On The Brink with Castle Island - Michael Greenwald (Tiedemann Advisors) on the Dollar as a Policy Tool (EP.196)

Episode Date: March 22, 2021

Michael Greenwald is a former U.S. Treasury official with expertise in sanctions programs and using USD infrastructure to promote policy objectives. In this episode:  What the weaponization of the dollar really means How sanctions mechanically work How Treasury and the State Dept carry out sanctions The risk of sanctions wearing blunt as a tool  The growth of sanctions post 9/11 How sanctions against Russia represented a sea change in policy How the US deputizes SWIFT for sanctions How and why Europeans tried to route around US sanctions on Iran Is the US led international order fraying? China's attempt to build a parallel financial infrastructure to challenge the dollar The objectives of the Belt and Road Initiative The purpose of the digital yuan Can the yuan challenge the primacy of the dollar in the international system? How China uses the belt and road initiative to advance the yuan How the US should react to China's aggressive move into closer economic relationships with the third world What a digital US dollar or CBDC might look like How the US can reassert dominance in the international sphere Michael's thoughts on stablecoins and Bitcoin Read Michael's paper, The Future of the US Dollar Sponsor notes: Copper is transforming how institutional investors engage with digital assets by developing award-winning custody and next-gen trading infrastructure. Headquartered in London, the firm is scaling rapidly across Asia and North America to bring its suite of products to a wider pool of institutional investors. To learn more visit copper.co or reach out on Twitter, @CopperHQ

Hello and welcome back to On the Brinkgoose Castle Island. Today on the show, we're very lucky to have Michael Greenwald join us. He is a subject matter expert on the topic of sanctions and using the dollar as a policy tool. Michael is the director at Tidaman Advisors, a multifamily office. From 2015 to 2017, he was the U.S. Treasury attaché to Qatar and Kuwait. He served in two presidential administrations. He worked in counterterrorism and intelligence. He worked on the Treasury team that crafted sanctions against Russia, ISIS, and al-Qaeda.

He's also a director at the Atlantic Council, and he's a fellow at the Harvard Kennedy School Belfour Center. In short, he really is the subject matter expert on using the dollar to promote policy objectives. In this conversation, we talk about the recent history with sanctions and whether they can be overused, whether weaponizing the dollar is a pejorative or positive thing and then of course about China's ascendancy and their aggressive entry into the sort of digital currency world and their attempts to promote the yuan as a tool of international trade and how the U.S. can push back against that. This is a really fascinating question. We're very lucky to have Michael on the show. Let's side-vining.

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So out of this worry, we have something called the Bitcoin. Bitcoin. Michael Greenwald, thanks so much for joining us today. It's a pleasure to be with you, Nick. So you've written a lot of papers, but the main one I would. wanted to talk about was this recent note of yours entitled the future of the United States dollar weaponizing the U.S. financial system, which is quite the title. Maybe before we start, though, just tell us a little bit about some of the roles you've had in your career. You've done a huge

number of things. So maybe just catch us up on your professional history. Sure. So I had the pleasure of spending many years at the U.S. Treasury Department, which was really the center of all the efforts to go after terrorist financing and anti-money laundering within Treasury's Office of Terrorism and Financial Intelligence. After law school, Nick, I I had a chance to work in the general counsel's office at the Treasury and got to tackle alongside Treasury Warriors, as we call them, Afghanistan, Pakistan issues dealing with illicit financing, looking at al-Qaeda's movement of money in that region. I then had the pleasure to spend almost three years in the U.S. intelligence community as part of Treasury's Office of Intelligence of Analysis.

And in that capacity, I had the opportunity to really see how Al-Qaeda's affiliates, they're affiliates in North Africa, Somalia, Mali, Nigeria, and, you know, Yemen were moving money, how they were raising money, and how they were interfacing with core al-Qaeda. And that was prior to bin Laden being killed. And then post-Bin-Lodin raid how al-Qaeda had regrouped and how the affiliates started working together and what was their financing techniques. I've been at the pleasure, Nick, to spend a couple of years as the policy advisor for Europe within the policy division of TFI and Treasury.

And that brought me all over Western and Eastern Europe. I led our delegation to the European Parliament in Strasbourg, dealt with US-EU counterterrorism, financing issues. For me, a watershed moment was when Russia invaded Crimea and Ukraine. And I was tasked with a great team at Treasury to look at the debt and equity restrictions on Russia, the banks, the oligarchs, the different ways that Russia was raising and moving money. and how we could pressure and ultimately impact Putin's calculus. And that was an incredible couple of years. And that was a great example of bringing together

not only the national security side of the House at Treasury, but also the economists, the macro strategist, the markets room. That was just an incredible effort. I would say, Nick, during that time, it crystallized to me what a powerful weapon, the U.S. dollar, the U.S. financial sector was. It crystallized earlier when we were working on Iran and al-Qaeda and key counterterrorism efforts with ISIS. But when you have a country like Russia that's so connected, much more so than Iran to the world, the dollar in our financial system really plays a key role if it enters its crisis.

I then had the great opportunity to open the Treasury's office in Qatar and also serving Kuwait as the Treasury attach. And I really used my legal, intel, and policy background to be a diplomat, to go after terrorist financing in the region, working with the host governments, and understanding how money was being moved. And so through all of those experiences, Nick, I really have been very passionate about writing about the dollar, the power of it, the future of it, the importance of the United States to maintain its dominance, to not overuse it, and how the United States is going to enter a new race in digital currencies, ultimately with China, which I know will get to. to in our conversation today. All right.

Wow. That's an amazing introduction. I couldn't imagine someone better suited to opine on this. Actually, just finished reading that book, Treasury's War by Juan Zarate, which I'm sure you're sort of intimately familiar the events described in that book. When you talk about weaponizing the dollar, I mean, I normally hear that in a pejorative sense, you know, like we oughtn't weaponize the dollar.

I take it you see things kind of differently. I do. Yeah, Juan's book, Treasury's War, I still, I'm still waiting for it to be converted to a movie. It makes us look much cooler than we actually are. The Wans, Wans, a trailblazer in this space,

and his book is excellent. And when I taught a counterterrorist financing course, it's always number one of my syllabus. But, you know, Nick, when I talk about weaponizing the dollar, it really began when Stuart Levy, the first undersecretary at Treasury in this area, went to Europe and said to the European banks and institutions, you've got a decision. Are you going to bank with Iran or are you going to bank with the United States? Do you want the privilege of working with the U.S. financial?

system. And it is a privilege, right? You want to foster integrity and good compliance in our banks. And we've worked hard at that since 9-11. And I think what we've seen is that the United States wielded the power of the dollar and the power of the U.S. financial sector around the worlds, not just with Europe, but with other countries so that they understood what the consequences are if you work with countries or actors that are sanctioned, that are doing activities that are illegal. And that was really one of the, I would say, earlier forms. Obviously, there are sanctions programs that go back before 9-11. And, you know, Treasury and OFAC originated with going after Nazis money during World War II, which I'm very proud.

That's part of the history. But the dollar, you know, since Bretton Woods and being the global reserve leader, it's one of our most important national security tools. And so when a country is cut off from banking in New York or working with the U.S. financial system, it is such a large scarlet letter of reputation on that country. And they are unable to operate. They're unable to operate with other allies because if countries or institutions or charities or banks enter that, jurisdiction or that company or that bank, they can be sanctioned. And so it's an incredibly powerful tool to have the dollar in this capacity. But with that, Nick, comes an incredible

responsibility to use it thoughtfully, to use it in a targeted manner. And a lot of times, a treasury, we use the approach, a scalpel-like approach, so that if we overuse it, countries become frustrated and they want to go around the dollar. They don't want to deal in the dollar. And that's really been my main focus is for the United States not to become complacent for us to identify who is going around the dollar and to minimize that so that we can continue using the dollar as a force of good in national security, but also as a good economically and hopefully create an alternative to China's Belt and Road addition.

Right. Yeah, I wanted to get to the risk of overuse and, you know, the tool wearing blunt, so to speak. Maybe before that, it set the stage a little bit. Talk us through some of the the precise mechanics of using sanctions in kind of a scalpel-like way. I mean, for the uninitiated, how does that work exactly? So traditionally, sanctions programs are split between the Treasury and the State Department. The State Department sanctions traditionally organizations and Treasury does individuals. So Al-Qaeda and ISIS are sanctioned by the State Department, and individuals are by of al-Qaeda and ISIS are sanctioned by the Treasury Department. And so they have to fall under an executive order. So after 9-11, President Bush signed executive order 13-224, which is the terrorism

executive order. And that's for material support, movement of money, fundraising, all the areas that when we are looking at a member of al-Qaeda has to fall under to meet some of those definitions and we have the legal standard to freeze the assets in the United States, not able to travel, those type of things, Nick. And that has grown. Sanctions have expanded since before 9-11 and afterwards programs, whether it's Cuba, Iran, Syria, Venezuela, North Korea. These are all different sanctioned programs that are worked between OFAC and the State Department. And obviously, Russia was a major watershed moment because that's when we went into debt and equity restrictions. And we started using sanctions in a different form.

But traditionally, it goes through a robust, robust legal process interagency-wise to make sure that it meets the three. threshold for designation because it's something we take very seriously. It has huge reputational risk. And when the United States goes out to the world and says this individual or this organization is designated, we need to have concrete information to back it up so that the individual or the organization has the appropriate due process to also challenge that designation. And, um, In Europe and in the UK, during my time when I was working with Europe, they had a lot of legal challenges. And they had issues with their sanctions regimes because their evidence wasn't as deep as ours or their courts weren't allowed to share classified information. And we're able to, through an in-camera review process in the United States.

And so the United States is uniquely set up to do that. And it really is a whole of government process, but treasury and state and commerce to a bit play a key role in rolling out U.S. sanctions. And I like to say, Nick, that, you know, your greatest asset is your reputation. So reputational risk is essential. And so when we are working with other countries, we bring them unclassified information that they may be operating or dealing with a sanctioned individual, they take that very seriously. In the OFAC list, the U.S. designation list, it's not required by every bank to use, but every bank has the OFAC list. because every bank, every organization, when it's doing its due diligence, does not want to come in the crosshairs of OFAC or the United States. So I suppose partly it's a matter of convincing banks not to do business with individuals on the OFAC list.

Swift also comes into play. How exactly does that work? I mean, I guess Swift is technically not even a U.S. entity. No, it's a Swiss entity and it's Swift has been used very, it's been a helpful tool post 9-11. Obviously, financial messages and data worldwide, the United States has an important relationship with Swift. And it was a key component of our national security process to make sure that bad actors are not operating within, the U.S. financial sector and elsewhere, I would note that the China's central bank joint venture that it's signed in January with Swift is alarming and is very significant. And I'm sure we'll

discuss the rise of China's digital currency, but I think that is a watershed moment for China. It's something that people have warned about happening. And so I would say, Nick, the two things that I'm most concerned about is that relationship really becoming operationalized so that China can deal with Swift outside of the U.S. And China's Belt and Road, which is now done in dollars, gets to be done in digital one. So that's two things for listeners to keep an eye on. So definitely we're going to get to China. I think that's really the impetus for the conversation. Just quickly on the limits of sanctions, you know, we had the Iranian sanctions

and we actually saw our European allies sort of chafing at that a little bit. We had some SPVs kind of set up Instex, I think it was called, to try to ride around our sanctions so the European nations could do business with Iran, although I don't think it amounted to much in the end. What do you make of that? I mean, what is the threshold of which even our closest allies start to, you know, route around our sanctions efforts? Yeah, no, I mean, I wrote about it at the time.

I mean, in Stex, as other observers have noted, was a holding pattern. And it was a buying time tactic by the Europeans so that it could keep Iran at bay so that it could still have a relationship with Iran. It never truly became operationalized. It was never effective. My concern is that the symbolism behind Instex is very troubling for the United States. and we need Europe. We need Europe as a multilateral, strong ally in sanctions. We got to the Iran deal, not just because of U.S. sanctions on Iran. We got to the Iran deal through U.S. EU sanctions.

So that's essential. We hit Russia hard because of our cooperation with the EU. We're going to work on. on digital currencies against China, if we get a digital euro started and the United States plays a key role. If we get a digital pound started, a digital yen, that cooperation is essential.

So I would say, Nick, that it's more troubling symbolically, but the United States has called out European institutions for being bad actors, for doing business where they shouldn't have. So BNP Paribah, obviously, is a very large case where there was a violation. You've seen Deutsche Bank have issues and others. And so where there is violations in its clear, OFAC and the Justice Department will use its authorities to call that out. But I think Instex is a clear example that the United States has clearly overused the dollar

and has frustrated our European allies so much that they felt they had no option but then to deal with Iran, even if they knew that Instex wouldn't be successful in the short or long term. Does this signal to you any disenchantment with the U.S. sort of led international order? Is it a consequence of, you know, really heavy sanctioning? I mean, to what do you attribute this European, you know, reluctance to cooperate? Well, it's nothing really new, and I don't think it's political. And I think, you know, your common observer would say the past administration pushed the United States against Europe. It didn't help.

But under the Obama and Bush administration, European allies, they complained to the United States that we were, the United States was being, you know, using its dollar, using its sanctions in an in an extra territorial way. and I can't tell you the amount of times we heard that phrase, you know, extra territorial. And so I think it's a fine balance because we have to work hand in hand with the EU where we can find common value together against certain actors. We know the Europeans are going to have an economic relationship with China. know they're going to have an economic relationship with Russia, but where can we come together? You know, Huawei is a good example of that, the 5G debate. Digital currencies is going to be the center of all of these discussions, because the geo-economic wall

against China and their digital wand from really spreading its tentacles is going to be whether the United States under Jay Powell and Janet Yellen can work with Christine Lagarde and the key finance ministers in Europe. Now, I'm hopeful because Yellen and Lagarde have an excellent relationship and that Yellen and both Powell have highlighted in the past two weeks the importance of a digital dollar, the importance of not just studying this, Nick, but actually putting it into implementation. And I argue that we, the United States, needs to do this in the next 12 to 18 months before the Olympics in China, because that Olympics is going to be the greatest laboratory for China to test its digital one. And I can guarantee you that no athlete

attending that Olympics will be allowed to operate. without interfacing with a digital one. So the United States needs to have an alternative just to be at that geoeconomic starting line of this digital currency race. So, yeah, I mean, let's talk about China. Obviously, I would say absolutely, no question about it. They're the number one sort of, I don't know how to put it,

but adversary of the United States right now. You know, they are absolutely resurgent. There's the Belt and Road Initiative, which is interestingly hit some hiccups lately, but still, you know, is an absolute tool of power projection. It's a tool to effectively acquire hard assets and influence abroad. They're, you know, the Asian Development Bank. And then, of course, there's the digital yuan. So how do these tie together?

I mean, do you see a grand scheme here? for influence abroad? And so what's the importance of the digital wand and all of that? So Secretary of State Tony Blinken yesterday said in a really outlining the interim national security strategy. And this line really crystallized what we're discussing. He said, and I quote, China is the only country with the economic, diplomatic, military and technological power to seriously challenge the stable and open international system.

So what does that mean? You know, Chinese officials, Nick, they've continued to express skeptical views and worry about the side effects of aggressive economic stimulus policies in the U.S. And so the question of potential shifts in global economic primacy, you know, continues. So for the past few decades, China's made substantial economics strides. They've seen tremendous growth over a year, over year, and through COVID. So they've thrown into question the traditional Western-centric model of international financial processes. So they've grown more aggressive in their adversarial role to the U.S. They've attempted to highlight the instability of the traditional model time and again,

and they've noted the unequal financial power of the U.S. in shaping global markets. So the stimulus response to COVID and the resulting economic downturns, they have added the perfect window for China to progress their narrative of an unstable U.S.-led financial order. And within that realm, they've denounced the world's dependence on U.S. markets. They've denounced the use of the dollar in currency reserves. But at the same time, Nick, they have pressed forward with their own initiatives to increase the influence of their rem and B, which has stalled since 2010. But one of these initiatives has been the development of the central bank digital currency.

And that's going to challenge the traditional role of the dollar. It's going to cataglia, you know, really push forward cross-border exchanges. So I think that ultimately they're making great strides. They're ahead of this race by quite a bit. But this is a tactic by the Chinese not only to gain greater financial influence, but they are gaining incredible control over its country. And they're all about control in all of the categories that Secretary Blinken outlined in the economic, in the diplomatic, in the military, and the tech. And so this, their digital law and their digital currency, as it comes out with their key strategy next week, it is a essential part of their national security strategy. This episode is brought to you by Copper. Copper is the global provider of blockchain infrastructure solutions for institutional investors.

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there's obviously there's a technological element where if they create, you know, I suppose they have already, you create a digital version of the one. You know, maybe that's more efficient and they can create a more integrated system and maybe offer that abroad. to their allies potentially and offer them, you know, a frictionless payment system and so on, and maybe even offer to their allies, you know, the ability to perform surveillance in a really, you know, intricate and detailed way over their own citizens. So, you know, certainly you can see how that might be a strategic use to them. But if you consider the one itself, it's a managed currency, you know, they've got capital controls. It doesn't have a big predominance in terms of

foreign exchange reserves in other countries. And of course, the dollar is still, you know, by far the most common, you know, tool in those central bank foreign exchange reserves. What do you make of China's progression in terms of, you know, actually getting other central banks, other countries to adopt yuan as an actual reserve asset? Well, I think it's a great question. It's the key question. So the thought is that if China can convince, you know, current trade partners and emerging a market economies to utilize their digital one, you know, they can reduce the number of

transactions that occur in dollars. So check, that success, right? So through the digital currency, you know, they can harness the market share and the technological innovation of private financial firms. They can better access the information about the activities, consumers, again, control at every stage. But, you know, Nick, over time, this technology may facilitate the escalation of China in the global financial regime. So if other countries sign on to China's first mover innovation, we will see China exercise greater control over private transactions and wield punitive power over Chinese citizens and in tandem, you know, with the

social credit system. So it will not be the sole factor in determining the future of the U.S.-led global economy, but it highlights China's anticipatory focus on the future and really the actions that are already being taken to dismantle the current system. The dollar is not, you know, in threat right now. But as I mentioned, the United States can't afford to be complacent. So I think if the United States develops a digital dollar, China will take notice when the U.S. starts actually deploying it.

And they will be asking other countries to accept payments that way. But, you know, I really think that countries will look to China as a model. And China will work with their central banks and say, this is how you gain greater control. This is how you do it. And they will use the same tactics of the Belt and Road initiatives with the digital wand. So I always view the rollout of the digital wand as chapter two. in the Belt and Road initiative. So on the BRI, you know, there was some interesting coverage.

I want to say in Bloomberg recently that it had actually started a little bit in terms of the pace of deployment. And, you know, they've made some, you know, pretty bad investments. I want to say something like $30 billion in Venezuela, which is basically a write-off. What is their progress with the BRI? I mean, has that given China either economic gain or is it just a backdoor to achieve more political control or hard assets in some of these countries? How would you characterize the success of the BRI right now? Well, I think it's given them all the above.

It's given them control. Again, it's still being transacted in dollars. So I wouldn't call it a success in their eyes until it's being done in non-U.S. currency. So the United States, unfortunately, has been distracted for many years on multiple fronts. And China has used this opportunity through BRI to spread its economic and political tentacles in Latin America, in Africa, in places that the United States has been warning that's going to happen. But we've been admiring the problem. And while we've been admiring it, China has been using its debt and its influence

to make those on the ground relationships, but really control. And a great example is China's influence in Djibouti, right, and in Kenya. and in key parts of Latin America. And so the United States, in my opinion, Nick, needs to wield its power of the dollar through a positive BRI alternative. And use our trade, use our dollar, use the strength of our financial system as an alternative. Right now, there's not an alternative to BRI. And the deal that the Europeans struck with China before the inauguration and the deal that China has been setting with, you know, multiple countries and what Bricks is doing in that system, they're creating a separate financial order.

And the United States cannot afford to not be at that starting line. And we need to be more focused. So I would say the China's had success, but they haven't had the kind of success that they want because it's still being done in dollars. When it's when it's transacted in BRI in Digital One, then coupled with the JV with Swift, Nick, alarm bells, and we're too late. Yeah. So you've talked about the need to create a dollar alternative to the Digital One, perhaps. maps, a CBDC. But you also mentioned that the Chinese approach involves, you know, extreme levels of surveillance and control through the financial medium, where, of course, if you control

the transactions someone can make, you basically controlled their life. So clearly, a direct analog to the Chinese approach wouldn't work in the U.S. We just have a different view on individual liberty and, you know, individual rights and so on. What would you look for in a U.S. CBDC project? Well, I think privacy and civil liberty concerns are going to be critical. Anti-money laundering and terrorist financing protections, those are going to be key priorities. I think what Secretary Yellen, Chairman Powell, are going to be looking at, and I think Fed Governor Lail Brainerd are going to be key players in this effort,

they're going to be looking how this can be done as a central bank digital currency, so backed by the dollar. And the narrative and the message to the American people are going to be twofold. It's going to be when COVID hit and there needs to be stimulus checks, sent out to households. This is a quicker way of distributing it, even though part of way of our banking system is digital right now. This will be faster. It'll be a financial inclusion, positive aspect to it as well, so that people who are unbanked can be banked and can transfer money securely and safely and cheaper. So I think that,

that how the public reacts is going to be important, what that public dialogue around privacy and security is going to be important because we can't afford to not roll this out well. We need to be careful of that control, of the cyber risk, of that amount of data in the case. in the hands of the government. So there's gonna have to be very clear lines of that.

And ultimately, I think other countries, American allies, they're eager to see, you know, what technical features in privacy configurations the United States develops for its own because the best case, Nick, is that the digital Euro, the digital pound, the digital yen, they model their digital currency closely to the United States.

We have a digital Bretton Woods where there is a new discussion about this challenge, and we work collaboratively together. As the Global Reserve leader, the United States should take the lead, it should collaborate, and it should be a positive economic force, against China. So when you think about physical cash, I know physical cash isn't that popular anymore, but, you know,

it's actually a pretty amazing technology. It's private. You have transactional freedom. You know, you've strong anti-counterfeit ability built into it. And transactions are final, of course. So you've, you know, strong settlement assurance. If you were to transfer that into the digital realm, you know, as a pure cash product, you're not getting any AML or KYC embedded into that.

But it seems to me that you're envisioning something slightly different where there is some embedded ability to, you know, engage in counterterrorist financing. So how do you sort of square the two things? On the one hand, the creation of digital cash-like product and then the measure of surveillance or sanctions ability that you sort of require? Well, I think that's going to be the difficult conversation ahead. Those features, that public-private dialogue, balancing the civil liberties concerns, but also the security concerns, that's at the crux of what they're going to study.

And so I think ultimately they're going to create some sort of digital wallet, Nick, that will have those features built in. There's going to have to be an education period for the general public in a rollout similar to what has happened in China. So my sense is that they will start this in key cities, in key demographics. very similar to China. The only difference is that there needs to be clear lines that the United States is not using this to gain control, that companies and consumers are not using this data for marketing purposes. And so that's the challenge.

Yeah. And that's what's going to need to be worked out. There's going to need to be several pilots of how this would operate. I don't think the United States, is developing a digital dollar to defeat China in the digital war. I think they have to develop it just to enter the race. And as the reserve leader, it needs it just to stay economically relevant. Because if it doesn't, it's behind the eight ball.

And we already are behind the eight ball. So ultimately, those features will be built in, and I think you're going to have to see a very strong conversation between private and public entities. So there's something also I wanted to ask you about, which is this market sector, which is effectively privately issued digital cash instruments, so namely. stable coins. So if you think about what a stable coin is, it's effectively commercial bank dollars, not central bank dollars, that are wrapped in tokenized form, and then they circulate on a public blockchain, so they're relatively unencumbered. As of today, there's about 50 billion, that's billion with a B dollars worth of stable coins outstanding. So it's a really material sector, I would say. You know, they're doing over $10 billion of transactions.

a day. What do you make of these? I mean, is this a signal that there's a real desire for a digital bearer asset, which is dollar-denominated? And if so, you know, where do they fit in to this CBDC regime that you envision? Well, I think there's a popular theme to be decentralized, to to operate outside of formal channels. And I don't view that as positive. I view that as a dangerous threat to the financial order, but it's something that we can't ignore. I mean, Bitcoin causes, you know, Bitcoin in other coins,

they are a form of an illicit finance problem. And they also use a lot of energy. in a lot of time and they're not as efficient to use right now. But the number of coins that are popping up, it is popular because I think there is an approach that not everyone wants to go through formal government channels. Not everyone wants to go through a central bank. But I think really the future of this digital currency space is through central banks. And I really don't see them being successful unless central banks are engaged early and it's worked through those monetary provisions.

Michael, I would thank you for your time. I'd encourage everyone to read this paper, the future of the United States dollar weaponizing the U.S. financial system. Where else would you direct people in terms of following your work and staying up to date with your thinking on this? Thank you, Nick. I publish around once a month with the Harvard Kennedy School Belper Center. And so I'm coming out at a piece next week about the digital dollar in China.

So between Harvard and the Atlantic Council, there's plenty that I publish. And I want to thank you, Nick, and thank on the brink for having me today. It's really been a pleasure speaking.