion of future competition, the protection of innovation, product quality, all sorts of things sort of fit within consumer welfare.

but what we care about are economic injuries inflicted on participants in marketplaces, not about stuff that isn't related to sort of economic welfare of market participants. At the same time this is happening, something else is happening in our system. We have this sort of like economic libertarianism on the right that sort of attaches itself to the consumer welfare standard, and it has certain, like ideological suppositions about markets. Markets always correct themselves is one of the suppositions. professor at NYU, Daniel Francis, bright young, anti-trust scholars, written a lot about this, I highly recommend them, that government intervention is almost always worse than anything happening in markets, even monopolies.

And so we should always preference against government intervention, even if it's to correct market failures and monopolies. And a strong deference to C-suite decision-making on the view that they understand what should work best in a marketplace, and government ought to be hands-off and deferential to C-suite decision-making. These two things ride alongside each other. And so by the 1990s, consumer welfare has basically been reduced to two questions. Is the transaction or conduct at issue likely to increase price in the shorter intermediate term or reduce outcome in the short or intermediate term? But that isn't really what consumer welfare is about.

Consumers can suffer all sorts of injuries that aren't just about short-term prices or short-term output. A loss of innovation is a huge injury to consumers. a loss of product quality, huge injury consumers. But a lot of courts had started to shift away and focus on the extremely qualitative question about price and output, which also led to a deference to econometrics and to economists and antitrust cases. Sorry, you make quantitative.

Quantitative, sorry, thank you. Thank you, that's right, quantitative. Which also ends up making antitrust cases very expensive because everyone has to hire an army of economists to talk about the case. It makes it very difficult for judges to decide these cases because the way these often go is each side has their own army of economists, identically trained, identical schools, fancy credentials on both

sides, making exactly opposite arguments about the same number, often predictive arguments, and a judge untrained in any of this. I mean, you know, I don't know how much, how many lawyers are in the room, but the average federal district judge in the United States was like a local prosecutor or a local defense attorney or a member of the local bar has probably never dealt with antitrust in his or her life before that case. And now you've got MIT and Stanford-trained economists having a really vicious dispute about identical facts, and the judge is supposed to decide, the judge kind of goes, I don't know, it seems like a wash, but it makes these cases long and expensive. And so that is, you know, in my view, the consumer welfare standard

encompasses injuries to participant, economic injuries to participants in marketplaces. It includes consumers, obviously. It also includes laborers. The Supreme Court has understood the antitrust laws to protect laborers as sellers of labor, to the same extent it protects purchasers of goods. You know, the sort of fixation on short and intermediate term price and output effects isn't actually what consumer welfare was ever understood to mean. It was supposed to encompass a broader range of injuries to marketplace participants, but it got shrunk largely because of ideological views about markets. Thank you for that history. That was useful. And Joe and I keep joking that we need to, um, we need to add a bork claxon to our monopsony

that's right. That's right. That's right. Um, but I, I guess. Well, actually, I didn't really answer your question because the question was more about like, yeah, I was building up to that. I was a narrative I would be too. I was trying to think how to ask it politely. Yeah, yeah, yeah, go ahead. So then we get to President Trump's first administration. And I'll just give a little background on myself. I was a private practicing lawyer. I clerked off law school and it was a private practicing lawyer here at DC firms doing antitrust work. And my parents back in rural Virginia

used to joke that I was a pro-trust lawyer because I represented the businesses who were resisting antitrust suits. And then I went and clerked on the Supreme Court for Justice Thomas during the 2016 election, and I would bike into work from Old Town and listen to the news or podcast on the way in and was doing this as sort of a like lawyer

who had thought a lot about antitrust as a practitioner, but very little about antitrust as a policy. You know, when you're practicing lawyer, you think about doctrines, how can I help my client with these doctrines? You don't go one step up and sort of think about the policy. And as I'm driving to work, I'm listening to President Trump calling for more vigorous antitrust enforcement,

pretty vociferously on the campaign trail. And I'm riding in and going, what's happening? Like, A, we're talking about antitrust in a presidential campaign. This is very strange. And two, a Republican calling for more vigorous antitrust enforcement. And so when President Trump takes office, he's not calling for a revolution in the consumer welfare standard, like some of his successors did.

He wasn't saying, you know, get rid of the consumer welfare standard, but he hires antitrust enforcers who take seriously the idea that consumer welfare isn't just about price and output and what a bunch of economists say. It's about consumers' participation in marketplaces and protecting them from short-term and long-term injuries and laborers as marketplace participants. And so, you know, a lot of folks have talked, not incorrectly, about the Biden administration bringing lots of lawsuits against big tech. A lot of people have talked about the Google search suit, which is in the remedy phase right now where the United States is asking

to split Chrome off the rest of Google. President Trump brought that case. President Trump brought that case in 2020, and it was litigated during the Biden administration, but President Trump brought that case. The biggest attempted block of a vertical merger in American history up to that point was brought by President Trump in the 18T Time Warner case. And the meta case that's going to trial in my agency in just a month that says that Meta's acquisition of Instagram and WhatsApp violated the antitrust laws was brought by President Trump's administration. So sort of the reconsideration of consumer welfare to encompass a broader range of consumer injuries than just price and output starts with President Trump.

Now, President Biden comes in and picks my successor, who is an extremely talented antitrust thinker, but was of the view that the consumer welfare standard ought to be discarded entirely and ought to be replaced with a far more open-ended understanding of the antitrust laws that protect which she calls the competitive process, but is more than just economic injuries to laborers and consumers. It's, you know, the political effects of consolidation, all sorts of downstream non-economic effects, and that consolidation itself is the enemy, even irrespective of the relationship of that consolidation to sort of economic injuries on market participants. And that was basically a proposed revolution. A lot of people call this neo-brandizianism.

Brandeis was a very famous Supreme Court Justice who articulated a sort of anti-consolidation view of the antitrust laws in the first half of the 20th century. And they proposed sort of ripping the antitrust laws out of the consumer welfare standard and opening up a much broader range of interests. I think sort of two things to think about there. The first is this is basically go back to the 50s and 60s before Bork's book. Their rationale was that price and out part are too narrow a consideration on which to base an antitrust regime. And the answer to that is, that's true, but Bork didn't actually say just limited to price and output. He understood consumer welfare standard to encompass consumers in all of their aspects of participating in markets, including

how things will happen further in the future with innovation and product quality. And, you know, I think if you measure the previous antitrust regime by whether it achieved its Neo-brandizian revolution, the answer is it definitely did not.

Every court in the country still applies the consumer welfare standard. I prefer hipster antitrust to neo-brandizia. But, I mean, what should we call your brand of antitrust? Give us, like, a catchy name, like hipster antitrust, like anti-woke antitrust,

like MAGA M&A, like give us something. Yeah. You can call a MAGA antitrust if you want. I think there are two things, two things I would say. The first is it's conservative antitrust in the sense that, you know, we aren't behold into sort of libertarian ideology about markets. We take markets actually as they actually are. We take consumers as they actually are, how they actually participate in markets.

We take laborers as they actually are. And we take very seriously that, you know, consumers and laborers suffer in markets short of things that just affect short-term price and output. And that the loss of innovation, even if you can't measure it the way, or the loss of choice or product quality, even if you can't measure it the way

that an economist would measure price and output still matter to consumers and still matter to antitrust. And I think the second is, you know, I really do see my view as just like a cop on the beat. You know, I think the other thing that was unusual about the previous administration was that it had a really hard core focus on ex-ante regulation.

You know, the FTC under my predecessor, passed a record-shattering number of ex-ante rules for an agency that doesn't pass very many ex-ante rules, including competition rules, which it had not done in a long time, arguably, in my view, had never lawfully done, and, you know, the only one that we passed has been vacated by the courts.

But, you know, it was not just a sort of neobrandizian revolution, it was an emphasis on ex-ante regulation, And my view is, as a cop on the beat, if we really vigorously enforce the antitrust laws, we avoid the need for regulation. Because regulation is what you have to do when monopolies have totally consumed a market. I mean, all of us live in some form of a utility monopoly. Grew up in Virginia. We have a giant electric utility monopoly. It is heavily, heavily, heavily regulated directly by the state legislature.

But if you vigorously enforce your, and utility monopolies, they're a little different because of the sort of space constraint. on wires and cables and things like that. But if you take the antitrust laws very seriously, and you really vigorously enforce them, and you don't pull your punches because of ideological suppositions about markets, you can avoid the need for ex-ante regulation because vigorous market competition ensures monopolies do not rise. Antitrust enforcement ensures vigorous market competition,

and if you have market competition, you don't need heavy regulation because you don't have giant monopoly problems. So I take, I understand this point, point that you don't need as much regulation if you take antitrust seriously. There does seem to, however, be, maybe you dispute this, this tendency towards centralization in the modern internet economy. And, you know, like, it's very helpful that everyone, you know, more or less goes to one

place to share photos, something like Instagram or one place to review books, etc. Like, this is just seems to... One place to troll? One place to troll on Twitter like I do. How do you like... Actually, that's a joke. I never troll. Sorry.

I slipped there. Tracy, Tracy Connell. I was so sorry. I made you do that. Hey, I slipped for a second. I do not troll on Twitter. But how do you like... I guess what I'm trying to understand is

many people on both the right and the left feel this intuitive sense that there's a tremendous amount of power being accrued in these gigantic tech platforms. And to your point, like antitrust and the FTC seat specifically, how do you measure when something is uncompetitive in a deal? Because, again, the nice thing about prices, et cetera, is like you can measure it. So like what does it actually look like to have a sort of more competitive internet?

Yeah. And the additional layer of complication for a lot of the internet platforms that we all use is that we use them without exchanging money for them. Right, right. Like, you know, Facebook, X, not premium, Google search. You know, we don't hand over money in exchange for using those services. It doesn't mean that there aren't ways to measure a loss of competition. So, like, you know, I'll just use an example about the position that the commission is articulated in meta, which is, you know, purely public.

But one of the ways you can measure a loss of competition is if product quality is degraded without a meaningful competitive impact to the company that's degrading product quality. So, for example, the FTC has alleged, and we've got a trial coming up on this, but the FTC has alleged in meta, for example, that Facebook was able to massively increase the ad load on Facebook without losing any consumers, which meant that they were able to degrade the quality of their product, and consumers didn't have anywhere else to go, and so they just sort of stayed. And the antitrust law is a sort of fully formed understanding. But the question, I guess, and that makes a lot of sense. to me. On the other hand, how much is that about some prior failure of antitrust versus this tendency on the internet for everyone to be where their friends are and the sort of natural centralization? Network effects. Yeah. Yeah. So, you know, network effects are sort of a natural part of the internet environment. Yeah. And the antitrust laws do not actually forbid monopoly itself. They don't.

The courts have gone out of their way over and over for decades to say the acquisition of a monopoly naturally and lawfully does not violate the antitrust laws. You know, if someone is just really good at something and way better than everyone else, they sort of will naturally develop a monopoly in that because people will prefer that product or service. What you can't do is maintain your monopoly from things unrelated to your skill or the quality of your product or sort of dumb luck. And, you know, in terms of like, you know, failures of previous antitrust regimes, let me just touch on that a minute. Sure. Let's just take Google Search, for example. A lot of, the Google search case is a very traditional Section 2 case. It's tying, it's ordinary monopolization conduct, it doesn't

propose breaking sort of our standards. It's a very normal thing. And this case, the idea for this case, is sort of sat around for a long time. But there were political decisions made by antitrust informers in previous administrations not to do it. But those are political decisions. Those are political economy decisions driven either by some combination of ideology or a prudential, you know, preference against government intervention, even if you think you can win the case, because, you know, you don't want to be the guy that kills the goose laying the golden egg. But, you know, I think we need to be realistic about it. There were moments during the creation of the internet and during the sort of of rise of these platforms where they made decisions that even under ordinary antitrust theories would

have said, hey, this is potentially a problem. I mean, for example, that the FTC's theory in meta was at the acquisition of Instagram was an antitrust violation, but the FTC did not block the merger. My own view is, I don't think that we should say if a monopoly

arose in any market, in any market, internet platforms or any of the other goods and services we use every day, we shouldn't let, you know, enforcement declarations in the past that led to the creation of monopoly be a reason not to confront the monopolies.

today because that's basically just the sunk cost fallacies. Like, oh, well, we already did this once. Like, you know, they have the monopoly. Now it is what it is. My view is, no, if we have monopolies and they're being maintained illegally, no matter how they were formed, no matter who is asleep at the wheel when their formation came about, my job as an interest enforcers to do something about that if I think I can win in court. And if I don't think I can win in court, I need to leave them alone. Okay, so since we're on the topic of the internet, big tech platforms, one of the things you've talked about potentially going after censorship on these platforms. Can you connect that to, you just gave us a great history of the consumer welfare standard

and how it's changed through time. Connect that to the consumer welfare standard, whether it's a bork-esque definition or something more broad. Sure. Can I resist your premise lately? Of course. I don't want to go after censorship. Okay.

The government is not supposed to go after censorship for censorship because we're not the speech police. I do care about market power. and if market power enables a business to mistreat its consumers or to degrade the quality of its product by, for example, throwing people off of their platform and suffering no competitive consequences whatsoever, that antitrust cares about. Not the censorship itself, the market power that makes it possible to mistreat consumers without suffering competitive consequences. I just give you some background on this. 2020, I am Mitch McConnell's lawyer. I'm sitting in my Senate office, the George Floyd protest,

are sort of at their peak. I start getting calls from the GCs of giant Fortune 100 businesses and business groups. And I pick up the phone and they say, hey, cops are really racist. We, the business community, want you to pass a bunch of police reform bills.

And, you know, I was sort of like conservative that had relatively strong deference for markets and for market actors and people making decisions in those markets. I was shocked by this. And my response was, why are you calling me about this? You're supposed to make widgets at low prices for Americans.

Why are you calling me about police reform? What the hell does this have to do with you? Leave the political debates to Americans and to voters. Stop calling me about this. If anything, don't you want more police to protect your businesses? And they're like, no, it's really important to us. Like, we want this done. And I remember sitting in my office and going,

it's weird that these big businesses with all this economic power are leveraging that economic power to accomplish social and political objectives. And then in 2020, we have this censorship crisis. People want to question the efficacy of masks? You're not going to be on a platform. You want to question the safety of vaccines. You're not going to be on the platform. You want to question whether it's like fair to change voting laws in the middle of an election. You're not going to be on the platform. You want to question whether there's something at Hunter Biden's laptop that we should know about. You're not going to be on platform and we're not going to let you publish it. But it wasn't just censorship. Like any consumer in

2020, you couldn't watch TV, you couldn't go online, you couldn't shop in a store without having nakedly political messages, almost exclusively the platform of one party being thrown in your face. And as a consumer, I said, how can it be that there are all these businesses who are willing to alienate huge swaths of their consumer base with these messages that they throw on our face and suffer no economic or competitive consequences at all? And I started to understand sort of the critique of the very narrow understanding the consumer welfare standard and the libertarianism that had sort of glommed onto it, which is large businesses with market power will sometimes leverage that market power to injure consumers and sometimes do it in politically motivated ways.

And we should really care about the market power that makes that sort of mistreatment possible. But that's the thing I care about is the market power that makes the treatment possible. I don't want to police people's speech, but I do want to police market power. But do, okay, I guess my question is, do people have a right to be platformed? And then secondly, I mean, I would really like an Hermes Birkenbag. Armase will not sell it to me because I do not buy thousands and thousands of dollars worth of luxury goods every year. They have the option whether or not to sell me, and they are famously very exclusive in their decisions to do that. Yeah, so I don't think that anyone has a right to be on any particular platform, but you do have a right to participate in a market that isn't infected by. monopoly and you do have a right not to have the quality of the product that you want, including speech on platforms, be degraded by someone who will suffer no competitive consequences from doing that. For the same reason, Hermes does not have to lower its prices to sell you

a Birkenbag. I think they should, but yeah, okay. But what they don't have the right to do is engage in conduct that maintains a monopoly where they can charge you higher prices than they could otherwise charge you in a competitive marketplace. Yeah, of course, we're going to have luxury goods, but we don't want a market and we shouldn't have a market, and it isn't a free market. For anyone who cares about free markets like I do, a market isn't free if monopolists get to charge you higher prices, degrade your product quality, deprive you of innovation because of their market power. How do you know, in the case of sort of the world of algorithms, right? So there are certain instances where, okay, the platform is saying if you talk about X,

you are gone. And in some cases, there are emails and very clear trails about stuff like that. There are other cases where it looks like there is a dial that gets turned from time to time where suddenly, oh, I'm starting to see a lot more people talk about this perspective versus that perspective. Do you have a way of measuring whether, outside of, like, say, emails, whether companies are degrading their consumer experience with respect to those consumers' ability to speak freely. Do you feel confident in your way in your ability to

know whether the company is serving their customers well in that? Yeah, that's a good question. And I'm not going to we antitrust enforcers are sort of taking seriously the antitrust problems of the big tech

companies for the first time. I mean, 2020 is sort of the watershed moment when President Trump brings the meta suit and the Google search suit. I litigated the Google ad tech case alongside the Biden Department of Justice when I was the Solicitor General of Virginia, I'm not going to pretend like applying the antitrust laws to new context doesn't come with some difficulties, including potentially the difficulty you're describing. What I'm saying is that for a long time, especially in the 2010s, there was a strong preference before President Trump became

preference for saying this is difficult, it's new, it's novel, let's not bring the antitrust laws into these contexts. And my view is that that sort of ideologically driven hands-off laissez-faire approach created a system where we have super-large, super-powerful platforms that, in my view, there are instances where they were quite obviously degrading their product quality in a way that would surprise me in the presence of real competition. And I also want to address the, you know, in some instances there were emails where it was like, oh, I'll take this person off. Look, I mean, I was involved in the Murphy litigation, Missouri against Biden litigation about alleged either coordination or collusion between the government and big tech platforms during 2020.

It's more than just a couple emails. This was rampant. It was systematic. And it was terrifying the relationship between the big tech platforms and the government about who was going to get to speak about what. And I think this leads me to another important point. And it's one I try to make to my libertarian friends who think some of what I'm saying sounds extreme, which is, if you are a libertarian and you care a lot about personal liberty, you ought to really care about monopoly because it is way easier for the government to control

all of our lives if they only have to coerce a small handful of suppliers. If you have a wide range of options for consumers, it's harder for the government to pick up the phone over and over and over and be calling executive after executive and say, we need you to do this to that person and this to that person. But if it's just a handful, that gets real easy, real quick. And I think we saw that in the Murthy litigation. It's just a couple platforms. You need a handful of government officials who call and berate platform people to kick consumers off. That's harder if there are more suppliers, if there are more choices for consumers. And so even if you are sort of libertarian, and you have this ideological sort of predisposition view that markets correct themselves,

and government intervention is always worse than monopoly. My response is you don't want a tiny number of suppliers because the government can coerce them real easily, and if the government can coerce them, they can coerce you. So just on the content issue, I mean, as part of the problem, the advertisers as well here, because we've seen this happen where advertisers will say, I don't want to put money into this particular business

because I think there are a bunch of people saying racist or unacceptable things. And then secondly, I mean, you've pressed for Section 230 reform. I think this is something you're interested in. And that's always an interesting thought experiment to think what the world would look like if we never had Section 230. But, I mean, that exists. That currently exempts Internet platforms from a lot of liability here. But if you were to reform it, surely that would come into conflict in one way or another with content and censorship. Let me talk about 230 really quickly.

So as a state enforcer, which is what I was before I was at the FTC, trying to protect Virginians, the amount of time I spent trying to come up with complaints that had to plead around Section 230 was like shocking. Section 230 on its face seems to care mostly about protecting tech platforms in the early 1990s from the liability for torts committed by people who are speaking on their platform. platforms. And it has, over the course of years, been interpreted basically to immunize tech platforms from anything relating to content moderation. In my view, that isn't what Section 230 says, but that is what the courts have done. My view about Section 230 is that it's very difficult to justify

immunizing the biggest companies in the history of the world from state and federal enforcement actions. and the FTC has tried to enforce Section 5, our preeminent statute, against online platform companies, and we have lost cases because of Section 230. Where private businesses, large private businesses, are interposing Section 230 between the government and trying to protect Americans through government enforcement actions. In my view, that just categorically cries out for reform. But I don't think that that runs into conflict with censorship in the following sense. some of the section 230 cases that have troubled me the most are people who were alleged that they were thrown off of a platform in violation of the platform's terms of service it's just a contract claim like hey i entered into this relationship with you the platform and i did so on the basis of what you had in your tOSs which governed you know the kind of things i'm allowed to say the kind of conduct in which i'm permitted to engage etc and you kicked me off in violation of your own t-us and the platforms have been able to interpret

post section 230 between consumers and say it doesn't matter what our TOS said. We kicked you off. That's a content decision. Therefore, you don't get to bring the lawsuit. And my view is, you know, consumers can protect themselves better from censorship if they're able to at least hold platforms to their terms of service. And one of the questions that we've asked consumers to provide us info on in our own tech platform investigation on this issue is give us examples, if you have them, of times that

you think that you were de-platformed or shadow band or whatever in violation of the terms you agreed to when you got on the platform. And, you know, so on Section 230, I do think it has been interpreted wildly belong what anyone thought was going to say, and that at the very least, you know, the Trump administration proposed these changes in 2020. It should not provide immunity from government enforcement actions that are designed to protect Americans. Andrew Ferguson, FTC Chief. Thank you so much for coming. We got Odd Lots live. Thanks for having.

That was our conversation with FTC Chair Andrew Ferguson. I'm Tracy Alloway. You can follow me at Tracy Allaway. And I'm Joe Wisenthall. You can follow me at the stalwart. Follow our guest, Andrew Ferguson. He's at A Ferguson FTC. Follow our producers, Carmen Rodriguez,

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