Ottoman History Podcast - Afghanistan's Constitution and the Ottoman Empire

Episode Date: January 4, 2020

Episode 443 with Faiz Ahmed hosted by Shireen Hamza and Huma Gupta Download the podcast Feed | iTunes | GooglePlay | SoundCloud In this episode, Professor Faiz Ahmed recounts the fascinating history of Afghanistan’s first modern constitution, contextualizing it within a broader legal and political history. The constitution was developed by Afghan, Ottoman and Indian and other scholars, at the behest of the country’s monarch, between 1919-1925. After the first world war, Afghanistan was one of few sovereign Muslim countries. This was one factor which drew many scholars and activists to the court of Amanullah Khan — a “Young Afghan,” graduate of an Ottoman institution in Kabul, and a Muslim modernizer. We learn about the role of figures like Queen Soraya, her father Mahmud Tarzi, and myriad scholars and jurists in shaping the constitution. We discuss the nature of the constitution as a living document, which acknowledges its place within an Islamic legal heritage — as well as the fact that the constitution will evolve. Professor Ahmed also reads from one section of the constitution, which determines “Who is an Afghan?,” and shares his translation. We also learn how the history of the constitution is remembered in Afghanistan today. « Click for More »

There is no inherent or good reason really to associate Afghanistan with failure. If we just look at the early 20th century, we see the possibilities. Hello, and welcome to the Ottoman History Podcast. I'm Shirin Hamza. I'm also joined today by Huma Gupta, who will be joining me as a co-interviewer. Hello. And today we will be talking about the constitutional history of modern Afghanistan and how that's connected to Ottoman and Indian scholarly networks. I'm here today with Professor Faiz Ahmed, who specializes in Middle East history at Brown University. He recently published a book called Afghanistan Rising, Islamic Law and Statecraft Between the Ottoman and British Empires, published by Harvard University Press in 2017.

Welcome to the podcast, Professor Ahmed. Thank you. It's a pleasure to be here. in the early 20th century? Who was really in charge at this time? What are Ottomans and Indians doing in Kabul? And how did this constitution, which was formalized in 1923, really come into being? Sure, so we could start that narrative in terms of early 20th century Afghanistan in 1901, with the death of Amir Abdur-Rahman Khan, often known by his nickname, the Iron Amir.

In 1901, when he passed away, Afghanistan experienced its most peaceful transition of the 20th century. And with the ascension and coronation of his appointed son, Habibullah Khan, who ruled until 1919, after which, after his assassination in 1919, his son, Amanullah Khan, came to power, who was sort of the star of the book and on the cover of the book. He rules for about a decade until 1929. So I'll talk about that period and father and son, Habibullah Khan and Amanullah Khan. Under Amir Habibullah's reign, this was a period of what we could call gradual liberalization or opening of the country to the outside world would be the words that would be used in most books and articles

about 100 years ago in newspapers. Of course, the early chapters of my book show that Afghanistan was not a closed world, was not a forbidden kingdom, but was actually at the center of trade, mercantile, intellectual, pilgrim networks from a variety of directions. But that's a 19th century story. To answer your question on who's in control, this would be, again, Amir Habibullah between 1901 and 1919. What he is doing, what's distinctive about his rule is that one of the first things he does is he grants amnesty to a sizable number of political exiles

and refugees that had fled during the rather draconian, authoritarian, but state-building rule of the Iron Emir. And with this amnesty, you see the return of Afghan political exiles, many of whom are intellectuals, scholars, serving in the courts of other states and empires. Most famously, the case of Mahmoud Tarzi is a case in point, arguably Afghanistan's most famous intellectual of the 20th century. Born in Ghazni, Afghanistan, but raised in exile in Damascus, Baghdad, and Istanbul. And I'm citing him as just one example of one of the prominent Afghan exiles that returned to Kabul in the early 1900s after Amir Habibullah's amnesty.

Now, Mahmoud Tarzi is a fascinating figure by himself. We could spend a lot of time talking about him, but I'm mentioning him here for another reason, which is that he doesn't just come back by himself, nor with just his family, as important as that is. He brings essentially a trail of Ottoman experts with him, if not in his actual entourage, within the months and years to follow. And this is fairly easy to document and see based on Ottoman archives who are following

this development of Ottoman officials, in some cases, young Turk dissidents going to Kabul from Damascus, from other parts of the Ottoman domains. And when they arrived in Kabul, they were not just seeking work and a place to live in refuge due to their political activities in the late Hamidian Ottoman Empire. They were, perhaps for some of them, it was adventure. For some of them, they had relatives. And in that sense, Afghanistan is opening, not for the first time, but I would say expanding its contacts and networks and interaction with neighboring states and societies. This, of course, includes Iran and Central Asia, but my book focuses on India, but most of all, the Ottoman Empire, which I would argue is the least known or least discussed connection. Discussed connection after him. Amir Habib Allah is assassinated following his rather unpopular rule to not

decision to not support the Ottoman war effort among other authoritarian aspects of his rule that Among the dissidents to him were his own son. Aman Allah was his own son when he when Aman al-khan came to the power this was a godsend for young Turk activists in Kabul, for young Afghans, which was a group, as clearly in the name, reflects this strong political connection between constitutionalist, parliamentary, even pro-republic political activists in Kabul that were unhappy with Habibullah's reign.

And when Amman al-Khan comes to power, who was a young Afghan prince himself, political activists in Kabul that were unhappy with Habibullah's reign and when Amanullah Khan comes to power who was a young Afghan prince himself even though he's the son of the Mir he was very influenced by Ottoman teachers he attended the Maktaba Harbiye in Kabul which as the sound suggests as sound of the the name of the institution suggests, this was an Ottoman-designed military academy in Kabul, where Amanullah Khan trained as a young prince. And as he imbibed these ideas and discussions, he brought those constitutional activists to his actual chambers, to his palace, and actually employed some of them in drafting what became Afghanistan's first

constitution, arguably the most ambitious legislative campaign in the country's history up to that point in time. As you emphasize in the book, this is a very significant constitution for many reasons. At the time that it was established or promulgated, Afghanistan was one of the only sovereign Muslim countries. It was after the World War. And maybe you can tell us a little bit more about why this constitution was so interesting. So I only spoke to the two monarchs and some of the Ottoman connections. And you led me to an even more important point, arguably, which is the sovereign status of Afghanistan as of the summer, August 1919. After about a three to six month war with the British, what became known as the Third Anglo-Afghan War, in which the Afghans

were arguably, if not militarily, politically successful. They were able to drag out this war long enough that a war-wearied British empire actually recognized Afghanistan's sovereign independence, that is to say, on equal status with the British empire, Manal Khan as an equal sovereign monarch with the monarchy of Britain. Now, that takes actually a few years beyond just 1919 to officially achieve that status, but the beginning of that story is in this military political victory in 1919.

So Afghanistan, as you pointed out, is absolutely this island of sovereignty, if you will, among Muslim-majority states in the world. This is a time that in the post-Ottoman Middle East, Mediterranean, North Africa, indeed most of Africa and Asia in general, was under the rule of a sovereign, excuse me, of a colonial power, either as a colony like India or a protectorate like Egypt to a certain extent

or Afghanistan before World War I, or sort of under a sphere of influence, which I would put Iran, even though it technically has a sort of sovereign status, it is under de facto British and Russian sphere of influence and even occupation, continuing from World War I. So all of that is to say Afghanistan really stands out as a sovereign nation, and that attracts the attention of not just Afghans, of course, but many Muslim activists, constitutionalists, not only Muslim, I should say, but the book largely focuses on Muslim scholars and students

who are pushing forward new conversations about what it means to be an Islamic state, essentially, in the early 20th century. And it is a time where you start to see this language of constitutionalism and Islam, or even the idea of an Islamic state. What does that mean? So, in short, Afghanistan is absolutely an island of sovereignty, a term that's often used after World War I, after its independence. So one of the things that struck me in your explication and situating of the figures

who are coming to Kabul right after Habibullah Khan's reign is the role of Mahmoud Darzi as a central figure. I was curious, from my recollection, Mahmoud Darzi was the father-in-law of Aminullah Khan. And as one of these incredible reformers and also the publisher of Siraj al-Akhbar, I'm curious about the influence that Mahmoud Tarzi had on Aminullah Khan, along with his daughter, Queen Soraya, in shaping Aminullah Khan's kind of political and constitutional framing? Right. Thanks. It's a great question. And Mahmoud Tarzi's influence can't be overstated.

He really is this towering intellectual and wears multiple hats and carries multiple positions over the course of his career, from political exile and Ottoman bureaucrat, I should say. I mean, he didn't sit on his Ottoman pension while in Damascus and Baghdad, but he actually worked and learned Ottoman Turkish as well as French and so forth, in addition to his native Dari and Pashto. When he comes back to Afghanistan,

yes, he marries his daughter, or his daughter is married to Prince Amanullah. Princess Soraya becomes Queen Soraya, is essentially half Afghan Half Syrian Her parents were from Damascus There are some records that indicate that her father Was the local muezzin

Of the Umayyad Mosque So somewhat of a perhaps not Super elite, very respectable Notable figure in Damascus Well it's, I mean we could spend an hour On each of these figures, they're so important And fascinating, but just to give you Tease you with a few details in Damascus. Well, it's, I mean, we could spend an hour on each of these figures. They're so important and fascinating. But just to give you,

tease you with a few details, Mahmoud Tarzi is not only Amanullah Khan, Prince Amanullah's father-in-law. And you can see that's a sort of towering figure in any case, in anyone's son-in-law's life,

I suppose. But intellectually, they align on a lot of matters. Respect, admiration for the Ottoman constitutional experiments, I guess we should say. Ideas of Islamic modernism that are circulating between Iran, the Ottoman Empire, India, Egypt, and other places. The idea that Afghanistan needed and should be independent, absolutely independent, and is a Muslim country, is a Muslim majority state, but one that in his own words should be advanced and progressive and following the likes of countries like Japan, right, in order to be again to use their own words sort of a member of the

civilized club of nations. So there's very much an Islamic modernist in that sense. And Imanullah shared many of these goals with him. Now later, to fast forward, later when Imanullah Khan becomes king, he appoints him foreign minister. Essentially Afghanistan's first foreign minister, right? Because under the protectorate period, Afghanistan was prohibited from having foreign relations

on its own terms by the British. So he becomes Afghanistan's foreign minister. He is also advising in many other capacities. But they do have their differences. And this is important to acknowledge. Some records, some authors go so far to say they have a sort of fallout. And when Mahmoud Tarzian retires, and I'm in quotes, to southern France, many see that as not just relinquishing his job out of age or exhaustion, but a sort of difference of opinion on several issues. That's an issue that could be explored more. I don't go into it in detail,

several issues. That's an issue that could be explored more. I don't go into it in detail, but it's one of these sort of debates that Afghan historians love to have and should have more. Now, as to Mahmoud Tarzi's daughter, a remarkable woman and leader. She is sometimes called Afghanistan's only queen. Of course, she's not the only queen, but she is, to my knowledge, one of the only ones that her status as queen is really emphasized and respected, at least in the early part of Ammanullah's rule. In genealogies of Afghan monarchs, she will often be the only woman to suggest a queen alongside a king, even though, of course, there are scores of queens and wives of previous monarchs. Why is that? I think that says something about Imanullah Khan's thoughts on the role of Muslim women scholars in history and in his

present time is something that the opening first or the most well-known opening of women's schools, teaching teacher training colleges for both sexes. This is something that happened under Amanullah's rule. To give credit, we have to attribute much of that to Queen Soraya's tireless activism, some of which happened in public. But most of it, as you can imagine, probably happened in the quarters of the palace with very intense conversations with Aman al-Khan. So we have to give credit.

A lot of these remarkable laws and milestones of this period, things that most people think only emerged after the overthrow of the Taliban in the early 2000s, but is actually existing in Afghan history for almost a century, at least, women's schools and so forth, are very much attributed to Queen Soraya. She often toured the country and gave speeches about the role of education in Islam, talked about honorific women scholars such as Hazrat Aisha, of course,

one of the wives of the Prophet, and many other women scholars in Islamic history. So all of this is, I wish I could have more space in the book to talk about it, but I appreciate the question. This is all so interesting. Queen Suraya, in her lectures, it sounds like she was framing the state's decision to open women's schools in the context of a long history of Islamic education. This really reminds me of what you are arguing for in your book, which is that so much of the constitution is framed in Islamic law, is claiming a lineage

of being a Muslim document, a Muslim legal document. It's very interesting to know that Queen Suraya was part of that intellectual ferment. So maybe we can hear a little bit from the constitution itself. Sure. So first, let me stress that the Qanuni Asasi of Afghanistan, 1923, what I translate as the first constitution of Afghanistan, or literally basic code, is merely one of scores of nizam namaz or regulations issued by the government of Amanullah Khan mostly between the years of 1919 and 1925 but actually continued all the way to the end of his reign in 1929. Now the qanuni Asasi or the constitution is clearly the most important document, I would argue, in the sense that it frames the general principles of governance, answers questions, fundamental questions of any nation state, such as the sources of law. Who is an Afghan?

Which is a perennially problematic and controversial question until this day. This document clearly weighed in on the side of territorial nationalism which has opportunities and restrictions to it. We can talk about the ramifications. So to give you some examples for texture, Article 8 talks about all residents of Afghanistan, the Kingdom of afghanistan are considered to be citizens or subjects of the country in other words afghan citizenship is not limited to pashtuns it is regressive in that sense that it creates this by law

equal citizenship for all residents of the country, regardless of religion or ethnic background. Anyone who's familiar with the recent history of Afghanistan will be aware of how ethnicity and sectarianism, perhaps overstressed in the news, but are nevertheless realities. By looking at this law, it is sort of addressing it very clearly and in line with international norms at the time and today. That also creates, it's much simpler than it sounds, given that at this time, and certainly by today, there are arguably more Pashtuns residing outside of Afghanistan than within.

But in any case, this document opted to create equal citizenship, which is the plus for all Afghans within the Durand Line, within the borders established between international negotiations. But let me give you an even more core example. And this is probably my favorite article Which is article 72 If you'd like I can read For authenticity I suppose

Given that the actual legal document is not in English We'll read it in Dari Article 72 In the compilation of these laws, the conditions of the people and the necessities of the time as well as the rulings of Sharia must be carefully attended to. That's a so-so translation. and was a bit off the fly.

Essentially what this article is getting at and why it's a very important one in any constitution which is identifying the sources of law. Now on the one hand references to Sharia don't really tell us anything, whether it's Egypt or Iran or it's sort of an obvious point and of the angels and the details, maybe I should say, that what is meant by Sharia? That is the important question. What schools of law, what texts, what

are the government's positions on controversial issues of talafiq or eclectic use of various schools of law versus sticking to one school of law? This is the real rub that's not addressed in this. And so I recognize that. But this is at the same time, I would resist the temptation to see this as just window dressing. And the reason I say that is that when it says the compilation of the laws of the government of Afghanistan, of the laws of the government of Afghanistan of the laws of Afghanistan careful reference are made

not just to Sharia which is of course in the perspective of Islamic legal jurists encompassing everything but this article is also mentioning the conditions of the people and the necessities of the time this is

a very very flexible and empowering language, I would say, that perhaps even I would go so far to say that given we have originalists in our own country, in the United States here today, who argue at end that we need some holding the opinion that we need to abide by the original intent of the founders or the original application. In the U.S.? Yeah, in the United States. Yeah, given that there are some who hold that, even in the United States. This is a tremendously relatively progressive article that's saying that this constitution is evolving,

that it must consult what are admittedly generally called the necessities of the time and the conditions of the people. But I think there's a lot of room there for enriching the debates between the Afghan fukaha or between the Afghan jurists and bringing in social scientists, bringing in the physicians and the teachers and the farmers even to talk about that their expertise is also important in crafting the laws of the state. And you can expand this article in a lot of different ways that make it a living document, not a sort of fixed or ossified one. And the possibilities are really tremendous here. So those are just some examples for texture. There are about just over 70 articles in the constitution. So again, this constitution is only one of many scores of

texts that range from criminal procedure codes to the foundation of new ministries, to regulations on taxes, agriculture, and a variety of public issues that we might not call law or per se in the United States, but more like municipal ordinances and regulations. All of that constitutes what we call the Nizam Namar, the Nizam Namah Amaniyah, the regulations, laws of codes of Amanullah. So one of the things that I really appreciate about your reading of the qanuni asasi and these nizam na'me is how you try to read them or read these as instances of the architecture of Afghan state building within an Islamic legal tradition, which Shireen also mentioned, and you talk about it as a sort of creative adaptation using the Gaonker's concept. But one of the kind of questions that I have, and this comes from your own reading,

when you instruct your reader to not think of these as necessarily participatory, liberal, or even democratic measures, but you talk about how these particular legal reforms are trying to reconstitute society to a more legible mold for a centralizing state, and how historiographically that plays out. I also understand that in your text, you are resistant to the focus on the 1924 rebellion or the 1929 rebellion that eventually leads to the Aminullah's deposition, because Afghan history is so often told from the perspective of failures and regime changes, and not so much of these positive moments of construction. However, I think that in 1930, the year right after the deposition, there is an immediate sort of historicizing that is happening, looking back at this decade of legal reforms. And I wanted to just quickly bring in a quote from Sirdar Muhammad Yunus Khan, who is the Sharjah Daffir at the Afghan legation in London.

Sharjah Daffer at the Afghan legation in London. And in 1930, he writes, the year after Amanullah's deposition, I feel sure that hundred years hence, a monument will be erected at Kabul, the capital, to King Amanullah, to commemorate his patriotism and great reforms, for which my countrymen were, perhaps at the time of their introduction, not quite prepared. And Yunus Khan goes on to talk about these as, I think you and I would both disagree, as westernizing reforms. And he would also use the trope of pitting the enlightened metropolis against the ignorant periphery or the ignorant priestly classes who are resisting these types of reforms. But in many ways, in the rebellions, some of these legal reforms do come up as sites of contention, you know, because of the centralizing state that's using conscription or tazkiras, identity cards or heavy taxation, public education, a new national criminal law, Western dress codes, regulation of

child marriage and polygamy, end of parda. I mean, there's so many kind of sites of contention that play out. So it's very interesting to me that in 1930, that's the historicizing and this kind of devaluing of the reception of these reforms in the provinces. And I'm curious in your research how perhaps in the Ottoman or the British or the Indian or the Afghan archives, is there any sense of how these are being reformed before the rebellions start? any sense of how these are being reformed before the rebellions start? Both Shirin and Hama's questions here really flow into each other very nicely because they're about lineage and rupture, right? Or continuity and rupture, which are classic dialectical debates for historians and no less here, given that Amanullah Khan has been framed in so many different ways, right? that Amanullah Khan has been framed in so many different ways.

And one of the tragedies of Amanullah Khan, just to be out with it, is that he was actually neglected quite a bit for the 20th century. And so that very remarkable and in some ways very foresighted, farsighted quote from 1930 is perhaps exceptional. One, in that there's this such central attention being given to Imanullah, who during the subsequent Musahiban dynasty, which ruled till 1973 essentially, he was forgotten and purposefully. And there are many anecdotes from elders who are alive, who had textbooks, who remember, or if this is the right, remember him being forgotten,

or remember him not being mentioned at all, because he was, of course, still alive until 1960, and hence always a potential threat to return. I'm saying all that because his legacy was largely forgotten until the late 70s, and I think this is one of the tragedies is that Afghan communists and Soviet Union supported governments of Afghanistan themselves rather lionized him, took him, resuscitated him, resuscitated him, you know, in an attempt to sort of claim Afghan history for their own what they saw as progressive legislation, whether it was the role in the realm of women's rights or centralization and other matters. I call that a tragedy because as a result, his legacy became further impugned as one of, quote, you know, atheistic, communistic,

disbelieving, a various variety of other unpleasant adjectives that are completely ahistorical with regard to Amanullah Khan, perhaps less so today, given that there's a lot of work that has come out. Senzil Nawid's fantastic book on this era, Chief Among Them, that have sort of reframed or put Amanullah in his proper light as,

I think it's fair to say a Muslim modernist. And so the lineage that Shirin's question was referring to, that your question was referring to, that all these remarkable laws were drafted not as an imitation of Swiss or French or German or Belgian constitutions and codes and social norms, nor of Kamalist Turkey, later Kamalist Republican, secular Turkey, but within, or at least an attempt was made to produce these laws within the juridical Islamic legal tradition, Islamic scholarly tradition, and specifically the Hanafi school, which is a predominant madhab or school of law within Afghanistan. But to get to this quote, this remarkable quote of Sardar Yunus's

farsighted prediction, which is maybe right. Of course, there already was a monument, I believe, 1925, constructed that still exists. It's in a sort of go around, one of these Kabul go around streets. What do you go around? Roundabouts. Sorry, roundabouts. It's known, at least at its time, as the monument of knowledge and ignorance, you know, of element and jahiliyyat, right? Which is tremendously condescending and bears these civilizational tones. But in its context, right, in its historical context,

that monument is perhaps what Yunus was, Sardar Yunus was referring to, right? But that was already made. And I think it's fair to say that every Afghan administration since the overthrow of Taliban, President Karzai, President Ghani's administrations have looked admirably upon Amanullah's legacy. And the quote is foresighted in that regard, farsighted. But Homa's question raises some really difficult issues, right, with that. And I'm... Sorry about that. No, not at all. I mean, I have tried to acknowledge it to myself. We should not be too celebratory or triumphalist. And I hope I didn't give that impression. Sometimes I do in my general talks because I have,

I didn't give that impression. Sometimes I do in my general talks because I have, you know, there's such a thrust to overturn these narratives of failure that I, being so focused on that, that I sometimes, it may come off as I'm romanticizing or lionizing Amanullah Khan or his era, which is, you know, not the historically sound way to go either. As you rightly acknowledge, he's engaged in a state-building campaign. He wants to build a modern nation-state that is in classic Weberian mode, backed by a monopoly of violence. He never, of course, achieves that. Yet that has been the

goal that every Afghan government has sought, perhaps to its failure, since then, yet continues to be sort of lifted as the vision and goal of what Afghan government should be. So there is tremendous violence in that project. But Amanullah Khan at the same time is not, certainly not distinctive in that. That is what every other nation state does. From the United States to New Zealand to more relevantly late Ottoman Turkey, Kamalist Turkey and perhaps you know as another violent, extremely violent episode is right next door in Pahla v. Iran under Reza Shah. A tremendously violent and brutal period where tribal confederations are gridded in the sense that Tehran is trying to apply

a central grid across the country, set up tax garrisons and tax registry, population registry institutions, and many nomadic tribes bear the brunt of Reza Shah's violence. Now, did Amal al-Khaan want to do the same thing? Yes and no. I think he wanted the results without the violence. What's my evidence of that? Well, he went out of his way to hold these assemblies. Of course, Jamil Hanafi has an excellent series of articles

on the Loya Jirga and its sort of creation for precisely these violent purposes of rubber stamping the violence of the central state. The Loya Jirga are these very gatherings? Yeah, they're consultative. Yeah, I mean, they became like a household name and in fall 2001 with you know lawyer July as again there as well I think professor Jimmy Lanfee's point is very it makes a very good point there it applies to that context as well that to what extent are these national lawyer jurgas representative we

could debate that or are they essentially endorsing a project that is going to bring tremendous violence to many particularly outside of major cities that's a separate debate but let's bring it back to the monologue on era and say that I acknowledge that there is that. In fact, I spent a lot of the last chapter in conclusion talking about that tension. But at the same time, this is what makes Mano al-Khan so fascinating. Because he did not command a centralized national army or a monopoly of violence in the way that Mustafa Kemal Ataturk did, that Reza Shah did.

He did not enact, he was not enabled to enact that type of violence. Instead, he tried what I argue is a more persuasive model of state building, which is to go around giving speeches for these consultative assemblies, and of course, the actual assemblies that made, that drafted the legislation which we can talk about as a big part of the book You know, what's interesting is actually right after his deposition as I'm sure you're familiar Aminullah goes to Turkey

meets with Kemal Ataturk and they embrace and there's newspaper reports of their embrace and they're very affectionate towards each other and in that conversation it's reported that Ataturk tells Amanullah that one of his mistakes was not actually commanding total monopoly on violence and that these reforms, that's why they weren't able to be implemented in the way they could be implemented in Turkey. Going too fast is the critique that is often made.

And essentially, Kemal is saying that, said that as well, that it is true, but it can, that claim, they sort of quote going too fast. But oftentimes it follows, falls too easily into old Orientalist tropes about the conservative Pashtuns who are so, so protective of their women that he touched upon that dicey issue, and that's why. Whereas in your actual question, you actually contextualize it quite well, which is that yes, the woman's schooling and other reforms, marriage law reforms, age limit on marriage

and so forth, or age threshold, all of these were controversial, but why? In and by themselves, I'm not sure. Rather, I think they became sort of iconic battlegrounds for a larger struggle between Kabul and the provinces, which is the axis of political conflict, I would argue, and arguably even today, but certainly before the 1990s. Something that struck me a lot in reading this book was the importance of focusing on Muslim modernizers, as you say, Amanullah Khan could be considered, who had the ear of state power and who played a role in the creation of constitutions, the creation of statecraft in a Muslim majority context.

I think a lot of the people who come to mind when we think about Muslim reformists, Muslim modernizers, are these figures who were much more mobile and who were not always in close collaboration with governments and and officials so Jamal ad-Din al-Afghani who you mentioned was not actually Afghani yeah as well as Muhammad Abdo or Rashid Ridha so I'd love to hear a little bit more about the people who were connected by this broad scholarly network. As you mentioned, not all Muslim, but in this case, specifically, I'm asking about Fokaha, as well as like the Diobandis, all of these folks who are from not only the Ottoman Empire, but also South Asia, for whom Kabul became a site of convergence. Well, this is really one of the most exciting things about the project for me, doing the

research for it, is that while the central story, the epicenter, if you will, is of course Kabul, and you're right, the legislation that is at the core of the story is promulgated by a monarch based in Kabul. And it is Afghan national legislation for the nation state of Afghanistan. There's a paradox there or within this story because a good part of this legislation and the political tumult and political openings

that led to its production span really the world, but more specifically cities like not just like Kabul and Kandahar and Herat and so forth, but Istanbul, Aleppo, Damascus, Dioband, Delhi, Lahore. And that story, uncovering that story, following that story is one of the most exciting things for me about this account. I guess the way I, if you ask for an architecture, a general, a bird's eye view of those transnational, cross-border, inter-Islamic dimensions,

I would say it looks something like this. And I can follow the overall arc of the book as follows, that I begin with the first Ottoman mission to Kabul, which is surprisingly late, right? First official Ottoman delegation to Afghanistan comes in 1877 with the Russo-Ottoman War. And Ahmed Hulusi Effendi is an Ottoman A'lam, a jurist who serves on the Majalla Commission, a remarkable civil code that, like the Afghan Nizam Nama, was not a translation or imitation of Belgian, Swiss, French codes. An original project in Islamic codification, which is a controversial project

loaded with debates and criticisms, but it is one legitimate form of Islamic juridical legal discourse, legitimate meaning widely accepted even until this day by and taught, the Majal has taught in Sunni seminaries across the world one jurist on that commission Ahmed Lelousi Effendi serves as the first Ottoman ambassador I talk about the potential ramifications of that chapter one is the most speculative because we had the least documentation and evidence but the point of talking about this mission and this collision, if you will, an interaction between an Ottoman scholar

and Afghan scholars is precisely that, right? It's to highlight that Afghan jurists are meeting, interacting, not just writing, but actually physically meeting, welcoming, speaking, talking to, probably touring the city of Kabul together. But what we do know for sure is they met, as documented in Ottoman, British, and Afghan sources.

So that is where the narrative arc starts. And if that's the most speculative and we have the least information about in terms of the nature of those conversations, we know much more about the opposite end of the spectrum in terms of the historical arc of the book. So if we fast forward to 1923, more specifically 1919 to 1923, we have at the helm, the very director of the Afghan Codification of Laws Committee, a body of jurists that Amanullah Khan assembled shortly after coming to power

to promulgate the first constitution and scores of supplementary civil and criminal and commercial law codes. At the helm of that committee is an Ottoman Turk attorney named Osman Bedribe who flees the Ottoman domains after World War I. He was a jurist, obviously, but more specifically an attorney and a prosecutor. So he had a lot of

experience in not so much debating legal treatises or meticulous questions and debates within fiqh, rather far from it his experience was not one of an alim but of an administrator within the Ottoman Empire and with that with that we can surmise that he brought this

sort of cachet that Amanullah Khan found attractive that cachet being a combination of coming from the Ottoman Empire, Muslim by confession, and this is not about piety, but about identity and experience. This is not, he's not a colonial officer. He is not a member of a British or Russian government. Rather, he's a member of the Ottoman government, which has a long-standing relationship with Afghanistan. So between these two spectrums, right, from the first Ottoman commission,

excuse me, mission, delegation of Afghanistan in 1877, to the promulgation of the country's first constitution, of Afghanistan's first constitution in 1923, the committee of which is directed by an Ottoman Turk. Those are just some of the most prominent examples. And most of the chapters is about the in-between period, which includes other figures like Mahmoud Sami, who is this Ottoman Arab officer out of Baghdad, but has family relations, extended family with a prominent Sufi spiritual religious leader in Kabul and that has a center and student networks that tie Iraq, Ottoman Iraq, Ottoman Mesopotamia, Baghdad to Afghanistan.

And this officer, Mahmoud Sami, who it's unclear why exactly he leaves, though Michael Sullivan has an excellent article on modern Asian studies that goes in more depth on Mahmoud Sami, the Mahmoud Sami figure. He's quite a fascinating figure. on Mahmoud Sami, the Mahmoud Sami figure. He's quite a fascinating figure. When he arrives in Afghanistan, he builds, he helps construct Kabul's first Maktabi Harbiyeh. Those of you familiar with the term Maktabi Harbiyeh

or just Harbiyeh Academy or Military Academy, this should conjure up images of schools that are in existence throughout major cities of the Ottoman Empire and are expanded particularly during the Hamedian era as Ben Fortinah and Professor Somel's work on the Hamedian education, the Hamedian period display so nicely. What most people don't know is that there was a Harbiya in Kabul. And Amanullah Khan studied at this. He was a prince. They're essentially a teenager.

He had Turkish teachers. It's unclear to what how good his Ottoman Turkish got. That's just a side curiosity I have. But what we do know is that he trained in this academy, studied Ottoman drilling activities, anything that a young prince and student at one of these military academies would learn. More importantly, perhaps, for our story is the conversations that he is starting and having with Ottoman Turkish and Ottoman Arab teachers.

And given the fact that there was a fledgling young Afghan movement already taking place, that, as clear in the name, mirrors somewhat or parallels the young Turk, young Ottoman, young Turk, and young, essentially, constitutional, young Iranian, young constitutionalist activity in Iran at the same time, they're having debates, conversations about what would it mean to have a constitutional state within an Islamic framework? What would it mean to have a territorial nation state

with equal citizenship, regardless of religion or ethnicity and so forth? These are only some of the most prominent debates, but there are many others that were taking place at this time. And that gives us a sense of really what a fluid, exciting period it was. This is, as you say, a very dynamic setting for Amanullah to encounter these ulama as well as ulama who have, as you also explained, lived as administrators, worked as administrators, and as well as these political movements and people who are thinking deeply about them. I'm also really curious about those who brought specifically jurisprudential expertise to the formation of the constitution.

You really emphasize Hanafi madhab or the Hanafi school and its importance in this moment, in this region. And you also point out that that is shared between several other political movements, including many of those involved in the Khilafat movement. So I'd love to hear a little bit more about the ulama, the networks, and the political movements and how they're all coming together. It's important to acknowledge that a large body of these Nizam Namas are administrative in nature, dealing with what today we would consider issues of streetlights, municipal ordinances, and so forth.

In Afghanistan, because it's a sovereign Muslim monarchy, everything has the stamp and the aura of, quote-unquote, Islamic, right? Which is not a very helpful adjective, given that it is a vastly Muslim-majority state in which the sharia plays a fundamental role in the imagining of the law, the sources of law. So let's get into substantive matters. So family law, inheritance,

all the codes that address these matters are drawing the vast majority, predominantly, from the Hanafi school of law. More specifically, cited our texts within what we would call the Hanafi canon and with a predominant sort of influence of what we could call South Asian Hanafism. There being subtle differences between, say, the Hanafis in Syria and South Asia. The most textured example I give is chapter five, which looks at a particular code, which is essentially a criminal law code and a criminal procedure code combined,

that, as shown in the text itself, makes references to canonical texts of the Hanifah school that are well known to anybody, the sort of paradigmatic texts, particularly of the late Hanifah school, such as the works of Ibn Ar-Bidin, most famously. He was actually an Ottoman Syrian jurist, but had a profound influence eventually in South Asia as well, until this day, actually.

So there are several references. I count the exact number in the chapter, as well as texts going back to the 17th century, Fatawa al-Amgiri being the most well-known, and even earlier ones like the Hidayah, which is essentially a medieval Central Asian Hanafi text, very foundational. So by the Hanafism of the Nizam Nama, it's very clear in select documents like the criminal law and procedure

code that I described and is outlined. Now, I wish I could expand more and spend more time. One more thing I'll say to use this term that I'm the Hanifism of the Nizam Nama is that on the one hand, I frame it as a, I mean, you could say almost positive thing. It's framed in a positive light from the perspective of continuity, right? That's the stakes. Like what's the big deal about saying that Hanafism is the predominant source of law for the substantive law of select codes? Well, that means that it was not. That is evidence that it's not coming from

not only Belgium, it's only not coming from Belgium, France, Germany, etc., but also not Kamalist Turkey, which was a somewhat widespread assumption or thought or theory behind the NizamnNamah. It was just often thought and assumed that because the Manila had this close relationship with Ataturk, right, that of course

his laws also came from copying. Well, there's two problems there. There's a chronological error, right? The Nizam-Namah were produced, most of them, before even the independence, before the success of the Turkish War of Independence and establishment of the Secular Republic. And then certainly before the full nature of Kamal's dramatic remaking of Turkey came out to play, which didn't happen immediately. It happened really in the mid to late 20s, at the earliest. in the mid to late 20s at the earliest. But the second era is nobody, to my knowledge, took a real close look at the substantive laws other than Professor Sanzil Naweed, who I mentioned,

who I think has written the best book on this era and has given us, has looked in detail at the entirety of the Nizam-Namal codes. But the political context and the Ottoman links were things that I tried to sort of highlight and expand even more. Yeah, so that's what I'd say about. One more thing I would say that we haven't on an issue that we haven't addressed yet, which is the South Asian and specifically Diobandi connection. Now Dioband will come up as almost synonymous with Afghanistan in light of the Taliban movement

and the shared genealogies between the political movement and the intellectual school that is Dioband. And it's important to separate those given that Dioband is now some have already described it as the world's largest alumni network. From India to South Africa to Britain, of course, and Afghanistan. And it has so many branches and has been so successful in that regard in terms of reproducing and generating so many generations of students and scholars. That said, what is Dioban in the 1920s? Well, this is where Sanaa Haroon's excellent work on the Dioban movement, and she herself has in her book, Frontier of Faith, many connections to

Afghanistan. What I try and unravel and explore further is specifically connections to the Constitutional Commission, in which we see, for example, prominent Afghan ulama either training at Dioband, having loose connections, or in some cases,

and this is where we have to have a broad understanding of constitutionalism in Afghanistan, some of the dissidents against Amanullah Khan. So maybe some readers weren't expecting that. I argue that the dissidents also, not just in Afghanistan, but anywhere, need to be included in the conversation

of what ultimately makes a constitution and what promotes it as a living discourse within a country. We know that there were revolts in 1924 and 25 that actually produced a series of amendments after which the Diobandi role became much more pronounced. So the prominent jurist, Amanullah Khan's sort of chief justice, if you will, Qazi al-Qazad, was trained at Kabul's Mandir Sashahi, so was not a Diobandi alum in that sense. But clearly there were conversations and linkages. He was a prolific author and a Hanafi jurist and would share much with the Diobandi school in that sense, but he cannot be described as Diobandi in the ways that some of the later dissidents

against the original constitution were. Now, that's a whole conversation that would draw us closer towards the revolts and the rebellions, which are tremendously important. But Leon Pallotta, Vartan Gregorian, and others have written very important books about those rebellions, and I didn't want to sort of rehash that history.

I wanted to focus more on the constructionist period, the foundation that was built, the juridical foundation that was not overthrown in the rebellions, or, and I'll, I guess, end the question on this, or in the actual overthrow of Imam al-Akhan, is that the edifice he created, not just the constitution, but the various ministries of the government, the Afghan state as we know it,

owe in large part to the work of his committee. Of course, his father and specifically, especially his grandfather, Abdurrahman Khan, also play a huge role. But we're talking about Amanullah Khan and the constitution and various ministries and the architecture of the modern Afghan state was, I think it's fair to say,

designed and launched under his rule. And while he was overthrown, the subsequent dynasties inherited that, even if not much credit was given for it to him. So we began this conversation about deprovincializing Afghanistan within modern constitutional history from Kabul and setting up the stage. And I thought it would be a nice way to also conclude

by taking us back to the city of Kabul. As you did in your own conclusion, when you were discussing Darul Aman Palace, which was commissioned and built by Aminullah Khan. This palace, for those of our listeners who aren't familiar, while it was built to serve as a seat of parliament, it never fulfilled that purpose. However, it had a lot of amazing afterlives that in some ways inscribed the development of the modern state of Afghanistan within its own history. For instance, it served as the Ministry of Public Works, Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Justice and the Supreme Court,

the General Staff Building, Ministry of Defense. It's also operated as a medical school for Kabul University. However, in your conclusion, you instruct your readers to not be as taken by this monument, which stands so prominently within the landscape right outside of, I would say, the old city of Kabul. And yet you direct them to smaller monuments that are unknown, like the Shado Shamshera Mosque, which I think is also a way in which you've tried to tell the story of Afghanistan by bringing up these phenomenal figures from India and the Ottoman Empire. So I was wondering if you could say a final note about the city and these monuments and why you're redirecting spatially your readers to a different geography.

Donald Oman is such an iconic figure for Kabul in Afghanistan, there's no doubt. And perhaps for good reason, because of the tragedy that is reflected in this house of parliament that was built in such a time of optimism and hope and self-governance and all the tropes that people don't think about when it comes to afghanistan were there when it was originally built and its sort of skeletal figure also reflects the devastation the dash dashed hopes, the international abandonment, the international manipulation, and not just the failures of Afghans, so to say. But I am pushing readers and observers and people who care about Afghanistan a bit further to say that it doesn't have to be this way. That doesn't have to be the defining image because there's so much else

just within Kabul. And we're just, you know, it's important to not be too Kabul-centric in our work. There is no inherent or good reason really to associate Afghanistan with failure. If we just look at the early 20th century, we see the possibilities, historical possibilities that were there. And it's sort of a tempting end of the book provocation that can those possibilities be reimagined, continued, revived. that revival, if you will, or more optimistic outlook is to say, well, if we just keep looking at this iconic image of Dar al-Aman destroyed, it promotes this narrative of failure. Whereas just down the, you know, just 20 minutes away, 10 minutes by car away, right, are these other remarkable buildings that have survived. I mean, not everything was destroyed. A lot was destroyed. I don't need to talk about the devastation of the Soviet occupation

and subsequent civil war and all the violence and tragedy since. But if you take the Afghan National Archives and the Shah of Doshamshiri Jami, or this iconic mosque built during the Manila era that had these neo-broke, late Ottoman architecture, then we get a sense of these other layers of the city. And that's not to talk about the multiple layers, like Bahri Babur, for example.

This wonderful, beautiful garden where the founder of the Mughal dynasty is buried. about the multiple layers like Bahri Babur for example this wonderful beautiful garden where the founder of the Mughal dynasty is buried and by his own choice because he loved Kabul and wasn't so fond of India unfortunately he didn't get to know it well enough he didn't get to know it well enough clearly

so all of that is to say that there are these other layers of richness of possibilities of not of of Afghans isolation and self-destructiveness but of connection to the rest world and of and productive constructive generative ties with other parts of the world in the case of my book it is you know Islamic in India and Turkey or the Ottoman Empire of course these are not the only connections that

Afghans make right we shouldn't only connections that Afghans make, right? We shouldn't essentialize that Afghans are only talking to Muslims, or they're only talking to Ottomans and Turks and Indians. Of course not. But I agree that these are underexplored, or I focus on these underexplored connections and the legal and constitutional dimensions of those, which you can see in both of these buildings.

The National Archives, which some reports indicate was the house of the Maktaba-i Harbiyeh, where Amanullah Khan was schooled and was built the site of the academy built by Mahmoud Sami. And the Ottoman-style mosque that is iconic in Kabul today. And they both happen to be pivotal to the story. sorry, Mahmoud Sami, and the Ottoman-style mosque, right, that is iconic in Kabul today.

And they both happen to be pivotal to the story. So maybe the beginning of imagining a new future, to quote a dear mentor, is to imagine a new past for Afghanistan. for Afghanistan. Listeners who are interested in learning more can go to our website, www.ottomanhistorypodcast.com, where Professor Ahmed has kindly provided us with a bibliography and images from his book.