Odd Lots - Why the Damage to Fed Independence May Have Already Been Done

Episode Date: July 19, 2025

There’s a long history of US presidents putting pressure on the Federal Reserve to lower interest rates, but the techniques have often been subtle or quiet in some way. Under President Trump, attacks on the Fed have risen to a whole new level. And it’s not just Trump that’s called on Chair Jerome Powell to cut rates. Other members of his administration (along with allies in Congress) have been hammering him both on policy and also topics unrelated to monetary policy, such as the cost of renovating the Federal Reserve building in Washington. Investors are taking seriously the prospect that Trump will find a way or a reason to remove Powell before the end of his term next year. And regardless of when Powell is replaced, there’s a widespread anticipation that the next Fed chair will be someone more closely resembling a Trump loyalist. So do we still have an independent Fed at this point? On this episode, we speak with University of Texas-Austin economics professor Carola Binder about why central bank independence is so cherished by economists, why mere criticism of the Fed could be inflationary, and whether Fed independence has been permanently damaged.Read More:Odd Lots Newsletter: Central Bank Independence Is a SpectrumWhat Happened the Last Time a Fed Chief Was BouncedOnly Bloomberg.com subscribers can get the Odd Lots newsletter in their inbox — now delivered every weekday — plus unlimited access to the site and app. Subscribe at bloomberg.com/subscriptions/oddlotsSee omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.

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Bloomberg Audio Studios, Podcasts, Radio, news. Hello and welcome to another episode of the Odd Thoughts podcast. I'm Tracy Alloway. And I'm Joe Wisenthal. Joe, you wrote a good newsletter this week. Thank you.

Thank you for saying that. Just that one. I wrote a good newsletter this week. No, but interesting week because obviously there's, months, you know, talk about Fed independence, would President Trump try to fire Jerome Powell, all of these different questions. It's heating up. This is a very difficult topic to talk about podcast-wise, because there's always that chance that, you know, we record something on Fed Independence,

and by the time the episode is produced and edited, something new has happened, so very dicey, but, you know, we're hoping that in the next short period of time, this holds. But yes, this is a really important story. We're recording this on July 18th, and I think the ambition is to get it out on July 19th. So hopefully nothing changes that quickly, but of course, you never know. And just this week, we have had these back and forth headlines. We had a report that Trump was considering firing Powell sort of imminently. And then he came out at a press conference and said, no, he wasn't. Yeah. And he said there was a report that there was a literal letter that was signed. Other people affiliated in the administration of been hammering Powell. Some on.

related to monetary policy, some relating to the cost of renovations of the Federal Reserve offices. The criticism is, of course, getting intense. Anyway, I've been trying to learn more about this question of Fed independence. I came across a lot of the research that was done by economist Carolabinder, which I thought was interesting, which talks about how Fed independence is this cherished idea in economics, but it's not just about the idea of whether the Fed is legally independent, pressure on the Fed itself, even if the Fed doesn't necessarily react, just the rhetoric against the Fed, in central banks around the world, not the Fed specifically, but central banks around the world, just the rhetoric and the pressure and the perception that

the central bank is losing independence can have macroeconomic effects. Yeah. And despite some people cherishing that independence we know from a lot of recent events, the rise of populism around the world, it seems a lot of people don't like unelected bureaucrats. Just put it that way. Okay, so we actually have Carilla here. She is, of course, the Associate Professor of Economics in the School of Civil Leadership at UT Austin. Huckum. Huckum. Carole. Thank you so much for coming on oddlots. Yeah, thanks so much for having me. I'm excited to be here. Do you just want to give us maybe a

summary of your previous work and why you got interested in the subject of Central Bank independence in the first place? Sure. Yeah. I mean, the taper that was mentioned in the newsletter is one called political pressure on central banks. And in that work, I really wanted to understand this distinction between legal central bank independence, which we know has been rising around the world for the past couple of decades, versus actual or de facto central bank independence. Because it seems like even when the central bank does have legal protections that kind of insulate the bank from politics, there's still always going to be reason for politicians to try to convince the central bank to do what they want.

I mean, that's the whole reason why we have legal protections on central bank independence. So it's kind of hard to measure that. What I ended up doing with the help of a couple of research assistants was reading through these reports by Economist Intelligence Unit that come out every quarter for basically every country. and just seeing whenever there was a mention of some kind of political pressure on the central bank. And we tried to record whether it was pressure for easier or looser monetary policy and also whether the central bank resisted the pressure or succumbed to it. And then once we had this new data set about all of these instances, at least all the known instances of pressure on central banks, then I was able to use that to say, well, what happens afterwards, especially to inflation?

And as Joe said, if the central bank succumbs to the pressure, it's almost always pressure for a looser monetary policy. So that's certainly followed by higher inflation. But even if they try to resist, inflation still rises, just not as much, but it still rises. So my, you know, interpretation there is that it probably has something to do with expectations. So people start at least worrying that there's a chance that the central bank is going to give in to those pressure. they know that if they do, that'll be inflationary. So inflation expectations rise right now, and that makes inflation itself start to rise also.

To back up for a second, I described in the intro, Central Bank Independence, one of these sort of very cherished ideas and perceived is extremely important. What do you describe? Why is this, actually? Because as Tracy mentioned,

there's a lot of people who find it distasteful, that there are entities within any government that aren't directly democratically accountable. What is it about central bank independence that is perceived by economists to be such a goal, so to speak? So the way I see it is two main parts. One is that there is a natural inflationary bias in monetary policy. So meaning if you had monetary policy controlled by elected politicians, they would always

have this concern about the next election. They always want to make the public happy. in the short term, so they're going to tend towards juicing the economy, even if in the longer run that's going to cause inflation. So in equilibrium, you're always running monetary policy too loose and getting too much inflation. That happens if you don't have an independent central banks, so if elected officials are controlling monetary policy. The other side of it is think about the distinction between fiscal policy and monetary policy. So having independent central banks is very common. Having independent fiscal authorities is not. And the usual justification there is that

fiscal policy has very obvious distributional consequences. I mean, that's basically the point of fiscal policy in some sense. Like, you want, maybe you want progressive taxes. You want to spend on certain groups of people. You want to tax certain activities. And so that's inherently about distribution, which is something that you really want to be a political decision. You want the voters to decide about what kind of distribution they want. Monetary policy, on the other hand, is thought of as being a lot more even, right? It affects the macro economy more than it affects distribution. So in that way, it's like kind of more acceptable in a democracy to delegate it to some technocrats. That's kind of the traditional case, but of course that's been very much

challenge, especially when the Fed during the financial crisis started doing more unconventional monetary policies, those did have distributional consequences. They're kind of hard to measure, but they're there. And even conventional monetary policy, like inflation is going to hurt some people more than others. Having a weak labor market is going to hurt some people more than others. So I think people do partly get dissatisfied with central bank independence when they realize that whatever the Fed is doing, I think maybe hurts them more than it hurts others or that they didn't have any say in that kind of decision, which it is political. Inflation is political and monetary policy is too. You just reminded me on the topic of a natural bias towards loosening of monetary

policy and therefore inflation. Do you ever get governments trying to pressure for higher interest rates? I feel like I can't come up with a single example. Well, if, might not be obviously for higher interest rates, but one of the few examples in that paper that I found of pressure for tighter monetary policy was in the U.S. after the financial crisis when the Fed was doing so much QE. A lot of Republicans in Congress, especially were worried that that was going to be very inflationary. So they were pressuring the Fed to cut back on the QE or not do so much monetary easing. Those were wild times when a lot of people, myself included. it probably thought QE was going to be inflationary.

Yeah, or people thought it was going to be hyperinflationary. The more cynical interpretation, by the way, is not that Republicans thought that, and this is just the cynical interpretation. I'm not even saying, I'm going to say this, but not that they were worried about inflation, but that they didn't want the economy to recover particularly rapidly under a Democratic president. Again, different perceptions of what their motivations are. Okay. One of the things people say, and you talk to like veteran people on.

Wall Street and they've always done this. This is nothing new in this country. Every president has in some way tried to pressure their central banker typically for easing in some way. And I think there's certainly examples of that without question. How novel and different. When we talk about they're attacking them over the cost of renovations. They're directly say cut 300 basis points in a tweet, et cetera. Does this feel like a meaningful step up in the level of pressure that we've historically seen in the U.S.? Yeah, I think the meaningful difference is that it's so public now and so obvious, where it used to be like there was this protocol, right,

that the president might want lower interest rates, they might want easier monetary policy, but they're not going to say so out loud. There was a lot of just careful procedure around it. So the fact that it's really, really like a public spectacle now is a difference. it does, I think, further politicize the Fed because now the general public sees the president tweeting about the Fed and depending on whether they support the president or not, they might be more angry at the Fed or more defensive of the Fed.

So it really makes it public in a way that is pretty new. But, I mean, I do get the point that there is always this pressure on the Fed, always from within Congress to you've had criticism of the Fed, which coming from Congress, it's a bit more appropriate than from the president because the Fed is accountable to Congress. So it kind of makes more sense that you would see a lot of criticism of the Fed coming from Congress because that's more their role. They have the monetary power that they've delegated to the Fed. I know you're not in the sort of market coal mines on a daily basis, but I'm hoping you may nevertheless have an opinion on this because one of the weird things that happened this week when all the

headlines about Trump possibly firing Powell started to fly around was the biggest reaction in the market seemed to be in the dollar in the U.S. currency. And we actually didn't see that much movement in yields, at least going up. Like, they didn't start surging. So I guess I'm curious, if your thesis holds that any type of pressure tends to be inflationary because it boost perceptions of inflation. Why wouldn't we have seen an upward rise in yields that reaction this week? Well, it's not that any type of pressure is inflationary. It's that on average, across all of these hundreds of data points I was looking at, on average, pressure was inflationary. This particular case could be very different. I think partly because there's so much

uncertainty about what is Trump actually going to do. It's hard to even. and follow the news here where he says he's going to fire Powell or no, he didn't. You know, so any kind of announcement you get, I think the markets don't know exactly how to take it right away. And some of the news, right, like, was already kind of baked in. Like, we've known for a couple of months that President Trump was having this conflict with Chairman Powell. So maybe these most recent announcements are not really that much new news. Today's show is brought to you by Vanguard. To all the financial advisors listening, let's talk bonds for a minute.

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This is the sort of question that I'm wondering about, which is that, okay, pressure is to some extent forever. It's become much more of a public spectacle. It's become much more aggressive, et cetera. There is this, I would say, safe assumption that Paul doesn't have that much longer in his term, but that the assumption is that the next Fed chair will be some sort of capital L loyalist to Trump, that there will be alignment. I forget who it was on TV, we need a new Fed Treasury accord. So would you say, like, to some extent that the, glass has been broken here or the glass has been cracked and that the damage has been done, even if the Fed legally retained its existing structure, that the Fed going forward will not be

the same independent Fed, will not be as independent as we've had for the last several decades. Yes, I think that the damage to the perception of the Fed's independence has already been done. there are really big political divides in how people perceive the Fed, the kind of tradition that one president would reappoint the previous president's Fed chair, even if they were from a different political party. I think that that tradition probably is over. Yeah. Kind of like Supreme Court nominations, which used to fly through now are entirely done on political, like the votes and the confirmation votes are completely political now. Yeah, but I would say it's not just the fault of Trump since his election, since his most recent election.

It's not just that. It's also what was happening during the pandemic and during the high inflation episode in 2021 and 2022. That did a lot of damage as well because there was so much on both sides of trying to place the blame and saying was everything the Fed's fault, was everything the fault of the fault of the fault. the fiscal stimulus, was inflation transitory or permanent, that really got things more politicized then, and that's only been exacerbated by the past couple months. One of the other narratives that I've seen this week is this idea that, okay, even if Trump fired Powell and put in place someone who would immediately push for lower interest rates, you wouldn't necessarily get them, A, because of the market expectations, which you just describe, so people might start pricing in higher inflation expectations, which would move the curve up

or steepen the curve, but also because it's not just the Fed chair making decisions, it's a committee, and Trump might not be able to influence the entire committee. How do you take into account, I guess, the rest of the FOMC members? How do they play into this type of political pressure? Yeah, so it is monetary policy by committee. And different. Under different Fed chairs, the kind of committee decision making has differed a little, just the norms around it. So whether they like kind of how strong the Fed chair was and making sure that everyone would come to a consensus versus allowing some more disagreement to be public. But yeah, I think the fact that, I mean, the fact that the members of the committee have these overlapping terms and pretty long term lengths is part of what gives it independent. because it means we don't have a complete turnover of the committee at any given point in time.

And there's going to be a lot of continuity there because of that institutional structure, especially if you get a Fed chair that's kind of external that's viewed as a loyalist. The rest of the committee may be quite reluctant to just go along with whatever the new Fed chair says if they don't feel like it's the right decision. the Fed, they emphasize all the time that they're data dependent. And I think that's the line that a lot of committee members would keep using. The unfortunate thing is we don't know exactly in what sense they are data dependent. Like they don't publish a monetary policy rule that they follow, but they say that they take into account not just the PCE inflation rate and the unemployment rate,

but all sorts of other indicators about where the economy is headed. and they react to all of those. So they would, I'm pretty sure most of the committee would try to just stick to the course that they're on, even if there were a new chair in place. It would be really interesting because dissents are very rare. And sometimes you get, a lot of times you get no dissent, sometimes you get one. Very rarely you get two. In the last, in my career, I can't remember any decision in the U.S.

that I think ever got more than two dissents. It would be interesting of that norm or broke. where the Fed really does not control or have basically get to guide the committee on their preferred path. I want to, though, like, talk about in the broad research globally, establishing a central independent central bank is politically difficult. And some countries attempt to do it by simply outsourcing their monetary policy to the Federal Reserve itself by setting up a dollar peg or a currency board or something like that because they don't even have the sort of political capacity to establish a truly independent central bank. Bank. What are the patterns you see around the world? I'm curious of in your research, when pressure builds on a central bank, is it usually sort of a symptom of a broader domestic political disintegration that's happening where just all kinds of norms are being violated

or all kinds of structures are sort of collapsing or deteriorating in some way? Yeah, well, to the part about how the central bank independence is set up, sometimes it's because there's already a very strong preference in that country for lower inflation. So then it's kind of easier to set up an independent central bank because they really want low inflation and they're committed to it, which is why it's so hard in the research to say does central bank independence actually lower inflation because you have like a reverse causality. So sometimes that's how it gets set up. Sometimes it's imposed by like the IMF saying, you know, if you want to keep having our support. There's some things you need to do, and one of them is set up a independent central bank.

But then the part about like, when do politicians start pressuring the central bank, when does that really build up? Yeah, I mean, there was a lot more of the pressure on the central banks around crisis times. So I think the financial crisis did erode a lot of trust in institutions and made it more acceptable to pressure central banks also during. the 2010s when inflation was really low, that made it seem more, okay, having higher inflation doesn't necessarily seem like so much of a threat. What we really want is to boost the labor markets, at least in certain countries. So then there was more pressure on the central banks that way. The other thing is also like the fiscal situation.

So if there's big debts to finance, right? And then there's going to be often pressure for the lower interest rates or to monetize the debt. Tracy, by the way, just as we're recording this, headline from the AP, all this stuff about criticism of the Fed. It turns out Chris Rugerberg, Josh spoke of the AP reporting, much of these costs were associated in 2020 with Trump officials demanding that there'd be more marble at the Fed instead of glass. So a new wrinkle to the cost of these office constructions. Anyway, you've got to have that marble. Trump loves marble. Marble and gold. He does have a very, Louis the 15th style, I guess, taste in interior design. Anyway, maybe we should do an interior

design. Yeah, I'm down. I would like that. Okay, anyway, on a serious note, given those concerns around trusting unelected bureaucrats and the idea that maybe, you know, Central Bank started to overstep their traditional roles post 2008 or something like that, what's the best way of, I guess, ensuring that central banks are in some way answerable to the electorate or in some way, you know, there's accountability there without sacrificing that independence. Yeah, I mean, this is a really important topic to me and something I focus a lot on in my book and in some of my other research. But I think that making sure that the role of the Fed or the central bank is limited to

something like price stability and having. a lot of transparency about how they're achieving that is really important. So the Fed has a dual mandate. Having the price stability and the employment side of the mandate gives them a lot of discretion because sometimes those two goals can come into conflict and then they need to just decide, well, what are we going to prioritize right now? The more discretion that unelected technocrats have, the more room there is for people to try to pressure them one way or the other. In my book, I advocate for a nominal GDP or a nominal income target, which I think would help them achieve both parts of that dual mandate, but with a single target that they're going after. And then it makes it

really clear at any given point of time, do they need tighter or looser monetary policy? And there's not as much wiggle room. It makes it easier for them to justify their actions and for the public to say, well, are they doing what they say they're going to do or not? Versus if you have an inflation target and kind of full employment target, then you can always argue kind of for either way. And yeah, so just keeping the role more limited. Not lately, but before COVID, there was a lot more pressure on central banks to do even more

beyond those kind of two parts of the dual mandate to take on climate change and inequality and issues like that. And I think that those are important things that somebody needs to do, but it's not really the job of the Fed because they're not elected to do that. And those kinds of political topics need to be addressed by elected officials. One of the funny things I used to think of the 2010s is that had the Fed only had a single mandate, it's not, it's conceivable to me that policy would have been looser if they were continuing to fail on its inflation target. from the downside in those days that, you know, they continued to miss that 2%. Had they had a nominal GDP target, a nominal income target solely, it's possible, actually, that they might have achieved the employment part of the mandate sooner

because it would be so sufficient that they were failing to hit that target. Anyway, Carolabinder, really appreciate you coming on. I'm finding your research to be very fascinating, happy to have dived into it. So thank you so much for coming on up. Thank you. Joe, obviously a very timely episode to get out. I do think the question you asked about whether or not attacks on central bank independence might be part of a broader deterioration in norms and what's deemed acceptable by society and political society. There is an element of that. Like it does feel like that. No, like I think so. Like I think if you were to look around the world and you were to say find those examples where there is a lot of pressure. or stress on central banks, I think almost always you would find it associated with other things

happening in politics that are sort of, you know, the wheels are coming off in some way. Turkey strikes me is a great example, a country where the sort of like democratic norms have eroded over time, certainly over the last 20 years. Many would say, and which gets to this whole idea, which Carol had talked about, causality is often hard to establish. So you can point to on the line that there's pressure on a central bank, or, central bank independence period associated with this or that inflation. But whether that's because it was the pressure or because many bad things are going on at the time. It's hard to disentangle. Absolutely. But I guess her broad conclusion that on average, this type of political pressure does

lead to higher inflation expectations. Like it does suggest that if your ambition is lower rates, then maybe this doesn't help. I mean, here's the thing. We are almost certainly going to get a Fed share sometime in the next year, whether it's because Powell has been removed from his term prematurely or just because at the end, the next central banker is perceived as a President Trump loyalist, there is probably going to be a meaningful difference in the reaction function of the Fed toward faster impulse to cut. Very naturally, people can assume, therefore, that the future would be all things equal, more inflationary. Ah, very naturally. The natural rate will go up. Okay. Shall we leave it there?

Let's leave it there. This has been another episode of the Odd Thoughts podcast. I'm Tracy Allaway. You can follow me at Tracy Allaway. And I'm Jill Wisenthall. You can follow me at the stalwart. Follow our guest, Carolabinder. She's at C. Consis. Follow our producers, Carmen Rodriguez, at Carmen Armin, Dashobin at Dashobin at Dashbott and Kale Brooks. For more Odd Lots content, go to Bloomberg.com slash Oddlots with a daily newsletter and all of our episodes. can chat about all of these topics 24-7 in our Discord. Discord.g.g. slash oddlots. And if you enjoy Oddlots, if you want Joe to run for the next Fed chair, then please leave us

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