Odd Lots - The Hidden History of Eurodollars, Part 3: Spinning Out of Control

Episode Date: January 16, 2025

In this special three-part series, Odd Lots is exploring the history of the eurodollar market. By the 1970s, eurodollars are hitting the headlines — and not in a good way. While this new form of money initially acted as a pressure valve for the Bretton Woods system, many now think the eurodollar market has spun out of control. What happens next — including Richard Nixon's decision to take the US off the gold standard — will not only shape the ultimate contours of today's eurodollar market, but will also give us the modern financial system itself. The story is told by Columbia Law School Professor Lev Menand and Federal Reserve Bank of New York Policy Advisor Josh Younger. Read More:US Aims to Tighten Flow of TSMC and Samsung Chips to ChinaRussian Crude Oil Piles Up Near Chinese Coast After US Sanctions Only Bloomberg.com subscribers can get the Odd Lots newsletter in their inbox — now delivered every weekday — plus unlimited access to the site and app. Subscribe at bloomberg.com/subscriptions/oddlotsSee omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.

Bloomberg Audio Studios. Podcasts Radio News. Joe. Joe, what's that moving over there? What's that shadow? It's the shadow banking system. It's getting bigger. I think you've been down here, Tracy, in this proverbial bunker for a little too long, maybe?

But no, it's the final installment of our three-part Eurodollar series. Yeah, we've been tracing the history of Euro-Dollars, an incredibly important component of the global financial system. and at more than $10 trillion, the biggest form of shadow banking today. There has been post-World War II reconstruction, Cold War intrigue, 1960s politics, existential crisis in the dollar-based monetary system. But this right here, this is the moment when the Eurodollar market really takes shape and starts to look like it does today.

Right. If you haven't caught the first and second episodes of this series, you should first definitely go back and listen to them because if you don't, you're going to miss out a lot of the detail and you're not going to really understand what happens next. But this is key because this is when the euro dollar market that we talk about all the time and finance, etc., actually begins to assume its modern form and really emerge from the inflation and monetary shocks of the 1970s. And of course, this story is being told by two odd thoughts favorites, Lev Menand and Josh Younger. I'm Lev Menand. professor at Columbia Law School, where I study money in banking and the history of central banking. I'm Josh Younger. I'm a policy advisor at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. And the views I am going to express are my own and not necessarily those of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York or the

Federal Reserve System. Now, where we last left off, we closed out the 1960s. The Eurodollar market has grown to about $70 billion. And that growth has bought some time for policymakers who are trying to find a solution to the problem of funding dollar-based activity while maintaining the gold peg. Eurodollars have become a pressure valve, basically, to the Bretton Woods system, and they're helping it to stay alive. But as a consequence of that, the Eurodollar market is now really booming in a wild way. And Nixon is about to do something really big in response. He's about to abandon Bretton Woods altogether and do that famous move where he went off the gold standard. So take a listen.

Okay, so now it's 1970, 71, and things are really starting to go off the rails. This system is creaking and then swaying, and it really looks like it's about to fall down. And Eurodollars are getting a lot of the blame. They're called this hydro-headed monster. People are really worried that this is the mechanism for funding the speculation that is being directed against the dollar and really threatening to bring the whole system down. And it's 1970. You don't have to be that old in 1970 to remember the Great Depression.

And one of the theories of the Great Depression that's pretty common at that point and still is today is that the depression itself was largely a consequence of monetary contraction, global monetary contraction. So what does that mean in this context? If the dollar system fails, the money goes away, in a sense. And so that monetary contraction in the early 70s represents the same existential threat. This is going to come back again. Everyone's really worried about this. This existential threat to the global economy, another Great Depression. No one wants another Great Depression. think that's generally true, but it's very acutely true at this point in time. And so in the summer in 1971, things are just completely untenable. And Nixon, after a few days huddling with advisors at Camp David, just says enough with the whole thing. Right. So it closes the gold window. This is the Nixon shock. On a Sunday evening, he addresses the country, and he says, among other things, we're not going to be giving you gold for your dollars anymore. In recent weeks, the speculators have been waging an all-out war on the American dollar. accordingly, I have directed the Secretary of the Treasury to take the action necessary to defend the

dollar against the speculators. I have directed Secretary Connolly to suspend temporarily the convertibility of the dollar into gold or other reserve assets, except in amounts and conditions determined to be in the interest of monetary stability and in the best interest of the United States. This has all kinds of repercussions and it's dealt with in various ways and there are attempts to mitigate the effect of it. But for the Eurodollar market in particular, it signals a shift towards a degree of flexibility

and a lack of a need to have this thing to plug the balance of payments gap because all of a sudden, we're in a floating exchange rate type of world, and the imbalances can be corrected through the foreign exchange market, just like people sort of intended for a long time, as opposed to through financial engineering and different ways to sort prop up,

essentially a gold exchange standard. So that was a major shift in policy. And it was a big signal that the U.S. was willing to rock the boat, and that hadn't really been the case previously. And you can see that in this clip of John Connolly. He was Nixon's Treasury Secretary talking to the British Ambassador a few months after that in the winter of 1971. Mr. Ambassador, water, it wouldn't be better. That's great. Well, I'm delighted to hear from you, and I'm looking forward to seeing you.

It's hard to deal with ten nations at the same time, and it just takes a lot of everything out of us. The president has just been magnificent in his approach and his support, so I'm trying to carry out his wishes as best I know them. And I think we're going to make some headway. And don't you let anybody kid you that we're trying to tear things up. We've been the most forthcoming, the most expansionist nation in this world. You just take it from me. We want to settle this thing, and we've offered more to settle it than any other nation in the world's offered water. Well, water, that's right.

The president's options are entirely. We've tried to structure it in such a way that we're fairly close, but those countries over there have to be forthcoming a bit. Now, we've already gone further than we should, but the president has the options, and if they're, if Pompe do, Heath and the rest of them are halfway reasonable, I think it can be settled in the next month. Very important because, sticky situation. Tell them, they all preach that we're going to have a recession of worldwide depression, and I said, well, if you already believe they're, that you all come up with something. We've made you an offer. We're willing to take less than we deserve to keep that from happening.

Now, you all come forward. But they talk one way and act another. That's the problem. Remember, in the 1960s, we have U.S. policymakers embracing the Eurodollar market to save Breton Woods. Not for its own sake, not to help the London financial institutions compete in a dollar world, but to save Bretton Woods, to win the Cold War, to not embarrass ourselves in front of the Soviet Union.

And now we have Nixon saying, you know what? The hell with it, actually, this gold drain, we need to get ourselves out of this. That approach that Kennedy rejected, almost a decade earlier, Nixon embraces. And suddenly, the question is, well, why are we tolerating this destabilizing euro dollar market? We've decided to just rip the band-aid off. So now people can think about regulating it because it's not as essential anymore. And so the BIS, the Bank for International Settlements in Basel, recipient of the swap line to support the Eurodollar market, also starts convening central bankers and experts and so forth to try to figure out a way to regulate the market. And what they discover quickly, they come up with a standing committee on the Eurodollar system.

It's convened in the early 70s after the Nixon shock, and it basically doesn't come to any firm conclusions. They agree to have a standstill, which means no new central bank deposits. Remember, central banks are the largest or among the largest depositors, supporters of the Eurodollar market. they're putting their own money there. So they agree basically to stop doing more of that with a maybe we're going to think about reducing our holdings in the future, which is like not exactly the most aggressive regulatory response, but it's something and it's basically the only thing they can agree on. Right.

Remember, multilateralism is hard. We spent the last 10 years, basically a group of central banks building up this market to try to save this Bretton Woods system. You have all these foreign central banks investing their own. reserves into these Eurodollar deposits of their domestic banks to try to nurture it. You have the U.S. with its swap lines trying to suggest there's a lender of last resort backing to try to nurture this market. It's this major project that everybody is engaged in. And all of a sudden, you have Nixon walking away from the whole system. And now, can we agree

on what to do with the euro dollar market? Unsurprisingly, no. Everybody's like, oh, whoa, we have this whole thing that we built up. What are we going to do? and do with it. And the best they can sort of do is say, well, we're going to stop making it bigger. It went from half a tether to as large as one of our major banks today and larger really by the early 70s. It's like we had a Bank of America and a city group just totally operating offshore in Europe. But the tide has turned at this point, and you might think that there's going to be a crackdown, but then the euro dollar market gets another deus ex machina in the form of a massive dislocation in energy markets. Here's a clip from Nightly News with John Chancellor, which is indicative

of what you would have heard during this period. Good evening. The Middle East War produced developments all over the world today. The oil-producing countries of the Arab world decided to use their oil as a political weapon. They will reduce oil production by 5% a month until the Israelis withdraw from occupied territories. If the Arab countries keep that pledge, it would reduce their production by almost 50% in one year. So it's the fall of 1973, and conflict in the Middle East leads to an embargo by the Saudis against the United States. They will not ship oil to the United States, and that causes the price of oil to skyrocket. What does oil have to do with the euro dollar market? Oil has something to do with everything, right? Think about everything that we

use. Oil is an input into the cost of everything that we use, because we have to pay to get that to you. And oil is what is fueling global trade, quite literally. So if oil prices double or quadruple, that's going to be felt across everything that you buy in consumer goods markets. Not good for inflation. And also not good for the global financial system, because now, like, when oil goes up in price, it sort of creates a lot more money in a sense, because the value of this thing that's flowing around the world has gone up in value a lot, somewhat, you know, exogenously. And so the world has to find a way to deal with the money associated with the flow of more expensive oil. And so oil is not unique, but is special in the sense that there are producers and consumers.

So the producers of oil are taking in money and providing oil. The consumers of oil are spending money and taking in oil. And so the difference between those two is that the producers of oil want short-term liquid investments to hold the proceeds of the oil sales in, safe, short-term, easily accessible. They could put some of that into their domestic economy, but not all. of it, especially when the price quadruples. The consumers of oil don't want to pay that back every day. They want long-term, ideally fixed rate loans in many cases. So there's a maturity mismatch.

They're borrowers of money to buy oil want long-term loans. The investors or sellers of oil want short-term investments. And so who provides intermediation when you have a maturity mismatch? Banks. And so you need some way to allow for long-term lending and short-term borrowing. Euro banks are very well set up to do this because it's basically what they do already. Actually, LIBOR was invented for Eurodollar borrowings to allow them to do long-term maturity loans without taking the interest rate risk, right?

This whole mechanism for making loans that are not going to necessarily blow them up on an interest rate risk basis, but have a longer maturity. Eurodollar deposits are considered safe in part because of the SWAT network and its perceived backstop, the availability of some form of lender of last resort, although it's somewhat murky and complicated. And so the euro dollar system is one means by what. which to accomplish what becomes known as Petrodollar recycling. So the proceeds of oil sales, getting recycled back to the consumer of oil and on and on again in a circle. And that's the thing

that keeps the world going because in a world where oil supplies are suddenly interrupted, just like let's said, I mean, it's in everything, right? So if you suddenly cut off the supply of oil, either through embargo, but more importantly, through financial collapse, where you can't actually find a way to move the oil because the money isn't there when it needs to be there, that's another recipe, yet another Great Depression risk. People are very worried that the collapse of the financial system that provides for oil to make it where it needs to go will simultaneously collapse world trade, and that's yet another theory of the Great Depression,

the collapse of the monetary system, the collapse of world trade. So they're looking at a very similar set of risks. And it's hard to overstate how scary this is to policymakers at the time because we're engaged in this Cold War with the Soviets. And there's a massive shock to our whole economic system that is threatening to disrupt our whole monetary system, which policymakers have spent the last decade plus agonizing about and concerned that it might go the way of the system in the 1930s and jeopardize this whole almost civilizational conflict that the United States is engaged in at the time.

And so once again, the euro dollars are there to sort of save. the day in the sense that policymakers, they know their euro dollars are a problem now, but they need a solution to this oil price shock. They need to figure out a way to facilitate the recycling. And the euro dollars are, in some sense, the easy way out. By the mid-1970s, there was a sense that the whole system was in crisis. Here's a clip of the Treasury Secretary Bill Simon in March 1975 laying out the stakes. The basic underlying course, of our inflation has been the mismanagement of the government's spending and monetary policies. And unless we change this basic direction, inflation is going to continue to plague us for a long

time to come. Kissinger thinks this is the biggest threat to the world since the Second World War. So he thinks this is like existential risk. And so to some extent, I think they breathe a sigh of relief because of the euro dollar market. I mean, a lot of the pieces are in place. They have a pretty deep and broad network of banks across my country. multiple countries, the swap lines provide some degree of liquidity support in the event of isolated instances of problems, right? The key is you don't want amplification spillover or contagion.

You want to be able to solve problems locally, and that's what liquidity provision is designed to do. And so you could imagine a world in which they go, well, this is a disaster, but thank how we have euro dollars, because otherwise, what are we going to do? Because you could do multilateralism and try to find a way to pipe it through the World Bank or the IMF or something like that. But like, that's again hard. And the easy solution is there. And indeed, the Europeans do want to do. multilateralism. They want a public sector solution to this problem, but U.S. policymakers are very wary of that, in part because it's just like Bretton Woods all over again. The U.S. doesn't want to share, and they're experiencing this incredible shock to their economy. We're entering a period of

stagflation, and if we can manage the petro dollar recycling in such a way that the oil producers are reinvesting disproportionately in the U.S., that will help us recover. If we have to spread out that reinvestment across Europe as well, then it's going to mean a weaker outlook on the U.S. economy. And so the U.S. rejects this public sector solution in the hopes that the private sector solution, Eurodollar recycling of petro dollars, will actually help the U.S. recover relative to everybody else from the economic shock. Yeah, never let a crisis go waste, right?

So the U.S.C. is crisis and opportunity. The opportunity is twofold. One is the federal government's running deficits. Somebody's got to fund those deficits. These oil-producing countries have all this cash. It would be a shame if he didn't buy some treasury bonds with that cash. Getting the Saudis to buy more treasuries, that fell to Bill Simon. Simon had just been appointed Treasury Secretary. He succeeded George Schultz, who was a Ph.D. economist from MIT. Shultz had already served in two cabinet-level roles before he joined the Treasury. So he's very experienced, very expert in in economic affairs. Bill Simon grew up in New Jersey. He went to Lafayette, and one of his early profiles said he, quote, unquote, liked partying in sports a bit more than studying. So he wasn't

quite the same personality type as an MIT PhD economist. He was actually a bond trader at Solomon Brothers, but he knew Schultz, and Schultz brought him in as deputy secretary, basically to be the chief operating officer of the Treasury Department. But when there's a need for expertise on the energy side, Nixon taps him as the energy czar to respond to the oil shock. And he's immediately not very popular with the Nixon team. They think he doesn't have enough experience with international economics and the international monetary system to really perform that function. But he quickly becomes the mouthpiece for Nixon policy on petrodollar recycling. And he's firmly of the belief that private markets, and by private markets, he means

commercial banks. And by commercial banks, he means euro-dollar banks, are the best. way to keep the money and oil flowing. The thing that was the most critical aspect of this period, keeping that market together without monetary collapse, he thinks private markets do that better than public alternatives. But he also knows the banking system can only handle so much. There's only so much of this maturity transformation that private institutions can really perform. The Eurobanks have been pretty vocal about that from the beginning. So they've been warning since the fall of 73 that they can only get so big and provide only so much intermediation for just prudent risk management would dictate that they start turning deposits away. And the Saudis are

going to need an alternative. They need a safe investment that's an alternative to euro dollars, eventually. So treasury bonds are arguably the best substitute. Simon just needs to make sure that they can buy those bonds on terms that leave them in a position they feel okay with. They want them confidential. They want a look at the auction pricing. They want certain kinds of special treatment to make them comfortable with this kind of investment. And so there's a secret mission. Bill Simon flies over to Riyadh to try to pitch the Saudis on kind of a sweetheart deal, right? They get to bid on U.S. Treasury bonds at auction, but anonymously, and they don't actually have to be part of the auction. They get what's called an add-on. So after the auction happens, if they like the

price, they can have a little more at the price at which the auction cleared. So not competitive bidders. They have an option to participate or not. And so it's pretty attractive, right? You need something. You want to diversify. You don't want to take a lot of risk. Like, you know, U.S. Treasuries seem pretty good under those contexts. And the federal government would love to sell you U.S. treasuries. And so, you know, that's the opportunity in part is another buyer and a large buyer so that the recycling gets piped through the federal government as opposed to just the private sector. And the second is in exchange, or at least implicitly in exchange, maybe oil is only sold in dollars because in the fall of 73, roughly a quarter of oil was in sterling. So the

sterling system still existed to some extent. There was still something of a sterling block, and it was still an international currency in some context. And one of the, was global commodities. And so, you know, on the one hand, you offer this sweetheart deal with treasury bonds, which is sort of beneficial to both sides. I think that's fair to say. And on the other, you kind of negotiate for a switch in Saudi oil sale policy. And the day after the Saudis agree to this secret arrangement, they also announce that Saudi oil will only be available for dollars, no more sterling. They actually do this by the Chancellor of the Exchecker's in-country and he doesn't get a heads up. It's a little awkward. He sort of telegrams back and he's like,

I have no idea about this. So maybe the communication could have been handled more effectively or less effectively. I'm not sure. But at the end of the day, the U.S. gets their deficit funding. They get a dollar system in oil. And it's still on a nice edge. People are still very worried about the ability of the euro dollar system to accommodate the continued growth because the price keeps going up.

Right. So the price goes up. The flows get bigger. The banks get more levered. And all of a sudden, everyone was kind of worried that there is a point at which this is not going to work anymore. And it turns out that point comes a little earlier than most people expected. So that's really in June of 1974, which is only less than a year after the oil shock initially

that you get really the critical event in the history of the euro dollar market, the history of the global dollar system, which is the collapse of a bank I'm sure very few people have heard of, which is Bankhouse-Hurstadt in Germany. So Bankhouse-Hurstadt is a private bank. It's run by a guy named Ivan Herschstadt. So it's an eponymous bank. It's run by its owner. And he loves speculating in foreign exchange.

And one of the, you could call it benefits of the niction shock is in a world of floating exchange rates, you can start to make money, trading exchange rates. And so for a while, it's not a huge business for them. But pretty soon, most of their revenue, I believe, was generated by foreign exchange trading. And he sees this as his big moment or something as he writes an autobiography. And he's very excited about the opportunity presented by these trading. dynamics and problem of trading is sometimes you make money and sometimes you don't. And they put a big bet on the dollar that goes sour in June. And they're closed by the German regulators. Now, Herschot has no regrets. He writes an autobiography later called how my life's work was stolen from me.

So he's perfectly fine with this outcome, but the global economy is not super fine with this outcome. Has a little Dickfold Lehman brothers to it. So the problem, among others, is that the Germans come in in the German evening. And if you're very active in foreign exchange markets, you're going to make a mark payment, the Deutsche Mark payment in German time. And at the time, a dollar payment in New York time. The problem is that the German regulators close Herzstod before they're able to make their dollar payments. So this is now called Hirschdrisk, right, which is probably better known than Bankhouse Hirschstadt. And it's just timing mismatches in transactions and the necessity of lining those up. Otherwise, if somebody goes out of business, they may not

make good on one side of the trade, but they will make it on the other. And everybody in New York freaks out. Everyone in London freaks out. The foreign exchange market grinds to a halt. There is something like two transactions or something like that in the whole day after this happens. Almost all these transactions happened in New York, by the way. Almost all foreign exchange transactions with a dollar leg are settled in New York. So it affects a lot of trades because New York time is the one that's affected. And you have a sudden stop to the foreign exchange markets. And that's really scary. And you also have a run in the Eurodollar market and in the money markets more generally. So we've had a decade plus of U.S. policymakers building up this market. Now it's reached a size and scale

where a run on it might jeopardize U.S. financial stability more generally. This one bank fails in Europe, and the contagion starts to spread onshore in the United States. And there's one bank in particular that gets caught up right away, and it's this bank called Franklin National Bank. And Franklin National Bank has a bank charter, so it's not a shadow bank. They invented credit cards. They're like a Long Island local bank, right? I mean, they do that business. They were an early promoter of credit cards. You know, they are pushing the envelope type of bank. And they are a chartered bank, but they are getting involved in shadow banking type funding

sources. And so you can run your bank with just deposits on your right-hand side. That's the normal way to do it. But over the last 10-plus years, these deposit alternatives have been proliferating. One is an offshore U.S. dollar deposit. That's what we've been talking about. That's a euro dollar. Another is a repurchase agreement that can be an onshore or an offshore transaction. And Franklin National Bank is doing both. They're doing both of these. And so they have deposits, but they also have these deposit

alternatives that are highly runable, that are not FDIC insured, and they experience a run. And if you look at their balance sheet over the course of the summer of 1974, it's a run that looks a lot like the run on Lehman Brothers. Their repo counterparties drop away, and they have to turn to the Fed for a massive discount window loan. And suddenly the Fed is thrust into the crisis that policymakers have been worrying about for the last several years. The hydra-headed monster is looking to consume the system, and the problem of the euro-dollar market overseas has hit the U.S. domestic financial system. And the story is going to have a lot of resonance for anybody who lived through 2008,

because it starts in much the same way, and it also sort of ends in a similar way. So now it's the summer of 74. Things are falling apart. That mood that we talked about, about maybe we should crack down on Euro dollars? Like, that doesn't make sense anymore. And there's a bunch of op-eds that say, like, explicitly now is not the time to regulate this market. It's precisely the opposite. De-regulate the market. Make sure it doesn't fall apart because people are just looking for the next domino next few to drop. And so the world gets together in June, in July, rather, can't really come to a really firm agreement. They're not willing to make a firm commitment. And by September, like, it's very clear that something needs to be done. And so the BIS

convenes the group of 10 countries, central bank governors. And they put out a very unusual thing, which is a public statement. And they say, we are here to backstop the year dollar market. I'm paraphrasing. We're here to backstop the year of dollar market. And we are convinced that the means are available to do so. And so that's an implicit reference to the swap lines. And the FMC and others are sort of aware of the fact that the swap lines are kind of the backbone of that commitment. But what they're really doing is saying there is a lender of last resort.

You all thought there might be. There is. It's us. And we're here to fix the system. And that has a really seismic impact. It really, like, cures the problem because people are aware of the fact that there's an announcement effect at its finest, right? This is like whatever it takes for Mario Draghi.

just the mere fact of the public statement is enough to cure the run. And then it's really off to the races because this market has been identified by the most powerful countries in the world as critical to financial stability and national security. And so the limits on its growth are really pulled back. So I think it's worth saying that the work on understanding what happens in 1974, a lot of archival work was done by Ben Braun and his co-authors Ari Kromp and Stephen morale, and they call this communique, the original whatever it takes moment. The original sort of central bank response to a run where the central bank basically implicitly commits to use its money printing ability to stop the run-like behavior. And that's an incredibly powerful tool

that central banks have. Because they can print money, they can make good on everybody's money-denominated obligations. And in 74, you have this critical moment where the central banks, especially the U.S. Central Bank, commits itself to this sort of policy. Remember in the 1930s, that's not the attitude of the Federal Reserve, and over a third of the banking system closes its doors. In 1974, you have the Federal Reserve essentially committing to support the banking systems of European countries that are doing a dollar banking business without following any of the rules that govern the dollar banking business domestically. And that puts out this fire. And 2008 is just in many ways a repeat of 1974, where it's not clear, is the U.S. going to do whatever

it takes, and eventually that is made clear, and the fires ultimately subside. And we still sort of live in this world where there are lots of runnable money claims in the monetary system, and there's always a question about the extent to which the central bank is there standing behind them. So if this was a movie, this would be the point where you have the contemplative music and what happens to all the characters in the movie. And so, In this one, there's really no one character that's really important, and that's the Eurodollar market. And so, you know, just for a sense of scale, by the mid-80s, there are more Euro-Dollars than dollars, which is kind of a remarkable fact.

By the mid-2000s, there's much more, 150%, 170%, depends on how you count them. So the Eurodollar market becomes, in some sense, the dollar market, becomes the much larger, more important, more globalized market that, like, keeps the whole system running. And this is why everybody uses LIBOR as a measure of interest rates. The London interbank offer rate is the euro dollar market interest rate. We don't actually look to the federal funds rate because the real rate that mattered in the market, once more dollars were being created offshore was the offshore dollar rate, LIBOR. And so LIBOR is perhaps the best sort of known symbol of the Eurodollar market. And by the time you get to 2008, the whole system is key to the rates in this offshore dollar market as opposed to the rates in the onshore market that the U.S. banking system was

sort of developed around. Yeah. So global trade settled in Eurodollars. Eurodollars are a huge asset that people have. So in a sense, it's both the backbone and the lifeblood in the body analogy. It's the lifeblood and the backbone of the whole global dollar system. It still is in a lot of ways. And in the contemplative music overlay version of the program, like you could say, it all really goes back to the 60s.

And so we're left with this remnant of the whole war competition that in some sense was antithetical to U.S. monetary sovereignty, but served a very particular purpose at the time. And it's really a lesson in how, for lack of a better word, decisions have consequences. and how financial systems evolve in unexpected ways. And particularly when the government supports something, it gets a lot of room to grow and run. And it's very hard to predict what comes next. And so, you know, it does all start in Yugoslavia,

but it becomes obviously a much, much bigger thing over the subsequent 50 years. So, you know, we're recording this on the 50th anniversary, roughly of the intervention, the communique, to stall the run on the year-dollar market in 1974. And so like, it's a, time for reflection in a sense. But I think more importantly, it's just a really compelling story. It's A, how we got where we are, which is a question I think we don't ask enough. And be like the real

sort of underlying reasons why systems evolved in the way that they did, which can tell us a lot about the future as well. Oh, look, we're free. We're out of the bunker or the vault or the archive or whatever this is was. Is the story over? I guess it is. All good things. come to an end. I feel like I learned a lot. I love these historical deep dives, and Leve and Josh really dove deep for this one. Actually, like, honestly, though, is unreal. I mean, just the fact that we got to listen to them talk for that long about this really intense historical work, I'm actually going to miss hearing about Eurodollar history, for real. Yeah, me too. The good news on that front is we are not quite done. Josh and Lev, they've walked us

through the history. So we have a much better sense of where Euro-Dollars come from and the problems they were intended to solve. But I think there's still a lot of open questions about the Eurodollar market's role today and also how it fits into the ongoing debate about the future of the U.S. dollar. Totally. There's like a lot of discussion still about whether the dollar can maintain its special reserve currency status. People love talking about that, whether it can maintain its status within the financial system. And Eurodollars, as we learn from this series are one of the most important types of dollars out there. They facilitate global trade and investment liquidity and all that stuff. So all of these debates that everyone is having all around,

they sort of come back to this area. Yeah. So we definitely need to talk more about the future of the euro dollar market and by extension the future of the dollar system. And to do that, we are going to bring back Lev later this week in an episode of Lots More to talk about all of that. So definitely look out for lots more with Lev on Eurodollar. But for now, this is the end of our historic look back at this market. We hope you enjoyed listening to Josh and Lev as much as we did. I also just want to thank a bunch of folks at various archives because a lot of this work was based on primary sources and dusty books and forms and things like that. So definitely that at the New York Fed, the archive is there, have been extraordinarily helpful, the Bank for International Settlements in Basel, the JFK Library and

the LBJ Library, who've been super kind to provide stuff. Columbia has, the Clearinghouse Archives, which we've had a chance to go through, and the National Archives in general. Just a big thanks to all of them. Shall we leave it there? Let's leave it there. This has been another episode of the All Thoughts podcast. I'm Tracy Alloway. You can follow me at Tracy Alloway.

And I'm Joe Wisenthall. You can follow me at the stalwart. Follow one of our special guests. Levmanand. He's at Levmanand. Our other special guest, Josh Younger. He's not on Twitter. Thanks to our producers, Kerman Rodriguez, at Kermin Erman,

Dashel Bennett at Dashbot and Kail Brooks at Kail Brooks. and special thanks to our sound engineer, Blake Maples. For more OddLod's content, go to Bloomberg.com slash Oddlots, where we have transcripts, a blog, and a daily newsletter. And you can chat about all of these topics 24-7 in our Discord. Discord.g. slash Odlots. And if you enjoy Oddlots, if you like it,

when we bring you the hidden history of Eurodollars, then please leave us a positive review on your favorite podcast platform. And remember, if you are a Bloomberg subscriber, you can listen to all of our episodes absolutely ad-free. All you need to do is find the Bloomberg channel on Apple Podcasts and follow the instructions there. Thanks for listening.