Ottoman History Podcast - Autonomy and Resistance in Ottoman Kurdistan

Episode Date: December 29, 2018

Episode 395 with Metin Atmaca hosted by Matthew Ghazarian Download the podcast Feed | iTunes | GooglePlay | SoundCloud Zones of autonomy and resistance make up the region historically called Kurdistan - areas that can include parts of Syria, Iraq, Iran, Turkey, and Armenia - depending on whom you ask. This region, whose territory spans the boundaries of nation-states created after the First World War, continues to host conflict between powerful states and their opponents. Who ruled these areas in the past, and how did they become the rebel lands they are today? In this episode, we speak with Metin Atmaca about the rise and fall of Kurdish emirs who ruled in the Ottoman-Iranian borderlands, from their rise in the 1500s to their fall in the 1850s. We also discuss the afterlife of the Kurdish dynastic families who, in exile, re-invented themselves as political leaders, bureaucrats, and rebels in the Ottoman and post-Ottoman world. « Click for More »

Hello and welcome to another episode of Ottoman History Podcast. I'm Matt Gazarian, recording here in Ankara with Professor Metin Atmanca. Welcome to the podcast. Thank you. Thank you for having me. So Metin is an assistant professor of late Ottoman history at Ankara Social Sciences University. He defended his dissertation, The Politics of Alliance and Rivalry on the Ottoman-Iranian Frontier, the Babans, 1500 to 1851 at the University of Freiburg in Germany, and he's currently working on a book manuscript based on that project. Today we'll be drawing on Professor Atmajah's work to discuss

the history of the Kurdish emirates, or autonomous princedoms, in the Ottoman-Iranian borderlands, areas that include modern-day eastern Turkey, northern Iraq, and western Iran. We'll be covering a period from the 16th to the 19th centuries, and we'll be looking at the rise and fall of these autonomous emirates and their impact on the region. So first, we'll talk a bit about these Kurdish dynasts who solidified their rule in the region and preserved their autonomy, and then we'll discuss the centralization and reform movements in the Ottoman Empire that led to the eventual dismantling of these Kurdish emirates. So listeners will probably have heard about Kurds as forming a minority of predominantly Muslim people

who speak various dialects of the Kurdish language in contemporary Iraq, Turkey, and Syria. But the meaning of Kurdish has changed depending on time and place. And I wanted to talk to you about the historical periods that you study, the ways that you've seen what it meant to be Kurdish changing over time. I mean, did it refer to groups united by language, groups united by faith, class? How do you see it changing in terms of time and place? How do you see it changing in terms of time and place? Yeah, I wrote an article about that. For the people in the center of the empire,

basically the meaning change depends on the political situation of the eastern frontier as well as the eastern provinces. For the 16th century sultans in Istanbul, Kurdistan was kind of like a barrier and frontier in front of the threat from Safavids. So Kurdistan is like the wall separating the Ottomans from the Iranian dynasty, the Safavids. Yeah, but in the 17th century it turns from like a concrete wall to a buffer zone. Whereas in 18th, 19th century, for the Ottomans, since Iranian dynasties were not really great threat for them, Kurdistan was an unruly lens for them. So when you look into both the official as well as the local sources, for them Kurdish meant something else. I mean, for the local people, when we look into the poetry of Malay Jiziri in 16th century

and Mahmoud Khan in 17th and 18th century, as well as the famous historian Sharafan Bitlisi's Sharafnama in late 16th century, as well as the famous historian, Sherefhan Bitlis' Sherefname in late 16th century. We see that at the beginning of Ottomans, when they arrive, for them, Kurdistan was more united and the Kurds were more united people than the 17th and 18th century, because the threat was more imminent from the Iran-Shia administration and the dynasties. So even for them, they would redefine themselves.

It depends on this change of politics between the Ottomans and Iranians. Right. The idea of Kurdishness is changing over time, whether it's from the Ottoman administration, which looks at it for sort of political purposes, or whether it's local dynasts there or others whose idea of unity is affected by, say, the presence of a threat on the other side of the imperial border or politics going on within the Ottoman Empire. Yeah, but in the 19th century, you don't see that anymore.

It wasn't the Kurds between the Shia Iran and Sunni Ottomans, but instead it was the Kurds versus non-Muslims as well as the Europeans. And even among themselves themselves they start to also be diversified too. I mean in terms of the language in early 19th century you see the rise of Sorani dialect of Kurdish. Sorani dialect as opposed to?

Kurmanji. Basically in the north of Kurdistan. I'm stating this geographically not politically. I mean in the north you have more. I'm stating this geographically, not politically. I mean, in the north, you have more Kurmanji people and west Kurmanji speakers, whereas in the south, Sorani, whereas in the east of Kurdistan, which is more remaining lands inside of the western Iran,

they speak more in Gorani or Kermanshahi or any other dialects more closer to Sorani. So that linguistic division wasn't around that but the emphasis start to rise in early 19th century when you see more and more literature produced in Sorani dialect. So the publishing brings about these discussions on the nature of language and its relation to Kurdishness. Yeah. So before we go farther into the 19th century, I wanted to talk a little bit about the rise of these different emirates,

some of them that you mentioned, Pothan, Baban, and another one, Soran, that you talk about in your work. You go into great detail about the ottoman rivalry with the iranian safavi dynasty during the 1500s several wars between these two empires are going on and these kurdish emirates are smack in the middle of it how did these emirates carve out these spaces where they could keep their local dynasties, they could avoid paying much tax or any tax to the center, they could avoid having their people conscripted to the army.

How did they do this? Well, short and crisp, by using the rivalry between these two empires, when the first time Selim I decided to just come and deal with Shah Ismail in 1514, just around that period, a very influential expert, I would say, a Middle Eastern expert, probably, I would call him Idris Ibn Al-Sisi. Okay, you mentioned him in your way. Yeah, expert probably, I would call him, Idris Bithlisi. Okay, you mentioned him in your way. Yeah. Meets the Sultan.

Earlier he already had some experience with the Shah and the dynasties before the Safavids and Memlukids. I mean, that's why I call him a Middle Eastern expert of his own period. He knew all the important dynasties. Yeah, dynasties

was the balances. So he was originally from Bitlis and a couple of PhD dissertations were written recently about him because of his prolific production.

So he was also a writer as well as a wheeler and dealer. Yeah. And he basically came up with a plan for Sultan Selim just to make sure that Shah Ismail wouldn't remain inside of these Kurdish Emirates. So he basically tells him that, okay, after the war, I can bring all these dynasties together, and

then have them to submit their allegiance to the Ottoman Empire. And he was very successful, actually, to accomplish this plan. He, in a year or so,

from right after the Chaldron War all the way to end of 1915, he brings all these dynasties together and then he has esteem these documents of the hereditary rights signed and given to these Kurdish emirates. Given by the sultan to these emirates, basically saying, you've got these rights as a hereditary dynasty. Yeah, your lands are yours and your family are welcome to stay as long as you are loyal to the sultan in the administration. To what extent were these sorts of autonomy arrangements unique to the Kurdish populated areas of the empire?

Could you compare and contrast the ways that the empire used this in Kurdistan and other parts of the empire? The Ottomans already had some experience in the Balkans dealing with the notables there when they would conquer. So, I mean, it wasn't something really special for the Kurds too. But then when they came to the area, they were not Christians like the notables that the Ottomans faced in the Balkans. They were Muslims. So, I mean, at the beginning, they were not sure if they would really have them listed under the central administration or just give them some, you know, exemptions from tax and military. that the Safavid threat was not going away

after even having a decisive victory against the Shah Ismail's military, they decided basically to just give some of these concessions in order to just keep them there as well as to assure their allegiance. And they compared themselves with the Safavids and tried to make sure that they would be more favorable to the Kurds in order to keep their allegiance to themselves.

That's why, I mean, the Ottomans didn't just give it away for the sake of they really like them, but instead they just really pragmatic in terms of giving such rights and also the Ottomans were not sure that they would stay because this was still a very fragile agreement and also the Safavids basically after Shah Ismail, Shah Tahmasp and Shah Abbas they basically decided to also be more lenient towards the Kurdish emirs in order to just have them under their influence. And their influence continued, I mean, through centuries. So when studying these Kurdish emirates, some other historians often look to the 19th century as the beginning of the time of reform when these emirates get slowly taken apart and their rights are taken away. In your work, you talk about how it's not just the

19th, but in fact also the dawn of the 18th century when you see the beginnings of such reforms taking shape in the empire. What changes do you see going on in these regions of the Ottoman East during this period, and why do you propose this shift in our periodization? Well, first and foremost, it's because of the change in Iran. I mean, you see the 18th century of Iran in turmoil and kept changing between the Safavids and later Afsharids and Zendis and finally the Kachars. The Kurds, each time they saw a change in politics around themselves, they would readjust their position some way or the other in the end they were doing politics too they would participate into these politics themselves that's one of the reason and so the weakening of the

weakening of Iran basically it's hard to play them off of each other if one of them is in shambles yeah but the weakening of Iran meant also wicking of Ottoman Empire in these regions too because Ottomans basically took away their attention from this part of the Empire towards more of places where there is the danger is more eminent especially towards the Russian the regions that you, neighbor with the Russian Empire. When the Kurdish emirs start to see more autonomous administrations inside of the Ottoman Empire, especially the empowerment

of notables in the 18th and 19th century also. For example, in Baghdad, the Georgian slaves, Mamluks, who were converted to Islam and came to the region and then became more and more powerful. They become governors of Iraq until the 1830s or something? Yeah, or Jalali family in Mosul. or something? Yeah, or Jalali family in Mosul. So such

families basically also made the Kurdish polity to reconsider their position and try to come up with a solution to remain more independent from them, not from

the Sultan or Khalif, but rather from them. From the provincial or Khalifa but rather from them definitely provincial government yeah because always I mean they would always look to the more imminent threat and not from Istanbul which was away from them I mean for someone who would travel from Kurdistan all the way to Istanbul, especially the southern part in Iraq, would take two months. So it was really far away. Whereas from Baghdad to Sulaymaniye, it would take just a couple of days to arrive. So the threat for them was more imminent.

Right, more imminent from provincial governors. was more imminent. Right, more imminent from provincial governors. So if I'm hearing you correctly, the political disorder in Iran with the quick changing of many dynasties in a short time, this is one reason. The other one is in the Ottoman Empire as well, there's military defeat from outside,

and also the third one you said was the these provincial governors becoming more powerful yeah the rise of these provincial families actually so a lot of this stuff's going on in the 18th century that's already setting the stage for the dismantling of Kurdish emirates in the 19th yeah okay I mean these Kurdish families were not really imminent, immediate threats for the center's power vis-à-vis the other notables, such as Muhammad Ali Pasha, or even the families that we just mentioned in Baghdad and Mosul. For Ottomans, it was more important to crush them first and then deal with the rest of the nobility further away from the centers of provinces. Okay.

So that's why you see the Ottomans coming into Kurdistan to just remove these notables after they dealt with the Mamluk family in Baghdad, Jalalis in Mosul or even some other families in Damascus and other places and they tried to deal with Muhammad Ali Pasha but they couldn't simply so they let it go but then they definitely decided to take care of these Kurdish notables just to assure that the centralization would be complete. And we will get to centralization and the dismantling of Kurdish Emirates after a short musical break. Welcome back to Ottoman History Podcast.

I'm Matt Gazarian here with Metin Atmanjah, speaking about Kurdish dynasts in the Ottoman-Iranian borderlands. Earlier we were talking about the rise of autonomous Kurdish dynasts in the Ottoman-Iranian borderlands. Earlier we were talking about the rise of autonomous Kurdish emirates on the Ottoman border with Iran during the 16th century into the 17th-18th centuries. Ottoman sultans starting in the 18th century, sultans like Selim III, like Mahmud II, and also their successors, made major changes to government, changes in the military, in conscription, taxation, land ownership, and all sorts of other administrative practices. And it was during this reform period, the Tanzimat, that the central administration

sets its sights on dismantling these autonomous Kurdish enclaves within their empire. Metin, could you talk a little bit about this process? Just how did the Ottomans go about taking apart these emirates that have been there for centuries? After Muhammad Ali's autonomy, Ottomans started writing about these notables, but then Selim III didn't have much power actually to deal with. So these problems basically were passed to the next sultan, Mahmud II, who basically decided to just go on and take care of most of these autonomous structures. For him, the Kurdish notables were not of immediate threat, or at least they were really away from the center to deal with. But then after 1820, when more problems arised between the

Ottomans and Iranians, I mean, the border was basically becoming a political issue between them. Until that time, they would basically handle between each other and no other parts would involve, I mean, Europeans. You mean the Ottomans and Iranians? Yeah. This is the Ottomans and the Qajars at this point? Yes, Qajars during this period. But then after that period, you see more and more of the Brits first and later Russians coming into the question of the borderlands and the borders. Starting from 1828, when the Russians basically had an agreement with the Iranians

and then later on, any of the conflict would arise, especially in the northern part of that borderlands, close to Erzurum, Kars. Russia would definitely be involved into any agreements or disagreements. these especially more conflicts came especially because of the Kurdish tribes who would move in between both lands Iran's and Ottomans as the summer pastures and winter camps for them who keep livestock they're going they go back and forth between summer high plateaus and winter quarters. That was one of the issues that rose in the region. And also the political structures, the Kurdish emirs also would once in a while have conflict with the other Kurdish emirs on the Iranian side.

the Iranian side and then a political power question in the family itself for example in Baban family or in Botan family in Akkari family would also rise questions of penetration by Iranians I mean they would crave actually for just getting into the conflict in the family in order just to influence the Kurdish emirs so so these dynasties from the outside but also kind of have intrigues within these Kurdish emirates seeing all these troubles as well as you know not be able still to penetrate into the region the Ottomans basically decided okay that's the time to just take care of them. Starting from 1830s with the Soran Emirates, centered in Rwandos in northern Iraq, and later the Bedirhani families in Jezre and Hakkari and Moks

and Soran, I mean Baban families. and Soran, I mean Baban families. All these would be basically beaten up with military powers coming from the provincial centers as well as from Anatolia. And they would be mostly taken away after they were defeated, taken away from there. And most of them would be exiled to the creed someplace far away yeah or balkans or other places and you see in some of their memoirs that later on these emirs come together in creed or in balkan some places not because they really wanted to come and they never probably met each other in Kurdistan but for the first time they saw each other there as an

exile but just coming back to some other conflicts before they were removed mean, the Ottomans not only realized that, okay, they had to deal with them, but also they wanted to use some pretext, basically, to take them away. One of the most useful excuses was that, okay, a Kurdish emir, if he made a massacre of the Nestorians, He made a massacre of the Nestorians, such as Bedir Khan's massacre. In 1840. Yes, 42, 43, in the valley of Zab in Haqqari. I mean, the Ottomans were aware of such things, but they would just remain blind to... Look the other way. Yeah, look the other way, and then to just stay and look and see what comes up

and um and then when the european uh raised the question of okay what was happening to these christian minorities then the ottomans would say okay that's the time now to go and deal with them i mean killing two birds with one stone i mean because for them in the time now to go and deal with them. I mean, killing two birds with one stone. Because for them in the east of Anatolia and the frontiers, it wasn't Iran threat anymore. It was now the Christian monotheists who were influenced more and more by the missionaries as well as the European powers later, and these Kurdish emirates.

So how to deal with both, to use, as I said, one way to take care of both. After they were basically exiled and remained for a while in exile, some of them would try to come back to their native lands, and some even succeeded to do it. And the Ottomans basically started to think how to keep them away from their native lands, and they came up with new positions and offices for them. They appointed them as governors, judges. for them. They appointed them as governors,

judges, even later on some of them would be ministers. So they're never sent to the chopping block? No. Probably that was the difference between Mahmud II and the sultans coming later on too

because during Mahmud II's period you still see killing of such notables so there would be execution but after his period you don't see that much and this was out of question

especially for the Kurdish emirs because once you remove them you don't want huge trouble rising in their native lands. Their people were still there. So then after the Emirates are removed, what happens in the region itself? Well, the Ottomans sent governors and qaymakams from Istanbul to this region.

But then many people considered them as aliens because first and foremost, they did not speak the same language. And secondly, they didn't have even the same religious creed. One was Hanafi, the other was Shafi. But beyond that, these people who were appointed from the center, they remain inside of the provincial centers as well as the towns. Beyond that, they never had much power in rural areas. And in the end, basically, people decided to fill this power vacuum by considering the rising Khalid sheikhs as their natural and political

leaders especially after Maulana Khalid al-Baghdadi came to the region 1811 this is a Sufi group this is a Sufi group that originates from Naqshbandi's of India but then the leader was a Kurd from Sulaimaniye, Mawlana Khalid. He goes to India and initiates into Naqshbandi through Abdullah al-Dahlavi and then a year later takes his ijazet and comes back to Ottoman lands and then starts to spread his own order all around. After he passed away in 1826, he left behind probably around 12,000 students. And many of those basically went around the Ottoman Empire. That's like in a decade, he has 12,000 students.

Yeah, I mean, if that is true from the sources that we read. went around the Ottoman Empire. That's like in a decade. He has 12,000 students. Yeah, I mean, if that is true from the sources that we read. And then most of these people basically go around the Ottoman Empire. Even the sultans start to accept them as the quote-unquote official order of the Sufi order of the empire. And it's these sheikhs of this order,

these are the ones who start filling the power vacuum after 1851. Yeah, some of them remain in Kurdistan, especially a family named Nehri in today's Shamdini in Hakkari, bordered with Iraq and Iran. This family becomes, after Sayyidah, becomes very powerful. And then people start to accept their religious power first and later on their political power too. you see these sheikhs even supported by the Ottomans and the Brits to influence the Kurdish tribes and

other people in the region just to make sure that the Russians would not attract them to their side. On the one hand naturally comes but on the other hand as you see that even the Ottomans empowered them just to make sure that they would now become, the Kurds would now become a buffer zone between the Russians and the Ottomans,

not anymore between the Iranians. So it's still a buffer zone politics, but it's moved to the north a bit. Yeah, and they realized that they still need some notables in the region. I mean, even after they removed all these families, they just couldn't make it through after a few years of chaos in the region. So basically, after these emirs and their families are exiled, one of the trends you see are the rise of quality shakes like sayid taha are there any other um either sufi groups tarikats or

other families that you see also kind of rising to fill this power vacuum yeah the same happens in south of kurdistan in sulaymanah and Senandaj on the Iranian side Qadri's were Qadriyya was more influential there and the Khalidi sheikhs focused more

on the north of and west of Kurdistan. Right. The areas that are now incorporated into the Republic of Turkey. Yeah. Right right I mean for example Taliban family related with today's Germany in Sulaimani were Qadiri's and they were very influential in the area and later on they even became politically really powerful during the British mandate in Iraq Okay so there's a trend that you're describing here

which is that after the dismantling of these autonomous Kurdish emirates starting around 1851 when the last one is taken apart the sheikhs of the Haldi and the Qadiri orders or brotherhoods many of them step in to fill this power vacuum the sheikhs of the Haldi and the Qadiri orders,

or brotherhoods, many of them step in to fill this power vacuum. So this period is also a period of great change in the 19th century, the Tanzimat, and particularly for political equality for non-Muslims. There are a lot of motioning towards the equal defense of property and life, I think are some of the phrases that they use for all subjects,

regardless of their religion. So with the rising of these religious figures in the power vacuum, how does this shape the history of the region after the fall of the dynasts? You know, at the same time that the central government is saying non-Muslims are going to get more rights, you have the rising of these two Sufi orders into more political power in the region. How do you see that playing out? Well, I mean, especially after 1856 reforms, the Tanzimat had a certain amount of the influence in the region, but not in terms of the conflict between the Muslims and non-Muslims. But after 1856, when the Muslims realized that they were not superior anymore officially, they were very much alienated. What does that sound like in the sources?

Yeah, they even blame some of the sources from locals. You see, they say that, okay, this reform period is the cause of all problems illnesses even illnesses yeah like when i was reading a story of a man from a memoir stating that okay one of my eyes gone blind because of an illness and this is caused by these reform periods he blames i mean everyone blames everything on the reforms they use tanzimat they say it's the problem of the tanzimat it's the tanzimat that caused my blindness he says everything's gone bad i mean that's the common expression for them during this period you discuss how the sons and daughters of these old emirs go on to be important figures in Ottoman administrative and intellectual life.

And you point out that however we want to judge these Tanzimat reforms as they were carried out in the regions, these Tanzimat reforms, or at least the sort of ideas of progress that they were trying to spread, did actually catch on quite well within these notable families. Could you talk about that a little bit? Yeah, I mean, once many of these families were exiled, some of them in Istanbul, some of them even voluntarily went to exile to Istanbul

just to find their way through bureaucracy, such as the famous Sheriff Pasha's father, Said Pasha, who arrived there with two other families from Sulaymaniye. And later on, Said Pasha became the Minister of Foreign Affairs during the Abdulhamid's period from 1880s till 1890s. And his son, Sheriff Pasha, he studied in France and became an attaché militaire and later on at the camp. And finally, he became an ambassador in Stockholm.

Stockholm. And the same was also for other families too, for Bedirhanis, for Shemdinli, Nehri families. For example, Sayyid Abdul Qadir, who is a very well-known figure in early 20th century, he becomes the head of the Senate during the Committee of Union and Progress. And many of those were actually somehow reintegrated into the Ottoman polity in late 19th and early 20th century. But CUP's administration changed almost everything for them. Once they excluded many of them from the power and alienated them from the center they start to reconsider their positions and even some of them start to think they were discriminated because of their Kurdish backgrounds they say that in their memoirs or wherever yeah in in early 20th century you don't see very precisely but then you see an emphasis on the cultural background they had they some of

them even remembered their exile in their families exiles in 19th century and when they come across this discrimination they remember that and then they start to say that okay this happened before to us that means that we are basically not welcomed into this ottoman world because the committee of union and progress the party that is the main mover and pusher to push the salt into the side and reintroduced the constitution in 1908 a very important number of them were they they bought into an idea of um turkishness being the feeling the identity the whatever you want to call it that would hold the empire together so is this why these these dynasties are feeling this this exclusion from the inner circles of the people in power during this period?

Yeah, after experiencing the long period of suppression and censorship during Abdulhamid, basically almost all ethnic and religious groups supported CUP politically, including the Kurdish notables and intellectuals too. But once the revolution was accomplished in 1908, a few months later they realized that it wasn't something they were looking for. It wasn't a real revolution. A real revolution meant becoming very inclusive, both in terms of their identity as well as in terms of their positions, political, dynastical positions too. I mean, they realized that Ottoman sultans were even more lenient towards their dynastical background than the CUP members themselves. So that changed the question for them. I mean, they basically

withdrew their support. Many of them even went to exile one more time after a few months of coming back to Istanbul. Do they also join the opposition, the Liberal Party that opposed the CUP in parliament? Yeah, for example, Sherif Pasha, he remained in Istanbul for a few months, and later on he moved to Paris and then established the Ottoman Radical Party. He also started to publish a periodical

called Mesrutiyet or Constitution. He gathered most of these oppositions to CUP around himself. In Paris? Yeah, in Paris. And C.U.P. tried to assassinate him once in a while.

The casual assassination attempt. Yeah, or banning this periodical to come into the lens of empire. So, I mean, that's Sherif Pasha, who was originally from Sulaymaniyah, whereas Bedr Khany family members, some of them went to Cairo, some of them went to Switzerland and Paris too, and started to establish their own periodicals as well, and started to raise the question of Kurds more and more. I mean, the Eastern question now for them was more about the Kurds,

not the Armenians or not the Ottomans themselves, became more specific for them. And World War I for them became even a turning point, you know, to believe in that they were totally excluded from the Ottoman polity. they were totally excluded from the Ottoman polity. So all these process basically accumulated into 1919's Paris Peace Conference in the body of the Kurdish delegates led by Sheriff Pasha and he asked for a Kurdish state in terms of you know having a balance between a new state in Anatolia as well as an Armenian state

and some Arab states that would be established around it. He basically said, OK, if there is no way for us to remain with the Ottomans, the best is for the Kurds to come up with, to carve out a new state there. so it didn't come to his mind right away as i said i mean there is a long background of all this that we talked about right he was he grew up in at least for part of his life in that region before his family was exiled his family had been famously powerful there and And then now he was, as a result of the political situation,

forced to offer this solution that would actually have him probably going back there. But that was not what happened, as we all know. I think the First World War, we can wait for another podcast to get to. Metin, I want to thank you very much for joining us on the podcast today. Well, thank you for having me, Matthew. So we've discussed quite a bit the rise and fall of Kurdish emirates from the 16th century, rising out of the imperial rivalry with the Ottomans and the Safavids up until the 19th century, some different imperial rivalries between the Ottomans, the Romanoids up until the 19th century, some different imperial rivalries

between the Ottomans, the Romanovs, the Qajars. And we've also talked a bit more about the ways that these autonomous emirates in that region that rose out of those imperial rivalries were eventually dismantled and the sort of political afterlife of those dynasties in the capital and elsewhere, as well as the ramifications for the regions where they used to rule as new officials come in and try to set up their rule. For those of you who'd like to find out more, we will post a bibliography of further reading on our website, ottomanhistorypodcast.com.

You can also join us on Facebook, where you can stay up to date with our newest episodes and join our community of over 30,000 listeners. Thanks for listening, and until next time, take care.